Anti-Semitism in the UK

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Wednesday 21st February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for the Statement. It is warming to see the Government taking things seriously. I will not raise many more questions as to what they are doing because I think we all want to do something to cut down on anti-Semitism.

I welcome the comments on and compliments to the Community Security Trust, which the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, referred to. I must declare that I am a member of the CST’s advisory board, although my advice is rarely sought. It does an incredible job, not only on the statistics on which we base a lot of our information but in the security it presents to the Jewish community in the UK. I do not know whether anyone has had a chance to go to the CST’s headquarters in Hendon. It has an array of television monitors that are the envy of Scotland Yard. There are rows and rows of them. How do they cope with recording things at each individual site? They are monitored and are activated by movement, so although you might have 100 monitors they may be covering 1,000 sites, because they do not come on until there is physical activity in that area. It is state of the art and quite amazing.

We all decry anti-Semitism, but it appears, sadly, that no political party is immune from it. It is rampant in the UK, and if it is rampant in the UK it will be rampant in organisations, including political parties. When it comes up in any political party, it is the duty of that political party or administration to stamp on that anti-Semitism. Take politicians as an example: they stand for the local council or for Parliament and people carry out due diligence, but sometimes they do not come out, at that time, with the feelings that are abhorrent to us all.

It was a horrific time, on 7 October, when there was a massacre on the borders of Gaza, in Israel. People were killed, murdered and slaughtered. A couple of hundred people were taken hostage, some of them from a music festival. The other day, I met here in this House a woman in her early 20s who was at that music festival—a gig that many of us, our children or our grandchildren might have gone to if it had been in the UK. She survived because she was underneath all the dead bodies. What trauma that is. That is a harsh example of anti-Semitism.

We are thankful to the CST for giving us this information: Israel had not yet responded on 7 October but there were 31 incidents of anti-Semitism in the UK that day. This continued until it peaked on 11 October, with 80 incidents in the UK. The week following 7 October saw 416 anti-Semitic incidents. The speed and number of these incidents on or after 7 October appear to show that this increase in anti-Jewish hate—that is what it is—was a celebration of Hamas’s attack. It was not just what everyone wants to believe: they were actually celebrating the attack. The subsequent response has added fuel to the flames.

I have seen this anti-Semitism in my own locality. There is a kosher supermarket which I patronise. On a week when I was not there—otherwise I could have been a hero—a man with a knife attacked the shop owners in Golders Green. Recently, there have been a number of incidents; it is hard to pick them out. One of the most horrifying ones was in a theatre in London, where the stand-up comedian decided, as part of his act, to wave a Ukrainian and a Palestinian flag, and invited the members of the audience to stand up and clap those flags. One guy in the audience was an Israeli, there enjoying the show, and he did not stand up—he did not make a fuss but he did not stand up. The comedian picked him out and he and the audience forced the guy out. The anti-Semitism forced him out of the theatre. This is the reality of how anti-Semitism is working in many fields.

I understand what is sometimes behind many of the people on the marches which take place—a horror at the Palestinians’ suffering in Gaza. I sympathise with and understand that. But I must say that, as an Orthodox Jew in the UK, I am reminded somewhat of the Duke of Wellington’s comment “I don’t know what effect they will have on the enemy but by God they frighten me”. I do not know what effect they are having on people in Parliament, but I will tell you the effect they have on the UK Jewish community.

The CST, which has been mentioned, works in schools in the UK to protect the people of those schools. At the moment, there are Jewish parents who are not sending their children to their Jewish schools because they are frightened. If they are sending them, they are telling them not to wear the school blazers or their yarmulkes—their head covering—because it will identify them. This is the UK, this is the country we live in, and this is not how it should be. My local synagogue has had security outside it forever; I used to do the security until they decided they would probably kill me first. But it is just something in practice.

So anti-Semitism is here, and it is rampant. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked a number of questions; I will not repeat any of them because, in fact, the Government have understood what the problem is. The Labour Front Bench understands it and my Front Bench understands it. We must support the police, and support the Government, of whatever hue they are, in dealing with the dreadful horror of anti-Semitism that sadly exists in this country.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank both noble Lords for their comments. On 19 February, my right honourable friend the Policing Minister made a very powerful Statement in the other place. He stated very clearly:

“This Government will not stand for antisemitism of any kind”.—[Official Report, Commons, 19/2/24; col. 500.]


He added that nothing could ever be used for its justification. He is, of course, right. Anti-Semitism is deplorable, and it is worse now than I have ever known it.

I turn to the late, great Rabbi Jonathan Sacks, formerly of your Lordships’ House, for some words to sum up my feelings on this. With the House’s indulgence, I will repeat them and I sincerely hope I speak for many. He said:

“Jews cannot fight antisemitism alone. The victim cannot cure the crime. The hated cannot cure the hate. It would be the greatest mistake for Jews to believe that they can fight it alone. The only people who can successfully combat antisemitism are those active in the cultures that harbour it. Antisemitism begins with Jews, but it never ends with them. A world without room for Jews is one that has no room for difference, and a world that lacks space for difference lacks space for humanity itself”.


I think that is very powerful.

I join both noble Lords in praising the work of the Community Security Trust, which I hope to visit very soon. I hope that my private office is busy, as we speak, arranging that. I also join the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, in noting that the rise in some of these incidents spiked after 7 October, but before there had been any military response by Israel, which really illustrates the pernicious nature of what we are talking about.

If I may, I will get on to the specific questions. I was asked a lot, and unfortunately, owing to my long-windedness, I will probably go a little over time—but I will not apologise for that as I would rather answer the questions.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, backed up by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, asked what we are doing to protect Jewish schools. Department for Education Ministers have written to university, school and college leaders, urging them all to ensure that Jewish students are protected and, of course, are offered our support. That is part of the continued engagement with the sector to ensure that settings have the tools they need to act swiftly to tackle anti-Semitic abuse and discriminatory rhetoric.

The terrorist atrocities carried out against the people of Israel are of course horrifying, and anti-Semitism in British society will not be tolerated. This extends to our schools, colleges and universities. So the department is working with all relevant authorities to keep Jewish pupils, students and educational staff safe. We are providing an additional £3 million for the Community Security Trust to provide additional security at Jewish schools, synagogues and other Jewish community buildings. The Government’s Educate Against Hate website provides support for pupils to challenge racist and discriminatory beliefs, and we are due to imminently send letters to schools outlining advice on managing sensitive discussions around anti-Semitism.

The funding for the Community Security Trust will be maintained next year, with a total of £36 million available for the protection of UK Jewish communities between 2023-24 and 2024-25. The Prime Minister has also announced a number of other aspects to this funding. As I mentioned already, it is to provide security at schools, synagogues and other community sites.

I will also comment on the remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker; I was talking to somebody who works at the Community Security Trust. They pointed out, in a very powerful comment, that in most schools the alarms are for people to get out. In Jewish schools, they are for people to stay in and hide under a table. That is what we are talking about. The Chancellor’s Autumn Statement confirmed that protective security funding for the Jewish community would be maintained at £18 million in 2024-25.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, also raised the important subject of Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate. The Government have made an additional £4.9 million of funding available for protective security at mosques and Muslim faith schools, which brings the total funding to £29.4 million for both 2023-24 and 2024-25. We obviously have to listen to the concerns with the same attentiveness. The Government have made additional funding available. The total funding is a good number and is, I believe, delivering the appropriate safeguards. We have also extended the deadline for the protective security for mosques scheme and continue to invite mosques and Muslim faith community centres to register for protective security measures. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for referring to the work of Tell MAMA, which he will know has been supported by DLUHC to the tune of £6 million, I think, since its inception.

I will move on to the subject of the police and their powers. The police are fully aware of the powers available to them. I believe there have been more than 600 arrests so far. I take this opportunity to thank the police for their work; six officers were injured over the weekend in these protests, and I wish them a speedy recovery, as I am sure all noble Lords do. Of those 600 arrests, I believe that more than 30 were made for terrorism-related offences.

That the police are fully aware of their powers has been repeatedly demonstrated, most recently with respect to a convoy planned from the north of England to north London, many parts of which have Jewish communities. The police stopped that convoy because they were concerned it would inflame tensions and engage in intimidatory behaviour. Under Sections 12 and 14 of the Public Order Act 1986 the police have powers to impose conditions on protests to prevent specific consequences, including serious public disorder, serious disruption to the life of the community or intimidation. The police can impose any condition they deem necessary to prevent these harms occurring and have made repeated use of these powers—for example, to prohibit protests outside the Israeli embassy and to ensure that vulnerable communities are protected.

The recent protests have seen a small minority dedicated to causing damage and intimidating the law-abiding majority. We respect the right to protest, which we regard as paramount in our country, but dangerous behaviour must not be tolerated. Noble Lords will remember that we announced new powers last week—for example, banning the use of face coverings, about war memorials, on using flares and so on.

As regards the recent protests, the Chancellor set out in his Autumn Statement that we are giving organisations such as the Holocaust Educational Trust £7 million over the next three years. That, as I said, goes into the overall protective security funding for the Jewish community.

However, we need to be very careful when we are criticising the police for actions they may or may not have taken at individual marches. It is difficult to judge what it is like when you are in a protest and trying to police it. We should trust the police. We know that they have good advice in the control rooms and so on, and that they are doing their very best under difficult circumstances. Once again, I praise their efforts.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked about the hate crime strategy and action plan. We are not intending to publish a new plan at this time, but we remain committed to continuing to protect all communities from crime, and we have a number of programmes in place to do so. Our absolute priority was to get more police on the streets. I will not rehash the numbers, but noble Lords will know that we were successful in that endeavour.

As regards non-crime hate incidents, the Government introduced a new code of practice to make the processes surrounding the recording and retention of personal data subject to stronger safeguards. The code better protects the right to freedom of expression, while respecting the operational importance of NCHI recording for the police in protecting vulnerable people and communities from harm. However, the code makes it clear that instances that include personal data can and should be recorded if the event presents a real risk of significant harm and if there is a real risk that future criminal offences may be committed. We would like to make it absolutely clear that the code relates only to non-crime hate incidents; it does not amend the hate crime framework in any way, shape or form.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked about the birth certificate incident that was widely reported. I happened to be with the Home Secretary when we were made aware of that, and he immediately asked officials to investigate the matter. Appropriate action will be taken, but at the moment investigations are ongoing.

On online hate crime, again the Government are clear that online offending is as serious as offline offending. We have very robust legislation in place to deal with threating and abusive behaviour or behaviour which is intended or likely to stir up hatred. This applies whether it takes place online or offline. The Home Office regularly engages with the tech companies about unlawful conduct on their platforms and shares information about the threat landscape. I believe the Home Secretary is visiting the west coast of the USA shortly, which will allow him to raise these matters with the companies concerned.

The Government have worked with the police to fund True Vision, which is an online hate crime reporting portal, designed so that victims of hate crime do not have to visit a police station to report. The Government continue to fund the national online hate crime hub, which is a central capability designed to support individual local police forces in dealing with online hate crime. We also made hate crime a priority offence in the Online Safety Act, which received Royal Assent in October last year.

Finally, the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, gave us some personal reflections on the kosher supermarket and restaurants. I saw a clip of that online, and I appreciate the points that he made. Let me be clear: in this, as in all the other subjects that are under discussion this evening, we have a robust legislative framework in place. We expect the police to fully investigate these sorts of offences and make sure that those who commit them feel the full force of the law. Anti-Semitism, or indeed any other form of intolerance of that type, is completely unacceptable in this country, and we have to be vigilant in our efforts to combat it.

[Lord Mann (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I refer to my entry in the Register of Members’ Interests. I would like to confirm with the Minister, and thank him if it is the case, that he announced three-year funding for the Community Security Trust. That is a welcome change of policy that for some years I have pressed the Government for, and it will make the trust’s work much easier.

In my view, there is a sinister change in what is going on with anti-Semitism beyond the noise, which is bad enough: it is the very specific, organised and co-ordinated targeting of individual Jewish people, at work and in their accommodation, in ways that we have never seen before. I do not mean awful random violent acts of anti-Semitism, which of course are dangerous and threatening for all of us and something that we need to deal with, but the co-ordinated targeting of people, isolating them and organising pile-ons to force them out of workplaces—in some cases off student courses and in other cases out of accommodation, but particularly from the workplace. That co-ordination is something that we have not seen in this country.

I urge the Minister to agree with me that, for the Jewish community to be safe, this crisis of anti-Semitism is going to require the maximum detailed co-operation between all parties in this House, because this scourge is already out of control and lives are being ruined that we are not even seeing. We are going to see more of that as they surface, because people are alone and terrified and are being picked off.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

First, if I make a correct the record, I may have said three-year funding but I should have said two-year funding. If I mis-spoke, I apologise.

On the points that the noble Lord raises, I completely agree. The targeted stuff that he refers to is a particularly pernicious form of anti-Semitism, and I too have seen evidence of it. The police are aware of it, and I hope they will crack down on the perpetrators. The noble Lord is right that it needs a cross-party response, but to some extent he is missing the point: it needs a cross-society response. It is not just us in here; everyone has to get on board with this.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for bringing this Statement to the House and I thank the Government for making it.

I too welcome the Community Security Trust. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, referred to the reported figures of anti-Semitic incidents being up by 147% last year on the previous year. One such incident, which was reported on 12.55 pm on 7 October, was of a car passing a synagogue in Hertfordshire with a Palestinian flag raised and an occupant inside putting his fist and arm out, shaking his fist in the air towards the synagogue that he was passing. By Monday 9 October other crimes were on the increase. A piece of graffiti was sprayed on a bridge in Golders Green, saying “Free Palestine”. I ask the Minister: what steps have been taken to find the perpetrators of each of the incidents that have been reported and recorded? No perpetrator should go without the sanction of the law.

The noble Lord, Lord Palmer, referred to the pro-Palestine demonstrations that we see on our streets in this country. In today’s protest outside Parliament, crowds were chanting “Free Palestine” and waving Palestine flags. They were right up to the metal barriers of this Parliament. Does the Minister not consider that if the police do not have the powers under the Public Order Act 1986 to impose conditions, perhaps that Act might be considered so that such conditions could involve moving those crowds across the road, so that they are not intimidating people trying to get into Parliament? Whether those are parliamentarians, members of their teams or people working on the Parliamentary Estate, it is something of an ordeal to have to pass through those crowds. Now I hear that the people working in this Parliament must leave the estate by an exit where they will not encounter these crowds. In another age, they might have been called mobs.

Do the Government not think it a stain on the honour not only of the country but of the way we are conducting our policing for such marches and intimidation to take place? There is a very fine line dividing the words “From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free” from the slogans we see on the railings at our entries to Parliament of “Free Palestine” and the flag waving. I would like to know whether there are powers to impose conditions of moving them away from these Houses of Parliament, where we applaud free speech and no one should feel intimidated when coming in. What powers are needed?

I am glad about the increased funding but I would like the Minister to think further. Can he say whether, in providing all this money to protect synagogues, we need to do more to protect people going about their normal business when they are interrupted or intimidated by marchers?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My noble friend asks a number of questions which I am afraid impinge on the operational activities of the police. I am obviously not able to comment on those. On whether we are satisfied that the police are sufficiently aware and have sufficient powers to stop marches and control public protest, we are, and I went into that in some detail earlier. Crowd policing is a very difficult thing to do, for obvious reasons. In some cases, I would absolutely defend the police’s right to carefully gather evidence and consult the experts whom they have available to them before potentially inflaming tensions—this is me dangerously straying into operational areas; I probably should not say even that—because the decisions that the police take have to be context-specific. It is not right for us to second-guess those decisions; the police could of course be challenged on them afterwards if they are found wanting.

We need to be careful when talking about these things, but we are confident that the police have the right powers. I am not aware of any particular incidents today. I did not feel particularly intimidated, although I completely accept that my noble friend might well have done. I am sure all those feelings and thoughts are being taken into account by the House authorities and by other police when they keep us safe.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I really thought that the noble Lord, Lord Mann, spoke very powerfully and that it was not hyperbole. We almost cannot describe how serious the mood is at the moment. This is a serious time, historically, in terms of anti-Semitism, and this is not just some rhetorical flourish. I want to have that on record.

I am not frightened by the phrase “Free Palestine”, and I do not want to give the Minister any more excuses to clamp down on demonstrations or free speech, because goodness knows he has done a fair amount of that over the period I have been here. However, it is grim, or maybe fitting, that this Statement on the frighting rise of anti-Semitism is against the backdrop of the debate today on a Gaza ceasefire in the other place—albeit performative, because I note that not one life will be saved and there will not be a ceasefire as a consequence of this. That debate descended into a nasty mood of sectarianism. Worse, tonight we are hearing dark allegations that physical threats were made to elected Members, poisoning the democratic procedures of this Parliament. You associate anti-Semitism with those kinds of dark stories. We are in a building that has witnessed it today, never mind the protestors outside.

A much smaller incident that I would like the Minister to comment on is one that cheered me up. It might sound minor, but, after the unpleasant incident earlier this week of the Star of David necklace on the statue of Amy Winehouse being covered up, which the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, rightly referred to—it was so shocking, even though it seemed so small—I was pleased to see that a non-Jewish member of the public had gone out of their way to skive off work and scrape off the sticker from the statue. I know that because it was reported by the group Our Fight, a new grass-roots campaign of non-Jews challenging British anti-Semitism, which was set up after 7 October.

Would the Minister agree on the importance of such solidarity, which cuts across identity politics and all sorts of party tribalism? This was summed up by the New York mayor, Eric Adams, when he said in a speech:

“Israel, your fight is our fight”.


So much of the anti-Semitism we are seeing today, and much of the reaction to the war in Gaza, is, I am sad to say, around religious and racial identity and some of the most divisive, regressive sides of society. We should call for a universal condemnation of the racism of anti-Semitism.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I agree entirely with the noble Baroness. She will know that I am not brave enough to restrict her freedom of speech in any way. I think this goes back to what I said when I quoted Rabbi Sacks. He pointed out that anti-Semitism may begin with the Jews but it does not end there, so it is for all of us to combat it.

[Lord Leigh of Hurley (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his words, and particularly for reminding us of the wise words of the late Chief Rabbi, Lord Sacks of Aldgate. I echo the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Mann. It is as he says, but it is actually worse.

I was talking to a beauty journalist yesterday and she was telling me of the tweets going around about beauty products, telling people not to buy from certain businesses as they are owned by a Jewish person and not to buy from certain businesses as they are owned by a person who supports Israel. It is biting, and it is not just beauty products but clothing products and any Jewish business. This is truly shocking. This last happened 70 years ago. It is spiralling out of control. Jewish businesses are being targeted because they are owned by Jewish people, and people are responding to it. I do not know what the Government can do about that.

As I mentioned earlier in this Chamber, I am president of Westminster Synagogue. On Saturday, the police told us that they would protect us. They sent 20 police officers and four vans, because the demonstration walked past our synagogue, and they felt that was necessary. That demonstration included people chanting anti-Semitic slogans and the expression “From the river to the sea”, which means genocide of the Jewish people in the State of Israel. Of course, the police did not do anything to stop those chants and protests. They did, however, take one person away. That person was standing behind a railing with a banner saying, “Hamas are terrorists”. He was manhandled by the police, his arms were locked and he was walked away. My noble friend the Minister says that the police are restricted in what they can do; they seem to be selective in deciding what to do.

Of course, I do not expect my noble friend the Minister to have answers to all these specific instances tonight, and I can only add to the praise of CST, of which I am proud to be a supporter. I commend Sir Gerald Ronson’s incredible work in promoting CST to the organisation it has become.

I add that it was extremely disheartening to see the disgraced academic David Miller allowed to tweet out his vile abuse of Jewish charities, and it was very disappointing that the University of Bristol failed in its case. One can only think that it did not try particularly hard. I hope the Government will think through how they can take action to stop people like David Miller from posting such vile abuse to people who are just trying to be philanthropists and to help others in need.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank my noble friend. I heard his comments about the synagogue and the march this afternoon in another Question. On that incident, as I said, it is very difficult to second-guess the police after the fact. I appreciate where my noble friend is coming from. The decision obviously has to be context specific. But the police are accountable for their actions and, speaking from a personal point of view, I read a good article in the Spectator yesterday by our noble friend Lord Godson. He was right to raise the questions that he raised in that article, and we are all right to question the police, after the fact, about why they did what they did, how they did it and all the rest of the operational matters that they have to remain responsible for. On the targeting of businesses, I have seen some of this stuff online, and I am afraid it disgusts me as well. I am not sure what the Government can do, but this is obviously noted, and I will take it back to the Home Office.

House adjourned at 9.07 pm.

Immigration Rules and Border Security

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Wednesday 21st February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, there is yet more chaos at the borders as we learned yesterday of a failure to check hundreds of high-risk flights for the obvious threats of trafficking, serious crime and terrorism. The Government dispute the figures, so let me give them an opportunity to say whether all the high-risk flights were checked. What are the figures that the Government believe, not only for London City Airport but across the UK, and are they all properly checked?

Instead of getting a grip, the Government sacked the inspector immediately when he was being forced to leave next month anyway. Some 15 of his reports remain unpublished, including revelations of visa failures in the care sector, with 275 such visas issued to a non-existent care home. When will these 15 reports, being sat on by the Home Office, be published, and when will there be a new independent inspector to oversee our borders and immigration arrangements? Border security is too important for confusion, delay and incompetence but, too often, that is what we get from this Government.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord for his questions, and I will do my best to answer them all. I can reassure anyone from the public who happens to be watching: Border Force performs checks on 100% of scheduled passengers arriving in the UK and risk-based intelligence-led checks on general aviation. It is disturbing that information with no basis in fact was leaked by the independent chief inspector to a national newspaper before the Home Office had the chance to respond. As a consequence, Mr Neal lost the confidence of the Home Secretary, as he pointed out in his WMS yesterday. I cannot really improve on his words:

“I have terminated the appointment of David Neal, the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, after he breached the terms of appointment and lost my confidence”.


In terms of the checks at London City Airport, Mr Neal was very aware of a specific issue with the recording of data there that meant that a large proportion of flights recorded as high risk should have been reclassified as low risk. As I have already mentioned, all notified general aviation flights are categorised as high risk or low risk based on a number of factors. These are primarily related to persons on board, but additional factors can relate to intelligence about the aircraft and other matters. A flight may be remotely cleared when it has been assessed using the risk assessment as low risk, and for high-risk flights in certain circumstances only. A remote clearance requires, as a minimum, a digital record check on Home Office systems for all passengers. Where we are notified of a general aviation flight, we clear 100% of high-risk and low-risk flights remotely or in person, in accordance with the general aviation guidance.

I am not sure when the new replacement will be recruited. It is a very important position, and an appointment will be made following robust competition in accordance with the Governance Code on Public Appointments. As regards the publishing of the other reports, it is undeniably unfortunate that circumstances have delayed the publication of certain inspection reports. I will say that the one that was leaked was well within the time limit, and the Government had not been given an opportunity to respond and were still fact-checking, for the reasons I mentioned earlier. These will be published as soon as possible.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, why did the Government not follow the advice of the social care sector and ensure that only CQC-registered homes and businesses could accept social care workers? That would have helped overcome the problems. Will that be considered from now on? It is clearly important to the sector, which needs the employees, and everyone else.

Can the Minister also explain how Ukrainian family members whose own circumstances in Ukraine may include being bombed out of their homes, for example, will now no longer be able to join their families here under changes to the Ukrainian scheme?

Finally, the Minister referred to unpublished reports by David Neal, the former chief inspector. The Government may have been checking only the last one, but can the Minister explain why 15 reports have not been published and give us a date when they will be published by?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

To answer the last question, I say that the date is soon. I am afraid that I cannot improve on that. They all require fact checking and a variety of other things. In terms of the Care Quality Commission, that is precisely what we are doing. It was made very clear the other day that, additionally, care workers in England will be able to sponsor migrant workers only if they are undertaking activities as regulated by the Care Quality Commission going forward.

Ukrainian family members can still come. It is just that we are unifying the schemes currently in existence. The old family scheme allowed settled Ukrainian sponsoring family members to come here. That settlement used to have only a six-month qualification. They can still come under the Homes for Ukraine scheme. The sponsors can now be British, Irish or settled in the UK, and that obviously includes family members. This scheme was greeted favourably and with some very positive comments from the Ukrainian embassy, which I am happy to recount if anybody would like to hear them.

[Lord Mann (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, my wife and I drove trucks for our family business regularly through Calais to Dover, and we are very aware of the weaknesses in the systems and pressures from people smugglers attempting to come in through commercial vehicles, trucks and lorries. What is the increase in the number of checks done on those vehicles this year compared with last year, and what is the increase in the number of people found to have been smuggled or trafficked through those routes using trucks or lorries this year compared with last year?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am afraid that I do not have the statistics on trucks. If I may, I will write to the noble Lord.

Knife Crime: Violence Reduction Units

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Tuesday 20th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bailey of Paddington]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what steps they are taking to assess the efficacy of violence reduction units in addressing knife crime.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, the Home Office has commissioned a multiyear independent evaluation to assess the impact of violence reduction units on the most serious forms of violence and their progress in adopting a public health approach. Recent findings have shown a statistically significant reduction in hospital admissions for violent injuries in VRU areas since funding began in 2019.

[Lord Bailey of Paddington (Con)]

With the effects of serious violence falling on some communities far more than on others—here in London we have had 1,000 homicides since 2016—what work has been done by VRUs to increase the effectiveness of the money that they are allocating?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, since 2019, the Home Office has provided over £43 million to develop and run London’s violence reduction unit, which includes an investment of £9.5 million in 2023-24. As part of their funding terms, all VRUs are required to deliver evidence-based approaches that are shown to deliver the most impact in steering young people away from violence. In London, the various interventions being delivered include those that the independent youth endowment fund has found to be capable of delivering the highest impact. That includes the delivery of specialist support for young people affected by violence on admission to A&E or custody suites, as well as personal support such as mentoring programmes, where sport is used as a hook to attract participation.

[Lord Farmer (Con)]

My Lords, a major risk factor for young people’s involvement in violent gangs is the lack of a father at home, so what are the violence reduction units doing to make absent fathers part of the solution? Many are still very present in their children’s minds, and being estranged from ex-partners does not automatically mean they have no sense of responsibility towards the children who have gone astray. How are VRUs harnessing and encouraging that responsibility?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, the violence reduction units deliver a range of preventive work with and for communities, as I outlined in the previous two answers to my noble friend Lord Bailey. That can include families, which of course obviously involves fathers as well as young people, and includes a wide range of approaches, including mentoring and trusted adult programmes or intensive behavioural therapies and, as I mentioned earlier, sports-based diversionary activities. In London in particular, the VRU’s My Ends programme provides community leaders with resources to enhance violence prevention measures in their areas. In addition, the Young People’s Action Group, which is made up of young people from across London, works alongside the VRU to ensure that the voices of young people influence policy and funding decisions.

[Baroness Hollins (CB)]

My Lords, a 2014 Scottish study by Professor John Crichton found that the kitchen knife was the most commonly used weapon. The author suggested that the introduction of knives without points as an effective public health strategy might positively affect the rate of death and serious injury. I quote:

“It would not be necessary to enforce an absolute ban on long pointed kitchen knives, but simply to limit availability, thereby making a lethal weapon less likely to be at hand in the context of unplanned violence”.


Is this something that VRUs are taking forward and that the Government would support?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Baroness raises an interesting point. Of course, we keep all knife legislation under review, and noble Lords will be aware that moves have been made recently to ban, for example, zombie-style knives and machetes. Secondary legislation was laid in January, guidance will be available from 26 June and the ban will come into effect on 24 September. I will ensure that all forms of knives are kept very closely under review, particularly in view of patterns of use.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, obviously, large urban areas such as London have particular problems, and I would argue that there is a lot more crime. Are any comparative assessments being done so that each VRU can learn from others in all sorts of ways?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Yes, again, the noble Baroness raises a very good point. She is right, of course, that London has particular problems in this area. The activities of certain violence reduction units have absolutely influenced the way that the whole programme has been established across England and Wales—and indeed taking a lot of the lead from Scotland.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, knife crime is up by 70% since 2015 and, according to the YMCA, youth services were cut by 71% in the decade after 2010. Does the noble Lord think these two statistics are linked? Does he also believe that, building on the work of the VRUs, local youth services should be introduced and backed in a way to try to prevent further knife crime?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

On the noble Lord’s latter point, I agree, which is one of the reasons the Home Office has invested £200 million in the youth endowment fund, to which I have already referred. As regards knife crime across the country, the rise is driven largely by the situation in London. For police-recorded offences involving knives or sharp instruments, there was a 5% increase year-on-year nationally, but the increase in London was 22%. If London was taken out of those figures, the natural trend would be a 1% reduction.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, violence reduction units can definitely reduce knife crime, as has been shown time and time again, but for them to be able to do their job properly they need long-term funding and they are not being provided with it. The Government’s three-year funding model runs out next year and there is great anxiety about what will come next. Will the Government reconsider their current funding model and provide the sort of long-term funding that these units, which are so desperately needed, require to do the job they were set up for?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

As I have already outlined, we have already committed over £110 million since 2019 across the country. Of course, we want to see VRUs continue to operate beyond the end of 2025; by that time, though, they will have received investment for six years. We would encourage VRUs to become financially sustainable organisations. We will of course support them to obtain matched funding and partnership buy-in, but future funding beyond 2025 will depend on the needs of the VRUs and the outcome of future spending reviews.

[Baroness Bull (CB)]

My Lords, how many of the VRUs include domestic and gender-based violence within their definition of serious violence? Does the Minister agree that artificially separating public violence —street violence—from private violence in the home ignores the links between the two, not least the impact on young people’s future behaviour through what they might learn is normal?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Again, the noble Baroness raises a good point. I think it is important to collect the statistics as accurately and in as granular a way as possible. So I would perhaps mildly dispute the second part of the question. However, we need to look at the way violence occurs in the round—so the noble Baroness raises a very good point.

[Baroness Blackwood of North Oxford (Con)]

My Lords, it is critical to rebuild trust from these communities and public services who are so affected by violence if violence reduction units are to be successful. This is obviously possible but it is very challenging. What steps are being taken to evaluate successful measures to rebuild trust and share those between violence reduction units, so that this can be done effectively?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank my noble friend for that question. Part of the funding for VRUs has to be allocated towards evaluation, but an independent evaluation programme shows that, alongside the Grip, which we have talked about before from this Dispatch Box, there are serious violent hotspot programmes. These are putting additional highly visible police patrols into key locations. The VRU programme is having a statistically significant positive effect, as I referenced earlier. An estimated 3,220 hospital admissions for violent injury have been avoided since funding began in 2019.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

Can I just challenge the Minister? He suggested that in the future, VRUs will depend on match funding and non-governmental sources of money. Surely, violence reduction and the protection of our young people is a core activity and it is entirely right that it should be fully funded by the taxpayer. Other money is for add-ons and extras: this, surely, is not an add-on or an extra.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I was not making the case that it was an add-on or an extra; I was saying that future funding beyond 2025 will be dependent on the needs of the VRUs and the outcome of future spending reviews, and of course the evaluation that is already under way.

[Lord Watts (Lab)]

My Lords, is not the increase a direct consequence of the cuts in public services, for example to local government, youth services and the police? The police used to make visits to schools and many police authorities have stopped doing that completely. Do the Government not need to understand that their cuts over 13 years have had a dramatic effect on this issue?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I referenced earlier that there is some new funding. The London Metropolitan Police, for example, will receive an additional £8 million this year and the City of London will receive an extra £1 million for additional visible patrols in serious violence and anti-social behaviour hotspots. The funding supports the delivery of a combination of regular high-visibility patrols in the streets and neighbourhoods experiencing the highest volumes of serious violence and/or anti-social behaviour.

I remind noble Lords that there are currently more police in this country than ever before. The Metropolitan Police currently has 35,000 and could have had more; the budget was available but they were unable to recruit up to the budget, which is a shame because it obviously cost them some resource. The Government have delivered on their police uplift programme.

Protest Measures

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Tuesday 13th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, I appreciate that the Government are trying to strike a balance among competing priorities—maintaining the right to peaceful protest, restraining incitement to racial and religious hatred, and keeping the country moving, free from disruptive events. It is right that police use all available powers to arrest those who go beyond what is acceptable for a peaceful protest, not least when their actions are motivated by hate. Protest should not be used as a shield to allow anti-Semitism, Islamophobia or any other type of hatred to fester with impunity.

However, we must ensure that the tactics employed by a minority do not undermine the ability of others to protest peacefully. I have a number of concerns, and it would be helpful if the Minister could address them when he responds. The provisions announced to prevent the use of facial coverings plainly bear a relationship to the increased use of facial recognition technology in policing. The Policing Minister is on record as saying that he is already encouraging police forces to search all available databases, including the passport database, to identify people using facial recognition technology for crime generally.

Clause 27 of the Criminal Justice Bill creates a very wide power to access driver licence records for this purpose, but there has been little public debate on this or on the parameters of the accelerated use of such technology. Given the potential freedoms that this could infringe, is a legal protest the correct context for technology to be used? Should the faces of people engaged in lawful and peaceful protest systematically be recorded and added to databases? Would there be a temptation to create lists of people who attend such protests, with the justification that these are people who are not in favour of the status quo and might, at some future date, cause trouble?

Police already collect information on political activists. However, attending a protest should not qualify as criminal activism. The fact that facial recognition is being introduced into policing without the debate or openness that is needed is a cause for concern. Since the Government are proposing amendments to the Criminal Justice Bill, will the Minister commit to setting out in that Bill the circumstances in which this technology should be used? Will he commit specifically to addressing the many concerns that the systems can be particularly bad at recognising black female faces? This is powerful technology, but it is not infallible by any means.

As things stand, its use enjoys public support, but that support may diminish if it is deployed disproportionately, causing problems for minority groups or being used for minor offences. It is surely in the interests of all of us who want to continue to see policing by consent for this to be avoided.

Finally, I want to raise the question of police resources. The Home Affairs Committee recently expressed concern about the effect that the increasing number of protests is having on the number of rest days being cancelled for police officers. Last year the Metropolitan Police had to cancel 4,000 rest days to police protests at a cost of nearly £19 million. Can the Minister say what the Home Office is doing to ensure that police forces are reimbursed for the cost of these cancelled days? When I was a member of the Metropolitan Police Authority, we had a dreadful job trying to get the money back from the Home Office. I suspect that things have not changed very much. What is being done to support officers’ well-being when large numbers of rest days have to be cancelled?

Will police officers receive the necessary resources and training to identify and prevent hate crimes, including threats and incitements to violence on social media? According to the official figures, between October and December last year there were more than 1,000 protests and vigils and 600 arrests, accounting for 26,000 police officer shifts. This issue is not going away. The duty of care that we owe police officers needs to be addressed as a matter of urgency.

These are among the issues that we on these Benches will want to raise during the passage of the Criminal Justice Bill. I look forward to the Minister giving us his early indications of his views.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank both the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for their generally supportive remarks. Like the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, I join in congratulating, thanking and praising the police for their strenuous efforts to keep us all safe during the recent heightened protest activity.

Both noble Lords asked me about the questions raised in response to the original Statement, regarding the Home Affairs Select Committee pointing out that 4,000 rest days had been lost, coming at a cost of about £18 million or £19 million. Obviously, that is very concerning, but I have to say that the police uplift programme has helped many forces around the country significantly with their numbers. That helps to minimise the number of rest days lost. Unfortunately, the Metropolitan Police in London did not manage to fulfil its police uplift numbers, and that has financial consequences as well as a consequence for the rest of the officers employed. It is regrettable, but I am afraid it is very much for the Metropolitan Police to up its recruitment to sort out that particular problem. That is not the same as saying that we do not care about it or are not keeping a very close eye on it. We do.

I should also point out that the police have arrested more than 600 people over the course of the protests, and some 30-plus were related to Terrorism Act offences. Once again, I thank the police for their efforts.

On the question about whether these laws were requested by the police, the police have a comprehensive suite of powers to maintain public order and to keep the public safe. However, we keep their powers under constant review and, when gaps are identified, by whomever, we seek to legislate for them. I am not precisely sure how many of these powers were asked for by the police; I know that the bulk of them were, but not precisely which ones. When we come across gaps in the legislation, we seek to make these types of changes.

Those were very good questions on face coverings, particularly as regards the legitimate wearing of face coverings in protests. It is not difficult to come up with a number of scenarios that would classify themselves as legitimate. This was addressed in detail by my right honourable friend the Security Minister. The guidelines in the legislation that we are setting out will cover this, because police officers will have discretion to give an order requiring a face covering to be removed, but those commanding the policing of protests will have discretion over when they ask for that instruction to be carried out.

Under Section 60AA, the new criminal offence of concealing an identity will apply only when there is a particular authorisation on a protest, and those authorisations come only when there is a risk of serious violence or crime. Just as a reminder to the House, Section 60 offences can be ordered only by those of the rank of inspector or above and for a period of 24 hours, which is extendable for a further 24 hours. So they apply only to protests and only where an authorisation is in place. I hope that answers and assuages noble Lords’ concerns to some extent. I will come back to facial recognition towards the end of my remarks.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked me about pyrotechnics, flares and disorder. The current legislation on the use of fireworks in public places does not consistently prohibit the possession of pyrotechnic articles during a protest but limits it to specific circumstances, such as the use of fireworks in public places and possession of explosives other than for a lawful purpose. It is not already an offence to be in the possession of such articles at certain musical events and football matches, for example, but this extends it to processions and protests. The new measures do not provide police with new stop and search powers, but they do allow the police to make an arrest when an individual is holding or lighting a flare at a protest.

I associate myself with the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, on war memorials. I am also delighted that this is taking place, for all sorts of reasons. I do not have a huge amount more to say on this subject; I think we have all been offended by the antics of certain protesters who have clambered all over war memorials. The Security Minister in the other place described them as

“altars of our national grief”.—[Official Report, Commons, 8/2/23; col. 379.]

That description could be extended, but it is very appropriate none the less and sums up all our feelings.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, also asked me about hateful extremism. He is quite right that there is some thinking about that at the moment. The Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities is working on a definition of extremism alongside the Attorney-General. Of course, this is an extremely complex subject and conversation, so I will update the House when I have more, but I am afraid I cannot at the moment.

The noble Lord will know what I am about to say on proscription. The Government do not comment on groups that are potentially about to be proscribed or are under consideration. This will come under the Criminal Justice Bill.

I do not think facial recognition is entirely aligned with the subject of the measures that are being taken today. However, I understand the noble Baroness’s concerns and this subject will have to be further debated. It is a philosophical discussion about freedoms, rights and proportionality, and I have no doubt that we will revisit it in due course.

These measures are proportionate and carefully thought through. We will be discussing them at greater length, and I thank noble Lords for their support.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I hope my noble friend will be cautious about invoking criminal law unless there are clear mischiefs to be addressed. I entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, about face coverings and was much reassured by what my noble friend said, but I am much less happy about war memorials. Clearly, clambering over a war memorial is an unattractive and distasteful business, but I am far from clear that it is such a mischief that we should invoke the criminal law and impose criminal penalties. Many years ago, when my wife was 20, we were clambering over the lions in Trafalgar Square. I do not want to be told that we were defiling the memory of Lord Nelson.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I take my noble friend’s point, though I must admit that I did not realise that he had quite such a colourful past. I am afraid that, on this, the Government disagree, and think that this is a proportionate measure.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, not for the first time in the last 24 hours, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. Why was this announcement made by vague press release on a Wednesday evening, rather than in the House of Commons? While I am grateful to the Minister, as always, for that lengthy answer, I do not quite understand the gaps in the present law. We have all these stop and search powers, for example, including specific and blanket powers in relation to protest. Why do we need additional face covering removal powers—are they not a form of stop and search? I totally agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, on the huge relevance of facial recognition technology to why people are concerned about uncovering their faces. At the moment, it is for the police, totally unregulated by statute, to decide who goes on the watchlist, what kind of technology is used, and the trigger for stop and search on the basis of being on this watchlist. The noble Baroness is quite right: if we are going down this path in relation to face coverings, we should be regulating the use of facial recognition technology as well.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I do not entirely disagree with the noble Baroness, but I do not think this is the particular forum for that discussion. It is clearly a philosophical discussion, as much as a legal and operational one, that is required around the appropriate extent of facial recognition technology. I am sure that is a debate we will return to. These particular powers are very specific and can happen only under certain circumstances, so in this context they are proportionate.

[The Archbishop of York]

My Lords, like others, I entirely share the views about war memorials and their desecration, and fireworks and flares—there is a lot that is sensible in this. On face coverings, what concerns me is the law which we often do not often think about—the law of unintended consequences. To those dissidents, I would add religious minorities to the list of those who may be concerned about this. I wonder whether the effect of this will be that more people will wear face coverings, not fewer, because they are concerned about facial recognition. I find it hard to understand why this should be a matter for the law. If somebody commits a criminal offence while on a march, we already have the powers to deal with them. If somebody on a peaceful protest chooses to wear a face covering, I find it hard to understand why that, in and of itself, is a problem. The Minister has explained that this will be used only under certain circumstances, but if I have heard him correctly it is around the “risk” of criminal activity and violence. We do not arrest people because we think that they might be doing something. If the protest is peaceful, why should somebody not wear a face mask? I am struggling to understand why this has become such an issue, and I am concerned about minority groups who could be adversely affected by this.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The current legislation gives police the power to direct people to remove face coverings in designated areas and to seize face coverings, but there is a loophole, in that an individual could follow the direction of an officer to remove their face covering but then move to a new area and redeploy the face covering. We are trying to close that loophole. I take the most reverend Primate’s point about minorities and so on, but, as I have tried to explain, this is being applied to protests only where there is an authorisation in place, so it is time-limited and very specific.

[Lord Walney (CB)]

My Lords, I welcome this package, a number of measures in which I recommended in my role as the Government’s independent adviser on political violence and disruption. Can the Minister say more about how the Government intend to mitigate the Ziegler judgment, which is a very welcome commitment on the part of the Government to make it clear that protest is not sufficient justification for criminal acts such as vandalism and disruption of highways?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord asks a very good question, because this is about, effectively, reasonable excuse. The Ziegler judgment held that obstructive protests that intentionally cause disruption can be protected by Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR. That means that those who purposefully disrupt the daily lives of others can escape justice under the guise of protest. Our amendments will mitigate the impact of this judgment and ensure that those who deliberately disrupt others by obstructing the highway cannot rely on protest before the court as a reasonable excuse using the definitions defined under the PCSC Act.

[Baroness Foster of Oxton (Con)]

My Lords, most of us have witnessed and been involved in protests, and even though some have been quite violent and very disturbing, what we have seen over the past four months with the pro-Palestinian marches and protests in London has been on a completely different level. The police have had their hands tied behind their backs, not least because they have been unable to identify so many of those involved who have been wearing face coverings, and with huge crowds the police have been unable to see exactly who they are. Notwithstanding that the police have made some arrests and have charged and prosecuted certain individuals, the numbers involved are limited and small. Month on month, people have been allowed to protest, calling for the death and destruction of Jews and Israel, and to show Nazi symbols, with Islamic extremists who have been involved with Hizb ut-Tahrir. Permitting them to carry on like this is not acceptable. I fully support this proceeding to make sure those individuals are dealt with properly.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My noble friend raises some very good points. She is right that the simple fact of the matter is that recent protests have upped the temperature of protest. However, we have to remain proportionate, and I think this strikes the right balance.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I want to put it on record that I am appalled at the behaviour of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, in climbing on the lions in Trafalgar Square. I think that is unacceptable. I have been on a lot of protests and I have never climbed on a war memorial or a lion. However, I agree with him in asking why on earth we are making this a criminal offence. All the officers I have spoken to—admittedly a small sample—have said that they do not need these powers and that they have enough powers. What these extra powers do is take away the discretion that they have in dealing with people, which is something they value because they do not want to be tied up in having to go off to the police station with loads of arrested people. Most of these measures are totally unnecessary. I completely support the firework ban; they are so environmentally polluting. But the Government cannot ban everything that they do not like; that is a mistake that some Governments get into, and that way lies a loss of democracy. In response to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, the Minister said that facial recognition is for another day and it is not quite covered now. I argue that oversight of this is urgent, so in good time is not enough. The noble Lord, Lord Harris, said months back that this is a horse that has bolted out of its stable. We really have to find some way of making sure that the information is not passed out by the police, which it is in some cases now. Will the Minister think about bringing this in or discussing it urgently?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

On the noble Baroness’s latter point, those discussions are ongoing and will continue within the Home Office. I certainly raise the subject regularly, not least because I too am concerned about proportionality; I think it entirely right. I am of course aware that the Government cannot ban everything they do not like, much as it might sometimes be fun to do so. On war graves, cemeteries, war memorials and so on, the public outrage was fairly significant, and noted. It was clear that this offended a great many people from all parts of the community. I do not know which officers the noble Baroness spoke to, but they should have spoken to their boss, because he asked for these powers.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as chair of the Equality and Human Rights Commission. As the Minister would expect, I looked at this quite carefully in the context of Article 11 of the ECHR. He is right, and I accept fully, that Article 11.2 gives the state the right to bring in public order laws and a whole of host of other things. I would say to colleagues who are feeling uncomfortable about this that they need to look at the wording of Article 11.2. However, my question to the Minister is slightly different. It relates to the Aarhus Convention, which the United Kingdom signed in 2002, and which is there to defend the rights of environmental protesters. The Special Rapporteur on the Aarhus convention recently visited the United Kingdom. He has since sent a letter of complaint to the United Kingdom Government concerning environmental protesters. Is the Minister minded to reply to that letter and to publish the reply?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am afraid that this is the first I have heard of this, so I cannot comment further, but I will of course look into it. These changes are compatible with the ECHR and do not prevent individuals exercising their rights to freedom of expression and assembly. Many of the offences affected, including public nuisance, which involve serious harm to or obstruction of the public’s rights, are highly likely to fall outside of the protections of ECHR rights or within the state’s margin of appreciation. On the rights of environmental protesters, I do not think we should elevate any particular set of protesters’ rights above any other.

[Lord Deben (Con)]

Will my noble friend the Minister congratulate my noble friend Lord Hailsham on his ability to climb one of those large animals in Trafalgar Square? At the same time, does he accept that what my noble friend said is a salutary reminder? We are becoming too concerned about restriction and not concerned enough about freedom. I am very concerned that the normal habits of proper protest—particularly at a time when parliamentary democracy is under very considerable pressure—are being undermined by the constant provision of yet more new things that the police want in order to control. I would like to see a real understanding of the importance of protest. I very much agreed with the most reverend Primate when he said that he could not quite see why people who were not doing anything illegal should be told to remove their face coverings. For the Iranians and the Chinese, face coverings are essential if there is to be protest.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am very happy to join in the congratulations to my noble friend Lord Hailsham on his lion-climbing expertise, but I am afraid that I disagree with my noble friend when it comes to climbing war memorials as a normal part of protest. What is normal about climbing a war memorial?

[Baroness D'Souza (CB)]

My Lords, if ever there was an example of the slow attrition of our democratic freedoms, it is this. First, experience tells us that, once a law is on the statute books, it will in future, merely as a convenience, be abused to exert control. Secondly, why on earth would wearing a face covering be made a criminal offence, if not to prepare to punish someone who has committed no crime whatsoever as yet?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I have already largely answered that question on face masks, but, for the avoidance of doubt, I will say it again: we are creating a new criminal offence of wearing a face covering for the purpose of concealing identity when the police place a particular authorisation on a protest. The particular authorisation point is surely the key.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, the Minister says that live facial recognition is irrelevant to this. I see a very clear intersection with these issues. I agree with him that there are philosophical aspects—I would say ethical aspects—but there are practical ones as well. The public looks at it in both those contexts. I was until recently chair of your Lordships’ Justice and Home Affairs Committee, and the Minister may have seen a letter that we wrote to the Home Secretary very recently on the subject of live facial recognition. I base my questions on that. First, on the issue of how live facial recognition is applied, one police force said to us—we have not been able to obtain any backing from that force for this comment—that the watchlist is made up of people known to have committed offences, or wanted for offences, who may have an intent to commit an offence. So how will a watchlist be made up for the use of live facial recognition of a protest? In particular, will images obtained during a protest or previous protests be used to make up a watchlist for a subsequent protest?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

First, I did not say that it was irrelevant. I said that this is a very specific set of circumstances and I accept that there is a whole separate debate about facial recognition that we need to have in the near future—I accept that it is a matter of urgency. I cannot honestly recall seeing the noble Baroness’s letter to the Home Secretary. I will track it down and, if I may, I will come back in writing on that question because I genuinely do not know the answer.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, one of the reasons why there is this problem is that the police appear over a period of time to have been confused about what is a criminal act or not, sending messages on social media defining jihad in the most peculiar way, as some kind of inner struggle, or more recently saying, “We have looked at that flag, checked it out, and it is not a threat”, even though it is being used by ISIS. This makes the public more inclined to think that the criminal law might be needed, rather than the enforcement of existing laws.

Does the Minister concede that we have a deeper problem than climbing on statues? We earlier discussed the horrors that children in Gaza are enduring—weaponised by demonstrators walking around with dolls covered in blood, shouting “Blood on your hands” at our fellow Jewish citizens. We talked about disinformation earlier and we now know that conspiracy theories are mainstreamed to political parties—no facemasks required. Would the Minister concede that maybe we should enforce the laws we have, but avoid criminalising other behaviour? There is the bigger problem of a growth of anti-Semitism in society, which really needs to be challenged as much as any other racism that is a scourge.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I agree entirely with the remarks of the noble Baroness about anti-Semitism which I find personally disgusting, as do the Government, as she will know. On police confusion, it would be unwise for me to comment on the matters the noble Baroness describes, not least—as we frequently say from the Dispatch Box—because of the operational independence of the police, which I am very happy to defend. As for glorification, which she effectively talks about, the UK has a strong counterterrorism framework —one of the strongest in the world. It is important to recognise that. It is an offence to encourage an act of terrorism, and that includes glorifying—including by praising or celebrating—action in committing or preparing acts of terrorism where others may be encouraged to emulate that action, and that offence can be committed recklessly. As I said earlier in answering the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, some 30 people have been arrested since the start of these protests for offences under the Terrorism Act. The police are not confused when it comes to policing those sorts of marches; the statistics prove otherwise. These measures are proportionate to the sorts of activities we are describing.

Computer Systems: Independent Testing

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Monday 12th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Clement-Jones]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what action they are taking to reform the Computer Misuse Act 1990 to enable legitimate independent testing of computer systems.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, the Government support people undertaking legitimate cybersecurity work to do so without fear of criminalisation. We are actively considering options to strengthen the legislative framework as part of the review of the Computer Misuse Act, which is ongoing. This work is complex and needs a lot of thought, not least to ensure that we do not inadvertently create a loophole that can be exploited by cybercriminals or hostile state actors.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, the need to be able to carry out independent research into computer systems has been put into the spotlight by the Horizon scandal. We last discussed this issue at Oral Questions last July. Since then, the Government have had the conclusions of a stakeholder working group for several months but have done absolutely nothing to include a public interest defence in the Criminal Justice Bill that is now in the Commons. I described the Government’s progress last year as “glacial”. Was I being unkind to glaciers?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Regrettably, the noble Lord is wrong. We set up a multistakeholder group of systems owners, law enforcement, cybersecurity companies and prosecutors—a systems access group—to specifically consider the proposal of statutory defences. Six meetings were held between May 2023 and October 2023. Unfortunately, there is a lack of consensus among those participants and the cybersecurity industry, and with law enforcement and prosecutors, on whether there is a need for statutory defences and on what is considered to be legitimate activity. That lack of consensus proves the point that careful thought is needed in this area.

[Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con)]

My Lords, I declare my technology interests as set out in the register. Does my noble friend agree that it is time that a statute which is 34 years old, was introduced when only 0.5% of us were online and which 91% of cyber professionals say is damaging to the UK cyber industry, was updated to enable our fantastic cyber professionals and to increase growth and productivity in the UK?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My noble friend raises some good points and, as I said, the Government are considering the right way to do that. If I talk about some of the difficulties, it might illustrate this point to the House. Amending legislation to enable cybersecurity activities involves accessing computer systems, and the data is complex. This needs a lot of thought. We would need to establish what constitutes legitimate cybersecurity activity and the boundaries of such activity. We would need to consider who should be allowed to undertake such activity, where the professional standards would need to be complied with and what reporting or oversight would be needed. We cannot make changes that would prevent law enforcement agencies and prosecutors investigating and prosecuting those who commit cybercrimes. It is right to consider this carefully and that is what we are doing.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, the Minister set out a long list of things that need considering. I understand his point, so could he perhaps tell us the timetable for this process, when we might hear the verdict on all these considerations and perhaps see some legislation before your Lordships’ House?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, the public consultation on this process concluded only in November 2023, so we have not had a huge amount of time to consider all the responses. As I have explained, we will be reviewing how to take forward the recommendations and will update Parliament in due course.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, why would a public interest defence help cybercriminals?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, that is clearly among the things that are being considered.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, does the Minister agree that there is a related issue of computer-based evidence? The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 stated that computer-based evidence should be subject to proof that the computer system was operating properly. That changed, in 1999, to a presumption that a computer system has operated correctly unless there is explicit evidence to the contrary. That change was supported by the Post Office and coincided with the introduction of the Horizon IT system. Does my noble friend agree that this area needs to be looked at?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My noble friend raises a very good point. If I may, I will look into the specifics of her question and write to her.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, Article 40 of the French criminal procedure code provides for cybersecurity specialists who are acting in good faith and solely in the national interest to be protected from prosecution. Does the Minister believe that a similar provision would be suitable here?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, we are always interested in learning from the approaches taken by other countries and jurisdictions. We speak with our international counterparts, including all our major allies, to understand how they approach the issue of whether there should be defences to these types of offences. But the majority of our like-minded partners do not have statutory defences and are instead in favour of prosecutorial guidance. For example, the US Department of Justice introduced guidance for prosecutors on when to prosecute instances of potential breaches of its Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, does the Minister agree that the Criminal Justice Bill is a good opportunity for the Government to bring forward a public interest amendment, perhaps with the bells and whistles that the Minister is talking about, or is he firmly of the view that this will occur only in the future?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am not quite sure where the bells and whistles come from. As I said, we are just considering all the potential implications. However, part of the Criminal Justice Bill introduces a new power for law enforcement and other investigative agencies to suspend IP addresses and domain names where they are being used to facilitate serious crime. So the answer is partially yes, but the other situation that the noble Lord described is very complicated.

[Lord Arbuthnot of Edrom (Con)]

My Lords, the prosecutorial guidance referred to just now by my noble friend leaves computer professionals in a position of uncertainty. Do they not need certainty as to the shape of the law?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Well, yes, and as I said, the working group that was set up to look into this, which included the cybersecurity industry, law enforcement, prosecutors and others, could not reach consensus on this subject. Certain cybersecurity professionals are in favour of defences but other industry experts are not—so we have to continue to consider these responses.

Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill [HL]

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

3rd reading
Tuesday 30th January 2024 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

That the Bill be now read a third time

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, throughout the preparation and passage of the Bill, we have been working closely with each of the devolved Administrations. Most of the provisions are UK-wide and are reserved, as national security is a reserved matter. A small number of measures in Part 2 of the Bill, on oversight, engage the legislative consent process in the Scottish Parliament. Currently, the Scottish Parliament has not granted a legislative consent Motion, although I can confirm to noble Lords that the Scottish Government have lodged one. We are engaging constructively with officials, and I reassure noble Lords that the Government will continue with this engagement as the Bill is introduced into the House of Commons. I beg to move that this Bill be read a third time.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

That the Bill do now pass.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I extend my gratitude to all noble Lords who have contributed to the Bill, both on the Floor of the House and outside. We all agree that this piece of legislation is both important and necessary. The targeted amendments that it will make to the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 will ensure that the UK’s intelligence services and law enforcement will continue to have the tools at their disposal to keep this country safe, while ensuring that these are used in a proportionate way which places privacy at its heart. As the Bill passed through this House, the valuable debate has shaped it into what it is now. I am pleased that the House was able to reach agreement on several areas of potential divergence and that we send the Bill to the other place in exceptional shape and with cross-party support.

I first correct the record on one small point I made in my speech on the second group of amendments in last Tuesday’s debate on Report. His Majesty’s Treasury is not an example of a public authority that already has the power to acquire communications data using a Part 3 request. Examples of public authorities which do have these powers include His Majesty’s Revenue & Customs and the Financial Conduct Authority, both of which perform a range of vital statutory functions using communications data.

Once more, I extend thanks particularly to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, who has been crucial in shaping the Bill through his independent review of the Investigatory Powers Act and his contributions during the Bill’s passage. My thanks go also to the noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead, and his colleagues on the Intelligence and Security Committee. The input from him and his fellow committee members has been valuable and intended to improve the Bill. He has been ably and knowledgeably supported by the erstwhile chair of the committee, the noble Lord, Lord Murphy of Torfaen.

Similarly, I have valued the collaborative and serious way in which the Opposition Front Benches have engaged on matters of such importance, so I offer my thanks to the noble Lords, Lord Coaker, Lord Ponsonby and Lord Fox, for their desire to scrutinise the Bill carefully and constructively.

I am much obliged to the support of other noble Lords who have contributed with such eloquence and expertise as the Bill has passed through this House. In particular, the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, and the noble Lords, Lord Evans of Weardale and Lord Hogan-Howe, have all provided an invaluable perspective from their professional backgrounds. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, both made a number of important and insightful interventions to help shape the debates and work towards practical solutions, for which I am grateful. My thanks go also to my noble friend Lord Gascoigne and his team in the Whips’ Office for their support as the Bill passed through this House.

I ask noble Lords to join me as I thank the policy officials and lawyers in the Home Office teams led by Lucy, Phoebe, Lucy, Hugh, Rob, Daphne and Becca, whose significant efforts have made this Bill happen. It is their hard work that has brought the Bill to this point. My thanks go also to the Bill team—Tom, Megan, Sophie, Emer and James—as well as Dan in my private office. I am also very grateful to Pete and Lucy, the expert drafters in the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel, for preparing the Bill and amendments during its passage.

Finally, I thank the intelligence agencies and law enforcement for their expert contribution to the Bill and for the work they do to keep this country safe day after day. The Bill will ensure that they continue to have the tools they need to carry out this task. We will all be the safer for it. We remain hugely grateful for their work.

As we send the Bill to the other place, it needs very little amending, save for some tidying up here and there. It is the first job of government to keep this country safe. The Bill helps us do just that.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

My Lords, first, I thank the Minister and his team for the liaison and the work we did together to try to meet all our concerns about the Bill. I also thank him for giving me the excitement of my life in that I had an amendment accepted—for the first time in 14 years. That is a pretty good strike rate, is it not? I was pleased about that as well.

We on the ISC are very happy that the Bill is needed. However, as the Minister knows, we are still concerned that there is insufficient acceptance of the fact that parliamentary scrutiny is required by the ISC more broadly in this and a number of other areas. I am sure this will be brought up in the other place; otherwise, I am pleased that we have moved this Bill forward at pace.

Emergency Services Network: Critical Communications System

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Monday 29th January 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper. In so doing, I draw attention to my interests in the register.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, the Home Office is procuring a new supplier for mobile radio and data services following Motorola’s withdrawal from ESN. This means the expected transition to ESN in 2024 and Airwave shutdown in 2026 cannot now be achieved. A revised business case will be published this year. This will reflect the impact of procurement activity and the charge control imposed by the Competition and Markets Authority on Motorola in 2023.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, this is pretty poor, is it not? The programme was originally announced a decade ago. The switchover was supposed to start in 2017 and be completed by 2019. The original cost was a mere £6.2 billion; the last estimate—and that is two years out of date, before Motorola withdrew—was £11.3 billion. Only one network provider was prepared to bid. The National Audit Office warned that this is a technology

“not yet proven in real-world conditions”.

It is a system based on a mobile phone network, creating a single point of failure. Can the Minister tell us—given that the cost has at least doubled, implementation is at least 14 or 15 years late, and there is no guarantee that the existing Airwave system can continue beyond the year after next—if this debacle is not the fault of his department then whose fault it is and who is taking responsibility?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord has asked me a large number of questions. To reassure all noble Lords, there is no reason at all why Airwave cannot be extended beyond 2030. As for how we got to where we got, it is worth reminding the House that it was the Home Office that referred Motorola to the Competition and Markets Authority in April 2021; that resulted in Motorola leaving the Emergency Services Mobile Communications Programme in December 2022. My noble friend the Chief Whip answered a Question back in 2022 which mentioned the £11.3 billion figure referred to by the noble Lord. That was for a programme that was supposed to run between 2015-16 and 2036-37. Unfortunately, any estimates that I give now would not be comparable in duration or end date; the end date is now expected to be 2044. However, the CMA charge control imposed on Motorola will involve a saving to the taxpayer. The numbers are very much up in the air.

[Lord Addington (LD)]

My Lords, can the Minister assure us that the Government will look at the original tendering process to find out exactly why this went wrong, since it clearly has? As an aside, can the Government give us an assurance that no one from Fujitsu or its Horizon programme is let anywhere near it?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I suppose this could have been spotted earlier, but the fact is that Motorola’s dual role in it arose as a result of the company acquiring Airwave at the same time as it was awarded the contract for ESN, so the Home Office’s options at that point were limited. We sought to agree measures to protect the delivery of ESN and, when it became clear that those measures were insufficient, the Home Office raised its concerns with the Competition and Markets Authority. As for future suppliers, the contracts will be awarded later this year, and I shall make sure that the noble Lord’s concerns are reflected.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, the Government are supposed to be introducing a new emergency services network, but, as my noble friend pointed out, what the Minister has said leaves us all still bewildered about the actual implementation date. Perhaps he can tell us. The original date was 2017, but the implementation date is what everyone wants to know. When is it going to be working? When are we going to know that we have a new emergency services network? From what I could see, the Home Office stated that it would be 2029. Is that still correct? In other words, when can we actually have the new emergency services network promised by the Government?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I obviously cannot answer that question as precisely as the noble Lord would like. Yes, 2029 is an aspiration, partly because of the functionality of Airwave, to which I have already referred. However, some aspects of ESN are already live. Three ESN products have gone live in the past two years: 4G data connectivity for vehicles, which is called Connect; push-to-talk and messaging capability on smartphones, Direct 1 and Direct 2; and a device that can monitor and assess coverage on the move. Significant work has gone into the EAS, which is blanket coverage across the country, while much of the hardware has already been put in place. The noble Lord draws far too bleak a picture.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I declare an interest, including having carried out a review for the Home Office, part of which the Minister has referred to, which is the recommendation to refer to the monopolies commission. As he explained, Motorola purchased the legacy system and was paid around £250 million, while for the new system that it was about to deliver it would be paid £50 million. There was no financial incentive to deliver anything, and, perhaps consequently, it has not.

The only thing that reassures me at the moment is that the Government are going to look smartly at whether to discriminate between the radio system and data production. The big problem is that, nowhere in the world, at pace and at scale, has anyone shifted a radio system on to a telecommunication system. That is the fundamental problem. The transmission of data is not the issue—we do that on our phones all the time—but we probably need to carry on delivering the radio as it was and separate the data off. If we continue to try to combine them, I worry that it will become even more undeliverable than it has been to date.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord makes a good point and I thank him for his perspective. He is right that the radio supply over the networks remains critical. As I understand it—and this answers one of the earlier questions from the noble Lord, Lord Harris—the technology is more proven than it was when the PAC last commented on it. It is being rolled out in other parts of the world; from memory, Korea is one of the countries where it is being tested. So some of those aspects at least have been dealt with.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, I apologise for coming back again, but the Minister is essentially implying that this just happened—that Motorola came in and bought Airwave, and these things just happened like that. But is not the reality that the negotiations were conducted between highly sophisticated multinational companies that are used to doing negotiations and a bunch of ingénues on the Home Office side? It is not surprising that the country has been ripped off in this way. Does the Minister agree?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

No, that is a very unfair characterisation. As I said earlier, Motorola bought Airwave, which could not have been foreseen, and, therefore, as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, has just pointed out, it became in effect a monopoly supplier. That is why the Competition and Markets Authority was involved at the behest of the Home Office, which did the right thing.

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 29th January 2024 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken today and shared their thoughts on this legislation. We have heard many thoughtful speeches from many noble Lords, but I welcome particularly the valued insights of my noble friends Lady Goldie, Lady Verma, Lord Wolfson, Lord Dobbs, Lord Horam and Lord Murray. It is clear from across the Benches that there is common ground in needing to find a solution to the challenges we face. Just for the record, of course I agree with the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury on the worth of individuals.

Stopping illegal migration is an important issue for both the public and the Government. Parliament and the British people want an end to illegal migration, as my noble friend Lady Stowell powerfully argued; therefore, we need a deterrent. As noble Lords will have heard me say last week, we made progress towards stopping the boats but we must do more to break the business model of the criminal gangs and deter illegal migrants. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, that there is evidence of deterrence—and that it works. I am also grateful to my noble friends Lord Udny-Lister and Lord Horam for reminding us of Albania and the Australian example.

The dangerous channel crossings are often made by young, fit men in search of better life opportunities. Many of those have travelled through safe countries to reach the UK, as my noble friend Lord Hannan set out, and they have paid substantial amounts of money to the criminal gangs to facilitate their journey. As my noble friend Lady Goldie highlighted, these criminal gangs could not care less about the safety of migrants; they care only about the money. I think noble Lords are in agreement that we cannot let this continue.

The most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury and other noble Lords were right to place the Bill in its moral context, but proceeding with it is the moral course, as my noble friend Lord Blackwell powerfully noted. We must put a stop to the dangerous channel crossings that are putting lives at risk and to this mass trafficking of people in order to save lives. That is the humane thing to do, and it is the fair thing to do, as my noble friend Lady Verma argued.

By delivering our key partnership, relocating those with no right to be in the UK to Rwanda and not allowing them to stay in the UK, we will deter people from making these journeys and we will save those lives. We also need to ensure that we are meeting our international obligations, so the treaty the Home Secretary signed in December last year sets out to Parliament and the courts why Rwanda is, and will remain, safe for those relocated there. The Bill makes it unambiguously clear that Rwanda is safe and will prevent the courts second-guessing Parliament’s assessments.

The Prime Minister has been clear that he will not let a foreign court block flights. We simply cannot let Strasbourg dictate our border security and stop us establishing a deterrent.

I turn to the matters raised in the debate, including the points addressed in the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord German. A number of noble Lords asked why the legislation seeks to confirm that Rwanda is safe when the treaty simply sets out the aspirations of what should happen, and the measures are not in place. The Supreme Court recognised that changes may be delivered in future which could address the conclusions it came to. We have been working closely with Rwanda on these changes. The partnership with Rwanda is now set out in a new treaty, binding in international law, with specific provisions to address the court’s findings.

Since the evidential position considered by the UK domestic courts in summer 2022, we have obtained further specific information, evidence and assurances from the Government of Rwanda explicitly to address the challenges raised by the claimants and the UNHCR in the litigation, and the findings of the Supreme Court, following its judgment in November. This primarily takes the form of detailed standard operating procedures, reviews of contracts for services that the Government of Rwanda have procured—for example, with accommodation, facilities and medical insurance companies—and new and revised training programmes.

The noble Lords, Lord Purvis and Lord Coaker, mentioned this all in the context of the UNHCR. Rwanda has successfully hosted over 135,000 refugees and asylum seekers in collaboration with the UNHCR and other organisations. That is not including the nearly 2,000 supported in Rwanda by the emergency transit mechanism to evacuate to safety refugees and asylum seekers trapped in or fleeing civil war in Libya. That is also supported by the EU, which will support the operation of the ETM until 2026, and the EU announced a further €22 million support package for it. As recently as December 2023, the UNHCR evacuated 153 asylum seekers from Libya to Rwanda, and the European ambassador to Rwanda described the scheme as:

“A crucial life-saving initiative to evacuate people facing major threats and inhumane conditions in Libya to safety in Rwanda, It is a significant example of African solidarity and of partnership with the European Union. We are grateful to the Government of Rwanda for hosting these men, women and children”.


Regarding our agreement with Rwanda, we have taken crucial steps forward to respond to the Supreme Court findings, which recognise that changes could be delivered to address its conclusions. Both the Court of Appeal and the High Court found that the principle of relocating individuals to safer countries for their protection claims to be assessed was consistent with the UK’s obligations under the refugee convention, and the Supreme Court did not disturb this.

It is imperative that we continue to work at pace to stop the boats, save lives and break the business models of the evil criminal gangs. The fundamental accusation that Rwanda is incapable of making good decisions and is somehow not committed to this partnership is wrong, as my noble friend Lady Verma pointed out. I disagree with that. Rwandans, perhaps more than most, understand the importance of providing protection to those needing it. At this point, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, that the monitoring of all this is of course dealt with by the treaty, which we debated at some length last week.

I turn to the early intervention from the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, on the Motion set down by this House not to ratify the treaty. Your Lordships will be aware that a resolution made in this House on the treaty does not necessarily stop its progress. The International Agreements Committee report did not fundamentally find anything objectionable in the treaty itself. The report was about implementation, not any flaws in the treaty. The treaty will therefore follow the usual process with regard to scrutiny and ratification. Ultimately, the Minister responsible can decide to issue a statement declaring that the treaty should be ratified in any event, and the Home Secretary will confirm the Government’s position in due course.

The noble Lords, Lord Carlile and Lord Purvis, also asked about the timings of the Bill. This reflects an answer I also gave last week. Both the treaty and the Bill need to progress their respective paths through Parliament in the usual way before they can be ratified or receive royal assent respectively. Rwanda will also need to adjust its legislation and ratify the treaty on its side. Once these things have happened, the Bill and the treaty will be operable.

The noble Lords, Lord Ponsonby and Lord German, asked about the Government’s safe and legal routes. The UK is a generous country. We are proud of that fact, and we are proud of the fact that we have helped so many refugees to safety. The Government have made it clear that we will continue to provide sanctuary to those most in need, but we can act only within our capabilities. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that it is not about “I’m all right, Jack”; it is about capability and capacity. While the compassion of the UK is unlimited, our capacity is not. Local authorities have played a vital role in delivery of our safe and legal routes, but they are feeling the pressures caused by both legal and illegal migration. We can bring people over on safe and legal routes only when local authorities are able to receive them. We remain committed to looking at new or expanded safe and legal routes to the UK for those most vulnerable, but only once we have drastically reduced the unacceptable number of illegal, dangerous and simply unnecessary small boat crossings, which are putting a huge amount of pressure on our public services.

[Lord Blunkett (Lab)]

Perhaps the Minister can answer the simple question which I put early in this debate. If that is true, why do the Government not accept that those who are accorded refugee status through the process that this Government wish to apply in Rwanda should be allowed back into the United Kingdom?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I will come back to that.

On 20 October 2023, the Home Office launched the consultation on the cap on safe and legal routes, to understand local authority capacity. This consultation closed on 9 January 2024. Home Office officials are currently reviewing those responses and are planning further engagement with the respondents through a series of regional dialogues to validate responses and to determine a capacity estimate. We will produce a summary of the consultation by the spring and, in summer 2024, the Government will lay a statutory instrument in Parliament which will then need to be debated and voted on, before the cap comes into force in 2025. Therefore, in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, we have to wait for all those things to take effect. I have no doubt that this matter will be up for debate again after 2025.

The noble Baronesses, Lady Whitaker and Lady Brinton, asked how we can deem Rwanda to be safe if we are granting Rwandan nationals refugee status in the UK. Rwanda is a safe country, which is what this Bill asserts. The meaning of a “safe country” is set out in Clause 1(5). However, our obligation when an asylum claim is lawfully lodged and admitted to the UK asylum process for consideration is to carry out an individualised assessment of a person’s particular circumstances. If, after that assessment, there is found to be a reason why a person, based on these individual circumstances, cannot be returned to their country of origin, then it is correct that we grant them protection. It is important to stress that people from many different nationalities apply for asylum in the UK and this includes—

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)]

My Lords, where, under Clause 4, an individual is seeking the court’s ruling on whether their individual circumstances might give them a reason to not be sent to Rwanda, might that be because they are able to argue that “It may generally be safe but it is not safe for me”? Will they be able to argue that, because they are homosexual or ill, it is not safe for them?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, quoting from the Bill in answer to the noble Baroness, it is

“the person in question, based on compelling evidence relating specifically to the person’s particular individual circumstances (rather than on the grounds that the Republic of Rwanda is not a safe country in general)”.

That is pretty straightforward. It is important to stress that people from many—

[Baroness Whitaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I asked what the grounds were for people from Rwanda being given asylum here. What was their well-grounded fear of persecution about?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, each individual case is different. I do not know the particular circumstances.

It is important to stress that people from many different nationalities apply for asylum in the UK. This includes nationals from some of our closest European neighbours and other safe countries around the world. That is why there are a small number of cases where we have granted asylum to individuals from countries that we would otherwise consider safe. This is a reflection of our system working. An individual claim is not a reflection of the country as a whole. This process also reflects the safeguards which the Bill provides to individuals in Clause 4, which I have just read out. Each case will be considered on its individual merits by caseworkers who receive extensive training. All available evidence is carefully and sensitively considered in the light of published country information, but I cannot comment on the specifics of individual cases.

The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of London and the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, asked what support will be available for those who are particularly vulnerable. Rwandan officials will have due regard to the psychological and physical signs of vulnerability of all relocated persons at any stage of the application and integration process. Screening interviews to identify vulnerabilities will be conducted by protection officers in Rwanda who have received the relevant training and are equipped to handle competently safeguarding referrals. Interpreters will be available as required to ensure that relocated individuals can make their needs known. All interviews will be conducted with sensitivity for the individual’s well-being.

The Government of Rwanda have processes in place to safeguard relocated individuals with a range of vulnerabilities, including those concerning mental health, gender-based violence and addiction. All relocated individuals will receive appropriate protection and assistance according to their needs, including referral to specialist services, as appropriate, to protect their welfare.

Article 13 of the treaty makes specific provision that Rwanda will have regard to information provided about a relocated individual relating to any special needs that may arise as a result of their being a victim of modern slavery or human trafficking and shall take all necessary steps to ensure that these needs are accommodated.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

How will they know? The Illegal Migration Act prevents someone who may well have been trafficked from even starting the process of claiming that they have been trafficked here, so how will the Rwandans know? We are not collecting that information.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, as I have just said, the treaty makes specific provision that Rwanda will have regard to information provided about a relocated individual by the United Kingdom.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am grateful, but that is prohibited in the Illegal Migration Act.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I will have to write to the noble Lord on that very specific point.

These are also detailed in the standard operating procedures as part of the evidence pack released on 11 January in support of the Bill. Furthermore, the UK is providing additional expertise to support the development of Rwanda’s capacity to safeguard vulnerable persons.

The noble Lord, Lord Cashman, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, asked about the treatment of LGBT persons, if sent to Rwanda. Rwandan legal protection for LGBT rights is generally considered more progressive than that of neighbouring countries. The constitution of Rwanda includes a broad prohibition of discrimination and does not criminalise or discriminate against sexual orientation in law or policy. As set out in paragraph 36 of the Government’s published policy statement, the constitution of Rwanda prohibits, at article 16, discrimination of any kind based on, among other things, ethnic origin, family or ancestry, clan, skin colour or race, sex, region, economic categories, religion or faith, opinion, fortune, cultural differences, language, economic status, and physical or mental disability.

The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, asked about unaccompanied children deemed to be adults being relocated to Rwanda. As the treaty sets out in Article 3(4), we will not seek to relocate unaccompanied individuals who are deemed to be under 18 to Rwanda. Any unaccompanied individual who, subsequent to relocation, is deemed by a court or tribunal in the UK to either be under 18 or to be treated temporarily as being under 18, shall be returned to the UK.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

I am sure the Minister wants to be accurate. Is it not the case that he should recognise that homosexuality is illegal in Rwanda? The penal code criminalises same-sex sexual activity and individuals found guilty of engaging in such activity can face imprisonment. If that is right, is Rwanda really a safe country?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am afraid I am not familiar with that part. However, I have just read out the relevant clause in the Bill that deals with specific individual circumstances.

Any person who has been relocated to Rwanda but who subsequently receives a court or tribunal order from the UK that they must be treated as a minor, and are therefore a child who is in Rwanda without a parent or guardian, shall be provided with suitable accommodation and support that meets all the requirements for families with children set out within the treaty under paragraphs 1.1 and 1.2.2 of Part 1 of Annex A to the treaty until the child is returned to the UK.

With regard to concerns about the impacts of the policy on children treated as adults, I reassure noble Lords that there are safeguards in place to prevent that happening. The Home Office will treat an individual claiming to be a child as an adult without conducting further inquiries only if two officers—one of at least chief immigration officer grade or equivalent—have separately determined that the individual’s physical appearance and demeanour very strongly suggest that they are “significantly over 18 years” of age. If doubt remains about whether the claimant is an adult or a child, they are treated as a child for immigration purposes until a further assessment of their age by a local authority or the National Age Assessment Board. This will usually entail a careful, holistic age assessment, known as a Merton-compliant age assessment. Only once this assessment is complete could the individual then be treated as an adult if found to be so.

Many noble Lords have asked whether this Bill will comply with international law. Its provisions are consistent with our international law obligations. They retain rights challenge based on compelling evidence of serious and irreversible harm in specific individual circumstances, which will arise in narrow circumstances.

In response to the points made by the noble Lords, Lord German and Lord Howarth, I say that the Bill makes it clear that it is only for a Minister of the Crown to determine whether to comply with an interim measure of the Strasbourg court. I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Wolfson and the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, for their comments on this.

I will not get drawn into speculation about hypothetical scenarios, but the internationally binding treaty agreed between the UK and Rwanda contains binding commitments to ensure that the scheme is compliant with international law, including the ECHR. It also makes it clear that domestic courts may not have regard to the existence of any interim measures when considering any domestic application flowing from a decision to relocate a person to Rwanda in accordance with the treaty.

The Permanent Secretary for the Home Office has confirmed that if we receive a Rule 39, instead of deferring removal immediately—as the guidance currently indicates—officials will refer the Rule 39 to the Minister for an immediate decision. To answer the noble Lord, Lord Wilson, I say that the Cabinet Office has confirmed that it is the responsibility of civil servants under the Civil Service Code to deliver that decision. Consideration will be on a case-by-case basis depending on the facts. I also remind noble Lords that, as the Government have set out, both the UK and Rwanda are committed to making this partnership work.

As my noble friend Lord Murray set out, the Section 19(1)(b) statement is not specific to one provision; it applies to the Bill as a whole. A statement under Section 19(1)(b) makes it clear, in this instance, that the Home Secretary is not able to state now that the Bill’s provisions are more likely than not compatible with convention rights. There is nothing improper or unprecedented about pursuing Bills with a Section 19(1)(b) statement. It does not mean that the Bill is unlawful or that the Government will necessarily lose any legal challenges on human rights grounds. Parliament clearly intended Section 19(1)(b) to be used as it is included in the Human Rights Act 1998. It is an important measure to safeguard parliamentary sovereignty. Section 19(1)(b) statements have been used by Governments of all stripes before. For example, the Bill that became the Communications Act 2003 included a provision banning paid political advertising on TV. The use in this case recognises the novel and ambitious approach taken by this Bill, and the fact there is room for argument both ways. We are testing the limits but remain satisfied that this Bill is compatible with international law.

The Bill allows decision-makers and the courts to consider claims that Rwanda is unsafe for a person due to their particular individual circumstances, as we have discussed. As the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of London noted, the Bill does not disapply Section 4 on declaration of incompatibility, as this is the only substantive remedy against the conclusive presumption that Rwanda is safe. Retaining DOIs allows the courts to respond to changing circumstances and for this question to be brought back for parliamentary consideration. Of course, the final say on the matter will remain with Parliament and the Government because Section 4(6) of the Human Rights Act makes it clear that a declaration cannot affect the operation or validity of domestic legislation.

The effect of retaining this Section 4 is therefore beneficial in limiting domestic and international legal challenge and, crucially, does not undermine the operation of the Bill, and in doing so reaffirms parliamentary sovereignty. The court could not grant interim relief on the basis of a DOI having been granted because of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 4(6) of the Human Rights Act.

The noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, asked about the impact of the Bill in Northern Ireland. The Bill will apply fully in Northern Ireland in the same way as it does in the rest of the United Kingdom. This is explicit in the Bill and will always be the case, reflecting that immigration policy is a UK-wide matter. Nothing in the Windsor Framework, including Article 2, or the trade continuity agreement affects this. The Bill’s provisions do not diminish the rights and commitments we have made on the convention on human rights in the Belfast agreement. The Government remain fully committed to that agreement in all its parts. The Government are unshakable in their commitment to the Belfast/Good Friday agreement, and the Bill does not undermine this.

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

Has the noble Lord actually read the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission’s advice on this matter? Has he taken cognisance of the number of measures he lists which are affected, and the fact it is an obligation under Article 2 of the Windsor Framework?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

As I have just set out to the noble Baroness, the Government takes a different view to those opinions.

The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, asked about the costs of this partnership. The spend on the MEDP with Rwanda so far is £240 million. Further funding will be provided to Rwanda once the partnership is operational. Costs and payments will depend on the number of people relocated, the timing of when this happens and the outcomes of individual cases. Spending will continue to be reported as part of annual Home Office reports and accounts in the usual way. Those focusing solely on the costs of this partnership are missing the point. It is incredibly frustrating for the British people and the taxpayer to spend billions to house illegal migrants in hotels. The daily cost of hotels for migrants is £8 million and the cost of the UK’s asylum system has roughly doubled in the last year; it now stands at nearly £4 billion. Criminal smuggling gangs are continuing to turn a profit using small boats. We must bring an end to this.

The Government recognise the extraordinary level of interest in this partnership, and we take our responsibility to be transparent seriously. However, that must be balanced with the nuances of managing our international relationships and respecting commercial sensitivities. We have said we will do what it takes to curb illegal migration and stop the boats. As we explore avenues of doing this, it would be against our direct interests to release all financial information. Costs and payments of course will depend on the number of people relocated, the timing of when this happens, and the outcomes of individual cases. Every individual’s needs are different, and funding will only be provided while an individual remains in Rwanda. Spending will be reported as part of the annual Home Office reports and accounts in the usual way.

I am getting to the end. Noble Lords have asked whether this Bill will, by disapplying international law, have a knock-on impact on wider international treaties and potentially worsen the UK’s relationship with the ECHR. We have a long and diverse history of freedoms in this country, and we are proud of the UK’s heritage and culture on human rights and democracy. But no country has all the answers to global human rights challenges. We continue to engage others about our ongoing journey on these issues—a point made by many noble Lords and emphasised by my noble friend the Foreign Secretary on 16 January.

I am again thankful for all the contributions made to today’s debate. It is absolutely essential that we tackle illegal migration, bring an end to such dangerous channel crossings and save lives. To the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, I say that the integrity of our border also matters. I therefore urge noble Lords to support the Government in delivering the partnership with Rwanda, and our wider plans to take control of our borders and stop the boats. These are difficult choices to make with regards to tackling this issue. That is what this Government are doing, and we will continue to do so. The Bill will enable us to stop the boats, and I commend it to the House. I invite noble Lords to reject the amendment standing in the name of the noble Lord, Lord German.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

That the bill be committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

Motion agreed.

Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill [HL]

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 23rd January 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his continued engagement with us on all aspects of this important Bill. I would be grateful if he could pass that on to his officials as well. I wish the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, well with her knee, and I hope she will soon be able to make do without the crutch.

I very much support what my noble friends Lord West and Lord Murphy said about the amendments moved by my noble friend Lord West regarding the ISC. I look forward to the Minister’s response. I will come to my amendments in a moment, but it goes to the heart of what many of us have been saying—that the Intelligence and Security Committee is extremely important. Part of the problem is that, when the Minister responds to us on these points, he often says, “Don’t worry: there’s ministerial oversight”. However, what my noble friends have talked about is that this is not the same as parliamentary oversight. There is an important distinction to be made. I hope that the Minister can respond to that.

I turn to the noble Lord, Lord Fox, and his amendments. Again, we thank the Government for the communication we have had regarding Amendments 1 and 7. As I have intimated before, we support the noble Lord, Lord Fox, on his Amendments 1 and 7. With the addition of the low/no datasets authorisation and third-party data warrants to the bulk personal datasets warrants regime, and the extension of powers that this represents, it seems appropriate that additional safeguards are put in place to ensure the judicial commissioner is informed as quickly as possible of the use of these urgent warrants. Importantly, that does not change how long the judicial commissioner has to consider the warrant, and to revoke access if necessary; it is just on the importance of notification as quickly as possible. If urgent powers, as the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, has pointed to, need to be used, nobody is suggesting that they are not used; the suggestion is that the notification to the judicial commissioner should be made as soon as possible and, with respect to the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Fox, within 24 hours.

I turn to my Amendment 47. This amendment aims to try to get the Minister to put some of this on the record, rather than to seek to divide the House on it. Amendment 47 seeks to ensure that the Government report on the potential impact of the Bill on the requirement to maintain data adequacy decisions from the EU. The adequacy agreement is dependent on the overall landscape of UK data protections. Although the UK protections are currently considered adequate, deviations from this under this legislation could put our current status at risk. Losing this designation would have serious consequences for digitally intensive sectors, such as telecommunications and financial services as well as tech services. In his response, could the Minister provide some reassurances on this particular aspect of the legislation and say whether any specific analysis has been done on the impacts of the Bill on the data adequacy agreement?

I turn to my Amendment 5, which, just for clarity, is a probing amendment but is extremely important. The Minister will know that I have raised this point again and again on various pieces of legislation over the last year or two. To be fair, the Minister has said that he will raise it with the appropriate people, and I am sure that he has done that—I am not questioning that at all. As the noble Lord, Lord Murphy, said, and the Intelligence and Security Committee said in its report of 5 December 2023—hence my Amendment 5 to probe this—no meeting between the Prime Minister of our country and the Intelligence and Security Committee has taken place since December 2014. I am pleased that we have the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, here—not present in the Chamber now, but here within your Lordships’ House—because he was the last Prime Minister that met with the committee. I find it absolutely astonishing that that is the case.

We are informed by the committee that many invitations have been made to various Prime Ministers to attend the Intelligence and Security Committee. I do not want to go on about this—well, I will to an extent—but it is incredibly important. I cannot believe—people say that it cannot be right, and I show them the report—that it has been 10 years since a Prime Minister has gone to the body, which has been set up by Parliament to ensure there is liaison between Parliament and the intelligence and security services. Obviously, matters can be discussed in that committee. Some of those cannot be discussed in the open, but that is one way in which it is held to account.

Can the Minister explain what on earth is going on? Why is it so difficult for the Prime Minister to meet the committee? I am not intending to push this amendment to a vote, as I say, and I am sure the Minister will try to explain again, but it is simply unacceptable that the Prime Minister of this country has not met the ISC for 10 years. For the first 20 years of its existence, and my noble friend Lord West will correct me if I am wrong, I think it was an annual occurrence that the Prime Minister met the ISC—my noble friend Lord Murphy is nodding—yet that has not happened since 2014. That is unacceptable, and my Amendment 5 seeks to ask the Minister what on earth we are going to do to try to get the Prime Minister to attend. I would not have thought that was too much to ask.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, I have listened with interest to the points made in this debate. As noble Lords will be aware, we have considered carefully the amendments that have been debated. I place on record my thanks to the noble Lords, Lord West, Lord Coaker and Lord Fox, for their constructive engagement in the run-up to today’s debate on these issues and various others that will be debated later today.

I turn first to the topic of oversight of the new Part 7A regime containing bulk personal datasets, BPDs, where there is low or no expectation of privacy. Alongside the proportionate set of safeguards set out in Part 7A, the Bill currently provides for executive political oversight and accountability by requiring the heads of the intelligence services to provide an annual report to the Secretary of State about Part 7A datasets. The intention of the report is to ensure that there is a statutory mechanism for political oversight, given that the Secretary of State will not have a role in Part 7A authorisations. That is set out in new Section 226DA in Clause 2 of the Bill.

The Investigatory Powers Commissioner will continue to provide full, independent and robust oversight of the investigatory powers regime, including this new part. Nevertheless, the Government have listened to the points made by noble Lords and colleagues in the other place, and we understand their concerns about increasing parliamentary oversight. Government Amendment 4 therefore recognises the important role of the ISC in providing parliamentary oversight of the intelligence services. It places a statutory obligation on the Secretary of State to provide the ISC with an annual report containing information about category authorisations granted under the Act during the year. The amendment will ensure that the ISC is proactively provided with information about the operation of Part 7A on an annual basis. That will support the ISC in continuing to fulfil its scrutiny role and will enhance the valuable parliamentary oversight the committee provides.

It is appropriate for the ISC to be privy to certain information relating to Part 7A in the exercise of its functions, and that a statutory obligation be placed on the Secretary of State to provide it. This obligation is intended to be consistent with the provisions set out in the Justice and Security Act, and due regard will be had to the memorandum of understanding between the Prime Minister and the ISC when meeting it. It is likely that Amendments 2 and 3, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead, which would require that the report provided to the Secretary of State be also shared with the ISC, would not be in step with that. The information required by the Secretary of State to fulfil their responsibilities in respect of the intelligence services will not necessarily be the same as that which would assist the ISC in performing its functions. The report will almost certainly contain information about live operations, which is outside the scope of the ISC’s remit, as well as other information that it may not be appropriate to share with the ISC and which the Secretary of State could properly withhold from the ISC were the ISC to request it.

For that reason, we think it more appropriate that a report be written to meet the ISC’s functions that the Secretary of State will send to the ISC. This will provide the additional parliamentary oversight the committee is seeking and would be akin to the existing arrangements in place for operational purposes.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for giving way, because this is an extremely important point. He mentioned with respect to my Amendment 5 that somebody will formally reach out. Does that mean that the Prime Minister will formally reach out to the ISC and meet with it, so that we get a resolution to this non-meeting?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I cannot say whether or not that someone will be the Prime Minister at the moment.

As I said, the Government are clear that the MoU review is the correct forum to discuss relevant potential changes to the agreement between the Prime Minister and the ISC. But the Government do not believe a report of this kind is appropriate or necessary and do not support the amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, has already answered the question from the noble Lord, Lord Murphy, and all I can say from the Dispatch Box is that I will try again.

I turn to the second of the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, Amendment 47, which would require the Government to publish a report assessing the potential impact of this legislation on the EU’s data adequacy decision. The Government are committed to maintaining their data adequacy decisions from the EU, which play a pivotal role in enabling trade and fighting crime. The Home Office worked closely with the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology when developing the proposals within this Bill to ensure that they would not adversely impact on the UK’s EU data adequacy decisions. As the European Commission has made clear, a third country is not required to have the same rules as the EU to be considered adequate. We maintain regular engagement with the European Commission on the Bill to ensure that our reforms are understood. Ultimately, the EU adequacy assessment of the UK is for the EU to decide, so the Government cannot support this amendment.

I turn to the amendments retabled by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, on urgency provisions for individual authorisations under Part 7A and third party dataset warrants under Part 7B. The Government remain opposed to these iterations of the amendments for the following reasons. Urgency provisions are found throughout the IPA and the Government’s approach is to mirror those provisions in the regimes in new Part 7A and new Part 7B. Making the proposed amendment solely for these parts would reduce consistency—as the noble Lord, Lord Fox, predicted—and ultimately risk operational confusion where there is no good reason to do so.

It will always be in the interests of the relevant intelligence service—as the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham- Buller, said; I add my comments to those of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, about a speedy recovery—to notify a judicial commissioner of the granting of an urgent authorisation or the issuing of an urgent warrant as soon as is reasonably practicable. These urgent instruments are valid only for five working days. A judicial commissioner must review and decide whether to approve the decision to issue or grant the instrument within three working days. If the judicial commissioner refuses to approve the decision within that time, then the instrument will cease to have effect. It would be counter- intuitive for an intelligence service to make untimely notifications, as this increases the risk of the urgent authorisation or warrant timing out because the judicial commissioner is left without sufficient time to make a decision.

In an operational scenario where the urgency provisions are required, such as a threat to life or risk of serious harm, or an urgent intelligence-gathering opportunity, it may not be practical or possible for the intelligence services to ensure completion of paperwork within a 24-hour period, as the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham- Buller, explained rather more eloquently than I have done.

The intelligence services work closely with the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office to ensure that the processes for reviewing decisions are timely and work for judicial commissioners. For those reasons, I ask that the noble Lord, Lord Fox, does not press his amendments.

This group also includes the two modest but worthwhile government amendments, Amendments 8 and 9. These make it clear beyond doubt that the new third party BPD regime will fall under the oversight of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. The robust oversight that IPCO brings will ensure compliance, ensuring that robust safeguards are in place when information is examined by the intelligence services on third parties’ systems. I hope that noble Lords will welcome these amendments and support them.

[Lord Butler of Brockwell (CB)]

My Lords, as a former member of the Intelligence and Security Committee, perhaps I may say how much I endorse what has been said by the noble Lords, Lord West and Lord Murphy, and welcome many elements in the—

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

4: Clause 2, page 11, line 16, at end insert—
“226DAA Report to Intelligence and Security Committee(1) The Secretary of State must for each relevant period provide to the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament a report setting out information about category authorisations and renewals of category authorisations granted in that period.(2) In subsection (1) “relevant period” means—(a) a period of at least one year and no more than two years beginning with the date on which this Part comes fully into force, and(b) subsequent periods of no more than one year, beginning with the end of the period to which the previous report related.(3) Each report must be provided to the Committee as soon as reasonably practicable after the end of the period to which the report relates.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires the Secretary of State to provide to the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament reports about category authorisations and renewals of such authorisations under new Part 7A of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

8: Clause 6, page 25, line 15, leave out “and (3)” and insert “to (3A)”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment in the name of Lord Sharpe of Epsom at page 25, line 30.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

10: Clause 8, page 27, line 14, at end insert—
“(aa) deciding under section 90(11) or 257(10) whether to approve a decision of the Secretary of State,”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides that the function of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner (“IPC”) of deciding, under section 90(11) or 257(10) of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (review of notices), whether to approve decisions may be delegated to a Deputy IPC only where the IPC is unable or unavailable to exercise the function.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to the government amendments in this group, Amendments 10 to 14.

The Investigatory Powers Act contains world-leading oversight arrangements and safeguards that apply to the use of investigatory powers. The Bill strengthens these to ensure that the oversight regime is resilient and that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner is able to carry out his functions effectively. These government amendments are designed to maintain this approach, and to tighten the drafting in certain areas to ensure that the scope of the measures in Part 3, in respect of communications data, cannot be interpreted more broadly than is intended.

I will start with government Amendment 12, which will ensure that there is clarity for telecommunications operators regarding their obligations to report personal data breaches relating to warrants issued under the IPA. The proposed new clause will also make provision for such breaches to be reported to the Information Commissioner and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. This amendment will also ensure that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner has the ability to notify an individual affected by the personal data breach, if it is deemed to be in the public interest to do so and if the Information Commissioner considers the breach to be serious. Such a notification will inform an individual of any rights that they may have to apply to a court or tribunal in relation to the breach. This important amendment will bring much-needed clarity in respect of how personal data breaches committed by tele- communications operators are regulated, and ensure that there is a clear statutory basis for the Information Commissioner and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to be notified of certain personal data breaches.

I move on to government Amendments 10 and 11. Amendment 11 adds Scottish Ministers to the list of parties, at Clause 9(5), who are to be notified by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner of the appointment of a temporary judicial commissioner. This must be as soon as practicable after any temporary judicial commissioner has been appointed. This will ensure that Scottish Ministers are kept abreast of crucial developments in the investigatory powers oversight regime. A similar requirement already exists in the Bill, which requires the IPC to notify certain persons, including the Secretary of State and the Lord President of the Court of Session, of an appointment of a temporary judicial commissioner.

Government Amendment 10 to Clause 8 allows the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to delegate to deputy Investigatory Powers Commissioners the power to approve decisions following the review of a notice. This brings this function in line with the commissioner’s other functions in the Act with regards to delegation and, as with those powers, allows for delegation in only when the commissioner is unavailable or unable.

I turn now to government Amendments 13 and 14, both of which concern communications data, which I will refer to as CD. Government Amendment 13 clarifies the extent of Clause 11 to ensure that its scope is not wider than intended. Section 11 of the IPA creates the offence of acquiring CD from a telecommunications operator without lawful authority. Clause 11 seeks to carve out from the scope of Section 11 the sharing of CD between public authorities, where one of those authorities was a telecommunications operator.

This amendment to Clause 11 ensures that the public authority carve-out from the Section 11 IPA offence of acquiring CD without lawful authority does not go wider than intended. The new definition is based on the definition of public authority in the Procurement Act 2023. The previous definition was based on the definition of public authority in the Human Rights Act 1998. This latter definition could, in some circumstances, have created doubt over whether it included certain private sector telecommunications operators.

This amendment removes that doubt and clarifies that the public authority carve-out will apply only to telecommunications operators wholly or mainly funded by public funds—in other words, they are public authorities themselves. The IPA was designed to ensure that the acquisition of CD from private sector tele- communications operators for the statutory purposes set out in the Act was subject to independent oversight to safeguard against abuse. This amendment maintains this important safeguard in relation to private sector telecommunications operators.

I turn to government Amendment 14. It is critical that the legislation is absolutely clear on what constitutes CD and the lawful basis for its acquisition. Without this clarity, we risk placing CD that is crucial to investigators out of their reach. Government Amendment 14 therefore seeks to clarify that subscriber data used to identify an entity will be classed as CD.

This amendment is necessary as the existing Act creates a carve-out in the definition of CD to ensure that the content of a communication cannot be acquired under a Part 3 acquisition request. This reflects Parliament’s view during the initial passage of the IPA 2016 that the content of a communication is inherently more sensitive than the underpinning metadata: the “who”, “where”, “when”, “how” and “with whom” of a communication. Clause 12 amends the definition of CD in Section 261 of the Act to exclude certain types of data from the carve-out of content from the definition of CD. The effect of this is to include those data types within the definition of CD.

Government Amendment 14 restricts the effect of Clause 12 to ensure that it is not overly broad and cannot be applied to bring unintended, inappropriate types of data within the definition of CD. For example, the amendment will put beyond doubt that the content of recorded calls to contact centres or voicemails is not in scope of the amended CD definition and will not be accessible with an authorisation under Part 3 of the Act. The amendment to Section 261 does not affect the oversight function of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office, which continues to inspect and highlight any errors and provide prior independent authorisation for the acquisition of CD in most cases.

I hope I have convinced noble Lords of the necessity of these government amendments; I ask that they support them. I also hope that these amendments provide reassurance to noble Lords, ahead of the debate on this group, of the Government’s commitment to ensuring that the clauses in Part 3 are drafted as tightly as possible and with a proportionately narrow scope.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, we support the introduction of the Government’s amendments. I echo what the noble Lord, Lord Fox, said about the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and I look forward to the Government’s response on that point.

I would also be interested to hear what the Government have to say about my noble friend Lord West’s amendments. He has taken a keen interest in this part of the Bill, and I hope the Government will be able to answer the questions, in particular on data disclosure powers, as I think they can give a more detailed response to the expansion of disclosure powers to regulatory bodies than was given in the original legislation. It is also very likely to be further analysed and looked at as the Bill moves down to the other end of the Corridor. Nevertheless, we support the amendments as they are currently.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for this short debate and the scrutiny on these important issues. First, I will address Amendments 15 and 16 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead, which seek to remove Clause 13 and the Schedule from the Bill. We have covered some of the same ground as we did in Committee, and I am afraid that much of my response will make similar points to those I made then. However, I can appreciate why he has raised the points he made about these provisions, and I hope that I can still provide him with assurance on why these measures are needed and proportionate.

As the Government have been clear, the purpose of Clause 13 is to ensure that bodies with regulatory or supervisory functions are not inhibited from performing the roles expected of them by Parliament. It restores their pre-existing statutory powers to acquire CD in support of those functions. When the IPA was passed in 2016—under the expert stewardship of the noble Lord’s fellow ISC member in the other place, the right honourable Member for South Holland and The Deepings—it made specific provision, at Section 61(7)(f) and (j) respectively, for the acquisition of CD for the purposes of taxation and oversight of financial services, markets and financial stability. The noble Lord and his fellow committee members have queried whether we are “unmaking” these measures in the 2016 Act through Clause 13 of the Bill. I would therefore like to put beyond doubt what has happened since then to lead us to this point of needing to refine rather than unmake these provisions.

Following the Tele2 and Watson judgment from the Court of Justice of the European Union in 2016, the Government took the opportunity to streamline the statute book, including but not limited to some changes in response to that judgment. This streamlining included the removal of the regulatory provisions contained in the IPA because, at that time, those public authorities with regulatory or supervisory functions were able to acquire the data they needed using their own information-gathering powers, and Section 12 of the IPA had not yet been commenced, removing many of those powers. The relevant data was outside of the provisions of the IPA at this time and therefore not considered to come within the definition of CD.

Since then, businesses have operated their services more and more online. This has meant that many have become, in part at least, telecommunications operators as defined by the IPA. As a consequence, growing amounts of the data that they collect—which regulatory and supervisory bodies would have previously been able to access using their own information-gathering powers—now fall within the IPA’s definition of CD. The effect of this is that public authorities are increasingly unable to acquire the CD that they need to perform their statutory civil or regulatory functions.

In summary, the IPA has been changed since it was commenced in 2016 to remove tax-related and financial stability-related powers to acquire CD and to introduce the serious crime threshold. Technology and society have moved on, with the result that more relevant data amounts to CD. Section 12 of the IPA has been commenced to remove general information powers. The combination of these changes has meant that public authorities are experiencing increased difficulty in carrying out their statutory functions. For example, the Financial Conduct Authority, His Majesty’s Revenue & Customs and the Treasury are all examples of public authorities that already have the power to acquire CD using a Part 3 request but that may be unable to do so in the exercise of some of their functions as a result of the issue I have just set out.

These bodies perform a range of vital statutory functions using CD, including tackling breaches of sanctions regimes, enforcing the minimum wage and providing oversight of banking and financial markets. Schedule 4 to the IPA provides a list of public authorities that can acquire CD under Part 3 of the Act. The new definition of public authorities inserted by this clause will apply in the context of the sharing of CD between public authorities. This will include government departments and their arm’s-length bodies, and executive agencies administering public services. While data sharing between government entities is covered under other legislation including the Data Protection Act and GDPR, or under separate data-sharing agreements, its sharing for legitimate purposes should not be discouraged or prevented by the IPA.

Clause 13 is needed to ensure that such bodies can continue to fulfil these existing statutory duties in the context of a world that takes place increasingly online. It strikes an appropriate balance between necessity and proportionality. In particular, I re-emphasise that it makes clear that the acquisition by these regulatory bodies should be only in support of their civil and regulatory functions, and not used in support of criminal prosecutions. Furthermore, the Government have retained the serious crime threshold that applies when acquiring CD for the purposes of a criminal prosecution.

The codes of practice will also provide additional safeguards and clarity on how this should work in practice. The Government published these in draft ahead of Committee to illustrate this. Any changes to the existing codes will be subject to statutory consultation before being made and will require approval from Parliament under the affirmative procedure. I am therefore confident that the changes will be subject to a high level of scrutiny. To be clear, this applies to a limited cadre of public authorities with the necessary statutory powers conferred on them by Parliament and only specifically when in support of regulatory and supervisory functions—it is not creating a way to circumvent the safeguards in the IPA. It ensures that the acquisition routes and associated strong oversight by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner are reserved for those areas where it is most essential and has the most serious potential consequences in terms of criminal prosecutions.

I am happy to provide the reassurance—or I hope I am—that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, sought. I am grateful to him for his comments regarding government Amendment 14, for engaging with officials to work through the concerns they raised and for his generous comments about the officials.

Our view is that the amended Clause 12 will be narrower in scope than the original drafting, which carried a risk of permitting access beyond the “who” and “where” of an entity. I assure noble Lords that the codes of practice will set out the further safeguards and details on the practical effect of Clause 12 so that operational partners are clear on the lawful basis of CD acquisition. It is appropriate that the technical detail is set out in this way rather than in primary legislation. The codes of practice will be subject to a full public consultation and will be laid in Parliament under cover of an SI, via the affirmative procedure. I reassure the noble Lord that we will consult with partners and the regulators of the IPA to ensure that the high standards of the CD acquisition regime remain world leading. I am happy to continue this conversation, and for my officials to continue with the extensive engagement already undertaken with the users of the CD powers, to see whether any further refinement is needed.

Finally, I confirm that the intention behind the amendment is to include the type of subscriber data that is necessary to register for, or maintain access to, an online account or telecommunication service. Examples of such data would include name, address and email address. It is not intended to include all types of data that an individual might give a telecommunication service that is not necessary for the purpose of maintaining or initiating access to that service.

I turn to Amendments 17, 19 and 20 on internet connection records, also tabled by the noble Lord, Lord West. Much of the argument I have heard relies on a perception that the new condition D is inherently more intrusive than the existing conditions B and C. I will set out why this is not the case.

The safeguards for the new condition D replicate the well-established and extensive safeguards already in place for CD authorisations. The authorisation process for CD varies according to the purpose for which the data is being sought and the type of CD to be acquired. This regime works effectively and has been considered by the Court of Appeal and found to be lawful.

The purpose of new condition D is to enable ICRs to be used for target detection, which is currently not possible under existing Part 3 authorisations. The level of appropriate oversight and safeguards is linked to the sensitivity of the data to be disclosed and the impact that disclosure may have on the subject of interest.

As I have said, the Government do not believe that condition D is inherently more intrusive than conditions B or C. Conditions B and C authorise “target development” work, and as such enable the applicant to request data on a known individual’s internet connections. As an example, this means that the NCA could request records of the connections a known subject of interest has made in a given time period, provided that request was judged to be both necessary and proportionate by the Office for Communications Data Authorisations. In comparison, condition A enables the requesting agency to request who or what device has made a specific connection to an internet service.

Similarly, condition D would enable an agency to request details about who has used one or more specified internet services in a specified timeframe, provided it was necessary and proportionate—for example, accessing a website that solely provides child sexual abuse imagery. The actual data returned with condition D will most likely constitute a list of IP addresses or customer names and addresses. No information concerning any wider browsing that those individuals may have conducted will be provided. Information about that wider activity would be available only under a further condition B or C authorisation. Condition D is therefore no more intrusive than conditions B and C in terms of what data is actually disclosed. As such, we see no benefit or logic to imposing a different authorisation route for condition D when the existing safeguards have proven sufficient in terms of ICRs applications under conditions A, B and C.

I use this opportunity to remind all noble Lords of the importance of this new condition D and how it will support investigations into some of the most serious crimes, as well as supporting the critical work against both state and cyber threats. ICRs could be used to detect foreign state cyber activity. For examples, ICRs could be used to illuminate connections between overseas state actors and likely compromised UK infra- structure. We understand that these actors have an intent to target UK-based individuals and organisations, including government and critical national infrastructure, from within UK infrastructure, which we typically would not see. The ICR data returned from TOs would be highly indicative of the extent of malicious infrastructure and could assist with victim exposure. Furthermore, improved access to ICR data would enable the National Cyber Security Centre to detect such activity more effectively and in turn inform incident management and victims of compromises. Using data to flag suspicious behaviour in this way can lead to action to protect potential UK victims of foreign espionage and attacks.

I now turn specifically to the ability of the intelligence agencies and the NCA to internally authorise condition D applications. The intelligence agencies and the NCA must obtain approval from the Investigatory Powers Commissioner for ICR applications for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime, other than in urgent circumstances. In urgent circumstances, such as threat to life or serious harm to an individual, the intelligence agencies and the NCA are able to obtain CD authorisations from internal designated senior officers in the same way that police forces are. In practice, the volumes of non-urgent requests are such that the IPC delegates responsibility for the authorisation of ICR and other CD requests to the OCDA.

In terms of oversight, the IPC could, if he wished to, consider specific types of CD authorisations himself. The IPC also has the power to directly inspect any part of the CD regime. If he wishes to focus attention on condition D applications, he has the necessary powers to do so. The approach we have adopted for condition D authorisations is therefore consistent with the wider CD regime and gives the IPC flexibility in how he exercises his powers and resources.

As is also consistent with the wider CD regime, condition D applications relating to national security will be authorised by a designated senior officer within the intelligence agencies. The CD codes of practice state that the designated senior officer must be independent of the operation and not in the line management chain of the applicant. This independence is declared within each application, and each designated senior officer completes training prior to taking up this role. Furthermore, each agency has one or more single point of contact officer, accredited by the Home Office and the College of Policing, who facilitates lawful acquisition of CD.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Ponsonby and Lord Fox, for their remarks in this debate. I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Fox, that any cheek-blowing he witnessed was more a reflection of the previous marathon speech than a reflection on his amendments.

Amendment 21, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, would require that the enforcement of data retention notices—DRNs—would apply only to UK recipients of those notices. DRNs and technical capability notices—TCNs—can be given to a person overseas, but only TCNs are currently enforceable overseas. Clause 16 seeks to amend Sections 95 and 97 of the IPA to allow the extraterritorial enforcement of DRNs in order to strengthen operational agility when addressing emerging technology, bringing them in line with TCNs. It is vital to have this further legal lever, if needed, to maintain the capabilities that the intelligence agencies need to access the communications data they need to, in the interests of national security and to tackle serious crime.

The Government therefore oppose Amendment 21 as it goes fundamentally against what the Government are seeking to achieve through Clause 16 and would not provide any additional clarity to telecommunications operators. As DRNs are already enforceable against UK recipients, there is no need to re-emphasise that in the Bill.

I turn to the amendments to Clause 17 concerning the notice review period. This clause is vital to ensure that operators do not make changes that would negatively impact existing lawful access while a notice is being comprehensively reviewed. Maintaining lawful access is critical to safeguard public safety, enabling law enforcement and the intelligence community to continue protecting citizens during the review period.

Let me be clear: operators will not be required to make changes during the review period to specifically comply with the notice. Rather, under Clause 17 they will be required to maintain the status quo so that law enforcement and intelligence agencies do not lose access to any data that they would have been able to access previously. The review process is an important safeguard, and that right of appeal will remain available to companies.

On Amendment 27, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, the Government have noted the strength of feeling from parliamentarians and industry regarding the current uncertainty over the timeframe for conducting a review of a notice. We have therefore tabled Amendments 26, 32 and 33 to Clause 17 to address that uncertainty and provide further clarity and assurances regarding the notice review process.

The existing powers within Sections 90 and 257 of the IPA do not give the Secretary of State the power to specify in regulations the time period within which a review of a notice must be completed. The Government are therefore introducing a new regulation-making power to enable the Secretary of State to specify in regulations the length of time the Secretary of State can take to reach a decision on the review of a notice upon receipt of the report by the judicial commissioner and the Technical Advisory Board, and the overall length of time that a review can take.

The amendments will also make provision for a judicial commissioner to issue directions to the Secretary of State and the person seeking the review, as they see fit, to ensure the effective management of the review process. That will give the judicial commissioner the power to issue directions to both parties, specifying the time period for providing their evidence or making representations, and the power to disregard any submissions outside those timelines. These amendments will provide operators the certainty they require regarding how long a review of a notice can last, and therefore how long the status quo must be maintained under Clause 17. They will also provide further clarity on the process and management of that review.

Specifying timelines will require an amendment to the existing regulations concerning the review of notices. The Government commit to holding a full public consultation before the amendment of those regulations and the laying of new regulations relating to Clause 20, which provides for the introduction of the notification notices. Representations received in response will be considered and used to inform both sets of regulations, which we have clarified in the Bill are subject to the affirmative procedure.

Amendment 35, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, seeks to specify in statute who the Secretary of State must consult before laying regulations relating to Clause 20 and the introduction of notification notices, and the factors that the Secretary of State must have regard to when making those regulations. I hope the commitment that I have just made to hold a full public consultation provides the necessary reassurance to the noble Lord that all relevant persons will be consulted before making the regulations, and that he will agree that is it unnecessarily prescriptive, and potentially restrictive, to put such details in the Bill.

Amendments 22, 25, 28 and 31, also tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, seek to limit the extraterritoriality of Clause 17 and ensure that operators can make changes to their services and systems for users in other jurisdictions during a review. To be clear, the Bill as currently drafted means that companies can make changes to their services during a review. They could choose to roll out new technologies and services while the review is ongoing, including in other jurisdictions, so long as lawful access is built into them as required to maintain the status quo. Furthermore, the status quo will apply only to whichever of their systems and services are covered by the notice in question. Naturally, anything outside the scope of the notice is unaffected by the requirement. I also emphasise that the control of telecommunications systems used to provide telecommunications services in the UK does not stop at borders, and it is highly likely that any such arbitrary geographical limitations would in fact be unworkable in practice.

Amendments 23, 24 and 29 seek to raise the threshold with regard to relevant changes that an operator must not make during a review period to a change that would “substantially limit” their ability to maintain lawful access. This would not make the position any clearer as “substantially” is a subjective test. Moreover, it would constrain Clause 17 in a way that would fundamentally prevent it from achieving its objectives: to ensure that the same level of lawful access available before the notice was issued is maintained during a review period.

Lawful access provides critical data to law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Constraining access to data that was previously available, in a limited capacity or substantially, may seriously undermine investigations and the ability to protect our citizens. It is therefore vital that the status quo is maintained during the review period. It would also be difficult to define “substantially limit” without referring to a “negative effect on” a capability.

Amendments 36 to 38 to Clause 20, also spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, seek to raise the threshold and provide more proportionality. As I have emphasised on every occasion we have debated the Bill, necessity and proportionality constitute a critical safeguard that underpins the IPA. Authorisations are approved by an independent body and all warrants and notices must be approved by a judicial commissioner. There is considerable oversight of authorisations, meaning that the threshold is already high. Necessity and proportionality justifications are considered for every request for a notice, warrant or authorisation and, by extension, whether it is reasonable to issue that request to the operator. Once operators are in receipt of such a request, they are required to provide assistance. The proposed amendments are therefore not required.

Finally, government Amendment 34 is a consequential amendment necessitated by the introduction of Clause 19, which amends the functions of a judicial commissioner to include whether to approve the renewal of certain notices.

I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate—

[Lord Fox (LD)]

Before the Minister sits down, winding back to the point about territoriality, he spoke of national boundaries as being arbitrary. It would help me to understand what kind of activity the Government envisage reaching across those boundaries, which he refers to as arbitrary; in other words, what would the Government be seeking to do extraterritorially?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

If it would help, I am happy to write to the noble Lord with some sensible and practical scenarios because I do not think it is appropriate to make them up at the Dispatch Box, if that is acceptable.

I was just about to thank the noble Lord for the time he has taken to talk me through his concerns ahead of Report and at various other stages of the Bill on various other issues. However, I hope that I have provided reassurances through my comments at the Dispatch Box and the government amendments that we have tabled. I therefore invite the House to support these amendments and invite the noble Lord to withdraw Amendment 21 and not move the others he has tabled.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

26: Clause 17, page 35, line 18, at end insert—
“(b) in subsection (5)—(i) after “must” insert “, before the end of the review period,”;(ii) after “(1)” insert “(and accordingly decide what action to take under subsection (10))”;(c) after subsection (5) insert—“(5A) In subsection (5) “the review period” means—(a) such period as may be provided for by regulations made by the Secretary of State, or(b) if that period is extended by the Secretary of State in accordance with the regulations (see subsection (14)), such extended period.”(d) after subsection (9) insert—“(9A) The Commissioner may give a direction to the operator concerned or the Secretary of State specifying the period within which the operator or the Secretary of State (as the case may be) may provide evidence, or make representations, in accordance with subsection (9)(a).(9B) If the Commissioner gives such a direction to the operator or the Secretary of State, the Board and the Commissioner are not required to take into account any evidence provided, or representations made, by the operator or the Secretary of State (as the case may be) after the end of that period.”;(e) in subsection (10)—(i) for “may” substitute “must”;(ii) after “Commissioner” insert “but before the end of the relevant period, decide whether to”;(f) after subsection (11) insert—“(11A) In subsection (10) “the relevant period” means—(a) such period as may be provided for by regulations made by the Secretary of State, or (b) if that period is extended by the Secretary of State in accordance with the regulations (see subsection (15)), such extended period.”(g) after subsection (13) insert—“(14) Regulations under subsection (5A)(a) may include provision enabling any period provided for by the regulations to be extended by the Secretary of State where the extension is agreed by the Secretary of State, the telecommunications operator concerned and a Judicial Commissioner.(15) Regulations under subsection (11A)(a) may include provision enabling any period provided for by the regulations to be extended by the Secretary of State—(a) where the Secretary of State considers that there are exceptional circumstances that justify the extension, or(b) in any other circumstances specified in the regulations.(16) Where regulations under subsection (11A)(a) include provision mentioned in subsection (15), the regulations must also include provision requiring the Secretary of State to notify a Judicial Commissioner and the telecommunications operator concerned of the duration of any extended period.””Member's explanatory statement
This amendment enables the Secretary of State to make regulations, and a Judicial Commissioner to give a direction, setting time limits in connection with reviews carried out under section 90 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (review of retention notices).

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

32: Clause 17, page 35, line 41, at end insert—
“(b) in subsection (4)—(i) after “must” insert “, before the end of the review period,”;(ii) after “(1)” insert “(and accordingly decide what action to take under subsection (9))”;(c) after subsection (4) insert—“(4A) In subsection (4) “the review period” means—(a) such period as may be provided for by regulations made by the Secretary of State, or(b) if that period is extended by the Secretary of State in accordance with the regulations (see subsection (13)), such extended period.”(d) after subsection (8) insert—“(8A) The Commissioner may give a direction to the person concerned or the Secretary of State specifying the period within which the person or the Secretary of State (as the case may be) may provide evidence, or make representations, in accordance with subsection (8)(a).(8B) If the Commissioner gives such a direction to the person or the Secretary of State, the Board and the Commissioner are not required to take into account any evidence provided, or representations made, by the person or the Secretary of State (as the case may be) after the end of that period.”;(e) in subsection (9)—(i) for “may” substitute “must”;(ii) after “Commissioner” insert “but before the end of the relevant period, decide whether to”; (f) after subsection (10) insert—“(10A) In subsection (9) “the relevant period” means—(a) such period as may be provided for by regulations made by the Secretary of State, or(b) if that period is extended by the Secretary of State in accordance with the regulations (see subsection (14)), such extended period.”(g) after subsection (12) insert—“(13) Regulations under subsection (4A)(a) may include provision enabling any period provided for by the regulations to be extended by the Secretary of State where the extension is agreed by the Secretary of State, the person concerned and a Judicial Commissioner.(14) Regulations under subsection (10A)(a) may include provision enabling any period provided for by the regulations to be extended by the Secretary of State—(a) where the Secretary of State considers that there are exceptional circumstances that justify the extension, or(b) in any other circumstances specified in the regulations.(15) Where regulations under subsection (10A)(a) include provision mentioned in subsection (14), the regulations must also include provision requiring the Secretary of State to notify a Judicial Commissioner and the person concerned of the duration of any extended period.””Member's explanatory statement
This amendment enables the Secretary of State to make regulations, and a Judicial Commissioner to give a direction, setting time limits in connection with reviews carried out under section 257 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (review of national security and technical capability notices).

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

34: Clause 19, page 37, line 25, at end insert—
“(4A) In section 229 (main oversight functions), in subsection (8)(e)(i), for “or varying” substitute “, varying or renewal”.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on clause 19(4) and (6) (renewal of notices). It inserts into section 229 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (main oversight functions) a reference to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner deciding whether to approve the renewal of certain notices.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I do not have much to add to the debate. From these Benches, we fully support the amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord West, and the excellent way in which he presented them. They have the support of the whole ISC, which in this respect has done a great service to us all in taking forward the discussion. These amendments certainly improve the Bill.

The point that the noble Lord, Lord West, made is exceptionally important—the fact that this has to be in the Bill, and that we need it to guide us in how we take this forward. For those who read our proceedings, it is important to repeat that what we are discussing here is the interception of communications of parliamentarians, and the fact that the triple lock was introduced to give additional protection to that. The role of the Prime Minister becomes crucial in that, for obvious reasons.

I join others in thanking the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, for the way in which he has presented his arguments, and the discussions and debates that have gone on in this Chamber and outside it. He has done a great service to all of us by tabling what seems on the face of it a simple amendment—simply changing one word, from “unavailable” to “unable”—but is actually of huge significance. We have concerns about it, which we have expressed in this Chamber and elsewhere— indeed, the noble Lord, Lord West, explained them. Notwithstanding the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and others, we are worried about where it takes us with respect to conflicts of interest, and who decides that there is a conflict of interest for the Prime Minister in circumstances in which the Prime Minister themself does not recognise that there is a conflict of interest. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and others, that there may be a need for this discussion to continue—but who decides whether the Prime Minister has a conflict of interest, if the Prime Minister themself does not recognise that, is an important discussion to have. In the end, the system rests on the integrity of the Prime Minister.

The way in which the ISC has tried to bring forward some conditions to what “unavailable” means is extremely important, and we support that, as indeed we support the amendments that try to ensure that those who take decisions are those various Secretaries of State who may be designated under the Bill to take decisions, should the Prime Minister be unavailable. It is extremely important for those Secretaries of State to have experience of the use of those warrants. Again, the amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord West, deal with that, and we are very happy to support them.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I offer my thanks to the noble Lords, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, Lord Fox, and Lord West of Spithead, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, for their amendments and for the points that they have raised during this debate. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Evans, for his perspective, and the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, for supporting the Government, which obviously I hope becomes a habit.

I have discussed the triple lock at length with noble Lords and many others in Parliament and across government. We are all in agreement that this is a matter of the utmost importance, and it is imperative that we ensure that the triple lock operates correctly. That means that the triple-lock process, when needed urgently, has the resilience to continue in the most exceptional circumstances, when the Prime Minister is genuinely unavailable, while ensuring that the alternative approvals process is tightly and appropriately defined.

On Amendment 40, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, for the valuable engagement he has taken part in with my ministerial colleagues, Home Office officials and me regarding this amendment. I take this opportunity to explain why the Government do not support this amendment. The expressed intention of the noble Lord’s amendment is twofold: first to tighten the requirement in the current clauses, which use the word “unavailable”; and, secondly, to introduce a potential provision for dealing with a conflict of interest, as one of the circumstances in which the alternative approvals process could be used.

There is certainly merit in limiting the circumstances in which the alternative approvals process may be used. However, the noble Lord’s amendment introduces the requirement for a judgment to be made on the Prime Minister’s ability to consider a warrant application, for any number of reasons, including conflict of interest. This raises a number of challenges.

The first challenge is that “unable” draws into the legislation the principle of ministerial conflict of interest. This poses a constitutional tension and a challenge to Cabinet hierarchy. The inclusion of “unable” would allow for someone other than the Prime Minister to decide whether the Prime Minister is subject to a conflict of interest in a particular scenario, which goes against clear constitutional principles regarding the Prime Minister’s powers. This would be a subjective decision on the Prime Minister’s ability, rather than an objective decision on his availability.

As such, rather than strengthening the current drafting, the amendment as proposed could be considered to constitute a watering down of the triple lock, in that it was always designed to be exercised by the Prime Minister. Someone else making a decision about whether the Prime Minister is able to make a decision, given they can be said to be available and therefore technically able to consider an application, risks the intention of the triple lock. As drafted, the original clauses require a binary decision to be made about whether the Prime Minister is available or not, whereas, in deciding whether the Prime Minister may have a conflict of interest, a judgment must be made which is not binary and therefore has much less legal clarity.

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, asked me if it is right that the Government believe that it is proper for the Prime Minister to consider a warrant application relating to the Prime Minister’s own communications. The best answer I can give is that the Bill is intended not to tackle issues relating to Prime Ministerial conflicts of interest, but rather to improve the resilience of the warrantry process. Conflict of interest provisions and considerations relating to propriety and ethics are therefore not properly for consideration under this Bill. The Prime Minister is expected, as are all Ministers, to uphold the Nolan principles in public life. For these reasons, the Government cannot support this amendment.

The Government have, however, recognised the concerns expressed by Members of both Houses, and the seeming consensus that a more specific, higher bar should be set with relation to the circumstances in which the alternative approvals process may be used. This high bar is of particular importance because of the seriousness of using these capabilities against Members of relevant legislatures. We accept that we are not above the law and it is appropriate for it to be possible for us to be subject to properly authorised investigatory powers. However, it is right that the significance that this issue was given in the original drafting of the Investigatory Powers Act is respected, and the communications of our fellow representatives are properly safeguarded.

I therefore thank the noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead, for his amendments, and for the close engagement on this Bill which I, the Security Minister and my officials have had with the members and secretariat of the Intelligence and Security Committee. Following engagement with Members of both Houses on these amendments, it is clear that there is good consensus for these measures, and the Government will not be opposing them today. While they will reduce the flexibility of the current drafting somewhat, the Government agree that these amendments strike an important and delicate balance between providing the flexibility and resilience that the triple-lock process requires, while providing the legal clarity and specificity to allow for its effective use. The amendments will also provide further confidence to members of relevant legislatures, including those of this House, that the protection and safeguarding of their communications is of paramount importance.

I should note that the Government do not quite agree with the precise drafting of these amendments, and we expect to make some clarifications and improvements in the other place, particularly to the references to routine duties under Sections 19 and 102 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, but I am happy that we seem to have reached broad agreement today.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

I just want to be clear, as I have never had an amendment accepted in 14 years —is the Minister saying that the Government accept my Amendments 39 and 41?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Yes. The noble Lord, Lord Fox, says, “Don’t get too excited”, and he is right.

I now turn to the government amendment in this group, Amendment 46. This proposed new clause amends the Investigatory Powers Act’s bulk equipment interference regime to ensure that sensitive journalistic material gathered through bulk equipment interference is subject to increased safeguards. Currently, Section 195 of the IPA requires that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner be informed when a communication containing confidential journalistic material or sources of journalistic material, following its examination, is retained for any purpose other than its destruction.

This amendment introduces the need for independent prior approval before any confidential journalistic material or sources of journalistic material are selected, examined, and retained by the intelligence agencies. It also introduces an urgency process within the new requirement to ensure that requests for clearance to use certain criteria to select data for examination can be approved out of hours.

The Government recognise the importance of journalistic freedom and are therefore proactively increasing the safeguards already afforded to journalistic material within the IPA. In doing so, we are also bringing the IPA’s bulk equipment interference regime into alignment with bulk interception, which is being amended in the same way through the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (Remedial) Order 2023; that is being considered in the other place today.

In wrapping up, I once again thank noble Lords for the constructive engagement we have had on the Bill, singling out in particular the noble Lords, Lord Anderson, Lord West, Lord Coaker and Lord Fox. With that, I hope that noble Lords will support the Government’s amendment.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Beith) (LD)]

If Amendment 39 is agreed to, I cannot call Amendment 40 by reason of pre-emption.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

46: After Clause 25 insert the following new Clause—
“Bulk equipment interference: safeguards for confidential journalistic material etc(1) The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 is amended as follows.(2) For section 195 (additional safeguard for confidential journalistic material) substitute—“195 Additional safeguards for confidential journalistic material etc (1) Subsection (2) applies if, in a case where material obtained under a bulk equipment interference warrant (“BEI material”) is to be selected for examination—(a) the purpose, or one of the purposes, of using those criteria to be used for the selection of the BEI material for examination (“the relevant criteria”) is to identify any confidential journalistic material or to identify or confirm a source of journalistic information, or(b) the use of the relevant criteria is highly likely to identify confidential journalistic material or identify or confirm a source of journalistic information.(2) The BEI material may be selected for examination using the relevant criteria only if the use of those criteria has been approved by—(a) the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, or(b) in a case where a senior official acting on behalf of the Secretary of State considers there is an urgent need to do so, the senior official.(3) The Investigatory Powers Commissioner or a senior official may give an approval under subsection (2) only if the Commissioner or official considers that—(a) the public interest in obtaining the information that would be obtained by the selection of the BEI material for examination outweighs the public interest in the confidentiality of confidential journalistic material or sources of journalistic information, and(b) there are no less intrusive means by which the information may reasonably be obtained.(4) Subsection (5) applies where—(a) material obtained under a bulk equipment interference warrant (“the relevant material”) is retained, following its examination, for purposes other than the destruction of the relevant material, and(b) the person to whom the warrant is addressed considers that the relevant material contains confidential journalistic material or material that would identify or confirm a source of journalistic information.(5) The person to whom the warrant is addressed must inform the Investigatory Powers Commissioner of the retention of the relevant material as soon as reasonably practicable.(6) Unless the Investigatory Powers Commissioner considers that subsection (8) applies to the relevant material, the Commissioner must direct that the relevant material is destroyed.(7) If the Investigatory Powers Commissioner considers that subsection (8) applies to the relevant material, the Commissioner may impose such conditions as to the use or retention of the relevant material as the Commissioner considers necessary for the purpose of protecting the public interest in the confidentiality of confidential journalistic material or sources of journalistic information.(8) This subsection applies to material containing—(a) confidential journalistic material, or(b) material identifying or confirming a source of journalistic information,if the public interest in retaining the material outweighs the public interest in the confidentiality of confidential journalistic material or sources of journalistic information.(9) The Investigatory Powers Commissioner—(a) may require an affected party to make representations about how the Commissioner should exercise any function under subsections (6) and (7), and(b) must have regard to any such representations made by an affected party (whether or not as a result of a requirement imposed under paragraph (a)). (10) “Affected party” has the meaning given by section 194(14).(For provision about the grounds for retaining material obtained under a warrant, see section 191.)195A Section 195: procedure where use of criteria approved by senior official(1) This section applies where material obtained under a bulk equipment interference warrant is selected for examination using criteria the use of which was approved by a senior official under section 195(2).(2) The Secretary of State must, as soon as reasonably practicable, inform the Investigatory Powers Commissioner that the approval has been given.(3) The Investigatory Powers Commissioner must, as soon as reasonably practicable—(a) consider whether the relevant condition is met as regards the use of the criteria for the selection of the material for examination, and(b) notify the Secretary of State of their decision.(4) For this purpose, “the relevant condition” is that—(a) the public interest in obtaining the information that would be obtained by the selection of the material for examination outweighs the public interest in the confidentiality of confidential journalistic material or sources of journalistic information, and(b) there are no less intrusive means by which the information may reasonably be obtained.(5) On the giving of a notification of a decision that the relevant condition is not met, the senior official’s approval ceases to have effect.(6) Nothing in subsection (5) affects the lawfulness of—(a) anything done by virtue of the approval before it ceases to have effect, or(b) if anything is in the process of being done by virtue of the approval when it ceases to have effect—(i) anything done before that thing could be stopped, or(ii) anything done which it is not reasonably practicable to stop.”(3) In section 229 (main oversight functions), in subsection (8), before paragraph (g) insert—“(fb) deciding whether—(i) to approve the use of criteria under section 195(2)(a),(ii) subsection 195(8) applies for the purposes of subsection 195(6) and (7),(iii) the relevant condition is met for the purposes of subsection 195A(3)(a).””Member's explanatory statement
This amendment replaces section 195 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 with new sections 195 and 195A which include additional protections in relation to confidential journalistic material and sources of journalistic material.

Female Domestic Homicides: Black, Asian and Ethnic-minority Overrepresentation

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Monday 22nd January 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Gohir (CB)]

My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper and draw attention to my interests in the register.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, domestic homicide is a horrific crime that disproportionately impacts women. The Home Office homicide index shows that 22% of the 249 female victims recorded between March 2020 and March 2022 were from minority-ethnic groups. These groups were overrepresented in domestic homicide data when compared to the 2021 census. Preventing domestic homicide is a key government priority, and we have set out commitments to reduce it in the Tackling Domestic Abuse Plan.

[Baroness Gohir (CB)]

My Lords, the Home Office funded a project in 2020 based in the vulnerability, knowledge and practice programme which confirmed that there is an overrepresentation of minority-ethnic women in domestic homicides rates—the rates may be higher because the police do not always record ethnicity data accurately. What follow-up has there been on that project? Will the Minister agree to holding a public consultation or an inquiry to uncover fully the contributing factors to safeguard black, Asian and minority-ethnic women and girls? Will he meet me to discuss that?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am short on the detail of that specific programme, but in March 2022, we published the cross-government Tackling Domestic Abuse Plan, which invested more than £230 million in tackling this crime between 2022 and 2025. This includes more than £140 million for supporting victims and £81 million for tackling perpetrators. As regards the domestic homicide review, work is under way to review, improve and update the statutory guidance on that review. The consultation on that is about to open, so if any Peers are interested and would like to get involved, please let me know and I will be happy to supply the details.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, studies have shown that ethnic-minority survivors of domestic abuse are much less likely to have previously been known to the police than white victims, often because of a wish to protect their partner from police—rather than health interventions—because of institutional racism. What are the Government doing to ensure that all police are properly trained not to move to police intervention and to be able to signpost mental health support for all victims of domestic abuse?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness asks a good question. We understand the importance of specialist services in providing the tailored support that victims and survivors of domestic abuse need. The Home Office is providing funding of more than £2 million to the London Community Foundation, Peterborough Women’s Aid, Diversity Matters North West and Sahara in Preston for the 2023-24 and 2024-25 financial years through the VAWG support and specialist services fund. This forms part of a programme called By and For, which is the Government’s commitment to provide specialist services that are led, designed and delivered by and for users and communities they aim to serve.

[Baroness Verma (Con)]

My Lords, does my noble friend agree that part of the issue for women from minority communities, particularly the south Asian community, is language, and that, before it gets to the stage that we hope it will not get to—homicide—those women should be able to report? Due to language barriers, they cannot. Will my noble friend look at ways of working with other departments to ensure that we can get English into communities? It may be through funding community groups, but the insistence should be that English is part of the programme. Secondly, will he look at how we do training within the Home Office—rolling it out to recognise the start of the need for intervention rather than waiting for it to become a big problem?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My noble friend raises some very good points. It links into part of the question put to me by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, which I did not answer: about the police response to tackling domestic abuse. We have provided funding to support the rollout of the Domestic Abuse Matters training to police forces which have yet to deliver it, or which do not have their own specific domestic abuse training, to improve and ensure consistency in the police response to domestic abuse. I would imagine—I will check—that that includes the language barriers that my noble friend identifies. That programme has been completed by 34 police forces to date. Considerable work is also going on in building up the evidence base and, indeed, starting a library, which will help police forces to investigate these crimes.

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

My Lords, the opening words of the briefing from Home Office-funded project referred to by the noble Baroness say:

“The onus is too often placed on survivors from minoritised ethnic groups to navigate a system that has not been designed to take account of their needs, rather than addressing structural barriers that prevent their access to support”.


I suspect that not much has changed since that briefing was written and published in 2022. By the time a woman becomes a victim of domestic homicide, the truth is that she may have been repeatedly failed by the system. How is the Casey report into the Met Police feeding into the Government’s programme, and what targets do the Government have to reduce domestic abuse and violence against women and girls? Of course, the Labour Party does have a target for if and when we are in government.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I have already gone through a number of the programmes that have been put in place, many of which started only in 2022. I do not think it is fair to characterise the Government as not treating this as a priority. As the noble Baroness will be aware, we made it a strategic policing priority alongside terrorism and other priorities only last year. It is worth mentioning at this point someone I have referenced many times from the Dispatch Box. Maggie Blyth, who is the VAWG lead at the NPCC, has recently been appointed as the new deputy CEO at the College of Policing. I think that is a very positive step forward from an enforcement perspective. I would also like to commend Louisa Rolfe, who is the domestic abuse lead at the NPCC. We are doing a great deal. A consultation is under way on the domestic homicide statutory guidance; I suggest that the noble Baroness participates.

[The Lord Bishop of Gloucester]

My Lords, after contacting the police to report domestic violence crimes, migrant women in the UK have often been reported to Immigration Enforcement. For this reason, those women often stay silent for longer. What are the Government doing to ensure that black, Asian and minority-ethnic women who are victims of domestic violence can report abuse without fear of detention or deportation?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The right reverend Prelate will be aware that, if they do, they are not subject to immigration action—a subject that has been talked about a number of times from the Dispatch Box.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as the chair of the Equality and Human Rights Commission. The Minister will know that, in the Istanbul convention, which is the foundation of much of our statutory work in this area, Article 12.5 refers specifically to honour-based killings and violence. The Minister has indicated that a consultation is about to open in this area. Will the Article 12.5 requirement, which calls for the Government to have improved statutory definitions of honour-based violence, be part of that consultation?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I cannot answer the last part of the noble Baroness’s question, but I can say that last week we hosted at the Home Office GREVIO, the organisation looking at our compliance with Istanbul, and I think we had a very positive meeting. It was a privilege to be able to host them in the office and to go through much of the work that we have already done. I will try to come back in writing on the specific question that she asked.

[Baroness Hussein-Ece (LD)]

My Lords, the report by the Centre for Women’s Justice, which the Minister has probably seen, highlights a number of barriers faced by women, particularly from black and minority-ethnic communities, in reporting domestic violence and abuse. One of them—and there have been a number of high-profile cases of this—is that victims face criminalisation by counter-allegations. As they lack the ability to navigate the service and the relevant support, that often leads to devastating consequences. Another issue is a fear of losing their children when social services get involved. The Minister mentioned police training, but specialist services and access to them are also important. The report says that cuts to those services have cost lives. I ask the Minister to comment on those issues and how best women can be supported to make sure that we bring down the level of fatalities in this cohort of women.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Baroness makes a good point. Obviously, I cannot comment on individual cases or indeed on the operational aspects of this. The criminal justice system will have to look at all those individual matters and judge them appropriately. What I can do is repeat what I have said about police training, which has now been rolled out to 34 forces. Obviously, there is more to do. The police force is being very well led in this area, as I have just highlighted. I will also say that the By and For programme to which I referred earlier supports services by and for those specifically affected. That makes perfect sense, and it should be as local as possible.