Tuesday 22nd November 2022
(1 year, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberPublic Order Act 2023 View all Public Order Act 2023 Debates Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Amendment Paper: HL Bill 61-II(a) Amendment for Committee (Supplementary to the Second Marshalled List) - (21 Nov 2022)
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, for his closing words; as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said, “No pressure”. I thank all noble Lords for their impassioned contributions to what has obviously been a very substantive debate.
Clause 9 seeks to establish buffer zones outside abortion clinics in England and Wales to ensure that persons accessing or providing abortion services are free from harassment or intimidation. As the Committee will be aware, this clause was inserted into the Bill on the basis of a free vote in the other place. I will not get involved in second-guessing the motivations of those who voted, but the result was 297 votes in favour to 110 votes against. As I have said before, and I am very happy to say again, the Government respect the will of the House of Commons.
It is obviously clear—today’s debate makes it even clearer—that there are very strong views on both sides of the argument. Many noble Lords want the clause to become law, and many want to alter or to delay it. Amendments 80 to 97—tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Hoey, Lady Fox, Lady Watkins, Lady Barker and Lady Hamwee, my noble friend Lady Sugg, the noble Lords, Lord Ponsonby and Lord Beith, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans—all seek to make an array of changes to Clause 9, be that by raising the threshold for the new offence or by seeking to clarify the clause in some way.
Amendments 98 and 99 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Farmer, seek to introduce buffer zones pending the outcome of
“a consultation … to determine if there has been significant change in”
protests “outside abortion clinics since” the Government’s last review. Amendments 87 to 93 look to ensure that only activities relating to abortion services within a buffer zone constitute an offence, while Amendments 88, 96 and 97 seek to ensure that activities within private dwellings and places of worship are exempt. Amendments 80 to 82 seek to provide a person within a buffer zone with the opportunity to defend their actions and
“to strengthen the burden of proof required to establish an offence.”
As I said before, I thank all noble Lords for their interest and ideas to amend the existing clause in its current form, particularly their well-intentioned attempts to tighten what was described in the other place by the Minister as a “blunt instrument”. It remains the Government’s view, based on legal advice, that this amendment does not meet our obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights and would require a Section 19(1)(b) statement to be provided. That said, after having been brief, I am now even more keen to meet noble Lords in the coming days, and I encourage them to meet me so that we may discuss the next steps for the clause. For now, I invite noble Lords not to press their amendments.
Baroness Sugg (Con)
Does my noble friend the Minister agree that the clause as inserted by the other place calls for universal zones around all clinics in England and Wales?
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I say again to my noble friend—I have said it before, and I am happy to say it again—that the Government respect the will of the House of Commons.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I thank all Members of the Committee for a wide range of speeches, ensuring that we have covered a lot of ground on this important issue. Contributions have been thoughtful, sometimes tetchy but largely civil; it is important to have these arguments out. I listened to what everybody said, and one thing I noted was that all speakers on all sides have condemned the harassment and intimidation of any woman going into a clinic or a hospital for an abortion. It is important that we note that we have that in common, because sometimes it can be presented as though people who are against Clause 9 are indifferent to the intimidation or harassment of women. Everybody has said that it is wrong; this is a question of how you deal with it.
The dispute is also about exactly what happens outside clinics. We have heard the clash of narratives in the contributions that I referred to, which makes the call for a new review from the noble Lord, Lord Farmer, all the more appealing. Indeed, the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, herself suggested—backed up by the reply to me from the noble Baroness, Lady Barker—that the situation has got a lot worse since 2018, and particularly very recently. That is disputed by people so, for the clause to have legitimacy, maybe we need a public discussion to get the evidence—that would be important.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. In answer to the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, about the duration of the previous debate, we are of course a self-regulating House.
We believe that stop and search is a vital tool to crack down on crime and protect communities. The Bill extends both suspicion-led and suspicionless stop and search powers, enabling the police to proactively tackle highly disruptive protest offences by searching for and seizing items which are made, adapted or intended to be used in connection with protest-related offences, such as glue, chains and locks. The powers can also act as a deterrent by preventing offenders carrying items for protest-related offences in the first place because of the increased chance of being caught.
The suspicion-led powers in Clause 10 will help the police manage disruptive protests more effectively, as police officers will have the power to stop and search anyone they reasonably suspect is carrying items that could be used for locking-on, obstruction of major transport works, interference with key infrastructure, public nuisance, obstruction of the highway and the tunnelling offences.
The suspicionless powers in Clause 11 build on the Government’s plan to give the police the powers they need to prevent serious disruption at protests from happening in the first place. In high-pressure, fast-paced protest environments, it is not always possible for officers to form reasonable suspicion that individuals may be about to commit an offence. That is where suspicionless powers are important, and reflect the operational reality of policing.
The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked about the wording in Clause 10(g). Of course,
“intentionally or recklessly causing public nuisance”
are legally well-understood terms which are found in much other legislation.
The suspicionless stop and search power will be usable only if certain conditions are met, and in cases where a police officer of or above the rank of inspector authorises its use in a specified locality for a specified period. This power uses a similar framework to that found in Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 to ensure consistency in police powers and safeguards. The rank of inspector aligns with existing stop and search powers to ensure consistency.
In answer to the earlier question of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, a Section 60 order cannot be extended beyond 48 hours. PACE Code A is also clear that a suspicionless stop and search should be reasonable and no bigger than needed.
In terms of the size of the area that designations would cover, as I said earlier, our intention is to mirror the approach used in Section 60. The geographical extent of a Section 60 order depends on the situation that led to the order being authorised, so it is for the authorising officer to determine. PACE Code A states that the authorising officer should specify a fixed location for the boundary of the search area, whether that is a street name or a divisional boundary, and not make the area wider than is necessary for the purpose of preventing these suspected offences.
Lord Coaker (Lab)
Will the Minister reflect on his remarks about a specified locality and his analogy with Section 60? That deals with terrorism. Suspicionless stop and search may well encompass a huge area, as this Parliament has accepted on the basis that a terrorist may travel hundreds of miles to target people. This is about protest and protesters. Is the Minister saying that the Government see that as analogous? I find that difficult to comprehend.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
The fact is that the search area should not be wider than necessary for the purposes of preventing the potential offences. I do not believe it is analogous to terrorism, but that is quite clear.
The noble Lord also asked how the geographical extent of a no reasonable suspicion stop and search order is communicated. It is for police forces to determine how and whether to communicate the geographical extent of such an order under Section 60, and this will be the case for the new suspicionless powers in the Bill. But although forces are no longer required to communicate whether a Section 60 order is in place, many continue to do so where they judge it to be operationally feasible, to help deter criminals and enhance community trust and confidence. It is very common for forces to use their social media channels or websites to communicate the extent of a Section 60 order.
The noble Lord also asked about officers in plain clothes. This power only extends to those in uniform.
Baroness Blower (Lab)
I invite the Minister to comment on the remarks that I and the noble Lord, Lord Beith, made at Second Reading, which my noble friend Lord Coaker referenced.
If a police officer attempts to stop and search a woman who clearly knows that she is not carrying anything unreasonable, given what the police themselves said about how single women walking alone at night might respond to this, there is every chance that a suspicionless stop and search could result in the woman—young or old—obstructing a police officer in the course of his or her duty. I did not hear the Minister respond to that. It is a very significant concern. It would be a concern anyway but it is an aggravated one, given what the Metropolitan Police and other authorities have said in the light of what we know only too well happened previously.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
Obviously, I understand where the noble Baroness is coming from, but asking an officer for proof of identity is not in and of itself an obstructive thing to do. That is very clear.
Baroness Blower (Lab)
If I might just press the point: of course, if the young woman has the presence of mind to simply ask for proof of identity, that may very well not be obstruction, but she may be frightened by this and seek to move away or to respond in some other way, but not to assault the police officer. I just see that there is a danger in this situation, and I am not hearing anything that I could tell women who are asking me about what we are doing in the Public Order Bill so that they do not need to have any concern about suspicionless stop and search. We heard before about it being perfectly reasonable to respond in such a way that you can categorically assure yourself that a person is a police officer. Frankly, I have never seen a police identity badge, so I do not know what they look like. The previous Metropolitan Police Commissioner talked about flagging down buses if you are not happy about what is going on. I want to press the Minister on this point, because although I absolutely accept that asking to see a badge is not necessarily chargeable with obstruction, other things could befall.
Lord Paddick (LD)
Before the Minister responds, he may also wish to think very carefully about what he said about these powers not being exercisable by officers in plain clothes. I am prepared to apologise to the Committee for misleading it when I say that these powers alter Section 1 of PACE, which has nothing in it about an officer having to be in uniform to exercise powers of stop and search. So what the Minister said about these powers not being exercisable unless the officer is uniformed is not true.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
If I am incorrect I will most certainly correct my statement. That was the information that I was given. If it is incorrect in any way, I will of course come back and apologise. It was inadvertent if that is the case.
I think we are getting slightly off topic, but I say to the noble Baroness that the Minister certainly appreciates that women and girls can feel very vulnerable, particularly at night, and I understand the level of hassle. However, a road where one is likely to be alone is not likely to be subject to the Section 60 power, so we are in the realms of the hypothetical to some extent. I accept and understand the concerns that have been raised, but I reiterate that it is everyone’s right to ask a police officer for identification, and I believe that under the suspicionless basis the officer has to be wearing uniform, but I will confirm that later with the Committee, certainly if I am incorrect. I do not have an answer for the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, so I will have to write to her.
Lord Paddick (LD)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have participated in this debate. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, questioned the area in which suspicionless stop and search could be operated. Marches that occur in central London traditionally start at Marble Arch, go down Park Lane and sometimes through Oxford Street and Regent Street. The number of people who could be subject to suspicionless stop and search as the result of that sort of demonstration is mind boggling.
In his real-world experience as adviser to the police on these issues, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester talked about these powers being invariably used disproportionately. The Minister has said nothing to reassure the Committee that the powers will not be used disproportionately, with the damage that will be caused to the reputation, trust and confidence in the police.
The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, made the valid point that the powers can be used against children. Public nuisance is such a wide offence. I also raised the offence of being present in a tunnel. How can someone go equipped to be present in a tunnel? There was no answer about that.
Before this, there were two elements to suspicionless stop and search. The Minister talked about Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, which is to do with serious violence. The other was Section 44 of the Terrorism Act, which the Conservative Government repealed because it was being used disproportionately. The Government withdrew suspicionless stop and search in relation to terrorism because they considered that its impact on trust and confidence in the police was disproportionately negative. It does not exist any more in relation to terrorism, but this Government want to introduce it in relation to people exercising their lawful right to protest.
The Minister made no reference to what HMIC said was likely to be a chilling effect on people exercising their human rights under Articles 9, 10 and 11. There was not a word about this, even though HMICFRS raised it. There was nothing about the disproportionate impact on minority communities. Minority communities and young people are more likely to be engaged in protest because they do not feel that the parliamentary process represents their views. As the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, said, we will return to these issues on Report. I am sure we will vote on them.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, I should like to clarify my remarks about uniforms. Section 60—which is what I was talking about—applies only to officers in uniform. Section 1 powers can apply to all officers.
Lord Paddick (LD)
Can the Minister clarify whether these powers—not Section 60 powers—to stop and search people in relation to protests can be exercised by officers in plain clothes?
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
As I think I explained, we are basing these powers on Section 60.
Lord Coaker (Lab)
Is the Minister telling this Chamber that a plain clothes officer in the middle of Lambeth, Manchester, Newcastle or Cardiff can stop a car without suspicion, without anybody knowing that there is a suspicionless stop and search operation going on?
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
Our intention is to mirror the approach used in Section 60. I said that very clearly earlier. I have already explained its geographical extent.
Lord Paddick (LD)
Can the Minister point to the part of the Bill that says that suspicionless stop and search powers are restricted to officers in uniform?
Lord Coaker (Lab)
This is extremely serious. It is exactly the point that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, is making and what we are trying to clarify. When can a non-uniformed officer use these powers and when can they not?
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I apologise to the noble Lords, but I have nothing more to say on the subject. I have tried to explain how this relates to the Section 60 powers. Our intention, I say again, was to mirror that approach.
Baroness Blower (Lab)
This is of very great significance; not just to me, not just to women, but to everyone who is trying to understand the Government’s intention with this legislation and in what position people will find themselves. Does the Minister not agree that, if it is the Government’s intention that only uniformed police officers may exercise these powers—frankly, I do not think that they should do so either—then that should be made explicit in the Bill, as there is clearly the possibility of ambiguity?
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I am grateful to my noble friend for pointing out that Clause 11(6) says:
“This section confers on any constable in uniform power … to stop any person and search them or anything carried by them for a prohibited object.”
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)
My Lords, Amendment 145 in the name of my noble friend Lord Coaker is a probing amendment which would require the Secretary of State to review the use of injunctions for protest-related activity. This is to probe how injunctions are used, what their effects are, how they interact with police powers and responsibilities, and the problems facing their use, such as securing them within a reasonable timescale. The purpose of the amendment is for the Secretary of State to set out a review of injunctions in the widest sense.
We also heard from my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti about her Amendments 114 and 115, which would create safeguards against corruption and abuse. They would require the Secretary of State to publish the reasons for any decision not to consult, the results of any consultation, any representations made to the Secretary of State as to a proposed exercise of the power, an assessment of why other parties should not finance their own proceedings and assessments of why any proceedings have been brought by the Secretary of State at public expense rather than by private companies. Such publication would occur each time an exercise of the power is considered and annually on an aggregate basis so that we can look at the overall effect.
My noble friend Lady Blower, who like me is not a lawyer, expressed incredulity about the situation, which I share. As a layman, it seems to me that the Clause 17 provisions give the Home Secretary powers to bring civil proceedings against protesters at public expense. This is a surprising set of circumstances, and my noble friend’s amendments are trying to get the Government to justify that on a continual basis, which seems entirely reasonable.
Amendments 110, 111 and 112 are also in this group. This clause provides that the Secretary of State can use new injunction powers where they reasonably believe the conditions under the clause are met. These amendments would delete “reasonably believes” and strengthen it to
“has reasonable grounds for suspecting”.
Amendment 113 would provide that the Secretary of State may bring civil proceedings under this clause only if it is not reasonable or practicable for a party directly impacted by the activity to do so.
I move on to Amendment 114. The clause provides that, before bringing proceedings under it, the Secretary of State must consult “such persons (if any)” that they consider appropriate. This amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish the reasons if they do not consult, the outcome of any consultation, representations made to the Secretary of State and a reason why the Secretary of State should bring the proceedings at public expense, rather than another party.
As the Minister has heard, there is substantial scepticism about many aspects of Clause 17. There are a number of amendments here seeking to probe the Government’s intentions, and we may well return to this at a later stage. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Murray of Blidworth) (Con)
My Lords, recently we have seen protestors blocking key national infrastructure, potentially causing delays to the supply of goods and services. Clause 17 provides a Secretary of State with a specific mechanism to apply for an injunction in civil proceedings where it is in the public interest to do so, and where the effect of the activity is to cause serious disruption to key national infrastructure, or to access to essential goods or services, or to have a serious, adverse impact on the public.
Contrary to the speeches that we have heard from noble Lords opposite, there is no constitutional dubiety about such a measure. This provision will support better co-ordination between government, law enforcement, local authorities and private landowners in responding to serious disruptive behaviour. You may say, contrary to that which the noble Baroness, Lady Blower, said earlier, that these provisions mean that the hypothetical man on the Clapham omnibus might actually make it to Clapham, rather than being delayed by roadblocks caused impermissibly by protestors.
The proposal does not affect the right of local authorities or private landowners to apply for an injunction themselves, but gives a Secretary of State an additional route to act—urgently in some cases—where the potential impact is serious and widespread, and where there is a clear public interest to intervene. I seek to reassure noble Lords who have raised concerns regarding this measure that it will ultimately be a matter for the courts and our judges to consider whether or not to grant an injunction application. All that this provision does is simply to allow a Secretary of State to bring a claim and to apply for an injunction; ultimately, the decision on whether or not the injunction is made is one for the judge. As we always would, there would be careful consideration of any such application made by a Secretary of State, and that would involve careful consideration of the evidence provided by the Secretary of State in support of an application for an injunction. This is the ultimate legal safeguard on the use of the powers in Clauses 17 and 18.
As to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Blower, I again reiterate that this measure provides an additional mechanism for a Secretary of State to intervene. This device would be most beneficial where protest activity targets multiple sites, and transcends local boundaries and the property of multiple entities. In such circumstances the potential impact would clearly be widespread, and the clear public interest would therefore be that injunctive proceedings are taken by the Secretary of State, rather than a series of separate private entities. It is not in every scenario that the Secretary of State’s power to seek an injunction would be utilised, and there is no doubt that the prevailing situation would remain, and businesses would have a major role to play in obtaining their own injunctions.
Turning to Clause 18, where an injunction has been granted by a court, with a power of arrest attached, the powers will support the police in taking action earlier to respond to those who engage in disruptive and dangerous forms of protest. Enabling the court to attach a power of arrest to such injunctions is key to allowing the police to act more quickly to prevent the disruption escalating. Where there is no ability for a power of arrest to be attached to the injunction, the applicant may be able to apply to the court for an arrest warrant where they believe that the perpetrator has breached the provisions of an injunction, as is the case for injunctions secured by private entities and natural persons. However, this creates an additional step in the process of enforcement which can affect the pace at which disruptive behaviour can be curtailed. As such, the power of arrest provision in Clause 18 can prove to be a highly important tool in the available responses to prevent serious disruption happening in the first place.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
My Lords, before the Minister resumes his speech, may I ask him about a word he used? I do not know if I misheard—and I have quite a good vocabulary—but I think he used the word “dubiety”. Does that mean dubiousness?
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
Right, I will add that to my vocabulary.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
I thank both noble Baronesses for their interventions. Turning to the question about transparency, we will certainly engage on that, and I appreciate it. It is always important that government actions are transparent. It is clearly an important public principle, and on that we agree.
As to corruption, in this context, it is really not a terribly likely hypothetical scenario. I say that because, if one were an ignoble baron seeking to pursue an injunction to preclude some sort of serious disruption, it is unlikely that the cost of pursuing an injunction would be sufficiently high to warrant seeking the assistance of the Secretary of State in bringing that injunction. It would be more likely that such costs would be borne by the company or person themselves, given the urgency and the much larger costs incurred by the disruption occurring. While I accept that there is a hypothetical concern, therefore, I find it unlikely in reality that such an envisioned scenario would eventuate.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for tabling Amendment 116. Let me start by saying that I, again, recognise the sentiment in this amendment. It is important that the Government intervene only in matters that are serious and proportionate to the public interest. However, I wish to remind noble Lords that causing nuisance or annoyance to the public can have a far-reaching impact when it occurs on a widespread scale. The recent protests targeting the M25 have shown just that. Furthermore, while a Secretary of State may apply for the power of arrest to be attached to an injunction, it is for the courts to decide whether or not this is an appropriate measure.
Finally, I turn to Amendment 145, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. Again, I understand and have considered the need for scrutiny and transparency, as I touched on earlier, and therefore I entirely understand the logic of the tabling of that amendment. None the less, it is the Government’s view that while a review is not needed to ensure that activity relating to these provisions is necessary, it is important that transparency is carefully considered, and I will ensure that that is done.
There are already several clear provisions in the Bill that serve to ensure that the use of these powers by a Secretary of State will be subject to scrutiny and safeguards. As has already been noted, of course, in Clause 17(5) there is a requirement for consultation as may be appropriate ahead of initiating civil proceedings. Moreover, as we have already touched on, civil proceedings can be issued in the interest of the public only when it is considered expedient to do so in the judgment of the judiciary hearing the claim. As I have already committed to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, I will nevertheless consider what further clarity could be provided on the circumstances in which a Secretary of State might seek to initiate such proceedings. I therefore invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Paddick (LD)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. If I can try and get the sense of the House, we on this side feel that this is constitutionally dubious, potentially providing opportunities for corruption, and that it is a very serious step to allow the Secretary of State to apply for an injunction to prevent a protest. On the government side, the Minister thinks it is reasonable if lots of people are affected—different organisations, private and public—and that it would be expedient for the Secretary of State to represent all parties and apply for an injunction on their behalf. Therefore, there is a clear difference of opinion as to whether we are satisfied that there are sufficient safeguards, as opposed to the Minister being satisfied that is the case. As the Minister reflects on what the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, we too will reflect on what the Minister has said, and we will no doubt return to this on Report. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 110.