Lord Coaker
Main Page: Lord Coaker (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Coaker's debates with the Home Office
(2 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, first, I declare my interest as co-chair of the National Police Ethics Committee for England and Wales, though I am speaking on my own behalf. I want to focus my remarks on the amendment opposing the question that Clause 12 stand part of the Bill, to which I am a signatory, but also on those opposing the questions that Clauses 10, 11, 13 and 14 stand part of the Bill. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, for the way they have introduced this debate.
It is deeply concerning that the Bill seeks to extend suspicion-less stop and search powers to the context of protest. If brought forward, such measures would open a Pandora’s box for the further misuse of such powers that have in many contexts caused trauma, both physically and mentally, particularly to those in marginalised communities. The proposers of these clauses may have in mind the current environmental protesters, who appear, somewhat unusually, to include a large proportion of those from white, middle-class backgrounds, notably one of my own clergy. But history tells us that such powers, after a short time, are almost invariably and disproportionately used against minorities, especially ethnic minorities.
I would not be involved with the police in the way that I am if I was not passionate that our forces should gain and hold the confidence and respect of all sections of our society. But I know all too well how fragile that respect and confidence are. Police powers that are not grounded in suspicion create suspicion, and they create suspicion in those parts of society, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has so eloquently indicated, where we can least afford it.
We must note when considering the Bill’s creation of a new stop and search power in relation to specified lists of protest offences that there is—as has been referred to—no agreed position among police forces that such a power is either necessary or wanted. When you add to this the fact that the definition of “prohibited objects” is so broad—the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, has referred to bike locks, but it could be posters, placards, fliers or banners—I am not sure about jam sandwiches, but I suspect it fits in somewhere; all could become suspect. How would the police ascertain that such objects were in fact for use at a protest? There are lots of legitimate reasons why you have household objects with you. The Joint Committee on Human Rights states:
“A suspicion of such an offence, even a reasonable one, in the course of a protest represents an unjustifiably low threshold for a power to require a person to submit to a search.”
There are serious risks here for people’s ability and willingness to exercise rights that are fundamental in a democratic society.
The Bill attempts to address what it refers to as “public nuisance”. But its scope is too broad—arguably, any form of protest risks “public nuisance”. Indeed, in these very halls of Parliament, four suffragettes chained themselves to statues to bring attention to their demands for votes for women; we must ask ourselves whether our contemporary context allows space for similarly important issues to be protested on. As things stand, these clauses risk a disproportionate interference with people’s Article 8, 10 and 11 rights as set out in the Human Rights Act.
This country has long prided itself on being a democracy, this Parliament is at the heart of that, and one of our duties is to ensure that the rights and freedoms necessary to such a system of governance are not undermined. Those rights and freedoms include the right to peaceful protest. Therefore, should these provisions remain at a future stage, I will vote to oppose the questions that Clauses 10 to 14 stand part of the Bill.
My Lords, I rise to speak to the clause stand part amendments in my name. In doing so, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester for their supportive remarks and the views that they have expressed, which I very much support.
Stop and search can be a frightening experience; it can be intrusive and intimidating. There are real concerns, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, outlined, about disproportionality, and a point that nobody has yet made is that it can be used against children, worries which matter so much in any democracy.
I am going to spend a few minutes going through this. The Chamber is not packed, but a lot of noble Lords will read our deliberations in Hansard, and this is one of the most important parts of the debate in Committee that we are going to have, as the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester outlined.
Despite these concerns, Parliament has given police the power to stop and search with suspicion for items such as offensive weapons, illegal drugs and stolen property. In its recent report, the Joint Committee on Human Rights accepted that stop and search with reasonable suspicion was appropriate in certain circumstances. However, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, are arguing through their Clause 10 stand part notice, is it right that these stop and search powers should be extended to peaceful protest? For example, new paragraph (g) inserted by Clause 10—I urge noble Lords to reread that clause—extends stop and search powers to an offence of
“intentionally or recklessly causing public nuisance”,
when we know how wide the scope of “causing public nuisance” can be. Can the Minister explain what, in the Government’s view,
“intentionally or recklessly causing a public nuisance”
actually means? We would be passing this in new paragraph (g).
By creating a risk of causing serious inconvenience or serious annoyance through your actions in the course of a protest, or preparation for or travel to a protest, you would have to submit to a search under the Bill. How would an officer know my intention? Extending the stop and search powers to cover searches for articles connected with protest-related offences risks encounters between the public and the police where there is little or no justification. Does the Minister agree with that? People on their way to protests, marches, rallies or demonstrations are at risk of being searched in case they are equipped to commit one of those offences—or so the police believe.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, has just articulated with reference to her Amendments 100 and 101—this is the purpose of a Committee—what on earth do the Government mean by “prohibited” items? It is incumbent upon us to give some indication of what we consider prohibited items to be. It is easy to scoff when the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, asks if that includes a bicycle lock—but does it? I think it is quite right to ask that question.
This takes us to Clauses 11, 12, 13 and 14. Even if one thinks that stop and search with reasonable suspicion may be appropriate, to stop and search for prohibited items without suspicion, looking for articles with respect to peaceful protest, is not where this country should be going or what this Parliament should be legislating to allow the police to do. The application of suspicionless stop and search powers was previously reserved for use in the most serious circumstances, such as the prevention of serious violence, gun and knife crime, or indeed terrorism. Is this where we want our democracy to go—to use stop and search powers that we have previously said should be used only in relation to the prevention of terrorism or serious violence? We are now saying that they are appropriate to be used to search people going to a peaceful demonstration for prohibited items.
The Minister needs to explain—this is the purpose of my clause stand part notices, even though we are in Committee—why the Government think that is appropriate, whether the Minister agrees that it is appropriate, and why the Government believe it is necessary to give terrorist-related powers to the police to deal with peaceful protest. That is the purpose of my clause stand part notices for Clauses 11, 12, 13 and 14 on the creation of the suspicionless stop and search power in relation to a list of specified protest offences. I am grateful for the support of the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Anderson—who is not in his place—the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester. I know there are others; the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, has just said that she supports it. My reason for opposing these clauses is to ask the Government to justify such an extension of power to the police in the context of peaceful protest.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. In answer to the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, about the duration of the previous debate, we are of course a self-regulating House.
We believe that stop and search is a vital tool to crack down on crime and protect communities. The Bill extends both suspicion-led and suspicionless stop and search powers, enabling the police to proactively tackle highly disruptive protest offences by searching for and seizing items which are made, adapted or intended to be used in connection with protest-related offences, such as glue, chains and locks. The powers can also act as a deterrent by preventing offenders carrying items for protest-related offences in the first place because of the increased chance of being caught.
The suspicion-led powers in Clause 10 will help the police manage disruptive protests more effectively, as police officers will have the power to stop and search anyone they reasonably suspect is carrying items that could be used for locking-on, obstruction of major transport works, interference with key infrastructure, public nuisance, obstruction of the highway and the tunnelling offences.
The suspicionless powers in Clause 11 build on the Government’s plan to give the police the powers they need to prevent serious disruption at protests from happening in the first place. In high-pressure, fast-paced protest environments, it is not always possible for officers to form reasonable suspicion that individuals may be about to commit an offence. That is where suspicionless powers are important, and reflect the operational reality of policing.
The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked about the wording in Clause 10(g). Of course,
“intentionally or recklessly causing public nuisance”
are legally well-understood terms which are found in much other legislation.
The suspicionless stop and search power will be usable only if certain conditions are met, and in cases where a police officer of or above the rank of inspector authorises its use in a specified locality for a specified period. This power uses a similar framework to that found in Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 to ensure consistency in police powers and safeguards. The rank of inspector aligns with existing stop and search powers to ensure consistency.
In answer to the earlier question of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, a Section 60 order cannot be extended beyond 48 hours. PACE Code A is also clear that a suspicionless stop and search should be reasonable and no bigger than needed.
In terms of the size of the area that designations would cover, as I said earlier, our intention is to mirror the approach used in Section 60. The geographical extent of a Section 60 order depends on the situation that led to the order being authorised, so it is for the authorising officer to determine. PACE Code A states that the authorising officer should specify a fixed location for the boundary of the search area, whether that is a street name or a divisional boundary, and not make the area wider than is necessary for the purpose of preventing these suspected offences.
Will the Minister reflect on his remarks about a specified locality and his analogy with Section 60? That deals with terrorism. Suspicionless stop and search may well encompass a huge area, as this Parliament has accepted on the basis that a terrorist may travel hundreds of miles to target people. This is about protest and protesters. Is the Minister saying that the Government see that as analogous? I find that difficult to comprehend.
The fact is that the search area should not be wider than necessary for the purposes of preventing the potential offences. I do not believe it is analogous to terrorism, but that is quite clear.
The noble Lord also asked how the geographical extent of a no reasonable suspicion stop and search order is communicated. It is for police forces to determine how and whether to communicate the geographical extent of such an order under Section 60, and this will be the case for the new suspicionless powers in the Bill. But although forces are no longer required to communicate whether a Section 60 order is in place, many continue to do so where they judge it to be operationally feasible, to help deter criminals and enhance community trust and confidence. It is very common for forces to use their social media channels or websites to communicate the extent of a Section 60 order.
The noble Lord also asked about officers in plain clothes. This power only extends to those in uniform.
As I think I explained, we are basing these powers on Section 60.
Is the Minister telling this Chamber that a plain clothes officer in the middle of Lambeth, Manchester, Newcastle or Cardiff can stop a car without suspicion, without anybody knowing that there is a suspicionless stop and search operation going on?
Our intention is to mirror the approach used in Section 60. I said that very clearly earlier. I have already explained its geographical extent.
This is extremely serious. It is exactly the point that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, is making and what we are trying to clarify. When can a non-uniformed officer use these powers and when can they not?
I apologise to the noble Lords, but I have nothing more to say on the subject. I have tried to explain how this relates to the Section 60 powers. Our intention, I say again, was to mirror that approach.
My Lords, I support the comments of my noble friend. The only observation I was going to make about the powers being given to the British Transport Police is that it is primarily funded by the rail industry and whoever pays the piper calls the tune. Can the Minister confirm that the BTP is accountable to the British Transport Police Authority, the members of which are appointed by the Secretary of State for Transport? What does the Minister believe to be the consequences, for example, for protests at railway stations, of such funding and accountability mechanisms?
My Lords, Clause 16 covers the British Transport Police in England and Wales. It is reasonable that, as the Minister explained, the government amendments also cover the BTP in Scotland, since that has been requested by the Scottish Government. We disagree with the premise of the Bill, as was visible in many of the groups, not least the last one, but we understand recognising the specific roles that the MoD and British Transport Police play as part of the wider policing family. Can the Minister confirm—this is part of what the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Beith, said—that the use of their powers is strictly limited to the areas under their jurisdiction?
Prior to today’s debate, I asked the Minister why the Civil Nuclear Constabulary was not referenced in the clause. Helpfully, he responded. I received a letter that said:
“we have not seen assemblies outside civil nuclear establishments and … the public do not have access to this land, so any assembly outside them … falls under the jurisdiction”
of the usual territorial force. I take that to mean that it is not included because no need has been identified for it to have these powers, which is welcome. It would be handy if the Government had applied that logic elsewhere in the Bill.
Does the Bill allow the Government to extend these powers to the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, should they wish to do so? In other words, we have just seen the Government announce and give the go-ahead to the building of Sizewell C, and the Civil Nuclear Constabulary would presumably be involved in and around that sort of site. Would the Government have to come back to Parliament to get primary legislation through in order to give the Civil Nuclear Constabulary similar powers to those in the Bill? Is some secondary legislation tucked away that would allow them to do that, without us being able to properly scrutinise that to determine whether we believe the Civil Nuclear Constabulary should have these protest-related powers?
I remind the noble Lord that the Civil Nuclear Constabulary is armed. It was armed by the late Anthony Wedgwood Benn, when he was Secretary of State for Energy.
That is a very good point—I was going to make that point and ask whether that made any difference. What makes this even more important is whether, tucked away in the Bill, there is some mechanism by which the Government could extend these protest-related powers to the Civil Nuclear Constabulary. The Government are saying that, at the moment, there is no need for it to have these powers because there have been no protests and it has not been appropriate—that is the information I received. All that I am asking—this is particularly relevant given the point of the noble Lord, Lord Beith, about it being armed—whether the Bill gives the Government the opportunity to do that, should they so wish, or whether they would have to come back and pass primary legislation to do that. It would be useful to find that out.
On Amendment 106 of the noble Lord, Lord Beith, which probes the breadth of the powers, can the Minister give us more clarity on the power to make an order prohibiting specified activities for a specified amount of time? What is the amount of time in scope, and who grants the order?
The clause references assemblies
“on land to which the public has no right of access or only a limited right of access”.
Would that activity therefore be covered under existing trespass offences? I am just asking for clarity on one or two of the specifics with respect to these amendments.
I am grateful to noble Lords for their speeches in this group. I turn to Amendment 106, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Beith, who explained that it is intended to avoid excessively wide use, at railway stations, of the power for a chief constable to make an order prohibiting a trespassory assembly if certain conditions are met. This is an outcome that we can all support: the Government are clear that public order powers should always be used proportionately and should have appropriate safeguards and limitations. However, I hope I will be able to provide him with assurances that his amendment is not necessary to achieve that outcome and indeed that it would not have the effect of limiting the use of this existing power at or around railway stations.
The Minister asked me whether I would be kind enough not to move the amendment. I am not entirely satisfied; he has promised to write on a couple of issues. The evidence that has not been brought forward is any inability of the local police forces to manage these situations if they arise. It does not appear to me that there have been situations where the lack of British Transport Police powers has made it impossible to deal with the situation. My worry is that giving it new powers will lead it to use them in circumstances that are not really envisaged by the Bill. At this stage, I am happy not to press the amendment.
The Minister said, quite rightly, that he will write to the noble Lord, Lord Beith. For the benefit of the Committee, it would be useful for it to be put in the Library. The letter writing is fine but I sometimes worry about it because it means it is not in Hansard. For those people who read our deliberations, I think that could be a bit of flaw in them being able to understand what is going on. The answers often are in a letter or in the Library and not as widely available as they would be if they were in Hansard. It is a point that has increasingly bothered me, to be frank.
I recognise what the noble Lord says and will make sure that the letter is placed in the Library.