Courts and Tribunals Bill (Tenth sitting)

Linsey Farnsworth Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 23rd April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Mullan]

I rise to speak in enthusiastic support of the clause. If we were starting from scratch, would we deal with this issue in primary legislation? I expect not. I do not know the history of why the approach of the time was followed, but it seems that the matter should be addressed flexibly via regulations. Members will have heard us argue vociferously against the use of both positive and negative regulations in different contexts, but it seems appropriate in these circumstances. The proposal reflects the changing nature of how people work, interact and fulfil their role as magistrates. We want to support and accommodate that in a way that is not over-rigid.

Of course, there will be opportunities for scrutiny of the legislation to come. Even though we have talked about the significant limitations of the negative procedure, scrutiny is still an option in theory if something were proposed that that we really were not happy about. Considering the stakes of this issue, that is a proportionate approach.

[Linsey Farnsworth (Amber Valley) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Jardine.

I wanted to speak on this clause because, as the Minister said, while it is technical and feels dry, it is incredibly important. I appeared in front of many magistrates over my 21 years as a Crown prosecutor. They do an incredibly important job and provide a huge public service. During the course of this legislative process, it has been concerning to hear suggestions that magistrates are, in some respects, an inferior bench or forum for our criminal justice system. That is far from my experience over 21 years.

I put on record my thanks to all the magistrates who serve day in, day out, across this country. The clause recognises them and shows that we can be dynamic in rewarding them. The Minister mentioned the medal, which I welcome. I can think of many magistrates who deserve a medal for their work. It is important that we pass the clause today.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Tenth sitting)

Linsey Farnsworth Excerpts

Thursday 23rd April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Mullan]

I rise to speak in enthusiastic support of the clause. If we were starting from scratch, would we deal with this issue in primary legislation? I expect not. I do not know the history of why the approach of the time was followed, but it seems that the matter should be addressed flexibly via regulations. Members will have heard us argue vociferously against the use of both positive and negative regulations in different contexts, but it seems appropriate in these circumstances. The proposal reflects the changing nature of how people work, interact and fulfil their role as magistrates. We want to support and accommodate that in a way that is not over-rigid.

Of course, there will be opportunities for scrutiny of the legislation to come. Even though we have talked about the significant limitations of the negative procedure, scrutiny is still an option in theory if something were proposed that that we really were not happy about. Considering the stakes of this issue, that is a proportionate approach.

[Linsey Farnsworth (Amber Valley) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Jardine.

I wanted to speak on this clause because, as the Minister said, while it is technical and feels dry, it is incredibly important. I appeared in front of many magistrates over my 21 years as a Crown prosecutor. They do an incredibly important job and provide a huge public service. During the course of this legislative process, it has been concerning to hear suggestions that magistrates are, in some respects, an inferior bench or forum for our criminal justice system. That is far from my experience over 21 years.

I put on record my thanks to all the magistrates who serve day in, day out, across this country. The clause recognises them and shows that we can be dynamic in rewarding them. The Minister mentioned the medal, which I welcome. I can think of many magistrates who deserve a medal for their work. It is important that we pass the clause today.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting)

Linsey Farnsworth Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 21st April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Sarah Sackman]

The Government have deliberately drafted clause 4 in a manner that focuses on the overall nature of the case, rather than applying an artificial count-by-count test. The necessary question that we are asking the court to apply is whether, taken as whole, it justifies an order for a judge-only trial, given the policy intent that lies behind clause 4, not whether every individual count meets a particular threshold. Such an approach also risks incentivising artificial charging decisions or indictment charges to determine the eligibility for mode-of-trial decisions, rather than focusing on the effective management and efficient conduct of the trial.

[Linsey Farnsworth (Amber Valley) (Lab)]

The Minister mentions charging decisions. As it stands, the amendment would suggest absolutely nonsensical charging decisions. Prosecuting somebody for all the offences listed in part 1 of schedule 3ZA would fly in the face of common sense and go against the code for Crown prosecutors, which makes it clear that prosecutors should select charges to

“reflect the seriousness and extent of the offending…give the court adequate powers to sentence”

and

“enable the case to be presented in a clear and simple way.”

Does the Minister agree that if all the charges listed in the schedule had to be included in a case, that would be completely contrary to the prosecutor’s obligation?

[Sarah Sackman]

My hon. Friend is right. Flexibility is not a weaking of the safeguards; it is what actually allows the statutory test in clause 4 to operate properly and in appropriate scenarios.

Judges will already be required to consider the technicality and length of the case when making an order as to whether to allocate to a judge-only trial. Cases including indictable-only homicide and sexual offences are excluded from the outset because we regard those as cases where a jury trial is in the public interest. For those reasons, I urge the shadow Minister to withdraw his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Joe Robertson]

I support the position of my hon. Friend the shadow Minister. There is a degree of cross-party support on the Opposition Benches; we heard some very good submissions from the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, which seems a while ago now.

The Government’s position on many of the contentious issues in Committee has been anchored on Sir Brian Leveson’s report—indeed, why would it not be? It is an independent report that the Government commissioned. But they freely depart from his recommendations, seemingly on a whim, without any substantial justification. This is one of those cases. Sir Brian Leveson was very clear that magistrates should continue to have sentencing powers only up to a year, and the Government are effectively doubling those sentencing powers.

This is about more than just sentencing powers; it fundamentally changes what magistrates courts are for and how our criminal courts are structured. The Crown court, whether sitting with only a judge or with a jury, is for more serious cases, with more serious sanctions, because it is able to deal with levels of complexity, be it in relation to evidence or procedure. We have heard about “rough and ready” justice in the magistrates court. That is not a criticism; it is a way of characterising the absolute foundations of our magistrates courts. They do a huge amount of criminal work in this country, but they are meant to be summary courts; they are meant to be courts that act quickly and do not have the rigour or probity of the Crown courts. That is their particular purpose, and it is therefore right that they have always had limited sentencing powers when it comes to deciding whether to lock someone up. Fines and community orders are the sort of sentences that are far more typical of magistrates courts.

Depriving someone of their liberty is a very serious matter. It is one thing to deprive someone of their liberty for months, especially given that such sentences are often reduced—in practice, a year can be reduced to months—but it is another thing to deprive someone of their liberty for two years. That would suddenly make the magistrates courts’ summary-style justice, or rough justice—call it whatever; I do not mean any of those words as a criticism—incredibly inappropriate for the powers that the Government would like them to exercise. The clause therefore does much more than just fiddle with thresholds, or however the Government might want to characterise it—we will soon find out. It fundamentally alters what magistrates courts are for.

[Linsey Farnsworth]

I remind the hon. Member that magistrates in the youth court are able to impose sentences of up to two years, and that in its written evidence, the Magistrates’ Association states that it asked for and welcomes the increase to up to 24 months in the sentencing powers of magistrates courts. Does he recognise that?

[Joe Robertson]

I recognise evidence, but I give greatest weight to Sir Brian Leveson, the author of the independent report commissioned by the Government. As the hon. Lady knows very well, the youth court is a very different beast, because a different set of principles and rules applies to cross-examination, evidence and so on for people who are of the age of minority. Simply to say that if the youth court can do it, then the magistrates court can do it for people over 18 is a slightly off-the-cuff argument, if I may say so; it does not really have any rigour at all.

Allow me to return to my line of argument about magistrates courts. If there is a genuine intention and belief that magistrates should be able to impose sentences of up to two years—as I say, in my view, that fundamentally changes the nature of the court—then that should be met with provisions that make the process in the magistrates court more rigorous. I would not agree with that, but at least it would hang together, show consistency and demonstrate an intention that justice must be delivered in a process that is commensurate with the sanction the state is looking to impose on someone.

There is no greater sanction in this country than depriving someone of their liberty and locking them up. In this case, it is more than a threshold argument; the Bill is fundamentally changing what magistrates courts are for, what Crown courts are for, and the difference in procedure between the two.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Seventh sitting)

Linsey Farnsworth Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 21st April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I say gently that if we are referring to the Lammy review we give it its name, and if we are talking about the Secretary of State we refer to him as that and not just his name.

[Linsey Farnsworth (Amber Valley) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Jardine. I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington for tabling new clause 29, which I support. It is a long-standing principle, established in the case of R v Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy, that justice must be done and be seen to be done. It is famous as a legal precedent in establishing the principle that the mere appearance of bias is sufficient to overturn a judicial decision.

To be confident in our criminal justice system, the public need to be satisfied that it is fair. New clause 29 would provide important reassurance that there is a check and balance in place to review the changes the Bill introduces, and that any issues of bias arising from a trial without jury can and will be addressed.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Order. As I have said, if you are referring to the Secretary of State, can you use his title?

[Linsey Farnsworth]

I do apologise, Ms Jardine.

The report by the Deputy Prime Minister, as he is now, was conducted almost a decade ago. It highlighted concern about the sentencing decisions of judges, so it is often cited—understandably—as a reason to be cautious about judge-only trials. New clause 29 would ensure that a review of judge-only trials will be conducted after a year, and should there be disparities in the conviction rates for those of an ethnic minority background and/or for white British persons living in lower-income households, measures can and will be put in place to prevent such disparities from arising.

It is also right that a further review is conducted between 35 and 36 months after enactment, as the new clause suggests, both to check the initial findings and to take account of the fact that things can change. In the review conducted by the Deputy Prime Minister, for example, it was found that where CPS charging decisions were concerned, a defendant’s ethnicity did not affect the likelihood of their being charged. However, subsequent research conducted by the University of Leeds, in which the outcomes of decision making in 195,000 cases between 2018 and 2021 were examined, identified evidence of disproportionality in CPS decision making. Specifically, defendants from minority ethnic backgrounds were significantly more likely to be charged than a white British defendant for a comparable offence.

Additional research by the independent disproportionality advisory group and scrutiny by the CPS itself has led to an action plan to tackle the disproportionality that was found to exist, and to deliver change. There is precedent for ongoing review of disparities in outcomes within the criminal justice system where ethnicity is concerned, and precedent for action being taken to address such disparities.

Recent research by the University of Birmingham identified concern about racial bias within juries, particularly when there is no representation of ethnic minorities among the 12 people serving on a jury. This research cited a case in which an attack on the victim was caught on CCTV, yet in May 2022 a jury with no black members acquitted most of the perpetrators. The researchers concluded that their study raised important questions about whether the public in England and Wales see juries as being fair and just in relation to racial minorities, and that juries in England and Wales remain extremely lacking in diversity; that is what the study found. Another problem the study identified in that case was that the concerns of victims’ families about racial bias among the jury were never investigated.

[Dr Mullan]

Will the hon. Member give way?

[Linsey Farnsworth]

No. I will make some progress; we need to make progress today.

The researchers found that more than 90% of respondents in the survey they conducted believed that discrimination on juries should be reported to trial judges and properly investigated, yet there is no mechanism under current law that allows juries to do so.

Appeal, a not-for-profit organisation, has submitted evidence opposing some elements of the Bill. However, in a paper that it prepared in 2024, Appeal set out concerns relating to majority decisions, as opposed to unanimous jury decisions, and the impact of racial bias. The case of R v. Connor et al was cited, in which questions from the jury suggested that there had been a focus on the defendant’s race and a letter from a juror after conviction confirmed racial bias in the jury’s deliberations.

Section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 provides for confidentiality in jury decision making. However section 8A, enacted in Scotland, permits the Lord Justice General to allow information about deliberations from the jury room to be disclosed for the purposes of research. That provides an opportunity for the same to follow in England and Wales. Recent statistics show an increase in hate crime, including crime based on race and religion, rates of which spiked after Brexit and, recently, following the Southport murders. Now more than ever, we must be conscious of the impact that discrimination could have on the fairness, or otherwise, of jury trial.

[Joe Robertson]

Will the hon. Member give way?

[Linsey Farnsworth]

I am about to conclude, so I will not.

I support new clause 29, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington, but I submit that the change and modernisation that the Bill seeks to introduce bring an opportunity to review all aspects of the criminal justice system in relation to ethnicity and socioeconomic background to ensure fairness for all.

[Yasmin Qureshi (Bolton South and Walkden) (Lab)]

I want to comment on two points. First, I agree entirely with the speech of the hon. Member for Chichester on the problem with clause 3 and jury allocation, and I especially agree with her point about the retrospective reallocation of cases, whereby people waiting for trial by jury will suddenly find that their case will be removed from the jury and heard elsewhere. She outlined in comprehensive detail all the issues—not just jurisprudence issues but legal and factual issues. I support what she said so I will not repeat it.

I also agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Amber Valley about these issues. She highlighted the disparities in the way that different groups of people are treated in our criminal justice system. I applaud my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington for tabling new clause 29. I hope that the Government will consider accepting it although, of course, if we did not abolish jury trial we would not need it.

We are told that the reason for clauses 1 and 3, which restrict access to jury trials in many cases, is to do with the backlog. That is where the Government start their position—the backlog—and I want to concentrate on that aspect. Please bear with me: I will blind the Committee with a few facts and figures because I think that they will make logical sense of why people such as me say that juries are not the reason for the delays. It is important that we get that sense.

There are currently around 88,000 cases awaiting trial in the Crown courts. The queue for the Crown court is now so long that some trials are being fixed for 2030—the Committee has heard that. We have talked about the old adage that, “Justice delayed is justice denied.” That is happening, and the delay is unacceptable, but the answer is honestly not to get rid of one of the fundamental systems that we have had in our country for centuries.

The reason for the delay is not juries but the court structure and how things happen there. One judge sitting in one courtroom for one day is known as a sitting day. The Old Bailey has 18 courts. It therefore has capacity for 18 sitting days per day, 90 sitting days per week and 4,500 sitting days in a 50-week year. For the last 15 years, restrictions have been placed on the number of sitting days in Crown court centres around the country. Resident judges, who are the principal judges at each court centre, have been told that funding will be given only for a limited number of sitting days. Restrictions of between 9% and 25% have been imposed. That is what the previous Government did.

There is always a queue for the Crown court; that is inevitable, as cases cannot be tried immediately. However—and here is the story—up until the start of 2019, that queue was managed without any undue delay. The backlog had come down from around 56,000 cases in 2014 to 33,000 cases by the start of 2019. All those cases were tried by a jury, and within a reasonable time: within six months if the defendant was in custody, and between eight and 12 months if they were on bail. Given that cases were being tried within a reasonable time in 2019, the suggestion that jury trials somehow take longer or are more complicated has no basis.

The length of the cases backlog rose from 33,000 at the start of 2019 to 71,000 by summer 2024, and rose by another 10% to around 80,000 last year. That increase is a direct consequence of the restrictions placed on sitting days. The problem was exacerbated by the closure of some courts. For example, Blackfriars Crown court in central London, which was a custom-made, modern Crown court building with eight courtrooms and the capacity to host 2,000 sitting days in a 50-week year, was closed and sold in 2019. Over the six years since then, 12,000 potential sitting days have been lost.

There are around 4,000 rape cases in the backlog. Trials for rape that have one defendant and one complainant often takes five days—although some trials are quicker and some take longer—so 2,400 of such cases could have been tried in the 12,000 sitting days that were lost following the closure of those eight courtrooms at Blackfriars. The budgetary decision to close one court led to the inability to try what would have been half of all rape cases in the backlog. Similar examples exist all over the country, including where individual courtrooms within a Crown court building sit empty, meaning that the court is open but operating below its potential capacity.

The Crown court estate has a maximum capacity of around 130,000 sitting days. Currently, it is permitted to have 113,000 sitting days, which is partly because the Government have invested some money and allowed an increase to the number of sitting days. The Government have said that that number is a “record high”, but it is high only relative to the low numbers of the previous 15 years. Given the current backlog, I would say that it is incorrect to say that it is high. We need to invest in more sitting days and having more courtrooms open.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting)

Linsey Farnsworth Excerpts

Thursday 16th April 2026 Public Bill Committees

“the absence of any appellate oversight…difficult to justify.”

[Linsey Farnsworth (Amber Valley) (Lab)]

This is a decision that magistrates make every day. Every sitting day, they look at allocation, and they do not put their finger in the air to decide what the sentence might be. The Sentencing Council provides guidelines for each individual offence. I know that the Conservative party does not like the Sentencing Council and has at times called to get rid of it, or Conservative Members have, in particular the former shadow Justice Secretary who has now moved to the Reform party, the right hon. Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick). The sentencing guidelines, however, are used by magistrates every day. Sentencing guidelines are also already available to Crown court judges. Does the hon. Lady accept that this is not something that judges will do willy-nilly? There are guidelines and factors that have to be taken into consideration, which is a safeguard in itself to ensure a fair decision.

[Rebecca Paul]

The hon. Lady is absolutely right that magistrates are doing that now, frequently and—as far as I am aware—fairly well, but we have to remember that they are doing it for low-level cases. In fact, their sentencing powers have increased only recently. The key point is that we will have an additional process. The magistrates do it, but now we will have this additional process at the Crown court level to decide between judge only and jury.

Obviously, the sentencing guidelines and all the things we have just set out would be entirely relevant to that process and will factor in. I will go through a that in a bit more detail, so I hope the hon. Lady will bear with me. I will of course let her intervene—that would be really helpful. She clearly has a huge amount of experience in this area, and I want everyone to feed in. I am asking questions about how this will work in reality, so it would be really good to draw on everyone’s experience. The Crown court deals with sexual assault and other more complex cases and, as she knows, the sentencing has to take into account things such as victim impact, so it is lot more difficult to estimate the sentence. Let us continue the debate, because it is very helpful to have this discussion.

To suggest that a judge in the plea and trial preparation hearing can undertake that assessment accurately and quickly off the back of the information that they have at that point, potentially on a paper determination without a hearing, is unrealistic. That could be very difficult for them. I will give a few examples, and again I am very happy for people to intervene or give their views, because we need to work through the nitty-gritty of how the measure will work in reality.

For category 2 sexual assault, the achieving best evidence full transcripts of the complainants’ evidence are often not available. Instead, the court has to rely on a written summary, but my understanding is that that information is needed to provide an accurate and realistic estimate of the likely sentence. How is it proposed that that will be done in practice for allocation? Will the judge watch the videos of the complainants’ evidence for an hour or two before deciding? If the case hinges on CCTV footage, is it proposed that the judge watch that before making the allocation decision? Those practical points do not appear to have been considered in preparation for the Bill, although the Minister may have all the answers and I obviously look forward to hearing how she thinks the process will work in practice.

It is not sufficient just to say that the judge will decide the likely sentence length without ensuring that they have the information they need to do that properly, particularly given the magnitude of the impact of the allocation decision. I therefore ask the Minister whether anyone has calculated how long it might take for the judge to go through the various videos and footage before the PTPH to get the information they need to make an allocation decision.

It is important to remember that victim impact is often a significant factor in sentencing. Is it proposed that victim impact statements will be relied upon at the point of determining an allocation? What happens if, at that point, the impact is not yet known? For example, the complainant might still be in hospital, medical evidence might remain outstanding or the psychological impact might not be known for many weeks or months.

On the face of it, we probably all thought that a judge deciding whether the likely sentence will be more than three years sounded straightforward. We would think that they just look at the sentencing guidelines, but I am not sure it is that straightforward. Once we start thinking it through and listening to those working in the justice system—I have spoken to people about this—we soon realise that it is far from simple, especially for complex cases such as sexual assault. The judge does not magically know the likely sentence; they need to understand the facts, the detail of the alleged offence and the impact on the victim before they can even begin to do that accurately. If they get it wrong, which is increasingly likely if insufficient information is available to them, that could result in defendants being denied a jury trial when they should have had one.

That brings me on to my next concern. How long will it take on average for the judge to do all this? Has that been factored into the Crown court saving of 27,000 sitting days? Has the increased time that the magistrates will need to spend on this, due to the complexity of cases, been factored into the increased demand of 8,500 sitting days? We also need to bear in mind that the allocation process that the magistrates undertake under the current rules will also get more complex once the sentencing powers increase up to two years. There will have to be allocation decisions for more complex offences such as sexual assault and death by careless driving. Do magistrates have the expertise to accurately assess the likely sentence in those types of cases to adequately assess victim impact?

The Government’s approach sounds simpler on paper, but I hope I have demonstrated that in reality I am not sure it is once we delve into it. These proposals add a not insubstantial amount of work simply to decide where to allocate the trial, essentially undertaking almost a mini trial to review the evidence before the allocation can even be decided. That does not sound time saving to me. It is the wrong way round. We expect the judge to make a judgment on sentence before the trial has even happened, which could change the type of trial the defendant is entitled to. That is fundamentally wrong. It is a flawed approach that will lead to bad outcomes for defendants and complainants.

[Linsey Farnsworth]

The magistrates court goes through that process. The process of allocation to the Crown court bench division essentially mirrors what already happens in the magistrates court, and that is quite a straightforward procedure. It often takes less than five minutes—virtually always less than five minutes. Because the prosecution makes its representations on the Crown’s case, it sits highest. For the most serious version of the offence, what would the likely sentence be, based on the sentencing guidelines that I have already mentioned? That will be the case in the Crown court. There will be a prosecutor in the Crown court standing up and saying, “The Crown’s case at its most serious does not warrant a sentence above three years. We therefore think it can stay in the Crown court bench division.”

For it to be a big argument, the defence advocate would need to argue that their client deserves a much longer sentence than the CPS says they deserve, if all the most serious elements of the case are proven. That strikes me as a very unusual argument for a defence barrister to make—that they would suggest their client deserves a longer sentence. That is what we are talking about here. How often is a barrister going to argue that their client deserves a longer sentence?

If the defence barrister convinces the judge, the judge might think, “Actually, maybe it does deserve a longer sentence; we will have a jury trial”, and that person is convicted after trial. Then there is the plea and mitigation stage. At that point, the defence barrister will try to argue, “I know the case is now proven, and I know that I said it deserved longer than three years, but actually, even though the case is proven, they deserve less.” That would be a very strange position for a barrister to be in, and I think they would be at risk of misleading the court at some point along the way, which is something they very much would not like to do. I can reassure the hon. Member that in my experience these arguments just do not happen.

[Rebecca Paul]

It is really helpful to hear the hon. Member’s perspective from her in-depth knowledge and experience, but I would challenge one aspect of her point: I might argue for a longer sentence if it meant I was more likely to get a jury trial and be found not guilty. Allow me to give an example. If I had created an offensive social media post, I would know that, if I could make my case to a jury, they would be much more likely to use their discretion and compassion and accept the human foibles that we have. They might well say, “This person did not intend to cause any harm—not guilty”. I therefore disagree with the hon. Member; I think she will find herself in a situation where—it sounds bizarre—people will argue that they should get a longer sentence in order to go to jury, so that they have a chance of being found not guilty and clearing their name.

[Linsey Farnsworth]

I know that that would absolutely not happen—

[Rebecca Paul]

Why not?

[Linsey Farnsworth]

Please allow me to finish.

It is because barristers have a duty not to mislead the court. If they are saying to the judge, “I know my client is not really going to get more than three years, but I am going to argue that they are because I want the jury trial,” then that would be very much against the requirements on barristers.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Mullan]

I beg to move amendment 41, in clause 3, page 5, line 38, at end insert—

“(7) Where a court has determined in accordance with this section that a trial is to be conducted without a jury, the defendant may request a different judge to preside over the trial than the judge who made the determination that the case was suitable to be tried without a jury.”

This amendment enables the defendant to request a different judge to try the case than the judge who determined that the case was eligible for trial without a jury.

The amendment draws into acute focus the challenges with public confidence and the risk of clouding judicial decision making that the proposals of a new judge-only court bench division will create.

It is important to set out the distinctions between different types of allocation decisions both now and in the future, if the proposals are passed. It is important to restate that we have summary-only cases based on the offence type rather than anything subjective, and then we have the indictable-only offences, again based on the offence type. In our previous debate on allocation, I pointed the Minister to grey cases, such as drug dealing and burglary offences, that are triable either way. At the moment, if it is about three of those offences, they have to go to the Crown court. I ask the Minister for clarity at some point about how they will operate.

Presently, we have what I sometimes call a clear and distinct separation of powers—a separation between those anticipating sentencing outcomes and those deciding sentencing outcomes, and a powerful safeguard for where that is not the case. Under the Bill, those lines will be blurred in a new and novel way, because the judge anticipating sentence length in the Crown court can then determine guilt and sentence length, and potentially issue a longer sentence of more than three years. That is important for the defendant and, in certain scenarios, for the victims and bereaved.

The hon. Member for Amber Valley, with her expertise, earlier described the fact that allocation and sentencing take place in the magistrates court, but importantly, the defendant can elect, and say no to their being involved in that process. They can say, “I want a jury trial; I want the judge who passes the sentence to be separate from the people involved in allocation.” Of course, the scenario is one in which a defendant is unlikely to have a reasonable claim of bias against their interests in relation to the sentence.

We discussed why someone may prefer a jury trial, even if the sentence might be higher. However, if we are talking about the defendant’s ultimate view about the judge, it is unlikely that someone in the magistrates court—if the case stays in the magistrates court—will say, “You chose to keep me here because of a shorter sentence, so I think you are biased in giving me a longer sentence.” They already have a positive disposition about the view of the sentencing.

More importantly, there are strict limits on the sentence length if a case stays in the magistrates court. It cannot go beyond what the initial judgment was. If the court decides, during or at the conclusion of the trial, that the sentence should be higher, it is up to someone else to pass that sentence. It goes to the Crown court for sentencing.

[Linsey Farnsworth]

It is true that the case has to go up to the Crown court, but it is not for the purposes that the hon. Member would like, as it were. It is because the magistrates’ maximum sentencing powers have been reached, and therefore they do not have the power, as opposed to it being preferable that the case go to somebody else.

[Dr Mullan]

That was not the point I was seeking to make, so I thank the hon. Lady for clarifying.

I sometimes wonder what victims think. Do they sometimes follow a case, hear the evidence and then think it should be getting more than the magistrates’ limits? Do they question whether the magistrates, who have a preliminary view about whether the case will hit a certain maximum at the outset, have come to the trial with some degree of bias about what outcome might be? Do they think the magistrates would therefore have some reluctance, even having heard the evidence in full, to pass a sentence that is beyond their powers and send the case up? Of course, magistrates do reallocate sentencing. As we have said, just because I feel there is a risk of a perception of bias does not mean I think we should scrap the whole lot and never let magistrates pass a sentence, but seeing that things are not perfect on balance does not mean that we accept them.

These proposals will add a degree of seriousness because of the potentially significant differences between possible sentence lengths. The sentencing guidelines for the offences are narrower than we will perhaps see with triable either-way cases, which have already been curtailed at a certain level of seriousness and might go up to an even greater level of seriousness.

If the clause passes unamended, the scenario could be as follows. A Crown court judge will receive an outline of the case, and make an initial judgment on the likely sentence outcome. They will decide, for a triable either-way offence, whether a sentence is likely to be more than three years. That same judge could then hear that case. That is the same judge whom a victim or bereaved family member could reasonably—perhaps not correctly, but reasonably—perceive on some level had already made a decision about the case, because of course they have: they have taken an initial view of the case and on what the outcome was likely to be. Importantly, that is not something that happens in any way shape or form with the jury trial system, where the two things are separate.

We all agree that perception as well as reality is important in our justice system. It is possible that some victims or bereaved family members might question whether the judge, who formed a view, is not best placed to then objectively and fairly decide what the actual sentence should be, if it should be longer than three years. They might even be concerned that passing a sentence of more than three years would suggest that they had got it wrong in their initial view. Again, we do not have to form a view about how likely or unlikely that is; we should form a view on what the perception of that will be. As politicians, we are very used to the concept that perception is important. Even if someone has not necessarily done something wrong, whether the public perceive that they might have done something wrong is important.

All that can be readily and simply avoided through our amendment, which would introduce a separation of powers, as I have described it. This is a modest and narrow amendment. It will provide a greater degree of confidence in the new system; even if the Minister is happy to proceed with the system, I am sure she would accept that it has generated questions and debates about rights and impartiality. This amendment is a very simple and modest way in which the Minister can minimise that. I know she wants maximum possible confidence in the new system, so I hope our amendment achieves that and that she can support it.

As we are still discussing allocations and who will or will not be allocated to different parts of the court, I would also be grateful if the Minister could provide clarity on triable either-way offences, such as drug dealing and burglary offences, where multiple versions go into the Crown court at the moment. What will happen to those cases in relation to allocation as part of the new division?

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Mullan]

I beg to move amendment 42, in clause 3, page 9, line 23, leave out subsection (4) and insert—

“(4) Where a court has determined in accordance with section 74A that a trial is to be conducted without a jury, the court cannot pass a sentence of imprisonment or detention of more than three years on a person convicted of an offence.

(4A) Where a person is convicted of an offence and the court considers that the appropriate sentence is more than three years’ imprisonment or detention, the court must refer the case for retrial by jury.”

This amendment prevents a judge sitting alone from sentencing a defendant to more than three years in prison, and requires that if this is the likely sentence, the case must be remitted for trial by jury.

It is my pleasure to speak in support of amendment 42, tabled in my name, which really drives at the heart of the question of fairness in relation to this new system. It would prevent a judge, sitting alone, from sentencing a defendant to more than three years in prison, and requires that, if that is the likely sentence, the case must be remitted for trial. Again, related to the important points I made earlier, it also introduces the element of “must”.

Again, we have to revisit the process of allocation; triable either-way offences will be allocated on the basis of sentence length. That is the important part for us to consider here. The Government have agreed that the suitable manner in which to allocate offences to trial with or without a jury is based on sentence length. We can only conclude, therefore, that the Minister accepts that the possible consequence—the possible time in prison—is intrinsically linked to the fairness, reasonableness, desirability or however the Minister might want to describe it of remaining with a jury trial.

In this case, if criminals—because they will have been convicted at this point, we can say criminals rather than defendants—ended up with a sentence of more than three years, they would have a reasonable basis on which to say that their treatment was not in keeping with the Government’s own decisions about what would be preferable in relation to fairness. Let us be clear: I spend a lot of time working with victims and campaigning for longer sentences for offenders, and I think that, across the board and for many decades, our sentencing regime for convicted criminals has been insufficiently punitive and has given insufficiently long sentences. But that does not mean that I do not think that there is a fair and proper way of going about that.

I agree with the Government that sentence length is inherently related to fairness in regard to whether someone gets a Crown court trial with or without a jury—although, in my view, it should always be a jury trial—but a convicted criminal now will look at this and say that he has a sentence greater than he otherwise should have expected to get, and that, if the judge had anticipated correctly that sentence at the outset, he would have had a jury trial. That would be his reasonable conclusion.

[Linsey Farnsworth]

On that point, what are the hon. Member’s thoughts in relation to a magistrates court where a magistrate has made a decision that a case is suitable for summary trial but then they have the opportunity—or the right if you like—to commit somebody for sentencing at the Crown court if the offence turns out to be more serious than had originally been envisaged? Actually, the safeguard for the expectation of the defendant is dealt with at an early stage—at the allocation stage—when the defendant is told of the decision that the case will stay in the magistrates court, but they could be committed in due course to sentencing in the Crown court.

[Dr Mullan]

That goes straight to the point we discussed earlier about why it is important to separate the two, because in this scenario it is the same person all the way through. Ultimately, the sentencing process ends up being separate to the people who decide whether or not someone is guilty, and they will have decided the mode of trial, as well.

[Linsey Farnsworth]

Can I also just mention Newton hearings? A defendant has pleaded guilty but does not accept all the allegations that the prosecution’s case sets out—perhaps the most serious aggravating feature. Then, there is a Newton hearing, at which a judge sits and decides what the factual situation is and goes on to sentence as well. There is already precedent in the Crown court for a judge to hear evidence, make a decision based on the evidence, and pass sentence. I wonder what the hon. Gentleman’s view on that is.

[Dr Mullan]

This is a great opportunity for me to learn and understand an element of the system that I did not understand—I know about it, rather than understand it.

I will go back to the point that we have made repeatedly. We are designing a system from scratch here. We have the opportunity to do things exactly as we want to. We do not have to be forced into replicating other elements of the wider system; we can design this system as we best think it should operate. I think that the best thing in this scenario, in which we are starting from scratch, would be to say to somebody that they should be able to derive the benefit of having a jury trial if the case is of a nature that the Government themselves agree would typically enjoy the benefits of a jury trial. This is just inherently a fairness question.

That is why we have replicated the process—in a positive way—in a magistrates court. The decision is the decision that has been made; the court cannot go above it. That is because we say that in a magistrates court, if someone seeks to go above that court, that is not the right place to do that; it would not be fair and reasonable. We are making a similar point here in relation to mode of trial, for jury trial.

We think that the amendment is sensible, reasonable, balanced and does not prevent the Government from undertaking their reforms; it is not what could possibly be described as a wrecking amendment. I hope that the Government will reflect on that and accept the amendment.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fifth sitting)

Linsey Farnsworth Excerpts

Thursday 16th April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Mullan]

The hon. Member has articulated extremely well that these things can be done differently and have a different outcome. I heard about case management directly from Liverpool Crown court. It has an aggressive approach to case management: it swept the cases and was clear whether it needed to be hearing a case or whether it could do any work to get a plea. It does a lot of work, and if every court was doing that, it would deliver different outcomes. The Minister might rightly point out that different courts have different circumstances, but surely the goal should be to correct those circumstances so that the positive things enabling some courts to bring the backlogs down can be done everywhere.

[Linsey Farnsworth (Amber Valley) (Lab)]

My point follows on from the powerful point the hon. Member is making about the need to look at good practice, which is something we should all get behind. Over my many years of working for the Crown Prosecution Service, I saw various schemes aimed at doing just that, but unfortunately, given that we are here today, they did not sort out the issue entirely.

Does the hon. Member recognise the evidence Sir Brian Leveson gave specifically about Liverpool Crown court, in which he cautioned against suggesting that that case could simply be replicated across the whole country? Liverpool Crown court deals with a single police force and Crown Prosecution Service, and has a very small local Bar that work together well. Although we would like it to be, that is not necessarily the case across the country. Does the hon. Member recognise that those circumstances are unique and may not be possible for the whole country?

[Dr Mullan]

Yes, absolutely. In the NHS, I worked on what we might call change and improvement programmes or quality improvement programmes. We worked hard to replicate the best clinical practice everywhere, but it is simply not possible to directly replicate everything that goes on in every unit, although that is not to say that we cannot do some of what goes on. As the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden pointed out, we are not talking about a single court; that is why I was clear about looking at this on a regional basis. I do not think that the data in any of these regions is getting better because of one court that has specific circumstances that cannot be replicated. That is why we have to show a high degree of interest in understanding what can be replicated and in trying those measures.

As we heard from the representatives of the criminal Bar and the circuit, we should give them a chance to try some of these things before we do something so unprecedented that will lead to a curtailment of rights. Nobody thinks that the other, positive parts of the Bill, or the measures that do not even require legislation, take away from anything else; they are just exceptionally positive things we could be doing where we do not pay some kind of price. Surely, we should try those before taking the step proposed in the Bill. Whether or not we think this step is reasonable—Labour Members have made it clear that they do—I doubt they think it will not lead to a loss in relation to jury trial rights.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Mullan]

I draw the Committee’s attention to my remarks at the outset of our proceedings: our judicial system, victims and defendants and how we manage crime in this country are my personal priorities. That is primarily the reason why I sought to be elected to this place, so I will never disagree that justice should get a higher priority than it has historically. I also pointed out that Labour Members more broadly have accepted that justice getting insufficient priority in our political system has gone on for many decades.

The hon. Member for Birmingham Erdington is right in pointing out the backlogs that existed prior to the pandemic, and they were actually lower than those we inherited from the previous Government. If we are talking purely about what happened with the backlogs, our record prior to the pandemic was an improvement on that of the previous Labour Government. That does not mean it is okay; that does not mean we say, “We did a great job,” but it is important, in balancing and understanding the debate, to know that.

In terms of what we did in relation to the covid pandemic and all the challenges it posed, we had uncapped sitting days and Nightingale courts, and we took steps to try to address the backlog. I served on the Justice Committee, scrutinising what the Government were doing at that time. I was very frustrated, because we would visit Nightingale courts and one of the biggest challenges they faced was the lack of certainty about whether they would be renewed in the future. I questioned Ministers at the time about that. To all of us on the Committee, on a cross-party basis, it was obvious that those courts would need to carry on for longer—why not just get on and agree that and let them run in that sustained way? There were many things we could and should have done better. That is not to say that we did not do anything or that, prior to the pandemic, our record did not compare favourably to that of the previous Labour Government.

As I said, in that particular example we introduced the innovation of making the provisional data available earlier. In June, given the challenges with that data being wrong on occasion, a decision was taken to temporarily stop publication, to see if we could close that gap. If that data is significantly different from the revised published data, there is sense in looking again at the methodology and seeing whether the gap between the provisional and final data can be closed. But here we are, almost a year later, and the Government have not chosen to reinstitute the publication of that provisional data. I think everyone on the Committee would benefit from seeing that data, so I would be interested to know whether that is the basis on which the Minister has said the backlogs in some regions are not going down, when in fact, from the evidence and data I have seen, they are.

Our amendments are aimed at delivering a fairer system. Amendment 23 also seeks to achieve that outcome, in a more specific but equally valid way. As my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate said, human beings in criminal cases are not neat, so we need a degree of flexibility. There is not flexibility in all parts of the system at the moment, but allowing a judge, on their own, in these types of cases, to allocate, hear the case, determine guilt and issue a sentence is unprecedented in our judicial system—

[Linsey Farnsworth]

District judges in the magistrates courts sit alone every sitting day and hear cases and trials. They then go on to sentence if that person is convicted, or to release them if they are acquitted. That happens every day, so there is precedent within our criminal justice system. District judges hear the most serious and complicated cases that go to the magistrates courts. So there is already precedent for this, and indeed in the youth court as well.

[Dr Mullan]

Although not intentionally, the hon. Member cut me off before I made the point I was going to make, which is that this is unprecedented in cases of this nature, with sentences of this length.

[Linsey Farnsworth]

I am afraid I have to disagree with the hon. Member, because the youth court has powers to sentence people for up to two years, so it already has higher sentencing powers than magistrates. Many of the cases we are talking about in the Crown court bench division would command a sentence of perhaps two years.

[Dr Mullan]

I covered that in earlier remarks, when I pointed out that those people are not adults, so it is a different set of circumstances. If the hon. Member is asking me to be ultra-specific—I am happy to be—what is proposed is unprecedented for cases of this nature, with adults, with these sentence lengths. That is, of course, the vast bulk of our justice system. There are lots of things that we do differently for children than we do for adults in the justice system. I am not familiar with arguments suggesting that those distinctions cannot be made, and that something we do with the youth custodial element or judicial process must therefore be perfectly acceptable with the adult estate. We do not do that.

[Linsey Farnsworth]

But the hon. Member is happy that youths are treated fairly in the criminal justice system, even if a single judge hears their case.

[Dr Mullan]

Again, we talked about this before. There are degrees of fairness. Specifically on whether a defendant will get a judge who is as fair as possible in terms of representation, understanding their background and so on, I think it is less fair than a jury system. But I made it clear that other factors are given greater weight in the youth court. For example, the intimidation that a young defendant might feel in the adult court versus the youth court is given greater weight. I might think overall that the deal, so to speak, for the youth defendant is fair and reasonable, but that does not mean that I cannot say that the absence of a jury might be less fair for a youth defendant in some regards.

[Linsey Farnsworth]

I think the hon. Member is saying this is a balancing exercise. It is about having a fair trial, but one that is equipped within our criminal justice system. That is exactly what the Government are doing here. Of course we need fair trials, but we also need a criminal justice system that is fair, and justice delayed is justice denied. That is not fairness. Would the hon. Member recognise that?

[Dr Mullan]

To use the word that the hon. Member used at the start of her intervention, it is a balance. We in the Opposition are clear that the Government have that balance wrong, which is why we oppose the measures. As I said, the Government want to have this both ways: on the one hand, when it suits them, they say that it is a balancing exercise, but on the other hand, when we point out flaws in the balance, they say, “Everything’s fine. You would be just as happy in a trial with or without a jury.”

The Government should be consistent. If the Government just said, “This is a balancing exercise. There will be some detriment to people as a result, but we believe that it is right”, and then stuck to that line, at least it would be intellectually coherent. The Minister might think that makes it a debating point, but I think it is pretty important in politics to be intellectually coherent. We take a different view from the Government.

The other point that we think is different, too, is that the proposal will not achieve the desired outcome. Even if we agreed, in theory, that the balancing exercise was correct and that the trade-off that the Government seek to achieve were a reasonable one to make against the loss of the rights that we are talking about, we do not think that the Government will get those outcomes. We therefore think that the Government’s argument is fatally flawed in two respects, which is why we continue to oppose the Bill.

As I said, fairness is important. We focused on the example where a first-time offender might end up with fewer rights in our judicial system than a repeat offender; in respect of, for example, loss of respect, reputation, employment or income, the person who has more at stake has their rights removed. That is a point made clearly by JUSTICE, which supports our amendment 39. JUSTICE states that the three-year threshold is likely to lead to outcomes that are seen as unfair by those within the system and by the public. Repeat offenders are more likely to qualify for a jury trial, because their previous convictions would push the likely sentence above three years, while first-time offenders committing the same offence may be denied a jury trial.

When we put that to Ministers, as I said, they say that it is perfectly fine for those people to have a trial without a jury, and that is fair. Ministers also say, however, that they are keeping jury trials for the most serious cases—but if they are keeping it for the most serious cases, they must at some level accept that it is a superior system in some way. Otherwise, why keep it for the more serious cases, as they define them? The Government cannot hold both positions coherently.

Absolutely, as I said, the core issue is fairness. The Government want to have it both ways in this argument, but of course the defendants will not get to have it both ways. The defendants will just have what they are told by the judge, without any ability to exercise their rights in the way that they think is fair or consistent with the broader point. We therefore continue to press our amendment 39 and that is why I ask Labour Members to think carefully; this might not be universal, but how many of them would feel happy if they—with their previous good character, and all the damage that could happen to their reputation and income from a conviction—were not allowed to have the option of a jury trial? I cannot say for sure, but potentially some of them might feel differently then.

--- Later in debate ---

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I do agree. It is important to remember which offences are kept in the magistrates court. There was discussion on Tuesday about burglaries and other offences making it to a magistrates court. With respect, burglaries have never been reduced to being tried in a magistrates court.

What happened was the way that motor theft offences were tried was tweaked. What used to happen is that people, particularly youngsters, would take away a car and were charged with the theft of a car, but as everybody knows, the definition of theft includes intention to permanently deprive. Those people never had the intention to permanently deprive; they were just taking the car for joyriding, and they were then going to leave it somewhere else.

That is why a new offence was introduced: it was initially called TWOC—taking without owner’s consent—and then it became TDA, or taking and driving away a motor vehicle without the consent of the owner. That offence went down to the magistrates court, because it was seen as a misdemeanour—something that a young person might do—and was not the same as giving someone a theft conviction. We had to make some changes, which were very sensible changes. Look at all the cases being dealt with in magistrates courts at the moment: any charge that goes to the issue of honesty is still either-way or indictable.

[Linsey Farnsworth]

Common assault, for example—

[Yasmin Qureshi]

That does not concern honesty.

[Linsey Farnsworth]

No, but it could very well come down to credibility. My hon. Friend is suggesting that no offences in the magistrates court would come down to credibility, or am I misunderstanding her point?

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I was giving the example of TDA and theft legislation. I was talking about offences involving dishonesty, such as theft and burglary or defrauding someone. Even producing a fraudulent insurance document is an either-way offence, because it involves dishonesty. Even now, producing a dodgy insurance certificate is not a magistrates court offence; it is still an either-way offence, because of the element of dishonesty—not in the sense of people saying different things but in terms of intent. That is what I am talking about—not what my hon. Friend was saying.

[Linsey Farnsworth]

I recently introduced the criminal offence of unauthorised entry of a football stadium. That is a summary-only offence. There are examples in the magistrates court where credibility and dishonesty are key points of summary-only offences.

[Yasmin Qureshi]

My hon. Friend is comparing apples and pears. Entry of a stadium that someone is not entitled to be in is not the same as being charged with stealing, even in minor instances, such as stealing a bottle of water. They are two different things. For example, entering enclosed premises is dealt with in a magistrates court. There are different elements involved. What is at stake if I steal a bottle of water? That is very different from entering a stadium that I am not meant to be in.

We have had a good discussion. I still ask the Government to look at my amendment. As I have said from the beginning, I will not put it to a vote, but I am asking them to consider it. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment proposed: 39, in clause 3, page 5, line 26, at end insert—

“or,

(c) the defendant demonstrates to the court that the circumstances of his case are such that to be tried without a jury would amount to a breach of the principles of natural justice.”—(Dr Mullan.)

This amendment would ensure that trials by jury continue for indictable offences carrying a sentence of less than three years in prison if the defendant can demonstrate that it would be in the interests of natural justice.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Third sitting)

Linsey Farnsworth Excerpts

Tuesday 14th April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Mullan]

The hon. Gentleman’s question articulates the gap between what the Opposition and the Government think about these issues. Actually, for a case like the first example, the sentence passed will be almost irrelevant to the person. If they are found guilty and convicted of an offence, they will suffer all the consequences that I have talked about whatever sentence they are given. Such consequences do not exist for the individual in the second example; they do not have employment or a reputation to lose.

The Government also often portray the assumption that people are guilty—if they are accused, they are guilty. The whole point of the jury trial system is to allow what we have all agreed, at some point and in some ways, is the fairest and most balanced way to determine guilt. The Justice Secretary himself has talked in detail about how it is the fairest way to determine guilt. When someone’s decision is going to have huge consequences for the accused’s life, it is perfectly reasonable for people to want the fairest mode of determining that guilt.

[Linsey Farnsworth (Amber Valley) (Lab)]

Is the hon. Gentleman saying two different things? At the start, I heard him say that we have fairness across the whole criminal justice system, but he seems now to be suggesting that magistrates court trials are inferior and less fair. Is that the position of the Opposition?

[Dr Mullan]

As I said, it is actually the position of the Justice Secretary, in his own report, where he said that the fairest and most balanced element of the justice system is jury trials. If the hon. Member thinks it is odd for me to hold that view, perhaps she should have a conversation with the Justice Secretary.

--- Later in debate ---

[Linsey Farnsworth]

It is right that we should talk about language. I refer the hon. Member to guidance on the CPS website in relation to the use of the term “victim”. In its guidance, the CPS says that it often uses the word “victim” when talking about general crime. When someone is making a speech in Parliament to say that there are victims waiting for justice, it is perfectly right and proper to do so, because they are not talking about an individual case. That is set out in the CPS guidance.

[Rebecca Paul]

The hon. Lady makes an interesting point, but we need to always be aware of the technical definition of the words that we are using. When the Government talk constantly about victims needing justice, and it all being about victims, I am not sure it is in the right spirit.

What all of us in this Committee Room agree on, however, is that the Crown court backlog is a critical problem that needs to be addressed. But limiting trial by jury is not the way to do it. We have heard that repeatedly from knowledgeable and experienced people working in the justice system—we have even heard it from one of the Government’s own Members, the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden. The Bar Council does not support it, the Criminal Bar Association is opposed, and the Law Society says the Government’s proposals go too far.

[Linsey Farnsworth]

We have heard a lot about the Bar Council and the Law Society. What we have not heard a lot about is the position of the Crown Prosecution Service on this point. If the Crown Prosecution Service was a legal firm, it would be the biggest in the country. It has thousands of lawyers working for it. Tom Guest, a member of the policy team at the Crown Prosecution Service gave evidence to the Justice Committee, in which he set out that the CPS is supportive of this legislation to look at structural reform. He said that it is not the only answer, but that it is necessary. The CPS considers us to be at a critical juncture, and that the backlog needs dealing with. Does the hon. Member agree that it is not universally the case that people working within the criminal justice system are against the legislation? Actually, the biggest law firm in the country is in favour of these structural reforms.

[Rebecca Paul]

I thank the hon. Lady for making that point, and I of course agree. Clearly, there is not a consensus, which is why we are here today, but we can categorically state that most knowledgeable and experienced people working in the justice system are against what this Labour Government are trying to do.

[Rebecca Paul]

I completely agree with my hon. Friend. If I recall correctly, the hon. Member for Amber Valley has previously worked in the CPS—she might want to disclose her interest.

[Linsey Farnsworth]

Yes, that is correct; I was a Crown prosecutor for 21 years, and I worked all the way through the terrible, terrible years when the Conservative Government were absolutely ripping apart our criminal justice system, so I speak with experience on this matter. I speak with a lot of former colleagues who still work on the frontline, and every single one of them supports this proposal. The difficulty is that, as civil servants, they cannot speak out. That is why we do not hear from them as much as we do from barristers. I worked at the CPS until just before the general election, so my experience is very recent.

[Rebecca Paul]

I thank the hon. Lady for making that point, and I hope that she is comfortable having put that on the record. It is good to hear her view.

--- Later in debate ---

[Linsey Farnsworth]

May I refer the hon. Member to the fact that the youth courts often deal with cases of this nature? They have sentencing powers of up to two years. Would the hon. Member suggest that youths are not getting a fair trial in those circumstances?

[Rebecca Paul]

I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention, but I will not comment on that specifically. I am talking about the magistrates courts, which generally deal with low-level motoring offences.

[Linsey Farnsworth]

But they are magistrates.

[Rebecca Paul]

I will look into the hon. Lady’s point, and I have no doubt that we will talk about that later on.

Can a Government who pride themselves on putting victims first truly be comfortable with what I have just laid out? Those are just two examples, but we see the same pattern for numerous other serious offences such as actual bodily harm, fraud and affray. In what world can those offences ever be considered minor enough to qualify only for summary justice? I do not believe that this is what victims want, either. For justice to be done, they need to have complete confidence that people will respect and accept the verdict given. That is a key part of the justice process.

Limiting jury trials for some of the most serious offences will mean that a verdict, whether innocent or guilty, will lose its current gospel status in the eyes of the populus. Clause 1 sows doubt into our justice system, and that doubt will eat away at it. At the opposite end of the spectrum less serious offences are impacted, but that will still have huge ramifications for the individual in the dock. We must always remember the human being at the centre of this. The offence with which someone is charged may be minor, but that does not stop it being the worst thing that has ever happened to them.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fourth sitting)

Linsey Farnsworth Excerpts

Tuesday 14th April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Mullan]

It absolutely does—but the Minister is not doing what Sir Brian recommended. She is rejecting his approach, but when we want to reject his approach, she asks how we can possibly question what Sir Brian has to say on such matters. That is the reality of what is happening. It is a consistent flaw that the Government cannot undo.

My hon. Friend the Member for Reigate did a good job of illustrating the nature and seriousness of so many of the offences we are considering. She also sought a firm answer on, for example, the modelling of the increases in guilty pleas that we might expect owing to the increase in the length of suspended sentences.

We had a debate about, “Well, it’s in the explanatory notes, not in the impact assessment,” as if that was just immaterial. The Minister and her officials will know very well that there is a big difference between what goes into an impact assessment, given the statutory nature of that document and everything that the Government have to do before they put things into it, and what a Government can put out in what is effectively a non-statutory document. They could really put anything in there that they wanted to.

Of course we would expect the Government to be fair, frank and honest, but the reason why we have impact assessments—and the reason why, when Labour Members were in opposition, they hammered the Conservatives repeatedly about what did or did not go into an impact assessment in particular, as opposed to broader documents—is that it has a statutory footing and is important in its own way. I think my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate did a good job of illustrating what was absent from that impact assessment.

We talked about the Crown Prosecution Service, and there was an attempt to say that what a senior member of the management said, one would assume—

[Linsey Farnsworth (Amber Valley) (Lab)]

On that point, will the hon. Member give way?

[Dr Mullan]

I will finish the sentence, and then I will.

Of course, we would assume that they had done that in consultation with other leadership figures, so we might reasonably say that they speak on behalf of the senior leadership team of the CPS, but there was an attempt to say that their views can somehow be taken to represent the views of the many people who work across the CPS—

[Linsey Farnsworth]

On that point, will the hon. Member give way?

[Dr Mullan]

I will finish the sentence, and then I will.

As my hon. Friend the hon. Member for Chatham and Aylesford pointed out, the CPS is a very big organisation, with a lot of people.

[Linsey Farnsworth]

Mr Guest was giving evidence to the Justice Committee in his capacity on behalf of the CPS. He was talking with authority from the CPS, on the organisation’s behalf, on its official policy position. It is fair to say that the CPS, as Tom Guest said, is in favour of the structural reform we are making, is it not?

[Dr Mullan]

Nothing that I have said is in disagreement with that. The point we are making is about whether that reflects the wider, individual views of all the people who work for the CPS. I am not aware that the CPS, for example, undertook an internal staff survey. Does the hon. Lady want to intervene and tell me whether the CPS asked people about that? I am not aware that the CPS undertook an internal consultation exercise. Did the CPS consult all the many people who work for it and say, “This is our position. This is what we think”? How did it come to its view about these decisions?

The hon. Lady is very welcome to intervene and talk about how the CPS formulated its position in the way that she sought to talk about it, covering all the different people who work for the CPS. As I explained to her, I know there are people who work for the CPS who do not agree. She may well know people who do agree, but some do not agree. I took the liberty of re-contacting one of the people who works for the CPS over the Committee’s lunch break. Their—quite rightly—anonymous and private view, which they are entitled to hold and express to me is that, as a prosecutor, we should all be very worried when a state prosecutor wants to do something that further curtails the rights of defendants. I might not express it in those terms, but that is how someone from the CPS expressed it.

The hon. Lady is absolutely right to say that the formal policy position of the organisation of the CPS is as she described, but she was not right to refer to it as being meaningful because it covers lots and lots of people who have had no formal engagement whatsoever in helping the CPS to come to that conclusion. It is a bit like the Minister getting up and saying, “The Ministry of Justice is a big organisation and we all think this is what should happen.” The Minister knows that her civil servants are asked to produce policy; what they actually think about it and whether they agree with it is totally irrelevant, and she would never use the size of the organisation to add weight to the strength of her argument, because it is nonsense. As I pointed out when His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service gave evidence, people are not allowed to give their individual views; it is a policy position that the organisation has to hold.

--- Later in debate ---

[Joe Robertson]

I thank the shadow Minister. I am probably not in a position to arbitrate between the two arguments; the hon. Member for Rugby will have to forgive me, as I come from the starting position that I back the shadow Minister, not least because he was wielding a particularly substantial file when he just spoke.

I want to address a provision that is not the immediate subject of this grouping, but which fundamentally determines the significance of clause 2—the reform of appeal rights from the magistrates court contained in clause 7. Currently, a defendant convicted in the magistrates court has an automatic right of appeal to the Crown court. That right is exercised in approximately—

[Linsey Farnsworth]

On a point of order, Ms Butler. I seek guidance on how we get back to clause 2, because we have veered off significantly from it. Clause 2 relates to provisions that have not yet come into force but could well come into force in the future, specifically in relation to how cases could proceed from the magistrates court to the Crown court by way of written submissions. The idea behind that provision was to avoid the need for a court hearing if everybody agreed. How can we get back on to clause 2, because I fear we are veering significantly away from what it is trying to do?

[The Chair]

I will give a little leeway, but I ask the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East to please go back to clause 2.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Mullan]

My final point in opposition to clauses 1 and 2 is that the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull East (Karl Turner), who is not here today, would have had a lot to say during our proceedings. He is a Labour MP who has quite literally never rebelled against the Labour Whip. Ms Butler, you have probably been here longer than all the rest of us, so you know that in our parties we have the usual suspects, who rebel when they get the opportunity and take any chance to disagree with the governing party—we all have a sense of what that means. The hon. Gentleman is not one of the usual suspects. He is a passionate practitioner. He will have dealt with clause 2 cases. He will have sat in court and dealt with the sorts of things that clause 2 covers.

[Linsey Farnsworth]

Clause 2 relates to measures that have not come into force yet, so my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull East cannot possibly have any experience of that.

[Dr Mullan]

I am not clear that that is the case.

[Linsey Farnsworth]

It is the case.

[Dr Mullan]

Sorry—I am not clear that there will not be real-world consequences in the kind of ways that the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull East will understand. The Minister nodded her head when I suggested that fewer people will get a Crown court trial as a result of clause 2. The Minister indicated from a sedentary position that it is correct to say that fewer people will get a Crown court hearing specifically as a result of clause 2. If the Minister can clarify that, I am very open to hearing her. I ask Labour Members to think very carefully about the fact that one of their own, who is not one of the usual suspects, is so vehemently opposed to the change.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (First sitting)

Linsey Farnsworth Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 25th March 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I want to get three more people in, so pithy questions and pithy answers, please.

Sir Brian Leveson: I am sorry.

[Linsey Farnsworth (Amber Valley) (Lab)]

Q I serve on the Justice Committee and am a former Crown prosecutor, so I have an interest in the Crown prosecutions aspect of this.

On 17 March, we heard evidence on the Justice Committee from Tom Guest, the director of policy at the Crown Prosecution Service. He talked about the CPS being supportive of the structural reform that is proposed in the Bill. He said that we were “at a critical juncture” and that this is

“a generational opportunity for end-to-end reform. Our view is that we have gone far beyond the point where piecemeal or non-legislative solutions will suffice. They are definitely part of the solution, but they will not solve the problem. The status quo is failing victims, witnesses and defendants.”

Do you recognise that sentiment, and do you have any comments in relation to the view of the Crown Prosecution Service and its role to play in this structural reform?

Sir Brian Leveson: I do recognise the sentiment: it is exactly my own. I think the CPS has an enormous role to play. You will know from the report that I wrote that there are lots of areas in which improvement and co-ordination of activity is critical. IT changes have to made: there are 43 forces with 43 different IT systems, each of which the CPS have to negotiate with. Redaction is an enormous problem, as is file build. The relationship between the police and the CPS, and the inability of police defence lawyers to speak to CPS lawyers—all that needs to change, and that is why I suggested the adviser.

--- Later in debate ---

[Joe Robertson]

Q My point is that bar is already there. The Children Act starts with it—it is in section 1(1). I do not need to say this, but absolutely every death, particularly where the state has been involved and a court decision has been made, is a tragedy, but presumably you will agree that those tragedies will continue even with this change in the law if other things are not done within the family courts to deal with what are primarily safeguarding issues, rather than broad presumptions over children’s interests.

Farah Nazeer: Absolutely. The presumption is a really important first step because without the presumption, we will automatically default to the status quo. That is where the training and an understanding of domestic abuse and coercive control come in. As you can hear, we are not in a situation where safeguarding is applied consistently or domestic abuse or sexual violence are understood consistently. That is where the mandatory training piece has to come in to accompany the change to the law.

[Linsey Farnsworth]

Q Thank you so much for being here today. I am really interested in the victim’s perspective on fairness, the treatment of victims within the current criminal justice system and the changes being made.

As a former Crown prosecutor, one aspect of the criminal justice system that concerned me was the appeals process from the magistrates court to the Crown court. As you all know, if somebody is convicted in the magistrates court, they have an automatic right to a retrial at the Crown court without having to give any reasons, regardless of whether there was a fair trial in the magistrates court or otherwise. If the victims and witnesses want to continue the process, they have to give evidence all over again through that appeal, otherwise the appeal is successful.

The Bill seeks to get rid of that automatic right and put the process more in line with the Crown court appeals process. There will have to be grounds to suggest that the original trial was unfair. As victims and survivors who have had access to the criminal justice system, what is your view on the current system of retrials and appeals from the magistrates court in terms of fairness to victims and the likelihood of victims attending to give evidence and being re-traumatised? I am also interested in whether the automatic right to appeal and have a retrial is used as coercive control in the current justice system. There is a lot to unpack there, I grant you.

Charlotte Meijer: There are a lot of questions there. From my experience, we will never know whether my perpetrator picked a magistrates court because he knew that, if he was found guilty, he could have then dragged me on to a Crown court case—we do not know.

It is absolutely terrifying because, as we all know, going through a trial for the first time is horrific—it is something that I never want to do in my life again. I had the ability to go to court again for rape, and I declined it; if there had been an appeal and I had to go again to a Crown court, I probably would have dropped out. It is not something that I would want to experience twice.

There is also a really interesting thing there. What does that say about our magistrates courts? Are we basically saying that they cannot do what they should be doing? I think that changing the system strengthens the trials and credibility of magistrates courts—they should be credible, given that 90% of cases go there. It also shows that it is the final choice; the decision will be made there, unless more evidence comes forward.

On what you said about fairness to the victim, there is obviously no right to appeal for a victim if there is a not guilty verdict. I know there is a tiny bit of legislation to say that, if there is a huge amount of new evidence, they could reopen a case. However, that barely happens. You are basically told no, so how come a perpetrator can just appeal without any reason? From victims’ perspectives, and from my perspective, it is an absolute no-brainer.

[Paulette Hamilton]

Q Thank you all, and can I add to everybody’s remarks about the powerful testimonies that are coming across today? Following on from Joe’s question, my question is for you, Farah. The Bill’s impact assessment states that repeal alone is unlikely to materially change the outcomes. As the chief exec of Women’s Aid, what further steps does Women’s Aid feel need to be taken to protect children from a parent?

Farah Nazeer: I think the repeal of the presumption is the cornerstone, because that gives the foundation on which the other measures rest. I think the first thing is mandatory training so that there is real understanding of coercive control and domestic abuse. I still speak to survivors daily who tell us that judges are saying, “Well, why didn’t you leave earlier? If it was that bad, why are you still there?” There is a real lack of understanding of coercive control, economic abuse and how coercive control can manifest in multiple different ways—the isolation, the withdrawal of technology and all the many things that make it impossible to leave. I think that mandatory training is really important.

The training also has to include a real understanding of the barriers that survivors face, particularly those with minoritised backgrounds, such as black women, women from minority backgrounds, deaf and disabled women and LGBTQ+ constituents. They face additional barriers and challenges in accessing justice, as well as in accessing empathy and understanding of their particular situations, which might have cultural implications, or mean different things in the domestic abuse context. We need really comprehensive training and understanding.

We also need unevidenced concepts like parental alienation to be banned from family courts, and we need actual regulated professionals—if they need to be brought in—to advise courts and judges in a way that the system and survivors can have confidence in. Right now, this is inconsistent and, in some cases, outright dangerous, as we can see from the many reports we have produced at Women’s Aid. I would say that those are the three most important things to ensure that we have a safe system.

The other piece that perhaps sits outside the provisions of the Bill is the specialist domestic abuse and sexual violence services that need to be there to support survivors through either the family court processes or the criminal court processes. Unless you have someone supporting survivors through those processes, they can be brutal. It is very hard to sustain the energy and commitment to return to those settings, time after time.

You build yourself up, as my fellow panellists have said, and then you are let down again. The experiences themselves are also deeply distressing. Without those specialist services there to support survivors, justice will not happen either way. It is really important that there is a recognition that specialist services are pivotal to ensuring that justice happens.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Second sitting)

Linsey Farnsworth Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 25th March 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Mr Paul Kohler (Wimbledon) (LD)]

Q Are you familiar with the argument of the retired Lord Justice of Appeal Sir Alan Moses, in The Guardian this week, that a third of the backlog could be cleared if we employed retired judges to undertake a winnowing exercise to clear the cases that will never come to court, and is he correct?

Claire Davies: I have not read that article, but if there is more judiciary, then there is more access for people. A lot of residents are taking the approach of looking at the outstanding cases, looking at the sorts of cases that may not go to trial, and bringing them in. As well as more judiciary to assist in that process, or to crack through the trials that there are, there would need to be the courtroom availability, and of course what has to come with more courtroom availability is staff so that the courts run efficiently. We would welcome retired judges to come back. There are many who currently sit in retirement in any event.

Caroline Goodwin: It would be absolutely brilliant to have these very senior judges come back. They have an absolute wealth of knowledge that they can bring. If they are prepared to operate in that role, it is a win-win situation. If we can instantly recruit more judiciary to deal with these cases, then it is something we should be proactively looking at.

[Linsey Farnsworth (Amber Valley) (Lab)]

Q It is fair to say that the CPS’s breadth of experience across the criminal justice system is unparalleled, given that it takes cases through the system, from advising the police at charge through to the magistrates court, the Crown court and the appeals court. Is it right that it is in a good position to understand the system fully, from start to finish?

Caroline Goodwin: It might understand the system, but it is about the application of the system. You may have a set of papers that comes in from the police and is sent to a reviewing lawyer—

[Linsey Farnsworth]

I am getting to my point; I am very conscious of time. It is fair to say that the CPS has a good overview of the system.

Caroline Goodwin: Yes.

[Linsey Farnsworth]

Q Thank you. Tom Guest, one of the directors at the CPS, recently gave evidence to the Justice Committee. He said:

“Our view is that we have gone far beyond the point where piecemeal or non-legislative solutions will suffice.”

He went on to say that the official view of the CPS is that the 20% time-saving projection regarding jury trials in the independent report is

“very much on the conservative side”.

Does the CPS not have a credible voice on those two points?

Caroline Goodwin: May I deal with that? It may be a credible voice in terms of having an argument in the debate, but it is not actually addressing the efficiencies of the Crown Prosecution Service; it is merely saying, “Yes, we think 20% could be a parsimonious figure. It could be a far greater saving of time.” But if we turn and look inwards, at ourselves, the CPS is the start of a lot of the difficulties that there can be around case preparation. That is why I say that there needs to be a rigorous approach when material is sent in to a reviewing lawyer, which is really when the process starts. They need to be saying, “I need you to find me that telecommunications evidence. I need to make sure that that media evidence from those telephones has been produced.” All that should be starting from the word go.

Tom Guest may be right in terms of—[Interruption.] May I finish, please? He may have a voice in the debate and the argument, but in so far as the efficiencies of the service are concerned, the CPS really needs to start looking at itself, and then perhaps it can come on a very strong footing.

[Linsey Farnsworth]

Q Indeed. I think part of the CPS’s role is to look at the impact of the court backlog on the system as a whole, and jury trials are a part of that. A big part of the work of the CPS is in the court back office, in relation to other aspects of juries that create time pressures on the system: preparation of jury bundles, dealing with jury queries when people have been summoned, juror expenses, and so on. Having fewer jury trials in itself will help with that back-office preparation and work, will it not?

Caroline Goodwin: With respect, often what happens is that counsel are told, “Please make sure that you know what’s going to be in the jury bundle.” That gets sent to counsel; counsel deals with that. Counsel is asked, “Can you make sure you can deal with the witness order?” Counsel produces that. All that you are having to do, basically, is either put material on a photocopier or put it into a media form so it can be played in court.

[Linsey Farnsworth]

Having been a Crown prosecutor for 21 years, I find it very disturbing that you take that view.

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

Q As a former family solicitor, I want to focus my questions on the proposal to remove the presumption that involvement by a parent in a child’s life is in the child’s best interest or good for the child’s welfare. Given that, in children’s proceedings, it is already the law that the child’s welfare shall be paramount, and given that, sometimes, children can be used as tokens between warring parents, I wonder, Samantha Hillas, whether you find it strange that we are going to hear evidence today only from parent groups, and not from groups representing children’s interests. Is that odd to you, as it is to me, given that we are dealing with changes to children’s proceedings, where a child’s welfare is paramount?

Samantha Hillas: I have not made the arrangements for who is attending, so I do not find it odd. Whoever has been asked to attend is attending. I can talk a little bit about the repeal of the presumption—

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Linsey, did you have a very quick question? You have seconds.

[Linsey Farnsworth]

Is it not the case that magistrates courts can be more agile in terms of court listing and picking up cases, like we heard from the Canadian—

[The Chair]

Order. Sorry, but that brings us to the end of the time allotted for the Committee to ask questions. On behalf of the Committee, I thank you very much for your evidence.

Ordered,

That the Order of the Committee of 25 March 2026, as amended, be varied by as follows—

Leave out rows 28 to end and insert—

“

--- Later in debate ---

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

Lord Burnett, would you say the same?

Lord Burnett of Maldon: I was going to make the observation that Sir Richard just made about the very low level of appeals from the magistrates court to the Crown court, which is something of a tribute to our magistracy. It really is a very low level, so I do not personally see this as a big problem.

You asked about risk; one of the reasons why the current system exists is that the magistrates court is not a court of record and transcripts of what has gone on in the magistrates court are not readily available. If there were to be an appeal of the sort that is contemplated in this legislation, my understanding is that there needs to be quite a lot of work to put the nuts and bolts in place in the magistrates court. Forgive me if I have misunderstood, but I had not understood that it was expected that this could be put into place immediately. It is more a tidying-up measure, as I see it, that accompanies issues that are really much more important.

Clement Goldstone: In principle, I am in favour of controlling the right of appeal to the Crown court. When I was in Liverpool—it is not that long ago—we were sitting one or sometimes two judges on Thursdays and Fridays on appeals. For some unknown reason, there seemed to be a lot dangerous dogs in Liverpool, so there were a lot of dangerous dog appeals.

More seriously, I do not think the right is abused, because it is there to be utilised, but I do believe that there is an argument for weeding out a lot of hopeless appeals. Also, you must bear in mind that if there is an appeal based on a wish to call fresh evidence, particularly perhaps bearing in mind that a defendant in the magistrates court was not represented, that is something that would have to be carefully considered, so I would not reject it as a good idea, because it could result in time savings, but it is something that has to be counselled with caution.

[Linsey Farnsworth]

Q You said that your preference would be for two magistrates and a judge to sit together, and I understand your views on that. There are already examples in our criminal justice system of where a judge sits alone in the magistrates court. We have district judges, which I am old enough to remember as stipendiary magistrates. I am not aware of any big campaigns or calls for them to be abolished. They deal with the most serious cases in the magistrates court, or tend to. Are you aware of any campaign to get rid of them because of unfairness or otherwise?

Lord Burnett of Maldon: District judges (magistrates’ court), formerly stipendiary magistrates, have been a feature of our system since the mid-19th century—I cannot remember precisely which year they were introduced. I have never been aware of any reasoned criticism of the way in which they conduct cases. On the contrary, the rate of appeal that Sir Richard referred to includes cases that have been tried by district judges and deputy district judges. It is a phenomenon that we are used to in the criminal justice system.

[Linsey Farnsworth]

Q On the practicalities of jury trials, you talked about the time savings of having judge-only trials over jury trials. I want to talk about other potential savings in terms of the backlog generally through jury trials. Personally, I think that a judge-only trial would make listing more agile. If a witness becomes ill, the judge could sit in a few days’ time, whereas a jury trial might be aborted and have to go back into the court list. What is the impact of those sorts of features on the court list more generally, rather than on the time saving in a particular trial in that moment?

Clement Goldstone: It would give the opportunity to a judge who was in the middle of a judge-alone or judge-with-magistrates trial to say, “We will have to break off because this witness is ill,” to use your example, or, “because the defendant is ill,” and that would enable him to start another trial. At the moment, in the Crown court, where there is a judge and a jury, when a witness is ill, very often there is an abortive trial. If a witness does not turn up and the witness cannot be found, a decision has to be taken whether to go on or to give a little limited time for the witness to be found. Therefore, one of the other savings of time that will follow is that there will be no retrials and no juries to discharge, for whatever reason.

I know that is not a direct answer to your question, but it is another by-product of restricting the right to trial by jury to the cases that are envisaged. There is, of course, a catch-all for the cases in which the public interest requires a trial by jury, even if conviction merits a sentence of less than three years.

[Linsey Farnsworth]

Q So potentially there would be less repetitive listing of the same trial over and over again through those issues.

Clement Goldstone: You would have one trial listed once, hopefully.

[Linsey Farnsworth]

Q My last question is about the allocation process. In previous debates, we have heard concern that the judge’s allocation decision about whether it is the Crown court bench division or a jury trial would be a very long process. There would be a lot of work and a lot of written submissions, and it would take the judge a long time to make those decisions. That mirrors the process of the decisions that magistrates make every day, which, in my experience, often take three or four minutes to decide. The system would essentially require a defence advocate to argue for a higher sentence if they are pushing for a jury trial. Does that strike you as an unusual argument for a defence barrister to be making? Do you think the allocation process could actually be quite efficient?

Lord Burnett of Maldon: I have read some of these arguments, and I have been slightly surprised by them. I cannot help the old advocate in me thinking that lawyers are terribly good at finding nine reasons why you should not do something. We all did that; that is what lawyers are sometimes asked to do. I think this one will very much depend upon the procedures that are put in place for dealing with it.

Obviously, if you are going to create a new decision that has to be made, there will need to be adjustments to the practice direction and probably the criminal procedure rules, and I am not sure that detail has been thought through yet. If it has, I am not aware of it. I imagine that most of these decisions would be done on the papers. It strikes me as rather extravagant to suppose that you list it for half an hour for argument to deal with something like that, so I think that one is a bit of a bogeyman.

Sir Richard Henriques: Paper applications seem to me to be fairly obvious.

Clement Goldstone: Judges in the Crown court are very good at paper applications. They are used to them.

[Mr Kohler]

Q We all agree that the backlog is too great. Lord Burnett, in The Guardian this week retired Lord Justice of Appeal Sir Alan Moses argued that we could cut the backlog by a third in six months if we employed retired judges to winnow the current backlog. Do you agree? [Interruption.] Richard clearly does not.

Lord Burnett of Maldon: It is a very good journalistic article.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

We have a quick declaration before the Minister comes in.

[Linsey Farnsworth]

I want to declare that, as Crown prosecutor, I was assigned to the team that looked at the Insulate Britain campaign and reviewed the evidence as to whether charges should be brought. I want to make that clear and put it out in the open.

Tim Crosland: Thank you.

[Sarah Sackman]

Q I want to be clear about the scope of this argument. Obviously, the least serious cases that take place in the context of public order would never get to the Crown anyway, because they could be heard within the magistrates—is that right?

Tim Crosland: Increasingly they are getting to the Crown court, because of this and the previous Government’s crackdown on protests. We had the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022; there is now a maximum sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment for any act that interferes with the rights of anybody in any way. We are now getting more protest cases coming to the Crown court, and more than 200 people have been jailed in the last few years for peaceful acts of protest. But of those 200 people, only one has been jailed for more than three years. A number of people have been jailed for precisely three years—the threshold in this legislation—but only one for more than four years. Almost any judge would be able to say that it is incredibly unlikely that you will get a sentence of more than three years imprisonment—therefore, no jury.