Antisocial Behaviour and Illegal Bikes

Matt Vickers Excerpts

Wednesday 5th March 2025 Westminster Hall

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

I would like to thank you, Dr Murrison, for chairing today’s debate. I would also like to congratulate the hon. Member for Tipton and Wednesbury (Antonia Bance) on securing this important debate. I think the last time this debate was had might actually have been the time that I brought it as a Back Bencher. We were having the same debates then, but it is clear from the contributions that the challenges posed by the misuse of off-road bikes are having an increasing impact in areas right across the country.

In my own constituency of Stockton West, the nature of incidents and crimes involving the misuse of bikes varies, but in all instances they have huge consequences. I have heard stories of people looking to enjoy some of Stockton’s beautiful green spaces and parks, only to be intimidated and threatened by teenagers on off-road bikes, riding incredibly close at incredibly high speeds. I have heard from pensioners kept awake all night by the racket of balaclava-clad yobs flying around residential areas, creating fear and havoc with no regard for others.

[Shaun Davies (Telford) (Lab)]

In the last year that the Conservatives were in power, off-roads bike incidents went up by 60% in my Telford constituency. The pathetic spectacle of police officers having to issue warnings to these yobs was at the heart of it. Does the hon. Gentleman want to apologise now for not reforming the police system to remove that?

[Matt Vickers]

That will teach me to take an intervention. I think, actually, one of the big problems is that off-road bike incidents are not recorded in a way that allows us to properly measure what is going on, where they are and what the response is. I think the best thing that was done at the back end of the last Administration was putting more police on the streets than ever before. That was a good thing.

[Leigh Ingham (Stafford) (Lab)]

Will the hon. Member give way?

[Matt Vickers]

I will carry on; I want to make some progress.

Cycle lanes and footpaths running through residential areas of Stockton West have become a crime speedway, used by those dealing drugs and committing thefts and other such crimes to move quickly under cover. Efforts to tackle the issue have seen motorbike inhibitors put in place, police use of drones and community-derived intelligence to locate and confiscate bikes.

The examples that I referred to, both in and around the constituency, reflect a broader national problem. As I understand it, the police have the power, under section 59 of the Police Reform Act 2002, to seize vehicles, including off-road bikes that are used antisocially. That applies when a vehicle is used in a careless and inconsiderate manner, or in a way that causes alarm, distress or annoyance. A vehicle can also be seized under different provisions if it is being driven without insurance.

There are additional powers in other pieces of legislation. For example, anyone who rides a quad bike on a footpath, bridleway or restricted bridleway is guilty of an offence under the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000. In addition, provisions in the Road Traffic Act 1988 make it illegal to drive a mechanically propelled vehicle on land where permission has not been granted.

I welcome the changes coming forward in the Crime and Policing Bill, in an effort to make it easier for the police to remove vehicles without warnings. That appears to be a sensible measure. However it will be important to assess the impact of the legislation once implemented. Does the Minister intend to collect data on these offences to assess the policy’s effectiveness? Will she also give further consideration to some of the changes proposed by the hon. Members for Hartlepool (Mr Brash) and for North Durham (Luke Akehurst)?

We already have a range of laws prohibiting much of this activity, which is why allowing the quicker confiscation of these bikes is a logical step. However, much depends on how the police allocate their resources to tackle the issue. As the Minister will be aware, there is a wide array of methods used to police off-road bikes. Ironically these have included providing police with their own off-road vehicles, using similar bikes to the ones they work tirelessly to confiscate. Forces such as Greater Manchester have also attempted to use data and hotspot policing effectively, so as to be in the right place at the right time. Meanwhile, intelligence-led pre-emptive raids have also been conducted by police forces across the country.

I will not take up the House’s time by running through the results of each of those approaches, but they highlight the ability of local police forces to develop strategies best suited to their areas. However, as we routinely discuss, police funding plays a significant role in their effectiveness. As we know, at the time of the last election, there were more police on the streets than ever before. Police services now face a shortfall of almost £118 million, which will put a strain on officer numbers and undermines the ability of police to confiscate more of these vehicles.

Does the Minister believe police forces will have the resources and flexibility to direct investment into this issue? As we know, in many cases police forces confiscate bikes only to sell them back on to the market as a source of revenue. What are the Government doing to prevent those bikes from falling back into the hands of those who would once again use them illegally or antisocially?

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Fourth sitting)

Matt Vickers Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 4th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Would everyone please ensure that all electronic devices are turned off or switched to silent? We now continue line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The grouping and selection list for today’s sitting is available in the room, as well as on the parliamentary website. I remind Members about the rules on declarations of interests, as set out in the code of conduct.

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship on your first outing, Mr Stuart. Clause 5(3) requires those who are co-operating with the commander in the exercise of their functions to put in place arrangements governing co-operation between the commander and that person. Does the Minister have a view about what those agreements will look like and what sort of obligations will fall on both parties?

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Dame Angela Eagle)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stuart. It will be the first occasion of many, I am sure. I hope you enjoy chairing Bill Committees as much as I enjoyed doing so in the previous Parliament.

Clause 5 places a duty on partner authorities to co-operate with the commander in the carrying out of their functions. The commander is tasked with maximising the effectiveness of our collective response to border security threats. That requires a whole-of-Government response, which will be enabled by this clause. It is recognised that partner authorities have wide-ranging functions that extend well beyond tackling border security threats. The duty set out in the clause extends only so far as it is appropriate and compatible with partner authorities’ other functions. That ensures that partner authorities across the system work in lockstep to enhance border security while continuing to enable the vital work undertaken by partners in other contexts, beyond border security matters.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 6

The Board

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clause 6 places a duty on the Border Security Commander to establish and maintain a board to assist with the exercise of their functions. That unique forum enables senior representatives from across the border security system to convene to shape our collective response to organised immigration crime and other border security threats. The commander will consult the board when developing strategic priorities for border security, which makes the board a crucial forum in shaping the whole-of-Government response to these threats.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 6 states:

“The Commander must establish and maintain a board to assist the Commander in the exercise of the Commander’s functions.”

It is all quite open-ended: the chair will be the commander, and the board will be made up of one or more representatives from each relevant partner authority. Will the Minister explain on what basis the commander might decide to have representatives from partner authorities? Why do all partner authorities not need to be represented?

Subsection (6) states:

“The Commander must hold meetings of the Board at such intervals as the Commander thinks appropriate.”

Does the Minister have any views about how regular the meetings should be? What sort of matters does she envisage the board will deal with?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The Bill is a framework within which the Border Security Commander operates, but it is not prescriptive because the people who drafted the Bill could not see what the priorities will be in the future. It is a framework that enables the Border Security Commander to respond to what is going on at the time, without limiting him.

There has been a common theme throughout the speeches from the Opposition. They seem to feel that somehow the commander does not have sufficient empowerment to command the border security system, that he is not independent enough, and that he somehow cannot get things done, but the functions outlined in these clauses are not the sole capabilities of the commander’s role as empowered by the Home Secretary and the Prime Minister.

The Border Security Command is not an operational entity, but a strategic leader for border security. Representatives on the board would be Departments such as the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, the Department for Transport, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and the Cabinet Office, as well as operational partners such as the National Crime Agency, the UK intelligence community and security services, Border Force, Immigration Enforcement and policing. Those kinds of people will be convened for a strategic purpose. It makes sense, if we think about it, that the commander can bring these people together as and when he or she sees a need for them to meet, depending on what is on the agenda and what is going on.

The commander is already using the role and its associated capabilities to deploy key functions to lead on border security across Government, including deploying additional resources across partners, such as the additional £150 million for border security that has been announced by the Government, and developing border security legislation to be used by operational partners, such as the powers in this Bill. In last week’s evidence sessions, we heard from operational partners such as the police, the NCA and the Crown Prosecution Service on how useful they felt the powers in the Bill would be in their everyday operational capacity. The operational commander can also lead on international engagement diplomatically, and has accompanied both the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary on journeys to Italy, Germany and Iraq to ensure that we have meetings at the highest levels with people in other jurisdictions, to try to get more co-operation going to deal with the cross-border issues of border security.

The Bill provides a new significant wide-ranging power to lead the border security system strategically, which is being done for the first time. All partner authorities, defined as those public bodies with functions in relation to border security, must, as a legal duty, have regard to the strategic direction set by the commander. However, this works best if there is not a battle between different bits of the Government—if there is co-operation and co-ordination—and that is what these structures are designed to try to achieve. The Bill will, for the first time, provide a clear and long-term vision for border security, bringing together and providing leadership to all parts of the system that work to maintain the integrity of our border and immigration systems both domestically and internationally.

I hope that that has provided a little more explanation for the Opposition on the thinking and approach behind some of the powers set out in the clauses we are considering, and most specifically in clause 6.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 7

Delegation by the Commander

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clause 7 ensures that the functions of the Border Security Commander can be delegated to an authorised civil servant when required. Flexibility in the exercise of these functions will support the most efficient and effective delivery of the Government’s actions to tackle border security threats.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 7 makes provision about the delegation of the commander’s functions. Subsection (1) provides that

“The functions conferred on the Commander by this Chapter may be exercised by any civil servant authorised by the Commander for that purpose.”

This is further evidence, were any needed, that the post of commander might not be a serious one. We have already seen that the Bill does not specify any minimum qualifications or experience for the commander, and we have seen why: they are not really in charge of anything.

There are serious questions to answer on the delegation of functions. What sort of functions does the Minister envisage the commander potentially delegating under this clause? Can any specific functions be named? The Bill does not specify any level of seniority for those the commander might delegate functions to. Is there any grade within the Home Office that the Minister thinks it would not be appropriate for the commander to delegate to? What oversight will there be of any delegation process?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I set out in some detail in my reply on the previous clause some of the things that the commander is involved with, including some of the meetings he is involved in convening and the purpose of those strategic meetings. During the evidence we heard last week from operational partners, both the NCA and the police chiefs set out some of the benefits they felt there would be.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 8 allows for an interim Border Security Commander to be designated. I would be grateful if the Minister could confirm that this is essentially a stopgap either because a Border Security Commander is going to step down without a replacement yet secured, or for reasons of temporary incapacity to carry out their functions.

Subsection (2) specifies that the interim Border Security Commander can be designated

for such period as the Secretary of State thinks appropriate.”

I would like the Minister to explain whether there is a limit to what could be regarded as appropriate. This is, on the face of it, a temporary measure, so what counts as temporary for these purposes? What are the safeguards against an interim appointment carrying on indefinitely?

Subsection (3) says that the temporary designation can last no

“longer than the period for which no Commander is designated or (as the case may be) the Commander is incapacitated or unavailable”,

but no time limit is set out in the Bill. Are there any minimum qualifications the Minister would expect an interim commander to have?

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clause 10 states that the duties in this chapter of the Bill do not apply to the armed forces, clause 11 makes amendments to the Data Protection Act 2018, and clause 12 provides definitions of the terms used. The work of the armed forces and the Ministry of Defence makes a significant contribution to the security of the United Kingdom. The Border Security Commander will work across Government, including with the Ministry of Defence, to enhance our border security. Clause 10 recognises the unique work of the armed forces. While the Border Security Commander will work closely with the armed forces, including through the military aid to the civil authorities process, it is correct that the important duty of our armed forces remains independent from the functions outlined in this chapter. That is achieved by clause 10.

Clause 11 amends the Data Protection Act 2018 to ensure that the Border Security Commander may process data for law enforcement purposes. That information is vital to build a shared understanding of the nature of border security threats and inform the priority setting process. Clause 12 provides definitions for the terms used in chapter 1 of the Bill for the reader’s understanding and to ensure clarity on definitions during the implementation and operation of the legislation.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 10 makes it clear that this chapter does not apply to the naval, military or air forces of the Crown. Clause 11 is an amendment to the Data Protection Act 2018 to allow the Border Security Commander to be added to the list of competent authorities in relation to the processing of personal data carried out for a law enforcement purpose. Given how toothless the Border Security Commander appears to be, will the Minister explain why this measure needs to be added to schedule 7 of the Data Protection Act, as well as what law enforcement purposes the commander will have and for what purpose they will be processing personal data?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The hon. Member asked why the Border Security Commander should be processing data collected from electronic devices. He will know that later in the Bill, there are some new powers that involve collecting, in an intelligence-led way, data from suspected organised immigration criminals. The point is to ensure that data is collected in a lawful manner, and that is why clause 11 allows the Border Security Commander to process data for law enforcement purposes. Some of that is about the counter terrorism-style powers, which we will discuss in relation to later clauses—I do not want to have that debate here—but it is really an enabling power to put beyond doubt the legality of the collection of such material.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 10 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 11 and 12 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 13

Supplying articles for use in immigration crime

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Third sitting)

Matt Vickers Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 4th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Will everyone please ensure that they have switched off any electronic devices or turned them to silent mode?

We now begin line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The selection grouping for today’s sitting is available in the room or on the parliamentary website. It shows how the clauses, schedules and selected amendments have been grouped together for debate. The purpose of the grouping is to limit, in so far as possible, the repetition of the same points in debate. The amendments appear on the amendment paper in the order in which they relate to the Bill.

A Member who has put their name to the lead amendment in a group is called first. In the case of a stand part debate, the Minister will be called to speak first. Other Members are then free to indicate that they wish to speak in the debate by bobbing. At the end of the debate on a group of amendments, new clauses or schedules, I shall call the Member who moved the lead amendment or new clause to speak again. Before they sit down, they will need to indicate whether they wish to withdraw the amendment or the new clause or seek a decision. If any Member wishes to press to a vote any other amendment in a group, including grouped clauses and new schedules, they need to let me know.

I hope that that brief explanation is helpful. I remind Members about the rules on declaring interests, as set out in the code of conduct.

Clause 1

The Border Security Commander

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

I beg to move amendment 10, in clause 1, page 1, line 6, leave out

“designate a civil servant as the”

and insert “appoint a”.

This amendment would remove the requirement for the Border Security Commander to be a civil servant.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 1 and 2 stand part.

[Matt Vickers]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Murrison. The subject of this Bill is incredibly important to this country and its future. I hope that, during the next two weeks, the Committee will give us a constructive opportunity for the consideration and strengthening of the Bill.

Let me briefly outline our first amendment. Clause 1 creates the Border Security Commander as a statutory office holder, and requires that the Secretary of State must designate a civil servant as the Border Security Commander. As Tony Smith, former director general of the UK Border Force, said in evidence to the Committee:

“I am not sure he will actually be able to command anything. He is probably going to be more of a co-ordinator.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 40, Q43.]

That is why we tabled amendment 10, which would remove the requirement for the Border Security Commander to be a civil servant.

The status of the Border Security Commander—as well as the commander’s functions and priorities, which I will come to in discussions on later amendments—is crucial if the role is to be in any way meaningful. As the Minister is aware, there are organisations that do not require civil servants to run them. Such a structure ensures their independence and reduces the internal day-to-day political struggles that can easily be imposed on them. Allowing recruitment from outside the civil service may also provide a wider talent pool and prevent the role from being relegated to that of yet another senior civil servant in the Department. We heard evidence about the wide array of roles in the Home Office already. The amendment would highlight the clear distinction between existing positions and the importance of securing our borders.

I would be grateful for the Minister’s answers to the following questions. Why have the Government decided that the Border Security Commander must be a civil servant? What is the operational benefit of that decision? Why would the Border Security Commander not benefit from greater independence? What level of seniority will the Border Security Commander have? In evidence to the Committee, Tony Smith assumed that the post would likely be a director general. Is he correct? If so, why have the Government made that decision? Fundamentally, if Mr Smith is correct and the Border Security Commander cannot actually command anything—we will discuss that in detail when we come to later amendments—what is the point of the position?

Clause 2 sets out that the Border Security Commander must

“hold and vacate office in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Commander’s designation,”

and that the

“terms and conditions of a designation as Commander are to be determined by the Secretary of State.”

That is all the information we get. Will the Minister explain what the terms and conditions of a designation as commander will be? Let us compare the situation of the Border Security Commander, who is allegedly responsible for the security of our border, with that of the Metropolitan Police Commissioner. The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 sets out that the commissioner has to be suitably qualified; will the Minister explain why no such requirement appears to exist in the legislation for the Border Security Commander? What would count as suitable qualifications for someone to take up the post of commander?

If the Secretary of State determines that a person’s designation as commander should be terminated, the Secretary of State must give the commander a written explanation of the reasons, give them an opportunity to make written representations and consider those before making a final decision. That seems sensible and in line with other positions, such as the Met Commissioner, that ought to be vaguely comparable in terms of responsibility.

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Dame Angela Eagle)]

It is a pleasure to serve with you chairing our proceedings, Dr Murrison, and I look forward to many hours of that—as I am sure you do.

I will set out what clauses 1 and 2 do and hopefully persuade the Committee that amendment 10 is not required. The clauses set out the role of the Border Security Commander and detail the terms and conditions under which they hold the office. The purpose of the Opposition’s amendment 10 is to remove the requirement that the Border Security Commander be a civil servant. The hon. Member for Stockton West—I will learn all Members’ constituencies by the time we get to the end—seemed to say that he thought there was operational benefit in complete independence. I suppose that is one way of looking at it, but there is also benefit in co-ordination and in being attached to a central strategic point. The Government believe that that attachment, rather than total independence for the sake of it, is more likely to be effective.

Amendment 10 implies that the Border Security Commander should not be a civil servant. The role of the commander is a civil service role and the Border Security Command is a directorate within the Home Office. In a future recruitment exercise, existing civil servants could be appointed or the role could be advertised externally. Under the arrangements in clause 1 there is no limit one way or the other on where the Border Security Commander might come from—they could be internal or external. I hope that is some reassurance.

The mechanism of appointment is a civil service recruitment campaign to ensure that the best candidate is selected on merit. Given that the role sits within the Home Office and leads the functions of a directorate in the Department, it is logical that the role would be a civil service role. The idea is to cohere, not to fragment the work that is done. I see it very much as ensuring that all the cogs across Government connect with one another, so that when we turn the wheel we get something out at the end, rather than having a load of cogs that do not connect, which would not lead to a more effective outcome.

Clause 1 sets out that the Secretary of State must designate a civil servant as the commander and will make the necessary arrangements to ensure that resources are available to support them in exercising their functions. The Bill will place the Border Security Commander on a statutory footing, which will future-proof and solidify the role and ensure a clear direction and leadership for the UK’s border security system. Placing the Border Security Commander under this new legal framework is a clear signal of our determination to tackle organised immigration crime by going after the criminals who put lives at risk and undermine our border security.

Clause 2 details the commander’s terms and conditions and how they will hold, maintain and vacate the office. This clarity is necessary to ensure continuity in the role, and it underlines the Government’s commitment to making the Border Security Commander an enduring office.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Hayes (Bournemouth East) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to speak under your chairpersonship, Dr Murrison. I want to take on a principled point that I have heard levelled by the hon. Member for Stockton West and other Conservative Members today and on Second Reading, which is that the Border Security Commander cannot command. It is really important to address that point.

From 2018 to 2023, we saw the number of small boat arrivals increase from 299 to 29,500. That is a hundredfold increase. As I understand it, some of the explanation given by the Conservatives is that the matter became very complicated, and we were seeing an increase in organised crime activity. To their credit, that was reinforced by the director general of the National Crime Agency, Rob Jones, who said

“The problem that I focus on is the organised crime element, which needs concurrent effort in a number of areas, designed to undermine the business model that supports organised immigration crime. That means tackling illicit finance; the materials that are used in smuggling attempts and the supply chain that supports them; the high-value targets based overseas who are involved in supplying materials and moving migrants”.––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 29, Q28.]

Those were just some of the things he highlighted.

If we acknowledge that the present Government face a more complicated situation, we should agree that it will involve a suite of tools. As Rob Jones said,

“There is not one thing that you can do to tackle these problems”. ––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 29, Q28.]

Sarah Dineley, the deputy chief Crown prosecutor, concurred with her colleagues and said:

“I do not believe that there is one single measure that would impact so significantly that it would reduce migrant crossings to zero.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 30, Q28.]

Jim Pearce, the National Police Chiefs’ Council lead for organised immigration crime, highlighted the same point.

If the situation is so complex and there is a need for the suite of tools that are being strengthened by this Bill, surely there is a need for greater co-ordination. Greater co-ordination will surely help to fix some of the strategic challenges that our immigration system and asylum system have faced in recent years. To co-ordinate is to command, and it is crucial we accept that point. If we do not, we will not be able to tackle the backlog we face, we will not be able to implement the measures in the Bill and we will not be able to secure our borders.

Amendments have been tabled in relation to aspects of the Border Security Commander role, but I am not entirely certain whether the Conservative party supports the role of Border Security Commander at all. On Second Reading, we heard colleagues asking what Martin Hewitt is doing with his time. I would welcome the hon. Member for Stockton West explaining whether the Conservative party does in fact support the role of Border Security Commander and Border Security Command. We heard clearly from those who gave oral testimony, who are operationally focused, experienced and expert in their field, about the necessity of such a command. Indeed, Enver Solomon, the chief executive of the Refugee Council, summed it up well when he said that

“the Border Security Command is an understandable response.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 5, Q1.]

[Matt Vickers]

We will discuss when we come to the next group of amendments the aims and objectives of this role, and the fact that if we are going to have a Border Security Commander, they should have a very meaningful role that can make a real difference. I would like to press on clause 2 of the Bill, which talks about

“The terms and conditions of a designation as Commander are to be determined by the Secretary of State.”

I would be grateful if the Minister could explain to the Committee what those terms and conditions of designation might be? As I mentioned, the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 sets out how the Met commissioner must be suitably qualified. What sort of qualifications could we expect to see in a commander and what will those terms and conditions be?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I do not want to read out the job description, which was put out there ahead of Martin Hewitt being appointed last year. It is there for all to see, it is a public document. The role is very much about being able to operationally cohere the system and to make certain by the operation of the Border Security Commander’s board, upon which sit many of the other parts of Government that need to have regard to the strategy, that we decide how to take forward and deal with threats to our border security. It is not really rocket science, and I do not think that there would be much to be gained from putting the details of all of that into primary legislation.

It is important that as the threats to our border security evolve, which they certainly will do over time, that we do not find ourselves with a very rigid set of requirements in primary legislation, which is hard to change. The idea is to have convening powers to give flexibility to the commander to ensure that he can bring together all of the forces across Government that are charged with security in this area and ensure that the focus on organised immigration, crime and border security is always at the forefront of the work that they do.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

It is true that independence has a very valuable part to play, particularly in holding Government structures to account. For example, the independent inspectors of our detention or prison estates who are allowed to go in and publish without fear or favour regarding what they find there. That is obviously a very important role where independence matters. But in this context, the Border Security Commander is cohering the effect and the work across Government that is trying to keep our borders properly protected. That is operational. It ties into the diplomatic and political as well, although obviously Ministers have an important part to play in that too.

The hon. Lady has nothing to worry about when it comes to the Border Security Commander sitting in a civil service context given that nothing in this Bill means that anyone who was not a civil servant when they applied to the post of Border Security Commander would be excluded from consideration. Being in the civil service to begin with is not a requirement.

[Matt Vickers]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 1 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 3

Functions of the Commander

[Pete Wishart (Perth and Kinross-shire) (SNP)]

I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 3, page 2, line 29, at end insert—

“(1A) In exercising the Commander’s functions, the Commander must have full regard to the provisions of—

(a) the Human Rights Act 1998; and

(b) the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings.”

This amendment would confirm that the Commander must have full regard to the Human Rights Act and the European Convention on Action against Trafficking.

--- Later in debate ---

[Pete Wishart]

Police Scotland has a chief constable who is in charge, but in “Scot Squad”, Commissioner Miekelson is a chief commissioner. It is only right that we point out these distinctions; there is a significant difference between that mythical, fictional character and the reality of the role of chief constable, which is very efficiently and effectively looked after by the current inhabitant of that post.

I know you want me to get on to the particular amendment, Dr Murrison, so thank you for your forbearance and patience. My amendment confirms that the,

“Commander must have full regard to…the Human Rights Act 1998; and…the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking”.

The Minister is likely to tell me that none of that is necessary as human rights compliance is already implicit with Government operations. However, without these explicit legal mandates and safeguards, all of that can be overlooked. If the Minister is asking us to agree to 12 clauses at the outset of a Committee for an important Bill, relating to a job that is already being done, surely we can agree that one of these functions should be about the observance of our very important international obligations under the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings.

I do not think anybody is opposed to the border commander; I know there are a few jokes about his comparison to Chief Miekelson, but all of us agree that the Minister is establishing a necessary and useful role. I do not think, even though she was trying to chide her Conservative colleagues, that there was much disagreement from anybody on whether this is a useful role that could help bring together quite a lot of the structure and infrastructure that is responsible for operating our border security. There is a discussion about a lot of his tasks being administrative. There is nothing wrong with that, but for something as important as this, everybody would like to think that where there is administration, it will be effective and put in place in a way that we could look at it.

However, we need further clarity on the roles, functions and responsibilities of the border commander. Clause 3 is supposed to be the place where we find all of those things, but the one thing that the clause does not do is outline fully, perfectly, roundly and coherently what the actual functions of the border commander will be. Even if we look very carefully in all the different subsections, it does not say much about what he is expected to do. It lists a number of administrative responsibilities he will have, which is fair and fine, but all of us discussing the role of the border commander in the Committee would like to understand what he will be doing—what are his jobs, what are his functions, what responsibilities will he have, how will these things be discharged, and how will he be open to the type of scrutiny that we, as Members of this House, require?

There are provisions that seem to speak about the functions without actually identifying any of them. The only place where we can find objectives in clause 3 is subsection (1), but they are only objectives to which the commander must have regard. That is important. It just says he must “have regard” to the particular responsibilities that are outlined in the subsections. Subsections (7) to (9) are particularly interesting because they seem to suggest that people smuggling and human trafficking to the UK are to be regard as threats to border security. That seems fair enough; most of the Bill is about the perceived threat—disrupting networks and tackling the gangs that operate their vile trade across the channel.

Here is the thing: the people who board these boats are subject to the constraints imposed by these gangs and are at their mercy. They are controlled and reliant. Those people are totally and utterly ignored in the subsections in clause 3. Their realities—their need and right to seek safety, reunite with family and escape situations of extreme deprivation—are ignored, even though they have everything to do with the responsibilities and functions of the commander. As a matter of principle, then, it is vital that the Bill should be amended so that the Border Security Commander has regard to objectives concerned with respecting human life and dignity, and that must include specific shared obligations to provide asylum to people fleeing persecution and to enable victims of human trafficking to have security and safety from their enslavement.

There are concerns that, if border enforcement strategies do not include these protections for vulnerable individuals and victims of modern slavery, trafficking victims will enter further cycles of exploitation. In prioritising enforcement over protection, as the Bill does almost exclusively, we risk wrongfully criminalising victims of trafficking and failing to identify those in need of urgent intervention—or, worst of all, sending them back to their exploiters. If we stand by our commitments under the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings, the Bill should ensure that the commander respects those obligations too.

As we have discussed, the commander is a civil servant. I have taken no great view on that, and I listened carefully to the exchanges about the civil service role, but I have a couple of concerns in relation to my amendment 1 that I would like the Minister to address. The civil service code does not give a clear, enforceable duty to respect the UK’s obligations under international law. I am pretty certain that the Minister will tell me that there is a general obligation to comply with the law and our international obligations, as that is expected and anticipated in everything that the Government do through all their responsibilities and actions.

However, I refer the Minister to the recent case in the High Court. That was, of course, R (on the application of FDA) v. Minister for the Cabinet Office and others. I think the Government actually won that court case, which meant that any of the civil servants who were involved in compiling regulations had to abide by the legislative context but did not have to oblige and comply with the international obligations. At best, it is unclear, so I ask the Minister to clarify: will the Border Security Commander, who will be a civil servant, always be obliged—totally and utterly—to fully respect all our international obligations, particularly those around the HRA and the ECAT?

Without those specific obligations in the Bill, the Border Security Commander will be presumed always to prioritise enforcement over vital legal protection, potentially leading to human rights violations. Although the commander is required to comply with instructions set by the Home Secretary, which again I think everybody would accept is right and appropriate, they are not explicitly required to comply with the UK’s human rights obligations. For me, that is totally wrong, and it completely skews the whole modus operandi of our Border Security Commander and features of the Bill. I will come back to that as the Bill progresses.

We need to see this change to the Bill. We have 12 clauses and various subsections dedicated to the role and the functions of the commander. Let us have one—just one—that says that he must be prepared and obliged always to act in line with all of our obligations on international responsibility, being a good international actor, being a place that is recognised for exemplary human rights requirements and being signed up to the HRA and to ECAT. Let us put that in the Bill.

[Matt Vickers]

I have not come across Chief Commissioner Miekelson before, but I will endeavour to catch up on Netflix or iPlayer.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

We are all going to be doing that.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 3 sets out the functions of the Border Security Commander. The shadow Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), correctly pointed out on Second Reading that the new Border Security Commander

“cannot actually command anything. There are no powers at all in the Bill, merely functions. They include, in clause 3, publishing a strategic priority document and, in clause 4, a duty to prepare an annual report…the Border Security Commander has no clear powers, merely an ability to publish documents and reports.”—[Official Report, 10 February 2025; Vol. 762, c. 69.]

According to the legislation, the functions of the commander

“must have regard to the objectives of…maximising the effectiveness of the activities of partner authorities relating to threats to border security, for the purpose of minimising such threats, and…maximising the coordination of those activities for that purpose.”

That sounds suspiciously like a co-ordinator, rather than a commander. That is exactly what the legislation states: the commander does not appear to be empowered by the Bill to command anyone.

Subsection (5) defines a partner authority as a

“public authority with functions in relation to threats to border security (whether exercisable in the United Kingdom or elsewhere)”,

but—in subsection (6)—

“not…the Security Service…the Secret Intelligence Service”

or “GCHQ”.

Will the Minister confirm what is meant by partner authorities? Does she have a list of likely organisations that the Border Security Commander should be able to direct co-operation with? How far does she think that the Border Security Commander will be able to have an impact on public authorities abroad? For example, what role might French law enforcement be expected to play in having regard to the commander’s strategic priority document?

The Opposition have tabled amendment 13, which would enable the Home Secretary to direct other agencies to support the Border Security Commander’s objectives and strategic priorities, specifically Border Force, Immigration Enforcement, police and crime commissioners and the National Crime Agency. Ideally, we would like the Border Security Commander to have a meaningful role and the ability to direct other agencies. As the Government seem unwilling to do that, however, we thought it might be possible for the Home Secretary to give the Border Security Commander a little support.

If the Minister does not want to accept amendment 13, I would like to understand why not. Why do the Government seem willing to allow the commander only to co-ordinate, rather than to command? Why could the Home Secretary not add some additional impetus?

The clause requires the Border Security Commander to issue a strategic priority document that sets out the principal threats to border security when the document is issued, and the strategic priorities to which partner authorities should have regard in exercising their functions in relation to any of the threats to the border identified by the commander. We have tabled amendment 12 to ensure that the strategic priority document supports the Home Office’s UK border strategy. We are attempting to ensure that the Border Security Commander is aligned with the rest of the Home Office’s work to secure the border. I am interested to understand why the Minister is not willing to accept that amendment.

[Becky Gittins (Clwyd East) (Lab)]

It is a privilege to serve under your chairship, Dr Murrison. Given the representations made by the hon. Members for Stockton West and for Weald of Kent, something seems strange and I would appreciate an explanation. The hon. Member for Stockton West is speaking to amendment 12 and the necessity of supporting the Home Office’s UK border strategy. Given the hon. Member’s comments about the Border Security Commander having a role within the civil service, why does he want the commander to adhere to the Home Office’s UK border strategy, which is headed up by a director general who is a civil servant?

[Matt Vickers]

If we are to have such a position, we want it to be effective and have the relevant powers, but we also want it to be aligned with the other priorities of the Home Office and the work going on there. I think that is clear.

Amendment 11 would remove the requirement for the Border Security Commander to obtain the consent of the Secretary of State before issuing the strategic priority document. We would like to understand the operational benefits of the Secretary of State having to sign off the strategic priority document, which again highlights the lack of a meaningful role for the Border Security Commander. Although the strategic policy document should set out what are, in the commander’s view, the principal threats to border security and the strategic priorities to which partner authorities should have regard, in reality the document is a diktat from the Secretary of State about the Secretary of State’s views, and that arguably exposes a lack of influence and gravitas in the Border Security Commander’s role.

Allowing the commander to issue a strategic priority document without seeking prior permission from the Secretary of State would provide a welcome level of independence for the role. The oversight and consultation of the board would ensure confidence in the Border Security Commander’s ability to take all necessary steps to stop the crossings. There may be occasions when the commander believes it is necessary to act swiftly and to implement changes without delay. Removing the requirement to have ministerial consent would allow them to act decisively. That approach, I am sure, could subsequently be supported by the Secretary of State.

[Chris Murray]

What, then, is the hon. Gentleman’s view of how UKBA functioned? In her testimony, Theresa May said that, where it had that kind of independence, it became “closed, secretive and defensive”, and she had to completely restructure UK border defence because the independence that the hon. Gentleman is talking about actually made it difficult for Ministers to have proper oversight.

[Matt Vickers]

When we talk about the Border Security Commander role, if we think it is going to “smash the gangs”, sort out all these problems and play a huge part in creating a secure border for this country, it is important that we allow it some element of independence and gravitas. We have talked about the commander being tied into the strategic priorities of the Home Office, but this amendment is about empowering them to make the difference that we want them to make. We want them to succeed.

As I was saying, removing that requirement would allow the Border Security Commander to act decisively. We must avoid unnecessary bureaucratic wrangling and ensure that, in this critical matter, they have the freedom they need to deliver results.

[Tom Hayes]

I have two quick points. First, the hon. Member talked about whether the Border Security Commander could somehow command or direct the activities of our international partners. I would highlight that this Government have strengthened and created the new international arrangements that have made it possible for us to start to secure and securitise our borders. It is important not to pretend that the history of what has happened did not happen; we should realise that we need to have close international ties.

Secondly, I am listening closely to the hon. Member’s suggestions for how the role could be improved. Is he proposing these amendments because the current office holder, Martin Hewitt, is not discharging the office in the way that he would like? Could he comment on whether he thinks that Martin Hewitt is doing a good job or a less-than-good job, and whether he thinks that the Border Security Commander role, as it is currently being discharged, is satisfactory?

[Matt Vickers]

At some point, Martin Hewitt will be superseded. We want to make sure that whoever is in this role is in the best possible position to do the best possible job. I do not think that these measures are necessarily about Martin Hewitt’s effectiveness or otherwise; they are about this post and its fundamental role—well, its apparent fundamental role—in delivering border security for this country.

[Tom Hayes]

It is not about Martin Hewitt’s professional competence or his ability as a person to do the role; it is about the role itself. Based on how the role has been configured, does the hon. Member believe that the present office holder is discharging the role well, with the responsibilities given, or is he proposing these measures because he believes that somehow the role is lacking?

[Matt Vickers]

I think there is an opportunity to strengthen this role so that it can provide that real fundamental change that we are apparently looking for in this Bill. I would not necessarily want to comment on the individual.

We have tabled new clause 21 to set out some clear and measurable objectives for the Border Security Commander, to attempt to give this co-ordinator some clear direction. New clause 21 would set out that, in exercising their functions, the commander

“must have regard to the objectives of…preventing the boarding of vessels, with the aim of entering the United Kingdom, by persons who require leave to enter the United Kingdom but are seeking to enter the United Kingdom…without leave to enter, or…with leave to enter that was obtained by means which included deception”.

In effect, we want it in black and white in the Bill that the commander will be given the objective of reducing illegal entry to the country, and that is what new clause 21 would achieve.

Since 2018, when the figures were first recorded, more than 150,000 people have arrived in small boats. As of 29 January, 1,098 people had crossed the channel since the start of 2025. In 2024 as a whole, 36,816 people were detected making the crossing. I would like to understand why the Government do not think it is worthwhile to give the Border Security Commander the direct objective of reducing or even ending those arrivals.

We also wish to ensure that those who arrive in this country illegally will not be able to stay. We know that effective returns agreements work as a deterrent. When in government, we cut the number of Albanian illegal migrants coming to the UK by small boat crossings by more than 90%, thanks to our returns agreement. In 2022, 12,658 Albanian illegal migrants arrived in the UK by small boat, but that fell to just 924 in 2023, following our landmark returns agreement with Albania.

We have therefore included in new clause 21 the objective for the Border Security Commander to ensure that a decision on a claim by a person who has arrived in the UK illegally is taken within six months of the person’s arrival, and for the commander to make arrangements with a safe third country for the removal of people who enter the UK illegally. It is up to the Government to put in place an effective deterrent to people crossing the channel in small boats.

[Mike Tapp]

I find it quite astounding that there are any claims of success from the Opposition, given that we saw 299 people cross in 2018 and then an exponential rise of over 130,000 on the Conservatives’ watch. The hon. Gentleman is talking about a deterrent, but four people went to Rwanda and over 80,000 people crossed when that scheme had been introduced.

Importantly, the whole system in the Home Office had completely ground to a halt. There is another deterrent that was overlooked by the Conservatives during their tenure, and that is having a process that actually functions. We now have record high deportations, and as that message cuts through to people who are looking to cross, it will start to serve as a deterrent.

[Matt Vickers]

I thought that we would get a bit further through the Bill before we got into records. In real terms, there has been a marked increase in the number of people coming here since this Government took office—small boat crossings are up by 28%. We now have 8,500 more people staying in hotels across the country—up by nearly 29%. We were closing hotels. The hon. Member talks about the number of people being deported, but they are voluntarily going back. In real terms, the number of people who have arrived on small boats being returned went down, and in the most recent figures, it has gone down again. We have not been sending back those people who have arrived in small boats since this Government took office—that is just not the case.

[Mike Tapp]

I thank the hon. Member for giving way again; I will not make a habit of it. It is important to realise that the processing of those who come into Western Jet Foil and then Manston takes time, but of course they will be deported, if they are not genuine refugees, once the system gets there.

It is also important to note something else. Being the Member of Parliament for Dover and Deal, I often look out across the sea, and I can tell when it is a good day to cross and when it is not. On those days when it is viable to cross, crossings have reduced. The Conservatives were relying only on the weather to bring down boat crossings.

[Matt Vickers]

I think, in the last week, we have found that the only thing that this Government are relying on is the weather, but I will carry on. I am sure we will come back to all these things in due course; it is good to be discussing them here instead of on a news channel somewhere.

As the Government are repealing the Illegal Migration Act 2023 and the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024 with this Bill, we want to make sure that the Border Security Commander is empowered to ensure that all relevant agencies are working towards taking timely decisions on any claims by illegal immigrants, and removing those who enter the UK illegally.

[Becky Gittins]

I applaud the hon. Gentleman’s comments about a timely turnaround in the processing of asylum claims—something that really concerns Government Members with regard to the IMA and the Rwanda Act. Could he tell me what proportion of asylum claims under the previous Government were processed within the six-month period stipulated in this new clause?

[Matt Vickers]

I could not, but I could tell the hon. Lady that the backlog is even bigger now than it was when this Government took office.

If the Government were serious about tackling illegal crossings and creating an effective deterrent, they would support new clause 21. We also want to make sure that the Border Security Commander is transparent with the public about how best to stop illegal and dangerous channel crossings, which is why this new clause includes a requirement for the commander to make an assessment of the most effective methods for deterring illegal entry into the UK, the most effective methods for reducing the number of sea crossings made by individuals without leave to enter the UK, and the most effective methods for arranging the removal, to the person’s own country or a safe third country, of a person who enters the UK illegally. Again, if the Government were serious about protecting borders, they would support the new clause.

Clause 9 specifies that the Border Security Commander must

“comply with directions given by the Secretary of State about the exercise of the Commander’s functions under this Chapter.”

Can the Minister explain what sort of guidance the Secretary of State is likely to want to give the commander? Can she explain how the Secretary of State wishes to exercise the powers in the clause?

The SNP’s amendment 1 would confirm that the commander must have full regard to the Human Rights Act and the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings. Given that the commander’s role, as drafted by the Government, includes no real power or responsibility, I am not sure what that amendment would actually achieve.

[Susan Murray (Mid Dunbartonshire) (LD)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Murrison. The Liberal Democrats would like to introduce new clause 7, because we want to strengthen cross-border co-operation and Britain’s role in that process. We also believe that we need to reverse some of the last Government’s roll-back of provisions to tackle gangs involved in modern slavery. The new clause would require the border commander to meet the executive director of Europol every three months, which would help to achieve those goals.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I can certainly assure the hon. Lady that I recognise the import of what she is trying to do with the new clause. Often, such proposals are hooks to hang a debate on, so that there can be a little more information about the Government’s intent. I can assure her that having close operational and diplomatic liaison across all the different structures we have to work with to deal with cross-border immigration crime is absolutely at the centre of what the Border Security Commander will want to do. When we come to it, I hope she will not press her new clause to a vote.

[Matt Vickers]

The contrast is interesting. The Opposition want to see a Border Security Commander independently empowered to make meaningful changes to secure the border, rather than another civil servant muted by political oversight. There is a big contrast in perspective in terms of whether a Home Secretary should be signing off on anything anyone in this huge role—which will make a difference to our borders—will be able to say. Secondly, I would like to understand why the Government do not think it worth the Border Security Commander having the objective of reducing or even ending small boat crossings.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

It is quite revealing that the hon. Gentleman seems to think that the natural order of things is for Ministers to be at loggerheads with civil servants and the people who are operationally charged with delivering on objectives. That may say more about Opposition Members than about the way we are seeking to achieve operational effectiveness and objectives in what we are doing.

Finally, new clause 21 focuses on the Border Security Commander’s functions in relation to tackling small boat crossings to the UK. This is an all-encompassing new clause, which goes far beyond the commander’s functions as set out in the Bill. The new clause seems to want the commander to be all things to all people.

The immediate priority is organised immigration crime-enabled small boat crossings. The Border Security Commander will, and necessarily must, evolve over time to provide the systems leadership across all threats as they emerge. Such crossings did not really emerge until 2018, but they have become embedded and more of a threat over time. Had we been discussing something like this in 2017, small boat crossings would not have featured at all. It is therefore important that our legislation allows the Border Security Commander to change approach or focus as new threats emerge. Threats evolve and change over time. Our approach accounts for that by stipulating in legislation that the Border Security Commander has particular objectives that might be important now but less important in the future. The new clause seems to me to present an overly difficult and inflexible way of moving forward.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Does the shadow Minister wish to press any of his amendments to a vote?

[Matt Vickers]

If we are to have a Border Security Commander, we want an effective one who can publish a strategy without being subject to a political veto, who has priorities aligned to the UK border strategy, and whom Home Secretaries can direct agencies to follow. We wish to press the amendments to a Division.

Amendment proposed: 12, in clause 3, page 2, line 36, at end insert—

“(2A) The strategic priority document issued under subsection (2) must support the Home Office’s UK Border Strategy.”—(Matt Vickers.)

This amendment would require that the Border Security Commander’s strategic priority document supports the UK Border Strategy.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Pete Wishart]

I will not detain the Committee for long. Amendment 2 covers the same sort of terrain as my amendment 1, which sought to ensure that the Border Security Commander takes cognisance of international obligations, most notably in relation to human rights and the provisions of the European convention on action against trafficking. Amendment 2 would require the commander, when making the annual report, to make reference to his compliance, in the work that he has done, with the Human Rights Act and with ECAT. That is all I am asking. There is no good reason why that cannot be included as part of the commander’s annual accounting to the House of Commons. That would give us an opportunity to understand how part of his work has been in ensuring that those obligations have been met, and I think it would be a worthy inclusion in his annual report. I commend the amendment to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 4 would give the Border Security Commander a duty to prepare annual reports, which must state how the commander has carried out their functions in that financial year and set out the commander’s view on the performance of the border security system that year, with particular reference to the commander’s strategic priorities. That all seems very vague, and a case of the Border Security Commander being allowed to mark their own homework.

Can the Minister explain what success would look like for the Border Security Commander? What are the measurable key performance indicators that the Home Secretary will consider? That is important because the Secretary of State, as set out in clause 2, can dismiss the commander. What would constitute poor enough performance for that to happen, and what would be a success?

To try to inject some objectivity and accountability into the process of annual reports, we have tabled amendment 14. We would like the Border Security Commander to report on the number of persons who have, since the later of the passing of the Bill or the last annual report, been charged or convicted of offences under clause 13, “Supplying articles for use in immigration crime”; clause 14, “Handling articles for use in immigration crime”; clause 18, “Endangering another during sea crossing to United Kingdom”; or clause 43, “Articles for use in serious crime”. We want to know how effective the new offences will be in practice for achieving the Government’s aim of stopping illegal immigration.

The Government’s own impact assessment admits that very few people will go to prison as a result of the measures in the Bill. On the proposals to strengthen and improve the function of serious crime prevention orders, it says:

“It is estimated that between zero and three prison places, with a central estimate of one prison place will be required per year once the steady state is reached.”

On introducing an interim serious crime prevention order, it says:

“It is estimated that between 0 and 1.54 prison places, with a central estimate of 0.2 prison place will be required per year once the steady state is reached.”

On serious and organised crime articles, it says:

“It is estimated that between four and six prison places, with a central estimate of five prison places will be required per year once the steady state is reached.”

On new offences to criminalise the making, adapting, importing, supplying, offering to supply and possession of articles for use in serious crime, it says:

“It is estimated that between four and six prison places, with a central estimate of five prison places will be required per year once the steady state is reached.”

It is important to report on the new offences relating to immigration crime, which the Government think will not send a meaningful number of people to prison, and also on the new offence of endangering lives at sea, for which the impact assessment includes no estimate. Can the Minister confirm how many people the Government expect each year to be arrested, convicted and imprisoned under the new offence of endangering lives at sea?

[Tom Hayes]

I am wondering about the intent behind that question. Is the hon. Member concerned about the availability of prison spaces?

[Matt Vickers]

We want to see how effective the offences will be. The Government have set that out in part, but not for the new offence of endangering lives at sea, which has great consequence.

Amendment 14 would also require the Border Security Commander to report on the number of people identified as entering the United Kingdom via sea crossing without leave to remain; how many of them are detained pending deportation or a decision on deportation; and how many are deported to a country of which the person is a national or citizen, or to a country or territory to which there is reason to believe that the person will be admitted. We believe it is important to have transparency about the role of the Border Security Commander in facilitating removals. If they are charged with minimising threats to the border, removing those who enter this country illegally with no reason to remain is a big part of successfully achieving that objective.

[Mike Tapp]

It is important to note that measures of success can change. Legislating for that might mean that, in a decade, we are wasting the time of the Border Security Command and its commander. My understanding of statistics and their collection is that that is for the Home Office and the Office for National Statistics. Of course, as those who are prosecuted go through the courts, we will all be able to see that.

There may also be a slight misunderstanding about what a prevention order is and what it aims to do. It is a disruptive measure that can be used before charge to stop the vile smuggling criminals from operating. If and when they go to prison, that means that they have breached that order. The fact that the estimate is low means that there is confidence in the prevention orders succeeding.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clause 5 places a duty on partner authorities to co-operate with the commander in the carrying out of their functions. The commander is tasked with maximising the effectiveness of our collective response to border security threats, which requires a whole of Government response and will be enabled by the clause. It is recognised that partner authorities have wide-ranging functions that extend well beyond tackling border security threats. The duty set out in the clause extends only so far as is appropriate and compatible with partner authorities’ other functions. That ensures that partners across the system are working in lockstep to enhance border security, while continuing to enable the vital work undertaken by partners beyond border security matters.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 5 provides that a partner authority has duties, so far as is “appropriate and reasonably practicable,” to co-operate with the commander in carrying out the commander’s functions. It would be helpful if the Minister explained what the Government mean by

“so far as appropriate and reasonably practicable”

and under what circumstances it might be justified for a partner authority not to co-operate. Does it mean, as per subsection (2), that the partner authority would co-operate only so far as the co-operation was compatible with the exercise of its other functions, or are there other circumstances where partner authorities might not have to co-operate?

Again, the clause exposes how powerless the Border Security Commander is. The commander cannot actually command any of these partner authorities to do anything at all. Subsection (3) requires those who are co-operating with the commander in the exercise of their functions to put in place arrangements governing co-operation between the commander and that person. Does the Minister have—

[The Chair]

Order.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Second sitting)

Matt Vickers Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 27th February 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

We have until 2.40 pm for this panel. Will the witnesses please introduce themselves briefly for the record?

Rob Jones: I am Rob Jones, the director general of operations for the National Crime Agency.

Sarah Dineley: My name is Sarah Dineley, and I am head of international at the Crown Prosecution Service and the national CPS lead on organised immigration crime.

Jim Pearce: Good afternoon. I am Assistant Chief Constable Jim Pearce, the National Police Chiefs’ Council lead on organised immigration crime.

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

Q28 What is the single biggest thing the Government could be doing to drive down illegal arrivals, and what could we be doing to aid your agency in doing its job?

Rob Jones: There is not one thing that you can do to tackle these problems; you need a range of measures that concurrently bear down on them. The problem that I focus on is the organised crime element, which needs concurrent effort in a number of areas, designed to undermine the business model that supports organised immigration crime. That means tackling illicit finance; the materials that are used in smuggling attempts and the supply chain that supports them; the high-value targets based overseas who are involved in supplying materials and moving migrants; and those who are closer, in near-Europe, who are involved in it. From an organised crime perspective, it is about concurrent pressure in a number of areas to make the incentives for being involved in organised immigration crime no longer viable.

Jim Pearce: From my perspective, you need to look at this at both ends of the scale. What we are probably thinking about at the moment is prosecution and putting people through the courts. Actually, we know that, in other thematic serious and organised crime, prevention and early intervention work just as effectively. We would call that disruption. Disrupting the patterns, and the ways of working that Rob just described, earlier would obviously prevent victims from becoming victims in the end. It is the 4P approach, which I am sure most of you have heard of. It is about working from neighbourhood policing, with a local factor, in order to gather intelligence, and putting that into the system all the way up through our regional crime units and into the National Crime Agency and high-end prosecution, international and online.

Sarah Dineley: I concur with my two colleagues. I do not believe that there is one single measure that would impact so significantly that it would reduce migrant crossings to zero. It is about having a suite of measures—whether they are prosecutorial or disruptive in nature—that taken together will allow the prosecution and law enforcement teams to work together to tackle the gangs. It is always important to remember that a criminal justice outcome is not necessarily the right outcome; there are other outcomes that can tackle organised immigration crime and gangs effectively.

[Matt Vickers]

Q Are there further specific measures to strengthen the hand of your agency that you would like to see in the Bill?

Sarah Dineley: From a prosecution point of view, I would say it is a matter for the legislators to decide what legislation they feel is appropriate. The Bill as drafted does add to the toolkit of measures we have available.

Rob Jones: From my perspective, the measures that make the most difference and are the most significant in tackling the organised crime element are on preparatory acts, in clauses 13 to 16. They give us the ability to be pre-emptive, proactive and very disruptive, giving us something we have not had before—the ability to act before people actually commit an offence under section 25 of the Immigration Act 1971, which is the facilitation offence. That is an important opportunity, because we are driven by trying to reduce the highest-risk crossings and trying to prevent crossings. We would not choose to react to crossings and then investigate; we want to act as quickly as we can. These measures create the ability to do that—to go much sooner, have more impact, and build momentum, so that the people who are behind these attempts really start to feel the pressure.

Jim Pearce: In addition, the Bill provides the opportunity to increase clarity and focus, with the ability to gain information and intelligence through the seizure of electronic devices, for example. I know this is controversial. Being able to do that with a very clear power to search, seize and then download, as opposed to potentially—I am not saying this has happened—misusing existing powers, will give clarity because you can say to an operational police officer, immigration officer, or a member of the National Crime Agency, “This is what you use in order to get that defined intelligence at the end.”

[Matt Vickers]

Q What concerns, if any, do you have about the Bill as drafted?

Jim Pearce: From a policing point of view, there would be insurance around safeguarding. For the electronic devices, for example, I understand the benefits that would come from the counter-terrorism-style powers to be able to seize electronic devices. I am confident that that is managed through the measures in place around reasonable suspicion and having to get the advice from a senior officer. It is about operationalising that, putting it into practice, and making sure that our staff understand through education and training. Any change in legislation requires training, finance and input. Those are the types of things that I would be thinking about.

Rob Jones: I agree. It is about the professional development and the guidance for officers who are using new tactics and new tools against this threat, and making sure that we are ready to go with very clear guidance on how officers should look to engage the new offences in the Bill.

Sarah Dineley: Clause 17 and one of the subsections of clause 18 create extraterritorial jurisdiction for the offences, and it would be remiss of me not to highlight some of the challenges that that will bring. We have a system of judicial co-operation, something called mutual legal assistance, whereby we can obtain intelligence and evidence from our overseas counterparts at both judicial and law enforcement level. We work very hard on building those relationships to collaborate.

To that end, the Crown Prosecution Service has a network of liaison prosecutors based across the world. Specifically, we have liaison prosecutors based in the major organised immigration crime countries—Spain, Italy, Turkey, Germany, Netherlands and Belgium—and two in France, one of whom is actually a dedicated organised immigration crime liaison prosecutor. We use them to foster and build those relationships so that we have that reciprocal exchange of information where required. That is not to say that is without its challenges. I flag that as something that we will continue to work on, but it has challenges.

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Dame Angela Eagle)]

Q Starting with Rob Jones, what do the witnesses think the Bill does for them operationally?

Rob Jones: It gives us the opportunity to make the most of the intelligence dividend that we have invested in tackling the threat. We have a good understanding of the people behind small boats crossings in particular, the supply of materials, the facilitation from near-Europe and further afield, but we want momentum and greater agility so that when we are aware that a crossing is being prepared—when materials are moving—we can act pre-emptively and proactively.

As I said earlier, we do not want to be investigating after thousands of people have arrived, and trying to put together very complex investigations that may involve months of covert surveillance and eavesdropping—a whole range of covert tactics—to get us over the line for a charging decision for a section 25 offence. The new offences give us the opportunity to act when we see that jigsaw puzzle coming together, to go to the CPS when we reach a tipping point and to go earlier than we can now. That means that we can pull more people through that system, deliver justice more quickly and be more disruptive in tackling the threat. That is a big step forward. That is lacking in the current toolbox to operationalise the intelligence we have.

Sarah Dineley: The endangerment offence potentially fills a gap between the current section 24 and 25 provisions. Each boat has a pilot—someone steering it across the channel—who, by the very nature and condition of those boats, the overcrowding, the lack of lifesaving equipment, and so on, puts everyone in that boat in danger of losing their life. We welcome that clause and will draft guidance on how it can be interpreted in terms of practical application.

Jim Pearce: Police officers mainly deal with the inland clandestine events as opposed to the small boats. From my point of view, it would be, correctly, common practice to use schedule 2(17) of the Immigration Act 1971 to detain migrants and then pass them into the immigration system. On searches after that, yes, there are powers in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 after that provision under section 32, but that is mainly to safeguard; it is not to seize evidence.

On Rob’s point about early intervention and intelligence gathering, the only way you gather intelligence is through what people tell you and what electronic devices give up. The Bill gives police officers the ability to gather intelligence through defined and clear powers in legislation, so that they are not misusing a PACE power, an operational procedure or anything else. That would be the biggest change for policing.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

We will now hear oral evidence from the former director general of UK Border Force, from Migration Watch UK and from the Centre for Policy Studies. We have until 3.20 pm for this panel. Could witnesses please briefly introduce themselves for the record?

Karl Williams: I am Karl Williams, the research director at the Centre for Policy Studies. I have written several reports on legal and illegal migration.

Tony Smith: Hello, my name is Tony Smith. I spent 40 years in the Home Office, between 1972 and 2013, from immigration officer right the way up to director general of UK Border Force.

Alp Mehmet: I am Alp Mehmet, chairman of Migration Watch. I am also a former diplomat and a former immigration officer.

[Matt Vickers]

Q A nice broad question: are there any provisions you would like to see added to this Bill to strengthen our ability to drive down illegal crossings?

Alp Mehmet: May I just make a few remarks? Would that be acceptable?

[The Chair]

We have a limited amount of time, so if you could answer the question, that would be great.

Alp Mehmet: I welcome the Bill in many respects. It is the sort of thing that needed to be done, and it is now happening. I welcome the co-ordination taking place across Government, and the potential co-operation with the EU and EU member states is also to be welcomed. The setting up of Border Security Command and the Border Security Commander will be helpful. My only gripe is that I strongly disagree with the repeal of the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024—I think that is a mistake. I also think that repealing certain parts of the Illegal Migration Act 2023 is a mistake. That is my personal view, and I am happy to explain why in a moment.

I wonder whether primary legislation was necessary to do a lot of what is happening, but we are where we are. If anything, I think repealing the Rwanda Act will encourage illegal immigration, or whatever we may call it, to some degree, which is unfortunate. A lot of people entering the EU—240,000 were declared to have entered illegally last year—will end up coming to us. There is no deterrence because, once they arrive here, the likelihood is that they will be able to stay. I believe the only deterrent is to restrict arrivals, and to contain and remove quickly. That will send the right message. I do not think anything in the Bill suggests that is going to happen. That is broadly my view.

Tony Smith: Looking at the relevant clauses, the first thing that struck me is that the Border Security Commander will be another civil servant. I think it will be a director general post in the Home Office. I was a director general, and we already have quite a lot of them. I am not sure he will actually be able to command anything. He is probably going to be more of a co-ordinator.

I would like to see the Border Security Commander and his team have law enforcement powers so that they can arrest and detain, the same as officers in Border Force, the National Crime Agency and Immigration Enforcement. I think that whole governance structure needs attention. It needs someone to pull it all together. I am not sure we have pitched the post right in immigration law enforcement teams.

On the Border Security Commander’s reporting requirements under the Bill, I think he regularly needs to publish details of irregular arrivals by way of nationality and age, and provide regular updates on where they are in the process, so we can all see whether there are logjams in the process from arrival to either removal or grant. We can check the timelines. I think they already have a dashboard in the Home Office that does that, so I presume he will be able to take responsibility for that.

I would also like to follow up on the point that Alp Mehmet made about data on removals and the numbers of people who can currently be excluded under NABA because they have come from a safe third country. That is still there, but we do not know the data on how many of them are actually being removed on a case-by-case, so I would like to see a list of all the countries to which we can remove people: safe first countries, source countries and third countries.

We know the EU will not take third-country returns. In fact, other than Rwanda, I do not think there are any countries that will take third-country returns. There are countries that will take back their own nationals, but under this new system where we are doing away with SORA and most of the IMA, there does not seem to be a third-country outlet. Therefore, people who come here from Iran, Iraq, Syria or Afghanistan know that, from the other side of the channel, they need only get into British territorial waters and they will probably be allowed to stay in the UK. They might well get asylum, but even if they do not, it is impossible to return them for one reason or another.

I am really interested in that returns piece. I am keen on capturing data from mobile devices. Some of them keep their mobile phones. That data is being used for prosecution purposes only. I think it should be made available to officials who are considering their asylum claim. Passport data, identity data, age data and travel history data are often held on those phones—all data that would be useful when considering an asylum application. We need legislation to do that.

I would also use mobile devices to track people who are given bail so that we can use the tracker to know where they are in the event of an adverse decision from the Home Office, so that we are able to find them. At the moment, we do not have powers to do that because of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. I would like to see an amendment that enables that to happen. We know the tagging systems have not really worked. In the unlikely event that we keep SORA or the Rwanda plan—I do not expect the Government will—we really need to look at options for offshoring asylum claims from people who have arrived from a safe third country. If we cannot send them back, we could send them to another safe country—ergo, Rwanda—where they could be resettled safely without adding to the continuing flow of arrivals by small boat from France.

[Matt Vickers]

Q Do you have anything to add on that, Karl?

Karl Williams: I have two brief points to reinforce what Tony was saying. It feels to me like the Bill focuses on disruption and the interdiction of routes for entering the country illegally. It does not do much on deterrence. As the impact assessment says, on pillar 3, the changes to measures for going after the gangs, it is very uncertain what the outcome will be. That is because there is no evidence base here. The only country that has succeeded in stopping small boats is Australia. There was some interdiction work with Indonesia, but it was primarily about the offshoring agreement, which was a major plank of its deterrence. I would like to see deterrence measures added, not just disruption.

Secondly, on the Border Security Command, to reinforce what Tony said, data information is really important. Migration policy, legal and illegal, has generally been bedevilled by very poor quality Government data. It seems the new Border Security Commander will have limited ability to take operational control. One thing I would like to see them have is power to access and pull together data, so that we can have a much better picture.

[Matt Vickers]

Q Are there any lessons from abroad that we are failing to learn at this point?

Tony Smith: One thing I have raised is the possibility of a biometric entry/exit system, which we do not have in this country. I chair a lot of conferences around the world, on border developments, border security and border technologies. Your face will become your passport sooner or later—sooner in some countries than here. If we had the powers and authority, we could capture a digital biometric image of everybody entering and exiting the country, and we could require the carriers to do likewise—we do not have physical embarkation controls.

This is happening in America. It is happening in Dubai. It is happening in Singapore. We are going to Curaçao, which now has a walk-through border. All it does is capture your face. It matches you to the API data that you already have, uploads it into the cloud and recognises you straightaway, so you have a more seamless border. It will give proper figures on who is in this country and who is not. Your net migration figures will be a lot more accurate than they are currently, provided that we have the powers to capture and retain everybody’s facial image. That means UK passports, Irish passports, electronic travel authorisations and visas, and permanent residents. I think that is achievable, and I would love to see it happening in this country.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Q Migration Watch’s website says that you are worried about population projections and a

“significant fall in the percentage of the indigenous (white British) population.”

Can you explain what your worry is, and could you define “indigenous white population”?

Alp Mehmet: First, I am a first-generation migrant. I came here as an eight-year-old. I have been here since the mid-’50s. The immigrant ethnic minority element of the population in those days was something like 4%. In the 1951 census, it was 3.9%, and it is now 25%. That has substantially happened over the last 30 years.

What worries me, if that is the right word, is the fact that people are being added to the population, and migration is the only driver of population increase at the moment. I know you have David Coleman coming up next. He will tell you a great deal more about the likely evolution of the population’s demographic mix. That is my concern. Having arrived here as a migrant, and accepted and joined this country and made it my own, I see it now changing very rapidly into something that the majority of people in this country do not want to happen.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Good afternoon. We will now hear evidence from David Coleman, emeritus professor of demography at the University of Oxford. We have until 3.40 pm for this witness. Could you please introduce yourself briefly for the record?

David Coleman: Yes, of course. My name is David Coleman. I am emeritus professor of demography at the University of Oxford. I have been retired for over 10 years, and I interest myself in all sorts of aspects of demography—not just migration, but mortality, fertility and all the other things that we play with.

[Matt Vickers]

Q Do you have any particular concerns about the Bill as drafted, or any suggested ways in which it might be improved to achieve its ends?

David Coleman: The sad fact is that I do have reservations about the Bill, but I do not have any magical solutions to put that right, I am sorry to say. It is, after all, an intractable problem, this question of asylum and migration.

My concerns are that we have to, we are forced to, restart or intensify a war that we may not easily win. Rather like, as I suggested in my note, the war against drugs, it will be difficult—probably perpetual and probably indecisive. It will have some effect. It will consume a great deal of effort. It may involve unkindness to asylum seekers and possibly risk to those doing the investigations. It is, I think, very much second best to the idea of trying to deter migration for asylum claiming in the first place. That, of course, was dismissed by the present Government as being unfeasible, unworkable and unkind, so the Rwanda scheme was scrapped. However, although it sounds rather brutal, it seems to me that the only obvious way of deterring movement to Britain is by making the movement to Britain unattractive. The obvious way of doing that is to divert at least some of the claimants somewhere they will be safe but will not enjoy the benefits of being in a rich country.

There are four ways of dealing with the issue, are there not? One is to have open borders, so that everybody who wants to come can come. Then there are two ways of being nasty: one is being nasty to the smugglers themselves, which is, I suppose, what the Bill is primarily about, and the other is being rather nasty to people who wish to claim asylum, which the previous policy did. Alternatively, you could have special routes for selected people who can be investigated, possibly by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and then admitted. That has, as far as I can make out, been ruled out by the Government for the time being.

[Matt Vickers]

Q Are there any lessons from abroad that we are failing to learn?

David Coleman: The lesson that everyone cites is the example of Australia, which, depending on which Government are in power, has a policy of diverting people right across the other side of the Pacific to an island where they were notionally safe, but where they were not able to enjoy being in Australia. That is supported or not supported depending on which Government is in power, which is one of the problems with migration policy. Generally speaking, whether the doors are tight shut, half open or fully open depends very much on the swings and balances of electoral change and is rather unpredictable. That is inevitable.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Q Professor Coleman, are you a member of the Galton Institute?

David Coleman: Yes and no. The Galton Institute does not exist any more; it has changed its name to the Adelphi Genetics Forum.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

We will now hear oral evidence from Professor Brian Bell from King’s College London. We have until 4 pm for this panel. Could the witness please briefly introduce himself for the record?

Professor Brian Bell: I am Professor Brian Bell, the chair of the Government’s Migration Advisory Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

Q Do you think that the Bill will be effective in achieving its aims? How could it be made more effective?

Professor Brian Bell: I think it is fair to say that it is an open question whether it will be effective. The evidence from lots of previous experiences is that it is actually very hard to deter this kind of activity, but I suppose you have to try everything you can and see what works. If something does not work, you try something else.

In some sense, it is an unanswerable question at this point, and it may be unanswerable in the long run. Suppose that the Bill is passed and small boat numbers go up. That does not prove that the Bill failed, because we do not know what the counterfactual is of what would have happened without the Bill, and vice versa: if the numbers go down, it could just be that the number of people who wanted to come to France and then on to England had fallen. It is going to be very difficult to directly observe the effect. Whenever you think about these issues, you always have to think about both the deterrence and sanction effect, which is what the Bill is focused on, and then how you change the underlying incentives.

[Matt Vickers]

Q Are there any lessons that we are failing to learn from abroad?

Professor Brian Bell: I do not think so, in the sense that I do not think any country has experienced these issues and dealt with them particularly successfully. There are different approaches—obviously, Australia has taken a different approach—but I do not think that any country would claim that it has really succeeded in significantly addressing this kind of problem.

To me, it is very much the same kind of problem as any sort of criminal activity. You can change the sanctions and the effectiveness of the police, and that has some effect. The evidence tends to suggest on this sort of thing that it has a fairly small effect. The deterrence effect tends often to be quite small with these policies, so in the end the right response will almost certainly be about changing the incentives as well, in terms of both what is the attraction to come to the UK and whether there are ways we can encourage people to stay in France, in this case, instead of wanting to make those journeys.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

We will now hear evidence from Dame Angela Eagle MP, Minister for Border Security and Asylum, and Seema Malhotra MP, Minister for Migration and Citizenship at the Home Office. We will have until 4.20 pm for this panel.

[Matt Vickers]

Q Looking at the changing approach, particularly around the repeal of the Illegal Migration Act, repealing section 2 of the Act removes the obligation on the Government to remove people who arrive here illegally. What is the rationale behind that?

Dame Angela Eagle: The Illegal Migration Act was flawed legislation, which did not actually work. It was so flawed that the previous Government, even though they put it on to the statute book, did not actually commence much of it at all.

[Matt Vickers]

Q On the obligation to remove people who arrive here illegally, whether it is in that Act or in the Bill being brought forward, why are we removing that as a principle?

Dame Angela Eagle: The issue was that we did not think it was possible to make the suite of legislation, which involved the Rwanda Act and the Illegal Migration Act, work together coherently. Its effect was essentially to allow people into the country but make it illegal to process them and leave them stuck in an ever-lengthening backlog and in limbo. The whole approach established by the interplay of those two Acts of Parliament, one of which was barely commenced even though it was on the statute book, had to be taken away so that we could bring some order to the chaos that we inherited from the previous Government, as a result of the practical outcomes of those two pieces of legislation.

[Matt Vickers]

Q I understand that comment, but do you not think that, as part of that approach, it should be an obligation on the Government to remove people who come here illegally?

Dame Angela Eagle: No, we certainly have not said that. As soon as people’s asylum claims have been properly processed, and the appeals that they are allowed to make are finished, if they have failed, we will seek to remove those people—but not to a third country.

[Matt Vickers]

Q Further to that, the principle in the previous legislation was that if someone arrived in this country illegally, they could not become a British citizen. That was there in the legislation, but it will not be there when this Bill has gone through. What message does it send to the world if people who break into this country can then go on to gain citizenship?

Dame Angela Eagle: The Home Secretary has made it perfectly clear in the changes to the advice that if you come to this country illegally, we do not expect that you will be granted citizenship.

[Matt Vickers]

Q But we have taken that out.

Dame Angela Eagle: We have taken that out of primary legislation because it was connected with the duty to remove, which was about the interplay of the Illegal Migration Act and the Rwanda Act. As I have just said, it was flawed legislation that did not work in practice.

[Matt Vickers]

Q The Illegal Migration Act also made provisions, in sections 57 and 58, for scientific age verification. We are removing that as well. Why would we want to remove those powers from our agencies? We have seen the consequences for safeguarding and the impact that that could have on young people. Why would we not want to give the agencies all the powers that they could have?

Dame Angela Eagle: There are real issues about the accuracy of scientific age assessment. At the Home Office, we are in the middle of doing work to see whether we can get a system of scientific age assessment that is robust enough to use. We are certainly not ruling it out, but the effects in that legislation were all about the duty to remove—it was about trying to define children. You will remember that in the IMA, the duty to remove excluded children, which perhaps created a bigger incentive for people to claim that they were children when they were not. The scientific age assessment clauses in that Act were related to the duty to remove. Given that we are repealing the vast majority of the Illegal Migration Act in this Bill, we removed those clauses.

I would not, however, want to give the hon. Gentleman the false impression that we have completely abandoned the idea of doing scientific age assessment. Currently, we are trying to assess whether there are ways of doing it that not only are cost-effective, but can be relied on. It is not an easy thing to do; there are no very easy solutions to whether it is accurate. We are exploring those areas ahead of making any subsequent announcements about if—and how, if we do—we use scientific age assessment.

[Matt Vickers]

Q I am sure that we could spend all day arguing about the pros and cons of Rwanda, but specifically, we see the effectiveness of returns agreements where those are in place. For countries where we cannot return people, if those people are not going to Rwanda, where will the Government put them?

Dame Angela Eagle: First, we will always seek to return people if they fail the asylum system, and have had all their claims and appeals, as soon as it is safe to do so. That is the first thing to say, and we must never lose sight of that. Situations in particular countries change—sometimes for the better, sometimes for the worse, as the hon. Gentleman knows. We never give up on that. Clearly, if people are here and have failed, we want them to leave, and we will facilitate them to leave.

[Martin Vickers]

Q What about where we do not have the ability to return—with countries where we cannot return those people? They were going to go to Rwanda; now, where are they going?

Dame Angela Eagle: With all due respect, I do not think they were ever going to go to Rwanda.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (First sitting)

Matt Vickers Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 27th February 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Yes, that is okay.

Daniel O’Malley: I am Daniel O’Malley, policy and public affairs specialist with the Scottish Refugee Council.

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

Q First, what are your views on the functions and objectives of the Border Security Command, as set out in the Bill?

Enver Solomon: I am happy to take that one. Our view is that this legislation is rightly seeking to disrupt the criminal gangs—the smuggling gangs. The trade is heinous; it is very damaging to people and it needs to be stopped. In that context, the Border Security Command is an understandable response. I think the issue that we have with it is that it is very difficult to simply rely on enforcement to tackle what is a complex and challenging situation.

The Bill is putting multiple eggs in the basket of enforcement, not just through the Border Security Command but by introducing a number of new offences. Our view, based on our frontline practice and work over many decades with people who have come to this country from war zones, having fled persecution or having been victims of modern slavery, is that that strategy will fundamentally fall short, because it is very difficult to change behaviour by adopting a primarily enforcement approach, which is primarily driven by further prosecution and creating new laws.

Essentially, new laws, such as the offences created in the Bill, are pretty much a blunt instrument to deal with behaviour that drives people to seek protection in other countries and to come here seeking asylum. I think that the evidence, from the offences created in previous legislation, demonstrates that they have not acted as a deterrent.

To sum up, enforcement is an understandable and legitimate approach, but it is only one approach, and it needs to be combined with other approaches that focus on international diplomacy and co-operation, and, critically, on additional legal routes. If you look at the evidence, particularly from the US under the previous Administration, the combination of those three can have a demonstrable impact on reducing irregular arrivals.

Despite the intention that this Bill has set out, our concern is that it will not deliver the outcome—the understandable and credible outcome—that the Government are trying to achieve, which is to stop the people smugglers and to stop people making dangerous crossings. It is focusing too much on an enforcement-driven agenda.

[Matt Vickers]

Q What provisions would you like to see in the Bill—you talked about a broader approach—that are not in there?

Enver Solomon: We would have liked to see more provisions that look at opening up targeted, additional humanitarian pathways, additional legal routes, and additional mechanisms for people to seek humanitarian protection and make applications for asylum without necessarily having to take dangerous journeys. We have advocated for a targeted humanitarian visa to be piloted for specific nationalities where there is a high grant rate.

We would also have preferred to see the full repeal of the Illegal Migration Act 2023—not all provisions have been repealed. It is very positive that a significant number have been repealed, and that the Government have started to clear the backlog and essentially end the meltdown of the asylum system under the previous Administration, with the failed implementation of the Act. That is positive, but we think that retaining other provisions in the Act, particularly the provisions on inadmissibility, and not repealing the differential treatment provisions in the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, contribute to greater dysfunction in the system.

The Government’s laudable and correct intention to bring greater efficiency and competence to the system is absolutely right, but having multiple pieces of legislation that just create greater dysfunction will not ensure that you get an effective end-to-end system. You do that by ensuring that you have reliable, speedy decision making on asylum; that decisions are right first time; that if people are granted protection, they can move through the system effectively with appropriate support; and that if people are not granted protection, the right steps are in place to support them. The focus needs to be much more on getting the asylum system to function, with a clear vision of its purpose, than on layering more and more legislation on to an already incredibly complex legislative system, which actually just creates further dysfunction.

[The Chair]

Before I go to the Minister, can I just check with Mubeen that you can hear us okay?

Mubeen Bhutta: Sorry?

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

We will now hear oral evidence from the Immigration Law Practitioners Association and from Migration Observatory. Again, we must stick to the timings in the programme motion that the Committee has agreed. For this session, we have until 12.40 pm. Could the witnesses please briefly introduce themselves for the record?

Zoe Bantleman: Good afternoon. I am Zoe Bantleman and I am the legal director of the Immigration Law Practitioners Association.

Dr Peter Walsh: Good afternoon. I am a senior researcher at the Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford.

[Matt Vickers]

Q Do you think the new endangerment offence will make any difference to channel crossings?

Dr Peter Walsh: Evidence from academic research shows that the impacts of deterrence policies are fairly small. The main reason for that is that migrants often do not have accurate or detailed knowledge of policies in destination countries. Their understanding of those policies is often lacking in detail and wrong, and it is often influenced by what they are told by their smugglers or handlers, who have a vested interest, of course, in downplaying risks.

There is also some statistical evidence that looks more broadly at what drives unauthorised migration and asylum applications around the world. That has found that domestic policy is not statistically one of the more important factors. Instead, geopolitical developments, conflict—civil, ethnic or international conflict—ecological disaster and regime change are all statistically much stronger drivers of unauthorised migration and asylum applications in particular countries.

Finally, rounding out the picture, when an asylum seeker decides which destination country to move to, that calculus is influenced not just by policy—policy is one of the things that they take least account of—but by things like the presence of family members, members of the community, friends, language and in some cases, in the context of small boat arrivals, escaping the Dublin system. Individuals may have claimed asylum in other EU countries—maybe those claims are outstanding or have been refused—and they understand that if they move to the UK they cannot be returned to the EU, because we are no longer a part of the EU and of the Dublin system that facilitated that.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Q Dr Walsh, you have just argued that deterrence does not really work, yet one of the big arguments on Second Reading was that somehow by repealing the Safety of Rwanda Act and most of the Illegal Migration Act we had thrown away the only thing that would work. Would you care to comment on that?

Dr Peter Walsh: Because under the IMA the Government proposed not to process people’s claims, they would not have known whether returning those individuals to countries of origin would be safe or not. That is where Rwanda came in.

There were always questions about the deterrent effect of the Rwanda policy. For my part, whatever deterrent effect it would have had would have depended fundamentally on how many people were actually sent to Rwanda. You can imagine that if it was a large share of people arriving by small boat, that might make people think twice, but if it were a small share—only thousands a year when we have tens of thousands of small boat arrivals—that would imply that the chance of being sent to Rwanda was fairly small. You can imagine that the people then making the trip would view that risk as just one risk among many much greater risks—risking their lives, for example—so there were always real questions about the deterrent effect of the Rwanda policy and how many people would in fact have been sent there.

The last Government said that the scheme was uncapped, and the Rwandan Government said, “We can take as many people as you can send.” But there were logistical challenges there, not least among them where people would be detained. At that time we had about 1,800 people in immigration detention in the UK, with a capacity of 2,200. You would have to detain people if you were threatening to remove them to Rwanda, so that was a very big initial stumbling block, putting aside whatever the capacity of those Rwandan facilities would have been, and more broadly the capacity of the Rwandan asylum system to process large numbers of claims. Typically it processed only a few hundred a year, not 10,000 or 20,000, so there were real questions there.

The big risk was what to do with people who are neither deterred from arriving nor able to be removed to Rwanda. That would be a sub-population in the UK without legal status who would be here indefinitely, so they would for ever have no legal right to remain in the UK, but we would be required to provide them with asylum accommodation and support at great cost. That was the risk when it came to Rwanda and the IMA.

Oral Answers to Questions

Matt Vickers Excerpts

Monday 24th February 2025 Commons Chamber

[Yvette Cooper]

I agree that special constables can play an important role. Their numbers have dropped by around two thirds over the past 14 years. I think that is damaging, and we want to increase their numbers. We are working with police forces on how best to achieve that so that they can play their part, both on the streets in neighbourhood teams and in supporting other specialist aspects of the police’s work.

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

Greater Manchester has one of the highest crime rates in the country, with many suffering as a result of antisocial behaviour, but this weekend we saw police officers knocking on the door of a grandmother because she dared to criticise a Labour councillor for his role in the pensioner-hating WhatsApp scandal. Does the Home Secretary agree that is a waste of police time?

[Yvette Cooper]

The Government have been clear that the focus of policing must be on the neighbourhood crimes that blight our communities. That is why we are increasing neighbourhood policing, because the Conservative party slashed the number of neighbourhood police on the beat and we lost thousands of neighbourhood police in our communities. That is why we are also focusing the police on serious violence. The legislation to be introduced tomorrow will focus on tackling serious violence and dealing with the most serious crimes in our communities—something that the Conservative party, which presided over a 61% increase in shoplifting alone during its last two years in power, failed time and again to do.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Speaker]

I call the shadow Minister. I have to get through the questions.

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

Fiona from Bradford was failed numerous times by social services and local police after suffering horrific sexual abuse at the hands of gangs of men while in a care home. Bradford’s local authority has shamefully sought to block a local inquiry into the issue. In Fiona’s own words:

“The Government can’t just leave it down to the local councils to decide if they’re going to be investigated, they’re going to have to enforce it.”

Will the Home Secretary reconsider a statutory inquiry into grooming gangs? If not, how will she guarantee that cases like that can never be allowed to happen again?

[Jess Phillips]

I am working with victims across the country to ensure, as has already been announced, that cold cases like the one referred to by the shadow Minister can be reopened. The Government have invested an extra £2.5 million in the taskforce to ensure that can happen. We will be working with local authorities across the country to ensure that the failures of the past are not repeated.

Employer National Insurance Contributions: Police Forces

Matt Vickers Excerpts

Tuesday 11th February 2025 Westminster Hall

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

Thank you, Dr Allin-Khan, for chairing this debate. I also thank my right hon. Friend the Member for Tatton (Esther McVey) for securing this important debate, and for all her work in raising awareness of this issue and its consequences.

The last Government recruited 20,000 more police officers, ensuring that there were more police officers on our streets than ever before. Why would anyone think that the solution to any problem would be a tax raid on our police forces? Any MP who has engaged with their PCC or chief constable knows that the funding settlement put forward for local police forces by this Government is entirely inadequate. Just the other week, when questioned by Nick Robinson about the absurd tax raid on local police forces and the fact that the police funding settlement will cut the number of police on our streets, the Minister conceded that she was not going to pretend that it is not challenging for police forces.

Since then, the Government have painted a different picture, understating the impact that this could have on our police forces and on police numbers. At first glance, the settlement may appear generous in cash terms. However, there is a sleight of hand. The Government are claiming to have increased police funding by £1.09 billion, masking their tax raid on our police forces and their failure to build police pay awards into the baseline. The previous Conservative Government provided in-year funding for PCCs to cover the police pay award, adding this to the baseline for subsequent years. By contrast, the in-year adjustment for this year’s pay settlement was not added to the baseline, so about £200 million of the apparent increase this year simply makes up for that omission.

Furthermore, as hon. Members have said, some £230 million of this apparently generous settlement will go straight back to the Treasury to pay for the Government’s national insurance tax raid on our local police forces. The Government are literally taxing the police off our streets. Therefore, about £430 million of this apparently generous increase just makes up for the Government’s choices. Adjusting for that, the increase in funding for policing next year is not £1.09 billion, but more like £660 million, or nearly £300 million less than the last increase under the previous Government. Make no mistake: this tax raid on local police forces, created by our own Government, will have real consequences for communities across England and Wales.

There are estimates that the shortfall in police funding could see 1,800 fewer police on our streets. My force, Cleveland police, has already been placed under special measures, with a recent report from His Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary and fire and rescue services giving it an inadequate rating for responding to children at risk of harm and for investigating child abuse, neglect and exploitation. It is deeply concerning and entirely unacceptable that vulnerable young people are being let down in such a way. Protecting children should be a priority for the Labour Government and for Cleveland’s Labour police and crime commissioner. These children deserve better. Does the Minister agree that creating a shortfall in funding for a force could lead to more failures in responding to and investigating child abuse, neglect and exploitation in Cleveland?

[Adam Jogee]

The shadow Minister knows I am a reasonable man, and I am not going to engage in partisan games for the fun of it—not all the time, anyway—but I want to draw him back to his use of the word “inadequate” to describe the settlement. Will he confirm that, if he had been the Policing Minister, the settlement would have been higher, and if so, how would that have been paid for?

[Matt Vickers]

As the hon. Member will have seen, in previous years, we were increasing the funding by more. In fact, last year we increased by £300 million more than what Labour is doing this year. We were not raiding our police forces with national insurance tax raids; we were putting the pay award into the baseline. I would be wasting less money on GB Energy. I would not be looking to give train drivers on £55,000 a year a bumper pay rise of almost £10,000, with no efforts to increase productivity. It is about priorities. Policing was a priority for the Conservative Government. That is why 20,000 more police officers were put on the streets, reaching record numbers.

The Government have pointed to their promise to recruit 13,000 new neighbourhood police officers, but we all know that a relatively small number—just 3,000—are new officers. Most of the claimed 13,000 are either reassigned or redeployed, are part-time volunteers or are police community support officers with no powers of arrest. That redeployment is concerning for many. Will the Minister assure MPs that when their constituents ring 999, they will not have to wait longer for an emergency response because response officers have been redeployed to neighbourhoods? Will she guarantee that police numbers will not fall any lower than the current level as a result of her funding settlement?

Given the nature of modern policing and overtime, to what extent did the Government consider the impact of overtime on the increased national insurance cost, and could there be a further shortfall as a result? We owe a huge debt of gratitude to our brave, hard-working police officers, PCSOs and police staff. They deserve resources and support, not tax raids and funding shortfalls.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Matt Vickers Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 10th February 2025 Commons Chamber

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

Today’s remarks from Conservative Members have been clear—we understand the public’s frustration that more has not been done to reduce these numbers. They are too high, and they must be lowered. During the election campaign, Labour said that it wanted to smash the gangs, but since it took power, small boat crossings have risen by 28%. Before the election, we were closing hotels, yet now 6,000 more people are in hotels, and the number of people arriving in small boats and being removed is down. Conservative Members remain deeply concerned that this Bill and the Government’s approach would represent a backwards step. Rather than utilising every power available, they are focused on tweaking existing laws and stripping away powers that were previously put in place. That is not the approach that the UK needs; rather, we need legislation and a strategy that establishes powers to stop illegal migration for good.

I can already hear Labour Members criticising the last Government. We do not deny that numbers were far too high—quite the opposite—but it was the last Government who introduced a deterrent, one that was scrapped by the Labour party immediately upon taking office before it could even begin. The Leader of the Opposition has been abundantly clear that despite efforts made by the last Government, far more needed to be done to solve the problem.

The problem for the Government is that, despite their complaints about their predecessors, this legislation is unlikely to provide anything like a real solution. The immigration crisis is undoubtedly one of the biggest challenges we face as a country, and it requires bold action. If people believe that they can arrive here illegally and stay, they will continue to come in ever-increasing numbers. The cancelling of the deterrent was an act of national self-harm. The increase in small boat arrivals since the Labour party took office makes that clear for the whole House to see.

[Gareth Snell]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Matt Vickers]

I will give way to people who have been here throughout and have contributed to the debate.

Some of the changes in the Bill weaken rather than strengthen our ability to deal with the issue. Creating a route to British citizenship for those arriving here illegally—enticing more people to come—cannot be part of the solution. Weakening our ability to scientifically verify the age of those arriving, creating huge safeguarding risks in our education and care system, is also not part of the solution.

The National Crime Agency, and examples from Governments around the world, show that a deterrent must be in place, but this Bill does the opposite by removing the deterrent that is currently in law. It seems to stem from the misguided belief that arresting a small number of these heinous criminals will be enough to stop the crossings. Even though we would all like that to be the case, it is a vast oversimplification.

On deterrence to stop criminals, we all agree on the need to arrest the people behind these crimes, which is why, in 2023, there were 246 arrests of people smugglers and 86 arrests of small boat pilots—and I am still stunned that the Labour party opposed life sentences for people smugglers. We need measures that stop people boarding those boats in the first place, however, because failing to do so not only harms our country but fails those who endanger their lives by making that perilous journey.

Where legislation increases enforcement powers, enables further interventions and enhances data availability, we will welcome it. The experience of the enforcement authorities must be heard to ensure that they have the necessary powers. These sensible measures should not, however, be bundled into a Bill that simultaneously weakens the Secretary of State’s authority. The Home Secretary’s remarks failed to acknowledge the impact of the repeals. [Interruption.] She could have commenced them with the stroke of a pen. We must ask why this Bill repeals sensible provisions. It is stunning that the Government would prefer to weaken their powers rather than strengthen them.

Turning specifically to the repeals of previously passed legislation, I ask the Government what is wrong with the principle that if someone enters the UK illegally, they should never have a path to British citizenship. Why remove that provision? British citizenship is a special privilege, not something to be granted lightly. Those who enter our country illegally—breaking our laws—should not be offered a pathway to citizenship. Regularly granting citizenship to such individuals undermines the deterrent and sends the damaging message that breaking the law can lead to benefits. That harms the UK and endangers those who risk their lives to come here.

Additionally, the legislation repeals the Secretary of State’s ability to regulate consent for scientific age assessments where there are no reasonable grounds to withhold consent. That was a sensible step to prevent the abuse of the system. Some may argue that the provision is unnecessary, but between 2016 and September 2022, around 8,000 asylum cases involved age disputes. In about half, the individuals were assessed to be adults. Removing that power again weakens our legal infrastructure. We have also suggested significant but appropriate changes to indefinite leave to remain and citizenship. Why should the right to stay not be dependent on someone’s willingness to contribute and obey the law?

Last week, the Brussels correspondent for The Times reported that the European Union is drafting plans to overhaul the post-war refugee convention in what may be one of the most significant shifts in migration policy for decades. That is a clear signal of a growing consensus across the western world that the legal structures and institutions that restrict the Government from doing what is best for our country, and that have been obstructive, are no longer fit for purpose in tackling this significant issue.

While EU countries look to put together a deterrent scheme similar to the one cancelled by the Government, we must ask what the Government are trying to achieve with this legislation. Rather than implementing the significant changes being seriously discussed in Europe, or those that have been effective in Australia, they are opting for limited interventions. They are focused on tweaks to the system while simultaneously reducing their own powers in other aspects of the legal framework. That is not the decisive leadership that we need from the Government of the United Kingdom; it is a weak approach stemming from weak leadership, and for that reason I urge the House to vote for the reasoned amendment. It would be far better for the Government to go away, return swiftly with the necessary legal changes, and adopt an approach that genuinely deters people from coming to this country illegally.

I remind Members that despite pledges to smash the gangs, as of yesterday crossings were up by nearly 28%. That demonstrates that, as we warned the Government, their plan is not working, and the reality is that there are no easy fixes to this problem. There are significant challenges in addressing the issues arising from channel crossings, but we do not believe that the appropriate response is to dismantle legislation that provides the Government with powers they could use for the benefit of the country. That would be capitulation, and a charter for illegal immigration. I say to the Government: bring forward a Bill that enhances the ability of enforcement agencies, rather than one that strips them of their powers. We need a solution that takes the transformative steps to reduce illegal migration significantly, and action that secures our country’s borders and stops these life-threatening crossings. It is wrong to tell the world that if someone comes here illegally they can become a British citizen. I urge Members to back the reasoned amendment.

Police Grant Report

Matt Vickers Excerpts

Wednesday 5th February 2025 Commons Chamber

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

Before engaging in the substance of the debate, I thank the brave, hard-working police officers, PCSOs, police staff and volunteers who work tirelessly to protect the public. They work day and night to make our communities safer, and run towards danger while others run away. We recognise the huge sacrifices that they make, giving their time, their health, and in the most tragic cases, their life.

I know that MPs across the House recognise our responsibility to support the police in their work. I am therefore pleased that Members have expressed their concerns to the Minister about this settlement. The reality is that the funding settlement put forward by the Government is inadequate. Everyone in this Chamber who has spoken with their local police force knows that the settlement will not provide the necessary resources, particularly given the inflationary pressures.

Last week, when questioned by Nick Ferrari about the absurd tax raid on our police forces and the fact that her settlement will cut the number of police on our streets, the Minister said that she was

“not pretending that it isn’t…challenging for police forces”.

Today, however, she and her colleagues are attempting to present a different picture, understating the settlement’s impact on reducing police numbers, and the financial challenge that it poses to our police forces. Last week, she stated that PCCs and chief constables must make local decisions about the composition of their forces. Will she now acknowledge that her Government’s decisions have created that impossible position for police leaders? At first glance, the settlement may appear generous in cash terms; however, there is a sleight of hand. The cash increase is not enough to cover new financial pressures, the biggest of which have been created by the Government. The funding will not be sufficient to sustain police forces. Without further action, it will ultimately lead to reductions in officer numbers.

Since the funding settlement was announced, numerous PCCs, chief constables and representative bodies have warned the Government about the challenges that it will create. Why are police forces so concerned? The impact of this year’s funding must be assessed in the context of two key factors. The first is the Government’s increase in national insurance contributions. Some £230 million of this apparently generous settlement will go straight back to the Treasury to pay the Government’s own tax raid on our own police forces. The Government are literally taxing the police off our streets. Economic data has already shown the harm that the national insurance raid has inflicted on businesses and jobs, but it has also reduced the financial benefit that the police will receive from the settlement.

Since the Government chose to impose this tax nationwide, it is only right that the Home Office should fully cover the cost of the tax increase for police forces, but the Government now claim that the £230 million that covers their own tax hike somehow counts as a funding increase. It is not a funding increase; it just covers an extra cost that the Government have imposed on our hard-working police forces. Would that money not have been better spent on more police officers, investments in technology to improve efficiency—something that the Government claim to prioritise—or targeted interventions?

[Gareth Snell (Stoke-on-Trent Central) (Lab/Co-op)]

The shadow Minister, like so many Conservative Members, was supportive of the health and social care levy, which was a larger and more wide-ranging increase in national insurance than anything proposed by this Government. I have just checked Hansard for the entire time that he has been a Member of this place, and not once did he speak out against that tax hike and not once has he referenced police funding, until today. What is it about being in opposition that makes him think he now has the moral high ground?

[Matt Vickers]

That is a false statement, actually—it is misleading. I have definitely mentioned police funding in the House before.

[Jessica Toale (Bournemouth West) (Lab)]

When?

[Matt Vickers]

Have a play with Hansard and let us see.

In fact, the sum of £230 million alone could have funded the recruitment, or at the least the retention, of thousands of officers who could have been out there protecting our neighbourhoods. Instead, it will be funnelled back into the Treasury to cover a host of other public sector pay demands from Labour’s union paymasters.

[Andy McDonald (Middlesbrough and Thornaby East) (Lab)]

Would the shadow Minister like to explain how he could sit on the Government Benches for several years but not say a word about the 20,000 officers who were lost, including the 500 lost in Cleveland?

[Matt Vickers]

After the last Labour Government’s spending and borrowing splurge caused the economic crisis of 2008, cuts were made, but the hon. Gentleman should be happy because thereafter we increased the number of police officers on the streets of the UK to record numbers: 149,679. That is the highest number of police officers ever on our streets.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[Matt Vickers]

No, I am going to make some progress, thank you very much.

Some might say that the Minister is giving with one hand and taking with the other. However, given the tax rises, it is clear that she is giving with the left hand and taking back with the far-left hand—[Interruption.] Does the Minister want to intervene?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Jess Phillips)]

I wonder whether the shadow Minister knows what pays for policing. The money comes from the Treasury, and when there is nothing left—for example, because the Home Office in which the shadow Home Secretary was a Minister did not put any money towards many of the schemes set out in their Budget—where does he think the money has to come from?

[Matt Vickers]

Taxpayers—the people who go out day and night, work hard and cough up for the national insurance rise. It is those small businesses battered by the Government’s slashing of rates relief on leisure, hospitality and retail businesses—absolutely horrendous. Those hard-working men and women out there paying their taxes fund these police officers.

The second big issue with the funding formula is that previous Conservative Governments provided in-year funding for PCCs to cover the police pay award, which was then added to the baseline, so any increase was on top of that already elevated baseline. By contrast, the in-year adjustment for this year’s pay settlement was not added to the baseline, so about £200 million of this apparently generous increase simply makes up for that omission. Around £430 million of that apparently generous increase actually makes up for the Government’s own choices. Adjusting for that, the increase in funding for policing next year is not £1.9 billion at all, but more like £660 million—nearly £300 million less than the last increase under the previous Government. That actual increase of £660 million is not enough to meet pay and inflationary pressures.

Freedom of information requests from police forces highlight the financial strain, with some forces not receiving the full amount required from the Home Office. That shortfall must then be covered, either by local taxpayers or through cuts elsewhere. I would be interested to hear the Minister for Policing’s view on this, given that her party was a strong proponent of freezing council tax in 2023—a principle that, like so many others, seems to have been abandoned now that Labour is in government. All that means is that police budgets are overstretched and the forces will inevitably have to make tough decisions.

Although estimates vary, the National Police Chiefs’ Council projected in December a £1.3 billion funding gap over the next two years, which the council’s finance lead said would inevitably result in job losses. Other estimates suggest that the funding shortfall is closer to £118 million per year, even when accounting for the additional funding announced last week.

Regardless of which estimate we use, either should be of serious concern to the Home Office and the Government. Given current staffing costs, the lower figure of £118 million could mean job losses for over 1,800 officers, which is unacceptable. Yes, a Labour Government who are borrowing like no one is watching and spending like there is no tomorrow could still leave us with 1,800 fewer officers on our streets.

[Mr Jonathan Brash (Hartlepool) (Lab)]

I would like to explore a little further the shadow Minister’s understanding of how taxes pay for things. He says that taxation pays for police officers and he believes that he has identified a funding gap. Will he explain to the House how he would fill that gap?

[Matt Vickers]

Last year there was funding of £900 million-plus; this year it is only £660 million. The hon. Gentleman is completely overstating what the Government are giving police officers. [Interruption.] He is wrong. We managed the finances to put the largest ever number of police officers on the streets of the UK. The Minister has given no guarantees that she will maintain that.

[Chris Vince]

Will the shadow Minister give way?

[Matt Vickers]

I will carry on; I am sure that there will be plenty of opportunities for everybody to contribute to the debate.

Thanks to measures introduced by the then Conservative Government, the total number of officers stood at 149,769 in March 2024—the highest headcount since comparable records began.

[Chris Vince]

Will the shadow Minister give way?

[Matt Vickers]

The hon. Gentleman will have plenty of opportunities to contribute.

I know that Labour Members do not like this fact, but the Conservatives left office with record numbers of police and thousands more officers on our streets than ever before. All we are doing is calling on the Government to try at the very least to maintain that number, not reduce it. In reality, the Government are placing police forces in an impossible position. How do they expect forces to meet their financial obligations without cutting officer numbers?

The Government will point to their intention to recruit new neighbourhood officers, but we all know that includes only a relatively small number of new officers—just 3,000. Most of the claimed 13,000 officers are either being reassigned, are part time, are volunteers or are PCSOs with no power of arrest. Given the existing budget shortfalls, I am concerned that that level of recruitment will not be enough. The £200 million allocated in that inadequate settlement appears insufficient to meet the Government’s stated objectives.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

rose—

[Matt Vickers]

Will the Minister be honest and acknowledge that in order to achieve what has been outlined, officers will need to be reassigned? If so, will she assure us that those officers will be assigned appropriately? Can she assure MPs—

[Jess Phillips]

Let her intervene!

[Matt Vickers]

I am sure that the Minister will have opportunities to come back to me. Can she assure MPs that when their constituents ring 999, they will not have to wait long for an emergency response, because response officers have been redeployed to neighbourhoods?

[Dame Diana Johnson]

rose—

[Matt Vickers]

Go on—you are welcome.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I just thought it might be helpful if I gave the shadow Minister a reminder. He is right that there were 149,769 police officers in March 2024, but in June—when the Conservative Government were still in power—that figure had been reduced by 1,232 to 148,536 officers. The numbers went down on the previous Government’s watch.

[Matt Vickers]

By the measurements in September, that is not the case. By the time September came—[Interruption.] Is the Minister going to give us the guarantee that the numbers will not go down any further as a result of the funding?

The Government have undeniably set well-intentioned goals. Halving knife crime and tackling violence against women and girls are ambitions that will be celebrated across Parliament and across the country, but what are the actual measures for halving violence against women and girls? Without enough police officers available to prioritise those issues, progress will be far more difficult.

Moving forward, will the Government commit to fully funding pay increases and ensuring that additional tax burdens are not placed on police forces in the years ahead? What has been put forward today does not do enough to provide the resources that the police need to tackle criminals in our society, meaning that the only winners will be those who thrive on criminality.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

--- Later in debate ---

[Rachel Hopkins (Luton South and South Bedfordshire) (Lab)]

I begin by putting on record my congratulations to Trevor Rodenhurst, the chief constable of Bedfordshire police, on being awarded the King’s Police Medal for distinguished service. It is well deserved. Like others, I thank the police officers, PCSOs and all police staff at Bedfordshire police for their service.

After years of campaigning for better funding for Bedfordshire police, I am very pleased that this Labour Government have demonstrated our commitment to safer streets and more police in our communities by bringing forward this core funding settlement. Bedfordshire police has been awarded £67.8 million, an increase of 6.6%, as well as £1.8 million in neighbourhood policing guarantee funding for 2025-26. This increase comes after 14 years of Tory cuts and underfunding.

[Matt Vickers]

Will the hon. Lady give way on that point?

[Rachel Hopkins]

I will not give way.

Those cuts and that underfunding have required Bedfordshire police to cut spending by over £50 million. I thank our Labour police and crime commissioner for Bedfordshire, John Tizard, for his commitment to ensuring that we make the best use of our funds to increase policing capacity, and for his dedication to tackling violent crime across our county. I particularly thank him for his ongoing desire to work in partnership with other public services and the voluntary sector, with a focus on prevention.

Bedfordshire has a diverse landscape, and our police cover urban, densely populated towns including Bedford and Luton, which suffer from crime associated with metropolitan areas. Our county has significant transportation links—road, rail and air—making Bedfordshire a particular hotspot for organised crime, including firearms and drug supply offences. Unfortunately, our police force is also tackling the impact of knife crime; in the period from January 2023 to March 2024, there were 449 knife crime-related incidents in Luton alone, and in recent weeks we have seen more violent crime in Luton. Two stabbings have taken place, one of which tragically resulted in a fatality.

Despite those factors, Bedfordshire police is still currently funded as a rural police force, due to failures by the previous Government to fix the archaic funding formula. Special grants have been provided each year since 2019-20 to tackle the disproportionately high gun and gang crime in Bedfordshire, with a further grant awarded since 2021-22 to combat organised crime.

I cannot comment on the contributions made by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Stockton West (Matt Vickers), but I and many other Members from across the House who represent constituencies in Bedfordshire have spoken many times about the funding formula for our police force. It is currently awaiting confirmation of the continuation of those special grants, which equate to 5% of its total budget. Announcements are expected later this month, so I urge the Minister to consider the specific circumstances of our police force when taking those decisions, as the impact of those grants cannot be overestimated.

I will close by saying how pleased I am to see multi-year settlements for local government coming in, because that provides local government with more stability in its partnerships with our police forces, working to ensure community safety.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers]

We have heard a great deal from Members across the House about the grant and the impact it will have on various communities. I reiterate my earlier point that we are deeply concerned about the effect that will have on policing. Members do not need to take my word for it; they can listen to the words of police leadership. Mark Rowley, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, previously said that the force would be

“scaling back our ability to tackle serious violence and organised crime”.

Norfolk’s chief constable, Paul Sanford, who is the National Police Chiefs’ Council’s lead for finance, described the funding package as challenging and said that cuts were inevitable. One of Labour’s own police and crime commissioners, Joy Allen, PCC for Durham, also said the money

“may not go as far as we would all hope”

and that

“We will have to wait and see what this additional funding covers and how long it lasts”.

Does the Minister think the £100 million announced will be enough to stop those cuts?

Unfortunately, we have seen that sentiment reflected not only in words, but in the actions of police forces. Lincolnshire Police says there is a budget gap of £14 million. To manage that, it plans to reduce the number of police officers by around 200, bringing the total down to 1,000 officers by 2028-29, alongside cancelling the upcoming police officer intake for March. Lincolnshire is unfortunately not alone. In Essex the shortfall in the Government’s police funding settlement led the police force to announce plans to eliminate all 99 of its police community support officers—[Interruption.] I am coming to it; worry not!—and reduce staff numbers by around 65 people. While I acknowledge that that was prior to last week’s announcement, Essex will still receive £2.2 million. However, Essex Police had identified a £5.3 million budget shortfall, so it is still over £3 million short. While the additional funding is welcome, it will not be sufficient to bridge the gap. That is a direct result of the funding shortfall.

Derbyshire’s chief constable stated that its budget shortfall of £1.5 million by the end of the financial year had increased to £5.5 million after the Budget. However, it did not stop there. She said that it was compounded further by the Home Office grant settlement in December, which increased the amount that the force needed to balance the books to more than £8.5 million.

In that context, last week’s announcement appears to be only 18% of the previously announced shortfall. Meanwhile, PCCs across the country—from Norfolk Constabulary to Thames Valley Police, and even in my home force of Cleveland Police—have repeatedly highlighted the challenges they face while having to increase the precept. Those decisions expose the hollowness of Labour’s so-called neighbourhood policing guarantee. How can the Government claim to be delivering that if forces must cut staff simply to maintain officer numbers at their current level?

Another aspect of this debate is the decision to increase funding through precept rises. During last year’s debate, Labour’s then shadow policing Minister, the hon. Member for Nottingham North and Kimberley (Alex Norris), said from the Opposition Benches that

“the Government have lifted the cap on the precept so that PCCs can raise it by £13 next year for band D properties. That in itself is a challenge for people’s finances, but it also creates differential challenges across the country… That failure of leadership has consequences for less well-off areas”.—[Official Report, 7 February 2024; Vol. 745, c. 286.]

Yet now that the Labour party is in government, its stance appears to have changed. This year’s precept increase is even more significant than the one announced last year. Like so much about this Government, they promise one thing to win an election and do completely the opposite when they are in charge. Given their actions now, will they acknowledge that they underestimated police funding needs when in opposition, and seem to be continuing to underestimate them now that they are in government?

Of course, we will not do anything to stop the police from getting the resources they need, so we will not vote against the motion, but I hope the Government recognise that their actions will not only make their job more challenging but risk undermining communities across the country. They have used a sleight of hand to pretend that the extra money for policing is more than it really is. As a result, police forces will not have enough funding to meet cost pressures, and cuts to police numbers are inevitable. If the Minister for Policing disagrees, will she guarantee that total police numbers will not fall from the record level at the previous Government’s last national workforce count of 31 March 2024?

I know that my colleagues want to work with the Government to empower police forces in their constituencies by giving them all the resources they need. However, we remain concerned that this settlement is a sign that the challenges that the Minister for Policing refers to will only grow over the course of this Parliament. Instead of a tax raid, we should give our police forces the resources they need and show our brave frontline officers the respect and support that they deserve.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Jess Phillips)]

First, I express my gratitude to all Members who have contributed to the debate. Before I respond to their points—and I will respond—I take this opportunity to say a massive thank you to the police officers, staff and volunteers who work tirelessly to keep us all safe. The contribution they make to our society is simply extraordinary, and we are fortunate to have them. I shamelessly take this opportunity to give a shout-out to Orla Jenkins and Jim Carroll, my sergeant and inspector, who almost live in my office—which is not a particularly good thing. They are absolutely amazing, responsive and well-known neighbourhood coppers. It is so important that people know the names of their neighbourhood officers and can contact them.

I do not plan to repeat the top headlines of the settlements that we are debating, as they were covered at length by my right hon. Friend the Minister for Policing, Fire and Crime Prevention, but I reiterate that the settlement represents a significant investment in policing that will kick-start the delivery of the safer streets mission. Neighbourhood policing is the bedrock of British policing. That is why we have injected an additional £100 million into neighbourhood policing compared with the provisional settlement, which means that we are doubling the funding available to forces to a total of £200 million so that they can carry on the fight against crime and keep communities safe.

Let me turn to some of the points raised during the debate. I welcome the comments from the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Stockton West (Matt Vickers). It seems that he lives in wonderland. He has talked today as if we have come from some amazing nirvana with regard to policing, not from a situation where every single part of our system—whether it is our courts, our police, our mental health services or our housing—has been so utterly degraded that all of that work landed on the hard-working police forces that he sought to praise.

[Matt Vickers]

Will the Minister give way?

[Jess Phillips]

Go on.

[Matt Vickers]

I was just wondering whether the Minister knew how much this national insurance tax raid was going to cost her local police force and those hard-working police officers in her part of the world.

[Jess Phillips]

I am not exactly sure how much it will cost West Midlands police, but what I do know is that the Home Office is going to give it to them. The shadow Minister has talked as if taxes do not pay for our public services—that is an absolute madness; money has to be raised to pay for our public services. The Home Office is funding the national insurance rise for West Midlands police and every other—[Interruption.] I cannot believe that it is being argued that our police forces were not completely and utterly decimated, and there seems to have been a tiny bit of whitewashing from some Members on the Liberal Democrat Benches about the role that their party also played in taking 20,000 police officers off our streets.

The shadow Minister specifically questioned the Policing Minister on 999 calls and response officers, and on how we will halve violence against women and girls with the help of this settlement. I want to bring him back from wonderland into the real world and tell him a story about Raneem Oudeh, who called 999 13 times on the night she was murdered by her husband. She called out to West Midlands police 13 times, and there was no immediate response—the immediate response that I am being told has always existed, along with, “Oh, something is going to change.”

Oh my gosh—I do not know what system the shadow Minister thinks has existed for the past 14 years, but I will tell him what we are going to do. We are going to put specialist domestic abuse workers in every single one of our police force response rooms, because of the failures of response under police forces decimated by the years of Conservative Governments. Frankly, I am flabbergasted by the shadow Minister’s gall. My husband often says, “I don’t know why you continue to be surprised.”

My hon. Friend the Member for Luton South and South Bedfordshire (Rachel Hopkins) raised the issue of the funding formula, as have many other Members in the Chamber today. I know that the Policing Minister has visited Bedfordshire and very much heard the particular challenges they face.

The hon. Member for Hazel Grove (Lisa Smart) talked about the mental health and morale of police. I went out to Hertfordshire police recently to see some police officers who were dog handlers; the dogs were there to sniff out the hard drives of sex offenders and child sex abusers. One of the officers had this amazing dog, Micky, and I noticed that it was the first time I had seen a police officer look genuinely happy for quite a long time. Morale in policing and the health of our police officers have been dreadfully tested over recent years, and I noted how chuffed this bloke was to be doing his job with this dog—the dog was lovely. We need to make sure we are looking after our police officers, and the Policing Minister informs me that as part of our reform programme, we are having a very close look at how occupational health is handed out to police officers.

The hon. Members for Richmond Park (Sarah Olney), for Wimbledon (Mr Kohler) and for Sutton and Cheam (Luke Taylor) all raised the issue of the Met. The Met is large and complex, and my hon. Friend the Member for Leyton and Wanstead (Mr Bailey) mentioned—as did many others—the issue of police officers being taken away from the frontlines in their neighbourhoods in order to undertake not just policing of the capital, but sometimes national policing in other areas. I reassure Members that the funding formula for neighbourhood policing means that it has to be spent on neighbourhood policing and cannot really be pulled away to other areas.

[Matt Vickers]

Does the Minister think that reducing the number of people working in response policing to make up the numbers in neighbourhood policing will improve or reduce response times?

[Jess Phillips]

What I think is that we have put £1.1 billion extra into policing, and what I expect to happen across police forces is that we will work with them. As we have seen today from Members in Essex—[Interruption.] Would the shadow Minister like to intervene? What are you shaking your head about, sir?

[Matt Vickers]

rose—

[Jess Phillips]

Go on.

[Matt Vickers]

As we have heard, once you take out your national insurance tax raid and the pay rise that you took from the base, it is more like £660 million, which is £300 million less than last year’s settlement from the Conservative Government.

[Jess Phillips]

Earlier, I heard everybody groan on your Benches—

Asylum Seeker Hotel Accommodation: Reopening

Matt Vickers Excerpts

Tuesday 21st January 2025 Westminster Hall

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

Thank you, Sir John, for chairing your third debate. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Windsor (Jack Rankin) for proposing this discussion on an important issue for many MPs and their constituents across the country.

If we need to provide accommodation for those who arrive in the UK seeking asylum, it is critical that we do all we can to ensure that that accommodation is cost-effective and does not unduly burden our communities. Unfortunately, we know all too well that hotel accommodation for asylum seekers fails to meet either of those criteria. Despite the disagreements that have been expressed today, this is an issue on which all Members of the House can and should agree.

As the Minister is aware, significant steps were taken by the last Government to reduce the number of people housed in hotel accommodation, which went from a peak of 56,042 in September 2023 to 29,585 at the end of June 2024. That is a 47% decrease. That was accompanied by the closure of many hotels from their peak number. It was therefore welcome to see this Government’s manifesto promise to close asylum hotels entirely. The pledge was clear: the Government would “end asylum hotels”. That is a goal that we all hope they will achieve, as it would undoubtedly benefit communities across the country.

The unfortunate reality, however, is that since this Government took power, we have gone in the opposite direction. Official Home Office statistics show that as of 30 September, 35,651 people were in hotel accommodation, an increase of 21% since the general election. Instead of hotels being closed, we have seen the contrary: the Minister informed the House last week that there has been a net increase of six hotels since the election. We have heard from MPs that announcements about new hotels are often made with little notice, leaving minimal time to prepare and a lack of clarity. Although the Government should undoubtedly improve that process, surely the most impactful approach would be to reduce the reliance on hotel accommodation altogether.

Sometimes it is too easy to focus on statistics. Although they provide an important part of the picture, it is through speaking to residents that we hear about the very real consequences for communities. In November, Councillor Nathan Evans invited me to visit Altrincham to see the huge impact of such a hotel on his community. I spoke to residents, business owners and the local chamber of commerce about the direct and indirect effects of Labour’s decisions. They emphasised the need for safety, security and clear communication. Those were reasonable requests that they felt had fallen on deaf ears at both the Home Office and the local authority.

As well as the concerns about security, there was a very evident impact on the local economy. In Altrincham, the loss of nearly 300 hotel places in the local hospitality sector was huge. Families who had worked day and night for years to create incredible small businesses, operating in an already challenging environment, now had to deal with another huge and unpredicted blow to their footfall. I suggest that the Minister considers visiting Altrincham, not only to see some incredible small businesses with a unique offering, but to see the impact of the decisions she makes.

Too often, places like Altrincham receive information at the last minute, leaving them unable to prepare and taken aback by the sudden loss of normal business generated by these hotels. That lack of warning undermines trust and further fosters animosity towards the system. I understand that this is a complex issue, but will the Minister consider the suggestion that the shadow Home Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), made in November: that greater notice be given to MPs before a hotel opens in their constituency? I also ask the Minister how sites are chosen and what consideration is given to proximity to local schools, care homes and centres for the vulnerable, as well as the impact on the local business community.

I recognise that the Minister and other hon. Members will point out that the number of people housed in hotels was too high under the last Government. They are correct, and my party does not shy away from that fact. The Leader of the Opposition has been clear that mistakes were made regarding immigration. Nevertheless, the last Government were taking steps to rectify these issues by closing hotels and attempting to halt illegal immigration. Since the election, however, we have seen increases both in contingency accommodation and in dispersal accommodation.

Ultimately, the Minister, like the rest of us, knows the root cause of the problem: the illegal and dangerous channel crossings. As of 19 January, 24,132 people had crossed the channel in small boats since the election, a 30% increase on the same period in 2023-24. What is more, the number of those being deported is actually going down.

We need a deterrent. If people arrive here illegally, they should not be allowed to stay. Until that is the case, they will continue to arrive in ever increasing numbers. Despite pledges to “smash the gangs”, it appears that the gangs remain active and evasive. This behaviour underscores the importance of deterrence, as highlighted by the National Crime Agency and reportedly by the head of the Government’s Border Security Command.

Policing alone is insufficient. The rise in small boat crossings illustrates that scrapping the UK’s deterrent policy before it had even started was a short-sighted decision; in fact, it was a decision of national self-harm. The deterrent approach has been successfully implemented in other countries such as Australia, which managed to resolve similar issues through decisive action. We have even seen it working here in the UK, with the Albania returns agreement reducing arrivals by more than 90%. Given the increasing numbers and the failure to reduce small boat crossings into this country, will the Government reconsider whether their approach to illegal migration has been effective thus far?

On costs, the Government’s policy is to expedite asylum decisions. Consequently, the costs associated with accepted migrants risk being obscured within the welfare system. The Home Office has previously acknowledged that it has no estimate of the potential cost of benefit claims and council-housing bills for those individuals. Will the Minister commit to recording and publishing the costs for migrants whose asylum claims are accepted?

I know that the Minister has previously stated that hotels are a temporary measure, not a solution. While she may be well intentioned, the continuing small boat crossings suggest that the need for contingency accommodation is unlikely to subside without decisive action. Can the Minister therefore explain whether there is a contingency plan should small boat crossings persist? Additionally, will the Government ensure that every possible policy option is explored to reduce the number of people in hotel accommodation in a cost-effective manner?

[Sir John Hayes (in the Chair)]

I call the Minister of State for Border Security and Asylum. Minister, I hope that you might finish at 6.03 pm to allow the hon. Member for Windsor to say a few words at the end.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I am happy to go on to what we are doing, but the legacy that one inherits is important and has to be taken into account when thinking about how we deliver for the future. We said that the Rwanda scheme was not going to work and that we would restart asylum processing. We also said we were going to set up the Border Security Command, which has been done. Opposition Members will know that there is legislation pending on border security and asylum, which hopefully will come before the House in the not-too-distant future. It has taken shape, but it is going through various processes to get agreement on when we can publish and introduce it.

Given the concern of Members in this Chamber, I hope they will attempt to engage positively with the new Bill when it is published, so that we can get the Border Security Command up and running as quickly as possible with the correct powers, including counter-terrorism powers. That will allow us to take more effective action to start dismantling and disrupting the activities of the smuggler gangs. In the last few years we have seen them be allowed to grow across the channel, becoming increasingly sophisticated and industrialising their processes. I hope all Members will agree that we have a duty to take action. We want to restore order to the asylum system so that it operates compassionately and efficiently. That will enable us to exit hotels and bring down the cost of the asylum system by billions of pounds.

Let me address the motion specifically. The strain on the system has necessitated the continued use of hotels in the medium term to enable the Home Office to deliver its statutory responsibilities to house asylum seekers while their claims are looked at. Of course, the more efficiently and effectively we can look at the claims, the less trouble we will have trying to house people—as the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Mid Dunbartonshire (Susan Murray) said. I disagree with her comments about the right to work. There are legal ways of trying to get into this country with a right to work that are processed through the visa system. We cannot have people getting around that by coming illegally and then having the right to work. That would be a huge pull factor that we simply do not want to countenance. She and I will disagree about it, but that is the Government’s view.

Since the general election, nine hotels have closed. Fifteen hotels were opened temporarily, and I apologise to the hon. Member for Windsor for the speed with which that had to be done. It is not ideal and I would not want to be in that position again. I have asked Home Office officials to be more open and transparent, as far ahead of time as possible, to try to give warning. We do not want any nasty surprises, but the hon. Gentleman had one. I have apologised for that—

[Matt Vickers]

Will the Minister give way?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I will be happy to, but let me finish apologising. I apologised to the hon. Member for Windsor in my response to the letter he sent me. It was not an ideal situation and it is not one we want to get into again.

[Matt Vickers]

What would the Minister say is a sensible period of notice that she would like the Home Office to give before migrants arrive in a hotel?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

We do not want to get into that situation, because we want to go down rather than up, but I would want notice of significant changes to be “as much as possible” because, sometimes, operational things occur. A hotel site can be lost—for example, we lost one in Manchester during the floods. Unexpected things can happen that have certain implications, so I will say it is as much notice as possible.

[Matt Vickers]

And MPs would know in advance?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Yes, as much as possible and, I hope, more in advance than we managed during the openings that I talked about.

Since the general election, nine hotels have closed. There were 15 opened temporarily—which is what this debate is really about—and nine are scheduled for closure by the end of March 2025. I certainly hope that, as we look for more dispersed accommodation and a more effective, faster system, we will get to the stage where we do not have to open any more. I cannot give the hon. Member for Windsor any date when the hotel in his constituency might close but I am working to close all such hotels. As I have said on the record, the use of hotels is undesirable and is not value for money. It is unsustainable in the long term and we want to get away from it.

Given that it is 6.03 pm, I congratulate the hon. Member for Windsor on securing the debate. I am happy to stay in touch with him about what is happening with the hotel in his constituency.