Metropolitan Police: Crime and Misconduct

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Thursday 1st December 2022 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions and I congratulate my noble friend Lord Lexden on securing this important debate.

Public confidence is, as all speakers have noted, a precious commodity for policing. When it is lost or damaged, the impact is significant and profound. Every time a high-profile incident occurs or a scathing report is published, that trust is placed in jeopardy. The truth is that recently this has happened all too often. I agree with my noble friend Lord Lexden that I could and perhaps should have used a much stronger word than “worrying” in my letter to him. However, I also take this opportunity to join the noble Lords, Lord Blair and Lord Bassam, in praising the “heroic, determined” majority—to use Sir Mark’s words, which were echoed by my noble friend Lord Lexden.

Things have to improve. Standards have to be raised and cultures reset. The Home Secretary has been clear that it is vital that the police act to restore trust, return to common-sense “back to basics” policing and treat the public and victims with the respect that they deserve. As the largest police force in England and Wales, with responsibilities extending beyond the vast task of policing and protecting the capital, the Metropolitan Police Service has a central role to play. The Government are committed to working with the Met Commissioner, Sir Mark Rowley, and the whole of his organisation. Their task is clear: to get the basics right, drive down and tackle crime, and rebuild public trust.

Many noble Lords have referred to the interim report of the noble Baroness, Lady Casey. Under the commissioner’s leadership, as I have just said, the Met must get back to basics—and get those basics right—and provide the first-class service expected of it. The report of the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, as the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, pointed out, contained many disturbing things, including: allegations of discrimination or sexual misconduct; issues of racial disparity, as referenced by the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence; and a lack of confidence internally that such allegations will be taken seriously.

The commissioner has already set out a plan for his first 100 days to, in his words,

“renew policing by consent … to bring more trust, less crime and high standards”

and, obviously, to deal with some of the findings of the Casey report. As part of that process, and going beyond those 100 days, Sir Mark Rowley attends the police performance oversight group, run by HMICFRS. The group brings together system leaders from across policing to offer constructive challenge and practical support to chief constables of engaged forces. I will go into this in some detail, with noble Lords’ indulgence. This body is chaired by the Chief Inspector of Constabulary, Andy Cooke, who has a clear remit to ensure that forces have realistic and clear improvement plans in place to address the serious concerns about performance that HMICFRS inspections have identified.

Members of this group include His Majesty’s inspectors, the National Police Chiefs’ Council, the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners performance leads, the College of Policing, the Home Office, represented by the policing policy director, the chief constables themselves, of course, and the PCCs or mayors. It is worth restating, as referenced by the noble Lord, Lord Browne, that the primary accountability body for the Metropolitan Police Service remains the Mayor of London and the London Assembly.

Sir Mark attended his first iteration of this group on 13 October and it met again today in order to review some of the performance measures he has outlined. The members scrutinise the improvement plans and provide expert and constructive challenge—one hopes—where needed and regularly review the progress that is made. The mayor and deputy mayor are also invited, as I said, and attend to ensure that they understand the issues and underlying causes of the failures that have been identified and can therefore more effectively monitor, scrutinise and support their chiefs.

The Home Office attends to provide Ministers with the assurance that sufficient and urgent improvement action is under way. Where appropriate, the department considers what additional support it may be able to offer to accelerate progress towards that improvement. Ultimately, officials consider whether the Home Secretary may need advice on using her backstop powers, but I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, that the Home Secretary does, of course, meet the police commissioner on a regular basis.

In addition to the police performance oversight group, Sir Mark has also established governance to ensure that the Metropolitan Police Service is challenged and supported on its plans for improvement. These arrangements include the Deputy Mayor and the relevant director-general for public safety from the Home Office—I believe that is called a “turnaround board”.

As for other things the Home Office has done, we have set out clear priorities for all policing through the national crime and policing measures outlined in the Beating Crime Plan, which was published in July 2021. The plan sets out the Government’s strategic approach to cutting crime and restoring confidence in the criminal justice system more generally, but also includes a focus on reducing homicide, serious violence and neighbourhood crime. To allow effective performance management, the Home Office has developed the digital crime and performance pack, which provides published and unpublished data on the Met’s performance relative to other forces and nationally. This has been made available to all chiefs and PCCs.

Most noble Lords raised the subject of police vetting. Following the tragic events surrounding the death of Sarah Everard, the previous Home Secretary commissioned an inspection into police vetting, countercorruption capabilities, misogyny and predatory behaviour. That report, which was published on 2 November, highlighted that policing must do more to safeguard the integrity of the police workforce. Previous inspections also highlighted risks that can arise with poor vetting practice. The NPCC has committed to addressing the recommendations in the report in full. Three recommendations have also been made to the Home Office, and we will be addressing those. Following the HMICFRS report on vetting, misconduct and misogyny, it plans to dip-sample force decision-making on vetting as part of its regular inspections, so that there is ongoing scrutiny of decisions, including forces’ risk appetite.

I was asked whether our unprecedented drive to recruit has perhaps been driving perverse behaviours or causing forces to cut corners. The honest answer is no. Meeting the commitment to recruit the additional 20,000 has not been and will never be at the expense of public safety. The various process improvements and substantial funding provided by the programme means that policing has the tools and ability to recruit in greater volumes while maintaining standards. I go back to the point I just made: the HMICFRS is introducing regular dip-sampling to make sure that that remains the case.

On police misconduct and the discipline system, which of course includes dismissal reviews, the Government announced a review in response to the interim report of the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, into the process of police officer dismissals, with the aim of ensuring that the system is fair and effective at removing those who are not fit to serve their communities. The Home Office is responsible for the regulatory framework. This follows significant reforms to the disciplinary system in recent years, including the introduction of independent, legally qualified chairs; public misconduct hearings; the ability to bring misconduct proceedings for former police officers; and the introduction of the police barred list. The Home Office is going to work closely with police partners, including the Metropolitan Police, as part of the review, and the terms of reference will be published in the very near future.

The Government are aware of the commissioner’s concerns around the number of officers not fully deployable but, ultimately, decisions on whether to suspend an officer or place them on restricted duties are a matter for chief constables. I have some data on this for the House. It probably does not entirely accord with Sir Mark’s comments in the newspaper report the other day—it was a snapshot taken at the end of March—but I think it is useful for context.

As of March 2022, the police workforce statistics showed that the Met has 780 officers on recuperative duties—about 2.3% of the workforce, compared with 4.5% nationally. Some 2,718 officers were on restricted or adjusted duties. “Adjusted duties” is worth defining. It is where an officer fails to recover from recuperative duties or another medical issue is identified, but where it is agreed that the officer, with reasonable adjustments, is able to discharge a substantive police role without unreasonable detriment to the overall force effectiveness or resilience, as judged by the chief officer. I am sorry that that is a bit of a mouthful, but it is worth defining. Unfortunately, we do not split the 2,718 into the various categories.

[Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)]

That is 10% of the Met’s active force. Are any other forces in the UK operating with that degree of handicap?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The average is 4.7%, and it is actually 8% of the Met’s workforce—but I agree that it is a heavier number than we would see nationally. As was referenced earlier, seven officers are currently suspended—0.02% of the workforce, compared with 0.15% nationally. I accept that those numbers are not particularly reassuring: obviously, much needs to be done to fix this problem.

As I said earlier, decisions on whether to suspend an officer or place them on restricted duties are a matter for chief constables. It is also at chief constables’ discretion to place officers on adjusted duties, as the guidance sets out fairly clearly. Where officers’ performance is unsatisfactory or they commit an act of gross incompetence, there are existing mechanisms to be able to dismiss them from the force. The Home Office will continue to work with forces to ensure that there is an effective regulatory framework in place. Whether we end up with legislative change or not, as suggested by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble Lord, Lord Blair, I really cannot predict.

My noble friend Lord Lexden referred to Operation Midland, which we have discussed many times in this House. As ever, his points were well made. On the remarks made by the former Home Secretary that he referred to, in which she stated that profound concerns existed about the handling of this operation, the Independent Office for Police Conduct responded to criticism of its handling in a letter sent to Sir Richard Henriques on 31 March 2021. That is available on the government website. The IOPC publishes further information on its performance and plans on its website. As announced by the former Home Secretary on 15 June 2021, an independent review of the IOPC—another review, I am afraid—is due to start this year. This will consider the organisation’s effectiveness and efficiency, including its decision-making processes.

I regret that I am running out of time. In closing, I repeat my earlier thanks to my noble friend Lord Lexden for securing this debate. I am grateful too to all other noble Lords who have contributed today. These are issues of the utmost importance, not only in relation to the way our capital city is policed but for British policing as a whole. The Metropolitan Police has a unique status within our policing system. Under the commissioner’s leadership, the force must step up to the task of driving down crime, upholding high standards and securing public trust. I commend the work that Sir Mark Rowley has done so far and look forward to seeing the rest of it concluded successfully. That is what the Government expect, and we will continue challenging the Met and the whole of policing to achieve it.

Independent Cultural Review of London Fire Brigade

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Tuesday 29th November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, female firefighters groped and beaten, a black firefighter having a noose put on his locker, and a Muslim firefighter having sausage and bacon sandwiches stuffed in his pocket—these are all awful examples, among many more, from the appalling report on the culture of the London Fire Brigade published yesterday. The report says that such abuse was shockingly often dismissed as being just banter. Do the Government agree that this has to be a watershed moment? How are the Government going to work with the London Fire Brigade commissioner, Andy Roe, to deliver the much-needed cultural change quickly? What evidence is there that this is a much wider problem than just London, and what are the Government going to do about that? Being shocked is one thing, but what is needed is action.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

I agree with the noble Lord; the report written by Nazir Afzal makes for deeply troubling reading indeed. The London fire commissioner, Andy Roe, commissioned this review due to his significant concerns about the culture in his own service. The review also followed the tragic suicide of Jaden Matthew Francois-Esprit, a trainee firefighter; my thoughts and sympathies are obviously with his family. I know that all noble Lords will share our sadness and shock at the testimony of those who shared their experiences for this review, to whom I pay tribute for their courage. I assure the House that the Government have taken and continue to drive action in this area. The London fire commissioner has accepted all 23 recommendations in the report, also stating that he will be fully accountable for improving culture. We will take a very close interest in how he intends to implement this.

[Baroness Pinnock (LD)]

My Lords, this is indeed a deeply troubling report. A life-saving emergency public service is being laid low by corrosively damaging behaviour by a minority of firefighters, despite the obvious dedication of the majority. As the Minister has said, there are 23 recommendations in the Nazir Afzal report. I have a couple of questions. First, will the Minister commit to providing a review of these recommendations within 12 months so that progress can be made and be seen to be made? Secondly, the report exposed the failure of the model of governance. Good governance would have exposed the failings and demanded action well before this horrific bullying, harassment, misogyny, homophobia and racial discrimination was brought to light. What action will the Government take—maybe the Minister can tell us—to remedy this absolute system failure of governance?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank the noble Baroness for her questions. I think it is useful to remind the House that the report confirmed that the disadvantage and discrimination that affects brigade staff does not translate into its operations and does not impact on the way the brigade prevents and responds to incidents. It is important to note that and to note our admiration for firefighters, who walk into trouble as opposed to walking away from it.

As for the Government’s response, we should bear in mind that responsibility for London Fire Brigade rests with the Mayor of London, but the Government published a fire reform White Paper in May. That set out proposals to reform the way the fire service supports and values its people. At its heart are plans to improve culture and professionalism and to put ethics at the heart of the service. The Government have also funded a number of important change programmes in the fire sector. We have supported the creation of a new code of ethics for fire and rescue services, setting out clear national expectations for standards of behaviour. The Fire Standards Board, which is funded by the Home Office, has produced fire standards to support the core code of ethics as well as a specific safeguarding standard, supported by guidance from the National Fire Chiefs Council. It will shortly be publishing new fire standards on leadership.

[Lord Udny-Lister (Con)]

My Lords, could the Minister please advise, first, that responsibility for the London Fire Brigade rests with the Mayor of London, who has a deputy mayor responsible specifically for the London Fire Brigade? So my first point is on governance—what is being done on that? Secondly, what will then be done about removing the individuals who have been clearly identified in this process? We only recently had the report of the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police on how we could not get rid of large numbers of policemen who need to leave the service quickly. Thirdly, national training has always been an issue for the fire brigade. The central Fire Service College in Moreton-in-Marsh was closed many years ago. It still has not been replaced and there are all sorts of training and governance issues around the fire brigade.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

That is very clear; there is fairly evidently a failure of leadership. However, as I mentioned, I commend the leadership of Andy Roe, who commissioned a report into his own brigade. That was courageous and, as I say, he has committed to acting on all the recommendations.

There were two recommendations on getting rid of people. One is for a historical review of complaints, which will obviously investigate potential historical injustices. I imagine that will have some sort of component to do with removing people.

I am happy to confirm that the Mayor of London has operational responsibility for this, along with his deputy. That is on the website, and he claims it for himself. This is not blaming; it is merely stating a fact.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his answer. He knows that I am always happy to examine issues of governance and new legislation where that is required, be it for the fire brigade or the police, which we will discuss in the debate of the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, on Thursday. But what is happening in our country? What is happening to the culture of kindness, decency and mutual respect among our fellow citizens and, it seems, I am sorry to say, particularly some men in our country? We now have these allegations—more than allegations; we have case after case in the Metropolitan Police, these new revelations about our much-needed and respected fire service and allegations of bullying in the Palace of Westminster, even at senior Cabinet level. The Deputy Prime Minister is now being investigated for bullying. Will we hear from the Minister for Equalities or from the Prime Minister—the first non-white Prime Minister—who has small daughters for whom he no doubt cares and is concerned? Will we hear some leadership on the culture of dignity and decency in our country?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I cannot speculate about what the Prime Minister might say so I shall speak for myself. I agree with the noble Baroness: I am disturbed by many of these reports that I have to stand here and talk about.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, rather than concentrating on who is to blame, should the Government not be focused on solutions? What have they done to look at parallels between this report and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Casey of Blackstock, into the Metropolitan Police? What are the common lessons and what, therefore, are the urgent steps that need to be taken in both the police service and the fire brigade?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I think I made it abundantly clear that I was blaming no one; I was stating a fact. I also made it very clear that we published a fire reform White Paper in May and that Andy Roe has committed to acting on all 23 recommendations.

[Baroness Warsi (Con)]

My Lords, if the Minister is open to suggestions for solutions, may I ask him to take one away? Many years ago, the Government committed to finding a definition of Islamophobia. There is an agreed definition which has been adopted by all political parties in Parliament, including the Conservative Party in Scotland. The Government, however, have not adopted that definition. There was a report recently of a private meeting at which it was suggested that the Government had dropped their work on the definition of Islamophobia, but a No. 10 spokesman subsequently confirmed that that is not correct. Can my noble friend please investigate whether this work is continuing, and, if so, can he say when we can find an agreed definition and when that is likely to be published?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The simple answer to my noble friend is that I am afraid I do not know but I will endeavour to find out.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)]

My Lords, I start briefly by saying to the Whips that when we have an Urgent Question, we cannot entertain speeches, because several of us would like to contribute—I say that very respectfully. I declare that I am chair of the Equality and Human Rights Commission, and I just have a simple point that I would like the Minister to emphasise. The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, rightly spoke of a spread of incidents across different public sector organisations where things have gone appallingly wrong. Will the noble Lord consider that all the organisations that have been mentioned today are covered by the public sector equality duty, which they are required in law to have due regard to? What is his assessment of why they have disregarded that duty?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am not sure that it is the organisations that have disregarded the duty, but clearly, individuals within them have. Obviously, that is part of a larger discussion, and I will take that suggestion back.

Investigatory Powers Commissioner (Oversight Functions) Regulations 2022

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Monday 28th November 2022 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

That the draft Regulations and Order laid before the House on 18 and 19 October be approved.

Relevant document: 16th Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee. Considered in Grand Committee on 24 November.

Motions agreed.

Technology Rules: The Advent of New Technologies in the Justice System (Justice and Home Affairs Committee Report)

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Monday 28th November 2022 Grand Committee

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in the debate today and particularly the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for securing the debate. I also thank those who contributed to the Justice and Home Affairs Committee’s thoughtful and insightful report, which has paved the way for today’s discussion.

As the noble Baroness has made clear, the Government responded to that report in June, but it is nevertheless welcome that we have found time to discuss these important matters more fully. I hope this is not the last time we cover the topic; I suspect it will not be. I will remark briefly on the broad thrust of the committee’s report and the Government’s position, as well as on points made during this debate, while also—I am afraid—having to join the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, by admitting that I am not much good with my thumbs either.

I am not sure that this line is going to qualify as “riding to the rescue”, but there is significant agreement between the Government and the committee on the challenges posed by advanced technology and how it is rolled out into the justice system. I am sorry if noble Lords feel that the government response was in some way a brush-off, but I am sure all your Lordships would agree that the technology is very complicated. The policing and justice sector and the ethics around balancing competing human rights are also very complicated. The public expect us to have a world-class justice system, and I think all noble Lords acknowledged this. Utilising technology is a cornerstone of this. The police must use technologies to free up officer time to fight crime, by making administration more efficient, and as a tool to hold those responsible for crime to account.

The Government are committed to empowering the police to use the latest technologies because the public support their use. However, there are no easy answers and the risk of acting without fully understanding the implications of these technologies and getting it wrong is very real. We are not presently persuaded by the overall recommendations put forward in the report, but the Government are committed to the spirit of improving consistency, maintaining public trust, ensuring sufficient oversight and empowering the police which sit behind those recommendations.

The subject of transparency was raised by my noble friend Lord Hunt and others. In their evidence, the Government were clear that transparency is not optional. The police themselves see and understand that being transparent is in their interests. We do not agree that we should mandate specific rules on transparency across such a wide range of current and potential future technologies and uses, but that does not mean we take it any less seriously.

Transparency is an important part of data protection laws. Our policing model works only if there is public consent. For the public to consent, as the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, has just pointed out, they must be engaged. It is in the police’s interest to hold conversations and be open about what they are doing and why. Several police forces are working with the Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation to explore how the algorithm transparency standard may work for them. We welcome it as one tool that could promote the sharing of best practice, but transparency can come in many forms. Our position is that mandating a set of rules could restrict what information is ultimately provided to the public and risks turning transparency into a tick-box exercise.

Instead, we will continue to help the police to collaborate with experts and identify how they can be transparent in a way that allows scrutiny, both at a technical level by those with expert knowledge and at an ethical level by the wider public. There is no point being transparent if what is said cannot be understood. We are in agreement that the question of ethics is of fundamental importance, and the ethics of acting or using technology is not something to be considered lightly.

We have heard how important the roles of accountability and oversight are at each stage of the system. I would caution that a statutory ethics panel, as proposed in the report, may decrease democratic oversight because such powers could override local decision-making, local accountability and locally elected officials, but I note the particular reference to the West Midlands Police example. We are not persuaded that the creation of a national statutory ethics committee is the best way to bring expert insight into police practice, but we will continue to work with colleagues in policing to develop and support non-statutory models.

Our democratic system, and ultimately Parliament, is here to provide scrutiny and oversight. The committee’s report is proof of that, as is today’s debate. It is right that our institutions are held to account, especially in relation to the complex and important issues we have discussed today. The committee’s report noted that, below this, there are a range of oversight bodies tasked with providing oversight on various aspects of how the police use technology. We recognise the risk of overlap and confusion, which is why we have proposed in the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill to simplify the arrangements for biometric and surveillance cameras, because, ultimately, it is individuals, not technology, who take the key decisions within the justice system. Technology may be used to generate insights, but the decision to arrest will always remain with the officer, while the courts will decide what material can be given in evidence in determining guilt and any sentence. The Government will continue to support work to equip and educate the individuals working within the justice system so that they understand the technologies they use and how to use them correctly.

My noble friend Lord Hunt and others raised governance and accountability. On accountability, I think the question was who is responsible when things go wrong—who has the day-to-day responsibility for governance? There are existing regulations covering the responsibilities of parties when undertaking a procurement and when working together to provide a service. Depending on the issue, it may be addressed in different ways: illegal activity may be a criminal offence; other unlawful activities, such as a data protection breach, would be an issue for regulators; and poor performance should be mitigated against at the contractual level.

The public expect the police to innovate. They have to be allowed to do so within the law, so decisions on what technologies to use are highly operational ones for the police, independent of government. However, the police need to act within the legal framework set out by Parliament, and bans are in place where they are proportionate to the risk, such as in cases where the technology poses a risk of lethal or less than lethal force. This is not the same level of risk as that associated with the types of technologies raised in the report.

Chief constables ultimately decide when and how to use new technologies. However, they and their PCC are advised, regulated and overseen by a range of technical and regulatory bodies. The police chief scientific adviser, who I will come back to, advises chief constables on important matters such as good education. The ICO can and will take action where there is a lack of compliance with data protection laws. His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services has a duty to consider how forces are meeting the Peelian principles, of which the use of technology is of course a part. HMICFRS undertakes thematic reviews based on its local inspections, and the use of technology is an area which could merit specific analysis.

The noble Baroness, Lady Primarolo, asked about individual complaints challenging the use of technology. Challenging the use of technology in the courts is certainly a resource-intensive process, and it is best reserved as a solution when the circumstances are exceptional. However, individuals can report concerns through other avenues, and we encourage them to do so. Where there are concerns over necessity, proportionality or a policing justification, they could be raised with HMICFRS, which has a mandate to consider how professional standards are applied in its reports and investigations. If the matter relates to how individuals within policing are using technology and their behaviour, this may be something to take forward with the independent police complaints authority. Concerns related to fairness, equality or rights can be raised with the Equality and Human Rights Commission, while the Information Commissioner’s Office is well placed to investigate questions of data protection and privacy.

Noble Lords have acknowledged that the police are operationally independent, which is an essential principle of our system. Nevertheless, we are also alive to the need to ensure that law enforcement is given appropriate support in adapting to technological change and advancements. The role of the police chief scientific adviser, to which I have referred, was created to give policing a scientific capability, establishing a dedicated place for advice on how to innovate, test technologies and ensure that tools do what they claim. Since being appointed, the chief scientific adviser has led reform of how the sector works with the scientific community and is developing a strategy for science and technology. The NPCC’s science and technology strategy will strengthen how the police approach using validated and cutting-edge science in their mission to protect the public. The Government support this strategy and encourage its successful adoption. Those using the technology and impacted by it must be confident that it works as it should.

The Home Office is investing in policing to strengthen the technical evidence available on the most promising future technologies, as well as helping in the commission of research by the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, which tests functional performance. Confidence in the scientific basis and validity of the technology being used is only part of the picture: there must also be confidence in the operational practice.

The wider question of technology in the justice system is clearly an area in which it is important constantly to develop best practice and future guidance. We agree that clear and consistent advice is essential to allow innovation. To this end, the sector is developing its repository of guidance and information. For example, the College of Policing published national guidance on live facial recognition earlier this year. The Government will support the sector to stay on the front foot in addressing specific technologies, as needed.

An approach centred on the “Move fast and break things” mantra may work for innovation in the Silicon Valley, but it would not be appropriate in the context of UK law enforcement. So we have no wish to break the system establishing the rule of law, which of course dates back a very long time. That is not to say that the Government intend to sit back and be solely reactive, but proactively regulating brings its own risks. Mandating standards without consensus in the sector on what it needs may turn certification into something that is easily gamed by bad actors, opening up public authorities to harm.

So, although I happily acknowledge that there will be an opportunity for someone to set global standards, at the moment the Government are of the opinion that certification, or kitemarking, can create false confidence in the validity of a technology. We want to ensure that responsibility for using lawful technologies is not delegated to a certification process that may be gamed. Within our existing regulatory model, the police have a responsibility to use products that are safe and meet the high ethical tests set out in the data protection, human rights and equalities legal framework.

Assessing proportionality and necessity, even if the technology works, depends on the unique factors of each use case. Organisations should not hide behind regulations or certification when it comes to deploying new technologies responsibly. The police must make justifiable decisions during procurement, development and deployment, reviewing them regularly. The current legal framework places responsibility for how to do that firmly on the organisation. However, in addition to the Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation, the Government have established an AI standards hub to help to promote good practice. But the responsibility and accountability that organisations face are theirs alone.

Although we did not generally share the committee’s overall approach of more and more legislation, we will act when the need is clear. We are confident that the regulatory model is proportionate and mature. We have established a statutory code for digital forensics and placed the forensic services regulator on a statutory footing. As practice consolidates around specific standards, we will continue to learn from the relevant experiences and engage with wider learning from sectors such as healthcare.

Someone, but I am afraid I have forgotten who, asked: does it actually work? The answer is yes. I have a large number of examples but in the time available I will provide one: all forces use facial recognition retrospectively. South Wales Police produces around 100 identifications a month, which, as a noble Lord—I forget who—noted, reduces certification time from 14 days to a matter of hours. South Wales Police and the Met have also used live facial recognition technology and successfully disrupted things like mobile phone theft gangs, with no reported thefts at rock concerts, for example, and there were 70 arrests overall during various trials, including for offences as severe as rape, robbery and other forms of violence.

The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, raised the Bridges case. That was a compliance failure by South Wales Police. The court confirmed that there was a legal basis in common law and a legal framework including human rights, data protection and equalities law, in which live facial recognition and, by extension, other technologies could be usefully carried out. Since the judgment, the College of Policing has published an authorised professional practice clarifying the “who” and “where” questions.

On the question of potential bias, noble Lords will be interested to know that the US National Institute of Standards and Technology, which is generally recognised as the world’s premier outfit of this type, found that the algorithm that South Wales Police and the Met use shows almost indetectable bias.

The Committee may have noticed that I am slightly between focus ranges with or without glasses, which is making life rather complicated. I wish I were relying on technology at this point.

I was asked about live facial recognition as an example. I have just mentioned that the College of Policing authorised professional practice guidance on live facial recognition. That requires chief officers to ensure training within the force on the following: how to respond to an alert; the technical capabilities of live facial recognition; the potential effects on those subject to the processing; the core principles of human rights; and the potential impact and level of intrusion on each subject.

The adoption of live facial recognition standards serves as an example of where practice has moved quickly over the last few years following legal scrutiny and greater public discourse. The sector learned from the early pilots to test, improve and evolve policies following feedback. The pilots of this tool were just that—early tests. Now that more evidence is available and the maturity of the capability is advanced, we can analyse how the legal framework is working. This process points to the strength of our legal framework as it has driven the improvement of standards without suffocating innovation.

My noble friend Lady Sanderson and the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, asked about DCMS and cross-departmental working. The answer is that we work very closely. The Home Office is also part of a pilot looking at how the algorithm transparency standard works for the department’s own activities. As for the White Paper, it will come some time next year but I am afraid I do not have a specified date.

I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this fascinating debate. I extend my thanks again to the committee for all the work and insight that went into producing a thorough and engaging report on these very complex issues. We do not fully agree on the way forward in terms of specific steps, but I am confident in suggesting that there is a broad consensus about the need for a long-term approach. Whether that stops noble Lords being disheartened, I do not know.

For the Government’s part, we will continue to look at the entirety of the system and seek to encourage improvements at each stage, with a focus on developing policy to ensure that the benefits of new technology are realised throughout the justice system. As the report laid out so clearly, there is no option to pause or stand still. The issues discussed today are of fundamental importance to the safety and security of our citizens and our values, and I look forward to continuing our engagement on these matters.

Investigatory Powers Commissioner (Oversight Functions) Regulations 2022

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Thursday 24th November 2022 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

That the Grand Committee do consider the Investigatory Powers Commissioner (Oversight Functions) Regulations 2022.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, I beg to move that the Grand Committee consider the draft Investigatory Powers (Covert Human Intelligence Sources and Interception: Codes of Practice) Regulations 2022, laid before the House on 19 October 2022, and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner (Oversight Functions) Regulations 2022, laid on 18 October 2022.

Protecting our national security and keeping the public safe remains a top priority for the Government, as does ensuring that public trust and confidence in the exercise of investigatory powers are maintained. These two sets of regulations are concerned with the exercise of investigatory powers, and in particular with the important safeguards and oversight. The investigatory powers with which they are concerned are set out in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, which I will henceforth refer to as RIPA.

We are concerned with three key measures today. First, I will turn to amendments to the Covert Human Intelligence Sources Code of Practice. Throughout this debate I will refer to covert human intelligence sources as CHIS, and the code of practice itself as the CHIS code.

The CHIS code sets out the processes and safeguards governing the use of CHIS by public authorities and provides detailed guidance on how CHIS powers should be exercised and duties performed, including examples of best practice. The draft regulations before the Committee today will bring into force changes to the CHIS code. These changes have been made following amendments made to RIPA by the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act 2021, which I will refer to as the CHIS Act throughout today’s debate.

The amendments made to Part II of RIPA by the CHIS Act ensure that there is a clear and consistent statutory basis to authorise CHIS to engage in conduct that could otherwise be criminal, where it is necessary and proportionate to do so, having regard to the Human Rights Act and the UK’s obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights.

The draft revised CHIS code enhances the protection for children and vulnerable adults where they are to be authorised as CHIS in exceptional circumstances. There has been substantial consultation with charities and interest groups, and we have given due consideration to the valuable feedback they have provided on the changes we have made to the CHIS code.

The investigatory powers regulations will also make necessary changes to the Interception of Communications Code of Practice, which I will now refer to throughout the debate as the interception code. The draft revised interception code provides further guidance on the use of interception by public authorities that exercise such powers, also known as intercepting authorities.

The amendments to the draft revised interception code will reflect the Government’s long-standing position on serving interception warrants on cloud service providers and the enterprise services they provide to customers. These changes will provide much-needed clarity to relevant UK and US companies impacted by enterprise service issues. By enterprises, we mean companies, academic institutions, not-for-profit organisations, government agencies and similar entities that pay cloud service providers to store and/or process their organisations’ electronic communications and other records. When a cloud service provider is providing such services to an enterprise, the enterprise is responsible for providing accounts to its users and determining the reasons for which data is retained and processed.

A public consultation on the proposed changes was carried out between July and October. After further cross-governmental engagement on the draft revised interception code, three additional changes to the proposed revisions were made to provide further examples of the circumstances under which a warrant may be served on a cloud service provider instead of an enterprise customer, and to outline the obligations imposed by the Investigatory Powers Act regarding unauthorised disclosure to help protect national security.

Finally, I turn to the changes to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s oversight functions, as proposed in the Investigatory Powers Commissioner regulations. I will refer to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner as the IPC throughout.

These regulations place two areas on a statutory footing: first, the IPC’s oversight of the GCHQ equities process; and, secondly, compliance by members and civilian staff of SO15 at the Metropolitan Police Service and officers of the National Crime Agency with the guidance referred to as the Principles Relating to the Detention and Interviewing of Detainees Overseas. These areas have previously been overseen by the IPC and his office on a non-statutory basis.

The IPC has made it clear, and the Government agree, that he considers formalising his oversight responsibilities as being in the best interests of transparency and robust oversight. As a statutory authority, the parameters of the IPC’s remit are set by Parliament. These changes will provide greater public accountability and enable the effective discharge of the IPC’s responsibilities.

These regulations are vital for keeping the public safe by providing clarity and transparency around the use and oversight of powers. I hope the Committee will be able to support these measures and their objectives. I commend the draft regulations to the Committee. I beg to move.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I apologise for coming in when the Minister was already on his feet. I declare an interest as a council member of Justice, the all-party law reform group that took a significant interest in the CHIS Bill when it was going through the House. It was a very strange time: it was during lockdown when we had Zoom Parliament and so on, as the Minister will recall.

All noble Lords will appreciate that the legislation was—and remains—controversial. Whatever the arguments for and against its necessity, it is controversial to grant advance immunity from prosecution not only to police officers or direct officials and agents of the state but to those whom they run in the community, including in criminal fraternities. We have had the arguments in relation to the legislation itself. None the less, we all need to recognise the dangers that exist with that kind of advance immunity from criminal prosecution, including for quite serious crimes.

During the passage of the legislation the Government said that the Human Rights Act would be a safeguard, and the Minister has repeated that. But we are constantly told that the Human Rights Act is in jeopardy and, with the return of Mr Raab to the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister and as Justice Secretary, that remains in the balance. That needs to be on our minds when we consider these powers and the codes of practice made thereunder.

I will make one further point, about the consultation around the CHIS codes of practice. Justice informs me and other noble Lords that the consultation took place between 13 December 2021 and 6 February 2022—an eight-week period that included Christmas and serious restrictions because of the rise of the omicron variant. That was of concern not only to Justice but to other charities and NGOs that had concerns about the legislation and about victims’ rights in particular. One of their substantive concerns is that there is not enough in the current codes of practice to encourage victims to seek compensation in the event that they are harmed as a result of advance criminal immunity being given to CHIS.

Christmas is a problem for people who work in the sector in any event, because staff are on holiday and so on, but lockdown made it harder still. What Justice says about that is if the Home Office had compensated for the short festive period by going out proactively to consult potential interested parties, that consultation deficit could have been met. But that, I am told, did not happen. As a result, both Justice and the Centre for Women’s Justice, which of course had been very involved in supporting the female victims of the spy cops scandal, made their views known to the Home Office. That has not been a satisfactory engagement.

I know there is a limit to what can be done about this at this point but I intervene today to put this to the Minister. He perhaps was not the Minister responsible at the time of the consultation but might, none the less, keep this under review and possibly open up a line of ongoing communication with Justice and the Centre for Women’s Justice. Although these regulations are of course going to pass, these codes of practice need to be kept under review, as does the operation of this legislation with the codes of practice. I know from my dealings with him that the Minister is a reasonable person. After the regulations pass, I hope that he will perhaps meet these people to keep that conversation going and ensure that the operation of these provisions and vital codes of practice is monitored, and that the monitoring from the Home Office actively encourages involvement from those who work on victims’ rights and in the sector.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all three noble Lords for their considered responses on these regulations. As I set out earlier, the changes we are seeking to make through the regulations will ensure that the investigatory powers regime functions effectively, with appropriate oversight and safeguards, to protect our national security and keep the country safe; I welcome the reassurance from the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, on that from his side. I will do my best to answer all the questions that have been asked. Obviously, if I miss anything, I will carefully go through Hansard and commit to write to noble Lords.

The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, asked why the public consultation was somewhat truncated, over Christmas and what have you. When the CHIS Bill was introduced to Parliament in September 2020, the Government also published a draft revised code of practice setting out the changes that it was anticipated would be appropriate, were the Bill to be enacted as introduced. The noble Baroness recalled the lively debates in Parliament during the Bill’s passage and the Government’s collaborative approach to engagement with both parliamentarians and wider stakeholders, during which a broad range of expertise was brought to bear and views were aired in respect of the policy underlying the Bill. The public consultation on the revised CHIS code, which commenced on 13 December 2021 and concluded on 6 February 2022, as noted, concerned not the policy underlying the CHIS Act but the proposed changes to the current code. Many of these changes were set out in the draft revised code, published alongside the Bill, in September 2020. The consultation was originally scheduled to last six weeks but, as much of that period was over the Christmas holidays, we extended the consultation by a further two weeks to accommodate that.

The noble Baroness also asked about compensation for victims of criminal conduct authorisations. Section 27A of RIPA makes it clear that those who have been victims of criminal conduct authorised under a criminal conduct authorisation are entitled to compensation, notwithstanding that the criminal conduct may have been authorised by a CCA. Any person or organisation is able to make a complaint to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal against a public authority if they suspect a public authority of using covert techniques against them, which will be independently considered by the IPT. Additionally, a person is able to make a claim to the IPT under the Human Rights Act 1998 for any suspected breaches of human rights that they believe have been committed against them in connection with conduct where Part II of RIPA is concerned.

I want to go into a little detail on the comments around women’s groups. I reiterate that it is never acceptable for an undercover operative to form an intimate sexual relationship with those whom they are employed to infiltrate and target or may encounter during their deployment. That conduct will never be authorised, nor must it be used as a tactic of a deployment. The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, will know that, in a specific case, the review is ongoing.

We are aware of historical instances in which the authorisation of CHIS has disproportionately disadvantaged women, for example in the case of Wilson v Metropolitan Police. That related to the actions of undercover police officers deployed to gather intelligence on protest groups and people associated with them between 2003 and 2009. The Investigatory Powers Tribunal found that the sexual relationships of an undercover officer with a female member of those protest groups demonstrated that there had been failures in the supervision and management of undercover officers.

Since 2013, steps have been taken by His Majesty’s Government to strengthen safeguards and increase oversight to prevent such activity by law enforcement. Separately, the Undercover Policing Inquiry was established in 2015 to inquire into and report on undercover police operations in England and Wales since 1968. That inquiry is ongoing; the Home Office will consider the report of its findings in due course. I am sorry to answer that point at length, but I think it is worth stressing.

On the question from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, about the public consultation and the Government’s response to it, Home Office officials carefully considered all the responses received on the revised code as part of the public consultation. The process took more time than expected, but we wanted to ensure that we gave full consideration to the concerns raised. Having a robust code of practice is an important part of maintaining public trust and confidence in the use of the powers to which the code relates.

On operating without a CHIS code, safeguards in the Act and under it were already enforced; the code provides guidance. A draft revised code has been in place since the Bill was before the House.

All noble Lords referred to safeguards. It is of course important that authorisation of CHIS activity is subject to robust and independent safeguards. The CHIS code provides guidance and clarity on the safeguards related to the use of CHIS that are set out in the CHIS Act. For example, all authorisations are granted by an experienced and highly trained authorising officer, who, as noble Lords will recall, is of high rank and will ensure that the authorisation has strict parameters and is clearly communicated to the CHIS. In addition, as with other sensitive investigatory powers, the use of CHIS is overseen by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner under the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, thereby providing robust and independent oversight of the power.

When public authorities authorise criminal conduct authorisations, the judicial commissioners within the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s office, which I will henceforth refer to as IPCO, must be notified of a criminal conduct authorisation within seven days of an authorisation being granted or cancelled. Where an authorisation is granted, such notifications must set out the grounds to which the authorisation relates and specify the conduct that is authorised.

The IPCO also conducts inspections of public authorities that have the power to authorise CHIS and publishes an annual report on the findings from these inspections. Previous annual reports on the management of CHIS have been positive. In 2018 the IPCO annual report found that, in all instances, MI5’s authorisations of CHIS participation in criminal conduct were

“proportionate to the anticipated operational benefits”

and met “a high necessity threshold”.

On the safeguarding of children, I stress that the revised code makes clear that children are able to be authorised as CHIS only in exceptional circumstances and subject to the enhanced safeguards, including the risk assessment process set out in Article 5 of the juveniles order. An enhanced level of safeguards also applies to the rare occasions when there is a need to authorise a vulnerable adult to engage in CHIS activity, including criminal conduct. As with authorising children as sources, vulnerable adults should be authorised to act as a CHIS only in exceptional circumstances.

These are substantive amendments to the code of practice that focus on the well-being and safety of the child or vulnerable adult. It is right that there are additional safeguards for these authorisations. These amendments provide this further protection while ensuring that they do not create any unintended consequences that risk the safety of the individual. We have consulted extensively with charities and rights organisations in preparing the draft code to ensure that these safeguards are at the heart of the guidance.

On the limits on CHIS criminal conduct, a CHIS will never be given authority to engage in criminal conduct of any and all kinds. All authorisations must be necessary and proportionate to the criminality they are seeking to prevent, and the authorising officer must ensure that the level of criminality authorised is at the lowest level of intrusion possible to achieve the aims of the operation.

Any authorisation for a CHIS to engage in criminal conduct must comply with the European Convention on Human Rights—the noble Baroness will forgive me for not speculating as to the current state of affairs with that. This includes the right to life, and prohibition of torture or subjecting someone to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, referred to the fact that the CHIS Act does not list specific crimes that may be authorised or prohibited. The reason is sound: to do so would place in the hands of criminals, including terrorists and hostile state actors, a means of creating a checklist for suspected CHIS to be tested against. That would threaten the future of CHIS capability and result in an increased threat to the public.

As I have already said, a CHIS may be granted only where necessary, proportionate and compliant with the Human Rights Act. The use of agents provocateurs or entrapment undermines a person’s right to a fair trial. That is reflected in the Undercover Policing Authorised Professional Practice, which states in clear terms that an undercover officer

“must not act as an agent provocateur.”

Although agent provocateur is not a defence at law, it is managed through common-law principles, and the updated director’s guidance on charging provides safeguards to ensure that the Crown discharges its disclosure obligations to ensure that an agent provocateur issue does not cause a miscarriage of justice. Furthermore, the criminal courts have developed safeguards to ensure fairness in criminal proceedings, including where entrapment is alleged to have occurred.

I am sorry, I am slightly out of sync. The noble Lords, Lord Ponsonby and Lord Paddick, asked whether the juveniles order will be amended to reflect paragraph 4.4 of the code. We have already amended the juveniles order. We do not intend to amend it again at present.

Finally on this, a failure to comply or to have regard to the code would be a relevant error per Section 231(9)(a) of the Investigatory Powers Act. It is therefore an oversight issue, so it would be a matter for IPCO.

I move on to the interception code, which the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked about. We wanted to make these changes as close as possible to the entry into force of the UK-US data access agreement, given that the number of requests to which this existing policy will apply will be significantly higher now that the agreement has entered into force. Additionally, as per Section 260 of the IPA, the Home Secretary will shortly publish a report on the operation of the IPA, in line with her statutory obligations. It would be wrong to pre-empt the outcomes of that report. We will continue to keep all the IPA codes of practice under review.

I must stress that this instrument does not expand the IPC’s remit but simply formalises existing functions. Neither will it provide intelligence agencies or law enforcement authorities with new powers. The regulations to amend IPCO’s functions will ensure that the IPC’s functions are underpinned by statute, increasing public accountability, transparency and robust oversight. These are important powers—again, I join the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, in singling out the relevant personnel for our thanks and praise—and will allow our agencies to keep the public safe and to protect national security.

I think I have answered all the questions. I am very grateful for the contributions that have been made, but as I set out in my introduction, these changes we seek to make will ensure the greater efficiency of the IPA and that the Act continues to retain world-leading safeguards and oversight.

Motion agreed.

Investigatory Powers (Covert Human Intelligence Sources and Interception: Codes of Practice) Regulations

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Thursday 24th November 2022 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

That the Grand Committee do consider the Investigatory Powers (Covert Human Intelligence Sources and Interception: Codes of Practice) Regulations.

Relevant documents: 16th Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee

Motion agreed.

Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) (Threshold Amount) Order 2022

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Thursday 24th November 2022 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

That the Grand Committee do consider the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) (Threshold Amount) Order 2022.

Relevant documents: 16th Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, this draft statutory instrument raises the existing threshold in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 below which certain businesses in the anti-money laundering regulated sector do not need to submit defence against money laundering suspicious activity reports, known as DAMLs. The amount is being raised from £250 to £1,000. This aims to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the DAML regime for law enforcement, businesses and customers.

A DAML is submitted to the National Crime Agency by a person proposing to deal with suspected criminal property that may make them liable for one of the principal money laundering offences under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. By submitting a DAML, a person can avoid criminal liability by obtaining consent or deemed consent for the act they propose to carry out; for example, a customer’s transaction to pay their rent. The DAML provides intelligence to the National Crime Agency and effectively freezes a transaction until it gives a consent decision or seven working days pass, after which businesses can assume that they have the relevant consent.

Raising the threshold to £1,000 is required now because the volume of DAMLs is rising and the vast majority do not provide law enforcement with asset seizure opportunities. Instead, they place regulatory burdens on businesses to submit and burdens on law enforcement to review, and cause a delay to customers, who must often wait seven days for their transaction to process.

To put the volumes in perspective, between 2018-19 and 2019-20 they increased by 80%, from 34,543 to 62,341. They then increased by, by my calculations, a further 41% to approximately 105,000 in 2020-21. In 2019-20, only 2% of all DAMLs, equivalent to 1,365, were refused consent by the National Crime Agency. Of those, only 1,062 progressed to law enforcement pursuing asset denial. The threshold applies to transactions in the operation of an account which do not relate to the opening or closing of an account. It applies only to deposit-taking bodies—in essence, banks and building societies—and to electronic money and payment institutions. This uplift in the threshold will result in fewer delayed transactions for businesses and customers where a DAML is no longer needed. It will allow businesses to prioritise their resources towards intelligence-led investigations and will enable law enforcement to focus on higher-priority reports that provide opportunities for asset seizure and disruption of criminal activity.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, we support this order as well. As the noble Lord, Lord Paddick said, it seems a reasonable increase and some organisations would have gone to £3,000. However, there were other respondents to the consultation who were against the increase to £1,000; they wanted to keep it at the lower limit. Can the Minister say what their concerns were? Although I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that £1,000 seems reasonable, other people thought it should have stayed at its original level: does the Minister know why they thought that? He indicates that he does not know why—okay.

I have some of the same figures that the Minister quoted. The Explanatory Memorandum states that the volume of DAMLs is rising steeply and gave those figures. The question is: what percentage of those 105,000 referrals were over the new £1,000 threshold—what difference will increasing the threshold to £1,000 make?

On the further figures that the Minister quoted, he said that only 2% of all DAMLs were refused consent in 2019-20, of which only 1,062 progressed towards asset denial. The question is, of that 2%, how many of those DAMLs were for amounts over £1,000 and so would still be caught? Both those questions are about how much the amount of work will be reduced by increasing this limit, although we of course approve of the objective.

One of the main benefits suggested by the Government, with which we agree, is that this measure should free up law enforcement to pursue other activities. We welcome that in itself. We heard from the current Home Secretary’s predecessor that the National Crime Agency has been asked to make staffing cuts of up to 20%. Can the Minister say anything about whether that previous expectation is still in place or has now been ruled out?

The Explanatory Memorandum states:

“A full Impact Assessment has been published alongside the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill, which considers the impact of the changes in this instrument.”


One of our key concerns about that Bill is its failure to tackle fraud and economic crime, with falling rates of enforcement and prosecution. I understand that this change is intended to reduce the number of ineffective DAMLs, but what action is being taken alongside that to try to increase the prosecution rate? It is a huge problem and it is very time-intensive to secure successful prosecutions—I understand that—so although we support this SI I would be grateful if the Minister could set out in a slightly broader context how he will try to increase the possibility of getting successful convictions.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank both noble Lords for their support. In answer to the detailed statistical questions from the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, the National Crime Agency has yet to publish its report into 2020-21 or 2021-22. The details will be in there; I will be happy to share that report as soon as it is published, if that is acceptable.

The noble Lord also asked me about staffing at the National Crime Agency. I cannot answer his specific question and do not wish to stray there, but I can say that we are increasing capacity in law enforcement to analyse and act on suspicious activity report intelligence. That includes 75 additional officers in the UKFIU, which will almost double capacity. Some 45 of those officers are already in post, and the milestone for recruiting the remaining 30 is the end of this financial year, 2022-23. I will not go beyond that at the moment but we all share the noble Lord’s concerns, particularly about financial crime, which, as we know, is a pressing problem.

However, we should also salute the news stories I heard this morning about the Metropolitan Police apparently busting a fairly sizeable scamming organisation. Well done them; let us hope that that results in a large number of successful prosecutions.

I will stop there. Once again, I thank both noble Lords for their support. We believe that this intelligence is a critical tool in our ability to identify, disrupt and recover the hundreds of millions of pounds that underpin the most serious organised crime in the UK. That intelligence will be preserved through this adjustment and the requirement to submit intelligence-only SARs even when businesses are using the threshold exemption. Increasing the threshold is a measure supported by industry and law enforcement. I am sorry, I do not know who did not support the rise; I will try to find out.

Setting the threshold at a more appropriate level to reflect the current landscape is an important step towards improving the performance of the anti-money laundering system to better disrupt money laundering, terrorist financing and high-harm offences.

Motion agreed.

Counterterrorism: Martyn’s Law

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Wednesday 23rd November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

I refer to my interest in the register and beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, the Government are grateful to Figen Murray for her tireless campaigning for Martyn’s law. The protected duty will ensure that public places put safety and security first. We are working hard to bring forward this important piece of legislation as soon as possible.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, it is five years since the Manchester Arena bombing and Figen Murray has campaigned tirelessly following the death of her son. Had there been a Protect duty in place at that time, 22 people might not have died. The Home Office has moved with extraordinary sloth since the principle was accepted. It has consulted at length and responded to the consultation. We were promised this in the Queen’s Speech. When is this going to happen, or do we have to wait for another atrocity?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Bringing forward this legislation was a 2019 manifesto commitment. As the noble Lord noted, there was supposed to be a consultation in early 2020, but that was delayed due to Covid. It was eventually undertaken between 26 February and 2 July 2021. It was a very comprehensive consultation process with more than 2,500 responses, and the duty has received strong support from businesses and others. As I say, the Government are committed to bringing forward this important legislation, as per the Queen’s Speech, as soon as parliamentary time allows.

[Lord Kamall (Con)]

My Lords, does my noble friend the Minister agree that one of the best ways to tackle terrorism is to prevent people becoming terrorists in the first place? What is his department is doing to work with the many local civil society organisations that are working with young people in many communities across the country, to prevent them being recruited by terrorists?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank my noble friend for his question. The Contest strategy is the Government’s counterterrorism strategy and has the four Ps at its core, one of which is Prevent. Many sections of the community are engaged with that and the Government expect to publish an updated and enhanced version of Contest early next year.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, notwithstanding the horrific slaughter of young people in the Manchester Arena, a clear majority of the 100 or so deaths from terrorism in Great Britain this century have been on public transport or on the streets of London. Knowing the risks, we still prize the ability to run for a train or hop on a bus without submitting to checks or scrutiny of any kind. Does the Minister agree that we need to reflect long and hard before requiring precautions at public venues that are not required on public transport? I think particularly of the hundreds of thousands of small venues, such as cafes or parish churches, where there may be no money to spare and no specific threat.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord makes a very sound point. He is, in effect, asking me about the scope of the proposed legislation and that work is ongoing. It would not be appropriate for me to comment at this point.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, and to Martyn’s family for their work on these issues. What else can the Government do to encourage small venues to improve security, while we await this long-overdue legislation? What about a public information campaign or a security rating scheme for venues? Lives may be unnecessarily at risk because of government inaction.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord makes an interesting point. ProtectUK was launched in March 2022 as a digital tool. Its work includes offering guidance, advice and engagement with counterterrorism experts via an online platform. As it develops, it will establish itself as a central digital location for counterterrorism support. There are a number of other aspects to that, which I could go on about at some length, but considerable work is being done in that space.

[Lord Blunkett (Lab)]

My Lords, seven former Home Secretaries have written to the Prime Minister today, asking for this matter to be expedited, given that it is almost 18 months since the end of the consultation. I am being only slightly facetious when I ask the noble Lord if he will make sure that the Prime Minister gets the letter because, when Tony Blair’s dad wrote a letter to Downing Street and signed it “love, Pop”, he got a letter back saying “Dear Mr Pop”. Perhaps we could make sure that this letter reaches Rishi Sunak.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I will make sure the Prime Minister is aware of the letter.

[Baroness Newlove (Con)]

My Lords, as the former Victims’ Commissioner, I have met Figen and other campaigners. For the Government not to have any legislation in place after five years is inhumane to the families who are grieving and fighting to make other venues safe. After all, at the end of the day, the Manchester inquiry has a huge profile and it is up to the Government to put legislation in place for the sake of the lost family members and for those fighting to protect others—as Figen has and will continue to, in a dignified manner.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I agree with my noble friend that the campaign has been conducted in a very dignified manner. Of course, I express my sympathies with all the victims and their families. As I say—I cannot improve on this answer—the legislation will come forward as soon as parliamentary time allows.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, we are not going to let the Minister off the hook with that. My noble friend Lord Harris has been campaigning with Martyn’s family on this issue for years. It has been five years since the Manchester Arena bombing. It is not good enough for the Minister to say that this will be done as soon as possible, “We are trying to do it expeditiously”, et cetera. When will we see this legislation put into practice to honour the memory of those who died at Manchester and elsewhere?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am sorry to disappoint the noble Lord again, but I will have to stay on the hook. The fact is that it will be as soon as parliamentary time allows. I cannot improve on that answer.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

My Lords, in 2009, I signed off a mass of work to do with security in crowded places. My right honourable friend was in a nearby office at the time and we increased the number of NaCTSOs, as well. Can the Minister confirm that that work—a great deal of work—on exactly this stuff is being looked at and used in the context of this legislation? If not, as with so many things, we will be going round and round in circles.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

As I say, the Government are still working on this and all aspects of it will be included in the legislation and in the other things I have referenced, such as the Contest and Protect strategies.

[Lord Flight (Con)]

My Lords, do the Government consider counterterrorist measures the most suitable measures to deal with the security of public venues?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

As outlined in the Queen’s Speech, yes.

[Lord Watts (Lab)]

My Lords, can the Minister explain why the legislation programme seems much slower with this Government than it was with the previous ones?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

No, I do not think I can.

[Baroness Foster of Oxton (Con)]

My Lords, while we wait for this proposed legislation to pass through this House and the other place, can we be assured that one of the main failures that was a contributory factor to the Manchester bombing was the lack of joined-up thinking and joined-up work by the emergency services? Can we at least have the assurance that that is in hand and that all venues, small or large, now have proper contingency planning while we await the legislation?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My noble friend makes a good point. I am, of course, happy to try to give that assurance from the Dispatch Box but, as we know, all police forces and emergency services remain operationally independent to some extent. The fact is that they have access to the various services I have outlined, through Contest.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, I am sorry to come back to the Minister, but the question just asked by his noble friend highlights that there is a lot of guidance there. The whole point of this proposed legislation was that it would place a duty to act proportionately on those responsible for public venues. I cannot understand why there is this continued delay. Is it simply that there is no parliamentary time, given that both Houses seem to have a very light load at the moment?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

From my personal point of view, I am not sure that it is a particularly light load. As the noble Lord says, the duty will enhance public security by introducing new requirements for certain public places to ensure preparedness. It is necessary: there is no disagreement about that. It will come forward as soon as parliamentary time allows.

Solihull Murders

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Wednesday 23rd November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

My Lords, this terrible tragedy highlights the fact that although domestic abuse crimes recorded by the police have been increasing annually by between 5% and 6%, prosecutions have slumped for the fifth year in a row. What are the Government going to do about the endemic misogynistic culture among the police and prosecutors which means that they do not tackle these dangerous crimes against women, which can, as here, with unanswered and unresponded to calls, prove fatal?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

I begin by saying that my thoughts are with the loved ones of Khaola Saleem and Raneem Oudeh. For a mother and daughter to lose their lives in this way is truly heartbreaking. We should bear in mind the perpetrator, who bears the ultimate responsibility for this sickening act.

The noble Baroness asked about misogyny in the police. The Government remain determined to tackle misogyny in the police. That is why the independent policing inspectorate was tasked with reviewing vetting and countercorruption arrangements in policing across England and Wales, looking in particular at what forces are doing to identify and deal with misogynistic behaviour. We welcome the report’s conclusion that the culture is improving. The findings about adverse attitudes towards women are unacceptable and I expect all forces to take action in response as a matter of urgency.

[Baroness Sugg (Con)]

My Lords, tragically, these deaths were preventable. Does my noble friend the Minister believe that the police are appropriately trained in cultural sensitivities in relation to domestic violence?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank my noble friend for that question. Training includes those issues. I will quote the Minister in the other place yesterday, because she summed it up perfectly. She said:

“It is about time that people who work in this field do not look towards colour as being an excuse for non-activity. This Government take the matter very seriously. It does not matter what colour, creed or sex a person is; if they need the police’s help, they need the police’s help. I expect those themes to be included in proper police training.”—[Official Report, Commons, 22/11/22; col. 158.]


So do I.

[Baroness Burt of Solihull (LD)]

My Lords, in her remarks yesterday, the Minister also said:

“We need thorough risk assessments, and they need to be followed with proper training.”—[Official Report, Commons, 22/11/22; col. 156.]


I am sure all noble Lords would agree. Can this Minister tell the House why some police forces have failed to carry out assessments and training of their officers? Can he give me any good reason why this training should not now become compulsory?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for that question. We agree: it is incredibly important that the training reflects the gravity of these sorts of situations. We are taking action to improve this. I am sure she will be aware that we are supporting and funding the National Police Chiefs’ Council’s Deputy Chief Constable Maggie Blyth in her role as full-time national policing lead on this sort of subject. We are committed to funding the continuing rollout of the College of Policing’s Domestic Abuse Matters programme for front-line responders, and to adding VAWG to the strategic policing requirement.

On the training that has been developed by Maggie Blyth, which I think was released last December, so far only two-thirds of police forces have adopted it. That is not good enough. The Minister in the other place said the same and I am happy to repeat it.

[Baroness Crawley (Lab)]

My Lords, will the Minister say why it took until these last 12 months for the Government to recognise that violence against women and girls should be included in the definition of “serious violence”?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am not sure that is strictly true. I do not wish to comment on the precise timings, but I repeat the statement I just made. The Government are taking violence against women and girls incredibly seriously and will continue to do so.

[Lord Bellingham (Con)]

My Lords, the five officers in question have been served with management action by the Independent Office for Police Conduct over the missed opportunities. Can the Minister explain exactly what this means? Furthermore, the Home Secretary has instructed police authorities to make sure that they do all they can to investigate every single burglary. Can the same principles not be applied to domestic violence as well?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My noble friend is completely right. In fact, nine officers from West Midlands Police were served with misconduct notices, and the IOPC found a case to answer for five of them at level. They received management action; I am afraid I am unable to define what “management action” actually means. I apologise for that. I will try to find out more on the subject and, if I can, I will write to my noble friend.

[Baroness Newlove (Con)]

My Lords, this case is horrendous. It makes me feel very sad that people are still dying unnecessarily under the laws we put in place in this Chamber. I inform my noble friend that, while I appreciate his answers to these questions, on the ground it simply is not happening. I am receiving lots of emails from women who have been asked by police officers to do their own investigations into domestic abuse, acid attacks and stalking; I guide them to go back to the police and ask the questions. The inspectorate says it will attend every burglary; I agree with my noble friend that it should do so for every crime. No victim should be asked to investigate the horrific crimes that they are going through.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I completely agree with my noble friend. It may help if I go through the list of recommendations made by the IOPC to West Midlands Police in this case. The learning recommendations concerned domestic abuse risk assessments being completed without intelligence checks and misunderstanding by officers around when such risk assessments would be reviewed by their public protection unit. Other recommendations were that the force should consider PPU oversight of all domestic abuse cases with repeat victims, and further training around the use of domestic violence protection orders—DVPOs—and domestic violence protection notices.

My noble friend is quite right that no woman should be asked to undertake her own investigation; that is absolutely absurd. It is for the police to do it. The police have recognised it, the IOPC has published recommendations and West Midlands Police in particular is acting on it. I hope all other forces do too.

[Lord Watts (Lab)]

My Lords, the Minister says that every force should carry out this training, yet we know that a lot are not. Between the Home Office, the inspectorate and the police forces, where is the accountability in the system to make sure that this crucial training takes place?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

As the noble Lord is well aware—I have said it many times from the Dispatch Box—police forces in this country remain operationally independent. That is right, but of course the PCC is also the interface here between the public and the police. The statement on this case by the West Midlands PCC, Simon Foster, was very robust and made some solid points. With the noble Lord’s permission, I will quote a bit of it:

“My Police and Crime Plan makes it clear that West Midlands Police must impose bail conditions on perpetrators rather than releasing under investigation, make full use of civil protection orders and restraining orders and make arrests for breach of non-molestation orders.”


He goes on at some length and I will not repeat it all, but I think that is the appropriate response. I commend him on his actions and urge other PCCs to follow suit.

[Baroness Hussein-Ece (LD)]

My Lords, police failed repeatedly to come to the rescue of Raneem Oudeh and her mother, despite 10 complaints and six 999 calls, including on the night of their death. We have heard the police pledge to attend every single home burglary, but I just wonder what the priorities are here. Surely, saving the lives of women in these situations should be of equal importance as attending burglaries, if not more important. Why are women just not listened to by the police?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I think it is of rather more importance than investigating burglaries; we should all think that. I do not necessarily agree that it is not a priority for the police forces. The police forces are certainly saying the right things but, as I have already said from this Dispatch Box, I, the Minister in the other place, the Home Secretary and the Government think they have more to do.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, is not the problem here—the difference between burglary and domestic violence—the attitude of police officers towards women? What are the Government doing about that?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I went through some detail on that, as regards the strategy on tackling misogyny in the police. I agree that there are some clear failings on this, certainly in regard to this case. The way the police failed to investigate some very clear signals was clearly unacceptable, but the Government are determined to tackle the misogynistic culture that has been identified.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, police attendance on a crime-by-crime basis is a difficult thing to sustain. The police should attend all reports of crime if the victim wants them to or if it is a very serious event, which is something I have always pursued, but should the Government not also work with the College of Policing to share the best evidence about what highlights those most at risk? For example, Professor Larry Sherman, recently at Cambridge, highlighted a high correlation between suspects who had threatened suicide and people who eventually became murderers of victims they had previously threatened. We had previously been told that threatening the victim prior to their murder was also an indicator. Both matter, but the police’s response needs to be based on good evidence. I am not convinced that the college has yet got that connection between the evidence base and passing that on to the police to share, so that their training improves.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord for that, and commend him for investigating all the crimes when he was still actively policing. I will take back his suggestions on the College of Policing because they make sense. Obviously one of the college’s primary duties is to ensure that best practice is shared and disseminated.

Public Order Bill

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 22nd November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

No pressure.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, for his closing words; as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said, “No pressure”. I thank all noble Lords for their impassioned contributions to what has obviously been a very substantive debate.

Clause 9 seeks to establish buffer zones outside abortion clinics in England and Wales to ensure that persons accessing or providing abortion services are free from harassment or intimidation. As the Committee will be aware, this clause was inserted into the Bill on the basis of a free vote in the other place. I will not get involved in second-guessing the motivations of those who voted, but the result was 297 votes in favour to 110 votes against. As I have said before, and I am very happy to say again, the Government respect the will of the House of Commons.

It is obviously clear—today’s debate makes it even clearer—that there are very strong views on both sides of the argument. Many noble Lords want the clause to become law, and many want to alter or to delay it. Amendments 80 to 97—tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Hoey, Lady Fox, Lady Watkins, Lady Barker and Lady Hamwee, my noble friend Lady Sugg, the noble Lords, Lord Ponsonby and Lord Beith, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans—all seek to make an array of changes to Clause 9, be that by raising the threshold for the new offence or by seeking to clarify the clause in some way.

Amendments 98 and 99 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Farmer, seek to introduce buffer zones pending the outcome of

“a consultation … to determine if there has been significant change in”

protests “outside abortion clinics since” the Government’s last review. Amendments 87 to 93 look to ensure that only activities relating to abortion services within a buffer zone constitute an offence, while Amendments 88, 96 and 97 seek to ensure that activities within private dwellings and places of worship are exempt. Amendments 80 to 82 seek to provide a person within a buffer zone with the opportunity to defend their actions and

“to strengthen the burden of proof required to establish an offence.”

As I said before, I thank all noble Lords for their interest and ideas to amend the existing clause in its current form, particularly their well-intentioned attempts to tighten what was described in the other place by the Minister as a “blunt instrument”. It remains the Government’s view, based on legal advice, that this amendment does not meet our obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights and would require a Section 19(1)(b) statement to be provided. That said, after having been brief, I am now even more keen to meet noble Lords in the coming days, and I encourage them to meet me so that we may discuss the next steps for the clause. For now, I invite noble Lords not to press their amendments.

[Baroness Sugg (Con)]

Does my noble friend the Minister agree that the clause as inserted by the other place calls for universal zones around all clinics in England and Wales?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I say again to my noble friend—I have said it before, and I am happy to say it again—that the Government respect the will of the House of Commons.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I thank all Members of the Committee for a wide range of speeches, ensuring that we have covered a lot of ground on this important issue. Contributions have been thoughtful, sometimes tetchy but largely civil; it is important to have these arguments out. I listened to what everybody said, and one thing I noted was that all speakers on all sides have condemned the harassment and intimidation of any woman going into a clinic or a hospital for an abortion. It is important that we note that we have that in common, because sometimes it can be presented as though people who are against Clause 9 are indifferent to the intimidation or harassment of women. Everybody has said that it is wrong; this is a question of how you deal with it.

The dispute is also about exactly what happens outside clinics. We have heard the clash of narratives in the contributions that I referred to, which makes the call for a new review from the noble Lord, Lord Farmer, all the more appealing. Indeed, the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, herself suggested—backed up by the reply to me from the noble Baroness, Lady Barker—that the situation has got a lot worse since 2018, and particularly very recently. That is disputed by people so, for the clause to have legitimacy, maybe we need a public discussion to get the evidence—that would be important.

--- Later in debate ---

I suggest to noble Lords and to those who read these remarks that suspicionless stop and search for protest-related offences is a step too far in a democracy. It undermines protest and, to be frank, I will be very surprised if the Government are able to say anything to stop us bringing this back on Report and saying to a wider audience that suspicionless stop and search for protest-related offences is a step too far, and we are against it.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. In answer to the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, about the duration of the previous debate, we are of course a self-regulating House.

We believe that stop and search is a vital tool to crack down on crime and protect communities. The Bill extends both suspicion-led and suspicionless stop and search powers, enabling the police to proactively tackle highly disruptive protest offences by searching for and seizing items which are made, adapted or intended to be used in connection with protest-related offences, such as glue, chains and locks. The powers can also act as a deterrent by preventing offenders carrying items for protest-related offences in the first place because of the increased chance of being caught.

The suspicion-led powers in Clause 10 will help the police manage disruptive protests more effectively, as police officers will have the power to stop and search anyone they reasonably suspect is carrying items that could be used for locking-on, obstruction of major transport works, interference with key infrastructure, public nuisance, obstruction of the highway and the tunnelling offences.

The suspicionless powers in Clause 11 build on the Government’s plan to give the police the powers they need to prevent serious disruption at protests from happening in the first place. In high-pressure, fast-paced protest environments, it is not always possible for officers to form reasonable suspicion that individuals may be about to commit an offence. That is where suspicionless powers are important, and reflect the operational reality of policing.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked about the wording in Clause 10(g). Of course,

“intentionally or recklessly causing public nuisance”

are legally well-understood terms which are found in much other legislation.

The suspicionless stop and search power will be usable only if certain conditions are met, and in cases where a police officer of or above the rank of inspector authorises its use in a specified locality for a specified period. This power uses a similar framework to that found in Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 to ensure consistency in police powers and safeguards. The rank of inspector aligns with existing stop and search powers to ensure consistency.

In answer to the earlier question of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, a Section 60 order cannot be extended beyond 48 hours. PACE Code A is also clear that a suspicionless stop and search should be reasonable and no bigger than needed.

In terms of the size of the area that designations would cover, as I said earlier, our intention is to mirror the approach used in Section 60. The geographical extent of a Section 60 order depends on the situation that led to the order being authorised, so it is for the authorising officer to determine. PACE Code A states that the authorising officer should specify a fixed location for the boundary of the search area, whether that is a street name or a divisional boundary, and not make the area wider than is necessary for the purpose of preventing these suspected offences.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

Will the Minister reflect on his remarks about a specified locality and his analogy with Section 60? That deals with terrorism. Suspicionless stop and search may well encompass a huge area, as this Parliament has accepted on the basis that a terrorist may travel hundreds of miles to target people. This is about protest and protesters. Is the Minister saying that the Government see that as analogous? I find that difficult to comprehend.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The fact is that the search area should not be wider than necessary for the purposes of preventing the potential offences. I do not believe it is analogous to terrorism, but that is quite clear.

The noble Lord also asked how the geographical extent of a no reasonable suspicion stop and search order is communicated. It is for police forces to determine how and whether to communicate the geographical extent of such an order under Section 60, and this will be the case for the new suspicionless powers in the Bill. But although forces are no longer required to communicate whether a Section 60 order is in place, many continue to do so where they judge it to be operationally feasible, to help deter criminals and enhance community trust and confidence. It is very common for forces to use their social media channels or websites to communicate the extent of a Section 60 order.

The noble Lord also asked about officers in plain clothes. This power only extends to those in uniform. 

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Blower (Lab)]

I invite the Minister to comment on the remarks that I and the noble Lord, Lord Beith, made at Second Reading, which my noble friend Lord Coaker referenced.

If a police officer attempts to stop and search a woman who clearly knows that she is not carrying anything unreasonable, given what the police themselves said about how single women walking alone at night might respond to this, there is every chance that a suspicionless stop and search could result in the woman—young or old—obstructing a police officer in the course of his or her duty. I did not hear the Minister respond to that. It is a very significant concern. It would be a concern anyway but it is an aggravated one, given what the Metropolitan Police and other authorities have said in the light of what we know only too well happened previously.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Obviously, I understand where the noble Baroness is coming from, but asking an officer for proof of identity is not in and of itself an obstructive thing to do. That is very clear.

[Baroness Blower (Lab)]

If I might just press the point: of course, if the young woman has the presence of mind to simply ask for proof of identity, that may very well not be obstruction, but she may be frightened by this and seek to move away or to respond in some other way, but not to assault the police officer. I just see that there is a danger in this situation, and I am not hearing anything that I could tell women who are asking me about what we are doing in the Public Order Bill so that they do not need to have any concern about suspicionless stop and search. We heard before about it being perfectly reasonable to respond in such a way that you can categorically assure yourself that a person is a police officer. Frankly, I have never seen a police identity badge, so I do not know what they look like. The previous Metropolitan Police Commissioner talked about flagging down buses if you are not happy about what is going on. I want to press the Minister on this point, because although I absolutely accept that asking to see a badge is not necessarily chargeable with obstruction, other things could befall.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

Before the Minister responds, he may also wish to think very carefully about what he said about these powers not being exercisable by officers in plain clothes. I am prepared to apologise to the Committee for misleading it when I say that these powers alter Section 1 of PACE, which has nothing in it about an officer having to be in uniform to exercise powers of stop and search. So what the Minister said about these powers not being exercisable unless the officer is uniformed is not true.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

If I am incorrect I will most certainly correct my statement. That was the information that I was given. If it is incorrect in any way, I will of course come back and apologise. It was inadvertent if that is the case.

I think we are getting slightly off topic, but I say to the noble Baroness that the Minister certainly appreciates that women and girls can feel very vulnerable, particularly at night, and I understand the level of hassle. However, a road where one is likely to be alone is not likely to be subject to the Section 60 power, so we are in the realms of the hypothetical to some extent. I accept and understand the concerns that have been raised, but I reiterate that it is everyone’s right to ask a police officer for identification, and I believe that under the suspicionless basis the officer has to be wearing uniform, but I will confirm that later with the Committee, certainly if I am incorrect. I do not have an answer for the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, so I will have to write to her.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have participated in this debate. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, questioned the area in which suspicionless stop and search could be operated. Marches that occur in central London traditionally start at Marble Arch, go down Park Lane and sometimes through Oxford Street and Regent Street. The number of people who could be subject to suspicionless stop and search as the result of that sort of demonstration is mind boggling.

In his real-world experience as adviser to the police on these issues, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester talked about these powers being invariably used disproportionately. The Minister has said nothing to reassure the Committee that the powers will not be used disproportionately, with the damage that will be caused to the reputation, trust and confidence in the police.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, made the valid point that the powers can be used against children. Public nuisance is such a wide offence. I also raised the offence of being present in a tunnel. How can someone go equipped to be present in a tunnel? There was no answer about that.

Before this, there were two elements to suspicionless stop and search. The Minister talked about Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, which is to do with serious violence. The other was Section 44 of the Terrorism Act, which the Conservative Government repealed because it was being used disproportionately. The Government withdrew suspicionless stop and search in relation to terrorism because they considered that its impact on trust and confidence in the police was disproportionately negative. It does not exist any more in relation to terrorism, but this Government want to introduce it in relation to people exercising their lawful right to protest.

The Minister made no reference to what HMIC said was likely to be a chilling effect on people exercising their human rights under Articles 9, 10 and 11. There was not a word about this, even though HMICFRS raised it. There was nothing about the disproportionate impact on minority communities. Minority communities and young people are more likely to be engaged in protest because they do not feel that the parliamentary process represents their views. As the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, said, we will return to these issues on Report. I am sure we will vote on them.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I should like to clarify my remarks about uniforms. Section 60—which is what I was talking about—applies only to officers in uniform. Section 1 powers can apply to all officers.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

Can the Minister clarify whether these powers—not Section 60 powers—to stop and search people in relation to protests can be exercised by officers in plain clothes?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

As I think I explained, we are basing these powers on Section 60.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

Is the Minister telling this Chamber that a plain clothes officer in the middle of Lambeth, Manchester, Newcastle or Cardiff can stop a car without suspicion, without anybody knowing that there is a suspicionless stop and search operation going on?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Our intention is to mirror the approach used in Section 60. I said that very clearly earlier. I have already explained its geographical extent.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

Can the Minister point to the part of the Bill that says that suspicionless stop and search powers are restricted to officers in uniform?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am afraid I cannot.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

This is extremely serious. It is exactly the point that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, is making and what we are trying to clarify. When can a non-uniformed officer use these powers and when can they not?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I apologise to the noble Lords, but I have nothing more to say on the subject. I have tried to explain how this relates to the Section 60 powers. Our intention, I say again, was to mirror that approach.

[Baroness Blower (Lab)]

This is of very great significance; not just to me, not just to women, but to everyone who is trying to understand the Government’s intention with this legislation and in what position people will find themselves. Does the Minister not agree that, if it is the Government’s intention that only uniformed police officers may exercise these powers—frankly, I do not think that they should do so either—then that should be made explicit in the Bill, as there is clearly the possibility of ambiguity?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am grateful to my noble friend for pointing out that Clause 11(6) says:

“This section confers on any constable in uniform power … to stop any person and search them or anything carried by them for a prohibited object.”

Clause 10 agreed.