Police and Crime Commissioners: Accountability Arrangements

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Wednesday 25th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bach]

To ask His Majesty’s Government whether they have any plans to change the accountability arrangements for Police and Crime Commissioners.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, the Government undertook a two-part review of police and crime commissioners, to strengthen their accountability and expand their role. Delivering these recommendations will sharpen their transparency and accountability and ensure they have the necessary tools and levers to be strong local leaders in the fight against crime and anti-social behaviour. PCCs continue to be directly held to account by the public at the ballot box.

[Lord Bach (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his Answer and for his written reply I received this morning on the vexed question of whether the accountability of police and crime commissioners includes, by law, the need to inform the police and crime panel of senior appointments so that the panel can interview and form a view, even when the senior appointment is interim. The Government’s view is that an interim senior appointment is in exactly the same position as a full appointment for these purposes. So I ask the Minister: is he aware that, in my county of Leicestershire, there have been six—yes, six—chief executive appointments in 19 months, four of them interim? The interim chief financial officer has been in place for 14 months. Not one of the interim appointees has been before the police and crime panel. Does this not show a complete contempt for accountability?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord is completely right. Paragraph 7 of Schedule 1 to the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act provides that any reference to the chief executive or chief finance officer of a PCC, in any legislation,

“includes a reference to a person acting as chief executive, or chief finance officer”.

In other words, there is no distinction, in our view, between acting or permanent appointments. My officials have spoken with the chair of the Leicestershire police and crime panel; it is the department’s understanding that representations have been made by the Leicestershire panel to the PCC insisting that formal notice of the interim CEO appointment be given to the panel as soon as possible, to enable the proper scrutiny to take place.

[Lord Lexden (Con)]

My Lords, a disgraced policeman, Mike Veale, has featured quite often in Oral Questions in your Lordships’ House. A few years ago he deliberately smeared the reputation of Sir Edward Heath. Asked recently why this notorious man’s gross misconduct hearing, announced in 2021, has been indefinitely postponed, the PCC for Cleveland said:

“It is complicated, it is interwoven with other things and there is an order of things that I cannot supercede.”


How can this impenetrable goobledegook possibly be reconciled with proper public accountability? When a member of the public asked the same question last August, he was told that a review was taking place. After two attempts to find out about the progress of the review, he was told just yesterday that “Once information about a hearing is published, we will notify you.” How can these curt, dismissive comments possibly be acceptable? Why has the Home Office done nothing to make this PCC properly accountable?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I have to say—and it will not please my noble friend—that the misconduct hearing of Mike Veale, who is, as noted, the former chief constable of Cleveland, is a matter for the Cleveland police and crime commissioner, and the management of the hearing itself is the responsibility of the independent, legally qualified chair appointed to it. It would be inappropriate to comment further while those proceedings are ongoing. As to why this has lasted longer than the normal 100 days of an officer being provided with a notice, it can be extended when the legally qualified chair considers it is in the interest of justice to do so, and I believe that is the case here.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, on 21 December in response to an earlier question by the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, described the situation as very concerning. That was in respect of the issue which the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, has just reminded the House about. Since then in the press it has become evident that the Leicestershire PCC has paid out £56,000 in compensation after an ethics group claimed it had been dismissed unfairly, so does the Minister believe that recall legislation should be considered for PCCs?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, the potential benefits and disbenefits of a recall mechanism were considered by the two-part review that I referenced in my Answer. It was decided that that would be to create a whole new body of bureaucracy and unnecessarily expensive. Ultimately, the public have the right of the ballot box, if you will, to determine the outcome of the PCC.

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, given the concern there has been about the vetting of candidates for the police forces and the uneven procedure of granting face- to-face interview after assessment for candidates, does the Minister believe that there is now a need for a tighter role and concern for making sure that the best practice in the appointment of police officers is now part of this scheme which rests either with police and crime commissioners or the central Minister concerned?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

As the noble Lord will be aware, after referencing a number of conversations that have been had in the House over the past few days, all of those things are happening with regard to vetting, police officer recruitment and so on.

[Lord Cormack (Con)]

My Lords, will my noble friend not accept that our noble friend Lord Lexden has made an extremely important point and made it very well indeed? The Minister in response really gives the impression of an incompetent and impotent Home Office. We really must have a proper inquiry into this man Veale, and he must be properly dealt with expeditiously.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I think I thank my noble friend for that. I am afraid I rather impotently have to go back to the comment I made earlier: it would be inappropriate to comment further while these proceedings are ongoing. However, of course I understand, and I accept that my noble friend Lord Lexden has made an extremely valid point and continues to do so.

[Lord Mackenzie of Framwellgate (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, as I recall, the original reason for setting up police and crime commissioners was to create more accountability, because the police and crime commissioner would be more visible in the community and very well-known. In fact, the opposite has been proved true because the turnout at votes shows apathy and ignorance. Then there is the question of the cost of setting up the offices of police and crime commissioners and their deputies and the salaries and everything else that goes with it. Can the Minister tell the House what this has added to the policing bill annually?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am afraid I cannot answer that specific question, but I can and will say that the public profile of PCCs means they are scrutinised in a way that anonymous police authorities were not. I think the fact that we have this conversation on a relatively regular basis is proof of that. Ultimately, PCCs are directly elected by the communities they serve, and the public will have their say in due course. The noble Lord raised a point on turnout. In 2021, the turnout figure was 33.9%, a 6.5% increase from 2016 and a significant increase on 2012.

[Lord Hayward (Con)]

My Lords, on 21 December, in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, my noble friend was willing to describe the current circumstances as “disturbing”—this was previously indicated. We have now seen a further month and four days pass, so could my noble friend please indicate when “disturbing” becomes “unacceptable”?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, they are disturbing; they are concerning; they are all of those things. I cannot say they are unacceptable at the moment because, unfortunately, the responsibility for this particular misconduct hearing lies with the Cleveland police and crime commissioner.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, the Minister was quite dismissive about police authorities, but I have some experience of them. They were in fact not anonymous; they were mostly councillors, who were elected directly by their constituents and known extremely well, and they actually did talk to people. PCCs do not; they are quite remote, and the Minister has also pointed out that they are held to account at the ballot box every four years. I can quote an example in Dorset where the PCC and the local MP have generated a lot of public dismay about their relationship, and yet the voters cannot do anything about it until next year, can they?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I would have thought that councillors are also elected once every four years as a rule, so I am not sure what the difference is there. The fact is that police authorities were anonymous, notwithstanding the noble Baroness’s evident fame on the police authority where she was. I would also say that, through part 2 of the review, we are undertaking a fundamental assessment of the whole panel system, and there is a considerable degree of transparency that has been introduced into the way the police and crime commissioners communicate with their constituents.

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

I make it eight questions that the Minister has fielded so far today, all of them pretty hostile to what he has had to say, including a number from his own side. These include those of two Members, the noble Lords, Lord Bach and Lord Lexden, who have persistently raised the issue that I will not repeat, which seems to have general support from the House. Can I give him some friendly advice? Unless he sorts out some of these questions from the noble Lords, Lord Lexden and Lord Bach, he is going to go on and on having to suffer this pain on a relentless basis.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I reassure the noble Lord that I actually enjoy it enormously, but I am going to have to go back to my earlier comment that it would be inappropriate to comment further while the proceedings are ongoing. The noble Lord knows that I will continue to say that until the proceedings are no longer ongoing.

Rape: Operation Soteria

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Monday 23rd January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what are the most recent rape (1) reporting, (2) prosecution, and (3) conviction, rates in England and Wales; and how many forces have rolled out Operation Soteria.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, the most recent statistics show that 70,600 rape incidents were recorded by the police in the year to June 2022; there were 2,326 prosecutions for rape and 1,019 convictions. Nineteen police forces and nine CPS areas are participating in Operation Soteria and informing the development of new national operating models for the investigation and prosecution of rape. These models will be available to all forces and CPS areas from June 2023.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to the Minister for that Answer, but recent Home Office research, including under Soteria, revealed a dismal picture of police attitudes towards rape complainants and whether they are at fault for the crimes committed against them. British women are reeling from Couzens and Carrick. Is it not time that the Government took this problem out of the long grass and legislated for police vetting, training and disciplinary reform?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I spoke from the Dispatch Box last week on the review into dismissal processes. We talked a lot then about vetting and the various changes that have been made to both the vetting processes and the vetting verification processes, which are being advanced. Operation Soteria pioneered a new model which will effectively put the needs of victims above those of suspects. The initial evidence is that it is working. Avon and Somerset Police was one of the pioneering forces; it has reported an increase in its adult rape charge rate from 3% to over 10%. I do not think that is good news but it is progress.

[Lord Lexden (Con)]

Does all this not underline the need for urgency in sorting out the deep-seated problems which are constantly coming back from the Metropolitan Police? My noble friend referred last week, and has mentioned again today, to a review lasting four months, I think it is. We need changes now. Home Office officials should have been working towards a conclusion—a conclusion that we should reach before the lapse of four months.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank my noble friend for that. As I explained from the Dispatch Box last week, the Home Office believes it is necessary to obtain evidence and make sure this is an evidence-based review in order to deliver the correct outcome for those police forces. As regards the Met, I attended a speech given by the Met Commissioner last week. He indicated the change in the Met’s thinking towards serious sexual offences, saying:

“we are targeting men who prey on women and children. The figures are far from where we would like them to be but the number of rapists we bring to justice is increasing.”

He went on to expand on some innovative use of data and technology which is helping him. I think the Met is making serious progress.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, does the Minister not agree with me and Professor Betsy Stanko, who carried out a review of rape investigation in the Metropolitan Police, that victim satisfaction is the most important measure for judging police performance against rape? Is it being measured?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I can only go back to quoting the statistics that I just gave to the noble Lord. I have not heard of the professor who the noble Lord refers to. As I said earlier, the pioneering police forces in Operation Soteria are reporting an improvement in these cases, though I think it is probably a little too early to tell. I of course agree that the victims should be paramount in this.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, Operation Soteria sounds fantastic and I support all of its aims, but the fact is that there is a long way to go, is there not, particularly within police forces? For example, in the year up to last April, nine in 10 formal allegations against Greater Manchester officers resulted in no misconduct action. That is a huge gap in culpability and responsibility. Are the police getting more funding for this?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, we have put a lot of funding into the police, as the noble Baroness will know. The Ministry of Justice has allocated significant funds towards victims’ groups, and so on and so forth. In the year ending June 2022—and this comes off the back of the last rape review—the police recorded an increase in rape offences of about 20% compared to March 2020. Eighteen months into implementing the rape review action plan, we have seen some improvements: the number of adult rape cases referred by the police to the CPS was up 96%; the volume of adult rape cases charged by the CPS was up about two-thirds; and the number of adult rape cases reaching court was up 91%. Progress is being made—not quick enough, I agree.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, for the Minister’s information, Professor Betsy Stanko wrote the Operation Soteria report. One of the things she recommended in that report was the improvement of data quality. It may sound mundane, but it is at the heart of improving police force quality and the response to sex and rape allegations. One of the central points she made was that the data was unevenly recorded across the country. Does the Minister agree that this should be seen as a priority to try to do better for victims, who are not getting the justice they deserve?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I agree with the noble Lord and thank him for the clarification—the professor predated me, obviously. Operation Soteria is bringing together all aspects of policing and CPS work with regards to rape cases. It is elevating the status of the victims above those of the suspects, which I would argue is long overdue. As part of that, and in order to validate the work of the operation, it is clear that data collection has to be uniform across the country. It will be available to be rolled out in June, as I say, across all police forces, but it is showing signs of improvement.

[Baroness Burt of Solihull (LD)]

My Lords, Operation Soteria is described as having exposed the underbelly of policing, which, as we know from the David Carrick statement only last week, is not a pretty sight. I welcome the Minister’s comments about the national rollout. I also endorse what the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said about proper policing and vetting. In addition to that, would the Government please consider discipline reviews, taking the legal process out of it and restoring discipline back to police chiefs themselves?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

As the noble Baroness will be aware, that is part of the terms of reference of the review into dismissals that was announced last week, as I talked about at the Dispatch Box. It will deliver its results in four months. I have to tell the noble Baroness to wait until then.

[Baroness Blower (Lab)]

My Lords, following on from a question that several noble Lords have asked, could the Minister give us further assurance in this House about the importance of victims’ voices being heard, and that they are heard to be satisfied with what is being done by the police force investigating the crimes against them? If there is an issue with the quality of data, can he advise the House that, when we are looking at that, we will look at what the victims are saying?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Absolutely—I can give that assurance. I am also going to go on to one of the reasons why it was a little difficult in the past to prosecute some of these cases; it was to do with the attrition of victims from the process. In the year ending June 2022, 62% of adult rape offences ended up not being supported for further police action because the victim withdrew. There were a number of complicated reasons for that but, obviously, it is necessary to collect the data which supports that.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, Professor Betsy Stanko’s report on Operation Soteria, which was published on GOV.UK last month, had two other key findings in addition to those mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby. She found that investigators and other police staff lack sufficient specialist knowledge about rape and other sexual offending. She also found that disproportionate effort has been put into testing the credibility of the victim, and that there is a need to rebalance investigations to include a more thorough investigation of the suspect’s behaviour. Can we see action on both of those points?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Action is being taken on both of those things. The noble Lord is completely right about specialist knowledge, and this finding is now being applied in South Wales Police and the Met, two of the pioneering forces in Operation Soteria. Structural changes have been introduced in Durham, another of the pioneering forces. That has improved shift patterns, supervisor ratios and so on, which will enhance officer and organisational capability.

[Lord Bach (Lab)]

My Lords, one reason why so many victims pull out of proceedings is the backlog in cases being heard. Could the Minister talk to his colleagues in the Ministry of Justice and point out to them again that the danger of these backlogs and the damage they do go right back to why the figures on rape are so poor?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I will happily do that.

Police Conduct and David Carrick

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Thursday 19th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Burt of Solihull (LD)]

My Lords, I associate myself with everything that the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, has said. He probably said it a lot better than I could have done. I preface my remarks by saying that the vast majority of police officers, as the noble Lord mentioned, are hard-working, caring, decent and law-abiding. These remarks do not refer to them.

The most galling thing to me is how, again and again, serving police officers feel that they can act with impunity, and even boast about their illegal, corrupt and misogynistic behaviour. Never mind losing the trust of the public, they have lost my trust—something I once believed was unshakeable. But never mind that, our Home Secretary is going to order another review—I am sure that is going to do a fat lot of good.

We have here a caucus of individuals who are out of control, taking the mickey and biting the hand that feeds them. When a police officer believes that they can get away with rape and murder, where do you go from there? With David Carrick, you can add another allegation as well: depravity. Some of the things that he did are too distressing to even talk about. We can improve the vetting, of course, but what is to stop the old rotten culture spreading to the new intake of officers who are coming along? At least the leadership have made a start, by re-examining over 1,600 existing sexual abuse allegations.

We learn that the police are literally a law unto themselves. I was surprised to learn that there are no national rules on vetting, as the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, mentioned, or standards—for example, in recruitment. I ask the Minister why not. Surely a lack of consistency was going to be very unhelpful. The public just see the uniform wherever they are.

Since 2016, getting rid of bad apples has become more and more long-winded and legalistic, with an independent legal chair on misconduct boards. I understand that this is to be reviewed. Perhaps restoring the power of the chief constable to dismiss, with a robust appeals system, is the way to go. Where does the safety of the public figure on the scale of importance? It took 17 years of suffering before the force got rid of Carrick—17 years of missed opportunities, despite his nickname, “Bastard Dave”. Incidentally, Wayne Couzens’ nickname was “the Rapist”.

That brings me to my final point. Plenty of people must have known that Carrick’s behaviour was out of order and out of control, but no colleague for 17 years dobbed him in or reported him, as far as we know. Why did he succeed in escaping justice scot free to wreak even more suffering? In fact, it was worse than that: he was even promoted. It looks to me like cosy, collaborative complicity—a toxic culture protecting its own. That is the core of what needs to change.

Will there be a review of culpability of senior staff, who should have stamped on this laddish, and worse, culture? Unless someone gets a grip to expose all the other Carricks who are out there, how can I and so many other people feel safe with the police service ever again?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, for their remarks. I start by echoing my right honourable friend the Home Secretary, who the other day said that this was

“a dark day for British policing and the Metropolitan police, as an officer admitted being responsible for a monstrous campaign of abuse”.—[Official Report, Commons, 17/1/22; col. 179.]

I am sure the whole House will want to join me and the Home Secretary in expressing our deepest sympathy to the victims, but also in thanking them for their courage in coming forward. It is intolerable for them to have suffered as they have. They were manipulated, isolated and subjected to horrific abuse.

We should also acknowledge, as did the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, that, every day, thousands of decent, hard-working police officers perform their duties with the utmost professionalism. It is inevitable that those police officers will feel very let down by the latest offence. I am sure that they too deserve some of our sympathy.

I shall go into the specific questions that have been asked of me, but, of course, I agree with the tone of all the remarks that have been made so far. On vetting, noble Lords may have heard on the radio this morning that the Home Secretary has written to the chief constable of the College of Policing, Andy Marsh. He has been tasked with putting the guidance on vetting on a statutory footing by the end of February—the 2007 guidance is not statutory; it is only that: guidance. Importantly, it is worth reminding the House that HMICFRS published a report on this matter last year. The end of February is a new target. Previously, when this was a set of deadlines that forces had committed to meet, it was to be done by the end of October, so it is a significant, and entirely justified, improvement in timing.

The HMICFRS has also been tasked with re-inspecting all the forces by the end of April. Finally, the National Police Chiefs’ Council will ask all forces to check on to the police national database. The Met is already doing it, and it is obviously overdue that that programme should continue.

The noble Baroness, Lady Burt, asked about the police uplift programme and vetting. Obviously, with such a large increase in officer recruitment, there are concerns about the vetting process, but the Government have ensured that all forces have been supported as they recruit officers and work towards meeting the 20,000 additional officer target—as noble Lords will know, that is well on track. That includes funding to deliver significant improvements to recruitment processes and improve infrastructure. A recent review of vetting capacity carried out by the uplift programme in October 2022 showed that, of the 36 forces that responded, 25 had increased capacity in vetting units between February and October of last year, totalling an additional 185 staff in those units—an increase of 33%.

Both noble Lords referred to the dismissals process. Last week, I answered a Question on this—coincidentally, I had a letter in preparation for the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, who asked it, because the terms of reference for that review were published yesterday. That review will look into whether the current system is fair and effective at removing officers who are not fit to serve in the police. It will include looking at the composition of misconduct panels, including the role of legally qualified chairs just referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, any trends in the use of misconduct sanctions, and consistency of decision-making in cases of sexual misconduct and other violence against women and girls. The Government expect the review to be completed in approximately four months. I imagine that I will be asked why we need another review, but it is important to stress that we have to look carefully at the evidence to ensure that any change to the system is effective. I agree that it needs to happen urgently, but I think four months is a very reasonable timeframe in which to conduct this work.

The questions on the culture of policing are obviously extremely important. There is no doubt that there is a huge amount of work not only for the Met but for the wider policing community to restore and rebuild trust and confidence among the general public, particularly among women and girls. I know that some important work is being done. For example, my right honourable friend the Home Secretary visited the force in Kent. In her opinion, it is leading from the front; it has instituted a whole raft of operational measures to support victims of serious offences and rape, and I hope that we hear more about that soon. Noble Lords will also be aware that both the Angiolini inquiry—the terms of reference for part 2 of which were published either today or yesterday; I cannot remember which, I am afraid—and the Casey review continue to look at this issue. Part 2 of the Angiolini inquiry will look specifically into the culture around Carrick.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked me whether all officers who have a sexual or violent allegation made against them should be suspended. There is no place in policing for officers who perpetrate such crimes—that goes without saying—so all allegations should be dealt with robustly. We believe it important that forces have the option to suspend officers while they investigate such incredibly serious allegations, but they must remain as operational decisions which must continue to be taken by chief officers, having given full consideration to all the circumstances. I believe there are good reasons for that.

The noble Lord asked me about statistics, especially annualised statistics on police misconduct. For allegations that commenced after 1 February 2020, which were finalised in the year 2021-22, 0.6% of all allegations against police officers fell into the category of sexual misconduct. That includes abuse of position for sexual purpose. The Independent Office for Police Conduct publishes data annually on public complaints against the police. In 2020-21, 109 of 109,151 allegations made related to sexual conduct; this accounts for 0.18% of all complaint allegations. The College of Policing publishes annual statistics on those dismissed from the police. In 2020-21, of 257 officers who were dismissed—the statistic was broken down into well over 200 categories; there may be more than one reason for a dismissal—abuse of position for sexual purpose was a factor in 38 of those dismissals. Those are the best statistics I currently have.

I appreciate that time is running on, and I am probably talking far too much. I would like to reiterate that the Government are committed to the safety of the public. I was going to talk at some length about our violence against women and girls strategy, but I do not really have time.

The noble Baroness, Lady Burt, asked about who, effectively, will be the agent of change in the police culture. It would like to commend Sir Mark Rowley, who I spent some time with last week, and his senior team, including Dame Lynne Owens and various others who have been on the news this week talking about these awful subjects. Sir Mark has been in post only since September. He is committed to doing the right thing, and I think that he is utterly sincere in that and the right man for the job. He deserves all our support, so I wish him well and hope that he manages to complete his task with extreme speed.

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for his response; it was entirely appropriate. As his colleague in the other place said:

“This is one of the most egregious cases of police misconduct in the history of the Met, perhaps in the history of British policing.”


I struggle with the term “misconduct” when we are talking sustained, sadistic rape and serious sexual assault. In a matter of a few weeks, we have had awful disclosures of racism and misogyny in the uniformed services on whom we depend in London, both the fire service and the police, which indeed raises questions about culture and recruitment. I will ask the Minister a specific question: why was the data and intelligence on this police officer and others not collected? Given that the police depend on collecting data and intelligence to stop crime—particularly terrorism—why are they not collecting data and intelligence on themselves? Why were these complaints not collated, so that somebody could notice that this police officer was out of control and behaving in a completely horrible and inappropriate fashion? It seems that there is a huge gap in management and operations.

I agree with the Minister that the commissioner is deeply committed to dealing with this deeply rooted misogynistic culture, but why is the commissioner against independent scrutiny and support of the progress to deal with these huge culture changes? Why has he not announced that there will be no more recruitment or appraisal of officers without independent input to ensure that that scrutiny has its eyes open to the risks and does not have its eyes closed by the culture that already exists in the Met?

Finally, Dame Vera Baird, the former Victims’ Commissioner, said it would be appropriate for his pension pot to be taken away because he was a serious offender. She asked:

“What does it matter if he was on duty or not?”


He used his status as a police officer to perpetuate these awful crimes, so, apart from the fact that there must be some question mark over his pension pot, she said:

“I hope his victims will be compensated without having to go to court.”

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I agree with the noble Baroness that “misconduct” is not the right word for this; this is serious and violent crime. She is 100% right on that.

I cannot answer the questions in detail as to why the Met failed in its responsibilities on the collection and assessment of data, but the noble Baroness is absolutely right that there were serial failures, which unfortunately were repeated very often. I will add go into some detail: Carrick was the subject of five complaints from members of the public between 2002 and 2008, none of which was of a sexual nature. He came to the Metropolitan Police Service’s attention nine times prior to October 2021 for off-duty matters; the earliest was in 2000, prior to his police service. He was not charged with a criminal offence on any of those occasions, but his case history clearly revealed a pattern of behaviour which should have raised concerns, regardless of the outcome of individual incidents.

The Metropolitan Police’s processes did not properly identify the risk and he was granted clearance when he was vetted on joining the Metropolitan Police in 2001, and again in 2017—that was six years later than when he should have been re-vetted after 10 years’ service. There is no excuse for any of that; these are just unfortunate and simple facts. I am confident that Sir Mark, as the noble Baroness reiterated, is the right man to root this out and to sort it out, and I have no doubt that he will. I cannot answer the specific questions as to why he is reluctant to do certain other things, but I can ask him and perhaps report back.

I apologise for this long answer. The noble Baroness also asked me about his pension. The forfeiture of a police officer’s pension is a matter for the Pension Supervising Authority, and, for officers in the Metropolitan Police Service, that is the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime—MOPAC.

[Baroness Bertin (Con)]

My Lords, I have been sitting on an advisory panel for the Metropolitan Police’s ongoing review of PaDP, the armed unit where Wayne Couzens and David Carrick worked. I absolutely do not doubt the determination of either the Government or Sir Mark Rowley; he is obviously determined to try to root out dangerous and toxic officers. But he needs tools to do that. As it stands, it is an impossible situation, and I really hope that the review they speak of will be robust. Let us face it, the bottom line is that the bar to dismissal needs to be severely and significantly lowered for police officers. At the moment, it is vague and open to interpretation what constitutes serious misconduct and grounds for dismissal; it is absolutely far too woolly, and that needs to change. We well know that charges of domestic abuse, rape and sexual misconduct never get anywhere near court, let alone conviction; so these things are not being picked up in the way they should be.

When the new systems are put in place—I sincerely hope they are; I give full support to what the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, said about a full overhaul of the regulatory system—they should include discretion, common sense and, as we have just spoken about, an ability to join up the dots on these individuals. That may sound easy, but it will not be. It needs a proper restructure, resource and a complete overhaul; if we do not do that, I am afraid that nothing will change.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I entirely agree with my noble friend. One of the reasons for setting up the dismissals review is that Sir Mark Rowley has publicly requested that we look into this, to make his life, and those of other chief constables, potentially easier in this regard. It was also partly a review of the interim report by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey.

I happen to have the terms of reference in front of me, and I think it is worth going through them in a little detail; I will try to keep this reasonably brief. The terms of reference are to:

“Understand the consistency of decision-making at both hearings and accelerated hearings … Assess whether there is disproportionality in dismissals and, if so, examine the potential causes. Establish any trends in the use of sanctions at both hearings and accelerated hearings … To review the existing model”—


which I have already talked about a bit.

“Ensure that forces are able to effectively use Regulation 13 of the Police Regulations 2003 to dispense with the services of probationary officers … Review the available appeal mechanisms for both officers and chief constables”—


I know that subject that exercises many noble Lords.

“Consider the merits of a presumption for disciplinary action against officers found to have committed a criminal offence … Review whether the current three-stage performance system is effective”.


That is a very comprehensive set of terms. As I have already said, the review will be delivered back to us for consideration in four months, and I certainly hope that its recommendations will be acted on in full, in order, as I said at the start of this answer, to deal with Sir Mark Rowley’s request and to respond to the interim review from the noble Baroness, Lady Casey.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, we have been here before; this is not the first time we have debated the issue in this Chamber. I have been here for nearly 10 years, and it has been debated several times, so I am sadly not convinced that determination is what is needed—there definitely needs to be an overhaul. I support all the comments that have been made.

My small knowledge of the police from the outside, and from having discussed this with many officers and former officers, is that it is impossible that there was not a lot of gossip about Carrick before now—and, before him, about Couzens and many others way into the past. Senior officers must have known and must, at some point, have turned a blind eye. That is what disturbs me the most, because this issue is not only about new recruits and officers on the street but about senior officers. It goes to the root of the problem: deep misogyny, which of course is not only in our police but in wider society, which is why it is so difficult to eradicate. The Minister has made good points on the collection of data and so on, but what makes him think that this will be any different from every failure in the past to reform the police?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank the noble Baroness for those remarks. I am not going to speculate on the whole “blind eye” situation; that would be unwise given that the case, as the Lord Speaker mentioned earlier, is still very much ongoing even though there has been a plea of “guilty”.

That affords me an opportunity to talk a bit about the strategy on violence against women and girls, which is a government priority. We have taken firm action to tackle these crimes; that includes delivering more than 127 commitments, worth over £230 million, that were made in the tackling violence against women and girls strategy and the domestic abuse plan. We are implementing the Domestic Abuse Act; introducing new offences, such as threats to disclose intimate images, controlling or coercive behaviour, stalking and forced marriage; introducing new schemes allowing women to check whether their partner has a violent history; supporting Greg Clark MP’s Bill in the other place, which will create a specific offence of public sexual harassment; and launching a national communications strategy, Enough.

Those are all words; obviously, we have to deliver on those words. There is more to do. I hope to be able to say more about that from this Dispatch Box in due course. On what will be different this time, I think that the team in place is absolutely committed to making this happen; that includes in the police force and among other stakeholders, including this one.

[Lord Houghton of Richmond (CB)]

I slightly hesitate to say what I am about to say but I am going to say it, although I do not want to draw crude comparisons between the police force and the Armed Forces as institutions. I know that there is much about the Armed Forces that we need to sought out because of cultural behaviours, misbehaviours and those sorts of things. However, helpfully, I would like to ask the Minister whether the role of quality leadership in mitigating these sorts of problems can be looked at in the review.

I ask this because the recruitment and training models in the police force as opposed to the Armed Forces are very different. In the Armed Forces, we recruit at two different levels: we recruit soldiers, sailors and airmen; and we recruit officers, for officer training, based on their potential leadership qualities. We reinforce leadership training and betterment throughout their careers. In the police force—although I am not an expert—they just recruit police officers. Yes, they have some fast-trackers with degrees, but I do not think that leadership potential is highlighted as an especial criteria for entry.

As I say, I do not want to make a crude comparison. My own gut instinct—in the Armed Forces, dare I say it, we deal with some quite raw recruits and put them in some quite difficult positions, so it is not surprising that sometimes some of it goes wrong—is that investment systematically throughout the recruitment, training and career development of officers in the Armed Forces does much to instil the right cultures and disciplines. I therefore think that it is worth looking at that in any review.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble and gallant Lord makes some extremely good points, if I may say so. They echo some of the points from the noble Lord, Lord Dear, a couple of months ago when I was answering a Question, which piqued my interest. He raised the subject of the closure of the Bramshill police college, which trained police officers for senior leadership and ensured a degree of consistency across forces. As a consequence of that Question, which was asked of me a couple of months ago, I had a chat about this issue with Andy Marsh at the College of Policing, where a leadership academy is being established. Progress is not particularly fast at the moment—there are all sorts of reasons for that—but conversations will be ongoing because it has certainly piqued my interest. I have the Policing Minister’s agreement to continue to pursue this particular subject.

On the Metropolitan Police specifically, Sir Mark Rowley is setting up a leadership academy. The noble and gallant Lord raised the subject of degrees and what have you; I think that there is a problem with the consistency of delivery of degree services across police forces. It is certainly true that there is a problem of consistency of leadership across police forces. The noble and gallant Lord also hinted at an interesting point, towards the end of his question, about the types of officer that are now recruited. Obviously, the skills required to break up a fight in a pub and those required to tackle online crime are very different. They really ought to provoke some serious thinking about who, how and why we recruit.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

I am grateful to the Minister for his points about the violence against women and girls strategy. The measure of that, of course, will be whether we stop losing 140 women a year at the hands of domestic abuse attackers.

Although PC Carrick was a Metropolitan Police officer, he lived in my hometown of Stevenage. I express my great thanks to Hertfordshire Constabulary for the very thorough investigation that it carried out into this issue. I join noble Lords in expressing my shock at the disgraceful and troubling revelations regarding this case and others. I worked in policing for many years. I feel deeply for the thousands of officers out there who do amazing things in our communities every day and who will feel so badly let down by the appalling conduct of PC Carrick and the other cases that we have heard about. They have damaged the trust and confidence of the communities that our good officers serve.

With the Met Commissioner, Sir Mark Rowley, saying that he has a further 800 officers suspended or on limited duties because they are under investigation for serious misconduct, what reassurance can the Minister give about the liaison between the Metropolitan Police and the surrounding areas and forces where these potential offenders may live?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I echo the noble Baroness’s comments about the vast majority of serving officers who do such a fantastic job, whom I have already referenced. As the noble Baroness says, their work is undermined by situations such as this. As regards liaison with the surrounding areas, I am afraid that I really do not have the answer to that question. I shall ask Sir Mark and see whether he is willing to say something in public on that subject.

[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

My Lords, this is the 75th anniversary of the arrival of the “Windrush”, which we will have a debate on later today. For years, there have been many complaints from certain communities and officers who have left the force, talking about the cultural problems around ethnic minority policing. Can my noble friend assure the House that this assessment of culture will be wide enough to cover that matter?

Can my noble friend also go back and ask for some urgent advice for women? Many of these situations involve off-duty or plain-clothes police and occur when women might be on their own. What is the advice to women in particular, and vulnerable people, if they are approached by somebody in plain clothes, either on or off duty, and they produce their warrant card? We are left in a serious situation here of not knowing whether to trust that person.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I reassure my noble friend that the review into police culture will be a review into all the police culture. I can confidently say that because I know it to be the case. As I just referenced when talking about the terms of reference on the dismissals process, there is a specific question there on proportionality, which very much relates to the matters that she has just raised.

On guidance for women, it would be difficult for me to comment on the operational guidance that is handed out but I remember that, after the appalling Sarah Everard case, there was some updated guidance given by the police. I cannot remember exactly what it was, I am afraid, but I shall refer back to it and come back.

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

A point has occurred to me as a result of this extremely interesting and powerful debate. On the question of vetting, who does it? What rank are those who conduct the vetting and what training do they have in vetting? If you want to join a merchant bank in this country, you are subject to vetting of a very effective nature. If that is the beginning of the mistakes, surely that is a place where there must be a much more effective way of deciding who is eligible, by reason of experience and ability, than has been the case so far.

Is there any independent element to vetting? We know—we can point to ourselves—that, when it comes to the issue of discipline, we now have a substantial element of independence. Indeed, we had two recent cases when a noble Lord and a noble Baroness were suspended. If we look at the document upon which those suspensions took place, we see just how substantial the independent element is in our discipline procedures. Can the Minister ensure that any review deals properly with the whole question of the quality of vetting, and that every sympathy is expressed to the extent that there should be independent contributions to both vetting and dealing with complaints?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord raises a good point. I think that I have dealt with this to some extent by talking about the Home Secretary’s letter and instructions to the College of Policing as regards vetting standards and to how they are going to be upgraded to the statutory code of practice. There is authorised professional practice guidance—I do not know what it contains and I am afraid that I do not know who is responsible for vetting, but the people who do it work to very professional guidelines, as set out by the College of Policing. The other important thing to remind the House of is that the Home Secretary has tasked the HMICFRS to re-inspect all police forces by the end of this April.

National Security Bill

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 18th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords very much for contributing to this relatively short debate. Let me first address Amendments 112, 117 and 120A.

Amendments 112 and 117 seek to impose on the Secretary of State a duty to implement the recommendations of the ISC’s report on Russia and to produce a report setting out the action taken. The Committee will already be aware that the Government published their response to the Russia report on the same day that the report itself was published, 21 July 2020. All the recommendations that could be identified within the report were addressed.

On the point just made by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, a majority of the ISC’s recommendations had already been implemented by the Government before the report was published: for example, those covering co-ordination of government work on Russia, close working with international partners, and continued exposition and attribution of malign Russian activity. The then Home Secretary reiterated this in a Statement made in the other place on 17 January 2022. I also say that there is ongoing engagement with the committee on these recommendations. The Bill is itself a part of that response, by introducing effective new tools and powers for the police, and security and intelligence agencies, to use against the sophisticated range of threats and actors that we face in the modern day.

I turn to Amendment 118, explained by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, as a probing amendment. Section 3(2) of the Justice and Security Act already provides, as the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, has just noted, for the ISC to make reports

“as it considers appropriate concerning any aspect of its functions.”

This provides the ISC with the ability to report on aspects of the Bill which fall within its remit. Furthermore, the amendment as proposed might be taken to imply that the ISC requires explicit legislative nomination to conduct oversight work on a relevant area of security and intelligence policy. The Government therefore cannot support this amendment.

Amendment 120A seeks to mandate the Prime Minister to update the memorandum of understanding between the ISC and the Government. The Committee will be aware that the MoU is subject to continuous review, as again noted by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. We welcome the ISC proposing changes that it would like the Prime Minister to consider, whether due to this legislation or other aspects of its security and intelligence remit. The Prime Minister will consider the proposed changes in due course. The MoU itself states that it is important to avoid duplication. Some of the organisations that the ISC has proposed that its remit should include are very new, and there are discussions under way regarding whether they are best overseen by other parliamentary Select Committees.

I am sure that answer will not particularly please the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, but I hope he would accept that it is a reasonable answer, given the current state of affairs.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, I apologise for interrupting. I am sure the Minister recognises the damage which was done to the relationship between the ISC and Parliament, and to maintaining public trust, by the various manoeuvres while Boris Johnson was Prime Minister. There was the delay in the publication of the Russia report and the attempt to have a chair appointed by the Prime Minister rather than elected by the committee, et cetera. We need to be reassured—and by “we” I mean Parliament and the interested public—that the ISC has a very clear and respected role, and is not subject to the whims of changing Prime Ministers.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, with the greatest respect, this is a different Government and we have moved on. The ISC very much has the respect of certainly this part of the Government. If I may say so, I have answered the principal question that was being asked: the Prime Minister will indeed consider the proposed changes in due course.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I understand that the Minister is saying that the Prime Minister will review it, but does he agree with me that it would help if the Prime Minister actually met the ISC? The Intelligence and Security Committee annual report states:

“Since its establishment in 1994, and for 20 years thereafter, the Committee met annually with the Prime Minister to discuss its work, report on key issues … However, the Committee has not had a meeting with a Prime Minister since December 2014. In the previous Annual Report, we stated that we would seek a meeting with the Prime Minister this year; unfortunately, despite requests for suitable dates, we are yet to receive a response from the Prime Minister. The Committee urges the Prime Minister to meet with it as a priority.”


May I ask the Minister to take that message to the Prime Minister? If he is looking at reviewing the MoU in due course, it might help him to meet with the committee.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord makes a very fair point. I will certainly make sure that that message is conveyed. As I have said, the Government do not think it would be appropriate at this point to mandate the Prime Minister to update the MoU as proposed, therefore we cannot support this amendment.

I now turn to Amendment 113. The Committee will be aware that the Government committed to a review of visas issued under the route between 2008 and 2015. The Home Secretary made a Written Ministerial Statement on 12 January setting out the findings of that review, including that the review had identified a minority of individuals connected to the tier 1 investor visa route who were potentially at high risk of having obtained wealth through corruption or other illicit financial activity and/or being engaged in serious and organised crime. The Government have set out the findings of the review of the operation of this route and acted to close it. I think it was in February 2022. I therefore submit that the amendment is not necessary.

I note that the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, was selectively quoting back to me various aspects of the WMS. I might selectively quote back to him—I suppose I am quoting myself here. I also said:

“Given the importance of ensuring the independence of the law enforcement process I am unable to say more on the operationally sensitive work being taken forward in this area. Whilst unable to comment specifically due to operational sensitivity of work - as an example of the range of actions we are taking I can say that we have already sanctioned 10 oligarchs who had previously used this route as part of our extensive response to Russian aggression in the Ukraine.”


I think that gives answers as to why we have perhaps not commented in the detail the noble Lord would like.

The noble Lord, Lord Wallace, has also accused me of not talking enough about certain states and talking too much about our allies. He, I think, suggests that this is for party-political reasons. I am disappointed that the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, would think so little of the Government Front Bench in this House. I gently remind him that, when I am talking about our allies, I am usually responding to questions he has asked me.

I say to the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, that I am afraid I do not have all the stats he asked for about Russian money, but I will endeavour to find them. I do not know if they sit within the Home Office, but I will find out where they are, and I will happily write to him.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, I apologise if I have gone—as the Minister is advising me—a little far. The point I am making is that the lack of distinction in “any foreign power” is one of the fundamental faults in this Bill. The ISC Russia report on several occasions refers to the threats mainly coming from China, Russia, Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. That is what I understand as well, although I am well aware that there are other potentially hostile states. One of my strongest memories is watching a demonstration outside the Libyan embassy and a policewoman being shot. These things happen; there are hostile states out there. However, that does not mean we cannot distinguish between allies with whom we work and open societies, and those from which there are likely to be threats. It is very important that we do so.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

This Bill does exactly that. We have been talking about FIRS over the last couple of days—the foreign influence registration scheme. There are different tiers specified in that. There is no doubt that this Bill acknowledges where our principal threats come from. Other countries, unfortunately, are also sometimes used as proxies. That is another discussion we have had at considerable length from this Dispatch Box with various noble Lords who have raised that point. I think it has covered very widely exactly what the nature of the threats are and where they come from.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, this is an amendment which I really did not think it should be necessary to debate, on ministerial appointments by a Prime Minister, where that appointment may raise issues to do with the safety, security and interests of the United Kingdom. The amendment seeks clarification from the Government on the ability for there to be transparency in the operation of the Ministerial Code, but also where there is concern about ministerial appointments.

This is not a partisan point, because we know as a matter of fact that a Home Secretary was sacked because of a significant security breach. The guidance on security of government business was breached considerably, and Liz Truss sacked Suella Braverman, who admitted a breach of government security guidelines. I recognise that none of the material that was shared on a private email system was marked “secret”, so with regard to national security considerations, on the face of what was sent to an incorrect recipient but also what was intended to be sent, it was not secret or top secret. They were not classified documents, and I respect that fact. However, the recipient’s employer—because one of the emails was sent to a member of staff of an MP—replied to Suella Braverman saying:

“Simply asking my team to delete this email and ignore it is not an acceptable response to what appears, on the face of it, to be a potentially serious breach of security … You are nominally in charge of the security of this nation, we have received many warnings even as lowly backbenchers about cyber security.”


The fact that that Minister was then reappointed for political purposes within a matter of days has been well rehearsed. The Minister has responded to this issue in Questions in the Chamber, and the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, also responded, saying:

“Everyone deserves a second chance.”—[Official Report, 22/10/22; col. 1558.]


I know for a fact that not everybody who will fall foul of some of the significant offences under this Bill will receive a second chance—or that some officials will receive it. But it would be useful to know whether there are security concerns about the appointments of Ministers.

The second thing I say concerns something that did not happen but could easily have happened. A Member of this House, the noble Lord, Lord Lebedev, was appointed under considerable concern about security situations. He was appointed to Parliament by Boris Johnson. He could very easily have been asked to be a Government Whip or a Minister: that is not a stretch of the imagination. What is the situation then, when security concerns have been raised about the appointment of a Member to Parliament but there is no mechanism for transparency about concerns about ministerial appointments? I do not besmirch any existing Ministers: these are two factual situations; one is regrettable, of course; and the other has not happened but could easily have happened. Therefore, my amendment seeks clarification as to what mechanisms are in place for it to be transparent when there have been concerns about an individual being appointed to a ministerial position, so that those concerns can be made public. I beg to move.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for speaking to Amendment 114, which seeks to require the Cabinet Secretary to publish information concerning ministerial appointments in scenarios where officials have indicated that the appointment of a particular individual

“may be counter to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom including because of potential influence from a foreign power”.

The Government cannot accept this amendment because the appointment of Ministers is a matter solely for the Prime Minister, in line with his role as the sovereign’s principal adviser. It is critical to the functioning of government that any conversations that occur around appointments are able to take place in confidence. There is a long-standing practice to protect that confidentiality. Without the ability to speak freely on matters that will be personal and sometimes sensitive, particularly where they may include matters of security, the ability of officials to provide meaningful advice ahead of an appointment will be critically undermined. The National Security Bill is concerned principally with the conduct of state actors working for foreign powers or with an intention to benefit a foreign power. Not only is the Bill not the appropriate vehicle for such a change but the Government also firmly believe that any information relating to ministerial appointments and procedures is not appropriate for publication. The Government therefore ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am grateful to the Minister, and I am not entirely surprised by his response. I think the Government’s concerns regarding confidentiality and protecting Civil Service advice were addressed in the amendment. In fact, it explicitly states that information would not be provided within the memorandum, but that security considerations had been raised should be in the public domain. I hear what the Minister said; we will explore this in the other avenues. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

121: Clause 92, page 63, line 11, after “63” insert “specifying a foreign power, or a person other than a foreign power, who is not specified immediately before the regulations are made”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment provides that regulations under clause 63 attract the affirmative procedure only if they specify a foreign power or other person not already specified. Regulations revoking a specification will be subject to the negative procedure.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

124: Clause 95, page 64, line 13, at end insert—
“(1A) His Majesty may by Order in Council provide for any provision of this Act other than section 20 to extend (with or without modifications) to the Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia.(1B) An Order in Council under subsection (1A) may make consequential, supplementary, incidental, transitional or saving provision.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment confers power to extend the Bill to the Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia. Clause 20 is excluded from the power because clause 20 is extended to the Sovereign Base Areas by clause 95(1)(b).

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 124 creates the power to extend any provision in the Bill with or without modification to the sovereign base areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia in Cyprus by way of Order in Council. The provisions of the Official Secrets Acts 1911 and 1920 extend to the sovereign base areas, and this amendment will allow provisions of the Bill to be extended to the law of the sovereign base areas. This would ensure that harmful activity that the Bill addresses can be prosecuted in sovereign base areas when conducted there.

Clause 20, which provides for the aggravating factor to apply to some service offences in the Armed Forces Act 2006, has been excluded from this power given that it is already being extended to the sovereign base areas though Clause 95(1)(b).

I end by putting on record that the Government consider that any references in this Bill to the sovereign base areas will not in any way undermine the provisions of the 1960 treaty concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus between the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. I therefore ask the Committee to support the inclusion of this amendment.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I have very little to say with regard to the government amendment. I recognise the Government’s sensitivity to the ongoing issue of the politics within Cyprus.

As this is the last group in Committee, I thank the Ministers today, the noble Lords, Lord Sharpe and Lord Murray, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, for their willingness to engage. As my noble friend Lord Wallace indicated, there is a lot of work to be done in persuading the Committee that the measures in the Bill will meet the Government’s intent. There are some key areas of the Bill where we are looking for more information. I think the noble Lord, Lord Murray, indicated on an earlier group that he is reflecting and that there is more to follow. We await the correspondence from the Ministers. We are very happy to meet Ministers before Report. I say from these Benches that it might be advisable for the Government not to be in a rush to schedule Report, so that there can be proper thinking on the many aspects of the Bill about which we have highlighted problems.

Banks: Forged Customer Signatures

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Monday 16th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sikka]

To ask His Majesty’s Government, further to the reply by Lord Sharpe of Epsom on 30 June 2022 (HL Deb cols 755–6) relating to allegations of banks forging customer signatures, what steps they have taken (1) to investigate and to prosecute banks for forging customer signatures, and (2) to compensate the victims.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, the National Economic Crime Centre has concluded its assessment into the materials submitted to it in relation to allegations of signatory fraud by banks and will communicate its findings to relevant parties imminently.

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

I note that the Minister has not given any definite date for that. As usual, the Government are soft on corporate crime in the City, and thousands of innocent people have lost their homes, jobs, pensions and savings. Is it not time that we had a public inquiry into the Government’s support for the City in these crimes?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord makes a number of fairly grave and unfounded allegations. The relevant experts in the NECC have been assessing the extensive material provided; he knows how extensive it was. The NECC has extended its review as new material has been supplied, but, recognising the complexity of fraud cases, I hope that all noble Lords will understand the length of time that this has taken. As I say, the NECC is in the process of notifying the complainants at the moment.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, does the Minister recognise that both the regulators and the enforcement agencies are seriously underresourced in tackling wrongdoing in the financial services sector? Will he support our proposals to distribute the fines from financial services-related prosecutions to the regulators and agencies in order to beef up their capacity?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, no, I do not accept that the enforcement organisations and the regulator are underresourced with regard to these matters. The Government are increasing law enforcement investigative capacity to tackle fraud. The 2021 spending review allocated a further £400 million to tackle economic crime, including another £100 million for fraud, which includes greater fraud investigative capacity in the NCA. There are a number of other sources of funding and government efforts and initiatives on this subject that I could go into, but the answer would be a long one.

[Baroness Blower (Lab)]

My Lords, rather than an independent investigation of fraud at HBOS, the Government have passed the buck to HBOS’s parent company, Lloyds Banking Group, to investigate. In April 2017, Lloyds appointed Dame Linda Dobbs to conduct a review, and a report was promised within a year. Nearly six years later, there is no report and no compensation for victims. Is the Minister satisfied, or is he rather ashamed? What prevents that inquiry being launched?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, the Minister is neither satisfied nor ashamed. I do not know the circumstances of that particular case. I am unable to comment on individual cases, but I will make further inquiries.

[Lord Woodley (Lab)]

My Lords, I struggle to read these facts out; they are quite unbelievable. As the Minister is well aware, the Lloyds Banking Group is accused of forging customers’ signatures. Since 2010, it has paid fines of £468 million, on 42 separate occasions. Yet it is allowed to fund the City of London Police—the very people who investigate banking and financial fraud. Can the Minister explain why the Government permit crooked banks to fund the police and how the resulting conflicts of interest are managed?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, those are yet more grave allegations that are partially unfounded. I have said already that this Government are doing a great deal with regard to funding the police and making changes to the way in which fraud is dealt with and investigated. We all recognise that this is a very serious crime; it needs to be dealt with.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea (Lab)]

My Lords, will those parts of the review that are partially well founded be made public? They are serious and of major public interest.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

As I have just said, I am afraid that I am unable to comment on individual cases. I do not know the circumstances of this particular case, but I will find out more.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, these victims of fraud by banks have been waiting nearly four years, following the initial statement from the Minister and others that they would look into this issue. One can only say that, if the banks were the victims of fraud, they would act a lot more quickly than they do when it comes to acting on behalf of their customers who are alleged to be the victims of fraud. I think what they want to hear from the Minister is what “imminently” means? Does it mean next week? Does it mean next month? Does it mean next year? These victims have been waiting too long for justice. It is about time the Government told the banks to get a move on.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, it is not the banks which need to get a move on. As I said earlier, the decision has been communicated to some of the complainants, but the Treasury Select Committee, certain remaining complainants and other relevant parties are not yet aware of the outcome. We should expect all necessary persons to be notified in the appropriate manner; beyond that, it would be unwise of me to comment on operational matters.

[Lord Howell of Guildford (Con)]

My Lords, stronger regulation means taking stronger powers to the Executive, which means a stronger and bigger stream of statutory instruments and secondary legislation coming through this House. Will my noble friend encourage his colleagues in the Government to support moves by Parliament to get stronger resources and have the capacity to scrutinise and control this stream of legislation?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friend makes a very sensible point. However, fraud falls within the Financial Conduct Authority’s objective of reducing the risk of financial crime, which impacts its consumer protection objectives. Obviously, the FCA will not hesitate to take the appropriate action against firms which do not meet its standards.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, since the Minister has just raised the Financial Conduct Authority, should it not have a clear objective to prevent fraud, rather than it just being under consumers? Much of this fraud has been perpetrated against small and medium-sized businesses, which are not covered by the consumer protections.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Baroness makes an interesting point, which I will happily take back to those who are responsible for overlooking and overseeing the FCA.

[Lord Watts (Lab)]

My Lords, is it not the case that all our regulators are toothless tigers? What is needed is more resources and a change in legislation to give the powers to protect the public.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I do not believe that they are toothless tigers. As I have said a number of times regarding capacity and resources, a great deal is being done. There will be significant improvement to the National Economic Crime Victim Care Unit over the course of this year, and I would be happy to answer more questions on that.

[Lord Greenhalgh (Con)]

My Lords, does my noble friend the Minister recognise that it is not the banks that we should be aiming at but the fraudsters themselves. The City of London Police, the Metropolitan Police and the National Crime Agency do a fantastic job. However, in some ways, Action Fraud should be renamed “No Further Action Fraud”, because we need more resources. This crime is getting greater. Let us not turn our fire on the banks but go after the fraudsters.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I completely agree with my noble friend that we should look at the fraudsters. Regarding Action Fraud, we are providing £10 million to the City of London Police this year to support the upgrade in the Action Fraud service. A project is under way to transform the Action Fraud website, where the public can report fraud and cybercrime. That is part of the continuous improvements to the national service, which will be fully upgraded by 2024.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)]

My Lords, why are the Government taking so long to produce the promised national fraud strategy? Also, why is less than 1% of police activity concentrated on dealing with financial fraud?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Regarding the national strategy, the noble Lord makes a very good point. I committed at the Dispatch Box that it would be out before the end of last year. However, I can confirm that it is being discussed cross-departmentally and is imminent. If noble Lords are interested, I am happy to set up a briefing so that we can discuss it in greater detail as soon as it is published.

[Lord Hendy (Lab)]

My Lords, the Minister says that the reason for the delay is that fraud is complex. It is, but why is banks forging the signatures of their customers complicated?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I have not seen the 10,000 pages of evidence in the 26 lever arch files, but expert investigators have, and it is their opinions that we are waiting for.

National Security Bill

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 16th January 2023 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

82: Clause 62, page 43, line 23, after “an” insert “agreement or”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies that agreements can be “foreign activity arrangements”.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, this group responds to the amendments tabled in relation to the political influence tier of the foreign influence registration scheme and separate amendments tabled regarding guidance on the scheme, impacts of the enhanced tier on the higher education sector and the exemption for legal activities. In addition, it introduces a number of minor government amendments to the scheme, which I will cover shortly.

Before I address the amendments and clauses specifically, let me say that we are not yet able to publish a policy statement relating to the power taken in Clause 77(1), which we committed to do in the Bill’s delegated powers memorandum. The Government are in the process of carefully considering feedback from industry and the important scrutiny in this House. As such, we believe that publishing a policy statement now would only muddy the waters when the Government’s focus is rightly on listening to Peers’ concerns.

It is the first duty of government to protect its people, the country they live in and the integrity of their democratic institutions. The political influence tier of the foreign influence registration scheme will play an important role in delivering on this agenda. Dialogue between policymakers and the rest of society is an essential feature of our democratic system. It provides parliamentarians and Ministers with important information and expert analysis, helping us to become more informed. It allows decision-makers and the public to be exposed to diverse opinions and voices, including from the international business sector. It can be a positive contribution to healthy and robust public debate, and will continue to be welcome in the UK.

However, when communications or disbursements are not transparent, it can lead to corruption or give certain groups an unfair advantage. It can be seen as a way for powerful interests to exert excessive influence on political and governmental processes, potentially at the expense of the British public. It is particularly important to be able to identify foreign influence. The UK Government and the British people are entitled to know when foreign interests seek to influence public policy and public opinion. We should be able to identify foreign influence and evaluate those contributions properly, including the aggregate impact over time. Some foreign lobbying presents risks to national security. Members of the Committee will have heard Ken McCallum, in his annual threat speech in November, discussing the challenge from state threats. He said:

“The West is in a contest in which our security, values and democratic institutions are at stake.”


The Intelligence and Security Committee discussed political influence and state threats in its 2020 Russia report, calling for a scheme like the one delivered through the political influence tier of FIRS, which we are debating here today. The political influence tier of FIRS will play a role in strengthening openness and transparency in those processes, with the additional aim of deterring foreign powers that wish to pursue their aims covertly through agents and proxies. Noble Lords will be aware that some foreign states increasingly seek to influence how we think, vote and feel. Such states view themselves as being in a long-term contest with the West and take a much broader view of what they are interested in than simply national security matters. Covert political influence from state actors can damage our democratic processes, institutions and wider societal cohesion.

The foreign influence registration scheme will require those acting covertly with malign intent to make a conscious choice between registering their activity and publicly declaring their provenance, or not registering and risking prosecution. This raises the cost of conducting such activity and will be a significant deterrent to those who seek to harm our democracy.

Before we move on to the main debate, I will very briefly explain the government amendments in this group. Amendments 82, 89, 99, 100, 101 and 102 make minor technical changes to ensure consistency in the use of “arrangement” and “agreement” across the foreign influence registration scheme provisions. These amendments will assist with the clarity and understanding of the scheme.

Government Amendment 92 amends the existing provisions regarding public communications in the political influence tier of FIRS. This amendment provides that where a public communication is reasonably clear that it is being made by a foreign principal on its own behalf, it will not need to be registered. The Bill already provides an existing exclusion from registration requirements where it is reasonably clear that the public communication is made at the direction of a foreign principal. This is in keeping with our commitment to ensure that the scheme is proportionate and does not impose any unnecessary burdens.

During the last day in Committee, the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, raised a number of questions regarding the foreign power condition, which we dealt with at some length last week, and the foreign influence registration scheme. I thank her for her letter and will deal with the core of her questions now, to ensure that this is on the record. On the question of whether a member of this House will need to register when entering arrangements, the responsibility to register under the political influence tier of FIRS will lie with the foreign principal carrying out the activity in the United Kingdom, or with the person in an arrangement with the foreign principal to carry out activities in the United Kingdom. There will be no requirement on the person whom the foreign principal is seeking to influence to register activities. As such, Members of this House would be required to register only if they entered into arrangements with foreign principals to carry out political influence activities in the United Kingdom. This applies equally for arrangements with any foreign entity, including political parties in government or in opposition.

There was also a question in relation to the foreign power condition of why “a governing political party” has been included in the meaning of “a foreign power”. It addresses situations where there is a dominant political party or parties within a country to such an extent that it may be difficult to disentangle whether harmful activities have been carried out on the direction of the ruling party or the Government. The noble Baroness posed the question of what constitutes a governing political party. It is right that this will vary in different countries. Clearly we cannot legislate for every different administrative structure. Rather, in criminal proceedings where this was an issue, the prosecution would have to prove beyond reasonable doubt that a political party was the governing political party based on the facts of the case. Therefore, any political party with no members holding posts in the Government would not be in scope. The definition in Clause 30(2) means that a political party is a governing party only if individuals within that party hold posts in the Government or part of the Government. For example, the Democratic Party runs the US Administration and sets the direction of government policy. It is therefore the governing political party in the US.

To omit Clause 30(1)(e) as the noble Baroness suggested and to rely entirely on the other aspects of the definition of “a foreign power” risks creating a loophole whereby sophisticated state actors could claim to act on behalf of the ruling party but not the Government. To be clear, foreign powers, including governing political parties of a foreign Government or their members acting in their capacity as a member, do not have to register their own activities. However, those in arrangements with foreign entities—including governing political parties—to carry out political influence activities in the UK will need to register those arrangements.

I will be listening very carefully to the remarks made on this group and will respond to the amendments directly in my closing comments. I look forward to this important debate.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, in his opening statement, the noble Lord said that the Government plan to publish a policy statement and that the reason they were not doing so now, in anticipation of Committee, was that they did not want to muddy the waters. Can I ask the noble Lord whether he plans to publish that policy statement and make it available before Report?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

That is certainly my intention, yes.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Cromwell (CB)]

My Lords, I apologise for not having participated in this debate earlier but, like other speakers, I have been provoked by listening to the contributions. The speeches tonight appear to be about either excluding certain categories or, in the case of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, trying to include a category in the scope of the Bill. The fact is that, if you start to specify organisations or types of organisations, you will include every organisation in the country, whether a business or arts organisation, a charity, a political party or any other group of people, because any organisation can host people who seek to bring influence of one form or another. It is the behaviour, not the organisation, that is the problem here. To suppose that registering organisations will defeat covert practitioners from seeking to exert influence is naive to the point of being dangerous. As many have suggested, the solution is to go away, redraft and come back with a shorter Bill that does not try to include every organisation, not only in this country but in every other country—any one of them could host a malign influence.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank noble Lords for their important amendments in this group and for the extensive and interesting debate. I would be very happy to meet the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and others from other political parties, as she wishes. As soon as the reply to her letter is written, I will circulate it.

I assure the Committee that I have heard the strength of feeling on this issue and the calls to remove the political influence tier completely. I will be taking this back to the department to agree the next steps required to address these concerns ahead of Report, while balancing the need for a mechanism that protects us all from malign foreign influence in the UK. At the risk of upsetting the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, further information will follow.

I should say this: there should be no doubt that those who comply with the registration requirements under FIRS, by being clear and open about whom they represent, are supporting the resilience of the UK and its institutions in the face of state threats. There is no suspicion around those who register with the scheme; they are doing the right thing. However, as I said earlier, this has been an extremely valuable debate and I am grateful for all the thought and expertise that went into these contributions. I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, that we are not singling out the Dutch; we are merely citing an example. This is about foreign influence.

I start by addressing the amendments tabled on the political influence tier of the foreign influence registration scheme. I have listened carefully, and several interesting points have been made. I have heard the concerns raised about the unintended consequences of the political tier, and the Government will consider these points carefully ahead of Report.

Today, we have heard calls to remove this part of the Bill and focus instead on amending existing lobbying laws. These laws have been designed to be suitable for the supervision of domestic lobbying where British citizens and residents have a right to participate in the political process, but they are inadequate for foreign influence, where the impact of undue influence presents a greater risk to our democracy, and therefore greater regulation is required.

This is reflected internationally, and it is not unusual for countries to have distinct lobbying and foreign influence provisions. For example, the US has a Lobbying Disclosure Act as well as foreign agent registration requirements. Similarly, the Australians have a lobbying register that is separate from their foreign influence transparency scheme. I hope that that goes some way to answering the queries on this from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis.

The United Kingdom is well behind these countries in understanding the impact of foreign influence, and both tiers of the scheme are required to rectify this. FIRS will allow the Government and the public to understand better the scale, nature and extent of foreign influence on our democratic institutions.

I refer noble Lords to the multiple calls in the other place at the point of the Bill’s introduction for a scheme to require transparency around political influence activities. Members of the other place have signalled their agreement that political transparency is essential. We also heard from the director of regulation at the Electoral Commission, who said in oral evidence:

“Any registration scheme that brings more transparency around who is seeking to influence those involved in our democracy can only be to the benefit of the confidence of voters.”—[Official Report, Commons, National Security Bill Committee, 7/7/22; col. 44.]


I know that noble Lords will agree that the British people need to be able to trust the institutions that serve them. It can only be right that the UK public and our democratic institutions are protected from covert foreign influence and better informed as to the scale and extent of foreign influence in our political affairs. I emphasise to noble Lords that the public, and Parliament, should know when these foreign political influence activities are taking place. Transparency is a source of strength. That is why we have included provisions in the scheme to make certain information public.

Those who register under the scheme will be playing an important role in supporting our efforts to strengthen the resilience of our democratic system and political institutions. While we are keen to work with business and other sectors to ensure a workable and easy-to-use scheme, the regulation of foreign communications or disbursements should not of itself be controversial for the reputable end of industry.

I reassure the Committee that the registration requirements will not be burdensome. Registering will require filling in a short online form. The scheme will not prohibit any activities carried out by foreign entities or on their behalf where these have been registered in line with the scheme’s requirements. We intend to consult widely and convene expert panels to produce targeted and practical guidance. That will be published ahead of the scheme going live to ensure that the public and business are clear on the requirements.

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, asked about NGO workers abroad. The scheme will require the registration of political influence activities where they are to be carried out within the UK at the direction of any foreign power or foreign entity, or where they are to be carried out by a foreign entity itself. Where the activities do not take place within the UK, they will not be caught by the scheme. I think this also answers the question from the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, about the Ukrainian situation.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. He may be missing a point but will correct me if I am wrong. The collection of funds for that scheme, along with a lot of the organising activity, is done within the United Kingdom. As the Bill stands, that surely means there has to be registration.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Well, as I have just said, I do not believe that it does. If I may, I will confirm that and come back to the noble Lord.

I will now turn to the amendments from my noble friend Lady Noakes. I commend her for the spirit in which they were made. The first of these, Amendment 89A, looks to constrain our definition of “foreign principal” in the political influence tier of the scheme. She is quite right to point out that the current definition includes all foreign powers and foreign entities, but I will explain why the scheme has this breadth and the ways we have constrained the scheme to compensate for it.

The amendment seeks to include only those foreign entities that are controlled by a foreign power, rather than all foreign entities, in our definition of “foreign principal”. In the development of the scheme, we considered this as an option. However, we have worked closely with our Australian partners and reviewed their submission to the parliamentary review of the foreign influence transparency scheme.

The Australians originally took a very broad definition of “foreign principal” to their Parliament. This was, through its passage, constrained to something akin to my noble friend’s amendment. However, this has caused the Australians significant challenges regarding compliance and enforcement. For FIRS to function as it should, it shall need to be crystal clear to people whether or not they are working for a foreign principal. With certain foreign entities, it can be very difficult to determine ownership and governance structures, and nearly impossible for a small business or individuals to know whether they are working for an entity owned or controlled by a foreign power. In their submission to their parliamentary review, the Australians have recommended that the “foreign principal” definition is broadened, in keeping with our proposals. To provide balance with the broad definition of “foreign principal”, we have drafted a narrower definition of “political influence activity” compared with the US and Australian precedents.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

I am very grateful to the Minister. He has just mentioned for the second time the compliance burden. Earlier on, he said very reassuringly that all that would be required to register was the completion of a form. But does the Minister understand that one reason why so many people are so anxious about these provisions is that it is not simply a question of filling in a form? In addition, once you have done that, there is the ongoing and, apparently, permanent obligation to comply with any information notices, which can be given at any time, requiring information of any sort to be provided to the Government. This is against the background of an absence of statutory guarantees regarding confidential information, except for lawyers and journalists, and not even—I think I am right in saying—any indication in the Bill as to whether this register will be public. The Minister has spoken a great deal about transparency.

How is that consistent with a United Kingdom that welcomes foreign engagement? Can the Minister understand how reluctant responsible directors and trustees will be to advise engagement with United Kingdom Government authorities against the background of those potentially very onerous provisions, which are liable to cause administrative problems and render it impossible for them to keep private what is always intended to be private?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I reassure the noble Lord that the Minister absolutely understands exactly where he is coming from. I will come on to the confidentiality aspects of the question he just asked in a second.

The process will require information about those party to an arrangement, as well as a description of the arrangements and activities to be undertaken. We would not expect a detailed account of every activity to be undertaken either as part of an arrangement or by a foreign principal, but the full process will be set out in regulations, which will be laid before Parliament.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

Are those regulations to be laid before Parliament before the completion of the Bill, or will we have to wait until after it becomes an Act?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I will come back to the noble Lord on that shortly.

I will go on to the commercial sensitivity aspects—in effect commercial confidentiality, mentioned just now by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. We believe that ensuring that information can be publicised where it relates to the carrying out of political influence activities will help to strengthen the resilience of the political system, but Clause 77(2) allows the Secretary of State to specify or describe information or material that is not to be published. We intend this to include where publishing the information would, for example, threaten the interests of national security, put an individual’s safety at risk, or result in the disclosure of commercially sensitive information. The registration system will allow a person to flag where they think they meet such an exemption, which will not be considered by the scheme management unit.

In accordance with our data protection obligations, we intend for the information to be published to be limited to what is necessary to achieve the transparency aims of the scheme, particularly where that information is personal. I have heard all the concerns and, as I said, the Government will give further consideration to these points ahead of Report.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

That commitment is welcome. The Minister referred to the lack of a regulatory burden; I am following the point that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, raised. However, the Government’s impact assessment says, in effect, that everybody needs to be familiarised with it because they will not know whether they are in scope. It says at paragraph 37, which I quoted earlier:

“Due to the offences and penalties associated with non-compliance with the scheme, organisations that are ultimately out of scope will still need to be aware of the FIRS”.


When it comes to domestic charities and NGOs, the impact assessment’s higher estimate of how many people will have to familiarise themselves with FIRS is 105,000 people. It will be an enormous regulatory burden on the domestic charity sector as to whether it knows to comply with it. Simply stating that it is a small online form is insufficient. On that point, I wonder why the Government have no estimate at all of how many small and medium-sized businesses will be captured by this.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord has pre-empted the remainder of my speech to some extent, which I am afraid goes on for rather a long time; I apologise in advance for that. I will come on to the charities aspect in a moment. On the regulatory burden, I think I have been reasonably clear as to the simplicity we intend when it comes to complying.

The amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, would extend my noble friend Lady Noakes’s amendment to charitable activities, as was just described again by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis. I once more thank the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, for his scrutiny of the scheme. In essence, the question is: why is there not a charity exemption in the scheme and will this not make it harder for charities to carry out legitimate activity here in the United Kingdom? We believe that the ability of charities to campaign on issues relevant to their charitable mission is very important and crucial to our democracy. The scheme will not prevent this. It will ensure that the public are informed about the role played by overseas entities in this work, however.

We have also taken steps to minimise the potential burden on charities conducting legitimate activity as a result of FIRS. For example, making a public communication, campaign information or requests for support by a charity will be registerable only if it is not reasonably clear from the communication that it is made at the direction of a foreign power or entity. If such a communication is published for or on behalf of a foreign charity in its own name, it would not need to be registered. If it is published by a UK charity or PR firm at the direction of a foreign charity, it would not need to be registered if it is reasonably clear from the communication that it has been made at the direction of the foreign charity. I hope that is reasonably clear and has given some reassurance to the charitable sector.

[Viscount Stansgate (Lab)]

For the avoidance of doubt, have scientific societies in this country that are charities been consulted by the Government in respect of the legislation in any shape or form?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I assure the noble Viscount that I shall come to the substance of his comments and those of the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, shortly.

I turn to the probing amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, that provides for a public health emergencies exemption to the political influence tier. I agree that where an event such as a coronavirus pandemic arises, it is imperative that the sharing of key information does not face unnecessary regulatory red tape.

The scheme does not intend to impede the sharing of information relating to public health emergencies. Governments speaking to other Governments, and experts speaking with other experts, will not be caught by the scheme. Only where communication is carried out to influence a political matter will it be registerable. Where it is done to influence a political matter but the information is shared as part of an arrangement with the UK Government, the UK arrangements exemption will apply and no registration will be required. We would be happy to consider further the point that the noble Lord raised. As an aside to one of his other points, I say that the enhanced tier will be used only for those countries or entities responsible for the greatest state threats. I do not know how many that will be.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

Does the Minister accept that issues of public health can often be highly political? One of my colleagues at the London School of Economics who was looking after a number of exchange students in what was then the Soviet Union was expelled from the Soviet Union for having collected some dust in a part of Ukraine where it was rumoured that there had been a nuclear accident. We all know that the provision of public information about Covid-19 in China has become highly political and highly sensitive. We cannot quite put things into neat categories in the way he suggests.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I do not think that I am putting it into a particularly neat category; I think I am leaving a large amount of room for this to be taken on a case-by-case basis. I repeat: only where communication is carried out to influence a political matter will it be registerable. Where it is done to influence a political matter but the information is shared as part of an arrangement with the UK Government, the UK arrangements exemption will apply. I think that covers it completely.

I turn to Amendment 88 tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Ponsonby and Lord Wallace, and Amendment 97 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, as they both raise the important issue of guidance for higher education and other sectors. We recognise that clear, targeted guidance will be essential in support of the public’s understanding of the scheme’s requirements. I hope that the Committee will be reassured by what I said of our plans to convene expert panels to help develop the guidance. That will ensure that the requirements are clear for universities and higher education institutes. Throughout the development of this scheme, we have listened to the views of organisations from the university sector. We will continue to do so as we design bespoke guidance.

Therefore, I do not think that the proposed amendments are necessary. Although it is essential that the guidance is published ahead of the scheme going live, putting time limits on publication following the Bill’s passage may hamper the engagement we wish to carry out in producing the most helpful and targeted guidance.

Amendment 104, which is another amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, seeks to ensure that the higher education sector is not unnecessarily burdened by the enhanced tier of FIRS. I assure him that this has been considered in relation to FIRS. There is a clear difference between it and the National Security and Investment Act, the academic technology approval scheme, and the export control regime. The Government are clear that FIRS fills an gap in our current toolkit.

The focus of the enhanced tier is to provide scrutiny to the UK activities directed by foreign powers, and foreign power-controlled entities, where the Secretary of State considers it reasonably necessary to do so to protect the safety or interests of the UK. In the limited circumstances where there is a risk of duplication, we will work closely across government departments and potential registrants to keep the burden of registration to a minimum and inform our approach to using this tier of the scheme.

In essence the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, and the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, were asking whether this scheme would interfere in the work of academia and broadened it out to further bodies, such as the British Academy, as referenced by the noble Baroness, and the scientific bodies referenced by the noble Viscount. There is no intention for this scheme to interfere with the work of academia, or with relevant international collaborations. We have considered the feedback of the academic and higher education community on this point. Under the specified persons tier, a UK university would need to be acting at the direction of a specified foreign power or a specified foreign power-controlled entity before registration requirements could apply. It would not be enough for a foreign power or entity to simply provide funding in support of an activity at a university, for example through subsidy or donation. Nor could responding to a generic request from a foreign power or entity be considered as “acting at the direction of”.

--- Later in debate ---

[Viscount Stansgate (Lab)]

I will reflect on what the Minister says when I read Hansard. I am glad that bodies such as the British Academy will be consulted, and I hope that the named organisations I mentioned earlier will be consulted. If we take the case of an international conference, held in one of many states around the world, is it the Government’s view that that international conference, which may or may not be sponsored officially by a Government but nevertheless takes place in what may be considered an unfriendly country, brings about the type of involvement in this scheme on the part of individual people attending, or does it not?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thought I was very clear on the precise specified persons tier here. A UK university would need to be acting at the direction of a specified foreign power or a specified foreign power-controlled entity before registration requirements could apply. I think that covers the set of circumstances just outlined by the noble Viscount.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

The Minister spoke about universities. Did he mean the academics—any academic within the universities?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Yes.

Amendment 103 was tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, to remove the exemption from the registration requirement in FIRS for lawyers providing legal activities. While I welcome the challenge, removing this exemption would risk undermining long-standing protections the UK has afforded to the provision of confidential legal advice and the equitable administration of justice. The exemption is available only to lawyers carrying out legal activity and so would not apply to other individuals carrying out legal activity.

I also reiterate what was said in Committee in the other place: that this exemption does not completely exempt legal professionals from engaging with the scheme. It does not cover all the activities that could be undertaken by a legal professional as part of an arrangement with a foreign principal. Activities that are not strictly legal activities, such as lobbying, for example, may still need to be registered. So, for example, if a lawyer were to enter into an arrangement with a foreign power to lobby a UK government Minister or parliamentarian on the UK’s foreign policy towards that foreign power, that would be registrable. The fact that the individual is a lawyer is not sufficient in and of itself to exempt them from registration.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

I heard what the Minister said about lobbying and the additional aspect of lobbying by law firms, but why is any exemption needed beyond what is contained in Clause 74, which covers legal professional privilege effectively—legal proceedings and so on—so that no confidential information needs to be divulged? Why is it not necessary that a law firm is acting for a foreign power or an entity controlled by a foreign power? Why should that be exempt?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I think I explained this in reasonable detail. It goes back to the sort of work the lawyers carry out. As I say, it is the long-standing protections that the UK has afforded—

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

All the Minister is saying, in a highly circular way, is that it is in here because it has always been in here in some other forms of legislation. I do not think that is much of an answer.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

In that case, I am very sorry to disappoint the noble Lord. I apologise for having spoken at such length.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I am not sure whether the Minister has picked up my point about arbitration. I am very sorry that I did not put down an amendment to direct attention to this, but it is quite an important point because London is a preferred seat for arbitration and many cases involving foreign powers and foreign-controlled activities. I have done a handful of arbitrations, but each one of them is within that category.

One of the features of an arbitration is the confidentiality of the process and the fact that the process exists at all. There are some cases where parties do not want it to be publicised that they are engaging in this process, because it would raise all sorts of questions, particularly at the home state of the foreign activity, the foreign-controlled entity or the foreign power itself. It is rather important to be sure that the ground is properly covered.

As an arbitrator myself, and a lawyer-arbitrator, I favour the exemption provided by paragraph 5, but I do not think it goes wide enough. That is my point: it would seem very strange if I, as a lawyer for a team of three arbitrators, did not have to register, but if the noble Lord, Lord Patel, was with me as an expert in his field, he would have to do so, and an engineer or an architect would have to do so as well. That really destroys the exemption. It is a serious point to look at, though I quite agree that it is a point of detail. I apologise for not having drawn attention to it specifically before.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I was about to attempt to address the question from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, but unfortunately he is not going to like the answer, which is that I do not know. I will have to look into this and come back to him.

I appreciate the concerns that have been expressed by all noble Lords, and I thank all those who participated in what was clearly a very healthy and important debate. We will reflect carefully on the comments raised prior to Report. For the moment, and to that end, I ask noble Lords not to press their amendments.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

Since the Minister said he would go away and reflect on this debate, which may bring about substantial changes to what the Government are doing, what would be the point of his moving his amendments for the remainder of this part? It would save the Committee quite a bit of time if he did not move these amendments to the rest of the part that he said he is now going to consider.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am not sure it would save a huge amount of time, would it?

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

It depends how long the Minister takes to move his own amendments. When he sums up his own amendments that he will be moving, he will be saying, “I am now going away to reflect on these and come back before Report”, so there is very little point in doing that.

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[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendment 83 provides that the Government must lay secondary legislation to define “specified persons” within 60 days of Royal Assent. A specified person under this Bill is a person who engages another for foreign activity arrangements. The purpose of the amendment is to probe who that could involve and whether they must be representative of a national Government or state. This amendment is further intended to probe the unintended consequences of the FIRS scheme and to illustrate that the legislation as drafted creates uncertainty as to who it applies to.

The Government have also tabled amendments as part of this group to clarify that activities being carried out must be registered at the time that they are carried out. A separate government amendment in this group limits the circumstances when affirmative procedures must be used in relation to defining “specified persons”, removing a layer of scrutiny. I beg to move.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, government Amendments 85, 86, 87, 94, 95 and 96 are minor and technical amendments that will make it clear that a current—rather than a previous—registration, is required to meet the registration requirements of either tier of the foreign influence registration scheme. This will mean that, where previously registered activities are resumed, a current registration will be required rather than a person within scope of the scheme being able to rely on the fact that the activities had previously been registered. This will support the need for the register to remain accurate and up to date, providing the best possible insight into the scale of foreign political influence activities, and activities of specified entities.

Government Amendment 121 ensures that that the clauses are as clear as possible and accurately reflect our intent. To specify an entity on the enhanced tier, the Secretary of State will have a regulatory making power as per Clause 63. Under subsections (5) and (6) of Clause 92, this power to specify will be subject to an affirmative procedure. The amendment adds wording to clarify that the affirmative procedure applies where a new entity is being specified. Where an entity is being de-specified, or an already specified entity is being re-specified—for example, because it has changed its name—a negative procedure will apply, under Clause 92(4). This will ensure that both the specifying and removal of entities from the enhanced tier will be subject to the necessary level of parliamentary scrutiny.

Amendment 83 seeks to require the Secretary of State to define “specified persons” within 60 days of this Act being passed. “Specified persons” are defined within Clause 63 of the Bill; I therefore interpret this amendment as being intended to set a requirement on the Government to specify any entities to which the enhanced tier will apply within 60 days of the Act being passed. The specification of a person will mean that individuals or entities will have to register any arrangements with the specified person to carry out activities in the UK. It will also set a requirement for specified entities themselves to register their own activities. I am sure the House will recognise that these are far-reaching requirements, and it is therefore vital that the designation of a specified entity is done following appropriate consideration and on the basis of circumstances that exist at the time, and the most up-to-date and comprehensive evidence. A blanket requirement to designate all specified entities within 60 days would impede the careful case-by-case basis consideration that is required and would be a disproportionate approach to the specification of persons under this tier. I therefore do not believe that this amendment is necessary, and I encourage the noble Lord to withdraw it.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

85: Clause 65, page 44, line 29, leave out from second “the” to end of line 30 and insert “activities are registered with the Secretary of State by the specified person.”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies that the activities being carried out must be registered at the time they are carried out.

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Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

89: Clause 66, page 45, line 19, after “an” insert “agreement or”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies that agreements can be “foreign influence arrangements”.

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Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

90: Clause 68, page 46, line 29, at end insert “a person listed in Schedule (Public officials);”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment inserts a reference to the new Schedule inserted by Lord Sharpe after Schedule 13.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, Amendments 90, 91, 93, 98, 122 and 123 insert senior leaders in the police and military, the mayors of London and of combined authority areas, and police and crime commissioners to the list of postholders who, if communicated with, trigger a requirement on the person doing the communication to register under FIRS.

State actors who pose a threat can and will seek to identify and target individuals who are relied on to inform decision-making by government. These amendments will require foreign principals, and those working on behalf of foreign principals, to be transparent where they are seeking to influence decision-making and political processes through the postholders listed. Requiring registration of these activities will shed light on the scale of the attempts to carry out this type of influencing and will allow for prosecutions where such activity is not registered. It will also provide a layer of protection for these postholders by providing a deterrent to hostile states seeking to act in this way to advance their own malign agendas and allow for postholders to inform themselves of who is communicating with them and why.

The existing list of potential targets of lobbying in Clause 68(2)(a) already includes senior officials. We consider that senior military and police officials fall into a similar category to senior civil servants; they are experts who are able to provide advice to Ministers on matters relating to government decisions.

Mayors are often senior political figures within their respective political parties whose views are likely to carry significant weight with Government Ministers, including when they are making government decisions. I hope that goes some way to answering the questions related to this matter from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, in an earlier group. Mayors, alongside devolved and central Governments, form an important part of the UK’s political establishment and, as such, we believe it is appropriate to capture them within a scheme focused on political influencing activity.

Similarly, in their capacity as elected officials, police and crime commissioners also form a part of the UK’s political establishment and may be identified as being in a strong position to influence contacts within Westminster regarding government decisions.

We have listened to the concerns about the breadth of the FIRS scheme, but we do not believe that adding these individuals would disproportionately expand the scheme. This is because communication with these individuals will be registerable only when it is for the purpose of influencing one of the existing persons or matters at Clause 68(3); for example, communication with a combined authority mayor for the purpose of influencing a local government decision, as opposed to a UK government decision, would not require registration.

These measures seek to tackle scenarios where postholders are being targeted by foreign principals seeking to indirectly influence government decisions and other political processes. While we consider it important to include these postholders, it is vital that the scheme remains proportionate. For this reason, we have taken the decision to limit these additions to the mayors of London and combined authority areas, as opposed to all mayors, and limit the ranks of the police and military officials included to the most senior.

These amendments also amend the power to add further to this list. Amendment 98 provides that the Secretary of State can by regulations specify a person “exercising public functions”, rather than

“persons exercising functions on behalf of the Crown”,

as in the original drafting. This reflects the fact that the list is not only of persons who are exercising functions of the Crown but includes persons carrying out wider public functions. This amendment will allow the necessary flexibility to future-proof the list of those who may be targets of political lobbying. Any regulations made under this power will be thoroughly scrutinised by Parliament through the affirmative procedure. I ask the Committee to accept these amendments. I beg to move.

[Lord Evans of Weardale (CB)]

On the extent of the schedule of those to be included, unless I have misunderstood or misread, there does not appear to be any reference to senior members of the security and intelligence services, who I do not think fall into any of the other categories. Could the Minister explain whether I have misunderstood or if that is a deliberate exclusion, and what any reasoning might be?

--- Later in debate ---

I think that this falls foul of the issue that was raised before. I respect the Minister’s viewpoint of wanting to have a broad scheme without being specific because, as soon as you get specific, loopholes are created because you start listing one and excluding others. However, that is exactly what proposed new Schedule 13 is going to do—including the situation where the leader of Glasgow is excluded while the leader for Tyne is included. So, if the Minister can clarify those points, I would be grateful.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I will have a go. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, very much for those comments. These amendments simply seek to add senior leaders in the police and military, the Mayor of London, mayors of combined authority areas and police and crime commissioners, as I have said, to the list of potential targets of communication by or on behalf of foreign principals.

I refer back to a statement I made in my opening remarks. We think it is important to include these postholders but we wish for the scheme to remain proportionate. For that reason, we have taken the decision to limit these additions to the mayors of London and combined authority areas, as opposed to all mayors, and limit the ranks of the police and military officials to include the most senior. The point about the mayors is surely a good one: they are politically elected and members of political parties. They therefore have significantly more political influence, I would argue, than the Lord Mayor of London, for example.

As regards the definition—

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

What about the corporation? I am grateful to the Minister, but there is a quite considerable amount of executive authority in the City of London Corporation when it comes to what could well interact with the interests of the United Kingdom. So perhaps the Minister might reflect on that.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I will absolutely reflect on that but, as I say, they are not politically elected persons, as the noble Lord will know. As regards his example of a foreign defence contractor talking to somebody of the rank of brigadier, having had our lengthy discussions earlier I would have thought that they would be captured under the corporate side of the Bill. The effect of this amendment would be that foreign principals, or those in arrangements with them, would be required to register communication with these postholders, as well as those in the existing list, if it were conducted for the purpose of influencing one of those persons listed in Clause 68.

In answer to the other question about senior members of the security services, I believe that is captured under “senior civil servants”, but I will confirm that and come back to the noble Lord. For now, I ask that the House agrees this amendment.

Amendment 90 agreed.

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

91: Clause 68, page 46, line 30, leave out sub-paragraphs (i) to (vi)
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes the list of persons in clause 68(2)(a). Those persons are now listed (with additional persons) in the new Schedule inserted by Lord Sharpe after Schedule 13.

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Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

93: Clause 68, page 47, leave out lines 26 to 41
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes definitions that are no longer needed in clause 68 because the terms they define have been removed by Lord Sharpe’s amendment to clause 68, page 46, line 30.

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Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

94: Clause 70, page 48, line 15, leave out from second “the” to end of line 16 and insert “activities are registered with the Secretary of State by the foreign principal.”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies that the political influence activities being carried out must be registered at the time they are carried out.

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Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

98: Before Schedule 14, insert the following new Schedule—
“SchedulePublic officialsMinisters
1 A Minister of the Crown (within the meaning of the Ministers of the Crown Act 1975).2 A Northern Ireland Minister (within the meaning of section 68).3 A Scottish Minister.4 A Welsh Minister (within the meaning of section 68).MPs etc
5 A member of either House of Parliament.6 A member of the Northern Ireland Assembly.7 A member of the Scottish Parliament.8 A member of Senedd Cymru.9 An employee or other member of staff of a person within any of paragraphs 5 to 8.Local government
10 The Mayor of London. 11 A mayor for the area of a combined authority established under section 103 of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009.Political parties
12 An officer, trustee or agent of a UK registered political party (within the meaning of section 68).13 A member of such a political party who exercises executive functions on behalf of the party.Election candidates
14 A candidate at an election for a relevant elective office (within the meaning of section 37 of the Elections Act 2022).15 A candidate at an election for a relevant Scottish elective office (within the meaning of that section).Civil servants
16 (1) A member of—(a) the Senior Civil Service;(b) the Northern Ireland Senior Civil Service;(c) the Senior Management Structure of Her Majesty’s Diplomatic Service.(2) A person who serves the government in a position in the civil service of the State and whose appointment to that position meets the requirements applicable to that position set out in section 15(1) of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 (special advisers).(3) A person appointed to a position in the Northern Ireland Civil Service by a Northern Ireland Minister (within the meaning of section 68) and whose appointment to that position meets the conditions set out in section 1(3) and (4) of the Civil Service (Special Advisers) Act (Northern Ireland) 2013 (c. 8 (N.I.)) (special advisers).Military personnel
17 (1) An officer subject to service law who is of or above the rank of commodore, brigadier or air commodore.(2) In sub-paragraph (1), “subject to service law” has the same meaning as in the Armed Forces Act 2006 (see section 374 of that Act).Police
18 The chief constable or deputy chief constable of a police force maintained under section 2 of the Police Act 1996.19 A police and crime commissioner.20 A person of one of the following ranks of the metropolitan police force—(a) Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis;(b) Deputy Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis;(c) Assistant Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis;(d) Deputy Assistant Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis.21 The Commissioner of Police for the City of London or an Assistant Commissioner of Police for the City of London.22 The chief constable or deputy chief constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland.23 The chief constable or a deputy chief constable of the Police Service of Scotland.24 The chief constable or a deputy chief constable of the Ministry of Defence Police. 25 The chief constable or deputy chief constable of the British Transport Police Force.26 The chief constable or deputy chief constable of the Civil Nuclear Constabulary.Persons exercising public functions
27 (1) A person exercising public functions who is specified by the Secretary of State in regulations.(2) “Public functions” means functions of a public nature—(a) exercisable in the United Kingdom, or(b) exercisable in a country or territory outside the United Kingdom by a person acting for or on behalf of, or holding office under, the Crown.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new Schedule expands the list of persons, communication with whom is capable of being a political influence activity. It includes the persons previously listed in clause 68(2)(a), and additional persons.

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Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

99: Schedule 14, page 180, line 7, at end insert “foreign activity arrangements or foreign influence”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies that the exemption for UK arrangements applies to agreements and arrangements within the meaning of “foreign activity arrangement” or “foreign influence arrangement”.

Public Order Bill

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Wednesday 11th January 2023 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

That the amendments for the Report stage be marshalled and considered in the following order: Clauses 1 to 18, the Schedule, Clauses 19 to 35, Title.

Motion agreed.

National Security Bill

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 11th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I start by saying that if the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, is a pupil barrister, I do not know what on earth that makes me. We shall see.

I start with a comment that I know will be supported by all members of the Committee: if the story on the front page of the Sun is accurate, it reminds us of the debt of gratitude that we owe to the security services. They seem to have foiled a plot to import uranium at Heathrow this morning. If that is accurate, it is something that we in this Committee should note, because I know that the security services and those who work on our behalf in all these areas read our proceedings, and they should not mistake or confuse the very real debate that is going on here about the best way for us to go forward, and the best legislative context for us to have for our Armed Forces and our intelligence services, with any sense in which we underestimate or do not respect them fully for the work they do across the world in our interests.

I have objected to Clause 28 standing part of the Bill, and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, for his support, because, as it stands, the clause is unacceptable. The Government themselves have said in the other place and in previous debates that they are considering whether the clause needs amending and, if so, how. We all wait with bated breath to see where that has got to. The ISC has said it needs to change, and we know that even with the further closed briefings from the intelligence services to the ISC, it still believes that the clause needs amendment.

Amendment 63A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, and Amendment 64 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Carlile, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, are welcome and important statements of how the Government may deal with the many concerns raised in both Houses. The excellent contributions we had in support of them challenged the Government to say, if they are not the way forward, what is. The Minister’s response to these amendments will be very important and it will be interesting for all of us to know whether the Government are actually listening. Are these amendments to be accepted by the Government and, if not, why not? If they are not, can we expect a government amendment in good time for us to consider it before Report?

Questions that arise for the Minister if the Government do not accept these amendments are clear. The amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, as he explained,

“would ensure that the immunity provided to Ministers and officials who assist or encourage crimes under the Serious Crime Act 2007 does not cover torture, murder or sexual offences.”

Indeed, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, mentioned the issue of torture. If this is not to be accepted by the Government, can the Minister clearly and without any qualification say that none of this behaviour would ever be allowed if the clause were to be passed unamended? Remember, we are referring to murder, unlawful killing, torture or sexual offences. A clear and categoric ministerial statement, on the record, with no qualification or prevarication, would help the Committee enormously with respect to that amendment.

Amendment 64 would ensure—as I read it, and the explanatory statement confirms this—that high-level ministerial authority is fundamentally important. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, made the excellent point that high-level ministerial authority must be maintained for the authorisation of the doing of such acts, rather than the weakening or even, as most of us believe, the exclusion of such authority, as Clause 28, as drafted, allows. Is that not the case? Why would the Government object to the maintenance of such ministerial authority, ensuring, in a democracy proud of its traditions, the importance of proper political accountability for decisions that are made? Again, this is a point that the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and, I think, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, made. Just as important, if not even more so, is that such ministerial authorisations would be under the supervision of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office—IPCO. This, under Clause 28, now seems not to be the case, whereas independent oversight and accountability seem to me, and I am sure to most of us in the Committee, to be an essential part of such a process.

We know the phrase in the clause as it stands,

“the proper exercise of any function”,

has also caused concern. What does it mean? Who decides whether it is proper or the breadth and potential scope of the phrase? If there is no independent oversight, as required by Amendment 64, who provides it and how? Something as sensitive and crucial as this cannot be left to a few individuals in a closed meeting in an office away from any public gaze or scrutiny. That is unacceptable in a democracy. As it stands, the clause is not acceptable and these amendments seek to improve it. As I and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, have said, we will have to come back to this on Report, either to push an amendment or to agree or disagree a government amendment.

Very serious concerns have been raised about Clause 28 that cannot and should not be ignored by the Government. The ISC has said that the clause needs amending because it is unacceptably broad. Will the Government listen to it, if no one else? Even with the additional briefings, as I have said, it does not believe that Clause 28 is the way forward, even if it accepts that there is a problem that needs fixing.

In justifying Clause 28 as it stands, can the Minister answer some of the following questions? There are currently safeguards, such as ministerial authorisation, the reasonableness test so eloquently outlined for us by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, under Section 50 of the Serious Crime Act and the fact that the DPP must be satisfied that a prosecution is in the public interest, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, properly reminds us time after time. I am grateful that he does so, because that point is lost; it is about not only whether a conviction can be secured but whether it is in the national or public interest for such a prosecution to be pursued. I have faith in the system. I believe that in most cases, if it is not in the public interest, it will not be pursued. That is an open decision that we can question to see whether we agree with it. Why have these safeguards been swept away with respect to such behaviour conducted abroad?

Can the Minister clarify what it means in Clause 28 for something to be necessary for the proper function of the UKIC or the Armed Forces, with no proportionality required? Why have the Government diminished the role and accountability of Ministers in the decision-making structure? As the noble Lords, Lord Purvis and Lord Beith, asked, why does Clause 28 extend this immunity to the Armed Forces? If I have read it right, the Armed Forces have protection under Section 7 of the Intelligence Services Act. Have I got that wrong? Can the Minister clarify why Clause 28, as drafted, appears to extend these immunities to the Armed Forces? As the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, asked, will he give an example of conduct that is the proper exercise of any function of the services but is currently subject to the chilling effect of the 2007 Act and would therefore now be allowed under this Bill? Why can it not be authorised under Section 7 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994 as it stands?

This is an incredibly serious debate, as we have heard from the many contributions from noble Lords. We also know that a huge cross-section of Members of Parliament in the other place expressed their concerns, many with great personal experience. Dan Jarvis MP, Kevan Jones MP, Maria Eagle MP and David Davis MP made excellent speeches asking why the change is necessary and, if it is, why we cannot have something that deals with the perceived problem and commands support, including from our parliamentary oversight committee, the ISC. The ISC was set up specifically to be allowed closed briefings, so that it could advise us on what was appropriate for these difficult matters. How on earth can the Government command the respect and support of this Chamber if the ISC, the committee we set up to have oversight on these matters, does not agree with Clause 28? Why do the Government set themselves against what the ISC is saying and then wonder why we have doubts?

The excellent House of Lords briefing highlights the many comments expressing doubts, particularly the belief that immunity from prosecution for serious crimes committed abroad would be made much more likely and possible under this clause. As Jeremy Wright MP asked, can the Minister explain the difference between acting reasonably under Section 50—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, made this point—and acting in the proper exercise of a function, as this clause requires?

We are rightly proud of the work of our intelligence services and Armed Forces, but we also have a responsibility as a democracy to set a legislative framework that sets, and is seen to set, high standards. Openness, transparency and accountability are part of the price of our democracy. As drafted, Clause 28 undermines these principles and needs at the very least to be seriously amended.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to a fascinating and wide-ranging debate. If the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, is not sure where it leaves him if the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, is a pupil, I am under absolutely no illusions where I am left.

I turn to Clause 28, the Serious Crime Act 2007 amendment. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for his advance notice of interest in this measure and the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, for our discussions to date on this Bill. I also very much thank the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Carlile, who provided advance notice of their intention to table this amendment and have generously shared their time and expertise with me and the team on this measure, as the critical friends to the national security world that the Committee knows them to be.

I will speak to the purpose of the SCA amendment and the amendments tabled by noble Lords. Respectively, they seek to remove the SCA amendment in Clause 28 from the Bill and replace it with an amendment to Section 7 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994, or ISA, and to add to Clause 28 to ensure that exemption from liability for individual Ministers and officials who assist or encourage crimes under the SCA would not cover torture, murder or sexual offences. However, before I come to that, it is right to express our thanks to those who work tirelessly to keep us safe, as the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Coaker, did, while recognising that we should carefully examine any changes to the law which might regulate or enable their activities.

I will briefly tell noble Lords why Clause 28 is in the Bill and why the amendment to the SCA is necessary. In essence, it is vital that we solve an unintended consequence of the SCA which currently exposes those acting for our intelligence and security agencies—MI6, MI5, GCHQ: the UK intelligence community, which I will henceforth call UKIC—and our Armed Forces to potential legal jeopardy and limits their operational agility. This can limit their ability to keep the UK safe, including through our international collaboration with trusted partners, which is vital in the modern world.

The SCA creates offences when an act is done which is capable of “encouraging or assisting” an offence and the person intends or believes their act may encourage or assist an offence. These offences are complex and were predominantly introduced to ensure the police could tackle those directing serious organised crime—for example, capturing those who knowingly directed violence or the importation of drugs but distanced themselves from criminal conduct. There is no minimum level of contribution to the offence which may be encouraged or assisted; the contribution can be small and indirect and there is no need for an offence to be ultimately committed. I will come back to the noble Lords’ amendment, but say here that these are obviously not circumstances that always lend themselves well to pre-authorisation.

Clause 28 focuses on this very specific area of criminal law which is having an operational impact to the detriment of the UK’s security. It is not a general immunity and it would not change the application of all other criminal law offences. It does not make it legal to encourage or enable torture or rendition or solicit murder and does not limit the offence of misconduct in public office. In addition, Clause 28 does not remove civil liability or change either the UK’s international law obligations or UKIC’s or the Armed Forces’ rigid adherence to these obligations. I will come back to that in a moment.

At present, UKIC and the Armed Forces are required to carefully apply the provisions of the offences, sometimes at fast pace and in critical scenarios, as has been noted, and some of which may have life or death consequences—all while they work with our international partners to help protect the UK. We are talking, for example, about sharing intelligence to combat terrorist attack plots. Delays and limits on activity arise solely due to SCA risks when otherwise seniors are clear that there is no wrongdoing and that the activity represents a proper function of the organisation. The offences in the SCA are therefore creating a “chilling effect”, as the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, referred to, across UKIC and the Armed Forces in the delivery of their mission, and impacting on their ability to keep our country safe.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

The Minister has repeated several times his reference to the Armed Forces, but, up to now, always in the context of support for intelligence organisations’ activities. It would be helpful if he could clarify—he is nodding; I think he is indicating that he might do so—whether the inclusion of the Armed Forces is intended to confer the immunity on their general range of activity or is intended to be confined to their support for the intelligence agencies.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord has pre-empted me by about a second. A number of noble Lords have asked why the Armed Forces are included, including the noble Lords, Lord Purvis, Lord Anderson, Lord Beith, Lord Carlile and Lord Coaker. The Ministry of Defence collaborates with a diverse array of allies and partners, with intelligence sharing often forming a key part of such efforts. The Armed Forces also work closely with the UK intelligence and security community, helping to protect the UK from myriad threats overseas. The protection provided for in Clause 28 seeks to ensure that where our Armed Forces collaborate and provide authorised operational support with international partners, as with UKIC, support can continue without exposing individual staff or officers to personal risk of criminal liability. I hope that answers the question to the noble Lord’s satisfaction.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

It would answer the question if the clause was so defined as to limit the extent of the immunity to acting in support of the intelligence agencies. However, as I read it, it does not do that.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I will continue, but I will come back to that, if I may.

I want to return to the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, seeing as we are talking about the application of this, and also to the point on torture. There will be no change to the UK’s other domestic and international legal obligations, including those under the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and international obligations on assisting an unlawful act, which is Article 16 of the International Law Commission’s articles on state responsibility for internationally wrongful acts. I hope that is unequivocal enough.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

I apologise for interrupting the noble Lord. Before he moves on, could he give us two figures which I am sure he must know or could be given very quickly? First, in relation to the security services, how many cases have there been in the past 10 years of the kind we are discussing in which the Director of Public Prosecutions has had to make a decision as to whether a prosecution should take place? Secondly, how many events have been affected adversely over that period by the existing state of the law?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am afraid that I do not have those figures to hand. I am not sure that I will be able to get them, but I will do my very best to find out and come back to the noble Lord on that question.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way, and I look forward to that reply when it comes in writing. If I have this right, the Minister said that it makes no difference—there is no change—to the approach on unlawful killing, torture or cruel or inhuman treatment. Is he saying that this clause does not provide immunity in offering assistance to others who would be committing unlawful killing, torture or cruel or inhuman treatment?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

As I said earlier, I think this is confined very much to the intelligence support by the Armed Forces—is that what the noble Lord is referring to?

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am grateful. No, it is not. The Minister said that there was no change to the approach on unlawful killing and torture. My reading of this clause is that there would now be immunity for offering assistance to others to carry out unlawful killing or torture.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I do not believe that there is immunity for that, but I will clarify that if I am incorrect.

Moving on, caution when considering the legality of support to our partners is of course correct and will continue. However, the current impact of the SCA offences means that vital intelligence-sharing opportunities have been delayed or missed, even when UKIC and the Armed Forces are fully compliant with other legal and policy requirements, such as the Fulford principles and the overseas security and justice assistance guidance, which ensure, for example, that support to international partners is in line with our human rights obligations. I have the principles and guidance to hand. If anybody would like me to go through them in detail, I will, but they are long so it will delay proceedings. I will await an intervention, if any noble Lord wishes me to do that.

UKIC’s and the Armed Forces’ adherence to and compliance with the principles are monitored by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office—IPCO—via regular inspections, and they are also routinely scrutinised by the Intelligence and Security Committee. Ministers are directly accountable for the work of the agencies and the legality of their operations. When things go wrong, it is entirely right that there is scrutiny of and accountability for the organisations’ activities, and I commend the important work that the ISC and IPCO undertake in this space. Meanwhile, any individual found to be working beyond the proper functions of the security and intelligence agencies or the Armed Forces will remain personally liable for those actions. This is right and fair.

However, I have heard the views of the House about this clause. The Government are in close consultation with the Intelligence and Security Committee, UKIC and the Armed Forces, and we are carefully reflecting on the views expressed and considering whether a change in approach is appropriate. It is important to note that those who have seen the very sensitive information which is relevant to this issue have agreed that there is a problem to solve—including the ISC, which has seen specific examples—and I am committed to us reaching a consensus on this matter.

Turning directly to the amendment in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Carlile, Section 7 of the Intelligence Services Act allows the Secretary of State to give authorisations for acts outside the British Isles, provided that the acts are done as necessary for the proper function of SIS or GCHQ—though not MI5 or the Armed Forces—and that the nature and consequence of the acts will be reasonable. These authorisations are clearly not currently available in all the circumstances in which SCA risks arise. I understand that this amendment seeks to address that gap and provide a solution to the application of the SCA offences. It also seeks to utilise an existing power for ministerial authorisation which is overseen by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. These are obviously legitimate and valuable objectives. Section 7 authorisations provide a carefully used route by which the agencies can seek ministerial approval in advance of planned activities. They require Ministers to consider, in relation to specific acts, whether they are necessary and whether the consequences are reasonable. Once authorised, they can remove criminal and civil liability for those acts.

There will invariably be instances where the SCA risk does not manifest itself initially and becomes apparent only much later. Where a risk is not identified in advance, a Section 7 authorisation would not be sought to cover it. In these cases, those acting for UKIC or the Armed Forces would not be adequately protected should concerns about SCA offences arise later. Further, this scenario could lead to an unintended consequence of seeking to use Section 7 authorisations for hypothetical risks, creating an unhealthy reality in which more conduct is approved than would be otherwise without providing meaningful consideration of those risks. I am sure the House shares our desire to find a targeted solution to that problem. It would be a perverse outcome indeed if this well-intended amendment were to lead to less consideration of the SCA risks rather than more. Whether it is a class authorisation or a targeted one, as referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, the reasons why Section 7 authorisations are inappropriate remain the same.

In short, the Government do not believe that Section 7 authorisation is the best solution to the specific operational issue and do not believe it would improve the clarity of the application of the SCA offences to all the complex operational scenarios that arise in ongoing, carefully considered but agile international collaboration. It is more desirable to remove this risk in a targeted way as per Clause 28, avoiding the burden of potentially missing, and/or the overuse of, Section 7 authorisations for SCA risks.

The noble Lords, Lord Purvis and Lord Beith, talked about criminal conduct and authorisation of this for covert human intelligence sources. I think they may have conflated this with the issue at hand. No amendment is being proposed to the criminal conduct authorisation regime which governs the action of agents. We are concerned here with support for our international partners’ activities, so I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Evans, and the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, who articulated this point very well.

I now turn to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, which aims to table provisions which explicitly state that Clause 28 does not cover torture, murder or sexual offences. Again, it is a legitimate attempt to clarify Clause 28. However, it is one which the Government deem unnecessary for reasons that I have partly outlined already but will continue to set out.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

Coming back to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, gives me the opportunity to return to an earlier comment from the Minister. Did he say in answer to the question from the noble Lord that he did not think we could assist others if they were conducting operations which involved torture, et cetera—that we could not support that activity? Was he going to clarify that and write to us, or clarify it later on the Floor of this Chamber?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am going to do it right now: there is no immunity for inciting or assisting others to kill or torture.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

Could the Minister give a little more information as to why there is no immunity?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord does not want there to be immunity.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

No. Why, under this clause, would there continue to be no immunity?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Perhaps I could get to the end and then clarify this. As I said earlier in relation to the SCA, I can confirm that the examples that the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, asked about have been provided to the ISC. As the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, pointed out, it has agreed that this is a problem that requires a solution.

It is vital to acknowledge that Clause 28 will not create blanket criminal law immunity or change the application of all other criminal law offences, including those criminalising torture anywhere in the world, as I have said a number of times. The UK remains committed and subject to international legal obligations, including under the UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and international obligations on assisting an unlawful act under Article 16 of the International Law Commission’s articles on state responsibility for internationally wrongful acts. The amendment to the SCA offences applies only when persons acting for UKIC or the Armed Forces are acting within the proper exercise of their functions. We do not consider that the activities that are of concern and the focus of this amendment would amount to the proper exercise of those functions. I hope that is clear.

I want to be clear that any individual found to be working outside the proper functions of the intelligence agencies or Armed Forces will remain personally liable for those actions under the SCA offences, as well as other applicable laws. Meanwhile, it will still be possible for legal challenges to be brought against the intelligence agencies and Armed Forces in relation to allegations of unlawful behaviour, whether in the form of judicial review, civil damages claims or through a referral to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. That is exactly as it should be.

In response to the point from the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, I say that the Government’s position is that this amendment is not intended to, nor would it have the effect of, removing the role of the relevant Secretary of State from the oversight of the intelligence and security services.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, spoke about the current reasonableness defence and effectively why it is not enough. There is an existing reasonableness defence in Section 50 of the SCA, as has been noted, which was included in recognition that there may be occasions when it could be shown that an individual’s actions were justified in the circumstances.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

I am very sorry to interrupt the noble Lord again. He said that this would not remove the oversight of the Secretary of State and I absolutely accept that. Of course the Secretary of State will have oversight, but does the noble Lord accept that authorisation by the Secretary of State, at least in some cases, will no longer be a requirement?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I see where the noble Lord is coming from and, yes, I accept that.

I return to the reasonableness defence in Section 50. While we consider that properly authorised activity to protect national security should be interpreted as being reasonable, the application of the reasonableness defence to UKIC’s activity is untested.

I come back to one of the earlier points from the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. I am not aware of any prosecutions, but he will know that I cannot comment on operational matters.

I also come back to the questions about the CPS. The fact that the CPS would not be obliged to prosecute offers little comfort to those carrying out legitimate work on behalf of His Majesty’s Government, who may still be subject to criminal investigation for carrying out authorised activities in the interests of national security. The Government consider that we should be able to offer legal reassurance to individuals carrying out vital work to support those interests.

I finish by reiterating that I am committed to continuing to work with the experts in this House, particularly the noble Lords who have tabled the amendments we have debated, and those in the other place to reach consensus on Clause 28. I thank all noble Lords for their patience as we move towards that shared objective.

I have noted the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, on timeliness but, at the moment, the Government cannot support these amendments and I therefore respectfully ask noble Lords not to press them.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Before the noble Lord sits down, could I see whether I have understood him correctly? Is he saying that an act of torture or sexual offences committed in support of another country’s services could not be a proper exercise of the functions of the Security Service—the SIS—or GCHQ? If he is, would it not be better to have that on the face of the Bill rather than simply as a statement from the Minister?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

That is what I am saying. I will come back to whether it should be on the face of the Bill in due course.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am very grateful for that last interaction between the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the Minister. I am also grateful for the Minister continuing to have a degree of open-mindedness. I do not know where I sit on the cascade of legal hierarchy, but I think it is lower order. I do not know if it is just me, but a frisson of nervousness went through my spine when the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, asked for a quick word outside. If I could avoid that, it would be better.

I am well aware of the distinction between SIS officers working under a CHIS authorisation and what is covered under the ISA. I am also well aware of MI5 officers running agents who carry out criminal activity. The point I was trying to make is that there are clear distinctions and that we have procedures with regard to MI5 officers running agents who carry out criminal activity, but there is no immunity for them to do so. The point I made in my opening remarks is that the processes that MI5 has are effectively the defence. The concern with the breadth of this immunity is that those processes will no longer be the case.

I am also well aware of our international obligations, but it is under domestic law that we would realise what those natures are. Because of the extraterritorial nature of the schedule in the SCA, I am still not convinced in the reading of it that our intelligence services and Armed Forces would be able to operate under domestic law in offering assistance to others carrying out criminal acts. Those criminal acts may well also be breaches of international law. I am grateful for what the Minister said, but I am also grateful for his willingness to engage further on that.

I hope the Minister took on board the consensus with regard to concerns about the Armed Forces. The point I made at the start of this debate is that, unique among the SIS and GCHQ included within this, the Armed Forces have powers of detention. Therefore, the processes under way under the MoD doctrine for risk assessments on torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, extraordinary rendition or rendition, and unacceptable standards of arrest and detention are all areas of considerable concern, if there is immunity for our Armed Forces when working with others.

Of course, the guidance that exists also includes the receiving of unsolicited information or providing or sharing information on collaboration. These risk assessment processes are in place—they are in published principles and guidelines—and the considerable concern is that they will be washed away by the extent of the immunity.

I am grateful to the Minister for being open. I still think that he has not sufficiently addressed all the areas of concern, not least that there would be a considerable diminution of independent oversight in the operation of this. I will withdraw my amendment at this stage. I accept the Minister’s word that he will engage fully before Report, and I hope he will be able to put in writing responses to all the issues that have been raised on this so that we can study it carefully before Report. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

No; I cannot respond to that gallantly, can I? I will plough on.

Interestingly, my son recently completed a master’s in journalism at City, University of London. He told me that the public interest part of the journalism course was the least attended, partly because there are fewer jobs in it, which I thought was interesting and worth reflecting on. It is a very important part of any journalist’s work, but it is not where the majority of students choose to study. I thought that was an interesting observation.

The amendments in this group relate to defining a foreign power for the purposes of its activity in the UK. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, moved her Amendment 66A, which would ensure that journalists and civil society are not wrongly included. This debate could have spread over to the group we will discuss on Monday on the foreign influence registration scheme and how that affects businesses, universities and political parties. In a sense, we will revisit a lot of these issues. Nevertheless, noble Lords have made points that will bear repeating, because they can be repeated in that context.

The noble Lord, Lord Marks, tabled similar amendments to create exclusions in certain instances. Amendments 67 and 69 would expand the definition to include corporations working on the behalf of foreign Governments. It is worth reflecting on the Government’s previous inconsistent approach to Huawei in 5G networks, and their lack of understanding of the risks. I believe that this underlines a need for a more coherent strategy. Serious questions remain following the 2020 announcement that Huawei would be removed from UK 5G networks, which we believe was long overdue, about why it was given the go-ahead in the first place. The Huawei case was sadly illustrative of how, in the past decade, the Government have allowed our national security to become an afterthought, creating risks to it. We on this side of the House believe that the Government need to invest in homegrown alternatives to end our national dependence on high-risk vendors.

My noble friend Lady Hayter made a number of very interesting points about political parties, which were picked up by other noble Lords in the debate. I would be interested to hear the Minister’s answer to the points she raised.

The noble Lord, Lord Black, referred to the letter in the Times today to which he was a co-signatory. The noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, also spoke about the potential chilling effect of the Bill’s provisions as they are currently drafted. They both spoke about the importance of a public interest journalism.

The noble Lord, Lord Wallace, made a point that I think will be repeated on Monday but is well worth repeating. It is the problem of overreporting. That is a theme that has run through all the briefings which I have received and that I am sure all noble Lord have received. It a fear in the university sector, the business sector and political parties, and literally hundreds of NGOs are also concerned about this matter—but that is something that can be talked about on Monday, as I have just mentioned.

When the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, summed up, he put his finger on the main problem with this section of the Bill, which is defining the anomalies of political parties, whether they are in government or not, or are part of coalitions or are opposition parties, and the many sorts of relationships which all political parties have internationally and how that works with the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Black, about the importance of public interest journalism, and how that is a very international approach, often dealing with leaked information and illegal information, and how journalists are to be protected in pursuing that valuable work. So this is a complex area. I am sure the Minister will, as usual, be very careful in his answer, but I hope he retains an open mind, as he did on the previous group when we were considering issues raised in this Committee.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I again thank all noble Lords who have participated in this debate. Amendment 66A seeks to exclude journalism and civil society activity from the foreign power condition unless the conduct is instigated by or is under the direction or control of a foreign power. I acknowledge the intention of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, to protect legitimate activity from being criminalised under the Bill with this amendment. However, the Government do not believe that the Bill criminalises legitimate activity and, as such, it is our view that this amendment is unnecessary.

The Committee will be aware that the foreign power condition provides a single and consistent means by which a link between a person’s activities and a foreign state can be drawn. Meeting the foreign power condition is not in itself wrong. It becomes relevant when the other elements of the offences to which it applies are met. As such, the Government do not believe there is a risk to those who engage in legitimate acts, such as journalism or forms of civil society activity.

Turning to the specifics of the amendment, we know that those with hostile intent seek to hide their activities under the appearance of legitimacy, and this amendment could therefore create a gap in our ability to prosecute such individuals. This amendment would mean that an activity carried out with the financial or other assistance of, in collaboration with, or with the agreement of a foreign power would not meet the requirements of the foreign power condition. As a consequence, where a state threat actor posing as a journalist has been engaged in harmful activity which is an offence under the Bill, they would not commit an offence even if we could show that they were receiving specific funding in relation to that activity from a foreign power. This would produce an unwelcome effect whereby those seeking to cause harm to the UK could pose as journalists or members of civil society groups or operate through proxies in order to make it more difficult to be prosecuted.

The Government understand that journalists and those conducting civil society activity can be acting wholly legitimately when receiving funding from a foreign power or working in collaboration with it. However, the other requirements for offences to be committed mean that those legitimate acts would not be captured. In answer to my noble friend Lord Black, I can be clear that this Bill targets wrongful activity from states, not whistleblowing —but we will be coming back to whistleblowing later in today’s session. I also hope that those comments reassure my noble friends Lord Black and Lady Stowell and, of course, the noble Lord, Lord Faulks.

I now turn to Amendments 67 to 71 on the meaning of foreign power, which were tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Marks of Henley on Thames and Lord Purvis of Tweed. The noble Lords have tabled an amendment to remove from the definition a political party which is the governing political party of foreign Government. The inclusion of governing political parties addresses situations where there is a dominant political party or parties within a country to such an extent that it may be difficult to disentangle whether harmful activities are being carried out on the direction of the ruling party or the Government. We know all too well that states seeking to exert their influence or cause harm to the United Kingdom will do so through a number of different vectors, and we do not wish to create a gap in our legislation which state actors could exploit.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

How then, if you seek to attack political parties that are effectively Governments, do you correspondingly exclude political parties that are not in any sense responsible for the activities of the Government, even though they may form a small part of such a Government? The point we made about coalitions is in point and illustrates one of the points we are concerned with, which is that, in a desire to encompass everything that ought to be encompassed, you pull into the net all kinds of fish that ought never to have been caught.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I of course understand where the noble Lord is coming from, but the point is that this relates to the activities of these political parties and those who are working for them. Therefore, I am not entirely convinced that it would be appropriate to exclude the smaller parties in, say, a coalition.

I was going to go on to explain why certain governing political parties in the Republic of Ireland have been carved out, in answer to the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. A political party that is both the governing political party in the Republic of Ireland and a political party registered in Great Britain or Northern Ireland is excluded from the definition of a foreign power, as noted. This exclusion is included in recognition of the fact that there are political parties that contest elections in the Republic of Ireland and in the United Kingdom to ensure that the provisions in the Bill do not inadvertently impact cross-border politics.

A further amendment has been tabled seeking to add corporate or other entities.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

Is the Minister moving off political parties? If so, he has not answered any of the questions that I posed, and I hope he is going to do so before he moves off political parties. The idea is that we are going to call in political parties—and only governing parties, although under Schedule 4 they are the ones that are excluded, not opposition ones—but other countries do not necessarily have a definition of political parties in the way that we do. In fact, until PPERA, in 1998 or whenever it was, I cannot remember, we did not have a definition of political parties or a register of them. So, in other countries that do not have them, how on earth are you going to know who is a political party?

Apart from that, there is the question I put about whether they are in opposition or in government, and what the answer is on America. If one is trying to get at agents acting on behalf of a Government, all you have to do—I used to be general-secretary of the Fabian Society—is call yourself a think tank rather than a political party, and then presumably you can do the activity. So, if this is a way of try to get at organisations that work on behalf of Governments, only calling them political parties, of which in many countries there are no definitions anyway, is, I have to say, somewhat the wrong approach. Will the Minister give me answers to the questions I posed in my contribution?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank the noble Baroness for that. She will forgive me if I do not get involved in what is the correct, or legitimate, Government of the United States. I do not think that is for me to opine.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

It will be for the noble Lord or his successor to opine, because it is in the Bill. There is no secondary legislation attached to it about what the definition will be. This is Pepper v Hart. What is going to be taken is the Minister’s words at the Dispatch Box. If the Minister is saying that he cannot define which is the governing party in America, how do we know who we can meet and who we have to register?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

As regards the registering point, the noble Baroness is—as the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, suggested—perhaps straying into the FIRS situation, which we will discuss at considerable length on Monday. I think that will deal with a number of the questions the noble Baroness has posed with regard to registration and so on. Can we come back to that on Monday, please?

As regards opining as to the Government of the United States, I choose not to do so purely because it would potentially be a political can of worms, but I acknowledge the fact that obviously there is a President who comes from a different party from the majority party in one of the two Houses.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

So there will be meetings that we can have now, and if—God forbid—Mr Trump wins, suddenly the parties with which we are allowed to talk will change because it is Mr Trump rather than Mr Biden. Is that really what the Minister is saying?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

No, I do not believe that is particularly what I am saying. I suspect we will have to come back to this for precise definition purposes, and I am happy to commit to do so.

A further amendment has been tabled, seeking to add corporate or other entities to the foreign power definition. We believe this is unnecessary as it is already covered in the foreign power condition provision, which covers indirect links, under Clause 29(3). This explicitly provides that a person’s conduct could meet the foreign power condition if there is

“an indirect relationship through one or more companies”.

The legislation therefore covers cases where a person is receiving tasking through a company that is under the ownership, control or direction of a foreign power. It is vital that states are not able to circumvent the measures in the Bill by working through proxies to deliver harmful effects.

The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, asked specifically about state-owned companies and Huawei in particular. We have not included state-owned companies in the definition of a foreign power as these companies often have their own non-state objectives. Instead, the legislation captures circumstances where a person acts directly or indirectly

“for or on behalf of a foreign power”.

That includes cases where a person knows, or ought reasonably to know, that the activity they are conducting for a state-linked company is being carried out for or on behalf of the foreign power, or where they intend to benefit a foreign power. Offences may be committed by bodies corporate, including those established in other jurisdictions. In addition, the legislation provides that where an offence is committed by a company

“with the consent or connivance … or … due to any neglect”

of an officer of the company, that officer of the company may be guilty of the offence.

In answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, I have just mentioned that a number of the questions she raised and subjects she covered are more appropriately dealt with under the FIRS discussion we will have on Monday. That also applies to a number of the things raised by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace. As noble Lords know, that part of the Bill—Clauses 65 and 66 —was introduced late into the House of Commons, to which the noble Lord referred. I am sorry if the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, thinks I was frivolous as to the potential for right-wing threats to our national security. Just for the record, I am completely agnostic about from which end of the political spectrum threats are made to our national security.

Finally, noble Lords have tabled an amendment to exclude members of NATO and other nations, via regulations, from the definition of a foreign power. It is important to note that the National Security Bill focuses on harmful conduct undertaken by a person, not the foreign power they seek to benefit. Actively excluding certain states could create an unwelcome gap in the legislation, particularly given that we know that states sometimes look to act through proxies. These amendments, therefore, could lead to us being unable to take necessary and appropriate action against harmful activities. Noble Lords will wish to note the case of Daniel Houghton, the dual British-Dutch national who attempted to sell sensitive information to the Dutch intelligence services in 2010. Were NATO states to be excluded from the definition of a foreign power, cases like Daniel Houghton’s would not be captured by the offences and measures in the Bill.

For those reasons, the Government cannot accept these amendments and I ask noble Lords not to press them.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I am afraid I do not accept the Minister’s idea that these things cannot be criminalised, so I will bring my amendment back on Report. I thank noble Lords for contributing to my amendment, particularly the noble Lord, Lord Black, with his expertise—which goes way beyond mine. I ask the Minister for a meeting to discuss this, because it is quite a fundamental point and bears further discussion. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw.

National Security Bill

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 11th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, this is another JCHR-recommended amendment, ably spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Marks. Its effect is to narrow the definition of foreign power threat activity by removing giving support and assistance to a person involved in offences under the Bill. The reason for the amendment is that the support and assistance become illegal if unrelated to espionage activity. As the noble Lord explained, its effect does not alter the lines which include facilitating such offending under subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b) of the relevant clause. His objection to paragraph (c) was that it does not make sense and is too vague. I take on board the legal points and his examination of the English in that paragraph, but the real point of this is to provoke a debate and discussion, to narrow the definition and encourage the Minister to explain more fully what is meant by the definitions set down in the Bill.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 72 seeks to narrow the definition of foreign power threat activity by removing the conduct of those who give support or assistance to individuals, as has been noted.

The definition of foreign power threat activity is a vital part of the Bill, ensuring that the police have the powers they need in support of investigations into state threats offences. It is important that foreign power threat activity has sufficient breadth to allow our law enforcement and intelligence agencies to act where a threat is posed to the safety of the United Kingdom.

There will inevitably be overlap between facilitating on the one hand and assisting or supporting individuals on the other to carry out certain harmful activity under the Bill. However, it is important to retain both elements as they serve distinct purposes. We do not wish to create a gap in the legislation that prevents us being able to act against persons who assist individuals involved in harmful activity, and therefore we cannot accept this amendment.

Both noble Lords implied that it is casting the net too broadly to say that it is not necessary to identify a specific offence or act. However, given the harm that can arise from state threats activity, it is right that the Government can act to disrupt individuals during the early stages of their conduct. Therefore, it will not always be possible to determine the end goal of their conduct. Indeed, in some cases an individual may not have even decided the precise outcome they seek to bring about but, none the less, they have an intention to engage in state threats activity. We therefore want to ensure that the provisions are robust enough to catch criminals in these cases. Waiting until we have a full picture of the act they wish to commit could mean that we have to wait until the act itself is committed.

Additionally, I reassure the House that the reference to

“conduct which gives support or assistance”

under Clause 31(1)(c) relates specifically to conduct falling under Clause 31(1)(a), as is made explicit through the reference to paragraph (a). The Government’s view is that it is implicit that the conduct in question must be support in relation to acts or threats under Clause 31(1)(a), rather than support in relation to any unrelated activity. Thus, the provision does not risk bringing activity wholly unrelated to state threats activity into scope.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

Can the Minister explain that? That is the only thing I can see that is covered by paragraph (c) which is not covered by paragraph (b)—the provision of support or assistance in matters which are nothing to do with the likelihood of the individual being involved in conduct falling within paragraph (a). The Minister has stated that paragraph (c) does not have the effect of proscribing conduct which has nothing to do with the provisions in paragraphs (a) and (b), but I do not know on what he bases that confidence.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I base that confidence on the explicit reference to Clause 31(1)(a) in Clause 31(1)(c). With that, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

I will withdraw it, but only on the basis that the Minister will consider this a little more carefully. As I have said, at the moment the clause seems to me unsatisfactory, and paragraph (c) ought to go. That would not damage the overall meaning of the clause at all, and I hope that the Minister will reconsider that before Report. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

73: Clause 34, page 25, line 20, leave out from “(1)” to end of line 21 and insert “is subject to sections 3(6) and 15(6) (commission of offences under sections 3 and 15 by conduct outside the United Kingdom).”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment provides that Clause 34(1) is subject to specific provisions in Clauses 3 and 15 about when conduct taking place outside the UK can constitute an offence under those Clauses.

Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (Codes of Practice) (Revision of Code A) Order 2022

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Tuesday 10th January 2023 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

That the draft Order laid before the House on 13 October 2022 be approved.

Relevant document: 15th Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, this order was laid in draft before Parliament on 13 October 2022. It will bring into effect a revised code of practice issued under Section 66 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, which I shall call “PACE” from now on. This is PACE Code A, which governs the exercise by police officers of powers to stop and search a person without first arresting them. For England and Wales, PACE sets out the core powers of the police to prevent, detect and investigate crime. The exercise of these powers is subject to codes of practice, or PACE codes, which the Secretary of State is required to issue. The PACE codes put in place important procedural safeguards for the public and detainees when the police exercise their powers.

The proposed amendments to PACE Code A, which we are discussing today, relate to police powers to stop and search individuals subject to a serious violence reduction order, which I will refer to henceforth as “SVROs”. Inserted into the sentencing code by the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, SVROs are civil orders which give the police powers to stop and search individuals convicted of an offence where a bladed article or offensive weapon was used or was present. Cracking down on knife crime is a priority for the Government, and SVROs are an important part of that crucial endeavour. By increasing the risk of detection, these orders are designed to deter habitual knife carriers from reoffending, as well as to help prevent exploitation into continued criminality, including further weapons carrying.

We must build an understanding of the impact of the new orders, so the issuing of the orders will be piloted in West Midlands, Merseyside, Sussex and Thames Valley police force areas. The pilot will be independently evaluated before a decision is made on rollout of the orders across England and Wales. We have proposed these revisions to PACE Code A to ensure that proper guidance and safeguards on the use of the new stop and search power are in place for the pilot.

The proposed revisions were subject to a statutory consultation, which ran for six weeks; they introduce a new temporary annexe, G, which deals with searches in relation to SVROs. In particular, the code highlights that the power does not require officers to have prior reasonable grounds, but its use must not be based on prejudice; it highlights that searches can be conducted only on those subject to an SVRO, and that officers should seek to confirm the identity of the individual; it outlines that the use of the power, like all other stop and search powers, is discretionary, and that officers will be expected to use their judgment when choosing to conduct searches; it outlines that the new annexe will apply for 24 months, plus an additional six-month transitional period; and it outlines the territorial extent of the use of the powers. While SVROs will be issued only in the pilot police force areas, the stop and search powers will be available across England and Wales.

On concerns around disproportionality and the impact of stop and search on particular communities, our aim is for these orders to enable police to take a more targeted approach, specifically in relation to known weapons carriers. The code of practice is just one of many safeguards in place to ensure the fair and proportionate use of SVROs. The revised code was laid before Parliament together with the draft order and Explanatory Memorandum. Subject to the order being approved, the revised code will come into force on 17 January 2023. I must highlight that this date is not a fixed date for the commencement of the SVRO pilot: we are ensuring that all the appropriate secondary legislation is in place before commencing in early 2023.

Fighting crime and protecting the public are central to the Government’s agenda. I therefore commend the draft order to the House and I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I start by thanking the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, who made some important and interesting points. I agree with many of them and I look forward to the Minister’s response.

The Chamber will wish to know that we did not oppose the Motion for this pilot in the other place, but there are also important points that I wish to pose to the Minister to add to those made by the noble Lords, Lord Paddick, Lord Moylan and Lord Hogan-Howe, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, in another sense, in that this also gives us in this Chamber the opportunity to discuss knife crime, which is clearly an important matter.

We are all horrified by knife crime and the horrific murders, sometimes of young people by other young people, in the most shocking of circumstances—in full public view. Can the Minister start by telling us what the latest figures actually tell us with respect to knife crime? I looked for them before this debate, and some are impacted by the pandemic or use different years as a baseline. What are the actual official figures for knife crime and knife-related murder, and not just in London but across the country? Clearly, whatever the figures are, they are too high, and the fundamental question for this debate is how serious violence reduction orders are expected to help. The noble Lord, Lord Moylan, made the point that knife crime prevention orders were backed as the answer to tackle knife crime back in 2019. They have not even started yet. Why is that, and when will they start?

On the issue of disproportionality, the pilot is for two years. However, supposing that problems emerge around disproportionality before the two years—a point the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, made—is there a mechanism for an earlier review within that two-year period to look at data as it emerges? The Minister in the other place says he is open to this. What does that mean: an interim review after, say, six months, or a year? What does the Government being “open to looking at this” mean?

Can the Minister explain the transition period of six months and how that will work in practice? In particular, how will it impact on an individual given such an order as regards its length? Are all orders for only a six-month duration or just those issued on the last day of the two-year pilot, hence the six-month transition period? It is not clear to me at all, because if you are given an SVRO on the last day of the two years, it can last only for a maximum of six months. If you are given it on the first day of the two-year period, can you be given it for two years, or two years and six months, or can you be given it for six months, then another six months and another six months? Some clarity about who can and cannot be given SVROs is needed.

On the issue of territorial extent, the SVROs will be able to be used only in the four areas—the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, made a good point about how the areas were chosen, why certain other areas were not and why the number four was alighted on, and I think the Chamber could do with some explanation of that from the Government. These four areas are the areas where the orders can be given but, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, mentioned, the concern is that the police power will be applied across England and Wales. How will the data be shared by these four areas with forces across the country? What about Scotland? If somebody who is subject to such an order went to Scotland, what happens with respect to that? How will a police officer be able to know that the individual is subject to an order? Again, the noble Lord, Lord Hogan- Howe, made that point, although I understand that his point was that you would expect it to be on the police database and shared in that way. However, it would be interesting to see how that will work and what the Government’s response would be.

In other debates, we have talked about stop and search, including whether only a uniformed officer can use this power; again, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has made this point forcefully before. With respect to this order, can only a uniformed officer use this stop and search power—particularly given that, as noble Lords will appreciate, it is stop and search that can be done without suspicion? How many officers have now received the College of Policing training on stop and search, and will they be updated with respect to this order?

On the question of pilots, can the Minister look at ensuring that, if, for whatever reason, a future pilot contains one part that is focused on a small number of areas and another part that is to be applied nationally, this is clearly explained—particularly in this case where, as the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, have pointed out, this pilot came about as a result of a concession made by the Government because of the concerns about serious violence reduction orders raised by many noble Lords?

Can the Minister say something to inform us how this pilot will be evaluated by Ecorys? How is it going to do that? What criteria is it going to use to determine whether this pilot has been successful? Will it be fully independent of government? Also, are the Government open to the fact that these pilots may fail and not work? In those circumstances, would the Government be prepared to say that they will not carry on with them? The evaluation is particularly important given the concerns around disproportionality with respect to gender and ethnicity. If the evaluation shows that there are problems, the Government should consider other measures.

We all want to tackle knife crime, whatever its level; there is no difference between us on that. There are real issues for us as a society to deal with, as the Minister in the other place said. I want to point out one statistic that the Minister in the other place used so that noble Lords can see how difficult this is, whatever the level of knife crime. He said that

“young black people are 24 times more likely to be murdered using a knife than those from other communities.”—[Official Report, Commons, Ninth Delegated Legislation Committee, 13/12/22; col. 8.]

We all want something to be done about that. We all accept that that figure is too high. The issue for the Government is how on earth knife crime prevention orders are going to tackle that and other issues related to knife crime across the country. Can the Minister say what else the Government are doing to tackle this problem?

We have this new order alongside other orders designed to tackle knife crime and serious violence. We all hope that they work. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and others pointed out, targeting hot spots, having police on the streets in neighbourhoods, prevention, community engagement and support are also crucial. Many lives, often very young ones, are still being lost. Many families are still affected. Many communities are still affected. Orders such as this one may help, but they must be part of a wider ongoing effort by the police and communities if they are to have the impact that we all want.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have made valuable contributions to this debate.

First, I will address the concerns expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, in relation to the territorial extent of the SVRO pilot. I want to clarify that, as I said earlier, SVROs are being introduced on the basis of a pilot in Merseyside, West Midlands, Sussex and Thames Valley police forces. They will be issued only in these four pilot police force areas. However, as the revised PACE Code A sets out, the stop and search powers are enforceable by all constables across England and Wales; the “all constables” point answers the question of whether they will be in uniform, I think, but obviously they would have to identify themselves as such. This is aimed at supporting an operational response across police force areas, allowing constables from non-pilot forces to stop and search individuals subject to SVROs if they travel outside of the pilot area.

The noble Lords, Lord Hogan-Howe and Lord Coaker, asked why we are piloting in those force areas and not with larger forces, where the prevalence of serious violence—

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I am sorry to interrupt; I apologise to the Minister for being rude. I am not clear what he means about whether or not an officer using this stop and search power must be in uniform. This is an extremely important point. I am sorry if it is just me and I did not understand, but I wonder whether the Minister can clarify that point.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

That is no problem at all. I will do my best to clarify that by the end of this speech, but as I understand it, it is all constables, which I assume includes those who do not necessarily wear a uniform.

Regarding the territorial extent of the pilot and why we are piloting in these force areas and not larger ones, where the prevalence of serious violence is higher, all four forces that will pilot SVROs are in the 20 areas most affected by serious violence across England and Wales. They accounted for 80% of all hospital admissions for injury with a sharp object, with each individually accounting for 2% or more of admissions, rounded to the nearest percentage point. The West Midlands has the third-highest rate of knife crime in England and Wales, and Merseyside the sixth-highest. The pilot will allow us to build an understanding of the impact and effectiveness of the new orders before deciding whether they should be rolled out nationally to other force areas. I hope that answers the question.

I have heard what the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, had to say on this topic; however, stop and search powers are not enforceable across England and Wales. As the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, noted, individuals subject to SVROs could simply operate outside the pilot areas. The Government held a statutory consultation on the revised code. This issue was discussed at length with key stakeholders, who strongly supported allowing the use of stop and search powers by police constables both within and outside the police force areas. In answer to the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, about the Police Federation, it is a member of the PACE board and as such was invited to provide a response. Whether it did, I do not know. Like the proposed approach to SVROs, knife crime prevention orders, which have been referred to, are being piloted in the Metropolitan Police area and can only be issued in that force area. However, the orders are also enforceable across England and Wales.

I stress that this is only a pilot, but we are revising the PACE codes because they outline the fundamental principles of fair and responsible stop and search. We want to ensure that officers have clear guidance on the use of the new powers in the SVRO pilot, including through PACE codes of practice. The search power can only be used against persons who are subject to an SVRO. An individual can be issued with an SVRO only if they are over 18 and have been convicted of an offence involving a bladed article or an offensive weapon, and if the court considers it necessary to make the SVRO to protect the public from the risk of harm involving an offensive weapon or bladed article, or to prevent the offender from further offending involving an offensive weapon or bladed article. Therefore, while the police do not require reasonable grounds for suspicion, it is not an unrestricted stop and search power. The code of practice is clear that the use of the power must not be based on prejudice. The use of the power is discretionary, and officers will be expected to use their judgment when choosing to conduct searches.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked how, if individuals are not legally required to give their identity when stopped by the police, officers will identify those subject to an SVRO. The police will have obtained the offender’s details at the notification stage of an SVRO—there is the requirement for an individual subject of an SVRO to notify the police of their name and address—and they should ensure that any stop and search under the power is targeted at offenders that have a SVRO only. In most cases, it is expected that offenders subject to an SVRO will be known to the police and officers will be able to identify the offender before conducting a search. Where an officer is unsure of an offender’s identity, they should seek to confirm that offender’s identity and whether they have an SVRO before using the stop and search power. It is an offence for an offender to tell a police constable that they are not subject to an SVRO if they are.

The Government fully support the police in the fair use of stop and search to crack down on violent crime and protect communities. The code of practice is one of many safeguards in place to ensure the fair and proportionate use of SVROs. Others include statutory guidance for the police on the use of the power, which we have laid in draft before Parliament, body-worn video, and extensive data collection. Stop and searches carried out using the SVRO power will be subject to the usual internal and external scrutiny panels to ensure that forces are continually reviewing and learning from officer stop and searches.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and my noble friend Lord Moylan asked about the evaluation of the pilot. We of course recognise the need for transparency in how the orders are used, and clear and robust monitoring to reassure communities that the orders are being used appropriately and effectively. The Government are piloting SVROs to build an understanding of their impact before deciding whether they should be rolled out nationally. By definition, that implies that if they do not work and we do not get sufficient data, they will not be continued with.

We have appointed an independent evaluator, Ecorys, to carefully gather the data necessary to assess the impact of these orders. We will lay a report on the outcome of the pilot in Parliament. It is expected in late 2025 and will include an initial assessment of the impact of SVROs on the reoffending rates of offenders in respect of whom such orders have been made; include information about the exercise by constables of the powers; provide an assessment of the impact on offenders of being subject to an SVRO; and assess the impact of SVROs on people with protected characteristics within the meaning of the Equality Act 2010. We are also working with the SVRO working group and the National Police Chiefs’ Council to ensure that all forces are aware of the draft statutory guidance on SVROs and the revised PACE Code A.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked me about training. I do not think it is for me to discuss operational matters particularly, but the training is being worked on by the College of Policing. It will be interactive e-learning training and will ensure that officers in pilot areas understand the new civil orders, their responsibilities and the stop and search powers being provided. This learning platform will test officer knowledge, including when it would or would not be appropriate to use the powers.

To sum up, we do not accept that the availability of the stop and search powers across England and Wales for individuals subject to an SVRO warrants the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. The rationale behind the approach we are taking is clear and sensible, and there are strong safeguards in place. Ultimately, we have a responsibility to tackle crime and keep people safe, and that is and will continue to be a key priority for the Government.

I welcome the fact that the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, mentioned victims; I will go into some detail on the statistics. The latest police-recorded crime figures published by the ONS for the year ending June 2022 show that knife-enabled crime remained 9% lower—that is, 49,991 offences—than pre-coronavirus pandemic levels; in the year ending March 2020, the figure was 55,076. Police-recorded offences of possession of an article with a blade or point were 9% higher in the year ending June 2022, at 25,287 offences, than the year ending March 2020, when there were 23,242 offences. That is a 13% increase. The police recorded 679 homicide offences in the year ending June 2022, which is a 5% decrease compared with the year ending March 2020. Levels have increased by 13% since the year ending June 2021, during which social restrictions were still in place.

I understand the concerns around disproportionality and the impact of stop and search, particularly on black individuals. But, as the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, has just mentioned, we should not forget that, according to the most recent studies, young black people are 24 times more likely to be victims of homicide than young white people. That is a tragedy. Young people are dying, their families are suffering and their communities are being disproportionately impacted. I totally agree with the noble Lord, Lord Coaker: we absolutely have to do better. I go back to the point I made earlier: to be absolutely clear, an individual must have been convicted of an offence where a bladed article or offensive weapon was used or was present to receive an SVRO, and the stop and search power applies only where an individual has an SVRO.

I will read out a supportive quote from Patrick Green, CEO of the Ben Kinsella Trust. As a reminder, Ben was knifed to death at the age of 16 in 2008; he would now have been entering his 31st year. Patrick said:

“We are pleased that the Government is setting out to do more to take knives and those who choose to persistently carry them off our streets. Reoffending rates have been one of the scourges of knife crime. SVROs give us a chance to look again at stop and search and what more can be done in the courts to reduce offending.”


That very powerful statement speaks for itself.

The policy detail of SVROs was discussed at length during passage of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. As mentioned, they will be piloted and we will conduct a full evaluation before any further rollout.

My noble friend Lord Moylan went slightly off topic when he asked me about non-crime hate incidents. I will endeavour to answer. The Home Secretary has asked officials to consider the issue of NCHI recording to ensure that the police are using their time most effectively. This work is currently under way and includes consideration of whether the Home Secretary will publish a code of practice on non-crime hate incident recording, as provided for in Sections 60 and 61 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act.

In closing, I offer again my thanks to all noble Lords who contributed to this short debate. I hope that I have covered the points raised during it. There is one that I have not: I will write to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, on the subject of uniforms; I cannot clarify that at this precise moment. I hope the House will feel sufficiently reassured that the changes we are making to PACE Code A are a necessary safeguard to have in place before commencement of the pilot scheme for SVROs. I have made it clear that public safety is our foremost concern. I therefore commend the order to the House.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, before the Minister sits down, I did not hear an answer to my two questions. I do not expect one as to whether the Government respect democracy because I know the answer to that, but my other question was about the pilot scheme. Why promise a pilot and then do the whole rollout?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am not entirely sure that I understand the noble Baroness’s question. If you are going to have a pilot you have to roll it out, surely.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

Why not wait for the pilot to finish before you decide to roll out the whole thing more widely?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

We have not actually started the pilot and we are not rolling it out. It is stuck to four pilot areas. We are talking about the territorial extent of the stop and search powers.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I am very grateful to all noble Lords for their contributions to the debate, particularly those who supported my amendment.

The Minister has completely glossed over the whole point of the regret amendment, which is that a concession was made by a government Minister at the Dispatch Box to limit SVROs to specific police areas. There was no mention of restricting only the issuing of SVROs, rather than their enforcement, at that time. It was never even considered, let alone agreed to. What has happened is this. The Home Office has consulted the police—what the Government called “key stakeholders”; I think the Minister means the police, as that is who they consulted—and the police said, “Hang on a minute, we need the power across all of England and Wales because these criminals travel”. That may or may not be a valid argument, but it was not what the Minister promised from the Dispatch Box. That is the point and that is why there is a regret amendment, but I do not intend to delay the House further because there is a big debate to come. I therefore wish to withdraw the amendment.