Police (Complaints and Conduct) Bill
Lindsay Hoyle Excerpts(13 years, 2 months ago)
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Damian Green
On the first point, I know that the IPCC is extremely aware of the desire for things not to appear to be unduly delayed. Indeed, that is one reason why we are here today—to put a Bill through all its stages in one day, which shows that the House and the Government are trying to speed the process up as much as we can.
On the application to the High Court, I know that my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General is proceeding as fast as he can, and I think a decision will be made public very shortly. I can go no further than that, but the hon. Gentleman’s wider point is well made, and I absolutely take it. I am very conscious that people want to see that this process, having started after the report, is not unduly delayed at any stage. I am very keen, as I know are many other people who have been involved from the start, that that should happen.
That explains why the House should not today consider the wider reform of the IPCC, although we will examine whether there are other gaps in its powers. We have asked it what tools it needs to progress its investigations into Hillsborough, and this short Bill will ensure that it has the two additional powers for which it asked. The Bill thus represents an important step on the road from truth to justice for Hillsborough. All who support that aim will, I hope, support this Bill. I commend it to the House.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
I must now announce the result of the deferred Division on the draft order amending schedule 1 to the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. The Ayes were 288 and the Noes were 213, so the Question was agreed to.
I must also announce the result of the deferred Division on the draft Civil Legal Aid (Merits Criteria) Regulations 2012. The Ayes were 287 and the Noes were 213, so the Question was agreed to.
Leveson Inquiry
Lindsay Hoyle Excerpts(13 years, 2 months ago)
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Mr Whittingdale
I have very little time left. I could probably spend another hour discussing the whole issue of privacy law, but I shall merely tell my hon. and learned Friend that I hear what he says.
I am absolutely at one with those in the Chamber who believe that we need to establish—
Mr Deputy Speaker
Order. The hon. Gentleman must not test the patience of the Chair. A great many other Members wish to speak.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
Order. Shorter interventions would be helpful. I know that two knights want to exchange views, but I worry about the costs that might be charged.
Sir Edward Garnier
I agree with the premise of my hon. Friend’s point but think that we perhaps draw different conclusions from it. Lord Justice Leveson has stated, as did our right hon. Friend the Secretary of State at the beginning of this debate, that the status quo is not an option, so if we learn nothing else from Leveson, we should learn that what went before cannot go on. It seems to me to be uncontroversial that the PCC is dead, for example. We need some other form of disciplinary body or regulatory system that matches public concern but also has parliamentary approval. We could approve through parliamentary procedure a body that is not statutory, but we could also approve a regulatory body that is not the creature of Parliament but that would be recognised and saluted by statute. There are plenty of other bodies that discipline the professions or other public bodies but that are not controlled by the Government.
Voting Eligibility (Prisoners)
Lindsay Hoyle Excerpts(13 years, 2 months ago)
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Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
Order. I want to get everybody in and do not want to disappoint anyone, so we need short questions and speedy answers.
Thomas Docherty (Dunfermline and West Fife) (Lab)
Many members of the public will believe that this decision is because of the Human Rights Act. As the Lord Chancellor has said very clearly that it is not, will he confirm whether he supports repealing that Act?
Defamation Bill
Lindsay Hoyle Excerpts(13 years, 5 months ago)
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The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Jeremy Wright)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 7, page 3, line 22, leave out clause 5.
Government amendments 5 and 6.
Jeremy Wright
New clause 1 deals with an issue raised in Committee by the hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Paul Farrelly). He was concerned that circumstances could arise in which a claimant who had successfully brought an action against the author of defamatory material online could be left unable to secure the removal of the material. That situation might arise as a result of the fact that an author might not always be in a position to remove material that had been found to be defamatory from a website, while the new defence in clause 5 might prevent the website operator from being required to do so. The Government indicated in Committee that we would consider whether anything further was needed to address such situations.
We have concluded that although such situations are likely to be rare, it would be appropriate to include a provision in the Bill to ensure that claimants in such cases do not experience any difficulty in securing the removal of material that has been found to be defamatory. New clause 1 therefore provides that where a court gives a judgment for the claimant in a defamation action, it may order the operator of a website on which the defamatory statement is posted to remove that statement. Such an order could be made either during proceedings or on a separate application. New clause 1(2) ensures that the provision does not have any wider effect on the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court.
In speaking to new clause 1, it may be helpful if I speak also to Government amendments 5 and 6, and to amendment 7, which has been tabled by the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent South (Robert Flello). Government amendment 5 relates to the circumstances in which a claimant might defeat the defence set out in clause 5. Such circumstances are set out in clause 5(3), paragraphs (b) and (c) of which require a claimant to show that he gave the operator a notice of complaint in relation to the statement in question and that the operator failed to respond to it in accordance with provisions to be set out in regulations. In addition, paragraph (a) requires that a claimant must show that it was not possible for him to identify the person who posted the statement. Amendment 5 clarifies what is meant in paragraph (a) by the word “identify”. Again, concerns were raised in Committee by the hon. Members for Newcastle-under-Lyme and for Stoke-on-Trent South that the meaning of the word “identify” was unclear and that possible difficulties in obtaining the true identity of the author—for example, when he was using a pseudonym—might mean that the claimant was left without a remedy. In the light of those concerns, we undertook to consider the position further.
Amendment 5 clarifies that, for the purposes of subsection 3(a), it is possible for a claimant to “identify” a person only if they have sufficient information to bring proceedings against that person. The amendment will ensure that claimants are not left in limbo, unable to bring proceedings against an author because they lack information that would enable them to do so, but also unable to defeat the defence of the website operator if the operator failed to take steps to assist. We consider that that will ensure that the new process operates fairly and effectively and strikes an appropriate balance between the interests of claimants and those of website operators.
Amendment 6 makes it clear that if the website operator moderates material posted by third-party users on his site, that fact alone will not defeat the defence that is available under clause 5 to a website operator who can show that he did not post the statement complained about on his website. We share the view, expressed by the Joint Committee on the draft Bill and Members of this House, that responsible moderation of content should be encouraged. We have listened to the concerns raised in Committee and consider that it would be helpful to include a provision giving reassurance on that point. Amendment 6 therefore provides that the defence under clause 5 is not defeated by reason only of the fact that the website operator moderates the statements posted on the site by others.
There might of course be situations when an operator goes too far. They might, for example, moderate content on the website so much as to change the meaning of what the author had posted in a way that makes it defamatory or increases the seriousness of the defamation. In such cases, the courts will have to consider whether the operator’s actions were sufficient for them to be regarded as having posted the material.
We have considered carefully the merits of seeking to prescribe the particular circumstances in which moderation might or might not lead to the operator being regarded as having posted the material. Precisely when an operator should become responsible for a statement they moderate will depend heavily on the individual circumstances of the case. On balance, we think it is right that the courts should have flexibility in making that assessment. We consider that these are sensible and helpful amendments that will aid the effective operation of the new process under clause 5.
Amendment 7, by contrast, would remove clause 5 from the Bill. I will of course listen carefully to what the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland (Helen Goodman) has to say on the matter, but I am sorry to say that we do not consider removing the clause to be an appropriate move. The current law in this area is unsatisfactory and has created a situation in which website operators, to avoid any risk of being sued, choose to remove material from sites they host on receipt of a complaint, whether or not the material is actually defamatory. That chills free speech.
However, we recognise that when people are defamed online they need to be able to take prompt and effective action to protect their reputation. Including clause 5 in the Bill will mean that the author of a statement is given an opportunity to defend it, rather than it simply being taken down on receipt of a complaint. Should the need arise, complainants will be able to bring proceedings against those truly responsible for statements.
Defamation Bill
Lindsay Hoyle Excerpts(13 years, 8 months ago)
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Mr Lammy
The hon. Gentleman makes that point well. This is about the prominence given to the decision, and the fact that it is often nothing like as prominent as the original story. I do not think that the Bill has cracked that problem, but I hope that, as it passes through the Committee and goes to the other place, the matter will receive further scrutiny.
Much has been said about the internet, and I shall not add to it except to say that I am truly concerned about the position of young people, and young adults, in this regard. Many of us will be aware of Facebook bullying, for example, and I remain concerned that much of what is said about young people and young adults in such forums remains out there. The ability to fail, to make mistakes and to grow up in a private arena seems to have disappeared from our society. All of that now seems to be done in public. A lot of what used to be said by young people in the pub at the age of 17 or 18 would just disappear. Now, nothing disappears. It is visible for all to see. Many of us might have exercised this when employing a researcher. It is all there, and that is a matter of huge concern. Kicking this matter into secondary legislation is a concern, because it merits hard discussion. This relates to some of the issues being raised in Leveson, and those being raised in relation to privacy. The Joint Committee conducted its deliberations against the backdrop of super-injunctions and the issues that had arisen on the Twitter network just a few months ago.
The Bill is obviously needed, and it is good, but there are elements missing. Those elements were highlighted in the work of the Joint Committee and of Lord Lester, and I hope that they will garner greater scrutiny in the weeks and months ahead.
Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill
Lindsay Hoyle Excerpts(13 years, 9 months ago)
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Glenda Jackson (Hampstead and Kilburn) (Lab)
On a point of order, Mr Deputy Speaker. The Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport has announced on Radio 4 within the last hour that he will make a statement to the House this afternoon, presumably arising from the contributions made to the Leveson inquiry. Has he made that request to you, has it been granted, and if so when will the House hear the statement?
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
No message has been conveyed to me, and I know nothing of it.
Before Clause 43
Resolved,
That this House insists on its disagreement with Lords amendment 31 and proposes its amendment (a) in lieu.—(Mr Djanogly.)
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 83H), That a Committee be appointed to draw up Reasons to be assigned to the Lords for disagreeing to their amendments 1B, 2B and 196B;
That Mr Jonathan Djanogly, Mr Shailesh Vara, Mr Andy Slaughter, Yvonne Fovargue and Tom Brake be members of the Committee;
That Mr Jonathan Djanogly be the Chair of the Committee;
That three be the quorum of the Committee.
That the Committee do withdraw immediately.—(Jeremy Wright.)
Question agreed to.
Committee to withdraw immediately; reasons to be reported and communicated to the Lords.
Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill
Lindsay Hoyle Excerpts(13 years, 9 months ago)
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Glenda Jackson
The Lord Chancellor referred to a majority of cases. Citizens Advice says that the proportion of appeals that are upheld in work capability assessment cases, for example, rises from 40% to 90% when a legal adviser is involved. I am not saying that it will necessarily be about a point of law, to pick up the point made by the hon. Member for South Swindon (Mr Buckland), but there are occasions when a legal mind can clarify the situation. I do not think that the Lord Chancellor understands who the people are who go to appeal. He said that in domestic violence cases, they go to a solicitor. None of my constituents in that situation has a solicitor; they go to the CAB or to a law centre, many of which, in my constituency, are in grave danger of having their ability to provide those services reduced—
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
Order. The hon. Lady has had a good go at intervening three times. Could interventions please be shorter, because we have to get in a lot of other speakers who want to make points?
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
Order. A lot of people want to get in and I want to get them all in as quickly as possible, so if Members can try to keep their speeches short, that would be great.
Mrs Helen Grant (Maidstone and The Weald) (Con)
I declare an interest as a legal aid family lawyer who specialises in domestic violence. I shall speak to amendments that deal with the widening of the evidence gateway for victims of domestic violence and the time limits applied to that gateway. However, at the outset I pay tribute to the Government’s wide strategy of combating the scourge of domestic violence. During the course of this Bill’s progress, they have clearly demonstrated their commitment to the legal needs of victims of domestic violence and their related family law issues. The Government have my support, but I would have liked them to go a little further on the time limits.
Let me turn first to the evidence gateway. Domestic violence is so often a hidden crime. It is committed behind closed doors, where the victim’s primal need to preserve a relationship or family unit can overwhelm their fear of continued abuse. There are often no witnesses, save for the sad exception of children, and it is one person’s word against another’s if the police arrive on the scene. The vast majority of victims are women. They find help, support and guidance in the face of adversity through their GPs, hospitals, social services and DV support organisations. The Government are absolutely right to ensure that the gateway criteria reflect and accommodate the alternative routes that women—and some men—take to address the pain and suffering that they are experiencing. Evidence, in the form of medical reports and letters from health professionals, social services and refuges, is successfully relied on every day in the courts. Judges use it all the time to justify the making of non-molestation orders and occupation orders, under the Family Law Act 1996. If such evidence is acceptable to the courts in establishing violence, it should surely be acceptable to the Executive agency of the Ministry of Justice in making its funding decisions.
Some who suffer abuse have even heavier armoury to prevent the disclosure and reporting of domestic violence. Be it a matter of duty, shame or honour, there is often huge familial and cultural pressure in black and ethnic minority communities to avoid the police, lawyers and other statutory bodies. Women also often feel compelled to use alternative but unacceptable community mechanisms for dispute resolution, which can often expose them to increased risk of harm and injustice. A widening of the gateway will especially help those women and girls, many of whom also have practical problems in reporting violence owing to language barriers, unawareness of services and fear of deportation.
There is also a need to maintain consistency across Departments in our treatment of domestic violence. Since 2004, in dealing with applications for leave to remain on the grounds of domestic violence, the UK Border Agency has used similar criteria to those advocated today by the Government. Although I appreciate that the list of criteria is now used as indicative guidance rather than compulsory evidence, it should be accepted that during the last eight years it has worked effectively, and without opening the fearsome floodgates to the outside world.
Having given reasons to support the widening of the gateway, let me now deal with one of the principal objections that has been raised against it. During earlier Government consultations, evidence was submitted by the Law Society and other bodies which suggested that a domestic violence gateway for family legal aid could lead to false allegations. However, having worked as a legal aid family lawyer for more than 20 years, I can tell the House that the overwhelming majority of my clients would not have deliberately recruited social services into their affairs, inviting all the risks that go with such involvement, nor would they have left the family to place themselves and their children in a hostel or women’s refuge, or deliberately inflict injury on themselves or their children and then falsely report the injury to a GP or hospital. Such acts require a high degree of wanton and malicious forethought. Yes, dishonesty exists across every section of society, but we need to weigh up the quantum of potential abuse and balance it against the harm that would persist if we fail to provide essential legal services for the most vulnerable people in society.
On the time limit applied to the criteria, I do not believe that the gateway should remain open in perpetuity, but there are strong reasons for extending it beyond 12 months. Such a limit does not recognise the dynamic of domestic violence or the genuine potential for post-separation violence. Research published by Women’s Aid found that 76% of those who have experienced violence also experience post-separation violence. Also, many non-molestation injunction orders are granted for just six months or a year. It is a sad fact that on expiry a significant number of respondents return and bring to bear a threatening presence, albeit one that is perhaps not sufficient to merit the making of a further injunction order. For many women, especially those who have suffered years of abuse before taking any action, 12 months is simply not sufficient to reach a state of physical, emotional and financial readiness to commence divorce or other legal proceedings. Indeed, a short, 12-month limit could encourage women to take action too early or miss out altogether on the help they need.
In the fullness of time, however, things settle down. Acrimony reduces, people move on, people remarry, children grow up, and old wounds start to heal. We therefore have to question the equity of bleeding the scars of old battles simply to obtain legal aid ad infinitum. All this suggests that at some stage a statutory line has to be drawn under the issues of the past. My personal view is that three years, rather than one, would be more appropriate for the majority of cases, but I of course leave that open for debate.
Police
Lindsay Hoyle Excerpts(14 years ago)
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Mr Ruffley
Yes, and to those who say that a single individual will not necessarily have the skills to provide leadership and to be a good manager and forensic accountant, the straightforward rebuttal is that one would expect someone who was going to be up for re-election after four years to have their mind focused on what the electorate wanted and to bring in people who could help with that work. At the end of the day, the mandate given to an individual, and the knowledge that they are accountable to the people, should certainly focus the mind—not the minds of 17 people in a diffuse police authority, but the mind of one individual, who will certainly be accountable as police authorities are not so accountable at the moment.
On the ways in which a smaller number—not a hugely smaller number—of officers can deliver more police hours, I must say that they will be required to spend less time during the average shift in a police station and more time visibly on the streets. I have said that reducing bureaucracy is one way in which we can square that circle, but the Government’s future work, which I know my right hon. Friend the Policing Minister is driving forward personally, involves a streamlined crime recording procedure. The previous Government undertook such work, to which I shall be generous and pay tribute.
The four-force pilot involving Leicestershire, West Midlands, Shropshire and Surrey created a more streamlined and time-efficient way of recording incidents, with police officers given the discretion, over a certain range of offences, to write shorter reports. I should like to see that regime become absolutely standard throughout the 43 forces, so it would be useful to hear how many have adopted it.
There is more to be done on rolling back statutory charging. It is ridiculous that for quite a slew of offences a charging sergeant has to ring up the Crown Prosecution Service to get permission on some triable-either-way offences. It is fair to say that—
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
Order. I am very concerned that the hon. Gentleman is in danger of taking more time than the Front Benchers. That is not good for all those hon. Members who have waited a long time. We are on a time limited debate, which finishes at 3.47 pm and we have another 10 speakers to get in, so I hope that he is now coming to the end.
Mr Ruffley
I take note of what you have said, Mr Deputy Speaker, and shall bring my remarks to a conclusion; they were coming to a conclusion anyway.
The second way in which we can get the police to spend more hours visible and out there, so that people are aware that they are around, is greater collaboration. I will not repeat some of the initiatives that the Government—this Home Secretary, this Policing Minister —have driven forward, but that work goes ahead in Suffolk, delivering the efficiency savings that can be ploughed back into the front line. As I said, the savings could amount to £1.5 billion out of the total police budget if all the forces became as efficient as the currently most efficient one. That money could be ploughed back into the front line to obviate the need for any significant reduction in uniformed officers.
The message must go forth from this debate that in a tough economic climate, the spending reductions against historically high levels of police funding are not fatal to the fight against crime. The police must do more with less. The public want them to; they want the police to spend more time on the streets and less time behind their desks. In that spirit of cheerful optimism, I commend the Government’s policy and announcement today.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
I will now have to put a time limit on speeches. I am sorry to hon. Members waiting to speak; they must take the matter up with others. There is now to be a 10-minute limit, although that might have to be reduced.
Sir Gerald Kaufman
On a point of order, Mr Deputy Speaker. I completely understand what you have just said, but again and again when I come to the Chamber for time-limited debates, I find that huge amounts of time are taken. The Minister spoke for three quarters of an hour in a three-hour debate. I believe that in future there should be restraint from Government Front Benchers in time-limited debates.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
I do not want to get into an argument about either side. I understand that having a time limit is frustrating. A 10-minute time limit is being imposed. Members making speeches should take on board the fact that others are waiting to speak. I have brought in the time limit to try to get everybody in. That is the best that we can do. As I said, the limit may have to be reduced even further for later speakers.
Tony Lloyd
Had the hon. Gentleman been listening to my speech, he would have heard that I spoke at the beginning about the great strides that have already been made by the chief constable, the police authority and the police to make the service more efficient. There is no doubt that numbers of people have gone, and that that process has been managed so far. My argument—the hon. Gentleman may wish to ask his own police force about this—is that there is a point beyond which we cannot go. The loss of 20% of Greater Manchester's uniformed police by 2015 and a similar loss in numbers of non-uniformed staff cannot happen without its impinging on our ability to provide the visible policing that the Minister and others claim to want.
People in Greater Manchester are desperately concerned that the cuts are too fast and too deep, and that when push comes to shove, problems will emerge not in the Prime Minister’s constituency but in the inner-city areas of Manchester, Liverpool and Birmingham, and other equivalent areas. We are not getting the Boris bung that the Metropolitan police force has received, and the hon. Member for Skipton and Ripon (Julian Smith) ought to raise that issue with the Policing Minister. Historically, the Metropolitan police force has been better funded than the police in other metropolitan areas, and in a difficult financial year and when other metropolitan areas are being denied, it is hard for us once again to see London given an increase in spending. These cuts are too fast—
Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill
Lindsay Hoyle Excerpts(14 years, 3 months ago)
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The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Mr Jonathan Djanogly)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government new clause 9—Northern Ireland: information about financial resources.
New clause 17—Extension of scope of legal aid in complex cases—
‘(1) Civil legal services other than services described in Part 1 of Schedule 1 are to be available to an individual under this Part if subsection (2) is satisfied.
(2) This subsection is satisfied where the Director—
(a) has made a complex case determination in relation to the individual and the services, and
(b) has determined that the individual qualifies for the services in accordance with this Part,
(and has not withdrawn either determination).
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2), a complex case determination is a determination—
(a) that the individual has complex, interconnected needs in relation to which the individual requires comprehensive civil legal services, and
(b) not all of those civil legal services would otherwise be available to the individual because they do not all fall within the scope of Schedule 1.’.
New clause 43—Funding for civil legal advice—
‘(1) The Lord Chancellor may make funding available for the promotion of civil legal advice on matters not included in Schedule 1, Part 1 where it appears to the Lord Chancellor that the provision of such services would be consistent with the purpose of the civil legal services provided for under that schedule.
(2) The Lord Chancellor may make arrangements by—
(a) entering into funding arrangements with other Government departments and public bodies to facilitate the provision of services,
(b) making arrangements to support the delivery of civil legal advice through the provision of grant in aid to providers of legal services, including any consortia or partnership arrangements into which providers of legal services may choose to enter, and
(c) any additional arrangements which the Lord Chancellor considers appropriate to ensure the provision of services as set out in subsection (1).
(3) In making any such arrangements the Lord Chancellor shall ensure that value for money is achieved.
(4) Welsh Ministers shall be consulted upon the funding and provision of civil legal advice in Wales.
(5) “Civil legal advice” means the types of services given in section 7(1) and includes advice and assistance which is usually given by any representative in the steps preliminary or incidental to proceedings and as to any appeal, mediation and other forms of dispute resolution, but does not include representation for the purposes of proceedings.’.
Government new schedule 3—‘Northern Ireland: information about financial resources.
Amendment 162, in clause 1, page 2, line 7, at end insert—
‘(c) funding for the promotion of civil legal services, not including representation, on matters not included in Schedule 1, Part 1 where it appears to the Lord Chancellor that the provision of such services would be consistent with the purpose of the civil legal services provided for under that schedule.’.
Amendment 123, in clause 4, page 3, line 25, leave out subsection (4) and insert—
‘(4A) The Director must, except to the extent that section (4B) applies, act under the direction of the Lord Chancellor.
(4B) The Director must act independently when performing any functions or duties under this Part.’.
Amendment 116, page 8, line 29, leave out clause 12.
Amendment 104, in clause 12, page 8, line 31, leave out from ‘station’ to end of line 20 on page 9.
Amendment 125, page 8, line 35, leave out subsections (2) to (7).
Amendment 90, page 9, line 27, leave out subsection (9) and insert—
‘(9) Sections 20 and 26(2) do not apply in relation to this section’.
Amendment 148, page 21, line 7, leave out clause 26.
Government amendments 1, 2 and 25 to 27.
Amendment 69, in schedule 4, page 130, line 36, at end insert—
‘(3A) A transfer scheme shall make pension provision and compensation provision for and in respect of persons who become employed in the civil service of the State under paragraph 1 which is at least as favourable as the pension provision and compensation provision applicable to them immediately before they ceased to be employees of the Legal Services Commission.’.
Government amendment 64.
Amendment 71, page 131, line 9, at end insert—
‘“compensation provision” means the provision of compensation under a compensation scheme;’.
Amendment 70, page 131, line 14, at end insert—
‘“pension provision” means the provision of pension and other benefits under an occupational pension scheme;’.
Government amendments 65, 137, 66 to 68, 138, 19 and 54.
Mr Djanogly
We now move on, or perhaps I should say back to, legal aid. When we discussed legal aid on our first day on Report, we had two very constructive, albeit lengthy, debates in which I took more than three dozen interventions. That was partly the reason, along with the many valuable contributions that were made, why we were unable to cover all the groupings—[Interruption.] I know that that disappointed a number of hon. Members in all parts of the House.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
Order. Let us not start where we left off the other day. Let us see if we can make progress. We do not want to run out of time, and I am sure that those on both Front Benches want to make good time.
Mr Djanogly
I want to try to avoid delay today, so I shall speak to Government amendments now and respond to the points made in debate later, rather than pre-empting in my opening remarks what hon. Members may have to say about their amendments.
Government new clause 4, which is a technical amendment, has two purposes. First, it seeks to provide clarity about the role of the director of legal aid casework, by ensuring that the exercise of the functions of the office is on behalf of the Crown, and that service as the director is service in the civil service of the state. The second purpose of new clause 4 is to ensure that the Lord Chancellor is treated as a corporation sole for the purposes of part 1 of the Bill.
The new clause is necessary in order to clarify the position in relation to the Lord Chancellor’s ability to hold an interest in land for those purposes, and so applies to charges that transfer from the Legal Services Commission to the Lord Chancellor at the point when the LSC is abolished, and for future charges to be taken over property under clause 24. The statutory charge is the charge that arises under clause 24 on any property recovered or preserved, including costs, by a legally aided person in respect of the amounts spent by the Lord Chancellor in securing their legal aid services and any other amounts payable by them under clauses 22 and 23. The amendment is essential, as the current value of charges held by the LSC is £212 million.
Government new clause 9 and new schedule 3 make provision on information sharing in relation to checking a person’s financial eligibility for legal aid in Northern Ireland. They replicate for Northern Ireland the information gateway for England and Wales created by clause 21 and further provided for in clause 32. Government amendments 26 and 27 are technical amendments that make it clear that regulations made under new schedule 3 will be prescribed not by the Lord Chancellor but by the Northern Ireland Assembly. Government amendment 54 is also a technical amendment that makes it clear that the Bill extends to Northern Ireland for the purposes of new clause 9 and new schedule 3, which create the information gateway, and for the purposes of clauses 38 to 40. I should point out that under paragraph 2(4) of new schedule 3, it will be a criminal offence to use or disclose information contrary to the provisions of paragraph 2.
Government amendments 25 and 64 to 68 relate to the transfer of LSC employees to the civil service when the LSC is abolished. The powers currently set out in the Bill include a power, in schedule 4, for the Lord Chancellor to make transfer schemes to transfer to the Lord Chancellor or the Secretary of State the LSC’s rights, powers, duties and liabilities under or in connection with an LSC occupational pension scheme, of which there are currently two, or compensation scheme. The occupational pension and compensation scheme arrangements for LSC employees are different from those for existing civil servants. When the employees transfer to the civil service and become civil servants, they will join the principal civil service pension scheme.
Amendment 64 confers new powers upon the Lord Chancellor that can be exercised as part of any transfer scheme. Proposed new sub-paragraph (6A), set out in amendment 64, allows for the Lord Chancellor to apply legislation with modifications as far as it is necessary to give effect to any transfer scheme. That is appropriate when transfer schemes are of an administrative nature relating to the specific issues in question. For example, it will allow the Lord Chancellor to provide that an aspect of pensions legislation applies in a particular way to that particular scheme. It will assist, as appropriate, in enabling the continuation of the LSC pension scheme or schemes after the abolition of the LSC so that they can continue for the benefit of their pensioner and preserved members. Those are members who have contributed to the schemes before leaving LSC employment and either draw a pension from the scheme or will be entitled to do so in future.
For compensation scheme arrangements, as well as allowing the modification of legislation, proposed new sub-paragraph (6B), set out in amendment 64, provides that the transfer scheme may amend or otherwise modify the existing LSC compensation scheme. That will allow compensation arrangements for LSC employees transferring to the civil service to be brought into line with those of other civil servants over a transitional period.
Amendment 65 reflects the fact that when LSC employees transfer to the civil service there will no longer be any active members of the two current LSC occupational pension schemes, known as the No. 3 and No. 4 pension schemes. The amendment provides the Lord Chancellor with the power to make a scheme to merge the two residual pension schemes. It is explicit that a scheme exercising this power must not result in members of the pension schemes, or other beneficiaries under the schemes, being deprived of any rights accrued prior to the merger.
The LSC’s No. 3 pension scheme has fewer than 100 pensioner and preserved members, and no current LSC staff members. The No. 4 scheme is for current staff and also has a number of pensioner and preserved members. At present there is much duplication in the administration of the No. 3 and No. 4 schemes, such as producing two sets of accounts and actuarial valuations. Merging the schemes would allow us to cut significantly the administration costs of running two trust-based schemes. The amendment will also give the power to wind up an LSC occupational pension scheme.
Amendment 25 corrects a slip in clause 38(7)(j). The intention was not to make regulations that contain free-standing provision that modifies an Act either directly or indirectly, subject to the affirmative procedure. Amendments 66 to 68 clarify the fact that the regulation-making power provided to the Lord Chancellor under paragraph 10 of schedule 4 can be used in connection not only with transfers affected by schedule 4, but with schemes under schedule 4, meaning schemes dealing with something other than a transfer.
Government amendments 137 and 138 concern schedule 4 to the Bill, which governs transfers of employees and assets following the abolition of the LSC. They are purely technical amendments that simplify existing provisions. Paragraph 10(1) of schedule 4 currently allows the Lord Chancellor to make consequential supplementary, incidental or transitional provision by regulation, and paragraph 10(2)(b) specifies separately that such regulations may include transitory or savings provision. Rather than continue to separate these related provisions, for the purposes of simplification amendment 137 brings them together in a revised paragraph 10(1) and amendment 138 amends paragraph 10(2) to reflect that simplification. That mirrors an identical amendment to clause 115.
Finally, Government amendments 1, 2 and 19 are minor and technical amendments to clause 32 and schedule 5, consequential on the removal in Committee of what was then clause 71.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
That is not a point of order, but the hon. Gentleman has certainly got it on the record.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 4 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 9
Northern Ireland: information about financial resources
‘Schedule [Northern Ireland: information about financial resources] (Northern Ireland: information about financial resources) has effect.’.—(Mr Djanogly.)
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 17
Extension of scope of legal aid in complex cases
‘(1) Civil legal services other than services described in Part 1 of Schedule 1 are to be available to an individual under this Part if subsection (2) is satisfied.
(2) This subsection is satisfied where the Director—
(a) has made a complex case determination in relation to the individual and the services, and
(b) has determined that the individual qualifies for the services in accordance with this Part,
(and has not withdrawn either determination).
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2), a complex case determination is a determination—
(a) that the individual has complex, interconnected needs in relation to which the individual requires comprehensive civil legal services, and
(b) not all of those civil legal services would otherwise be available to the individual because they do not all fall within the scope of Schedule 1.’.—(Yvonne Fovargue.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Mr Slaughter
I beg to move amendment 21, page 29, line 6, leave out Clause 41.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 150, page 29, line 36, at end insert—
‘(4A) The amendments made by subsections (2) and (4) do not apply in relation to proceedings which include a claim for damages for loss or bodily injury resulting from exposure to a harmful substance or process where the claim is made against a person who—
(a) carries on business in more than one country, or
(b) owns (wholly or partly) one or more businesses carried on in more than one country or in different countries.’.
Amendment 164, page 29, line 36, at end insert—
‘(4A) The amendments made by subsections (2) and (4) do not apply in relation to a success fee payable under a conditional fee agreement made in relation to—
(a) any proceedings in relation to a claim for—
(i) libel,
(ii) slander,
(iii) misuse of private information;
(b) any proceedings arising out of the same cause of action as any proceedings to which sub-paragraph (a) refers.’.
Amendment 163, page 29, line 41, at end insert—
‘(7) The amendments made by subsections (2) and (4) do not apply in relation to a success fee payable under a conditional fee agreement made in relation to—
(a) any proceedings based on a claim of defamation; or
(b) any proceedings based on a claim of privacy under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights; or
(c) any proceedings arising out of the same cause of action as any proceedings to which paragraphs (a) or (b) refer.’.
Amendment 22, page 31, line 1, leave out clause 43.
Amendment 151, in clause 43, page 31, line 45, at end insert—
‘(6) This section does not apply in relation to a costs order made in favour of a party to proceedings which include a claim for damages for loss or bodily injury resulting from exposure to a harmful substance or process where the claim is made against a person who—
(a) carries on business in more than one country, or
(b) owns (wholly or partly) one or more businesses carried on in more than one country or in different countries.’.
Amendment 165, in clause 43, page 32, line 4, at end insert—
‘(4) The amendments made by this section do not apply in relation to a costs order made in favour of a party to proceedings in a cause of action in relation to a claim for—
(a) libel,
(b) slander,
(c) misuse of private information.’.
Amendment 72, page 32, line 5, leave out clause 44.
New clause 39—Road traffic accident pre-action protocol—
‘(1) The Table in Rule 45.29 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (SI 1998/3132) (Amount of fixed costs under the Pre-Action Protocol for Low Value Personal Injury Claims in Road Traffic Accidents) is amended as follows.
(2) The figure for Stage 1 shall be £200.
(3) The figure for Stage 2 shall be £400.
(4) The figure for Stage 3 for Type A fixed costs shall be £125.
(5) The figure for Stage 3 for Type B fixed costs shall be £125.
(6) Any further amendment to the Table shall not be made by the Civil Procedure Rule Committee but may be made by the Lord Chancellor by rules made by statutory instrument and may not be made until a draft of the rules has been laid before and approved by resolution of both Houses of Parliament.’.
Mr Slaughter
This is an important group of amendments to part 2 of the Bill, which deals with a complex and vital area of access to justice. Because there are only 20 minutes left to debate this group, and I want to be fair to the Minister and give him 10 minutes to reply, I shall speak quickly in the hope of getting through the main part of my argument. I should make it clear at the outset that I wish to press to a vote amendment 21, which would undo the destruction of conditional fee agreements that the Government are pushing through in the Bill. I also ask, with the leave of my hon. Friend the Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant), the lead signatory to amendment 163, that we press that amendment to a vote.
Conditional fee agreements, also known as no win, no fee agreements, were brought in by a Conservative Government to preserve access to justice for those on moderate means at a time when vast areas were being removed from the scope of legal aid and eligibility criteria were being removed. The provisions were amended, with a remarkable lack of contention from the Conservative Opposition, in the Access to Justice Act 1999, to create their modern form.
The idea of contingency fee agreements was to create a viable market in legal services by introducing success fees paid by losing defendants—wrongdoers, in other words—to compensate lawyers for the cases that they lost, for which, of course, they received no fees. For lawyers, that form of payment by results meant not that they would take on spurious cases, but that they were allowed to take on cases that might be 75:25 or 50:50. That has created a system that works, for the main part, very well. It has created a viable market in legal services and permitted access to justice for millions since it was introduced.
What sort of people have availed themselves of contingency fee agreements? More than half of those who have used them have had an income below £25,000 a year and only 18% have had an income of more than £40,000 a year. Government Members carp on about footballers and models using them, but the average claimant is the average constituent.
How do the Government’s proposals work? First, winning claimants will lose. Victims will have to pay the costs of their insurance and their lawyer’s success fees from their damages—up to 25% of damages, aside from damages for future care, can be taken by the lawyer, and the insurance premium will take up even more of those damages, perhaps wiping them out altogether. To make up for part of those losses, the Government plan a 10% increase in damages for pain, suffering and loss of amenity. Simple maths should be sufficient to show that that will not make up for all losses.
Losing claimants, including those bringing speculative and nuisance claims, will gain. They will benefit because it is unlikely that they will have to pay the costs of the winning defendant—that is part of the perverse, qualified one-way cost-shifting scheme that the Government intend to introduce when the Bill passes.
Losing defendants—wrongdoers, in other words—and their insurers will gain. Wrongdoers will benefit, because they do not have to pay the cost of after-the-event insurance or the victim’s lawyer’s success fees, thus limiting their liabilities and those of their insurers. Winning defendants will lose out. A winning defendant will no longer be able to reclaim the cost of their defence, thanks to qualified one-way cost shifting. To summarise, winners lose and losers win. That is simply wrong.
There was a time when the Conservative party worried about access to justice, but now it appears to be nothing more than the parliamentary wing of the insurance lobby, which according to an investigation by The Guardian has donated £4.9 million to the Tories since the Prime Minister became leader.
I have spent the past few months speaking to victims who have used contingency fee agreements to get justice. I have heard them tell me how our justice system helped them, and their fears that others who suffer in future will not get the help they need. A number of areas of law will be badly—
Mr Wallace
PPSs are allowed to make points of order. Throughout the proceedings on the Bill Opposition Front Benchers, particularly the hon. Member for Hammersmith (Mr Slaughter), have made points about the perceived failure of Government Front Benchers to declare their interests. However, the hon. Gentleman has failed to point out that on 119 separate occasions the Labour party has received donations from lawyers who make their money from success fees.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
Order. That is not a point of order and the matter was dealt with earlier in the week. Let us have no more of that.
Mr Slaughter
Let me just say that if the Government start talking about conflicts of interest on this Bill, they will open a Pandora’s box.
Mr Deputy Speaker
Order. We are not going to open Pandora’s box. We are going to deal with the amendments before us.
Mr Slaughter
I was not talking about the Minister; I was talking about the Bill. I am not surprised that the Minister’s PPS is embarrassed by the Bill, after sitting through our proceedings in Committee.
The common link between parts 1 and 2 of the Bill is the destruction of access to justice in a way that we have not seen since the introduction of legal aid by a Labour Government after the second world war. The insurance industry is being given one of the biggest pay-offs in history which, as we know from experience, will go into the pockets of their directors and shareholders. While other aspects of this Bill display the startling incompetence of this Government, none shows their intent more truly than the provisions in part 2, which would give the whip hand to large public and private corporations, while taking rights away from ordinary people. What is the point in having rights if they cannot be enforced?
I ask the Liberal Democrats to look at amendment 21, which would deal with cases such as Trafigura and pleural plaques, and amendment 163, which would deal with cases such as that of Milly Dowler, and join us in the Lobby tonight.
Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill
Lindsay Hoyle Excerpts(14 years, 3 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Mr David Blunkett (Sheffield, Brightside and Hillsborough) (Lab)
I shall be extremely brief, given the time. It would be helpful, following the Secretary of State’s meeting with me and my right hon. Friend the Member for Wythenshawe and Sale East (Paul Goggins), if he assured the House that reconsideration of the detail will take place in the House of Lords. There is no difference between those of us who accept that the original intention has not been followed through and those who think that the changes that my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) introduced have not fully bitten as intended, but the propositions before us this afternoon do not meet the specific need that was identified back in the early 2000s by my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn, and which I carried into being.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
Order. The right hon. Gentleman knows that he should make a short intervention, not a speech at this stage.
Mr Deputy Speaker
Order. I remind the right hon. Gentleman that he may have finished, but he should not take so long in future.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
Order. May we have brevity? We want to hear as many speakers as possible.
Guy Opperman (Hexham) (Con)
I declare an interest as a former barrister and a former criminal prosecutor, who has worked on several murder trials.
I assure my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley (Philip Davies) that I am not soft on crime, but I support the Government in their reform of this untenable, shocking and wrong system. With great respect to the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw), he should hang his head in shame for being party to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, both of which were useless pieces of legislation that introduced something that the Prison Reform Trust, the Institute for Criminal Policy Research, the Nuffield Foundation and the criminal justice joint inspectorate described as
“one of the least carefully planned and implemented pieces of legislation in the history of British sentencing.”
The flip-flops of the shadow Justice Secretary would put a kangaroo to shame. It is entirely right to reform a system that was underfunded, worked poorly and is manifestly wrong in the circumstances of a 21st-century country. I will speak only briefly but I remind the right hon. Member for Blackburn of the comments in the House of Lords on the 2003 and 2008 Acts, when the Lords addressed IPPs in the cases of the Crown v. James and the Crown v. Lee. In a decision that effectively lambasted the then Secretary of State, Lord Hope of Craighead said:
“There is no doubt that the Secretary of State failed deplorably in the public law duty…He failed to provide the systems and resources that prisoners serving those sentences needed to demonstrate to the Parole Board by the time of the expiry of their tariff periods…that it was no longer necessary for the protection of the public that they should remain in detention.”
I could go on to quote from the judgments of Lord Carswell and Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, but I shall pause there.
I have made it clear that I am not soft on crime, as others have suggested. The debate has sadly been too short, but the new clause should certainly be supported by the House.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Mr Jonathan Djanogly)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Amendment (a), after first ‘paid’ in (1)(a), insert
‘will be paid, has made an agreement to be paid,’.
Amendment (b), after ‘pays’ in (1)(b), insert
‘will pay, has made an agreement to pay’.
Amendment (c), after first ‘paid’ in (2)(b), insert
‘will be paid, has made an agreement to be paid,’.
Amendment (e), at end of (4)(b), insert—
‘(2A) A breach of the provisions of this section shall be an offence, punishable on summary conviction by a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or on indictment for a term of imprisonment not exceeding two years, or a fine, or both.’.
Government new clause 19—Effect of the rules against referral fees—
‘(1) The relevant regulator must ensure that it has appropriate arrangements for monitoring and enforcing the restrictions imposed on regulated persons by section [Rules against referral fees].
(2) A regulator may make rules for the purposes of subsection (1).
(3) The rules may in particular provide for the relevant regulator to exercise in relation to anything done in breach of that section any powers (subject to subsections (5) and (6)) that the regulator would have in relation to anything done by the regulated person in breach of another restriction.
(4) Where the relevant regulator is the Financial Services Authority, section [Regulation by the FSA] applies instead of subsections (1) to (3) (and (7) to (9)).
(5) A breach of section [Rules against referral fees]—
(a) does not make a person guilty of an offence, and
(b) does not give rise to a right of action for breach of statutory duty.
(6) A breach of section [Rules against referral fees] does not make anything void or unenforceable, but a contract to make or pay for a referral or arrangement in breach of that section is unenforceable.
(7) Subsection (8) applies in a case where—
(a) a referral of prescribed legal business has been made by or to a regulated person, or
(b) a regulated person has made an arrangement as mentioned in section [Rules against referral fees](2)(a),
and it appears to the regulator that a payment made to or by the regulated person may be a payment for the referral or for making the arrangement (a “referral fee”).
(8) Rules under subsection (2) may provide for the payment to be treated as a referral fee unless the regulated person shows that the payment was made—
(a) as consideration for the provision of services, or
(b) for another reason,
and not as a referral fee.
(9) For the purposes of provision made by virtue of subsection (8) a payment that would otherwise be regarded as consideration for the provision of services of any description may be treated as a referral fee if it exceeds the amount specified in relation to services of that description in regulations made by the Lord Chancellor.’.
Amendment (a) to new clause 19, leave out subsection 5.
Amendment (b), leave out from ‘services’ in (8)(a) to end of paragraph (b) and insert
‘but only where the consideration was proportionate and reasonable in the circumstances.’.
Government new clause 20—Regulation by the FSA.
Government new clause 21—Regulators and regulated persons.
Government new clause 22—Referral fees: regulations.
Government amendment 139.