Health and Care Bill

Justin Madders Excerpts

2nd reading
Wednesday 14th July 2021 Commons Chamber

[Justin Madders (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab)]

In today’s debate we have heard from 37 hon. and right hon. Members, as well as the Member for Delyn (Rob Roberts), and another 29 hon. Members registered an interest to speak but were not called. A huge range of topics has been covered, some of which I hope to address briefly. I hope Members will forgive me if I cannot mention each contribution individually.

Many Members have talked about the particular geographic configuration of their ICS, and it is clear that there is lots of unhappiness about that in certain parts of the country. That is hardly surprising, given that has been done without any parliamentary oversight so far. It seems that, under the Bill, Parliament will not even get to approve where the boundaries lie.

There has been no attempt at public consultation or discussion about where these boundaries sit, and that is a theme throughout the Bill. Decisions, money and power move further away from the public and closer to the Secretary of State. He is certainly taking back control but, at the same time, he is silencing the patient voice.

In the Bill, the Secretary of State has a veto on who leads the integrated care systems, and he can stop foundation trusts borrowing money that they desperately need to tackle the £9 billion maintenance backlog. He even has the power to decide whether to instigate the closure of local services.

By contrast, when the 2012 Act was going through Parliament, Lord Lansley, who was then Secretary of State, told the Chamber:

“We want clinicians and their patients to lead the NHS, but they cannot do this while they sit under a vast hierarchy of regional and local organisations, all reporting to Whitehall. Everyone agrees that top-down command and control gets in the way of clinicians doing their job”.—[Official Report, 31 January 2011; Vol. 522, c. 613.]

The Bill supercharges command and control, so it is little wonder that even the British Medical Association has come out against it. It creates a vast web of new organisations, but very few of them will make decisions. It is pretty clear that the integrated care partnerships in particular will be little more than bystanders when it comes to the crunch, and that the boards will have all the power. That is a huge democratic deficit that must not be allowed to go unchallenged. When we hear about companies such as Virgin already having a seat on one of the ICS boards in the south-west we know that the power lies in totally the wrong place. The Bill needs to make it crystal clear that private companies should be a million miles from making decisions about how the NHS is run.

At the same time, the Bill does not legislate for boards to include a representative from a mental health organisation, for example. How will that encourage integration, let alone parity of esteem? There are plenty of others who are not guaranteed a seat at the table but who ought to be in the vanguard of integration: directors of adult social care, directors of public health, carers and, most of all, patients, who seem to have been completely forgotten in all this. How will decisions be made by the boards? Will there be transparency about where the money is spent in those areas which, we should not forget, are much larger than clinical commissioning groups. How can we be sure that the money will go to those parts of the ICS with the most need, and how can that be challenged if it does not?

We have seen the blatant abuse of the levelling-up fund, and party political considerations seep into every decision made by the Government. Will it now be patients who pay the price for that? How will the combined trust deficits of £910 million be met? The danger is that the Bill will force ICSs to close small local services to bail out the bigger trusts.

While we welcome an end to section 75 provision, I wonder exactly how much money has been wasted in convoluted procurement processes and legal challenges. Is it £3 billion, £4 billion or £5 billion? Whatever the final figure, there is no doubt that that money could be better spent on frontline services. While moving away from that monumental mistake is a good thing, it seems as if we are going from one extreme to the other, with the removal of any safeguards at all on who contracts can be awarded to. The Government are legislating for cronyism. I am sure that pub landlords and pest control companies will be delighted, but we cannot give the Secretary of State the blank cheque that the Bill allows.

There is a huge blank sheet of paper where the plan to tackle the workforce crisis ought to be. The Secretary of State will produce a report once every five years, but that is not a serious commitment to the workforce. Indeed, it is not a serious commitment to Parliament either, and the social care workforce is not even mentioned. Let us not forget that we have 122,000 vacancies in that workforce. The Select Committee has set out the kind of people whom we really ought to aim to employ, with annual, independently audited reports that cover the NHS and social care. In the words of the Select Committee:

“The way that the NHS does workforce planning is at best opaque and at worst responsible for the unacceptable pressure on the current workforce which existed even before the pandemic.”

The Bill will only reinforce that position, rather than reverse it.

In the introduction that the Secretary of State gave to the Bill today, it sounded very much as if he thought that it was the panacea that we have all been waiting for, but many more experienced Members could be forgiven for having a sense of déjà vu. Let us remind ourselves of what Lord Lansley told the House about the 2012 reforms:

“Previous changes have tinkered with one piece of the NHS or another, when what was needed was comprehensive modernisation to create an NHS fit for the demands of the 21st century. That is precisely what this Health and Social Care Bill will deliver.”—[Official Report, 31 January 2011; Vol. 522, c. 616.]

The Health and Social Care Bill provided for the constitution and structure of the NHS to work for the long term. How has that worked out? There are record waiting lists and staff vacancies; billions diverted into the private sector away from the NHS; life expectancy has stalled; and A&E targets have been missed five years in a row. The NHS was trying to unpick the last disastrous reorganisation before the ink was even dry on the Royal Assent, so why is this set of reforms going to be any more successful than the last? How is one line of this Bill going to tackle the operation backlog? Is not the truth that without a proper sustained funding settlement to meet the demand in both health and social care, this latest set of reforms is merely another rearrangement of the deckchairs? Why, oh why, is so much time and resource being focused on a wasteful, top-down reorganisation, in the middle of the pandemic? Even the Prime Minister told us on Monday that we are not out of it yet. Only today, planned operations have been cancelled in Newcastle because of a surge in covid cases. Is it not the case that every meeting called, every document written, every minute spent on this top-down reorganisation is less time spent on fighting the increase in covid cases we currently see, bringing down waiting lists, tackling the increase in mental health conditions, solving the workforce crisis and actually delivering the reform to social care that the Prime Minister promised nearly two years ago?

This Bill is the equivalent of someone reorganising the whole interior of their house, spending fortunes on new furniture and decorations, but finding it is all ruined within months because they forgot to put a roof over their head; we cannot fix the NHS if we do not fix social care. We know that, everybody knows that. The Government say they have a plan, but we still do not know what it is. Crucially, for the purposes of today’s debate, we do not know whether it will fit in with what is in this Bill. So are we going to have yet another reorganisation next year because there was no forward thinking? What about learning the lessons from covid? The inquiry is not even going to start until next year, so are we going to see yet another reorganisation when we have learned the lessons from that? The only thing guaranteed from this reorganisation is that another one will surely follow shortly afterwards. So let us reject this Bill, go back to the drawing board and come up with a plan that actually deals with the challenges that we have to face.

Health and Care Bill (First sitting)

Justin Madders Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 7th September 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Hywel Williams]

Thank you.

[Justin Madders (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab)]

Q Good morning. Thank you for coming. I am sure that you will be aware that everyone in the country, and the whole Committee, is very grateful for the work done by frontline health and social care staff, not only over the past 18 months, but over many years. The consequences of that work have been starkly drawn to everyone’s attention by the Health Committee report on staff burnout. What in the Bill will address the issues raised in the report?

Dr Navina Evans: I will give you three points that are really important. One is the absolute priority, focus and prominence given to looking after our workforce. Again, we will build on work that we have already been doing in the last few years. For example, in the interim pupil plan, there is a very strong focus on wellbeing, culture, leadership and retention. We have been working, together with Danny’s organisation and others, on thinking with staff about retention. One thing that is really important is looking after people. There are lots of good examples of work being done all around the country to improve wellbeing and therefore retention, and to minimise or prevent burnout. This is quite high on the agenda for our partners in NHS England and NHS Improvement. It is very high on the agenda for us in HEE, because we look after our students, trainees and learners, who are also part of the workforce, and they tell us what helps to keep them well and prevent burnout. We need to start doing that work, which is part of our business, very early on.

I am pleased to say that our partners in the universities, royal colleges and other professional bodies are really mindful of this. They all have work streams around wellbeing and preventing burnout. In the Bill, we can highlight the importance of this, and build on work that is already being done to look after our staff.

[The Chair]

Thank you. I intend to move to the SNP spokesperson at 10.15 am, and to the Minister at 10.25; the session ends at 10.30. If we can keep questions and answers succinct, that would be appreciated.

Danny Mortimer: Noted, Mrs Murray.

I agree with everything that Navina has said, and it is a huge focus for the health service. In terms of supporting the health and wellbeing of staff, I think the Bill can go further under the terms of clause 33—it represents the conversation that we have had with them a couple of times. Absolutely we should support people and absolutely we should care for them, but if there are gaps in their rotas and in their teams that only increases the pressure on people who are already working flat-out. The pandemic has shown us starkly where those gaps and needs are, but we were experiencing them before the pandemic. There are parts of our workforce—mental health, learning disability nursing and some of our smaller allied health professions, such as therapeutic radiography—that absolutely need urgent long-term investment. We need that investment in staff as well as in the pressing need that we saw covered in social care settings and in hospitals during the pandemic. The requirement for a regular assessment of what the health and social care system requires to meet the needs of the population would help us to support that.

[Justin Madders]

Q You were very clear in your view of what was needed to make clause 33 more effective. In your opinion, would the clause also require some funding requirements to meet the demand?

Danny Mortimer: I do not know to what extent Parliament is able to, or is willing to, pre-commit Governments to funding decisions such as you have described. Absolutely, that would bring clarity for us all in terms of what was needed, and it may well offer clarity in terms of the prioritisations that we have to make on investment in the workforce. We have seen a massive expansion in our medical workforce, particularly in hospitals, in the past 20 years, but we have not seen a similar expansion in the nursing workforce. That is not something that was clearly set out for us and for a Government to help make decisions about. I think a clearer, more effective clause 33 would help a Government to do that, and in turn help a Parliament to support a Government in that.

[Justin Madders]

Q Thank you. I have a quick question for Dr Evans, and then one more question for you both. You have mentioned the commission that you have been asked to form to draw up that strategy. When is that expected to be published?

Dr Navina Evans: We expect to go back to the Minister with our findings by early March. After that, we will have a clearer understanding of when we will publish our framework.

[Justin Madders]

Q May I ask you both whether you have given any thought to, or been able to quantify, the amount of staff and management time that will be taken on implementing the Bill?

Dr Navina Evans: From our perspective in Health Education England, our input is quite confined to the workforce planning. We are able to manage within our existing resources and to redefine and redeploy them. We are also able to work collaboratively with partners who are very willing to help us in this work.

Danny Mortimer: I cannot give you an exact figure, Mr Madders, but I can reassure the Committee that the way in which the proposed change will be implemented is much more about minimising the organisational disruption change that we have experienced with previous reforms, either the one 10 years ago or the one a decade before that. We are seeing a clear commitment to move staff who are currently employed in clinical commissioning groups—the Bill will disband those groups—to the new ICS organisations. That is a very positive way of managing the change rather than that experienced previously, which was hugely time-consuming in terms of management time and hugely unsettling for vital staff in terms of planning services. We are avoiding the problems that we faced in the past. Amanda and her colleagues at NHS England are to be commended for the proportionate and sensible manner in which they are looking to implement the changes, especially in terms of how they impact on people and organisations.

[Justin Madders]

Thank you. For the last minute, I am going to hand over to my colleague.

[Alex Norris (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)]

Q I have a very quick question for Danny Mortimer. You have the unenviable task of negotiating with the staff and their representative unions on all sorts of issues—pay, terms and conditions, safety. When you have such negotiations, how high up on the list does a commissioning restructure come in terms of the things that our front-line staff are really after?

Danny Mortimer: We have a really constructive set of relationships in the NHS with our trade unions, on both terms and conditions and the social partnership forum, which the Minister’s colleague Helen Whately chairs and which brings trade unions and employers together.

There is an interest in how the health service organises itself, and there is an interest in how the health service and our friends in social care can better work together to relieve the pressure that our colleagues were experiencing even before the pandemic. Of course, there are other things that people are interested in as well. There are outstanding questions about long-term pay strategy, and there are other issues around working environments and support that Navina touched on. Those are really important as well.

There is a recognition, when I speak to trade union leaders and representatives, of the opportunities available through system working to improve service delivery, and therefore to help their committed members do their jobs better and relieve the pressure that they have been under for far too long.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Thank you. We now move to the shadow Minister, Mr Justin Madders, and Mr Alex Norris.

[Justin Madders]

Q Good morning and congratulations on your appointment, Ms Pritchard. Obviously, the NHS has got lots of challenges. Covid is still very much in play, and there are the waiting lists and the workforce crisis. To your mind, which is the biggest challenge that the NHS faces and how will it be addressed by this Bill?

Amanda Pritchard: One of the really important things in all of this, of course, is that we do not over-claim for what the Bill will achieve. If I look at what has happened in the NHS over the last 18 months to two years, it is absolutely clear to me that the ability to work together has been critical to the ability of the country to respond to covid, and the opportunity now to strengthen those arrangements, write them into legislation and remove some of the barriers that exist will be an important factor in helping the health service now, in partnership with local government, education and others that we have talked about, absolutely to recover from the challenges of the last year and to continue to build on those really strong local arrangements that have been such a hallmark of the way that things have worked over the last couple of years.

But of course, that is only one part of what it will take for the NHS to respond to the challenges that we have at the moment. It is absolutely right that the NHS staff, who have worked so tirelessly over the past two years and of course beyond to look after what we now know are over 400,000 covid in-patients, get the backing and the funding they need, not just to deal with what is very much still with us, with covid in our hospitals and communities right now, but absolutely to make sure that we are as front-foot as possible in tackling the inevitable backlogs that have built up over the past couple of years.

There is a complex set of things. Workforce is critical: the support we give to the people who have already done so much for us—we continue to invest in them and support them, so that we have the right pipeline for new staff joining, the right skills and the right support. Then there is the funding that we need to do the work that we have, and the capital funding to invest in some of the transformation that has already begun and needs to continue. But also, I think the Bill provides us with the framework to continue to support that really powerful local joint working that we have seen over the last two years, and which we are already seeing really at the heart of the covid recovery within the NHS and more broadly.

[Justin Madders]

Q You touched on funding. You will obviously be aware of what NHS Providers and the NHS Confederation said last week about what might be required to address the operation backlog. Do you think that figure is about right?

Amanda Pritchard: It is worth saying that there are some big unknowns in the position at the moment. We just do not know, really, how covid is going to play out over the next few months and years. One of the things that colleagues have talked about, and are very aware of, is that a lot of people did not come forward for care over the past two years. One of the messages that I would like to give again is that, for anyone who is concerned about symptoms, the NHS is absolutely open for business. Please do come forward and seek diagnosis, treatment and support.

We do not know, as we sit here today with two big variables, quite how things are going to play out. What we can say for certain is that today we have over 6,000 people with covid in hospitals. It is costing the NHS more both to care for those patients safely, with all of the infection control arrangements that need to be in place—

[The Chair]

Thank you for that, but I just remind the shadow Minister to keep within the scope of the Bill.

[Justin Madders]

Q Of course. I was merely responding to the answer that was given. In terms of how the Bill is implemented, what would you say success will look like in five years’ time?

Amanda Pritchard: Actually, in some ways that does link to what I was just saying, because—you would expect me to say this—just to reflect the reality of where we are now, covid is still with us, but we also have a real commitment and opportunity to lean in now to that recovery of routine services. I think success looks clearly like we now have the platform right to be able to continue to evidence that local partnership working is really making a difference. What does that mean? It means partnership in practice, both to deal with the current challenges that the NHS is facing and will continue to face, and to start to show that we can really eat into the backlog of routine care that we know is with us and make the commitment, which I know is felt so deeply across the NHS, to tackling inequalities and really trying to think about some of those long-term planning commitments that talked about prevention and outcomes.

We want to see progress against all those things, but we also want to continue to support local systems, as they have been all the way through, to partner together to continue to deliver things such as the vaccine programme in really innovative ways. For me, this is all about putting the NHS on a firmer statutory footing, whereby partnership becomes the way that we do things, building on what has happened over the last few years and removing any remaining barriers that we know exist and which stop us progressing with the really important job now of improving care for the population and for our patients.

[Justin Madders]

Q Could you just turn that around to the patient’s experience? I know that there are so many different variables in this, but from a patient’s perspective, how will the Bill improve their experience?

Amanda Pritchard: Thank you for that, because from the NHS perspective, the reason we have been supportive, particularly of the integration parts of the Bill, is that it is all about what it enables us to do for patients. Mark and I have done a lot over the last few weeks and months. We have seen so many examples in practice of where it is about the ability to work in partnership, whether that is about mental health crisis lines that are partly delivered through the voluntary sector, with a bit of funding from the NHS, but with support from specialists and mental health trusts as well as primary care. It is about coming together to create those sorts of innovative services, whether it is children’s and young people’s services, such as in south-east London, or whether it is in schools, picking up where children and families have medical and health problems. It is about linking them to the right support within local government, housing and so forth.

That is the sort of thing that we have seen develop over the last few years. As I say, it has been turbocharged through covid, but what we now want to do—this is the critical part of the legislation—is to make that easier. We want to make it the norm and allow people the right opportunities to come together and think about what their population needs and what will make services. It is back to the triple aim of improving the health of the population, the quality of care for patients and the sustainability of services. But ultimately, it is about being able to work together to set up those sorts of innovative arrangements, to see them embedded in practice and to see the NHS working in an integrated way around individuals as the norm. Let me bring in Mark, because this is absolutely his operational space.

Mark Cubbon: Thank you, Amanda. Going back to what patients can expect to see, I think they can expect our local integrated care systems to continue all the efforts to engage with our communities and talk about how we are planning to provide more joined-up care for our communities, because that is one of the key benefits that we will get from the new arrangements. There will be fewer hand-offs in care and fewer organisational boundaries for patients to bump into occasionally, so that we can have joined-up conversations and talk about how things are going to be better. Our local systems, leaders and clinicians will be better placed, so that we really face into and talk about how we will reduce the inequalities and deliver better outcomes. That engagement will be really important, and I think we will build on what works well at the moment and continue to make sure that the patient point is front and centre of all that we are trying to do. We have clinicians leading the charge, in terms of the delivery of those services.

[Justin Madders]

Is there time for a quick question?

[The Chair]

Absolutely.

[Justin Madders]

Q In terms of the reorganisation, we know that they always come with a price tag. Do you have a figure for how much the reorganisation that will follow, which is being undertaken as a result of the Bill, will cost the NHS?

Amanda Pritchard: Mark, do you want to pick this one up? I know you have been leading on this issue for us.

Mark Cubbon: I will indeed. This is definitely a different change from 2012, and probably different from any other changes that have been put in place in previous times as well. We are very much approaching this in the way that we have done. From the outset, we have given a clear message and reassurance to staff who are working in CCGs on job security, so that they know that almost all posts, and the individuals holding those posts, will transfer over to the new organisations. There are not big redundancy bills attached to these changes. We very much want to make sure that the job security is there and that the roles are transferred—

[Justin Madders]

Q Sorry to cut across you, Mark, but I am running up against time and do not want to upset the Chair. I was just looking for a figure. Do you have a figure for how much this is all costing?

Mark Cubbon: We do not have a figure for all the changes, but we know that the CCG cost envelope, which is attributed to every CCG as it stands at the moment, is the cost envelope that will be allocated to each of the ICSs as well. We are not expecting the running costs to be significantly different from those that we have for CCGs.

[Justin Madders]

Thank you.

[Dr Whitford]

Q Following on from Dr Davies’s comments about the structure of the ICS board and the representation of some of the sectors, such as mental health, we have not talked much about the partnerships this morning, so could you explain what you think their role is? I know there are concerns about who will be represented on them, potential conflicts of interest—obviously, particularly around the lack of financial transparency if private providers are used—and some of the sectors, such as dentistry, community pharmacy, end of life and palliative care. People on the ground, at the frontline, are not sure who will represent them in either of those structures to ensure that that service is available for every community and that we do not end up with postcode prescribing. Will there be some guidance? How do you think that will work? I will start with Mark and then go to Amanda, because this is nuts and bolts.

Mark Cubbon: The ICB is essentially how the NHS leaders come together specifically to oversee how resources are allocated and how the NHS delivers its side of the bargain, in terms of how the rest of the ICS works and is able to support integration. The ICP—the partnership—is where we bring together other partners who will have a view, an input and a role to play in that integration agenda. That is essentially, at a very high level, the separation of the partnership and the ICB itself.

On how we get representative views from the whole breadth of the clinical community, again this was published in our guidance—we have further guidance that was published last week—which talks about the clinical community, based on all the engagement that has been done so far. The kind of arrangements that we are very likely to see are where we have clinical reference groups and clinical boards that start to shape all the representative views that give a holistic perspective on how services should be planned and how we should be delivering services for our patients and communities.

Although not every individual will have a seat around the board or partnership table, we are advising the boards and clinicians across the whole footprint to ensure there is deep-rooted engagement. We are trying to galvanise the clinical community and get consensus on the direction of travel in terms of how services should be delivered for patients to deliver better outcomes. That is what we are encouraging our local ICSs to do. We are giving as much guidance as possible, but it will be down to this local flexibility so that our clinicians locally can start to work out how they best come together to do all the things I just set out.

Health and Care Bill (Second sitting)

Justin Madders Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 7th September 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

We had better move on.

[Justin Madders (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab)]

Q Good afternoon. Obviously, you have the ICB and the ICP both within an ICS. If there is a disagreement between them about the direction of travel on a particular policy issue, who arbitrates? In your opinion, who is likely to be sided with in such a dispute?

Matthew Taylor: I defer to Saffron on that one.

Saffron Cordery: I think this is one of those elements that we have seen quite a lot of throughout the legislation in terms of where is the recourse—that is not the right word, but I cannot think of another one right now—if things go wrong. Collaboration by its very nature is a positive process where willing parties come together to reach agreement. Everyone’s hope and aspiration is that that is how ICSs will work overall, and that is how the ICB and ICP will work together. It is not currently clear how there will be recourse to arbitration or dispute resolution, if you like, in the process of this legislation. We have seen an optimistic approach to how this legislation has been brought together—rightly in some senses—and of course we do not want a situation where we are anticipating that the evolution of a new way of working will not be functional. At the same time, the role of legislation is to anticipate what can go wrong, as well as to support what needs to be done. It is not yet clear how some of this will shake out in terms of where ICBs and ICPs need to turn to should there be challenges, issues and disagreements. We have to remember that those bodies, once they have their independent chairs and accountable officers and chief executives, sit within the NHS system, so they sit within the regional NHS England system and within the overall NHS system. Routes will be pursued, but at the moment it is not clear to me how disputes, for want of a better word, will be resolved.

Matthew Taylor: The only thing I would want to add is that during covid, we have understood the scale of health inequalities. The evidence has been that those inequalities are growing. That has demonstrated that we need a conversation between the health service in relation to how it deals with the demand that is presented to it and the wider question about how we address population health. In some cases, that might mean that you have some creative tension between those two levels. As Saffron said, it will come down to the quality of relationships, and if those relationships break down, I am sure that the centre will need to intervene to address that because the system cannot work if it breaks down. But the fact that those two bodies might have a slightly different emphasis and focus is probably a good thing because this debate about how we best use our health resources to address population health and health inequalities is an important debate for us to be having nationally and locally. Let us face it, we have not got this right up till now.

[Justin Madders]

Q On the Secretary of State’s powers of intervention on reconfigurations, is it your understanding that a local system could agree across the board that particular changes were necessary and actually that it was important for reasons of patient safety that those changes were made but that the Secretary of State could intervene at any time to stop them?

Matthew Taylor: Yes, unfortunately that is our understanding, and we think that it would be a retrograde step. It is not a power that I would want if I were a Secretary of State and I wanted to focus on strategic policy questions. I would not have advised the Secretary of State to want those powers.

Our view would be that we should remove the extension of the Secretary of State’s power entirely, but, failing that, we should put some guard rails on in relation to hearing the views of local health overview and scrutiny committees, getting local clinical advice on what is best and having a public interest test that should be passed. If those guard rails were in place, we could cope with this.

What we do not want is a chilling effect on the capacity of local leaders to make the decisions that they need to make to use their resources effectively. The third element of the triple mandate is the effective use of resources, and that involves making decisions at a whole variety of levels around how you configure services. If you feel you are going to go through that process and potentially engage local populations in difficult conversations, and then at the end of the day a local MP, for whatever reason, is going to kibosh that by appealing to the Secretary of State, why would you embark on the process in the first place? That is why, while we are very supportive of the Bill, as you have heard from both Saffron and me, we do think that the powers of reconfiguration are the Achilles heel. I appeal to you to recognise that that is unnecessary and goes against the spirit of the Bill.

Saffron Cordery: I wholeheartedly support what Matthew says, and it speaks to a point I made earlier about adding to existing structures in a way that really is not necessary. I notice that you have representatives from the Local Government Association as witnesses later on. I am pretty sure that they will have some strong views about what these measures do for the powers of local health overview and scrutiny committees, because they already have the power to refer to the Secretary of State should they need that to happen. The powers that are currently in place are a really effective way of doing it. People getting something past a local health overview and scrutiny committee is a really important hurdle for any service change. It is already well respected, well used and very effective. This is one of those elements that at best is redundant and at worst is going to create a lot of work and a lot of unnecessary tension and friction where we already have challenge.

[Edward Argar]

Q I have just a couple of questions, because a lot of the issues have been explored. My first one is something that we have not touched on yet in our questioning of witnesses. I welcome both your thoughts on the proposals in the Bill to delete and replace section 75 of the 2012 legislation, around procurement, and your reflections on the opportunities or challenges that that presents.

Saffron Cordery: As we see a change in the system, obviously the nature of how we have procured services in the past does have to change. It is obviously a complex area, but one of the things that we really need to look at is the effectiveness of the current contracting regime, which for certain parts of the provider sector in particular is incredibly burdensome. If you sit in a mental health or a community trust, you are subject to a whole host of retendering, which can have a potentially far-reaching impact on your trust’s sustainability or the future operation of key services. For many bits of the system, that will be very important.

The procurement regime is fundamental. It underpins how this will operate. We need to make sure that the elements of fairness are upheld and that it does not disproportionately put a burden on any one part of the system in particular.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Whitford]

Thank you. In the interests of time, I am happy with that.

Ian Trenholm: If I could make just one point, I think you are absolutely right: the broader responsibilities of an individual provider, particularly around such things as duty of candour, would still stand. Therefore, at an institutional level, people will still need to do the things that they always needed to do, but there is a very specific set of circumstances that Keith was describing where safe space may apply.

[Justin Madders]

Q I have a couple of questions for Mr Trenholm. You mentioned the importance of co-operation with other agencies. At the moment, are there barriers that the Bill could help with in terms of identifying people who may provide inadequate care under the guise of a company and then dissolve it, move on and create another? Is there anything in the Bill that will help you to track those people?

Ian Trenholm: I do not think that there is at an individual provider level. What you have just described is our normal registration regulation process at an individual provider level. As we start to look across individual places and ICSs, we might be able to talk to individual partnership boards about people who are operating locally, but I do not think the Bill explicitly gives us more powers to look at individual providers in any more detail than we already would as part of our normal registration process.

[Justin Madders]

Q In terms of what you are required to do under the Bill, have you made an assessment of what additional resources you will need to deliver that?

Ian Trenholm: Not yet. Obviously, as the Bill goes through Parliament the breadth and size of what we will be asked to do will become clear. We are talking to a range of different stakeholders at the moment. The NHS Confederation and NHS Providers are on our list, as are the Local Government Association, the Association of Directors of Adult Social Services and, of course, various representative groups that represent people who use services, so we are having those conversations now around what they would expect from good-quality assurance at a system level—but no, we have not really got to the point of assessing this in any detail.

[Justin Madders]

Q Mr Conradi, in your submission to the Committee you mentioned a concern about the powers of the Secretary of State to order investigations. You used the term “undue political influence”. I wonder whether you could expand on what you mean by that exactly, and what your concerns are.

Keith Conradi: We see ourselves as very much an independent and impartial investigation body that can sit outside the system and look into it. We would not want to have any barriers really on where we might look to see where patient safety could be improved. As I mentioned earlier, we tend not to dwell on the incident at the trust level, but try to work our way up through the system. Ultimately, we end up making recommendations to the Department of Health and Social Care, and in the future I would like to ensure that we have that complete freedom to be able to make recommendations wherever we think that they most fit. That independence of the system is crucial for the success and the credibility of the organisation.

[Justin Madders]

Q In terms of recommendations, how are they monitored to ensure that they are actually implemented?

Keith Conradi: At the moment, they are monitored fairly informally. There is a part of NHSEI—a patient safety team—that looks at whether the actions that were promised in the response to the safety recommendation have actually been carried out. We believe that that might sit more appropriately with this body in the future—NHSEI receive a rather large number of our safety recommendations, so I do not know whether they are the right body to monitor the actions that are taking place, whereas I think that could sit with us. It is important that that is just monitoring the actions, not judging the outcome, and I think that there needs to be a separate, probably pan-regulation-type body that looks at whether the outcome at the end of the day mitigated the patient safety risk that we first went out to investigate.

[Justin Madders]

Q So in terms of what NHSI do at the moment, presumably you are interested in their investigations and ongoing work, but there is no formal method by which they can report back to you so that you can be satisfied that things are progressing?

Keith Conradi: Informally, we have a good working relationship, so we are interested. We get the response to the safety recommendation and we internally look at that and consider whether we are happy with it. If we are not, we would send out letters to say that we would like further information. We want to put this on a more formal footing to see that in the future.

[The Chair]

Do have anything further you want to add? No. Minister.

Health and Care Bill (Third sitting)

Justin Madders Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 9th September 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Thank you very much. I now turn to Justin Madders, the shadow spokesman.

[Justin Madders (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab)]

Q Thank you, Mrs Murray. Good morning to the witnesses and thank you for coming today. Dr Nagpaul, you talked earlier about unequal arrangements for private sector provision. Could you expand a little on what you mean by that?

Dr Chaand Nagpaul: Yes. If you repeal section 75 but do not allow the NHS to be a preferred provider, we believe that opens the door for contracts to be handed out to the private sector and undermines the NHS.

Although it may fall out of scope, the point is that there is every reason for the NHS to be a preferred provider. The point I am making is that the NHS really is effective and cost-effective, and allows for a population approach from providers that have accountability to local populations.

The other problem we have at the moment, unless you put in legislation to make the NHS the preferred provider, is that at the moment a lot of contracts are going out to the private sector and are affecting workforce training. In some areas, cataract operations have been moved en bloc into the private sector, meaning that ophthalmology trainees are not even seeing them, and the providers that are providing cataract operations are being paid the same sum of money but not providing the full service.

Another problem we have at the moment is cherry-picking. It has been there since 2012 and nothing in this Bill is legislatively addressing that. It means that you pay the same amount to a hospital—I am a GP and there is a list of exclusion criteria for any patient who has co-morbidities or complex conditions, so I cannot refer them there—but when something goes wrong in the middle of the night or on a weekend, they end up in the A&E of our local hospital.

That is why we believe it is really important that the Bill is amended to make the NHS the preferred provider; that is what we are referring to. We believe it will allow for a much more co-ordinated, accountable, locally focused and population-approach health service.

[Justin Madders]

Q We will see what we can do about that. In your written submission, you raised concerns about private providers sitting on ICS boards. Could you just say a little more about what your concerns are there?

Dr Chaand Nagpaul: If we have a Bill that is designed to support the NHS, we just feel that it does not make sense to then allow a private provider to sit on a commissioning board. We believe that there is an inherent conflict of interest. It is really important to understand that there is a difference between the private provider and the NHS. The private provider is ultimately driven by its financial motives, and to be sitting on a board influencing the spend of money where it may have an interest is a conflict of interest. That does not apply to the NHS. A doctor from a hospital does not have any financial gain to be made. I come back to the fact that we need to support the NHS, not as an ideological principle, but because it actually works.

[Justin Madders]

Q That is very clear, thank you. To play devil’s advocate, can you think of any positive reason why there would be a need for private companies?

Dr Chaand Nagpaul: No, I do not. If the NHS cannot provide a service—if it does not have the capacity—and there is a private sector contract, the private provider needs to be held to account to deliver. As I say, I think the same rules should be applied, so that if there is a complication, they need to be accountable for that complication, rather than the patient going back to the NHS, which picks up the pieces. There is a need to hold private providers to account where they are contracted to provide care, but we do not approve of them sitting on the commissioning board, which is about the use of public resources in the interests of local populations. That should be a commissioning decision, and commissioners who are accountable to the NHS and providers of the NHS should be sitting as part of that arrangement.

[Justin Madders]

Q Thank you. In your submission, you also referred to concerns about some of the Secretary of State’s powers proposed in the Bill. Could you say a little more about what those concerns are, please?

Dr Chaand Nagpaul: Sure. One is the NHS mandate, which spells out how the NHS functions. At the moment, the powers allow the Secretary of State to amend the mandate. We would like that to be affirmative. We would like it to be approved by Parliament, and therefore Parliament would vote to agree changes to the mandate. That is one area.

The other concern is about the local reconfigurations. We know how politically sensitive these things can be. We would not want the Secretary of State to have disproportionate powers in those arrangements, which will often be more susceptible to political influence. We think that those need to be safeguarded by mandated clinician involvement, so that we make the right decisions about local services. It is a counterbalance: we want a health service that has local clinician leadership, but on the other hand the Secretary of State can intervene. We think that is an amendment that needs to be made.

[Justin Madders]

Q Thank you. Ms Gorton, good afternoon—it is afternoon now. You obviously represent a huge range of employees within the NHS. What role do you see ICBs having in direct negotiations and consultation with the workforce?

Sara Gorton: There are a couple of points to raise here. First, we would like to see in the legislation confirmation of what we have been given assurances of in guidance and conversation—that there is no intention for any new parts of the system to undermine the existing collective arrangements and that, for the workforce I represent, the collective agenda for change agreement would apply for their staff. There is a very clear amendment that could be supported to ensure the new bodies are listed as what are called annex 1 employers in the relevant terms and conditions documents. That is one aspect.

The other aspect is the role that the provider selection regime can play—sorry, not the provider selection regime; what are called the people responsibilities, which are set out in some of the guidance materials that have only been recently published to support the legislation. They set out 10 areas relating to workforce over which the new bodies may have scope. We would like to see those areas of scope clearly defined within the legislation. That is why what I said earlier about the commitment to involve staff through the constitution promise is so important. We want to ensure that, if decisions are made at system level that undercut the role that staff have in making decisions within providers—if there are overarching decisions made about workforce—staff have an opportunity, through their representatives, to understand what the impact might be and to influence that conversation.

[Justin Madders]

Q Thank you. That is very helpful. You have probably seen quite a lot of media coverage today about the possible salaries of the chief executives of the ICBs—up to £270,000. What do your members, who have had 10 years of pay restraint, feel about those kind of figures being bandied about?

Sara Gorton: We are supposed to stick to polite language in here, aren’t we? You can all probably imagine what most of our members feel. Sticking within the scope of the Bill, as we have been asked to, the relevant segue is to go back to the extension of the provider selection regime to the non-clinical services. We are strongly supportive of the measures that have been put in place to ensure that service sustainability and social value are taken into account. Clearly, however, extending those provisions to non-clinical services would create a culture of in-sourcing, of valuing all members of the healthcare team equally, and place those on an equal footing.

[Justin Madders]

Q Moving on to the proposals in the Bill regarding professional regulation, do you see any risk or have any concerns about that, as it is set out?

Sara Gorton: As you have hopefully seen in our briefing, we are calling for that to be either explained in much more detail in the guidance, or dropped from the legislation. We are already seeing concerns from regulated occupations that this could lead to a sort of “regulation-lite” scenario, and there are concerns that, without it being clear exactly what the proposals would entail, this could be a hostage to fortune. We would very much like to see some clarity on that, or have it taken out at this stage.

[Justin Madders]

Q I will ask the same question that I asked Dr Nagpaul about the involvement of private providers on ICBs. Is there, in your mind, any possible argument as to why it might be a good idea?

Sara Gorton: What we are more concerned about is the potential risk that, if involved in the ICBs and in the partnerships, they could exert influence over the exploratory stage of discussions, which could tilt the balance their way. That seems out of kilter when we do not have clarity that staff of the NHS will have the opportunity to be involved at the same sort of level. We are very keen to ensure that we support amendments making any of the processes, and the way that the boards meet, more transparent, and, clearly, subject to the freedom of information process.

[Justin Madders]

Q Just one final question: at the moment, do you feel that there are enough avenues for trade union staff representation to feed into the boards?

Sara Gorton: At the moment, there is no explicit route through. What is set out in the published guidance documents is that the route for trade unions to be involved will be through the regional structures of NHS England and NHS Improvement. That is at a distance, and potentially after decisions have been made. Putting in a clear link, through that staff pledge in the NHS constitution and having that underpinning in the legislation, would really make clear the principle of staff involvement and engagement at the earliest stage of decisions.

[Justin Madders]

Thank you very much.

[The Minister for Health (Edward Argar)]

Q Sara and Chand, welcome. I will try to get through three questions, but, if I run out of time, I will settle for two. We heard from a significant number of witnesses on Tuesday; you will have seen or read what they said. The overwhelming majority said that now was the right time to do this. Sara, I noticed that, in your evidence, notwithstanding the challenges you posed about some of the content that you would disagree with, you highlighted that this was due in 2019, on the basis of the original consultation, and asked why it had taken so long.

To both of you, do you think that now is the right time? I know that Chand has answered that, but this second part might apply to him: if it is not, when is the right time?

Sara Gorton: We were strong opponents of the 2012 legislation, so, in our view, the right time to do this would have been to not put that legislation through. However, we have been waiting for this batch of changes for some time. It has been evident, from 2013-14, and certainly since the “Five Year Forward View” was published, that what we were doing was having a structural workaround with people tacitly agreeing to almost ignore legislation. That is just not acceptable in the system.

Certainly, for my members who have been moved into new arm’s length bodies, moved around those bodies, and are now subject to another change, they want the security of knowing who is going to be employing them this time next year. In our view, the changes, both to the competition and procurement regime, and to clarifying how the new bodies will operate and what powers they will have, cannot wait. There are lots of other aspects that, as you can see from our briefing, we suggest could wait for future debate.

Dr Chaand Nagpaul: I want to be clear: we do not support the status quo. There is a pressing need to repeal much of the 2012 Act. However, I cannot overestimate how much the pandemic has affected us. We have not been able to be engaged, so it has to be asked: why do we need the Bill at this moment in time, when we are all absolutely overwhelmed? We know that any reorganisation of the health service means that people get distracted from their core work. The process of reorganisation takes human resource time. We have not been able to engage with this as we should, so we do not think that this is the right time.

The right time would be decided by two factors: first, when we are through the worst of what we are going through at the moment, and secondly, when the legitimate concerns we have are addressed, and there are the amendments that we would like to see. This Bill can shape the future of our health service. Get the right Bill, at the right time.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Thank you very much. We are making excellent time.

[Justin Madders]

On a point of order, Mrs Murray. On the Minister’s question to the BMA witness about previous Acts that the BMA may have endorsed, that would clearly be out of scope as evidence. I would not want Dr Nagpaul to waste time researching an answer that the Committee could not take into account.

[Edward Argar]

Further to that point of order, Mrs Murray. Would it help if I set out the context in which I believe that question relates directly to the content of the Bill? Much of what is discussed in the Bill relates to previous legislation that has grown up over time; understanding which pieces of legislation the BMA supports will help us to better understand the evidence it has put forward on this legislation, and its context.

Health and Care Bill (Fourth sitting)

Justin Madders Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 9th September 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I think we had better move on now. I call Justin Madders.

[Justin Madders (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab)]

Q Good afternoon, and thank you for coming today. You will have heard the Prime Minister’s statement on Tuesday. He referred to a White Paper on integration. As the Bill is primarily concerned with integration, perhaps you could save him some time by pointing out the deficiencies in the Bill—in terms of integration—that need to be included.

Nigel Edwards: This took us all somewhat by surprise, I think it is fair to say. Richard may have had a different briefing from the Department of Health and Social Care on yesterday’s announcement. I picked it up on reading the document; it was not pointed out to me. I think I read it slightly differently. It seemed to me that the plan was likely to be a formalisation of all the activities that are currently going on, rather than a new direction of policy, but I am probably the wrong person to be asking about that. If it is not that, it would not be very helpful.

Richard Murray: One of the things the documentation speaks about is the planning of the health and social care workforce. You asked where I think the Bill is deficient. One example is its inability to help with the very poor track record, over quite a long time, in planning the health and social care workforce—hence all the problems that we have with the workforce right now. There is a nod in the White Paper to that. It may only be that the crossover between those two workforces is not the fundamentals of the numbers that go through them.

Otherwise, I really hope that the White Paper is not about further legislative change. It might be about setting out, for example, the outcome measures that would really work for an ICS, meaning that it will cover both critical issues for the NHS and critical issues for health, public health and social care, to make sure that you have that rounded and meaningful measure so you know who is doing well. If it is another round of legislation, I must admit that I would pause before saying whether that is a good idea, with the exception of the workforce issue, which remains the critical factor here.

[Justin Madders]

Anything to add, Nick?

Nick Timmins: The workforce does need to be tackled—it is just a glaring hole in all this. The NHS has plenty of policy at the moment; it has had an eight-year drive towards better integrated care—that is what the Bill is focused on—and a lot of that will not come through legislation, beyond what is in the Bill.

[Justin Madders]

Q Nigel, can I ask you a specific question about tracking where the money is distributed within an ICS, which you referred to earlier? You have already mentioned the Cheshire and Merseyside ICS, which my constituency falls within—what was 12 CCGs moved not so long ago into one massive beast, for want of a better description. If I wanted to hold someone to account on whether the money was distributed on a fair and equal basis consistent with historical distributions, who would I speak to and who would be responsible for that?

Nigel Edwards: Each ICS is supposed to have a chief finance officer—a director of finance—and an accountable officer. That is the starting point. I think the question to ask them would be to what extent they are spending money in a way that reduces health inequalities and improves outcomes in an equitable fashion—I think they would want to do that. One of the things that has very much struck me in my conversations with ICSs—this is very much influenced by local government, which will be a powerful advocate for this, as will primary care networks—is that quite a lot of people will be scrutinising this. The person to ask who is clearly accountable for answering that question is the accountable officer of the ICS.

Of course, ICSs do not have a legal obligation to distribute money below place level. You might not want to do that, because there is a need to be flexible, and sometimes you might want to spend more in a particular area if there is a sudden strategic priority, but over the long term, the expectation is that those accountable officers should be able to demonstrate that they are spending money in ways that relate to the objectively assessed needs of their populations.

[Justin Madders]

Q Thank you. I have a question for all three of you. The Secretary of State is seeking some quite broad powers of direction. What problem do you think he is trying to fix by giving himself those powers?

Nick Timmins: I think that is exactly the right question to ask. What have Ministers not been able to get the NHS to do without the powers of direction that he is seeking? When they were presented, it was as though the NHS was somehow unaccountable when, as I am sure you all know, Ministers can tell the NHS what to do through the mandate. The difference in the current system is that NHS England has to agree that what it is being asked to do is reasonable. If NHS England does not think it is reasonable, resourceful or doable, it can object, and the Minister then has to come to Parliament and explain why he is, in effect, instructing the NHS to do something. A measure comes before you and is subject to a negative resolution. If someone rejects it, it can be debated, so there is a perfectly good mechanism there right now. I think the really, really important question is: what are Ministers not able to get the NHS to do that means that they now feel the need for new powers of direction?

[Justin Madders]

Does anyone wish to add to that?

Nigel Edwards: I have no answer to that question.

Richard Murray: If the reason is not made clear, you end up starting to get worried and suspicious: “Are they trying to direct money towards one part of the country rather than another and overturning the allocation mechanism? Do they want powers to intervene in procurements?” Those are all the things that you would not want them to do which, to be honest, health Ministers generally have not done anyway. Even when they had the powers, they tried desperately not to get involved, because it is extremely poor governance and extremely poor value for money. However, without that explanation of why they want it, the temptation is to start worrying about what they want the power for.

Some of the behaviours could be governed through the framework agreement, or they should be able to be. You have the mandate that sets direction over the short to medium term, but the framework agreement also sets out the way NHS England should work with other parts of the system, so there are other things that you can use within this system. As it stands, and if it stays as it is now, to provide comfort to people, the temptation is to start listing the things that Secretaries of State should not direct—they should not direct allocations to individual parts of the country; they should not interfere in procurement decisions. You end up with quite a long negative list, but I would probably rather have a negative list than no list.

Nigel Edwards: The problem with negative lists, of course, is that you will forget something.

[The Chair]

I had better move on at this stage. I am really sorry, Nigel. Minister?

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

We have time to squeeze in one very quick one, if anyone has something else to ask.

[Justin Madders]

Q Thank you, Chair. Do you see any risks attached to the flexibility the Secretary of State has given himself with the mandates?

Richard Murray: I think a longer-term mandate is a better thing. The idea that each year, sometime between December and March, you can set a different expectation on the NHS is operationally unreal for the system. They cannot do it, so I think we want to get back to something where you set out a clearer medium-term objective for the things you want the NHS to achieve, whether that is reduced waiting times or better health, and allow them to try and work towards it.

Budgets on that basis would also be incredibly helpful—if you are working in the service not knowing what capital you might have two years down the line and what revenue you might have. I think there is a real chance to do that in the spending review. That is a move in the right direction; we just have to make sure that if the budgets are still set on an annual basis, you do not get a diversion between what it is you have been asked and the budget then being suddenly moved on that annual basis. I would strongly encourage the Government to also try and set multi-year settlements for the NHS, as used to be done, so that people can plan at local level.

Nick Timmins: If memory serves me right, the original idea of the mandate was a rolling three-year mandate. You set the objectives of the NHS and what you want it to achieve, and you can have a little review of it each year, but it is clear. I probably should have said that if the money was also planned on the same basis, that would help no end.

[The Chair]

That brings us to the end of our time. I thank our witnesses very much.

Examination of Witnesses

Dame Gill Morgan and Louise Patten gave evidence.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Whitford]

Q A brief question to Andy: there has been discussion over recent years about the need for greater preventative public health. Do you think there is enough discussion or enabling of that approach in mental health? Although we may not do it, we all know what we should do to be physically fitter and healthier—how good we are is up to us. But many of the public have no idea how to protect their mental health. Do you think there is enough population and preventative mental health work? And are there ways of strengthening that in the Bill?

Andy Bell: We have hugely underinvested in it, and indeed very poorly appreciated it. What we have seen in recent years, which we hugely welcome, is huge progress on mental health awareness and understanding. That was not there 10 or 15 years ago. It has not been that long since in a debate in the House of Commons the first Member stood up and spoke about their own experience of mental illness; that was hugely powerful, and began quite a significant social movement. However, we do not yet have literacy around that issue, or indeed a real understanding about what we can do to promote the public’s mental health. With the creation of the new Office for Health Improvement and Disparities—I must remember to get the name right—there is an opportunity to make public mental health as important as public physical health. How we translate that to local areas will be really interesting.

When I talk to people working in local public health departments, I see a huge enthusiasm for and interest in how they can better support mental support in the communities they serve. We have seen incredibly creative work from around the country, such as in Leeds and Bristol, from public health teams that are leading the way who understand that the things that determine our mental health are very much about the society and environments we live in—the families we come from, the schools we go to, the amount of income we have, and the homes and neighbourhoods that we live in. There is a growing understanding of that. However, we have not yet put that into practice on a large scale, and indeed the resources available to public health departments to do that are very threadbare. Many have to be very creative in how they do that.

We very much welcomed the promotion and prevention fund set up recently by the Government, which gave funding to local authorities in the 40 most deprived local areas in England for mental health promotion activities. We are really looking forward to seeing what that money is used for, and we very much hope that it will be the beginning of something much bigger. Our worry, in relation to the Bill in particular, is the understanding of prevention, and indeed the understanding of prevention that I read in yesterday’s Command Paper on the health and social care plan. It is still based on physical health, and the idea that public health is about telling people how to live their lives and how they should behave, rather than what really determines our mental health: how much money we have coming into our home, how safe we feel, and our position in society. It is really clear that very often the way that economic and social inequalities affect our mental health also affects our physical health. Very often it is poor psychological wellbeing that leads to later physical health problems, so we really have to start taking public mental health as seriously as any other part of public health.

[Justin Madders]

Q I have just one question for you, Mr Hammond. You obviously have the ICB decisions being made. What, in your understanding of the Bill, would happen if—hopefully this will not happen, but we have to look at every possibility—the chief executive of the ICB was making decisions that the ICP and other partners were not in agreement with, and they effectively lost confidence in him? Is there any mechanism that would be able to deal with that situation?

Ed Hammond: The obvious mechanism is the Secretary of State’s power of intervention. It is all about that referral upwards really to the Secretary of State to act. Ideally, these kinds of things can and should be resolved through dialogue, because the Secretary of State can intervene only so much. One of my worries about the focus in certain elements of the Bill on the new and enhanced powers of the Secretary of State is that it sort of assumes that the Secretary of State will need to have fingers in lots of pies to be aware of where these issues are occurring across England, and be prepared to step in where they are happening, which requires the exercise of a significant watching brief across a wide range of areas in a way that does not currently happen.

Ideally, these kinds of things can and should be thrashed out by the people involved at local level. The Secretary of State can intervene but does that intervention persist if relationships have effectively broken down? What do you do then? You cannot run everything from Whitehall; there has to be some kind of mechanism to rebuild relationships and trust. One would hope that it would not get that bad, but I know of past tensions. There are divergent priorities between local authorities, NHS partners and other partners in respect of health and care issues. The logic of ICPs is that you are aligning those priorities better, but that is not guaranteed.

That is one of the reasons we consider that there should be a role sitting with local health scrutiny committees to escalate matters of particular concern to the Secretary of State, so there is not this assumption that the Secretary of State is exercising a continual watching brief over everything that is going on. There is that formal power of escalation from an external body holding the system to account that can, before that escalation, exert some kind of influence at local level to try to knock heads together and bring some form of agreement in place, so that you are not in a situation where you have a persistent assumption that Whitehall will need to step in in every case where these kinds of issues occur.

[Justin Madders]

Q Thank you. Mr Bell, do you see this Bill helping to achieve parity of esteem for mental health?

Andy Bell: At the moment, it is really impossible to say. I would like to see the Bill achieving parity of esteem for mental health. As I say, the principles of integrated care could certainly enable that to happen, if combined with a lot of other very significant and important activity to shift the culture in the health service, apart from anything else. The lack of specific provisions in the Bill to ensure that parity is taken seriously is a real worry. I think there are still gaps in the Bill that could be very simply addressed and would help to ensure that system leaders, wherever they are—whether they are on integrated care boards or any other three-letter acronym that gets created—realise that their personal responsibility is to bring about parity for mental health.

I think we are at a point now where there is some recognition in most parts of the system that mental health is important, but very often, outside specific mental health services, there is still an assumption that mental health is something other people and other organisations do, and there is not that shared responsibility for it in quite the way that we think would help to move us forward.

[Justin Madders]

Q I have one more question, Mr McCabe. One of the consistent points we have heard from witnesses is that they are not convinced that the provisions in the Bill on workforce are sufficient to deal with the workforce challenges that the NHS faces. Would that be something that you feel is also the case for mental health professionals?

Andy Bell: This is incredibly difficult. We have some very ambitious plans now—the NHS long-term plan ambitions for mental health. There is, quite rightly, an awful lot of money going into that, because we have a very big gap in our ability to meet people’s needs. The only way that is going to succeed is if we have a very significant expansion in the mental health workforce.

We need to remember that that workforce is not just what people think it is. It is obviously nursing and obviously psychiatry, but it is also social work—a lot of really important mental health provision is in local government under social care. We need to think about the importance of advocacy and the importance of peer support, the importance of employment and housing rights workers, who we know make a big difference to people’s lives. There is also the key role of the voluntary sector in providing forms of support that may not come under traditional clinical headings, but none the less make a huge impact in people’s lives. We need to build the workforce.

The Bill gives some steps forward and summary assurances. In some ways, it is not quite the right place to be dealing with this. This is about whether the various parts of the system—the health education system, the NHS itself and its partners in local government—have the resources and the right ways to encourage people to come and work in mental health. It would be great to see the kind of recruitment campaigns we have had for the NHS as a whole to really help bridge that very big gap in the mental health workforce. At the moment, I think the Bill is probably neutral on it. It would be good to see some stronger assurances, at the very least holding the Secretary of State to account for how they are achieving the workforce ambitions set out in the long-term plan and future policies that will have to come.

[Edward Argar]

Q Good afternoon, Ed and Andy. Andy, in my first question, can I pick up on something you said there, before I broaden out to a question to you both? You talked there, quite rightly, about the importance of parity of esteem for mental health. As a local councillor years ago, I saw how important local councils and the NHS working hand in glove on mental health provision is, because if we get one half right but not the other half, it just does not work.

Building on what you have already said about the legislation, what would you identify as the opportunities of the legislation, if properly implemented or interpreted in the right way, for furthering that linkage and that joined-up mental health provision? Obviously, that goes beyond local council services and the NHS. There are a whole wraparound series of services that impact on someone’s mental health. What do you see as the opportunities in the legislation that we either need to draw out further or at least not lose sight of?

Andy Bell: This is about building real, sustainable, long-term partnerships. One of the things I know colleagues in the NHS and local government find very frustrating is that they just find a way of working with each other and then the legislation changes again and they have to start all over, so it is about having a system that actually works and stays working, that builds on the best of what is there already. I think there is some frustration in places where they spent a long time building relationships between clinical commissioning groups and local authority colleagues, sometimes with jointly employed staff, and now they have to start all over again because we are moving to a different thing. That will be immensely frustrating for many folk.

If we take the principle that this is about integrating care and equal partnerships between different players, including the voluntary and community sector, and if we give that time to work, we will enable partnerships to form with a clear voice for people—for example, in the case of mental health, for people living with mental health difficulties—so that decisions are being made with and in partnership with the people who use them rather than remotely by professional experts on their own.

Collaboration is incredibly important too. One thing we really welcome about the Bill is that it is moving us away from a system of competing providers to providers working collaboratively—literally, in providing collaboratives. There is a slight risk that all the power will be vested in one organisation and there will not be that check and balance between commissioner and provider. But some of the early provider collaboratives working in children’s mental health services that we have looked at have made really huge strides really quickly to reduce, for example, the number of children forced to go to hospital outside their local area in a mental health crisis. They have come together, looked at what support is needed for children in a crisis and put community services, in particular, in place to achieve that.

One further thing that will be important is that there is some positive provision in the Bill to ensure that ICBs—I think it is ICBs, yes, it is—have to take into account inequalities in access and outcomes. That is great, but there is not that requirement to pay attention to inequalities in health and to go out and identify which groups of people are experiencing health inequalities and what the system can do to deal with that upstream rather than waiting for people to need formal healthcare. That would be the other part that would really help in the Bill—to build on some of the positive noises and moves in the right direction in collaborating at the level of prevention and on the things that determine our health as well as in the provision of services when things have reached a point where people need care.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Whitford]

Q So is there a bit of the Bill you would want to change? If we let you write an amendment, what would you write?

Stephen Chandler: I will come back to you on that. I cannot immediately think of a part.

[Justin Madders]

Q I have a couple of questions for Gerry. Your briefing made it clear that your members had a concern about discharge to assess; a clear majority said they did not support it, although the numbers are quite small. Would you say that is an accurate reflection of your overall membership?

Gerry Nosowska: It is a genuine concern, yes—partly because, as Stephen was saying, it was rolled out very rapidly, at scale, during an unusual and very pressured time. Social workers have often been involved in those transitions, and very well, to advocate and to ensure that the person’s voice is heard and that people do not get lost somewhere in the system or forgotten, but the concerns are around the potential weakening of that social work role.

Not everybody will need that, but I advocate for a social worker being available to anybody who might need that kind of co-ordination, therapeutic support and advocacy at the point of such a major life transition. We want a review of the model, but we also have concerns about just taking out wholesale all the elements around notification of social care and everything that was in the care Act. A lot will hinge on what the statutory guidance says about this. We must make sure we do not lose people in the system, because there is always an incentive to free up a valuable resource in hospital, but our statutory job is to promote wellbeing.

[Justin Madders]

Q You mentioned the review; your briefing said that you had expected one to be undertaken back in March, and it has not been done yet. Do you know why that has happened?

Gerry Nosowska: My understanding was that the discharge to assess was due to be reviewed, but I do not know why there has been a delay on that.

[Justin Madders]

Q Okay. But as far as you are aware, there has not been a review up to now?

Gerry Nosowska: I am not aware of a large-scale, formal review of it, no.

[Justin Madders]

Thank you. That is all I have, Chair.

Stephen Chandler: If I could help, I am aware that the Department of Health and Social Care has undertaken a review of some discharge to assess arrangements. It is not a national review, but I think about eight separate systems have been subject to a review. I have not seen the outcome of it, but a review of a limited capacity has taken place.

[The Chair]

Right. We have two Ministers now. Jo, did you want to ask something?

Health and Care Bill (Fifth sitting)

Justin Madders Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 14th September 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Before we begin, I have a few preliminary reminders for the Committee. Please switch electronic devices to silent. No food or drink is permitted during sittings of the Committee, except for the water provided. I encourage Members to wear masks when they are not speaking, in line with the current Government guidance and that of the House of Commons Commission. Please also give each other and members of staff space when sitting and when entering and leaving the room. Hansard colleagues will be grateful if Members could email their speaking notes to [e-mail].

We now begin line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The selection list for today’s sitting is available in the room. That shows how the selected amendments have been grouped together for today. Amendments grouped together are generally on the same or a similar issue. Please note that decisions on amendments take place not in the order they are debated but in the order they appear on the amendment paper. The selection and grouping list shows the order of debate. Decisions on each amendment are taken when we come to the clause to which the amendment relates. Decisions on new clauses will be taken once we have completed consideration of the existing clauses of the Bill. Members wishing to press a grouped amendment or a new clause to a Division should indicate when speaking to it that they wish to do so.

Clause 1

NHS Commissioning Board renamed NHS England

[Justin Madders (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab)]

I beg to move amendment 18, in clause 1, page 1, line 5, at end insert—

“(1A) The Board of NHS England shall be made up of—

(a) a Chair appointed by the Secretary of State,

(b) five other members so appointed of which—

(i) one shall be appointed to represent Directors of Public Health,

(ii) one shall be appointed to represent the Local Government Association,

(iii) one shall be appointed to represent the interest of patients,

(iv) one shall be appointed to represent the staff employed in the NHS, and

(v) one shall be appointed to represent the Integrated Care Partnership.

(c) one further member shall be appointed by the Secretary of State after being recommended by the Health Committee as a person with appropriate knowledge and experience,

(d) executive members as set out in Schedule 1 of the Health and Social Care Act 2012.

(1B) In making the appointments in (1A) (a) and (b) above the Secretary of State must have due regard to—

(a) the need to ensure diversity and equality of opportunity and must publish a list of at least 5 persons considered for each appointment and the reasons why the particular individual appointment was made, and

(b) that no person who could be perceived to have a conflict of interest by virtue of their current or recent employment or investment holding in any organisation with any role in the delivery of services to the NHS may be considered for appointment.”

This amendment changes the makeup of the Board to acknowledge its new role in the integrated NHS and bringing representatives as non-executive members on the Board as with integrated care boards.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause stand part.

That schedule 1 be the First schedule to the Bill.

[Justin Madders]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship today, Mrs Murray, and to serve on the Bill Committee.

The amendment was moved in my name and that of my hon. Friends. The Minister whom I shadow is helpful—we will see how helpful during the course of proceedings—and we start in a spirit of optimism. I am grateful for the support of my colleagues on the Opposition Benches who, between them, contribute some relevant and highly knowledgeable experience. They are all passionate, as we all are, about the national health service and the care system, which are the subject of the legislation.

With your indulgence, Mrs Murray, I take this opportunity to make a few short points about the general context of the legislation. First, this is an important Bill. It could easily have been two or three pieces of separate legislation, so it requires proper consideration. We have a concern about whether enough time has been allocated to deal with everything in the detail that we would like, but we will do our best to get through it. We intend to make our contributions short but relevant and, we hope, persuasive.

Secondly, we share the apparent desire of the Government to repeal the worst aspects of the disastrous Lansley Act. Many of our amendments will be directed at trying to ensure that, in doing so, the baby is not thrown out with the bathwater. Thirdly and finally, as stated by the chair of the British Medical Association in the evidence sessions last week, we remain of the view that the Bill is the wrong Bill at the wrong time.

The amendment seeks to define the composition of the board of NHS England to align better with what we see as the new requirements set out elsewhere in the Bill. In looking at the issue of who should be on the board, we all ought to agree that it should not be open only to the friends and relatives of Ministers. Board members in our view should be subject to more independent assessment of their value and must pass at least some fit and proper test to avoid obvious conflicts of interest.

The amendment would ensure that the key influences on the board come from public health, local government, the patients themselves and the staff, without whom the NHS does not exist. At this point, I take the opportunity to place on the record, as I often do, Labour Members’ thanks to those in the NHS who have been so magnificent, not just over the past couple of years but over many years. They deliver a service that is rightly a source of great national pride. They deserve a seat at the table, as do patients. The Bill does not do enough to amplify the patients’ voice. We will be discussing a number of amendments over the coming weeks by which we will hope to change that.

We also need to look at what NHS England mark 4 will be required to do if the Bill becomes an Act. Other parts of the Bill deal with the powers and duties of this new version of NHS England, originally the NHS Commissioning Board. It is, in many ways, the pinnacle of the reversal of the Lansley position. The new NHS England does not bear much resemblance to what was envisaged under the Health and Social Care Act 2012. That is a good start, but one aspect of the Lansley view—that the NHS requires some degree of operational independence—has been shown to have some merit. Every clock is right at least twice a day, and we have found the one piece of the 2012 Act that proved to be correct. We will discuss some amendments later on to limit the power of Ministers to interfere with those who we believe should be operationally independent.

The new NHS England is pretty much in place anyway, as a result of the actions of those managing the NHS over the last few years. They desperately and very innovatively at times tried to find ways to circumvent the edicts of the 2012 Act, while Ministers looked on passively. It has been an unusual and interesting passage of time in the history of the NHS. We have seen legislation simply ignored and Ministers have allowed that to happen. It is little wonder, given the experiences of the 2012 Act, that many of the NHS witnesses we heard from said they wanted as little prescription as possible. They have had their fill of prescription. We would differ, I think, on the level of prescription necessary in the Bill.

New NHS England will be an amalgamation of the old NHS England, Monitor and the NHS Trust Development Authority. It will commission some specialist services. It will be the regulator, regulating a market that no longer exists. It will performance manage both commissioning by the integrated care boards, which, for the purpose of brevity, we will refer to as ICBs, and the provision of services by trusts and foundation trusts. I am afraid that how that wide range of responsibilities sits with the role of the Department is as vague as ever. The ability of Ministers and others to interfere and micromanage depends on whether the rest of the Bill survives in its current form.

Above all, the board oversees the operational running of the NHS, shaped by the mandate, which gives the direction of travel. Perhaps the most crucial policy change is that new NHS England sits at the top of the system, based on the integrated care boards as the major commissioner of services. That means who sits on the board is highly relevant.

The explanatory notes and the Government pronouncements about the new integrated bodies strongly assert that the role is to drive the reintegration of the NHS, repairing the worst of the fragmentation caused by Lansley and, I hope, once and for all, ending the obsession with marketisation, which has been shown to be a failure. We need board members on NHS England who might be seen to be more in tune with the new philosophy of partnerships and collaboration—not markets and competition, not business leaders, hedge fund managers, marketing experts.

In the new world, we want the NHS to be bound by its core principles—comprehensive, universal, free and funded from general taxation. That is a topic that we may touch on later; it may also be discussed in other business of the House today. What should be valued in board members is that they have some record of commitment to those principles. They should have some claim to be aligned to the new values, which favour a stronger role for patients; the public to have influence; a view that the NHS is contributing to reducing inequalities, as well as improving wellbeing; and the greater alignment of NHS services with local government.

The current make-up of the board is, put simply, the chair plus five other non-executives, all appointed by the Secretary of State, and then of course the appropriate executive directors. This amendment deals only with the non-executive directors. Given the huge importance of the NHS, it is appropriate that the chair and at least some of the non-executive directors are appointed by the Secretary of State. We will concede that. In another world, perhaps they could be elected in their own right, but we will not be travelling down that road on this occasion. However, we cannot ignore some of the headlines over the last 18 months and the huge media coverage of quite blatant abuse of patronage in appointments in the NHS more generally in recent years. Cronyism, I am afraid to say, has become a default position, and we think that has to be challenged.

To be fair to past Ministers, the NHS itself can also appoint people for the wrong reasons, moving out disgraced leaders if they go quietly, only for them to re-emerge somewhere else in the system. If the NHS is an organisation—it is a stretch to use that term after the mess created by the 2012 Act—appointments should accord with the highest standards of fairness, and inclusion is notably absent, so let us change the approach. Let us set the tone from the very top and enshrine in law the kind of people whom we as a Parliament would like to see—not, of course, specifying individuals but setting out in general terms some of the main interest groups that contribute towards the NHS and that we think should be at the very top table.

The amendment therefore seeks to give some direction to the Secretary of State in making these appointments and to ensure that at least one non-executive director is put on the board through a genuinely independent process and is not simply placed there by the Secretary of State. The kind of representative appointments that we set out in the amendment should, in our opinion, really be the standard. We would hope to see a similar standard adopted for the ICBs. We should appoint people who can really contribute to the future, with direct experience across the board in terms of the integration that the Bill seeks to achieve. The amendment also sets out how the Secretary of State must appoint suitable people and be able to justify their appointments against some sort of standards.

I hope that the Minister will at least acknowledge that some of the recent questionable behaviour around appointments needs to be addressed. No doubt he will refute the allegation of cronyism, but he cannot deny that there is at least a very strong perception that that is what has happened with some appointments.

In conclusion, I draw attention to how the NHS has already, effectively, blatantly put up two fingers to this Committee and anything we might decide, because it has already decided for itself how it will appoint people to roles within the new integrated care boards and has appointed some already, with the remaining positions, as we have seen from newspaper headlines, up for advertisement. That does not actually do us any favours, because Parliament has not decided that that is what we want to do, but we will see whether we get to that point later. That is all I have to say on the amendment.

[The Minister for Health (Edward Argar)]

It is a pleasure, once again, to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Murray. I fear—predict—that there will be occasions when the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston, and I may not be entirely of the same mind, but it is a pleasure, as always, to serve opposite him on this Committee, because I know that even where we may disagree, the debate will be measured and reasonable. I will address the amendment tabled by the shadow Minister and, in the same speech, clause 1 and schedule 1 stand part if that is appropriate and in order.

As has been the practice on numerous occasions in these Committees, I will start by expressing a view shared by all members of this Committee. It has already been expressed by the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston, and we join with him in expressing our gratitude to those who work in our NHS and in care services and—as he and I have often said in this place—all those, including in local government, who work in this space and have done amazing work over the past year and a half particularly.

As ever, the hon. Gentleman picked his example carefully in citing some of the witnesses whom we heard in oral evidence. As he will know, the overwhelming majority—possibly with only two exceptions—stated that this was the right Bill at the right time, albeit they may have picked up on particular clauses or elements. They did state that this was the right time for this legislation.

As the shadow Minister has set out, amendment 18 in his name and those of his hon. Friends seeks to make changes to the make-up of the board of NHS England, the provisions for which are currently set out in schedule A1 of the National Health Service Act 2006. It also outlines conditions that should be met in relation to the appointment process. I share his view that it is vital that robust governance arrangements are in place for overseeing public appointments. It will not surprise him that I refute his assertion that in the case of NHS England board appointments there is a so-called cronyism or a suggestion that any of those people are appointed on anything other than merit. However, I believe that those strong and robust governance arrangements are already in place for managing appointments to the board of NHS England. Those appointed already are deemed to be fit and proper people to hold those appointments.

The existing provisions, which the shadow Minister alluded to, setting out the membership of the NHS England board in the National Health Service Act 2006, provide the flexibility required for the fully merged NHS England to lead our more integrated health and care system. The clauses we will be addressing this morning in this part of the Bill reflect the evolution of NHS England and NHS Improvement and what has happened on the ground since they were originally formed. With this, we seek to create a legislative framework that catches up with where they are and is permissive, rather than prescriptive. That is something else the hon. Gentleman and other members of the Committee will have seen from the evidence sessions. Witnesses were clear that the Bill struck the right balance between permissive and prescriptive.

As we look to continue the fight against the covid-19 pandemic and, in parallel, prepare for the recovery of our health and care system, it is imperative that the most suitably experienced and knowledgeable candidates are appointed to the Board. I know the shadow Minister will share that sentiment. Unlike appointments to integrated care boards, the appointment of the chair and non-executive members of NHS England are rightfully public appointments made by the Secretary of State and managed in line with the governance code for public appointments and regulated already by the Commissioner for Public Appointments. The appointments are made on merit in a fair, open and transparent manner and in line with that governance code. They also require due regard to ensuring they properly reflect the populations they serve, including a balance of skills and backgrounds, supporting the Government agenda of promoting more diverse public sector organisations and board appointments.

The role of non-executives on public bodies includes helping set the strategic direction for the organisation, ensuring the organisation meets the highest standards of good governance and holding the executive to account for day-to-day business delivery. They come from a variety of backgrounds and bring a valuable range of skills and experience to a board position. It is important to note that they are not routinely or normally appointed to be representative of a particular sector or group. They are on the board in their own right and their independence in that context is paramount.

All public appointees are expected to uphold the standards of conduct set out in the Committee on Standards in Public Life’s seven principles of public life, as included in the code of conduct for board members of public bodies, and they must adhere to that. The code sets out clearly and openly the standards expected from those who serve on the boards of UK public bodies and includes a clear process for managing any conflicts of interest. The Commissioner for Public Appointments regulates those appointments to ensure they are upholding the values of that Government code and works with Government to encourage candidates from a diverse range of backgrounds to consider applying for such public appointments.

Finally, while I share the shadow Minister’s view that it is hugely important to have diverse representation on the board of NHS England and to ensure that diverse voices and viewpoints are reflected, the duty under section 13H of the 2006 Act already requires NHS England to actively

“promote the involvement of patients, and their carers and representatives”

without the specific need for a named non-executive patient representative. It is clear that comprehensive processes and codes are already in place to regulate public appointments such as those we are discussing in the context of clause 1 and amendment 18, as well as schedule 1, including on diversity, conflicts of interest and conduct in office. I emphasise once again that the role of non-executive members is not that of representing a specific or particular sector, which could be at odds with the independent and broad approach they are required to bring to the role.

I now move specifically and briefly to clause 1, which changes the legal name of the NHS Commissioning Board to NHS England, and also to schedule 1, which contains consequential amendments where the changes will take effect in another Act. Since 2013, the NHS Commissioning Board has been operating under the name NHS England, and I think it is fair to say that that is how all of us in this room, and the public, know it, rather than by the slightly clumsy name of NHS Commissioning Board. This move reflects what the public already regard as the body’s name. The organisation, including the new functions provided to it by the Bill, will continue to operate under the name NHS England; this clause aligns the legal and technical name with the operational and publicly used name for clarity, and updates associated primary legislation.

The clause puts in statute that legal name change. NHS England is an organisation that patients, public and staff recognise as providing leadership to the system and sector. It has been at the forefront, with each and every one of those who work in the NHS, of supporting operational delivery during the covid-19 pandemic and the integration of systems across the health and social care sectors. I believe it is right, as we update the governance arrangements for NHS England, that we make provision for this name change in legislation to provide legal clarity. I urge the shadow Minister to consider withdrawing his amendment, and I urge colleagues to support clause 1 and schedule 1.

[Justin Madders]

I am grateful for the Minister’s response, although disappointed that he does not agree with my amendment; I fear that may be a regular experience over the next few weeks, but we will carry on in hope rather than expectation.

As a final response, I would like to reflect on the kind of people we currently have on the board of NHS England. This is not meant to be a criticism of them at all—they are all very experienced and talented people—but their experience is not in healthcare; it is mainly in things such as retail or finance. They clearly have great qualities, but if hon. Members look at what is in our amendment and the kind of people we say ought to be at the top table, it is clear from the past 18 months how critical a role those people play.

Take, for example, the directors of public health. They have been the unsung heroes of the pandemic. I certainly know my local director of public health much better now than I did at the start of 2020, and he has been absolutely magnificent. He has always been available and, along with just about everyone else in the public sector, the amount of work that he has put in is phenomenal. That breadth of knowledge and experience deserves a seat at the top table.

Similarly, there should be a representative of the Local Government Association. Obviously there is some overlap with directors of public health, but local government has been magnificent, as the Minister noted, during the pandemic. We know that the vaccine roll-out, for example, and the ability to dispense tests quickly have been down to the agility of local authorities working in partnership with the NHS and the voluntary community sector.

There should also be a representative for patients; it seems a little odd that their voice is not at the top table, and I say the same about a representative for the staff. We talk a lot in here about how much we value the efforts of the staff, but we should put that into practice by acknowledging that they deserve a voice at the top table.

Clearly, the Minister will not accept the amendment, so I will seek to withdraw it, but I think we have made our point clearly about the kind of people we think should have a say in how NHS England is run. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 1 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 1 agreed to.

Clause 2

Power to require commissioning of specialised services

[Justin Madders]

I beg to move amendment 36, in clause 2, page 1, line 9, at end insert—

“(1A) In subsection (1), leave out “it” and insert “the Secretary of State”.”

This amendment, with Amendment 37, NC20 and NC21, restores the duty on the Secretary of State to provide or secure the provision of services to that in the National Health Service Act 2006.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 37, in clause 15, page 13, line 18, leave out “it” and insert “the Secretary of State”.

This amendment, with Amendment 36, NC20 and NC21, restores the duty on the Secretary of State to provide or secure the provision of services to that in the National Health Service Act 2006.

New clause 20—Secretary of State’s duty to promote health service—

“(1) The National Health Service Act 2006 is amended as follows.

(2) For section 1 (Secretary of State’s duty to promote comprehensive health service) substitute the following—

“Secretary of State’s duty to promote health service

(1) The Secretary of State must continue the promotion in England of a comprehensive health service designed to secure improvement—

(a) in the physical and mental health of the people of England, and

(b) in the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of illness.

(2) The Secretary of State must for that purpose provide or secure the provision of services in accordance with this Act.

(3) The services so provided must be free of charge except in so far as the making and recovery of charges is expressly provided for by or under any enactment, whenever passed.””

This new clause would restore the wording of section 1 of the NHS Act 2006, concerning the duties of the Secretary of State regarding the promotion of the health service, to its original form, before it was amended by section 1 of the Health and Social Care Act 2012.

New clause 21—Duties on the Secretary of State to provide services—

“(1) The Secretary of State must provide, in England, to such extent as he considers necessary to meet all reasonable requirements—

(a) hospital accommodation,

(b) other accommodation for the purpose of any service provided under this Act,

(c) medical, dental, ophthalmic, nursing and ambulance services,

(d) such other services or facilities for the care of pregnant women, women who are breastfeeding and young children as he considers are appropriate as part of the health service,

(e) such other services or facilities for the prevention of illness, the care of persons suffering from illness and the after-care of persons who have suffered from illness as he considers are appropriate as part of the health service,

(f) such other services or facilities as are required for the diagnosis and treatment of illness.

(2) For the purposes of the duty in subsection (1), services provided under—

(a) section 82A (primary medical services), section 98C (primary dental services) or section 114C (primary ophthalmic services), of the NHS Act 2006, and

(b) a general medical services contract, a general dental services contract or a general ophthalmic services contract,

must be regarded as provided by the Secretary of State.”

[Justin Madders]

These amendments and new clauses are significant because, if accepted, they will put an end to the seemingly endless arguments that we saw during the passage of the 2011 Health and Social Care Bill. There is a whole shelf of books pointing out the changes in wording in what became the Health and Social Care Act 2012, and how they marked the end of the NHS as we previously knew and understood it. Allegedly expert barristers—although I have never met a barrister who did not claim to be an expert in something—wrote articles about how that new wording changed everything. On the other hand, the Government explained that they had changed nothing, and had simply put the reality on the ground into words.

David Lock QC, a genuine expert on NHS law, said that this technical change attracted considerable and possibly misguided criticism, but it did not involve any substantial change in practice. However, as reported by the noble Lords, it caused considerable confusion and suspicion. This confusion revolves around what is included in the NHS; what defines the comprehensive NHS; and how services required for the NHS are to be provided. Over time, the NHS has had many different structural solutions for providing these services, and indeed we are on yet another iteration of such a solution—we will see how long this one lasts.

The debate on that change of wording took up days of the Public Bill Committee’s time—or, should I say, the first of those Committees, as they had two goes at it on the last occasion. Let us hope we do not suffer a similar fate. Following that, there were hours of debate in the other place. The issue was then considered by the Constitution Committee, and some sort of compromise emerged, with insertion into the 2012 Act of what became, in the end, section 1(3) of the National Health Service Act 2006, as amended, which said:

“The Secretary of State retains ministerial responsibility to Parliament for the provision of the health service in England”—

we hope that that is always the political reality, no matter the wording used in the legislation.

The extra wording proposed in new clause 20 sits within section 1 of the 2006 Act, and states:

“The Secretary of State must continue the promotion in England of a comprehensive health service designed to secure improvement—

(a) in the physical and mental health of the people of England, and

(b) in the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of illness.”

I will not read out the whole amendment, but I want to compare that section of the wording with that of the founding National Health Service Act 1946, which says:

“it shall be the duty of the Minister of Health to promote the establishment of a comprehensive health service designed to secure improvement in the physical and mental health of the people…and the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of illness, and for that purpose to provide or secure the effective provision of services”.

We have this curious word “promote”. To my mind, promoting puts a positive onus on the Secretary of State, but if he has a duty to promote a comprehensive NHS, how exactly should he do that? In 1948, did Nye Bevan drive up and down the street with a megaphone, urging people to go and see their doctor? Today, it would probably mean the Secretary of State sending out a tweet to do the same—although, given what we hear about GPs’ workloads, they would not thank the Secretary of State for that. Or does this duty mean that when we are in the Chamber, and some rogue Member claims that we should abandon the NHS and move to some kind of insurance-based model, the Secretary of State should leap up and promote away?

Over the past few years, even before covid, we have seen more and more people going for private treatment because waiting lists are so long. We know that whatever is decided in the legislation in the main Chamber today, those waiting lists are not going to reduce significantly for some considerable time. Is it in fact the case that the Secretary of State is not complying with his duty to promote the NHS by allowing these waiting lists to grow and grow, thereby forcing people to secure alternative provision? The word “promote” can have multiple meanings, and I can think of a few Secretaries of State who have lamentably failed to promote the NHS, and should probably not have been promoted in the first place.

The contentious bit of this issue is really about what makes up the NHS. It was claimed about the Lansley Bill, and has been claimed about this Bill, that the change in wording implies that people would be denied access to treatment from the NHS because, for example, an ICB decides to exclude a particular service, and there is no duty on the Secretary of State to stop that happening. A few points are clear enough: the Secretary of State promotes the comprehensive NHS, but does not provide it. The boundaries of what the NHS actually is change over time, as we all know. Social care is now outside the NHS, although that will probably alter slightly over the next few years. The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence can redefine the boundaries; primary care trusts and clinical commissioning groups could exclude treatments on a whole range of different criteria that, while they may not have admitted it, did amount to an exclusion; and of course, advances in medical science mean that many things that were not available in 1946 and, indeed, could not possibly have been conceived of during the original Act, are available now on the NHS. Those boundaries are never entirely clear, and it is often up to the courts to draw out a decision about what healthcare amounts to.

However, in the 2006 Act, there was at least a bit of definition in clause 3:

“The Secretary of State must provide throughout England, to such extent as he considers necessary to meet all reasonable requirements—

(a) hospital accommodation,

(b) other accommodation for the purpose of any service provided under this Act,

(c) medical, dental, ophthalmic, nursing and ambulance services,

(d) such other services or facilities for the care of pregnant women, women who are breastfeeding and young children as he considers are appropriate as part of the health service,

(e) such other services or facilities for the prevention of illness, the care of persons suffering from illness and the after-care of persons who have suffered from illness as he considers are appropriate as part of the health service,

(f) such other services or facilities as are required for the diagnosis and treatment of illness.”

I could go on, but I hope Members will take my word for it that this is very similar language to that of all the previous NHS Acts, going back to 1946. That is essentially what new clause 21 seeks to reassert and confirm for the purposes of clarity, so that where there are subordinate bodies such as PCTs, CCGs or even NHS England, those duties are very clearly set out at the top and can then percolate down.

Under the current Bill, the ICBs have a responsibility to provide services for a defined population that is phrased much like the above definition, but there is no duty on the Secretary of State to provide throughout England; in other words, there is nothing specific to say that the duty on the Secretary of State should be delegated to ICBs, which we say there should be. Our intention is to restore the position that the duty is placed on the Secretary of State, which he then delegates down to NHS England, ICBs and so on. We could spend a lot of time on this, as our predecessors have, but I do not think that will be the best use of our time, so we have attempted to avoid going down that particular rabbit hole with a straightforward amendment, with what I hope has been a straightforward explanation.

The Lansley changes were made to align with the NHS structures that the then Secretary of State introduced, which were essentially market structures, distancing the Secretary of State in the sense that they were unlike anything the NHS had done previously, which was part of the reason why there was so much debate about them. That is why in 2015, 2017 and 2019, we made it clear in my party’s manifesto that we would reinstate the duty to promote and deliver the NHS, so there would be no doubt that it was a public service and could be restored to that footing. Our argument is that for simplicity, we should restore the duties to those of the pre-Lansley era, to reflect that the Lansley experiment has failed and we are in a new world—a new world with the old wording, which we wish to reinstate. Let us keep it simple, save everyone a lot of work and go back to the old wording, so that there is no doubt about where the duties and responsibilities lie.

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[Edward Argar]

Amendments 36 and 37 and new clauses 20 and 21 are in the name of the shadow Minister and his colleagues. I do not believe that what is being proposed reflects the reality of the role of the Secretary of State or what it should be, which is a strategic oversight role with the ability to intervene when necessary to ensure accountability. The hon. Gentleman might correct me, but I think he cited Mr Lock, who said that there was no substantial change in practice. That goes to the heart of why I am unpersuaded by the amendments.

As the hon. Gentleman knows, the idea that the Secretary of State himself provides services has not reflected the reality of the structure of the NHS for many years, not least since 2003-04 with the introduction by the Labour party when in government of foundation trusts as independent entities in the health system. That purchaser-provider split, long established in the NHS and retained in the Bill, allows some of the health services in England to be provided by those such as NHS foundation trusts, which are legally distinct from the Secretary of State.

In the years since those changes, and as the many vigorous debates in Parliament since and during the passage of the 2012 legislation have demonstrated, there has rightly been no loss in the strong sense of governmental accountability for the NHS felt by Governments of all parties and by parliamentarians. As the proposers of this group of amendments have themselves been among the most eloquent and capable colleagues in holding Ministers and Government to account for the NHS, I find it slightly strange that they feel that their amendment is necessary.

At the time of the 2012 Act, as the shadow Minister alluded to, there was a great deal of debate in the other place on the value or otherwise of this wording. Eventually, the noble Lords concluded that it was better for the law to reflect the reality of the modern NHS. However, it remains the case that the Secretary of State has a firm duty to continue the promotion in England of a comprehensive health service in practice. He does this through setting the strategic direction and his oversight of NHS England and the other national bodies of the NHS, and in the future, subject to debates in this place—I do not want to prejudge what the Committee and the House may determine on those clauses—through the extra lever of the proposed power of direction. At all times, he remains responsible to Parliament for the provision of the health service in England.

NHS England also has a duty to arrange for the provision of services for the purpose of the health service in England and a concurrent duty to promote a comprehensive health service. Integrated care boards will, subject to parliamentary approval of the Bill, also have functions in relation to arranging the provision of services.

I understand the point that Opposition Members are seeking to make with the amendment, but it is entirely unnecessary as law. The Secretary of State has the duty to promote the competence of the health service in practice. He is accountable to Parliament for the comprehensive health service, and I believe that local NHS leaders and NHS England are best placed to know what is needed to serve individual communities.

This goes to the heart of what I suspect will come up a number of times in our debates in this Committee, which is the extent to which the legislation should be prescriptive, or permissive and flexible. I suspect the shadow Minister and I will disagree on where the balance should lie, in a number of areas. We believe that the Bill strikes an appropriate balance.

The shadow Minister talked about flexibility in redefining the boundaries of what the NHS does. Throughout the history of the NHS, there have been tweaks along those lines. The Labour party introduced charges for glasses and dentures; the Conservative party introduced charges for prescriptions shortly afterwards; the Labour party abolished them, and then reintroduced them two years later. I use those examples because I think we should be wary about being overly prescriptive in primary legislation.

Clause 2 makes a number of amendments to the power allowing the Secretary of State to require NHS England to commission certain prescribed services. It ensures that the Secretary of State can still require NHS England to commission specialised services and facilities, but recognises that aspects of the commissioning might be carried out by other NHS bodies through joint or delegated working arrangements or by directing integrated care boards to provide those services.

Specialist services are commissioned to support people with a range of complex and rare conditions. Those services could involve the treatment of patients with rare cancers, genetic disorders, and complex medical or surgical conditions, for example. As such, it is right that NHS England has overall responsibility for the services and can decide whether they might be better delivered through joint or delegated working arrangements or through directions to ICBs—I am happy to adopt the shadow Minister’s suggested shorthand, otherwise we will be taking a very long time repeating the same words on multiple occasions.

The clause also removes the requirement of the Secretary of State to consider the financial implications for CCGs—to be replaced with ICBs—when requiring NHS England to commission certain services. The change focuses the decision about categorisation of specialised services on the complexity and impact of the service and the ability of ICBs to support commissioning services for their populations, reflecting the fact that ICBs are significantly larger than CCGs and, correspondingly, so are their financial resources. In some circumstances, NHS England may request that a service is no longer nominated as a specialised service or facility—that could be used, for example, as the technology improves and it becomes more appropriate for it to be commissioned by an ICB instead. The clause inserts a new provision in the NHS Act 2006 which requires the Secretary of State to provide reasons for any refusal to requests from NHS England to revoke provisions requiring NHS England to commission specialised services.

I therefore encourage the shadow Minister not to press his amendment to a vote.

[Justin Madders]

I am grateful for the Minister’s comments, not least the promotion he inadvertently gave me by referring to me as shadow Secretary of State. We should have a Division on that, should we not? I understand what the Minister is saying, but our aim with this amendment is to reflect the new reality. No one has really got to the bottom of why the wording came out in 2012, but we are clearly moving back into a pre-Lansley era and the end of the marketisation, so we should go back to the previous wording. In terms of the services and duties in our new clause 21, I do not think the Minister said he disagreed that any of them should be provided. I am trying to do him a favour here and help him to avoid the Bill being bogged down in the Lords. If it comes back in ping-pong, we will quote the relevant new clause and say, “This is something that could have been avoided.”

I understand that the Minister does not want to be too prescriptive. He is right that the Bill will centre largely on the right balance between permissiveness and prescriptiveness, and we will no doubt have disagreements on that. I have tried to be helpful to him, but he does not want to accept that assistance on this occasion, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 3

NHS England mandate

[Justin Madders]

I beg to move amendment 19, in clause 3, page 2, line 12, leave out paragraph (e) and insert—

“(e) after subsection (6) insert—

‘(6A) The Secretary of State may revise the mandate should urgent or other unforeseen circumstances arise.

(6B) If the Secretary of State revises the mandate, the Secretary of State must publish and lay before Parliament the mandate as revised with a written explanation of the urgent or other unforeseen circumstances that justify the revision and an impact assessment of the proposed change.’”

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 20, in clause 3, page 2, line 30, at end insert—

“(6) No mandate may be laid before Parliament unless the Secretary of State has supplied a statement on how the mandate will be funded.”

[Justin Madders]

These amendments to clause 3 deal with the mandate to NHS England. The mandate was part of the changes that were introduced to attempt to distance the role of Government and Ministers from the sound of the bedpans dropping. We can talk about how much the Secretary of State should be involved in that, but we will focus our comments on the mandate today.

What we saw was, in effect, an artificial distinction—one that, like so much else in the last piece of legislation, has largely been subverted or ignored. Despite the intentions, Ministers still try to micromanage and sometimes interfere, for what we would describe as political reasons, and the mandate has rumbled on. During the tortuous passage of the Lansley Bill, the Government had to concede that the Secretary of State remained politically responsible to Parliament for the NHS, which, as we have just discussed, has always been the reality.

It would be brave, however, for someone to suggest that the mandate has had the same level of parliamentary scrutiny. The mandate is presented to Parliament each year, but is that anything other than a ritual? I do not think Hansard records energetic and fierce debates about the mandate, although I am happy to be corrected by the Minister, if he can point me to a particular section.

The idea of the mandate is not entirely without merit. It is good that the NHS knows what is expected of it, and we all agree that it should be free from sudden announcements or other surprises—such as the Secretary of State announcing that the following week all NHS staff would have to wear face coverings before informing them that that was what was required. That is just one example from an extreme situation, but the point is that we all crave certainty. The mandate is an attempt to provide that; and without it, it is unclear how accountability works.

As was clearly articulated in last Thursday’s evidence session, the NHS welcomes the mandate’s ability, in theory at least, to give it stability and enable it, if possible, to plan for the medium and long term. I am sure we could have a debate on whether that is indeed what has happened; it is pretty clear in recent times that, for genuine reasons, that has not been possible. However, most experts would suggest that the NHS would benefit from stability and the ability to plan over at least a three or five-year period without lurches in policy and—crucially and pertinently given today’s business in the Chamber—with a degree of funding certainty to match the requirements.

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I will pause there. I encourage the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston to withdraw his amendment, and urge colleagues to support clause 3 stand part.

[Justin Madders]

I thank the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire for promoting me to the Privy Council. At this rate I will be Prime Minister by lunchtime and supreme leader of the universe by the end of today’s sitting, in which case the Bill will no longer be required.

The hon. Lady made an important point about the effect of annual budgets and, frankly, the opportunism that follows from those providing services. We know that happens in all sorts of sectors, but the amendment sets out very clearly why a longer-term footing is needed. What the hon. Lady referred to was a boom-and-bust approach, but we will leave such terms to history.

My hon. Friend the Member for Bristol South articulated clearly some of the challenges as well. She made the point about accountability, which really does matter. As she said, there is a theme throughout the Bill that accountability is somewhat missing. I am grateful for the Minister’s explanation of the impact assessment—better late than never. The White Paper was issued in January and the Bill had its Second Reading in July, so there has been plenty of time to get everything sorted.

The amendments seek to stop the Government’s propensity to announce policy by headline and then work out the detail later on. The Minister has helpfully said—he will correct me if I am wrong—that the mandate will be fully funded, and we will make sure that he commits to that. We probably do not need to press amendment 20, but we will press amendment 19 to a vote. We think the Government intend to move towards a longer-term plan for the mandate on an annual cycle, but the legislation as it currently stands does not prevent it from becoming stop-start, and there will be circumstances when it will be necessary to change within year. It is important, for reasons of accountability, that that comes with some conditions attached.

The Minister said that we are trying to take away flexibility from the Secretary of State, but we are not. We are trying to encourage accountability alongside flexibility. We accept that there will be circumstances in which the mandate will need to be changed in urgent situations and we would not want to impinge on that, but if the Secretary of State has the power to move things forward in that manner, he should be accountable to Parliament when he does. Again, we are trying to be helpful and assist him. We hope he does not have to do it very often, but if he does issue a mandate in urgent circumstances he will want to know what the impact will be on the NHS. He will want to know that the funding is there and that the NHS has the capacity to deliver the demands placed on it. Those are questions that any member of the Department will ask, so we hope to put in the Bill what ought to happen in practice. It is important enough to press the matter to a Division.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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[Edward Argar]

The clause places a new requirement on NHS England to consult and involve carers and representatives of those individuals to whom health services are provided when exercising its commissioning functions. NHS England is currently required to involve and consult individuals to whom healthcare is provided when carrying out its commissioning functions; the clause extends that existing requirement to consulting with their carers and representatives as well. We want to ensure that we have a health and care system that is accountable and responsive to the people who rely on it.

The clause recognises the immensely important role that carers and representatives play in supporting our health and care system, and ensures that our legislation remains in step with current practice within that system. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee and hope that all Members feel able to support it.

[Justin Madders]

I am sure we are all excited to get this one passed—I am certainly not going to oppose it. However, I have a couple of questions of clarification.

Health and Care Bill (Sixth sitting)

Justin Madders Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 14th September 2021 Public Bill Committees

Question (this day) again proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Justin Madders (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair this afternoon, Ms Elliott.

We were left on a cliffhanger before lunch. I was about to ask the Minister some questions. He might have preferred the advantage of having two and a half hours in between to think of an answer, but I am sure he will cope. Actually, it is a fairly straightforward question, so I hope for a fairly straightforward answer.

The clause refers to carers and their representatives. Will the Minister clarify who that is? Is that carers’ groups or, for example, someone who might hold power of attorney? That is really the only comment I wanted to make on clause 5.

[The Minister for Health (Edward Argar)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Elliott, I think for the first time in Committee.

To answer the shadow Minister briefly, I certainly envisage that the clause encompasses those with power of attorney, because in effect and in law they are the legal representatives of individuals who do not always have capacity to speak for themselves. In that context, I also hope that we will see carers’ organisations, as well as others who do not necessarily have power of attorney but act as advocates or representatives for individuals, having their views heard and taken into consideration. I hope that gives the hon. Gentleman some reassurance.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 5 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 6

Support and assistance by NHS England

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Edward Argar]

The clause confers a power to provide assistance and support to NHS foundation trusts, NHS trusts and other persons providing services as part of the health service in England to work to secure continuous improvement in the quality of the provision of such health services and their financial sustainability. That new power replaces a range of existing support functions sitting with NHS England and the NHS Trust Development Authority. In particular, it replaces the function of the NHS Trust Development Authority to take steps to assist health service providers as conferred by directions. It also replaces the existing power of NHS England to support clinical commissioning groups and primary care providers, which enables NHS England to provide direct financial support to integrated care boards and providers within the scope of the provisions, and to provide other support and assistance to all those bodies exercising functions within or part of the health service.

The clause is an example of the positive improvement that the merger of NHS England, Monitor and the NHS Trust Development Authority will bring to the health service. It will allow NHS England to take such steps as it sees as necessary to identify and address areas of concern early, while also providing support to leadership and guidance where required to shape the services that are delivered for the greatest benefit of patients. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.

[Justin Madders]

The Opposition will not oppose the clause, but I have one or two queries that we hope the Minister will be able to answer. Obviously, it is a broad power. I assume that the reference in proposed new section 13YA(1)(a) to “person” relates not just to individuals. Perhaps the Minister will expand on what that is meant to cover.

Also, specifically, at proposed new subsection (3), on integrated care boards and the provision of financial assistance, as we remember from the evidence sessions, there was not a great deal of clarity about the costs that NHS England anticipated might be incurred as a result of the legislation. Will the Minister assist us by providing some estimates of that, as well as whether the powers under clause 6, including the financial assistance, are subject to any limits or reporting requirements back to the Secretary of State, and whether Parliament would have a role in that at any point?

Proposed new subsection (2) talks about providing

“employees or any other resources of NHS England.”

The Minister said that “employees” could include secondees. I think it is clear from the guidance that certain roles on the ICB should not have any, for want of a better description, conflicts of interest or hold any other roles within the wider NHS. I want to make sure that the Minister is clear that that requirement is not going to cause us any difficulties.

[Edward Argar]

I am grateful, as ever, to the shadow Minister for his succinct questions. I will try to address them all in turn. He referenced the term “person” in proposed new subsection (1). It is a legal definition. In the context of the services provided—I mentioned primary care—it could be a GP practice. Having gone through the drafting with officials, my understanding is that it is a legal term and does not alter what is currently possible.

I may take the questions slightly out of order, and I hope he will forgive me. On proposed new subsection (2), I think he was referring to subsequent new clauses and amendments he has tabled around ICBs, who the suitable persons to sit on them are and the management of conflicts of interest. I suggest to him that, given the amendments he has tabled, the most appropriate time to discuss those issues would be in the context of how we do or do not further refine the definitions around memberships of ICBs. The Committee will reach that on Thursday, I suspect. On reporting and transparency, I entirely share his view and reassure him that I expect transparency to play a key role when public moneys are spent this way.

Finally, on proposed new subsection (3) and the cost to the NHS and the Exchequer, no specific limits are stated in the legislation, but, obviously, any assistance provided would need to meet the purpose set out in the Bill and be transparently awarded. I hope that gives him some reassurance, but I am always happy to revert to him if he wishes to follow up on any detail—either now or in writing.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 6 accordingly agreed to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 7

Exercise of functions relating to provision of services

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Edward Argar]

I am getting my exercise today in bouncing up and down in my seat. Clause 7 enables NHS England to direct one or more integrated care boards to exercise certain NHS England functions and to fund the exercise of those functions. This relates to NHS England functions such as the commissioning of specialised services, health services in justice settings and armed forces settings, primary medical services, dental services, primary ophthalmic services, pharmaceutical services, and any of the Secretary of State’s public health functions that are exercisable by NHS England on his behalf. In future the intention is that ICBs be responsible for the majority of health service commissioning in England. This approach will ensure that decisions about services are made closer to the patient and in line with local population needs, enabling greater integration in the way that services are arranged and delivered.

Clause 7 ensures that NHS England has the appropriate powers to make sure we achieve our policy objective, by allowing flexibility for ICBs to take on these additional commissioning responsibilities as delegated functions from NHS England. We intend that this can be used by NHS England to delegate primary care functions while ICBs mature, before we transfer them fully to ICBs at the appropriate time using clause 16 and schedule 3, which we will debate in due course. This will allow NHS England to keep a closer watch on how ICBs are discharging these functions, and managing the transition, before they are fully delegated to and embedded in ICBs.

The Secretary of State will have the ability to make regulations under this clause, meaning that, where appropriate, certain conditions or limitations can be placed on NHS England’s power to direct ICBs, including the ability to prescribe functions that the power does not apply to at all. Any directions issued by NHS England under this clause must be published. I know that the transparency point is one that the shadow Minister has raised on a number of occasions, so I reassure him that they must be published ensuring that such directions are made transparently, and that responsibilities between NHS England and ICBs are clearly set out.

This clause is essential to give NHS England the flexibility, and the appropriate mechanisms, to delegate the commissioning of these services when the time is right to do so. Therefore, I commend it to the Committee.

[Justin Madders]

We will not be opposing this clause. Clearly, as the Minister has set out, it is necessary to enable the functioning of the health service.

I have one question about the powers under proposed new subsection 13YB(4), which are effectively prohibitions on the ICBs from delegating arrangements further. Will the Minister set out what circumstances are envisaged, if any, where this power may be necessary? There will obviously be delegations, not only to the services listed there, but to place-based organisations. In that situation, what does the Minister see the role of the ICBs as? Will it be the ICB itself that delivers those functions, or will it be another body?

[Karin Smyth (Bristol South) (Lab)]

Further to those points about clarity around the exercising of powers, the move to give NHS England that power is entirely sensible. The medical, dental, ophthalmic and pharmaceutical services have had a lower profile in our constituencies over the last few years, as I think we would all agree. It is important to give them the profile they need to be integrated into the system, because they have certainly not been so far.

The evolution of delegating that power to CCGs came late in the day, and remains muddled around the commissioning of primary care services. Therefore, while allowing the delegation of function is entirely sensible, it is not clear, as my hon. Friend the Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston has said, when or how that delegation will be sought. I think the Minister was referring to the involvement of the Secretary of State, but I am not sure in what circumstances the Secretary of State would be doing that, and why this would not be when NHS England, or NHS England regions, decides that the ICB is of a maturity to accept commissioning responsibilities.

One assumes that NHS England believes that at the moment some of those putative organisations are mature enough already; will some of them start doing that on day one, six months in or a year in? How will we know and how will they be resourced to do it? Is it a transfer of power? How NHS England and the local ICB, without representatives of medical, dental, ophthalmic and pharmaceutical bodies, will be taking that on board is all very opaque.

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[Edward Argar]

Clause 8 places a duty on NHS England to prepare, in respect of each financial year, a set of accounts that consolidate the annual accounts of English NHS trusts and foundation trusts. The transparency of financial reporting across NHS providers will be diminished without this provision, as the consolidated provider accounts collate the financial reporting of all NHS trusts and foundation trusts to give an NHS provider position that is laid before Parliament, and has been since the 2017-18 financial year.

In addition, NHS England has a duty to provide a copy of the consolidated accounts to the Secretary of State and the Comptroller and Auditor General, and a duty to lay copies of the consolidated accounts and the related report before Parliament. To ensure adequate financial scrutiny, the Secretary of State has the power to give directions to NHS England on the principles and methods to be applied in preparing the accounts and their content and form, and can direct that the accounts must be accompanied by any reports or information deemed necessary. The Comptroller and Auditor General must, as their responsibilities stand currently, examine, certify and report on the consolidated accounts and send copies of the report to the Secretary of State and to NHS England.

The provisions set out in this clause not only provide continuity to the system but place in law strong levels of oversight relating to both NHS trusts and foundation trusts. That ensures the transparency that we would all wish to see and the robustness of the process and procedures governing financial health at a local level. This clause is an important way of ensuring NHS England discharges its responsibilities as system regulator in delivering appropriate and adequate stewardship of the health system and, ultimately, public money.

[Justin Madders]

Again, we will not oppose the clause, but I have a query about the powers under proposed new section 65Z4(4), particularly in the context of what the Secretary of State said at the weekend about targets being a lot of form-filling and nonsense. It seems rather odd to give himself powers to direct trusts to provide any reports or information that he requires when, clearly, the Secretary of State gets all sorts of information and reports from the NHS at the moment. Could the Minister say what he is not receiving at the moment that he thinks the powers will allow him to ask for?

[Edward Argar]

I consider proposed new subsection (4) to be purely pragmatic, as there will be circumstances with individual trusts and situations where clarifications to accounts or data may be required. Therefore, it is prudent to give the Secretary of State the power to ask for further clarification. He will be accountable to Parliament for how the money is spent, so it is entirely appropriate that he has explicit power, given by Parliament, to ask for information over and above the de minimis specified in the Bill, to ensure he can be completely transparent with Members and the public more broadly.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 8 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 9

Funding for service integration

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Edward Argar]

Currently, one of the objectives of the Government’s mandate to NHS England—a process we discussed in Committee this morning—is that an amount of the annual sum paid to NHS England must be used for service integration. In practice, that must be contributed to the better care fund. The better care fund is the national policy driving forward the integration of health and social care in England. However, as we have discussed, other provisions set out in clause 3 will remove the requirement for a mandate to be published every year. As a result, the mandate will no longer be an appropriate vehicle for setting an annual ring fence for service integration. Therefore, the clause will put in place a new power to allow the Secretary of State to direct NHS England to ring-fence an amount of its annual allotment for health and social care integration through the better care fund, to continue the work of that fund and to direct it on how that amount should be used.

The change will have no impact on the operational policy intent of the better care fund; the provision will simply ensure the better care fund can continue to be set annually, notwithstanding changes to the mandate, which will not be made annually in the future, should this legislation be passed. The better care fund has enabled and improved co-operation between health and social care partners at local level. It is therefore important for it to continue. This clause ensures that that will happen, regardless of proposed changes to the mandate.

Further minor amendments are made to NHS England’s corresponding power to enable it to require that an amount of the sum paid each year to an integrated care board be used for service integration. That power exists currently in relation to clinical commissioning groups, and the amendment seeks to ensure that the better care fund continues to operate effectively once ICBs are established.

[Justin Madders]

Again, I will not detain the Committee for long: I just have a question for the Minister. The more we get into the Bill, the less permissive it appears to be. I have no doubt that will still be used by the Minister in defence against various amendments we will move later today. Given that we have been told that the role of ICBs is to direct health systems in their local areas, it is not at all clear what the situation is if the powers under this clause require them to set aside a certain amount of money for service integration, but doing so would mean a reduction in service elsewhere in the system. How would that dispute be resolved? Who would have the final say?

[Edward Argar]

As I made clear in my remarks, the clause does not so much direct ICBs specifically; it is primarily about setting aside an amount of the annual sum paid to NHS England to go to the better care fund, which is then allocated. This technical change will have no impact on the operation or policy intention of the BCF, and it should not have an impact on ICBs’ ability to operate. The intention is simply to make sure that as we move away from an annual mandate with an annual financial settlement for the BCF, we can still set an annual amount to go to the BCF so that it can continue its work, and for that to then be allocated to systems.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 9 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 10

Payments in respect of quality

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Justin Madders]

I will not repeat my earlier comments about secondees and ICBs, because we will pick that up later. In our evidence sessions, the role of the healthcare safety investigation body and its independence from NHS England was raised. Is the Minister comfortable that that role will not be compromised in any way by the requirements of the clause?

[Edward Argar]

I assume—and the hon. Gentleman will probably shake or nod his head—that in this context he is referring both to the Care Quality Commission and HSIB—[Interruption.] Yes, I am reassured and confident that the provisions in clause 11 will not impact negatively in any way on the ability of either safety organisation to conduct inspections and do the work that we envisage them doing. In the case of HSIB, we may return to that when we discuss the relevant clauses. I believe that what is proposed remains consistent with their specific roles, responsibilities and obligations and what we are seeking to achieve for patient safety.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 11 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 12

Role of integrated care boards

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

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[Edward Argar]

The clause replaces section 1l of the National Health Service Act 2006, which sets out the general function of clinical commissioning groups, with new section 1l, which sets out the general function of integrated care boards. It provides, in a similar way to CCGs, that ICBs have the function of arranging for the provision of services for the purposes of the health service in England. As a result, ICBs will now be the new commissioner responsible for the majority of health service commissioning in England. Later clauses will set out the details of the services that ICBs are responsible for commissioning, but we intend that they should include those currently commissioned by CCGs and some that are commissioned by NHS England, as we discussed in relation to a previous clause, such as primary care, dentistry, pharmacy and optometry services.

The clause is crucial to establish ICBs as the new key commissioners for the NHS in England in future. Our proposals bring together leadership across the health and care system, and without the clause ICBs will simply not have a clear purpose. It seeks to manage effectively in legislation the smooth transition from CCGs to ICBs, and I commend it to the Committee.

[Justin Madders]

Obviously, we will spend time this afternoon discussing ICBs, so I will not discuss this clause in particular. I will draw attention to proposed new section 14Z26, especially the proposals in subsections (2) and (3) for integrated care boards, which effectively allow clinical commissioning groups to determine their own processes to consult on ICBs. We do not think that the consultation process has been adequate—indeed, it has been non-existent in some situations—but we will probably return to the question of ICB geography later in this sitting.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 12 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 13

Establishment of integrated care boards

[Justin Madders]

I beg to move amendment 49, in clause 13, page 8, line 34, after “board”, insert

“NHS trust, NHS foundation trust, trade union, patient representatives and local authority”.

This amendment would ensure that trusts and local authorities are consulted before any changes are made to the number, shape and size of ICSs.

There are two big themes on integrated care and the White Paper in the Bill and associated documents. Our points are aligned with those of local authorities, using the integrated care partnership as the vehicle to bring the planning of services, such as social care and housing, into the wider framework. It is also the development of the concept of place.

Local government, as we know, does place; the NHS probably does not do it in quite the same way. The clue is in the name. The “local” in local government means that it has always done community engagement; it already has to integrate multiple public services around the needs of a defined population. It is fair to say that the NHS has operated in a very different way in the past and can appear to have a different geography for every service that is accessed.

The Bill settles on 42 as the magic number of areas that the NHS is divided into, which could be influenced by “The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy” and the ultimate question about life, the universe and everything. That might make more sense than what has been put forward so far as the optimal configuration for the integration of services. The view of many of those who we have spoken to is that 42 is too many for the commissioning of most acute and tertiary services, and too big for the commissioning of primary and community services and social care. Like a lot of things, it is a compromise. It is a fudge. It is an accommodation between competing interests and views.

There is very little explanation in the Bill—in fact, we have zero explanation—about how place will work. We need to understand more about that from the Minister. How will place fit into the commissioning framework? I hope we can have some further guidance in the Minister’s responses. For us, the concept of place is just that—a concept. It is not really pinned down or articulated clearly in the legislation.

As Members will be aware, the NHS has had local government as its key partner in healthcare from the outset. That is recognised by various bodies. For a long time, boundaries were not an issue. We sometimes forget just how intimately involved the NHS and local authorities were at the outset of the NHS. That has obviously changed over the years. It would be fair to say that the current integrated care system boundaries are really a product of the NHS and the way that they have been imposed implies a great weakness in the whole Bill. It is supposed to be about integration between local authorities and the NHS, but it is almost all about what the NHS wants and what it thinks is the best outcome. It should have been co-produced with local government, not presented as a fait accompli. Is the Minister able to tell us how much local authorities and mayoralties were involved and consulted in the design of ICS boundaries?

There is a dilemma here. In our view, starting this way, with boundaries that do not always reflect the natural communities that they are meant to serve, will store up problems. We are less than impressed by what has happened to date, and while we might well be stuck with the 42 configuration that we have now, that does not mean that we agree with the process. I use the term “process” in the loosest possible way. We do not believe it should be a template for the future. Amendment 49 seeks that, in future, any changes in ICS boundaries should be decided in consultation and conjunction with trade unions, local authorities and trusts, and that they are consulted before any further changes to the shape or size of ICSs are made.

The problem we see is how the big acute trusts fit into the system. It has been a problem faced in places such as Scotland and Norway, which are further down the integration pathway. As would be expected, the big trusts dominate, but while they might take 80% of the budget, the vast majority of interactions for the patient are in primary and community care and, of course, in social care. All of those sit far more comfortably in the local authority footprint, as the National Health Service Act 1946 accepted. It is even simpler to consider place in terms of districts and wards or even super-output areas. Those terms are all very familiar to local government, and local authorities already take them into account when they consider how to deliver their services. When the Pandora’s box is opened, we assume place is aligned with something that has already been defined, and we do not try to invent yet another new geography, as has been attempted with ICSs.

I would like to hear from the Minister what the impact might be of further revisions to the boundaries. I understand that Ministers have looked at that and they have apparently changed some but not others, without publishing any real rationale. I note that there have been some cosy fireside chats, after which various changes have emerged. That reminds me of how the Conservative party used to anoint its leader, but it is hardly a transparent or open way to do things.

Let us do the job properly, transparently and openly. No ICS should have a boundary that has not been agreed with all the relevant local authorities. I have had some information from the Minister in reply to a written question about discussions that he has had with hon. and right hon. Members, and I am grateful for that. However, I am still waiting to see all the evidence and civil servants’ recommendations that he had to hand when he made his decisions. One of the main themes during the evidence sessions was the concern that the Secretary of State and Ministers could make decisions for party political, or other less than noble, reasons. Of course, I do not accuse the Minister of doing that, but when decisions of this magnitude are taken in this manner, such questions will be asked.

Whenever we have changed the boundaries of parliamentary constituencies, there has been an extremely lengthy process. When my own local authority, Cheshire West and Chester, came into existence, I recall that regulations were approved by Parliament. I know that because I lived through the trauma of that change; for the record, I should state that my wife is a member of that local authority. The point is that the contrast between what happens with that sort administrative border change and what has happened here is stark. I should also make it clear that I have another hat on. As the Minister will know, there have been many discussions about the ICS area in Cheshire and Merseyside, and, as I understand it, the configuration will be reviewed within the next two years. I am sure that the hon. Member for Eddisbury agrees with me that any decision on that should be made with more transparency than we have seen to date, not less.

As an aside, it is probably worth saying that if we pretend that everything can be resolved on a single footprint, we fail to acknowledge that there are regional arms of what is pretty much a national ambulance service, some trusts operate multiple services across clinical commissioning groups, and even tertiary services are commissioned by NHS England for large population areas. Acute care will not be commissioned at place or even ICS level, so we need to think about a simple place-based model for the rest. In terms of transaction volumes, the vast majority of care services, and indeed wider public services such as education and housing, are already provided on a local authority footprint.

At this point, I will mention our proposals for elected chairs, which I will come to shortly. With the right boundaries, it would be a lot easier to enact that. Proper co-location brings healthcare into line with the rest of the public services—local authorities, police and fire. It makes no sense at all for ICS boundaries not to be coterminous, and I do not think the Minister should disagree with me on that. The boundaries need to match those of combined authorities and mayoralties, and they should be set by local authorities and their partners, not just by the NHS. In terms of transactional volume, the vast majority of patient care interactions are in primary, community and social care, and for the patient they are all classed as local.

This veers into a bigger debate about devolution, mayoralties and combined authorities. The trend is one way. If we start with a blank sheet of paper, the answer is obvious: align along existing populations and boundaries. This matter should have been discussed well before the switch from sustainability and transformation partnerships to ICSs; indeed, that should have been done when the STPs were formed. That was the time to develop a proper and open process and deal with concerns. That is history now, but at least with this amendment we may be able to avoid repeating those mistakes.

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[Edward Argar]

The approach that we have adopted thus far, which I believe is appropriate, is that we have that with local authorities and the NHS, but ultimately it is the Secretary of State who balances those in the case of these boundaries, and he is accountable to this House, so that strikes an appropriate balance. In the case of the East of England areas, certainly, we did have a very strong divergence of views as to what the right boundaries would be. It would be wrong if either local authorities or the NHS had the right to say, “No, it’s this.” That is where we have to have those views put forward together so that they can be considered in the round.

On the final point that the hon. Member for Bristol South made—I may have missed some points, but this is an important one that I want to put on the record—she is absolutely right to highlight the value of the work done by managers and administrators, or whatever title is used to describe them, sometimes pejoratively by some commenting on this matter. She is absolutely right about the value of their work. There is an analogy that I use all the time, with a much-hackneyed quote that Members will know: John F. Kennedy going to NASA, shaking the hand of the janitor and saying, “Thank you for putting a man on the moon.” What sits behind that goes to the heart of what the hon. Lady was saying. The NHS is a team. Without effective managers, people who can engage, and people who can manage budgets and ensure financial transparency and accountability, and without planning and people who make sure that patients are called and appointments are rescheduled, those on the clinical front line, if she will allow me to put it this way, would not be as effective at doing their job. It is not an effective use of a clinician’s time to ring up a patient to rearrange an appointment. Similarly, it would not be an appropriate use of the time of a highly skilled manager or administrator to be performing some other task. We have got to make sure that we have the right people in the right places, with the right skills.

The final point I would like to make again goes back to a point that the hon. Member for Bristol South made, about accountability. I think it was Amanda Pritchard, chief executive of the NHS—forgive me if it was Mark Cubbon, the chief operating officer—who highlighted, in asking who was accountable, that the ICB is an NHS body, working in partnership with the local authority, that is accountable for the funds it spends, which are voted on by Parliament. That is why it has an NHS official and there are routes of accountability up through the NHS to NHS England, and ultimately to the Secretary of State and this House. That is the structure of the NHS that has evolved over the past 70-plus years. I think that the hon. Lady sought—quite rightly—to press and challenge me on whether we think that evolution is the right approach, or whether we need to take a step back and challenge some of those assumptions. She is right to do that, but in this context, which involves the management of public money, the structures and accountabilities are correct.

I am sorry to disappoint the shadow Minister, as I fear that we will not be able to support his amendment. I hope he will not press it to a vote and that I have gone some way towards addressing the points made, particularly with regard to ICS boundaries and processes followed.

[Justin Madders]

We have had a fairly wide-ranging and useful debate. A number of issues have arisen that we will return to as the Committee makes progress. I am disappointed that the hon. Member for Eddisbury could not come on board; perhaps I should not have made my little dig about barristers this morning, otherwise he might have been more inclined to support us. I noted the sympathy he expressed and I think he articulated very well his knowledge of the geography of the area and why there are concerns locally about proper accountability in such a large area.

The irony of the whole debate, of course, is that we are discussing the Bill today, but before we have even got to the end, we know that the Cheshire and Merseyside ICS may not survive two years. Before the Bill has even become an Act, some of its constituent parts may be reorganised in future. We will see what happens on that, and I look forward to engaging with the Minister in that process.

Let us not forget that the genesis of what is before us was the STPs. How were they put together? I think local NHS leaders were sent a missive about three days before Christmas to say, “Can you give us an idea of what you think the most optimal design of your local NHS would be? By the way, we would like the response back by the end of January.” As we know, the NHS is traditionally extremely busy at that time of year, and Christmas is hardly a good time to be engaging with the wider public sector or indeed the community, but that was where the genesis was, and that is where the Cheshire and Merseyside STP and now ICS came from. It would be interesting to know how many of the 42 areas have changed since that original geography back in, I think, 2017—perhaps even 2016. It was clearly then, as it still is, a creature of the NHS, not the communities it represents.

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[Dr Whitford]

Does the shadow Minister think that the fact we have heard today that Cheshire and Merseyside could be reviewed as quickly as in two years’ time might undermine some of the commitment on the ground? If people feel that it will all change again in two years, the engagement may be weakened.

[Justin Madders]

I thank the SNP spokesperson for her intervention. That is undoubtedly a risk. It is possible we end up with two or three areas out of that review. I hate to think it would get any bigger.

In terms of what people think is their relevant community, Merseyside has a metro Mayor now with very clearly defined geography, and Cheshire is a different area. As my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol South said, people do not take to the streets with banners saying, “Save our CCG!” I suspect the majority of people do not even know what a CCG is or the area that it is meant to cover. I suspect even fewer people know what an ICS is and what area it covers. That will definitely have to change if we are to have a truly integrated health and social care system.

The point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol South about the defensive culture at times, alluded to by Sir Robert Francis, is a valid one. We may touch on that in the HSSIB elements of the Bill later on. She was asking the right questions—how can the board be challenged, and who is it accountable to? Those are points we will have to come back to, because there is, to our mind, a clear democratic deficit in the way these bodies have been structured.

Finally, the Minister referred to his guiding principle of coterminosity except in exceptional circumstances. Cheshire and Merseyside is coterminous, it is just coterminous for more than one local authority—and some pretty big ones at that—so I do not necessarily think that coterminosity is the answer.

The Minister referred to proposed new sections 14Z25 and 26 in regard to the duties to consult with members of the ICB. Some of the people named in amendment 49 might not actually be on the ICB, because they are not included in the legislation at the moment. We will come to our amendment on that in due course, and we might be able to change that. In proposed new sections 14Z26, CCGs must

“consult any persons they consider it appropriate to consult”.

That could be everyone and no one. I do not intend to press this to a vote, but I hope the Minister has taken on board several points that will lead to an improved process in the future. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Edward Argar]

I beg to move amendment 10, in clause 13, page 9, line 44, leave out from beginning to end of line 12 on page 10 and insert—

“(1) NHS England may, in connection with the abolition of a clinical commissioning group under section 14Z27, make a scheme for the transfer of the group’s property, rights or liabilities to NHS England or an integrated care board.

(2) NHS England may, in connection with the establishment of an integrated care board, make a scheme for the transfer of property, rights or liabilities to the board from—

(a) NHS England,

(b) an NHS trust established under section 25, an NHS foundation trust, or

(c) a Special Health Authority established under section 28.

(2A) NHS England may, in connection with the variation of the constitution of an integrated care board or the abolition of an integrated care board, make a scheme for the transfer of the board’s property, rights or liabilities to NHS England or an integrated care board.

(2B) The reference in subsection (2A) to the variation of the constitution of an integrated care board is to its variation by order under section 14Z25 or under provision included in its constitution by virtue of paragraph 14 of Schedule 1B.”

This amendment adds a power for NHS England to transfer property, rights and liabilities (including rights and liabilities relating to a contract of employment) from certain NHS bodies to an integrated care board on its establishment: see new subsection (2). In consequence, new subsections (1), (2A) and (2B) restructure material currently in subsections (1) and (2).

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[Edward Argar]

Both the amendments are technical ones. Amendment 10 amends proposed new section 14Z28 of the National Health Service Act 2006, which provides NHS England with the power to make transfer schemes to transfer property, rights and liabilities in connection with the establishment of, abolition of or change in the constitution of ICBs or the abolition of CCGs. The amendment widens the power to make transfer schemes when establishing integrated care boards, so that transfer schemes may include transfers from NHS England, English NHS trusts or foundation trusts, or English special health authorities.

We are widening the scope of those schemes to reflect further work done by NHS England, which has noted that a small number of people currently working in those bodies may need to transfer into ICBs. It is of practical importance for NHS England to be able to make transfer schemes that will ensure a smooth transition when ICBs are established, and for all the staff who may be transferring to newly established ICBs to be fully protected by such schemes.

For all but the most senior staff transferred from elsewhere in the NHS, I assure the Committee that NHS England’s employment commitment to continuity of terms and conditions, even if not required by law, will apply fully. That commitment is designed to provide stability and remove uncertainty during the transition. It is also possible for NHS England to use the schemes to transfer property and liabilities currently held by those bodies to ICBs on their establishment, although again we expect that to be rare in practice.

Proposed new subsections (1), (2A) and (2B) in the amendment restructure material in proposed new subsections (1) and (2) of the clause as drafted. That simply reflects the technical legal redrafting. The amendment therefore does not change the bodies that can be covered in transfer schemes relating to the abolition of CCGs or ICBs, or the variation of the constitution of an ICB. Those bodies continue to be CCGs, ICBs and NHS England.

Amendment 11 is consequential upon amendment 10 and is also simply a technical change. They are technical, but important amendments to ensure—and to be clear—that staff rights, liabilities and properties are in the right places in the NHS when we introduce ICBs into the system, and that the right protections are in place.

Amendment 10 agreed to.

Amendment made: 11, in clause 13, page 10, line 13, after “(1)” insert “or (2A)”.—(Edward Argar.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 10.

[Justin Madders]

I beg to move amendment 38, in clause 13, page 11, line 10, at end insert—

“Accountability

14Z28A  Reporting: duties on integrated care boards and the Secretary of State

(1) Integrated care boards must report annually to the Secretary of State on their actions and policies and the outcomes for patients of the services they commission.

(2) The Secretary of State must prepare and publish a report each year on the actions and policies of integrated care boards and the outcomes for patients of the services they commission and must lay a copy of the report before Parliament.

(3) A Minister of the Crown must, not later than one month after the report has been laid before Parliament, make a motion in the House of Commons in relation to the report.”

It is a pleasure to move the amendment in my name and that of my hon. Friends. The heading is “Accountability” and, as I am sure the Minister will have picked up by now, we think that accountability needs to be turbo-charged in the Bill. The new commissioning bodies, the ICBs, are directly accountable to NHS England and therefore on to the Secretary of State. That was explained by Amanda Pritchard when she gave evidence last week. Each year, the ICB has to prepare a report on how it has discharged its functions and specialist duties under the various headings—improvements in quality, public involvement and so on. It has to report under lots of headings. One has to wonder how it will be able to pick priorities from all that, but that is a matter for the ICB.

ICBs must also publish their plans. The NHS, in the form of NHS England, will then assess the performance of each ICB against how it discharges its functions. Presumably, that will be at least in part with reference to those plans.

The amendment, in essence, would add the accountability of the Secretary of State to what we would describe as a fairly cumbersome but necessary regime of performance management. The slant of the reporting in the amendment is less steeped in the kind of bureaucratic tick-boxing that we understand that the Secretary of State is not a fan of, and what has to be reported is outcomes to patients--perhaps, the thing that matters most.

In the recent comparative survey by the Commonwealth Fund, the NHS lost its top slot and went down to No. 4. It was close, but not close enough. Despite usually coming top, it does badly on one of the key metrics that goes into the assessment—patient outcomes. We do well on ease of access but not so well on outcomes, which is a sad reflection. The amendment makes outcomes a priority over other factors. While the ICBs may have much to say on the day-to-day running of the NHS in the area, the ultimate responsibility for the whole system lies with the Secretary of State, even though on a day-to-day basis it may be NHS England that does the real leg work of performance management. In its new integrated form, NHS England performance manages various trusts and foundation trusts. It also runs the failure regimes for them if needed.

Ways of managing providers are well developed, but most of the skills necessary to monitor whole system performance have been lost to some extent, as management capacity in commissioners has been nibbled away. That brings me to the current weakness in holding providers to account on outcomes. Payment by results was a euphemism, as the results did not matter: the process was the determining factor. Reports on outcomes, as with on patient satisfaction, are absolutely necessary. If any system is to be taken seriously, it must seek to improve. ICBs should not see this as added bureaucracy: they should see it as reporting vital elements of healthcare. I draw particular attention to the reference in proposed new subsection (1), which refers to outcomes specifically, because we do not believe that gets as much prominence as it should.

Leaving aside the desire to produce the right reports for the Secretary of State, there is also an issue about how to make ICBs more accountable to their communities—we will touch on that later. Giving them sight of a nice glossy annual NHS report will not be very enlightening, and it will not help communities understand what has been done on their behalf, even if they recognise the NHS as part of their community.

[Dr Whitford]

Is the hon. Gentleman talking about clinical outcomes? One of the issues is having national clinical standards against which every unit and every area should be able to benchmark itself. In Scotland, we have standards for 19 of the commonest cancers, which are continuously audited. I was directly involved in developing the breast cancer ones in 2000. We have data that goes back over two decades, which means we can see improvement. It is clinical outcomes that need to be the focus, and they need to be agreed nationally: it should not be for every local ICS to decide what it measures and how. Otherwise we cannot say, “We are getting rid of variability, we are saying that a patient with this disease in Newcastle will get as good treatment as they would in Liverpool or Wolverhampton.”

[Justin Madders]

The hon. Lady is right; we still have a national health service and we should have national standards, and they should be tagged to clinical outcomes. Of course, it would be down to the individual ICBs to deliver against those outcomes, but it is right that those performance measures should be comparable across different areas.

A robust system of reporting is easier to understand and is probably the most important thing from a patient’s perspective. It is so important that it should land on the Secretary of State’s desk. We will talk later about how ICBs can be more accountable to their communities, but this is very much about how ICBs can be accountable to this place. I hope the Minister will accept the amendment.

[Karin Smyth]

I rise to support the amendment, particularly in relation to outcomes. The Government do not accept having reducing health inequalities as an aim. In my round-up of 20 years of CCGs and all the rest of it, the driver over the past 15 years has been to put primary care at the centre of those organisations, recognising that 90% of patient contacts are within primary and community services.

We heard from representatives of GPs last week, and I have spoken to my local medical committee as well. They are very fearful—we can dispute whether the evidence exists for whether clinical outcomes are better as a result of these organisations’ being supposedly primary care-focused rather than dominated by the acute trusts, and whether that actually worked, but as a policy intent the Government are very firmly moving away from that position—and wondering what their real outcomes would be.

Were the Government to move along the lines suggested by my hon. Friend the Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston, a regular review of and look at outcomes in our local areas would perhaps help with that particular problem and highlight the driver that we need from community and primary care, as well as just looking at the financial dominance of the large acute trusts.

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[Edward Argar]

It is a pleasure to rise to respond. The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston, is now having to do a lot of bobbing up and down with his amendments, and I am grateful to him for tabling this one. I fear he will not be entirely surprised that we cannot accept it, but I will try to explain to him at least why, and why I urge him not to push it to a vote, although obviously he will be the judge of that.

The amendment, as the shadow Minister has set out, would place new requirements on integrated care boards to report annually directly to the Secretary of State on their actions, and a duty on the Secretary of State to prepare and publish an annual report for Parliament specifically on the actions of the ICBs. It would also require a Minister of the Crown to propose a motion in the House of Commons in relation to the report no later than one month following its being laid in Parliament.

We entirely agree with the shadow Minister that there should be strong lines of democratic accountability from ICBs to Parliament. I hope I can give him at least some reassurance that the Bill already provides for much of the transparency and accountability that he is understandably seeking. The provisions in the Bill will create clear lines of accountability for ICBs to NHS England; they will be accountable through NHS England to national Government and ultimately, therefore, to both Houses of Parliament.

Proposed new section 14Z26 of the National Health Service Act 2006 already places a duty on ICBs to prepare an annual report explaining how the ICB has discharged its duties, particularly in relation to its activities to improve the quality of services, reduce health inequalities and have regard to the effect of its decisions on, and its involvement with, the public.

The report must also explain how the ICB has exercised its functions in accordance with its proposed forward plan and capital resource plan, as well as the steps it has taken to implement any joint health and wellbeing strategy. NHS England will also have the ability to give directions to ICBs concerning the form and content of the annual report, meaning that it could stipulate further reporting requirements for ICBs as necessary where information might be lacking. The report must be provided to NHS England and must be published

I hope the Committee will agree that that is already a comprehensive reporting requirement. Further, under proposed new section 14Z57, NHS England is also required to undertake annual performance assessments to review how each individual ICB has discharged its functions, including how it has delivered on its statutory duties. The Secretary of State will have the power to issue statutory guidance concerning performance assessments, meaning that national Government will be able to influence the methods and requirements of assessment if necessary. Again, NHS England must publish the results of each performance assessment, meaning that the public will have open access to information concerning the performance of their ICBs.

I hope the Committee will agree that the Bill therefore already provides much of the transparency and accountability that the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston is asking for, and that further duplicative reporting requirements would risk creating new and unnecessary bureaucracy. In respect of the ability of the House to scrutinise, he knows, and Opposition Members know, that they have many opportunities to table debates on a wide array of subjects. He and his colleagues have held me and other Ministers to account, not only in these Committee Rooms but on the Floor of the House in recent months, on a whole array of subjects. With the information I have set out that will already be published, for not only the House but the wider public to read, absorb and consider, there is scope for the hon. Gentleman or any other hon. Member to table a debate in which such reports can be considered if they so wish. I believe that that provides for sufficient transparency and accountability, and I encourage the shadow Minister not to press the amendment.

[Justin Madders]

I understand what the Minister is saying. We still say there is not enough emphasis on outcomes and accountability to Parliament, but, as he has pointed out, there are other avenues that we can use to pursue those matters. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Edward Argar]

The clause, as we have touched on in the various discussions on amendments already, inserts new chapter A3 into the NHS Act 2006, which contains a number of duties and functions in relation to the new integrated care boards. A new duty is conferred on NHS England to ensure that ICBs cover England and details the required process for establishing the ICBs.

The clause also makes provision for abolishing clinical commissioning groups, transferring staff, property and liabilities to ICBs, requiring the constitutions of ICBs to be published and requiring ICBs to make arrangements for managing conflict of interest effectively. The clause is essential for delivering on one of the core objectives of the Bill—creating statutory ICBs as a means to take an ambitious, collaborative approach to planning and delivering integrated health and care services in England. The clause will establish a smooth transition from CCGs to ICBs, providing clarity and consistency for patients as we move to these new arrangements, as well as creating continuity of employment for NHS staff.

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[Edward Argar]

I hope that I can reassure the hon. Lady. Although these organisations move beyond the CCG model to be much more collaborative, with more partnership working with local authorities and others, and the genesis of the new model is to bring those two parts together, there is no intent for, and I do not believe the practical consequence of this would be, a diminution in the voice of and the need to pay heed to primary care. She is absolutely right. For the vast majority of our constituents, the front door to the NHS is primary care services. The majority of their appointments, their consultations and their engagement is with primary care services. That voice is hugely important. I see that continuing to be front and centre.

The Bill brings together a range of other NHS system providers and the local authority. We may come back to the point when we discuss further amendments. I emphasise what we heard in the evidence sessions, which is that the membership requirements are de minimis. There can be increased numbers of voices for primary care on these boards, as Dame Gill Morgan mentioned in the way she is managing Gloucestershire. That may not fully satisfy the hon. Lady, but I hope I can reassure her that I am in the same place as her in recognising the importance of primary care and that the expertise that has grown up in understanding local communities is vital in framing a system that works effectively.

In requiring ICBs to maintain and publish registers of the interests of their members and employees—I expect we will return to this point in the future, in a different guise—the clause is an essential part of guaranteeing the integrity of each ICB’s decision-making processes. It will ensure that any potential conflicts of interest are declared promptly by individuals and managed effectively. As a result, the public will be able to trust that decisions are made in a fair, transparent manner, in the best interest of the ICB’s local population. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 13, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 2

Integrated care boards: constitution etc

[Justin Madders]

I beg to move amendment 48, in schedule 2, page 119, line 18, at end insert—

“(c) the process by which any proposed changes to the policies of the clinical commissioning groups within the area for which the integrated care board is established will be consulted upon and agreed.”

This amendment would require ICBs to be clear about how they would make changes in clinical policies and established models of care that have already been established and are applicable to patients in the area for which the integrated care board takes responsibility.

We are certainly getting a good workout this afternoon, Ms Elliott—hopefully the Minister will now be able to catch his breath.

As the hon. Member for Eddisbury suggested earlier, we have seen a rapid reduction in the number of CCGs in Cheshire and Merseyside—there are now nine, but there were more than that not so long ago—and it is one of the biggest ICSs, if not the biggest, in the country. I am not going to take the Committee through the angst on that again, but even with sensible coterminous boundaries, quite a lot of ICSs will have more than one progenitor CCG.

Under the old regime, every CCG had its own plans, policies, care pathways and models of care. For example, many had different rules about gluten-free products being available on prescription, and most Members will be acutely aware of the manifest unfairness of the postcode lottery for IVF treatment. The number of cycles people were entitled to and how old they had to be to access treatment all depended very much on where in the country they lived. It is tempting to say that, rather than having all that variation, we should just level up—the Government’s catchphrase of the day—but that of course will not always be possible, and there will be variations in CCG policy that we cannot easily equate into one optimum outcome or standard, so how do we go about moving the many into the one?

The amendment would add a requirement that, in drawing up the initial constitution CCGs, which of course should be aware of the issues, make a start on place-based approaches, but there is an important job to do on harmonisation at the outset, and that is important for patients and the public. It will be contentious. We can all imagine the outrage if something that is offered in one CCG but not another is then removed from everyone in the process of forming an ICB. These are possible changes that we will see over the next 12 to 18 months, and they will be a real test of how responsive and engaged ICBs are in their local communities. We may indeed see people holding banners with ICBs on them if things are not handled well.

In the amendment, we say that the process of harmonisation or variation should be arrived at only after proper consultation. That fits in with the duty, which we have talked about already, on harmonisation, public involvement and consultation. It also highlights a gap in the specification for the job of producing the initial constitution for each ICB, which is given to the relevant CCG. As I have pointed out, it is very much up to them to decide who they consider it appropriate to consult. We want a much stronger and clearer commitment to consultation on changes that might affect patient care on the face of the Bill.

[Edward Argar]

As ever, I am grateful to the shadow Minister for tabling the amendment in order to air this issue in Committee. I fear that I may have to disappoint him once again; it seems I am getting into a habit, although perhaps at some point I will suddenly surprise him.

We agree that it is right that there is appropriate consultation when making decisions about commissioning policies and care. The shadow Minister set out very clearly, as he always does, some of the reasons for that. I hope that I can give him some reassurance that the Bill already provides for much of what he is seeking in terms of outcomes. In clause 19, new section 14Z44 of the National Health Service Act 2006 already places a duty on integrated care boards to involve and consult the public in respect of the planning of commissioning arrangements, including on any planned changes. That would include, for example, plans by an ICB to change the range of health services available to the public or the manner in which they are delivered. This will ensure that the voices of residents, patients and those who access care and support, as well as their carers and representatives, are properly embedded in ICB decision making.

Schedule 2, which concerns the constitutions of integrated care boards, states that ICB constitutions must specify how the ICB plans to exercise its functions, including the duty to involve and consult the public. ICB constitutions must, moreover, specify the arrangements that the ICB will make to ensure transparency in that decision making. NHS England will ensure that they are appropriate and include the relevant provisions.

Under clause 13, and new section 14Z25 of the National Health Service Act 2006, NHS England will need to approve the constitution and make an establishment order for the ICB. In that respect, new section 14Z26 goes on to make it clear that NHS England can reject a proposed constitution if it is inappropriate. I hope that that offers some reassurance to the shadow Minister, and helps underline our commitment to ICBs being as transparent and as involving of patients and the public as possible. I encourage him not to press his amendment.

[Justin Madders]

In light of what the Minister has said, we will not press the amendment to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[The Chair]

Unless anyone wishes to move amendment 1, we now come to amendment 31.

[Justin Madders]

I beg to move amendment 31, in page 119, line 28, leave out from “for” to end of line 29 and insert

“an initial chair to be appointed by NHS England, with the approval of the Secretary of State, for a period of no more than 2 years and for subsequent chairs to be elected by the voters in the area for which the integrated care board is established in accordance with regulations made by the Secretary of State for that purpose.”

This amendment would require the first Chair of each Integrated Care Board to be appointed by NHS England, with the approval of the Secretary of State for a period of no more than 2 years and for subsequent chairs to be chosen through local election.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 50, in page 119, line 29, leave out

“, with the approval of the Secretary of State”.

Amendment 51, in page 119, line 29, at end insert—

“4A The constitution must provide for all members of the integrated care board to be consulted, and for any views expressed to be taken into account, before a chair is appointed.”

Amendment 52, in page 120, line 2, at end insert—

‘(1A) The constitution must provide for all members of the integrated care board and of the integrated care partnership to be consulted, and for any views expressed to be taken into account, before a chief executive is appointed.”

This amendment would ensure the involvement of the integrated care board and the integrated care partnership in the appointment of the ICB chief executive.

[Justin Madders]

Amendment 31 is about the ICB having an elected chair. Amendment 50 relates to the Secretary of State’s approval to remove the chair from the ICB, amendment 51 relates to consultation on an ICB chair’s appointment and amendment 52 relates to ICB and ICP members and consultation on the ICB chief executive’s appointment. I hope there were not too many “ICB”s and “ICP”s in that statement, but I will now set out some detail on the intention behind each of the amendments.

I would like to make some general points about integrated care boards. I would also like to put some specific amendments to a vote—unless, of course, the Minister does surprise me, and concedes on some of these points. Many things have been said about ICSs, ICBs and ICPs that do not appear in the Bill. In discussing this matter, some care has to be taken in distinguishing between what is actually in the Bill as it stands and what is not. In particular, the NHS document on the ICS design framework came out in July. Is anything in that document to be regarded as interpretation of the Bill? Perhaps more pertinently, is anything in the design framework ruled out by the Bill or inconsistent with it? There is a huge contradiction in all this. Many actions have already been taken, such as fixing boundaries and appointing chairs, that presume that this Committee does not have a say—that this Committee is not going to change anything. That is almost contempt of Parliament, but we are where we are. No doubt the Minister will be able to justify why he feels it necessary to instruct the NHS to get on with these things before legislation has been passed. To be fair to him, that is what they have been doing for the past five years as they have been trying to avoid Lansley, but we are in a different world now.

For us, the most significant issues are ICB composition, ICB constitutions generally, and the vexed issue of what people on an ICB actually take responsibility for. In each of those areas, we have tabled specific amendments. As we know, ICBs are the latest in a long line of commissioning models: we have had GPs, PCGs, PCTs, larger PCTs, cluster PCTs, CCGs, merged CCGs, and now ICBs. Just maybe, if we do not get this right first time—if we have to keep reinventing the wheel—the problem here is that it is always the NHS making decisions about itself. Various retrospectives have shown that CCGs and PCTs have had virtually no impact on the design of services, or in terms of innovation or better allocation of resources based on need, and it is certainly difficult to show that they have had much impact on outputs. It is worth pointing out that in some cases, these ICBs will be allocating billions of pounds of public money—in theory, at least—so when we are talking about a multi-billion-pound venture, it has to be free of vested interests. It has to be open and transparent in a way that, I am afraid to say, has not been a hallmark of the Department in recent years.

We know that many of the NHS witnesses said in their evidence that they did not want more prescription. As we have already touched on, we are probably going to have some debate about where on the spectrum we land in terms of prescription, with one end being a totally prescriptive environment and the other being a totally permissive one. As it stands, the Bill is too close to the permissive end, in this area at least; as I have already said, we do get some prescription when it suits the Department in other areas. We consider that prescription is not an imposition: it is a vital safeguard to make sure that things are done correctly, and that there is proper accountability of roles and positions. Legislating for the removal of conflicts of interest to ensure that these bodies are more representative and accountable is not a frivolous or minor matter. These are not optional matters: they are fundamental in a democratic society. We should take this opportunity to widen public and patient involvement and end what is increasingly looking like a much more internal model than perhaps was envisaged when the White Paper came out—a pattern, I have to say, that is possibly being set from the top.

In our view, each ICB should have an elected chair so we are going to push amendment 31 to a vote, because we believe it is a really important principle that we should be exploring further. There are two justifications for that, the first of which is negative: we simply do not trust those who make these appointments. We have seen far too many family members and friends appointed within the wider NHS who, it would be fair to say, have not come with CVs that obviously lend themselves to being part of the NHS family. In fact, the NHS has already announced who the chairs will be for two thirds of these ICSs, showing a complete disregard for the work of this Committee, particularly when it was decided that councillors did not even need to apply. There are a number of former councillors on this Committee, not least myself, the shadow Minister, and the Minister himself. Perhaps we might not be the best people to judge who could go on those bodies as chairs, but I certainly think that councillors have a legitimate claim to be suitable people in a number of circumstances. We need to take control of this; we need to have a democratic system.

The positive argument for electing someone is that it signifies that there is some accountability. It also speaks to a trend that we want to see continue moving forward, improving genuine representation of the public and of patients. We have elected police and crime commissioners, and we increasingly see Mayors and other elected figureheads having growing powers over services in defined geographies. We have already touched on how ICSs may not mean much to people in the street, but if there is someone at the top who has been elected by the people of an area, that gives everyone a sense of ownership and identity—there is a tangible body there that they have some stake in.

Let us take the example of Cheshire again, as it is the one I am familiar with. The annual budget for the police authority is in the region of £200 million. We of course do not have sight of the equivalent for the ICS at the moment, but let us say it will be significantly more. Cheshire CCG’s budget is about six times that at the moment, and we have to throw in the whole of Merseyside on top. To my mind, we will have a rather unsatisfactory situation where someone is directly elected to represent our interests in police and crime, but no equivalent in health, where billions and billions more is spent.

We recognise that this is a departure from what has been worked on in the NHS to date, which is why the amendment would allow for a period of two years from the initial ICB appointment to enable the Government and probably the Minister to work through the detail of how elections would work, and the precise role and powers of a democratically elected chair.

As a country, we are being told constantly that we are taking back control. That should be put into practice. Local communities should be given a real say in who runs their health services. Throughout the evidence sessions, it was far from clear with which individual the buck stops.

Amendments 50, 51 and 52 reflect our concerns about the frankly arrogant way that the membership of ICBs has been formed to date. If we do not get our wish for a directly elected chair, we still think there is a clear need for more local accountability for the appointment and removal of ICB chairs. As the Bill stands, there is a danger that the chairs are answerable only to the Secretary of State—not to the partnership, not to the community and not to the patients.

Why does the Secretary of State need to approve the chair? Is the chair there to represent the Secretary of State or to represent the ICB? As we have already covered, there is a less than glorious record on appointments by the Secretary of State. Let us take him out of the equation and ensure, as amendment 51 would do, that members of the board are consulted and their views taken into account before any chairs are appointed. After all, we would not want them to be appointed and then not have the confidence of the other board members. One of the questions that is hanging in the air is what would happen in the situation where the chair does not have the confidence of the board. There does not seem to be any clear mechanism for dealing with that situation, which we hope would not be a regular occurrence.

We could have the absurd situation where all those who work with the chair on a daily basis simply did not think that the chair was leading the organisation as they should, but because the chair retained the confidence of the Secretary of State—someone who might meet the chair once a year, if they were lucky—they remain in post. I think we can all see that that would be a very unsatisfactory situation. What does the Minister say should happen in that scenario? What would happen if members of an ICB or ICP clearly object to the appointment of a chief executive? If the Minister does not have an answer to those questions, perhaps he could support our amendments, although I may be tempting fate in even suggesting that.

Will the Minister at least set out what role his Department will have in such situations? What does he define as failure for an ICS? In what circumstances would NHS England terminate the appointment of a chief executive? How will removing the chief executive lead to improvements if, for example, the reason for “failure” is systemic issues around workforce and funding, which we will be coming on to later on? Let us make sure that the system works properly from the outset and that the leaders in it have the confidence of all those who work within it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Justin Madders]

We have had an interesting debate, and I think we have seen the stark differences in approach. Certainly, Labour colleagues see the proposal as an obvious thing to do. As my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol South said, the NHS will account for about 40% of all Government expenditure, so it seems obvious to want some kind of accountability for how it is spent on a local basis. The Government have decided to split the NHS up into 42 areas, so this seems an obvious thing to do, but I appreciate that the Minister comes at this from a completely different perspective. It might say something about the culture of the NHS and perhaps the insularity in how it does things.

When the Minister talked about not being here in two years’ time, he was of course referring to the inevitable promotion that he is due. Perhaps he will be promoted to the Home Office, in which case he will be dealing with police and crime commissioners. Perhaps at that point he will be persuaded of the benefit of having locally elected individuals responsible for services. Of course, we did not have police and crime commissioners until the coalition Government decided to import them from America, and although there is certainly a degree of scepticism about them, if they are a good thing for policing, I see no reason why the NHS should not embark on a similar route.

I envisage some tension between those who sit on an ICB who have some democratic mandate, perhaps from the local authority, and those who do not. Would they be seen to have greater legitimacy? Would their vote carry more weight than other ICB members, because it could be argued that, in the eyes of the public, it would? I think that we are storing up problems for further down the line. If we are to see this levelling up—this renaissance of place—in towns and cities up and down the country, we will need a focal point in all our public services, and none is more important than health and social care.

The Minister suggested that those involved in NHS England might not be appointing people in the most straightforward manner. I was certainly not implying that in my comments, because, as he conceded—this makes me wonder why he is not prepared to support amendment 50—all these appointments still require the approval of the Secretary of State. That is the bottom line. If that is not necessary and the Minister has full confidence in NHS England to make the right appointments, we do not need the Secretary of State’s approval, so the Minister can support amendment 50.

Turning back to amendment 31, which I will press to a vote, we think that a focal point of local accountability is vital. When something goes wrong, when decisions are made that people are unhappy about, or when people just want answers, they need a figurehead that they can go to. They need someone they can hold to account at the ballot box, as is our democratic tradition in this country. I do not think that they will get that with ICBs. If the Minister does not support the amendment, I really think this will be a missed opportunity, and I hope that in future years he will think again on this point.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Edward Argar]

I am pleased that I do not see any signs of the hon. Member for Nottingham North moving to the substitutes bench any time soon. However, my hon. Friend is absolutely right. I do not want to pre-empt the detail of the guidance, but, as Louise Patten said, the whole purpose of this is to provide the ability to further supplement what is on the face of the legislation with guidance that the ICBs will have regard to.

[Justin Madders]

Perhaps the Minister can help me. When I read the guidance, I understood that it meant that there would be at least 10 individuals on any ICB. Does the Minister think that is the correct number?

[Edward Argar]

The key focus for this amendment is what the legislation sets out in this clause, and that is the five positions—that is what we want to specify on the face of the legislation. I will come to the detailed guidance, but first I will go through a few of the remarks from the hon. Member for Nottingham North in support of his amendment.

At the heart of the issue is our desire for the provisions of the Bill not to be too prescriptive regarding the membership requirement, beyond that proposed statutory minimum. The guidance is a different matter from what is in the actual legislation; we want the statute to specify that de minimis. We believe that it gives the right approach and balance, having key voices and local flexibility to add voices—including those the hon. Member has proposed, but others as well—and that it reflects the evidence given by Martin Marshall, who said that the boards have to be kept to a workable size to be able to make decisions effectively. Again, that is permissive.

I come back to the point that local ICBs can appoint more members, should they wish to do so. They can go significantly beyond the legislative minimum requirements if they so choose. Therefore, we do not believe that prescribing further membership is necessary. Of course, schedule 2 states that ICBs will need to publish details of their membership in their constitutions. Under clause 13, proposed new section 14Z25 of the National Health Service Act 2006, NHS England will need to approve the constitution proposed by each ICB. Again, we come back to that approval process.

[Justin Madders]

Of course, the evidence from the Gloucestershire ICS was that of course those individuals—some of whom are included in our amendment—would be on the ICB. From our perspective, it is clear that all the individuals we have named are critical players in any local health system. Could the Minister set out which of those included in our list, if any, he does not think would be appropriate to sit on an ICB?

[Edward Argar]

I think that all add value, but equally, in some circumstances, we see different local arrangements; in some localities, some people fulfil more than one role or sit in different places.

The hon. Gentleman asked me to cover his specific point about the guidance before I conclude: the guidance will not prescribe additional roles in the same way that legislation prescribes or mandates, but it does seek to set out best practice, highlighting what would be deemed to be best practice—drawing on experiences such as Dame Gill’s, I suspect. We would expect that ICBs would pay due heed to that guidance, alongside their de minimis legal and statutory obligations.

If in time, when those ICBs are up and running, it becomes clear that that approach needs strengthening and that we need to add further requirements, regulation-making powers in schedule 2 will allow the Secretary of State to do so at a later point. We believe that it is right to start at this de minimis point in the Bill. It reflects our view, which I have articulated throughout, that we must not attempt to over-legislate at this stage on the composition of ICBs, letting them evolve as effective local entities, to reflect local needs. It may not fully reassure the hon. Gentleman, but there is a mechanism whereby further changes could be made in future, although we do not believe that will be necessary.

The amendment takes a different approach, which is essentially more prescriptive and less permissive. I do not dispute the sincerity of that approach, but it comes down to a matter of where we feel the appropriate balance should be struck. I fear that, although the shadow Minister and I are quite close to one another in our region of the east midlands, we are slightly more distant in respect of the amendment, but I am grateful to him for affording the Committee the ability to debate a key point of principle in the approach to the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Justin Madders]

I would like to speak to amendment 33, which is grouped with amendment 30. I will try to address the real concerns that were so eloquently described by the British Medical Association. It said that there are huge risks and absolutely no benefits from having out and out private companies sitting on integrated care boards. Nothing in the Bill remedies that conflict to allow those companies to sit on integrated care boards at the same as allowing them to comply with their statutory duty to their shareholders in manner that anyone could feel comfortable about.

We know that spending in the private sector before the pandemic in 2019-20 was £9.7 billion. I accept that those figures before the pandemic are probably the fairest to cite, but that sum is still double what it was a decade earlier under the last Labour Government. We have seen the creep from the private sector in recent years and we need to put an end to that.

Amendment 33 is not about the amount spent on private providers but about who runs the NHS, not just who profits from it. For us, there is a complete and utter incompatibility between the aim of a private company and what we say should be the aims of the NHS and ICBs. I can do no better than refer to the evidence of Dr Chaand Nagpaul, who last week said:

“We forget at our peril the added value, the accountability, the loyalty and the good will that the NHS provides. We really do.

We only have to look back at the last year. Compare the vaccination programme run by the NHS and delivered by NHS staff to Test and Trace. Even with Test and Trace, compare the £400 million that Public Health England had to the billions that went to the private sector, and local public health teams reached 97% of contacts compared to 60% for the others. I am saying that it does matter. Your local acute trust is not there on a 10-year contract, willing to walk away after two years. It is there for your population; it cannot walk away.” ––[Official Report, Health and Care Public Bill Committee, 9 September 2021; c. 90, Q113.]

Those final words sum up our concerns perfectly. Put a company on the board and their interests last as long as their contract. Of course, their interests may not be the same as the NHS’s during that period anyway. With that clear and, we believe, unanswerable concern about conflicts of interest there must be a solution in the Bill. As it stands, there is not, and that is what amendment 33 seeks to remedy. We hope that the Minister recognises the opportunity that this presents and goes one step beyond his colleague, Lord Bethell, who said in response to a written question:

“We do not expect independent providers to have seats on the ICB.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 18 August 2021; Vol. 814, c. 56.]

What he expects and what is actually in the legislation is not the same.

We have already seen in the south-west private providers lining themselves up to have a big say in how local NHS systems are run. If it is the Government’s position that they do not expect private companies to sit on the board, do they say that because they do not believe it will happen, or because they do not want it to happen? If they do not want that to happen, they should support the amendment. If they do not support it, and if they refuse to join us in trying to legislate to stop private companies getting involved in the running of the NHS, all the people who believed that the Government were determined to increase private sector involvement in the NHS will be entitled to say, “We must be right.”

When presented with the opportunity to put a halt to further private involvement, not only did the Government not support the proposals from Labour, but they actively voted against them. All the words about what the Government expect will count for nothing because when it comes to the crunch, the Government will have sided with the private companies, some of which, let us not forget, have actually sued the NHS when they have not got their own way. Is that the kind of collaboration and integration that we want to see in ICBs? Remember when Circle walked away from Hinchingbrooke because the contract was too tough. Was that in the spirit of joint working? No, it was not. We should be absolutely clear in this Committee and support the amendment that says that private companies should not be running or having a say in the running of ICBs.

[The Chair]

I suspend the sitting until after the Division.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

We now come to amendment 33 to schedule 2, which has just been debated. Justin Madders, do you wish to move the amendment formally?

[Justin Madders]

In the light of the Minister’s concessions, we wait with interest to see what we can work together on to achieve the aim that appears to be shared across the Committee, so we will not move amendment 33.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Maggie Throup.)

Health and Care Bill (Seventh sitting)

Justin Madders Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 16th September 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Alex Norris]

I am grateful for the contribution from my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol South. I completely agree that where we will see the worst practices across footprints, each and every one will be secretive and not invite scrutiny, so it is very important that we set arrangements to ensure that that cannot happen.

I am grateful for the clarification that the 1960 Act will apply, which assuages my first concern. On the second, relating to the notice of board papers, the Minister has essentially said that local footprints will have to set that element of the constitution themselves, but that the safeguards and schedules will mean that NHS England has to sign them off. In that sense, there cannot be wide divergence, because the centre would not permit it. I reiterate that there should be commonality. I cannot see why it would be seven days in one place and five days in another. I do not know how we could explain that, so I hope that in those conversations the Minister stresses the need for uniformity. Perhaps the guidance might include strong encouragement on that. On the basis of the agreement that we have in principle, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Justin Madders (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab)]

I beg to move amendment 43, in schedule 2, page 123, line 2, at end insert—

“(5) An integrated care board must apply all relevant collective agreements for staff pay, conditions and pensions.

(6) An integrated care board must ensure that all relevant collective agreements for staff pay, conditions and pensions are applied throughout the area for which it is responsible.

(7) Any integrated care board which wishes to employ anyone directly on an annual salary greater than £161,401 must receive approval from their integrated care partnership before confirming the appointment.”

This amendment puts into primary legislation the current practice that NHS bodies honour collective agreements over staff pay and conditions and gives the integrated care board a role in ensuring this remains the case.

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Mrs Murray. I would like to say that it is a pleasure to see the Minister, although when I saw the headline that two Ministers from the Department had been promoted to the Cabinet, I had expected that he would be among them—alas, not on this occasion. I am sure it is only a matter of time. Of course, if the Minister and other Members on the Government side want to keep their phones on in case a call comes through, we will not be offended if they have to pop out for a couple of minutes. I hope the Minister’s rush of blood and damascene conversion to the perils of privatisation at the end of the sitting on Tuesday have not blotted his copybook too much.

I turn to amendment 43, which plays into several points that have come up in the evidence sessions, particularly the anxiety that was mentioned by Sarah Gorton of Unison in her evidence to the Committee last week. She said that she wanted to see in the legislation confirmation of assurances that have been given verbally and in guidance. She referred to conversations that she had had—I am not sure with whom, but I assume with officials in the Department. Those conversations were to the effect that there was

“no intention for any new parts of the system to undermine the collective arrangements”.––[Official Report, Health and Care Public Bill Committee, 9 September 2021; c. 96, Q129.]

and that the “Agenda for Change” agreement would continue to apply across the board and, indeed, to ICB staff. That is an important matter to seek assurance on. Anyone who has been involved in “Agenda for Change” will know that years of hard, torturous work were involved in getting that agreed. Certainly, on this side, we know the value of the staff and their trade union representatives, and the importance that collective agreements have in bringing issues to the fore and ensuring a universality in treatment and a common understanding of the basis on which the employer and employee move forward.

Of course, whatever the collective agreements say, the staff would like to be offered increases that actually keep pace with the cost of living, rather than the real-terms cuts that we have seen in the last decade. However, as an overall framework for ensuring staff are treated fairly and consistently, it is certainly not something that we want to be chipped away at.

I will not try to persuade the Minister of the benefits of collective agreements across other sectors—it would be well outside the scope of the Bill—but it is worth pointing out that there is plenty of evidence from across the world showing that where workforces have negotiated terms and conditions within sectors and across whole industries, they tend to enjoy better terms and conditions and, crucially, better rates of workplace satisfaction and staff retention. As highlighted in the report recently published by the Health and Social Care Committee, the NHS faces an enormous challenge in retaining its workforce.

We do not want anything to undermine “Agenda for Change”. Sadly, though, we have seen attempts to do that in recent years, with the creation of wholly-owned subsidiary companies. I will not return to the argument about whether those are a good thing, because we have said that they are not, but let us examine for a moment why trusts sometimes seem eager to set these companies up.

There are, of course, huge financial pressures on trusts. I will not rehearse the arguments on that, but they are always looking at ways to reduce their costs, and potentially with these subcos to boost their income. The VAT advantages have been a big part of that, but one of the big concerns—cash-pressed trusts may see this as a big opportunity—is that the subcos potentially have the ability to move away from “Agenda for Change”. That is the heart of it; it is not that the trusts have a major objection to “Agenda for Change”, but moving away from it allows them to set their own terms and conditions, which is really a euphemism for saving money and cutting pay. We think that that kind of approach is a false economy and, ultimately, self-defeating.

There are other examples of where the private sector will step in. We saw the news this week that King’s College Hospital Foundation Trust will transfer staff at its urgent treatment centre in Denmark Hill to Greenbrook Healthcare under a three-year contract, starting in October. Of course, staff will expect TUPE to apply, but, as we know, it is not a panacea. It does not protect terms and conditions for ever more, so it is little wonder that the news of that change has led the workforce to raise concerns.

Unison’s written evidence sought clarification from the Minister that

“it’s not the intention that ICBs depart from Agenda for Change”,

which the Minister gave on Second Reading. The written evidence also states that

“UNISON would support amendments to ensure that ICBs will apply the relevant collective agreements for staff pay, conditions and pensions, and be responsible for ensuring that these are applied within the wider system. In addition, further reassurances should be sought that nothing in the Bill will compromise the assurances already given in the Employment Commitment, the terms of which should endure beyond the point of staff transfer.”

The evidence continues:

“Recently published guidance lists 10 ‘outcome-based people functions’”—

perhaps that phrase could be translated into plain English at some point—

“that ICSs will be expected to deliver from April 2022… In addition, the guidance suggests that the responsibility for engaging with trade unions will rest with the regional teams of NHS England / Improvement rather than with ICBs”.

That runs the risk of depriving unions of access to those who might be making strategic decisions in their area—or perhaps it just speaks to a larger truth about where power will lie in all this. We have covered those concerns in our amendment to some extent, but we would like reassurance from the Minister on some of the points we have raised about how this will all work in practice.

In particular, we need reassurance that the system will not undermine existing provider responsibilities on engaging with trade unions. As hon. Members will know, the vast majority of NHS staff will not be employed in commissioning bodies such as ICBs. The strong relationships with individual provider organisations should be a supplement to existing national and regional partnership forums. The concern is that the new kids on the block, the ICBs, will in some way disrupt those arrangements.

If, as we are told, the new ICSs—to use the correct terminology—will be system leaders themselves, it is not impossible that some of those leaders will want to set their own path in tweaking employment matters. We might see circumstances in which some agreement about staff mobility within ICSs comes to the fore, particularly for those whose duties cross organisational boundaries. In principle, that is no problem, as long as no ICB thinks that, as a result, it can move outside existing collective agreements. Our amendment would rule that out.

It is essential that ICBs have a positive role in all this and that they follow existing practice by referring to collective agreements. We would not want a re-emergence of what we saw some five years ago, with certain trusts trying to undermine collective terms and conditions. Those attempts failed, but we never know when that might re-emerge. We also believe that the ICB should honour national agreements for the staff it employs.

That should not need to be said—as we have heard, assurances have been given—but it needs to be made explicit in the Bill to give us the cast-iron lock that both we and Unison would like. We would certainly like some further assurances about whether the ICBs have the potential to circumvent or destabilise existing arrangements, should they seek to forge their own path at some point. We see this amendment as bolstering the commitment to “Agenda for Change”—I hope that the Minister will confirm that commitment when he responds —so that ICBs’ broad powers are not seen as an attempt to undermine or conflict with the hard-won terms and conditions that have been collectively agreed.

Turning to sub-paragraph (7) in the amendment, which relates to pay limits, hon. Members will have seen headlines in the paper, on Tuesday, I think, about the highest-paid NHS managers being “cleared out”; I think that was the term that was used. I am not quite sure what that means, other than redundancy. The story refers to a Government-inspired audit, which was—at least on Tuesday—going to be led by the then Chief Secretary to the Treasury, the right hon. Member for North East Cambridgeshire (Steve Barclay), who has since moved on to other matters. That is a shame, because he used to hold the same role as the Minister does now, and he would know exactly where to look if there were indeed examples of unnecessary management and bureaucracy in the NHS.

That news follows the headlines we saw last week about some ICB executives potentially receiving salaries of £270,000. Let us be clear what we are talking about here: that is the pay of 10 nurses. It seems that someone somewhere in Government is exercised about the number of managers in the NHS, but according to the King’s Fund, the actual figure is somewhere below 5%, and many of those managers hold dual clinical roles. If the Government think there is a problem here, I am not entirely clear what they think the scale of it is, or what the consequences would be if thousands of managers in the NHS were made redundant. I am sure that was not covered in the impact assessment, but we have the benefit of that now.

To be clear, the amendment is not about bashing managers at all. Every organisation needs managers if it is to be effective, and they play an important role in enabling clinicians to get on and do their jobs on the frontline. I am sure the Minister would not want to leave managers in the NHS with the impression that has unfortunately been left by some of the headlines this week, namely that there is no role for managers in the NHS. One could be forgiven for concluding that from Tuesday’s headlines. If the Government think layers of management, bureaucracy or management costs have got out of control, we can do something about it.

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[Edward Argar]

I am grateful to the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston, for his remarks on the amendment. I echo some of his comments, which we covered on Tuesday in Committee in response to the intervention by the hon. Member for Bristol South. Members on both sides of the Committee made clear our recognition of the value we place on those who work in the NHS, irrespective of whether they are managers, in clinical roles or in any other role. In our exchanges, we recognised the centrality of having good, high-calibre managers for what we all know is a huge system.

Amendment 43 would have two effects. First, it would require ICBs to apply to their staff all relevant collectively agreed terms on pay, conditions and pensions. Secondly, it introduces new rules for oversight of pay for the most senior ICB staff. The Government and the NHS remain committed to the principle of “Agenda for Change”. If it gives the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston further reassurance, I am happy to write to him, because this is a detailed point and I suspect he may wish to have something in black and white that sets out exactly our position on this. We recognise—he alluded to this—that there is a need for a degree of flexibility in some circumstances. He talked about people moving between roles, secondments and so on. I will turn to that in a moment before turning to the point about pay.

There is already a commitment in the ICS HR framework technical guidance that staff transferring into ICBs will transfer across on their current terms and conditions, in line with the “NHS Terms and Conditions of Service Handbook” requirements. The commitment states that NHS pension rights will be preserved, as the individual will continue to be employed within the NHS, ensuring that staff transferring into ICBs will benefit from that protection and will not see any change to their existing conditions. Furthermore, we would expect ICBs to use the nationally agreed pay and conditions framework for the overwhelming majority of the time.

The hon. Gentleman referred to some flexibility, and he was right to do so. There may be circumstances in which an ICB needs flexibility to recruit staff, to attract staff with very unusual or valuable skills, or to reflect local circumstances and the availability of certain staff. Therefore, an ICB may need to vary the terms and conditions in order to make a post attractive if the marketplace is very competitive. Equally, the Bill provides valuable flexibility—for example, in order to allow ICBs to employ on secondment staff who have previously been employed by a foundation trust or local authority. Given the emphasis that the Bill places on systems working collectively and sharing staff, that is a useful flexibility. I would argue that such flexibilities are not unique, because NHS foundation trusts also have a degree of discretion in adopting such conditions, although they overwhelmingly choose to honour and keep the existing terms and conditions.

If I recall correctly, the hon. Gentleman asked specifically about the view on the involvement of unions and staff where there was divergence or flexibility. I would hope that where there was any divergence or a need for flexibility, that would be addressed collaboratively. Ideally, there should be consent from those working in the organisation as well.

I turn to the proposals for very senior managers. I believe that procedures are already in place to ensure that the most senior staff within the NHS are appointed with fair and equitable salaries, and proposals to pay very senior staff more than £150,000 a year must follow benchmarks or be subject to ministerial oversight. Ministerial oversight of salaries higher than £150,000 a year has been effective in managing the risk of salary escalations, and it provides for a national outlook across the public sector.

The hon. Gentleman referred to the former Chief Secretary to the Treasury, my right hon. Friend the Member for North East Cambridgeshire, who is now the Minister for the Cabinet Office. I do not think there is any inconsistency in what my right hon. Friend envisaged with the review. That should not be interpreted as a criticism or an attack on hard-working staff, but given the amount of money that is spent in our NHS on salaries at all levels, it is right that from time to time the Government look at that, review it and reassure themselves that the appropriate balance is being struck between fair remuneration for the work that is being done and value for taxpayers. I do not think I would read any more than that into it; it is simply the Government and Treasury being responsible with public money.

The hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston will be aware that the Government are in the process of finalising the system for pay oversight that will apply to ICBs. Although the specifics may differ, the effect and intention will be the same: to afford ICBs a degree of agency and flexibility, so that we can continue to attract the most senior and experienced leaders, while also ensuring that we put adequate checks and balances in place to ensure that public money is well spent. Therefore, I would argue that the amendment is unnecessary. Once again, I gently encourage the hon. Gentleman to consider not pressing the amendment to a Division.

[Justin Madders]

I am grateful to the Minister for his comments, but I fear that I will disappoint him on this occasion. He mentioned the flexibilities that already exist, which we do not seek to change. I do not see anything in the amendment that would alter those. We have had a very clear commitment, and he has mentioned the guidance. Indeed, he may write to me—

[Edward Argar]

As I do regularly.

[Justin Madders]

As he does regularly. I write to him regularly, too. He mentioned the importance of having this in black and white, and that is where we agree. We do need this in black and white, and the place for that to be is in the Bill, so we will press the amendment to a Division. I understand what he has said about ministerial oversight of ICB salaries, but if these bodies are to be locally run and accountable, we think the amendment would be entirely consistent with that aim.

Question proposed, That the amendment be made.

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I made a throwaway comment about what a hospital is, the 40 or 48 and what they are, but the Government have got themselves into a bit of a mess about this now. All hon. Members will have examples from our own constituencies that we can raise. LIFT is a way to manage some of these issues, and it does not go through the same process of capital. What is the further investment? How can I ensure that Bristol gets its dividend back from the LIFT scheme? That might be beyond the Minister’s wit now. But on a serious note, the people providing the bulk of our health services in community and primary care deserve to understand how they can have better estates over the coming years.

[Justin Madders]

Particularly in light of the changes that have been made with covid, one thing that has cropped up locally is that a lot of GP practices—they are basically converted houses—simply are not designed with the ventilation or space to ensure there is a safe distance between people. That points to the importance of this issue and the need for clarity on how we get these estates into a state that is fit to deal with covid.

[Karin Smyth]

I agree, and we will probably all have examples through the primary care networks of practices that were not in old houses but that had perhaps had a LIFT scheme or another new development. In my constituency, the Bridge View Medical practice was able to have a flow through the building and move patients downstairs because it had a large, fairly new building. The pandemic has shown that in an emergency we need to make sure that the community-based estate is brought together in some way. Actually, that applies not just to the health service, but to ex-local authority or even Ministry of Defence or other Government Department estates. The place-based aspect of the Bill should be encouraging people to do that locally. Because estates are not part of it, they will struggle to deliver on the service intent of the Bill.

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The schedule confers all the necessary powers and requirements to enable the ICB to discharge its general functions. I hope that the Committee will agree that it is therefore crucial to the establishment of ICBs and will ensure consistency in the arrangements across England. I therefore commend the schedule to the Committee.

[Justin Madders]

We will not divide the Committee on the schedule but as we have batted quite a lot of this about for a couple of days, it is worth reiterating some of our concerns in relation to how ICBs will actually work in practice.

Taking the Committee through the schedule, in paragraph 4 we have concerns about the chair having to be approved by the Secretary of State and, indeed, under paragraph 5 the chair can be removed by the Secretary of State, which could create tensions and speaks to the reality of how much autonomy these bodies will have. Paragraph 6(2) states:

“constitution must provide that a person is eligible to become or remain the chief executive only if the person is an employee of the integrated care board.”

That stands to reason, but the interim guidance on ICBs for the position of chief executive says that they must be employed or seconded to the ICB. Indeed, the chief finance officer, the director of nursing and the medical director can all be employed or seconded to the ICB, according to that guidance. We think that potentially represents a conflict of interest. It needs clarification, because what is in the Bill does not necessarily sit well with what is in the interim guidance. I wonder whether the Minister can clarify that.

Paragraph 7(1)(a) of the schedule talks about the constitution specifying who should be appointed as ordinary members. Again, the interim guidance helps in providing a list of suggestions regarding ordinary members. It is worth pointing out that, when we totted up all the people the guidance says are the minimum requirement for a board, it comes to 10 people. Although the Bill may say three, the reality is that the guidance says many more. Again, that speaks to the amendment that we tabled on Tuesday about the numbers on the board. The idea that the Bill is permissive is slightly betrayed by the detailed guidance. It depends on what is meant by “permissive”.

One particular mystery is in paragraph 7(3), which says:

“The constitution must set out the process for nominating the ordinary members”.

We know that ICBs will be able to set their own constitutions, approved by NHS England, but how the particular individuals on the boards will emerge still feels rather opaque. Of course, we hope that such things can be done by consensus and agreement. No doubt in the majority of cases they will be, but given the size of some of the areas it will be very difficult sometimes to get a geographical spread that represents the whole area and the various interest groups that constitute an ICB. Of course, diversity may also struggle to be accommodated within that. Such things are all fine and good in the Bill and in the guidance, but I think delivery on the ground will be slightly more difficult to achieve.

Paragraph 8 talks about qualification and tenure for membership of the board. I would be interested to hear the Minister’s comments on whether there is an optimal period of membership of a board. I think I saw two years somewhere in the guidance. I may be mistaken on that, but that seems a little short to me. I wonder whether he has a particular view on that. Paragraph 9 talks about constitutions being required to comply with any regulations that may come forward. Of course, the Bill has a lot of such clauses, where regulations will be produced in due course. I know this is slightly out of his control, but the Bill may not come back to us until much later in the year, if at all this year, depending on how the other place views it. That may mean that we are really down to the wire in terms of any enabling regulations that are needed under the Bill.

Paragraph 10 deals with the terms and conditions—a point that we discussed this morning. Paragraph 14 is quite interesting, because it talks about variation of the constitution, and how that should be done in consultation with NHS England. Indeed, NHS England will retain its own power to vary the constitution. It is important to put on the record that if such steps are taken to change the constitution, it is really important to involve stakeholders, the public, patients and workforce representatives. I hope that the Minister can fill me in on some of the details.

[Edward Argar]

I will try to address each of the shadow Minister’s points one by one, perhaps not in an entirely fluent way.

The hon. Gentleman asked about what he perceived to be an inconsistency between interim guidance and what is proposed in terms of secondees in similar employment. Actually, under paragraph 18(4) of schedule 2, the legislation allows for secondments to continue for those employed as chief executives. It specifies particular organisations, such as secondments from trusts, other parts of the NHS, such as NHS England, or indeed from the civil service. Given that specification, I do not believe that there is an inconsistency.

The hon. Gentleman touched on interim guidance and how that fits with what the Bill will look like once it is, as I hope, enacted. I would gently remind him that it is interim guidance—the key word being “interim”—to allow the continued evolution of ICSs at the moment, without pre-judging what the House may or may not do in terms of making them statutory. That guidance is there to allow them to continue on their path without having to sit and wait for the deliberations of the House on something that they are empowered to do and are already doing. I do not necessarily see the opacity to which the hon. Gentleman alludes but he may disagree.

The hon. Gentleman spoke about geography and the number of local authorities and other organisations involved. I suspect that he has got in mind his own particular geography of Cheshire and Merseyside and the size of the ICS there. That goes to the heart of why we are being permissive: we are setting out a minimum level, and therefore there is nothing to stop an ICS of that size, if it so chose, at ICB level to have a broader range of people sitting on it and a larger number. Each organisation will be able to judge what it thinks is the appropriate number of people to sit on its board to reflect the need for effective decision-making and effective local and organisational representation to reflect the broad geography of its remit.

The hon. Gentleman also asked about the optimal length of service on a board. I have to say in my experience, and I suspect in his from his days in local government, one sees a multitude of approaches in different public bodies. Some tenures are for two years or three years, or two years with a renewal presumed for another two years. I am not sure that there is a clear one size fits all, but there should be principles underpinning it, namely that one does not have someone who joins and never leaves the board, and one has to have the ability to refresh the board to bring in new skills. From my experience of sitting on various boards, including charity boards as a trustee or as a non-executive director, effective organisations need to conduct regular skills audits of their boards, to ask what has changed and what the organisation is lacking in the modern world. As time goes by, one needs different skills and different mixes of people. I would expect ICBs and ICPs to continue to look at what is needed to be at their most effective.

I hope that I have broadly addressed the main thrust of the hon. Gentleman’s points. The other points were those that he has quite rightly come back to, and which we debated at length when we considered his other amendments and those tabled by the hon. Member for Bristol South. On that basis, I encourage members of the Committee to support the schedule.

Question put and agreed to.

Schedule 2 accordingly agreed to.

Clause 14

People for whom integrated care boards have responsibility

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Edward Argar]

The clause requires NHS England to publish rules setting out which people each ICB is responsible for. We intend to recreate as closely as possible the arrangements that currently exist for clinical commissioning groups. However, CCG responsibility is based on a model of GP membership that will no longer exist under the new ICB arrangements.

The clause places a duty on NHS England to publish rules determining the responsibility of each ICB, subject to certain exceptions that may be created by secondary legislation. This is intended to replicate the ability to make exceptions to the responsibilities of CCGs by regulations in section 3(1D) of the National Health Service Act 2006. As with the existing regulations, the new regulations would be subject to the affirmative procedure of the House, which I hope offers some reassurance to the Opposition Front Bench in respect of the regulation-making powers. Therefore, there would continue to be strong parliamentary oversight of regulations under the clause.

Proposed new section 14Z31 ensures that no one slips through any gaps. The rules set by NHS England must ensure that everyone who accesses primary medical services, as well as anyone who is not registered with a GP but is resident in England, is allocated to a group of people for which an ICB is responsible. In practice, we expect NHS England’s rules to be framed in such a way that ICBs will be associated with certain GP practices, and responsible for patients registered with those specified GP practices. They will also be responsible for people who are not registered but are resident in the ICB geographical footprint.

Taking that approach is intended to ensure universality of coverage and to minimise the disruption of transitioning from CCGs to ICBs. The clause also provides a power to replace the duty on NHS England to publish rules dealing with ICB responsibility, with an alternative approach based simply on residency. If it is considered appropriate in the future, those new arrangements would mean that ICBs were responsible for those who usually reside within their specified geographical footprint. Regulations would be required in order to change that approach.

The clause provides the necessary certainty about which ICB is responsible for which people. Without it, there could be significant confusion about ICB responsibilities, difficulty in calculating financial allocations to ICBs based on those they are responsible for and uncertainty for providers about which people they are contracted to provide services to. The clause seeks to provide fluent continuity with the arrangements under CCGs, and explicitly does not allow people to fall through gaps. Ultimately, everyone will be the responsibility of an ICB and will be able to access care when they need it. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.

[Justin Madders]

I will make some comments on clause 14. I think the Minister has anticipated to some extent what I might say. I may well drift into clause 15 as well, but I promise the Committee that I will not repeat those comments in the discussion on clause 15. There is clearly an overlap here. It really is about the issue that the Minister referred to: who is entitled to what within the comprehensive NHS? For some, this is a formality, repeating the language used before and the principles on which the NHS was founded. For others, every word change and new clause that appears in the legislation is an attempt to restrict access and allow an opening for cuts to services to be made in a time of immense financial pressure. We want, and I think the Minister has opened the door to this, to ensure that that is not what the Bill is about.

To be fair, there is a history of commissioners trying on occasions to restrict access. There was the Croydon list of some 20 years ago. Primary care trusts set out lists of services and said that the treatments had little or no value and should not be provided on the NHS. Of course, that led to huge debates between trusts and medical practitioners. It could be argued that people were defending their own particular practices and specialties, or they could be said to be champions of the NHS. Patients looked at it from both perspectives, but for the patients who relied on those services it was a very real debate and a very real source of anxiety.

A more recent argument on this came from the various attempts to apply NHS charges to certain people who it was argued were not eligible for free treatment. There is a very sinister echo of the phrase “no access to benefits”. The long-held consensus appeared to be under threat—the principle that emergency NHS care is open to all. When American tourists come over here and have to seek emergency treatment they are pleasantly surprised, and somewhat bemused, that they do not have to produce a credit card at the point of use. This is where the arguments begin to arise.

If a patient is moved from an emergency bed for elective care, they can be charged if they are ineligible for free NHS care. The usual test is whether they are ordinarily resident in the country. On principle, if someone qualifies for NHS treatment, they can get it anywhere in the country, while on holiday. Most of us have taken our breaks this year somewhere in this country. We do not have to go back to our own local A&E to get treatment. We could, in theory, get our elective operations anywhere in the country, should we wish. Pre-Lansley this did not matter as much, because it was always payment by results. Ambulances crossing borders may occasionally result in a cross-organisational internal charge. Maybe we will see an end to that kind of bureaucracy.

The other argument that emerged during the Lansley period was around who the responsible commissioner within a particular area or population was. That market approach required tying people to a GP practice. The GP register has been a central base from which decisions were made. Did that really affect things on the ground? It certainly caused a lot of debate. It would be helpful if the Minister provided clarity.

The issue of access is important, and clause 14 sets it out in subsections (1), (2)(a) and (2)(b) of proposed new section 14Z31 of the National Health Service Act 2006. According to the NHS, access is universal, but depending on their immigration status within the UK, a person may be charged for accessing certain services. However, certain services are free to everyone: treatment given in an A&E department, though this does not include further treatment following admission to hospital; treatment for certain infectious diseases, but for HIV/AIDS only the first diagnosis and counselling that follow are free; compulsory psychiatric treatment; and family planning services, but this does not include termination of pregnancy or infertility treatments. People ordinarily resident in the UK or who have an exemption from charging will not be charged for NHS treatment. I could go into what ordinarily resident means, but I will not detain the Committee by going through all of that. However, it is fairly clear that it can be a British citizen or someone naturalised or settled in the UK, usually known as having indefinite leave to remain.

The Bill does not cover any of this, but there is a point about it not necessarily being the same person paying for and receiving the treatment. There are questions about those seeking asylum and those who might be denied care because there are questions about where they live. There was the image of a paramedic stepping out of an ambulance and asking someone suffering a cardiac arrest whether they had some kind of identification to prove that they were ordinarily resident. The images are not common ones, but they raise concerns. When the 2012 Act was debated, these issues were discussed at great length. I do not think the fears that were expressed at the time have manifested themselves. Does the Minister believe that using “usually resident” is better than “ordinarily resident”? I also wonder whether under proposed new section 14Z31, the NHS will publish rules as referred to. Could we have clarification on that?

[Edward Argar]

I will respond very briefly. The shadow Minister raises two key bundles of points. I hope that I can reassure him that the approach adopted here is far from restricting access. It is designed to ensure that everyone has an ICB covering them, ensuring universality of coverage. Similarly, the clause does not alter in any way the ability of anyone to access emergency care when they need it, nor those ordinarily resident in the UK to use the NHS as they do.

The second bundle of points he made related to charging regulations and those who are eligible to be charged under current regulations. While he highlighted a number of points, I genuinely believe that the charging regulations in place are appropriately and reasonably framed and strike the right balance in ensuring that people can access NHS care, while rightly making a contribution to the services they are accessing—obviously with certain things exempt from charging for public health and other reasons. I do believe they strike the appropriate balance. There is nothing in what we are proposing today that fundamentally changes people’s ability to access healthcare, nor indeed changes those charging regulations. On that basis, I commend clause 14 to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 14 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Maggie Throup.)

Health and Care Bill (Eighth sitting)

Justin Madders Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 16th September 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Edward Argar]

It is a pleasure once again to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Elliott. Government amendments 12 and 13 are both technical amendments that clarify the commissioning responsibilities of integrated care boards. Clause 15 introduces proposed new section 3 of the National Health Service Act 2006, which places a duty on integrated care boards to commission a range of non-primary health services. The duty to arrange for the provision of primary care is dealt with elsewhere in the Bill.

In the Bill as introduced, there was no specific reference to medical services. Instead, non-primary medical services were considered to be covered by the broad provisions of new section 3(1)(f) and (g), and primary medical services were dealt with elsewhere in the Bill. Similarly, there was no specific reference to ophthalmic services. Instead, non-primary ophthalmic services were considered to be covered by the broad provisions of new section 3(1)(f) and (g), and primary ophthalmic services were dealt with elsewhere in the Bill.

However, the equivalent duties for clinical commissioning groups specifically reference these medical services and ophthalmic services, so the removal of an express reference to non-primary medical services and ophthalmic services generated some concern, which I hope to reassure the Committee is misplaced. There is no change of policy in this area, but to avoid any potential confusion these amendments put beyond doubt the fact that integrated care boards are responsible for these services, and replicate the current language.

[Justin Madders (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab)]

We will not oppose the amendments or, indeed, clause 15. I think it is important, as the Minister said, to make it very clear that the relevant provision in clause 15, proposed new section 3(1), on ICBs providing services that they consider necessary, does not mean that they can unilaterally withdraw services. That is the concern that has been raised, and I think it is important that it is on the record that that is not what is intended.

[Jo Gideon (Stoke-on-Trent Central) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Elliott. I seek some clarification. With demand for palliative care set to soar because of our ageing population, I would be very grateful for any assurances that my hon. Friend the Minister can give that the reference in clause 15, in line 30 on page 13, to “after-care” includes palliative care and end-of-life care services.

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[The Chair]

We now come to clause 19, to which 15 amendments have been tabled. Although amendments 77 to 79, 4, 56, and 80 to 82 have not been selected for debate as no member of the Committee has signed them, if any Member wants to move those amendments, would they please indicate?

Clause 19

General Functions

[Justin Madders]

I beg to move amendment 45, in clause 19, page 16, line 2, at end insert—

“(c) make arrangements to ensure that patients can access services within maximum waiting times in accordance with their rights in the NHS Constitution.”

This amendment places a duty on each integrated care board, in the exercise of its functions, to meet maximum waiting time standards.

The amendment would insert in clause 19 a new requirement on integrated care boards, in addition to the many requirements set out in the clause, to ensure that patients could access services within the maximum waiting times as set out in the NHS constitution. I expect the Minister will tell us that those requirements are already set out in the constitution and that the amendment is therefore unnecessary, but if the answer is that that is an effective tool for ensuring compliance, by any account it has failed.

In every aspect of performance, the NHS has gone backwards in recent years and there can be no doubting the strength of connection between that going backwards and the decade of austerity that the NHS has endured. It is more than five years since the 18-week standard has been met, and that has led to the record waiting lists we see now. In case there is any doubt about this, let me put it on the record that waiting lists were already at record levels before the pandemic, and despite all the fanfare from the Prime Minister following the national insurance rise, we still do not have a guarantee that they will go down during this Parliament.

Let us not forget why the last Labour Government introduced the standards. Years of underfunding under the 1979 to 1997 Conservative Government led us to a dark place. People were waiting months—sometimes years—to access treatment, and that was rightly identified as a priority to fix by the last Labour Government, who wanted to let record investment into the NHS, but also wanted to ensure that that investment was targeted and effective so that the NHS could be judged on its performance. As a result, the targets were introduced.

Targets and funding combined proved to be effective, which is why, by the time the Labour party left office, the NHS had record satisfaction levels and waiting times that today’s Secretary of State can only dream of. Little wonder the rhetoric in recent months has increasingly been that of scepticism about the benefit of such targets, culminating in the Secretary of State’s words at the weekend that the targets are, in fact, “nonsense”. Well, I think we can see what is going on. Targets have got hopelessly out of reach and there is no real plan for to how to change that, so the Government seek to undermine and ultimately change—or remove altogether—the targets, so that poor performance is disguised or played down.

That does a disservice to the patients who are waiting months—in some cases, sadly, years—for the treatment that they are entitled to. Most of those people will be in significant pain. All will be unable to live their lives to the extent that they would like. Some may be unable to work or undertake other physical activities. We do not need to go through the full list; we can all understand the impact that waiting for treatment can have on individuals. In many cases, their lives are effectively put on hold. They deserve better. The amendment would make it clear that their rights as patients under the constitution meant something and that the ICBs should be expected to focus on delivering those standards.

[Edward Argar]

I am grateful to the shadow Minister for tabling the amendment and giving us the opportunity to debate it. Of course we understand the importance of reducing waiting times. The Government are committed to increasing activity, tackling backlogs and ensuring that patients can access timely healthcare, backed up by the record investment announced by the Prime Minister and the Chancellor—indeed, some might agree, to a degree copying what the Labour Government did in putting up national insurance.

For instance, to tackle backlogs and drive up activity, the Government are providing £2 billion of elective recovery funding, which is double our previous commitment, and we are working to encourage innovation to help patients to get the care they need. In his remarks, the shadow Minister highlighted funding. I would point out to him the fact that, despite inheriting a note saying “Sorry, there is no more money,” we have continued to increase spending on the NHS.

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The enabling power under which the standing rules regulations are made is being amended by the Bill to apply to ICBs. Amendments to regulations to confer the relevant duties on ICBs will also be made to coincide with the establishment of ICBs. Furthermore, it would not be appropriate to apply a requirement to ICBs in relation to all the waiting times in the NHS constitution, as some may fall, largely or partly, outside their control—for example, services commissioned nationally by NHS England. For those reasons, we cannot support the amendment, and I will try my luck in encouraging the hon. Gentleman to withdraw it.

[Justin Madders]

I am grateful for the Minister’s vain attempt to persuade me to withdraw the amendment, although he rather missed the central thrust of its purpose, which is, of course, to point out that this is not just about funding; it is about focusing that funding. That is why the targets were introduced in the first place.

We believe it is important that ICBs are also given that focus; we could call it an incentive or a prioritisation. They should be keen to be seen to be delivering that. This is such an important part of the NHS—how are we to judge each ICB’s performance if we do not know how they are performing on waiting lists? This is an important area. We think the general tone and the rhetoric from the Government are that waiting targets are not of significance, so this is an opportunity for them to put right some of the stories that go around in respect of that by supporting the amendment. We will press the amendment to a vote in any case because we believe that this is an important matter, and it should be put on the record.

[Karin Smyth]

I will not repeat my comments of the other day with respect to an amendment that suddenly disappeared from the amendment paper without my noticing. The point I was making was that targets do drive behaviour, and we learnt something in that magnificent drive down from the Conservative Government’s target of 18 months to wait on a list, which seemed acceptable to them at the time. The wait is beyond that now for many services, which seems acceptable to the Government now, although it is completely unacceptable to everyone in my constituency.

We must consider the managerial and clinical effort involved in focusing on those waiting lists, which, as I have said previously, is about making contact with all those patients, assessing their condition and seeing how it has ordinarily deteriorated once on the waiting list. Sadly, many people have died while on those waiting lists. That effort is huge, and it will require focus.

The Government are asking us all to pay a bit more towards the health service, and most of us are conscious of the fact that that is needed. We can debate how it is being done, but we should know what it will get us. We should absolutely be clear to our constituents—given that they have suffered so much, particularly during the pandemic—that the previous standards were not acceptable, and were not being met, and that it is completely unacceptable to ask people to pay more without their having any idea of what that will bring, or indeed of the Government’s intent with regard to how long they think it is acceptable for people to be on a waiting list.

It is also hugely onerous on the clinical managerial staff to manage these waiting lists in the way that they are, which is hugely inefficient. This is a really bad sign of the flow through the system; we have bottlenecks throughout. It will come back to haunt the Government and whoever is speaking on their behalf at this time—I have no doubt about that. I say that with sorrow because it is miserable all round. The Government would be wise to make some kind of assessment of what they think is an acceptable time to wait for various treatments, so that would be clear to people. Supporting our amendment would give some indication of good faith, at the very least.

[Justin Madders]

My hon. Friend has described the amendment very well, and it would be good to know the Government’s intentions in respect of waiting lists, because we consider the rhetoric a distraction and a nuisance. It is politically convenient for them to have such headlines. We want to put the amendment to the vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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[The Chair]

That is absolutely fine. I thank the hon. Member for advising the Committee of that.

[Justin Madders]

I beg to move amendment 58, in clause 19, page 17, line 4, at end insert

“through working with innovation and life sciences ecosystems, facilitated by Academic Health Science Networks, to ensure patients and the public have timely access to transformative innovation.”

This amendment would mandate Trusts to work with AHSNs to promote innovation in health services.

Innovation has allowed us to conquer certain diseases and come up with better and more effective treatments for others. It is integral to societal progress and is a major source of inspiration, new opportunities and, indeed, new financial burdens for the NHS. Most importantly, it means improved outcomes for patients. Innovation needs to reach patients if we are to get the full benefit of the many incredibly talented people who make up our academic and research community.

Academic health science networks have an informal role in the NHS, and there is no obligation on any CCG to work with them to ensure that new, innovative medicines are available. There are 15 academic health science networks across England, which were established by NHS England in 2013 to spread innovation at pace and scale, improving health and generating economic growth. Each network has a distinct geography, covering a specific population in each region—it almost sounds like an integrated care system, but there are not quite as many. They are the only bodies that connect to the NHS and the academic organisations, and are catalysts that create the right conditions to facilitate change across health and social care communities with a clear focus, as we believe should be the case, on improving outcomes for patients. We think they are uniquely placed to underline and spread innovation at pace and scale, driving the adoption and spread of innovative ideas and technologies across large populations, but their effectiveness rests on their ability to bring people, resources and organisations together quickly, delivering benefits that could not be achieved if they operated in isolation.

Everything those bodies do is driven by two imperatives: improving health and generating economic growth in our regions. They are the only partnership bodies that bring together all partners across a regional hub economy to improve the health of local communities. They have a remit from NHS England to occupy what is effectively a unique space outside the usual NHS service contracts and performance management structures, enabling them to collaborate to foster important solutions.

Those bodies use local knowledge to harness the influence of partners to drive change and integrate research within health improvements. They are interested in seeing healthcare businesses thrive and grow, creating jobs, bringing investment and seeing the system improve. They have a different focus, but they share the following priorities: promoting economic growth; fostering opportunities for industry to work effectively with the NHS; diffusing innovation; creating the right environment; and supporting collaboration across boundaries to adopt and spread innovation at pace and scale. They improve patient safety by using knowledge, expertise and networks to bring together patients, healthcare staff and partners to determine priorities and to develop and implement solutions. They optimise medicine use—[Interruption.] Perhaps I have predicted what the Minister was about to say?

[Edward Argar]

I am envying the shadow Minister’s breath control as he runs through his list.

[Justin Madders]

I am merely trying to ensure we make good progress today.

Those bodies ensure medication is used to maximum benefit, including safety and making efficient use of NHS resources. They improve quality and reduce variation by spreading best practice—we often talk about the variation among outcomes across different parts of the country. They put research into practice, collaborate on national programmes, and have a unified focus on various initiatives, including the NHS innovation accelerator and patient safety collaborative programme.

The amendment would bake in that good work, some of which I have outlined, by including those bodies within the scope of proposed new section 14Z39 of the National Health Service Act 2006 regarding innovation.

[Karin Smyth]

I rise to support my hon. Friend. We have rightly criticised much of what has happened in the last few years, but we should also remember that some amazing partnerships and networks have developed, including in my area—Bristol, north Somerset and south Gloucestershire—with the universities and others in both primary and secondary care, bringing together clinicians, researchers and so on. They stumbled initially as things were difficult at the beginning, but they have come together very well. They are well regarded—variable but well regarded—and are a useful source of innovation coming together, so I fully echo my hon. Friend’s comments.

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I hope that I have given the Committee some reassurance on the importance and value that we attach to research as a key part our health and care system, and also explained why we think it is right for ICBs to have a duty to promote research on relevant health service matters and to use evidence from such research, without our being over-prescriptive as to how they should do so. I hope that I have offered the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston, some reassurance and words of comfort.

[Justin Madders]

I am grateful for the Minister’s comments. The Opposition would not want to be accused of being over-prescriptive—that is certainly not what we intend. I appreciate what the Minister said about not wanting to limit the role of ICBs and he made a good point about the vaccine roll-out being a pertinent example of how innovation can be of huge benefit. That may be at the forefront of his mind because there is now a vacancy in the Department in the role of Minister for Covid Vaccine Deployment; the Minister may be looking to add to his already extensive portfolio.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Chris Skidmore (Kingswood) (Con)]

I beg to move amendment 7, in clause 19, page 17, line 7, leave out from beginning to end of line 9 and insert—

“(a) support the conduct of research on matters relevant to the health and care system,

(b) work with universities and other research settings to support the development of the health research workforce and careers, and

(c) promote the use in the health and care system of evidence obtained from research.”

This amendment would require Integrated Care Boards to work with universities to support research in their local health and care systems.

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[Justin Madders]

I am grateful to the Minister for that herculean effort in listing all the powers and responsibilities of ICBs. For a permissive Bill, the fact that it sets out 12 duties suggests that the pendulum has swung a little bit further than the Minister was perhaps prepared to admit on Tuesday. Of course, the number would have been even higher had our amendment been accepted, but there we go; a dozen is still an impressive amount. However, it is really about what that means in practice.

The Minister referred to the duty whereby ICBs are required to promote awareness of the NHS constitution. In the context of the debate that we have just had on NHS waiting lists, it strikes me as similar to the scene—it might be familiar to many Members—at the end of each “Bullseye” episode, when the speedboat that the unlucky contestant had not succeeded in getting was brought out, so as to say, “Look what you could have won!” In this case, it is, “Look what the NHS constitution says about waiting times. By the way, we are not delivering on that for you.” That is the nub of some of the duties—how will they be enforced in practice? The Minister referred to mechanisms for NHS England intervention, although we would have liked that to be further strengthened with specific reference to waiting lists.

I note that in proposed new section 14Z59(4), NHS England has retained the ability to terminate the appointment of an ICB chief executive, but also to direct the chair of the board as to which individual to appoint as their replacement and on what terms. That is quite a strong power. The way I read that, if NHS England decides to get rid of someone, it, and it alone, will decide who will replace them. That really goes against the spirit of what we have been discussing for the last couple of days. Would the Minister be able to allay my fears in that respect, or at least put into context the circumstances in which that clause might operate?

I was interested to hear what the Minister said about proposed new section 14Z47 and ICBs’ ability to offer grants and loans on whatever terms they see fit. It now seems that the “B” in ICB stands for bank, or possibly building society. Obviously, at the moment these bodies do not exist in law and so have no capital resources to draw on to create such grants or loans, but of course that will change in due course. Again, will the Minister advise the Committee in what kind of situations that might be a possibility?

Finally, I draw the Committee’s attention to the powers and responsibilities in proposed new section 14Z52, on health and wellbeing boards’ comments about forward plans. Like much of this, it is a process-driven, tick-box exercise where people have to “take regard” and explain why they are not doing something that everyone else has asked them to do. A whole lot of this raises the question: in a disagreement, what are the levers to get proper accountability and change that the whole of the system, apart from the ICB, wants to see?

[Chris Skidmore]

Although I entirely support clause 19 as an essential ingredient of the Bill that will provide certainty and legal confidence to ICBs, I wish to draw the Minister’s attention again to the duty to promote research. The past year has demonstrated the increased engagement, across all healthcare settings, in research and those activities relating to the pandemic.

Research demonstrates the enormous benefits not only to patients, but to organisations that see improved outcomes, lower mortality rates and increased confidence in care as a result of being research-led organisations. It also shows the staggering gross value added that is produced within the NHS—£2.7 billion in 2018-19, through the National Institute for Health Research clinical research network that supports clinical research activities. For every patient recruited on to a commercial trial between 2016 and 2018, the NHS in England received more than £9,000. When a drug is replaced by a new one—a trial drug—there is another saving of nearly £6,000.

Research not only improves lives; we know it saves lives. I am a passionate advocate for expanding our research and development capacity across society if we are to succeed as global Britain. That is one reason we have that cross-Government target of raising the amount spent on R&D, both public and private, to 2.4% of GDP by 2027.

I want to come back to this idea of the duty to promote research. I recall serving on the Bill Committee for what became the Health and Social Care Act 2012, when the duty to promote research was first written into legislation, with the duty on CCGs. That has now been transferred across in the text for ICBs, in proposed new sections 14Z39 and 14Z40 to the National Health Service Act 2006.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Vale of Clwyd mentioned, the duty to promote may not be strong enough. I do not have an amendment to hand, but I wanted to raise this point more generally so that the Minister and his Bill team might give it some consideration. Given that ICSs are established as the strategic system leaders for the NHS and partner organisations to deliver integrated care and take that whole-systems approach, research will have to be a core element of ICSs’ regional plans if we are to maximise the strengths of the NHS, our world-leading science capability and the opportunities I have spoken about.

I therefore urge the Government to consider whether there might be an opportunity to change the duty to promote into a duty to conduct and resource clinical research during the passage of the Bill. It is important to stress that a duty to promote has to be accompanied by the necessary infrastructure: staffing levels, research capability, digital resources, access to services, efficient trial approval processes, the ability to reliably recruit patients, guidance and dedicated staff time for research. The whole idea of “promotion” is doing a lot of heavy lifting. There might be an opportunity for us to be more detailed in creating a duty to conduct and resource clinical research.

Such a duty—this has been raised with me—would present the opportunity that research brings to highlight clinical inequalities within the NHS. We need to be able to measure research activity; we cannot manage or even promote research activity unless we are able to measure it effectively. With that comes the whole question of clinical auditing—making sure that there is an effective auditing process in place to ensure that research-led activities are able to be effectively measured and therefore effectively managed. I am sure that that will be raised in the other place during the passage of the Bill. I act as a canary in the coalmine to provide the Minister with due warning that I am sure these debates will come up during the passage of the Bill in the other place.

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[Edward Argar]

I am grateful, as ever, to my right hon. Friend the Member for Kingswood for his comments. I hope I can reassure him that the issues he raised, and the issues that he has aired in the Committee today, will continue to be reflected on carefully by officials and Ministers during the passage of the Bill.

I will try to address the specific points raised by the hon. Members for Ellesmere Port and Neston and for Arfon. The hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston touched on the appointment of chief executives and the termination of appointments. That power is broadly akin to the current power that CCGs have, and we are simply moving across the power that NHS England has over CCGs to reflect the new environment of integrated care boards.

[Justin Madders]

I am grateful for the clarification from the Minister, but does that not expose our fear that, really, ICBs are just bigger CCGs?

[Edward Argar]

No, because at the heart of ICBs is an enhanced integration and partnership-working model, which will be a significant step forward to facilitate improved patient care in our constituencies and localities.

The power to make loans is analogous to the power that exists for CCGs.

The hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston touched on forward plans and health and wellbeing boards. The ICB will have an obligation to consult the health and wellbeing board, including in respect of whether it takes into account the latest joint health and wellbeing strategy and provides the HWB with a copy of its plan.

On Wales, I fear that I may have to write to the hon. Member for Arfon with some of the answers, but I shall try to give some now so that he has at least something today. We are seeking not to make a policy change or anything like that but to carry the existing situation for CCGs across into the new arrangement. We have been consulting and working closely with the Welsh Government. I suspect that, as we heard from the witnesses, some in the Welsh Government may suggest that we should consult more closely, while others will say the consultation is adequate. I believe I have a good relationship with the Health Minister in the Welsh Government—I spoke to her only yesterday about a number of aspects of the Bill—and at official level conversations are constantly ongoing.

The hon. Member for Arfon touched on joint committees, which will involve ICBs and their Welsh equivalents. We would not expect private providers to serve on them because they will in effect exercise an ICB function. On Tuesday, I made it clear to the Committee that it is not our intention that private providers should serve on ICBs, so they should not serve on joint committees either. We will have further discussions with the Opposition Front-Bench team and others as to whether we can find a way to make that clearer in the legislation.

Finally, accountability remains essentially unchanged. The NHS in Wales is accountable to the Welsh Government and ICBs will be accountable to NHS England and, therefore, to the Secretary of State. The hon. Member for Arfon touched on the challenge of divergence or disparity of provision. I suspect that, in a sense, it comes baked into a devolution settlement that when power is devolved down there is sometimes a divergence of approach or there are different services. That is in the nature of any devolution settlement where specific services or functions are devolved. For example, as we have seen in our exiting from coronavirus regulations, the devolved Administrations have the right, under the settlement, to pursue the approach that they deem to be most effective.

I hope that I have addressed a number of the points made by the hon. Member for Arfon. I see my officials frantically scribbling down his other questions; we will endeavour to check Hansard and write to him with anything we have missed.

I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 19 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 20

Integrated care partnerships and strategies

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[Dr Davies]

I thank the Minister for that response. I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Eddisbury is particularly keen that these matters are covered within statutory guidance, but, with the leave of the Committee, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Justin Madders]

I beg to move amendment 47, in clause 20, page 31, line 31, at end insert—

“(3) The Secretary of State must make regulations which set out the procedure to be followed should an integrated care partnership believe that an integrated care board has failed in its duty under this section.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to establish a procedure for the resolution of any dispute between an integrated care partnership and an integrated care board concerning the implementation of a strategy produced by the integrated care partnership.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 83, in clause 20, page 31, line 31, at end insert—

“(3) Where—

(a) in exercising its functions a responsible local authority or integrated care board diverges from an assessment or strategy mentioned in subsection (1), or

(b) in exercising any functions in arranging for the provision of health services in relation to the area of a responsible local authority NHS England diverges from an assessment or strategy mentioned in subsection (2),

that local authority, that integrated care board or (as the case may be) NHS England must—

(a) (i) within 30 days, make a public statement of its divergence from the assessment or strategy, and

(ii) within 60 days, publish its reasons for the divergence, together with any supporting evidence.”

[Justin Madders]

I will talk briefly about amendment 83 which has been grouped with amendment 47.

Amendment 47 focuses on the whole discussion that we have had, and that we will continue to have, around integrated partnerships and what they will be able to do to deliver for their communities. I do not know if “Marmotisation” is a word; if it is, this could be seen as the first step towards that, but we will see how it works in practice. We must be clear, however, that this is a first step. The names of the partners being bandied about shows that this Bill is about the integration of not just health and social care but the whole wider public sector and other partners, and shows, too, that health issues permeate almost every walk of life. This certainly does not, as evidenced by the Prime Minister’s comments last week, constitute a solution to the integration of health and social care.

Putting that aside, there is an opportunity here to do something different. However, for all the froth and grand statements about partnership working we fear we may be looking at giant CCGs with less GP involvement—we have made this point a number of times so I will not labour it. What we are presented with is a reorganisation of the NHS, not a panacea for integration. We have tried a couple of times already to elicit from the Minister what is missing from the Bill in terms of the integration that the Prime Minister believes necessitates a White Paper. I think the Minister might struggle sometimes to understand what exactly is going on in the Prime Minister’s head in relation to this—or indeed anything else that is going on in his head—but we await his response on that with interest.

I would like to make some general points on the relationship between the NHS and local authorities, because that is important. The Bill acknowledges that greater interaction is needed, but the big question is whether it actually delivers that solution. If there is to be a genuine generational shift from thinking of the NHS as dealing with sickness to contributing to overall wellbeing, that will be welcome, although if our amendment on patient outcomes had been accepted that would have been a better start. There have been some discussions around SDPs and ICSs in the Bill, and that gives us hope that there might be something here we can work with.

The need to bring services together and integrate is blindingly obvious, but it is also very hard to do as the following example demonstrates. A patient with a long-term condition such as chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and with both healthcare and social care needs, has an acute episode and is admitted to hospital and is then discharged back into their home, which unfortunately suffers from a chronic damp problem—something many Members will know about from their constituency casework. The housing provider—a local authority, perhaps, or an arm’s length management organisation or registered social landlord—is doing its best, but it does not have enough resources to get to the root of the problem, so there is a liaison meeting where this case is discussed between the NHS and local councillors. The councillor for the area where the individual is located asks the chief executive of the trust whether it would be a good idea for some of the health budget to be invested in social housing so that people such as this individual would not be readmitted for a problem that is essentially caused by the property they are living in. The chief executive responds by asking why they would throw money away on something like that, even though a more holistic view shows that would be of benefit for everyone in the long run.

That illustrates why we need to work harder on integration, and it is not an isolated incident. As any councillor who has been in post for any number of years will know—if the Minister and I totted up between us how many years we have served, it would probably be quite a lot—sometimes it is difficult to have the level of interaction with the NHS that we would like. As an aside, I might add that children in care meetings or care around the child meetings are incredibly important, but often the GP does not attend because they have many other priorities.

We have talked about this many times, but the vaccine roll-out has been an exemplar of how local government and the NHS can work together. That was a specific task at the time of the national crisis. It is clearly more difficult to repeat that kind of synergy on a day-to-day basis, but it does show what can be done.

In Wales, the Government have a far-reaching strategy around the wellbeing of future generations. They have made a big leap, moving the NHS away from market thinking and focusing on the way it delivers its service to the public. Both Scotland and Wales have accepted the need for that approach, and their integrated joint boards, joint integration boards, health boards and local authorities have all been talking about integration for some time. Of course, they have the sense to make their health boards coterminous with local authority areas. That would have been a very wise move. We have already had some chat about devolved involvement and I am sure that we will return to that.

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I hope my comments give hon. Members a degree of reassurance and, as I have frequently done this afternoon, I will try to tempt Opposition Members not to press their amendments to a Division.

[Justin Madders]

The Minister has made some interesting points. I will have to come back on the reference to “weasel words”. I was a lawyer for a number of years, and when it comes to their use, I think that lawyers are probably second only to Members of Parliament in being able to use them.

There were many occasions when we were negotiating and drafting documents. Once, I wanted something to happen and another person said, “Well, we don’t want to actually make that an absolute commitment, but we intend to do it.” We always ended up with the compromise of reasonable endeavours. Best endeavours was another one. Often that led to one side being slightly disappointed, but that was usually the point of compromise. But that, I would suggest, is actually going further than what is in the current legislation, which is to “have regard”. That really is the nub of this, because we do not think that is enough to give the ICPs the teeth that they need and the strength and leverage that they might need if they are to be truly effective.

The Minister said that if there was a divergence, he would expect an ICB to put forward reasonable explanations as to why it was not going to follow a particular strategy. But that would then lead to the conclusion that if it was not able to do that, it was acting unreasonably, which of course could give rise to judicial review. That, I am sure, is a road that the Minister does not want ICBs and ICPs to go down. I do not think that would be in anyone’s interest, so we are actually, once again, trying to help the Minister out by coming up with a solution that avoids litigation and dispute and gives us confidence that we will not see a repeat of the lack of genuine engagement that we have seen in some areas in the past, but will see a real force, in legislation, to encourage the wider public sector to have real influence on the modelling of health policies and strategies in the future. Therefore we will—with your permission, Ms Elliott —press amendment 47 to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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[Edward Argar]

The clause introduces the integrated care partnership known as an ICP, as a joint committee of the integrated care board and local authorities in its geography. It gives the partnership its core function of preparing the integrated care strategy. The ICP was developed with the Local Government Association and NHS partners in recognition of the fact that the system has been calling for two different and important types of integration: integration within and across the NHS to deliver healthcare services within a defined locality, and integration between the NHS and local government and wider partners.

The ICP is intended to bring together health, social care and public health to develop a strategy to address the needs of the area also covered by the integrated care board. If the ICP wants to go further, it can also involve representatives from the wider system where appropriate, such as voluntary and community groups, and social care or housing providers. That will be up to the ICP, and we will welcome locally driven innovation to reflect local circumstances.

When preparing the strategy, the integrated care partnership must take into account the NHS mandate, any guidance from the Secretary of State and any relevant local joint strategic needs assessment. The ICP must also involve the local Healthwatch, as well people who live and work in the area. The strategy will need to look at how local authorities and NHS bodies can work together using arrangements under section 75 of the National Health Service Act 2006.

Local authorities, integrated care boards and NHS England, when providing services in the area, must have regard to the relevant integrated care strategy when exercising their functions, as well as, more locally, any joint strategic needs assessment or joint local health and wellbeing strategies. This will enable more joined-up planning and provision, both within the NHS and in local authorities. As a result, we would expect to see more integration of the services people receive, more efficient and effective commissioning, and closer working between local authorities and the local NHS.

The clause makes it a legal requirement for all ICBs and local authorities to establish an ICP for their area. These partnerships will promote and facilitate integration across health and care throughout England, thereby contributing to delivering on the ambitious aims put forward in the Bill to further integrate health and care systems.

[Justin Madders]

I will not detain the Committee as I have already said most of what I wanted to say. The Minister just talked about the ambitious aims to achieve integration. Obviously, they were not that ambitious; if they had been, we would not need another White Paper.

[Edward Argar]

Even more ambitious!

[Justin Madders]

We can never be too ambitious, can we? I will be interested to see those working practices. As hon. Members can probably gather, we are somewhat sceptical that the ICPs will really be the transformative and influential bodies that we want them to be. I will keep a close eye on what kind of partners end up on them. If we started involving every potential body in the Cheshire and Merseyside one, we would probably need to hire out Anfield to fit everyone in. It might be more entertaining than the football fare on there—we could have a Division on that. We will probably revisit this in future days, weeks and months. We will not oppose the clause but we wish to put on the record where we think its shortcomings are.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 20 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 21

NHS England’s financial responsibilities

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause 22 stand part.

[Edward Argar]

The clause provides for a number of financial responsibilities of NHS England and provides powers for the Secretary of State to direct NHS England in relation to those responsibilities. Clause 22 provides the ability to amend the provision in clause 21 that imposes a duty on NHS England to ensure that its expenditure, together with that of integrated care boards, does not exceed the sums received in a year.

On clause 21, proposed new section 223C of the National Health Service Act 2006 places a duty on NHS England to ensure that in each financial year, the expenditure of NHS England and integrated care boards does not exceed the aggregate amount received by them. It should be noted that that is in the context of the historic settlement for the NHS reached in 2018, which will see its budget rise by £33.9 billion by 2023-24. Proposed new section 223CA simply replicates a provision in the 2006 Act, which enables the Secretary of State to specify the banking facilities that NHS England may use.

Proposed new section 233D of the 2006 Act enables the Secretary of State to give directions to NHS England concerning resource use. Any directions given by the Secretary of State under that proposed new section must be published and laid before Parliament. Proposed new section 223E empowers the Secretary of State to direct that the capital and revenue resource used by NHS England and ICBs for specified matters does not exceed a limit set.

Clause 22 could be commenced at a later date than clause 21. It would expand the duty on NHS England to ensure its own expenditure, as well as that of ICBs and English NHS trusts and foundation trusts, did not exceed the sums received by those bodies in a year. The clause is essential to ensure that achieving financial balance is inclusive of the finance of NHS trusts and foundation trusts. It recognises that NHS England must be mindful of the need to ensure that public money is spent as effectively as possible and in the best interests of the public we serve. However, we recognise that the NHS is moving out of an unprecedented period, so we will not commence the clause until it is ready. The provisions will help to ensure that there is clear accountability for public spending and that the NHS lives within its means.

[Justin Madders]

I will talk briefly about clauses 21 and 22, although with your indulgence, Ms Elliott, I will step over into clauses 23 and 24, because we cannot really look at these points without having some regard to those clauses. I promise I will not repeat the same points when we get to them.

We know that ICBs and NHS trusts will have spending limits, and that in theory they cannot go into deficit in any year, but the combined deficits of trusts before the pandemic was several billion pounds. Foundation trusts are in a slightly different position. Monitor is going—clause 26, which I suspect we will not get to today, goes into that, and it reads quite brutally in isolation—so it needs to be clear in the Bill how performance management and financial oversight will work in its absence. We still have questions about that, particularly how accountability will work with those new systems.

We see in these clauses a basic tension that NHS England will apply totals to systems, but individuals within the systems all have their own duties and responsibilities. We might think it is the ICB plus all the providers that deliver the services required, which are paid for by the ICB, but I am not sure that is how it will work in practice.

If I am correct, an integrated system is not defined in the Bill, so how do we control something that does not exist in law? Where accountability lies is very vague. The terminology used in proposed new section 233M, which is where the Bill tries to constrain aggregate financial spending each year, is:

“Each integrated care board and its partner NHS trusts and NHS foundation trusts”.

That suggests some kind of joint responsibility, but where community health services are provided by Virgin Care, that does not appear within that wording. GPs and their spend are considered outside, even though they are commissioned by the ICBs, so how do their costs fit into this system? There have to be some answers on that.

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[Edward Argar]

I will be relatively brief because I am conscious of the fact that we have agreed to get through quite a few more clauses today, although I will try to address the points that hon. Members have made. One of the key issues at the heart of what I think the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston, was saying is around what happens if an ICB or a foundation trust spends beyond its limit. How does that work? What is the process? I am pleased that this brings some welcome clarity, rather than the fragmentation we sometimes see in accounting cashflow, following the cash processes at the moment.

First and foremost, local systems will be informed of their resource envelope at the start of the year and will be required to agree a plan that matches, or is within, that envelope. Therefore, all will start the year with a plan that sets out what is being delivered and how much funding they will receive to deliver those services. However, if overspends emerge within year, that should initially be resolved within the system by the individual organisation either finding offsetting savings or securing savings elsewhere within that system envelope. Through the financial duties imposed by the Bill, the system is encouraged to be collectively responsible for managing its funding envelope, moving away from what we often see at the moment, which is fragmentation in understanding how the money flows, and each organisation considering itself to a degree in isolation.

If the overspend cannot be managed within the system, NHS England and NHS Improvement can use the powers in the Bill to hold the system to account through mechanisms such as the system oversight framework and providing support via the recovery support programme, as well as more informal support from the local region. Additionally, individual trusts or FTs that are not working collaboratively within the system can be held to account using the provider licence and enforcement options available for breaches. Finally, of course, in extremis the Department of Health and Social Care can provide cash support to NHS trusts and FTs to ensure that services continue to be delivered.

The second concomitant part of the shadow Minister’s question was what action NHS England or the ICB can take in response to financial difficulties. Financial performance will be monitored by both of them, and in the first instance any difficulties will be resolved locally. However, as I have set out, tougher mechanisms or sanctions can be imposed on trusts that are not meeting their reporting and financial accounting obligations under the clauses.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 21 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 22 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 23

Financial responsibilities of integrated care boards and their partners

[Justin Madders]

I beg to move amendment 53, in clause 23, page 35, line 14, at end insert—

“(5) NHS England must publish guidance on the means by which an integrated care board, NHS trust or NHS foundation trust which believes its capital resource limit or revenue resource limit risks compromising patient safety may object to the limit set.”

This amendment would introduce an objection mechanism when an Integrated Care Board, Trust or Foundation Trust believes its capital resource limit or revenue resource limit risks compromising patient safety.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause stand part.

Clause 24 stand part.

[Justin Madders]

With this amendment, we are probably having another bash at the debate we have just had to some extent, but we are also making an important point about patient safety.

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[Edward Argar]

Clause 23 provides for NHS England to set overall system financial objectives for ICBs, NHS trusts and NHS foundation trusts, which must operate with a view to achieving these objectives. This includes the ability to set limits on local capital resource use and local revenue resource use for ICBs, NHS trusts and NHS foundation trusts.

Clause 23 removes the sections in the National Health Service Act 2006 relating to financial duties of CCGs and replaces them with new sections setting out the financial responsibilities of ICBs and their partners. Improving population health requires the breaking down of silos. Traditional financial control focused on individual providers and organisations artificially creates barriers and fragmentation that get in the way of high-quality care.

The new approach will help to break down those barriers by enabling NHS England to set joint system financial objectives for ICBs and partner NHS trusts and NHS foundation trusts, which must operate with a view to achieving these objectives. This includes the ability to set limits on local capital resource use and local revenue resource use for ICBs, and for partner NHS trusts and NHS foundation trusts. NHS England can also give directions to ICBs, NHS trusts and NHS foundation trusts on resource apportionment.

I turn to amendment 53, tabled by the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston. I am grateful to him for tabling it as it gives us an opportunity to air a number of issues. It would require NHS England to produce guidance to set out a process whereby ICBs, NHS trusts or NHS foundation trusts could object to their capital and revenue resource limits. Although I understand the motivation behind the amendment, which is about ensuring that the NHS has sufficient funds to deliver services safely, I do not believe that it is needed. The ability for NHS England to set system limits is important to enable systems to effectively plan their services and it enables NHS England to meet its obligation on delivering system balance and its broader obligation to taxpayers.

The decision to allocate revenue funding to systems is based on a weighted capitation formula, which produces a target allocation or “fair share” for each area, based on a complex assessment of factors such as demography, morbidity, deprivation and the unavoidable cost of providing services in different areas, meaning that systems will get funding linked to their individual needs. NHS trusts and foundation trusts will be represented on ICBs, so they will play a role in deciding how resources will be allocated within the system. They can raise concerns about proposals, including with regard to patient safety, as part of the decision-making process, although we do not consider that these clauses would put patient safety at risk. Capital allocations already include a funding element to address emergency or patient safety needs, based on planning information from systems. The funding element is intended to be used to address any issues that could arise, including in the context of patient safety.

Furthermore, clause 24 futureproofs the ICB financial duties provisions. It provides for some of the provisions in clause 23 to be replaced and is designed to be commenced at a later date. Once ICBs and their partner trusts are deemed ready to take on greater financial accountability, clause 24 can be used to replace clause 23 with a new joint expenditure limit duty on the ICB and its partner trusts. At a time when it is considered appropriate, the clause will require ICBs and their partner NHS trusts and foundation trusts to exercise their functions in a way that ensures their expenditure when taken together does not exceed their income. The intended effect is that each local area is mutually invested in achieving financial control at a system level, meaning that public funds can be spent in a more sustainable, joined-up and effective way. This should enable a nimbler approach to expenditure where needs across the system can be addressed more flexibly and holistically.

Should unexpected needs for funding arise, there is another safeguard in place to allow NHS services to continue operating safely, as the Department can issue cash to NHS trusts and foundation trusts. For example, if emergency support is needed to address patient safety issues, trusts can apply for additional cash funding to safeguard delivery of care. It is for those reasons that I invite the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston to withdraw his amendment. I commend clauses 23 and 24 to the Committee.

[Justin Madders]

I do not know whether it is too late on a Thursday afternoon, but I did feel like I had wandered into an episode of “Yes Minister” there. I will not press the amendment to a vote, but I will read the transcript of what the Minister has said with some care over the next few days. I am not entirely clear that he has addressed the central points that were made, but we will no doubt return to this at some point anyway. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 23 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 24 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Jo Churchill.)

Health and Care Bill (Ninth sitting)

Justin Madders Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 21st September 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

We resume this morning at clause 25.

[Justin Madders (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab)]

On a point of order, Mrs Murray. There have been quite a few changes on the Government Benches in the Committee. We congratulate the Under-Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, the hon. Member for Erewash (Maggie Throup), on her promotion and the Under-Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, the hon. Member for Bury St Edmunds (Jo Churchill), on her transfer. If there was a Sky Sports News transfer deadline day reshuffle pack, I can see Jim White in wheels of excitement about the number of changes at the Department of Health and Social Care. We are delighted that the star striker remains in his place.

On a more serious note, the composition of the Committee has changed. Was that in order? Was some kind of approval process from the House required before that could take place?

[The Chair]

It is all done through the Committee of Selection, so it is quite in order.

[Justin Madders]

Further to that point of order, Mrs Murray. Derek Wilton on “Coronation Street” used to say, “I shall be on the cocoa by the time Trevor McDonald has finished”—a reference to people retiring for the night at around quarter-past 10 or half-past 10. We got an email at 10.22 pm last night with an updated selection list from the Chair. I do not think there are any substantive changes, but in a case where there are dramatic changes to selections and groupings at short notice, is there any rule or procedure about how much notice must be given?

[The Chair]

There is no minimum notice requirement, but I am sure there will not be an issue in future.

[Justin Madders]

Further to that point of order, Mrs Murray; I have had a few days to think about these points. The Minister very helpfully said he would write to me about the workforce amendment we put forward last week. Over the weekend, I was talking to some members of the public who are very interested in the Committee’s proceedings. They asked when that letter might be published. I know the Minister is very busy and has a lot of new inductions for his colleagues to get through, as well as his work on the Bill, so I am not going to ask when he will release it, but would it be appropriate to add that letter to the page on the Government website where all the Bill information is contained?

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[Edward Argar]

I am grateful to the shadow Minister for that question, which reminds me of some of the questions that he used to ask me in this room about what the future held when we discussed delegated legislation. I am always cautious not to predict the future, but hopefully it will be helpful if I set out the principles that I think should apply. I agree that unnecessary duplication that does not bring clear and tangible benefits to patient safety or improve outcomes is clearly undesirable. Therefore we will seek to streamline where appropriate, but without compromising patient safety or the outcomes that patients experience. While not predicting the future, I hope that gives him some reassurance of the direction of travel as I see it.

Clause 26, along with other provisions in the Bill, including clause 29, makes the legal changes necessary to bring these organisations together as one legal entity. Clause 26 abolishes Monitor and introduces schedule 5, which contains amendments that transfer Monitor’s functions to NHS England in order to fulfil the Bill’s intention to merge Monitor and the NHS TDA into NHS England to form a single body. The schedule transfers powers and duties from Monitor to NHS England and repeals provisions that are no longer necessary in the light of the merger. For example, Monitor’s functions in relation to NHS foundation trust mergers and acquisitions in sections 56 and 56(a) of the 2006 Act, and in relation to licensing providers in sections 81 to 114 of the Health and Social Care Act 2012, will all transfer to NHS England.

We acknowledge that bringing together the commissioning functions previously exercised by the NHS commissioning board, and the regulatory functions previously exercised by Monitor, under a single organisation could be perceived as giving rise to conflicts of interest. The Bill will therefore ensure the proper management of any such conflicts, and we will work with stakeholders on robust processes that will safeguard the separation of responsibilities and improve transparency. For those reasons, clause 27 seeks to insert new section 13SA, which deals with minimising conflicts between the body’s regulatory and other functions, into the National Health Service Act 2006.

The clause places a duty on NHS England to minimise the risk of conflict or manage any conflicts that arise between its regulatory functions and other functions. In the event that a conflict were to occur, NHS England would be under a duty to resolve or manage that conflict and to ensure appropriate transparency. NHS England must include within its annual report details of such conflicts and how it had complied with its duties to manage them under new section 13SA of the 2006 Act.

Clause 28 amends section 100 of the Health and Social Care Act 2012, which relates to the modification of licence conditions for providers. Licences are the basis by which NHS Improvement and, in future, NHS England set conditions on providers as to the terms on which they can operate. The clause requires that when NHS England makes a major change to the standard licence conditions, as permitted under section 100 of the 2012 Act, it must assess the likely impact of the change or publish a statement explaining why such an assessment is not needed.

The clause also provides that the impact assessment carried out by NHS England must be included in the notice of the modification that is sent to the relevant licence holder and others, as required by section 100(2) of the 2012 Act. This new requirement is intended to make it clearer why NHS England is altering a standard licence condition, which we think is in the interests of providers and the smooth running of the system.

Clause 29 abolishes the NHS TDA and works in harmony with clause 26, which abolishes Monitor and other provisions in the Bill that confer functions on NHS England in relation to providers, in order to merge the two organisations into NHS England to form a single body. In transferring functions that were formerly delegated to the TDA, we have considered the mechanisms and processes associated with those duties and assessed the best fit for the system, to ensure that the relationships already in place are not unduly affected. Clause 29 revokes the directions that established the TDA, and subsections (3) and (4) include consequential amendments that remove references to the TDA. They will no longer be relevant once the TDA is abolished.

Clause 30 makes a consequential amendment to NHS England’s general functions to reflect its oversight of NHS trusts and foundation trusts due to the merger of NHS England and NHS Improvement. The clause ensures a joined-up approach to decision making, allowing NHS England to understand the services required to best serve patients. It amends section 1H of the National Health Service Act 2006 so that for the purpose of discharging its duty to promote a comprehensive health service in England, NHS England must exercise its functions in relation to English NHS trusts and foundation trusts, as well as in relation to ICBs, which will replace the current reference to CCGs, so that services are provided for that purpose.

As part of the merger of NHS England, Monitor and the NHS TDA, and as a consequence of the abolition of Monitor and the NHS Trust Development Authority, clause 31 gives the Secretary of State the power to make schemes to transfer the staff, property, rights and liabilities from Monitor and the TDA to NHS England. These transfer scheme provisions follow a similar protocol used within the Health and Social Care Act 2012 for the transfer of assets, rights or liabilities on the abolition of the National Institute for Clinical Excellence and the Health and Social Care Information Centre. The transfer schemes used then proved effective and efficient, ensuring a smooth transition and no impact on the services they delivered.

Finally, clause 32 contains a regulation-making power that allows the Treasury to vary the way in which any relevant tax has effect in relation to the transfer scheme. Regulations made under this power can be used to ensure that no taxes arise, and that there are no changes to the tax positions of either the transferee or transferor body. It is appropriate to avoid unnecessary tax complications relating to a transfer scheme between public bodies. The types of taxes that can be varied are set out in the clause.

Without this clause, the transfer of assets or liabilities between the bodies mentioned in clause 31—namely Monitor, NHS Trust Development Authority and NHS England—could give rise to unintended tax liabilities. As I have highlighted, this merger has clear benefits and is central to the Government’s plans for establishing a more integrated, responsive and accountable health and care system.

[Justin Madders]

I am grateful to the Minister for his detail on those clauses, which have been very helpfully grouped. Although we have not put forward any amendments, we do want to raise some general concerns—mostly around what these clauses do not do.

As we have heard—although I do not think the Minister used quite the same terminology as we would have—these clauses have got rid of the worst trappings of the market architecture, which were characteristic of the Lansley Act. As we have heard, they enable the merger of NHS England and NHS Improvement, although I do not think that NHS Improvement is actually mentioned anywhere in the Bill. All references are to Monitor and the NHS Trust Development Authority. It is almost as if the Government want us to forget that NHS Improvement ever existed—or probably want us to forget who was chairing it.

The abolition of Monitor sounds another death knell for the Lansley Act, but does leave some of the market mechanisms in place. However, since they were ignored anyway, I can understand why the Government have not bothered to go the whole hog.

Clause 26 finally turns the Monitor off at the mains—although I think it is fair to say that it stopped working some time ago. NHS England is now the undisputed, supreme leader over commissioning and both flavours of providing, so the Bill not only tears up the Lansley reforms but quietly changes the 2003 amendments. Monitor was set up as the regulator of foundation trusts, and was to be the approver of applications to become a foundation trust.

Foundation trusts have had many incarnations, but were once heralded as the vigorous, autonomous new organisations that would shake up the NHS and bring choice and competition into healthcare. They were beyond the reach of those nasty bureaucrats who ran the rest of the NHS. However, as I think we have seen today, it has not quite turned out like that. There must be a clever saying somewhere that “All health service reforms end in failure”, just like all politicians’ careers—although the Minister is clearly an exception to that!

It is fair to say that we are seeing the end of the foundation trust experiment. There is no evidence that the new foundation trust model did any better than the old model. Of course, the first few anointed foundation trusts did outperform non-foundation trusts, but that was because they were already the best-performing trusts. That was why they were allowed to become foundation trusts in the first place. It was, really, a self-fulfilling prophecy, but, as time has moved on, it has been harder and harder for trusts to excel to the level originally envisaged.

Foundation trusts did have some good characteristics; they did have a better go at accountability to their governing bodies. Given this Bill’s focus on involving patients and the public in the wider health system, perhaps this system also has some positives—something to commend it. It might not have been a bad idea to have an equivalent model for the governance of ICBs, but I will not return to that now. I know the Minister has not warmed to our suggestions of greater accountability, but I will leave that for him to consider if he brings forward amendments on Report.

The Lansley Act favoured foundation trusts and made the optimistic—and what turned out to be highly inaccurate—assumption that, in time, all NHS providers would become foundation trusts. As so much happened with that Act, however, it turned out not to be the case at all. Foundation trusts are now no different from the old-school, old-style NHS trusts—a “distinction without a difference”, as Lord Stevens once quipped. For all relevant purposes, NHS trusts and NHS foundation trusts are performance-managed in exactly the same way.

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[Karin Smyth (Bristol South) (Lab)]

My hon. Friend is right in what he says. Given Monitor’s role, NHS Improvement’s role and local scrutiny of what is happening within the system—it is almost independent in some cases—there is a real gap here now. I have called them cartels before, although my hon. Friend will perhaps not use that word. With the absence of Monitor, where is the transparent and independent scrutiny? What is the new regime, and how will that accentuate the patient voice? We have also been unable to highlight how many millions of pounds have been wasted in the intervening years from 2012 with regards to how the previous Act was pushed through, and the terrible waste that has arisen as a result. Surely the patient voice must be really important in holding trusts to account.

[Justin Madders]

I can assure my hon. Friend that I will not waste opportunities to refer to the waste of public money as a result of the Lansley Act, but the wider point is one that the Opposition have made already in Committee and will continue to make. There is clearly a gap where accountability ought to lie. It will be interesting to hear what the Minister says about why the governing model for foundation trusts cannot be expanded to all remaining trusts. We would particularly want to see far greater patient involvement in the integrated care systems in the Bill. Clearly, we have had that debate unsuccessfully, but I hope that we will perhaps have an opportunity to return to it once the Bill returns from the other place.

I will say a few words on the licensing scheme. Given that the Bill marks an end to the whole era of markets and competition and a move, at least in theory, to a model of collaboration and co-operation—not a cartel, as my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol South might call it—why is it necessary to license NHS bodies that are now fully under the control of NHS England and the Secretary of State? That does not seem to be a particularly good use of anyone’s time, and it will create more unnecessary paperwork and bureaucracy.

We will do our best to help the Minister in reducing obstacles to delivering patient care, so we will not oppose these clauses. However, we think that they have probably not gone far enough. They are clearly a necessary tidying-up job, but the Government should do the job fully and properly.

[Edward Argar]

As ever, I am grateful to the shadow Minister. He should be optimistic—perhaps not on this issue, but more broadly—about the reception of some of his suggestions. I think I managed to take him aback slightly last week with one suggestion, although it was perhaps not the one with which he expected me to be willing to engage. I always listen to and consider carefully what he says.

The shadow Minister made a number of points. He mentioned the references to Monitor and TDA and said there are no references to NHS Improvement. That is because NHS Improvement is not the named body in law—that is simply a legal distinction. The named bodies are the NHS TDA and Monitor, which we understand and know as NHS Improvement.

I gently chide the shadow Minister. His reference to the chair of NHS Improvement, Baroness Harding, was a little unmerited. She has worked tirelessly. Colleagues will have their views, as is entirely appropriate in this place, but his reference was uncharacteristically uncharitable.

[Edward Argar]

I believe that all appointments, including that one, are conducted entirely appropriately, in line with Cabinet Office guidance.

I move on to the shadow Minister’s substantive points, which he perhaps made more in hope than anything else. We are not resiling from the value that choice and competition can bring, but we recognise that it is not the only driver of improvement and that collaboration plays a key role, so the position is perhaps a little more nuanced than he might like to suggest or wish to see. What we are seeing here is a reflection of the reality. We are ensuring that the way the system has evolved in practical terms over time is reflected by updating the appropriate legislation.

The shadow Minister mentioned a number of specific points around foundation trusts, and I hope I can give him some reassurance. We are not abolishing foundation trusts or their rights. The licensing system that we are talking about allows for equivalent management of both types of trust in a consistent way, and the NHS will still have the power to authorise new foundation trusts in the future, if they meet the appropriate criteria.

[Justin Madders]

I think the Minister probably has the gist of what I was getting at in my comments. Can he tell us how many applications for foundation trust status are currently in the pipeline?

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[Chris Skidmore]

I think there is a subsection here about how clause 33 relates to clause 19 and the duties on ICBs as the placemaking organisations that can provide the training opportunities for the future. I also think there are great opportunities in the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities for potential further devolution of the skills budget through a mayoral system. That skills budget will already be devolved in some of the metro Mayor areas, so I hope that it will also be devolved across wider areas that do not necessarily have a city population. The Government are clearly looking to fill that gap. Those are also the skill needs of the healthcare population, which is why, when it comes to the duties for the ICBs, I am keen that they take on board the wider non-healthcare resident population, whether in universities, colleges or elsewhere, to bring in expertise on creating training pathways for the future.

Without going off-piste, I think there are future opportunities for more flexible qualifications. We have the lifelong learning allowance. We are looking at how to allow individuals to retrain for the future, creating apprenticeship opportunities, in-work opportunities and course-based opportunities. This is not just about providing nurses and doctors; it is also about allowing nurses to move up the scales and retrain when they are in the NHS, which would help to lower the attrition rate.

Retention is one of the greatest challenges we have—it is not only about training—and I am sure that the intention of clause 33 is also to get to grips with retaining the 20% of the workforce who leave over a five-year cycle. It would do so much better if it took into account statistics consistent with the Office for Budget Responsibility’s long-term fiscal projections and if we were able to look at the needs of the population. That is what subsection 2(b) of my amendment suggests—looking at workforce numbers

“based on the projected health and care needs of the population”

as well as the demographic numbers of the workforce.

The amendment suggests a number of organisations that should be able to contribute to the report, including health and care employers. I return to the point that the care sector is not reflected in clause 33, and it really should be. Trade unions also play a vital role in identifying needs; that may be strange coming from a Conservative MP and I may disagree politically with unions, but they have the data and the opportunity to provide feedback from their members, which is really important. I have mentioned the royal colleges in discussions on previous amendments. Universities are critical for identifying ways of integrating healthcare and education practices. I also suggest

“any other persons deemed necessary for the preparation of the report, taking full account of workforce intelligence…and plans provided by local organisations and partners of integrated care boards.”

The amendment would therefore allow for place-based opportunities, as the hon. Member for Bristol South has said, in delivering on the clause’s workforce planning.

I do not intend to push the amendment to a vote. It is a probing amendment, which I hope the Minister will take seriously, especially given the length of time the issue was discussed in the oral evidence sessions.

I am sure all Members have received briefing packs from various organisations. Clause 33 comes up as one of the priorities. The organisations’ intentions are not vexatious; they are not raising the issue to make a campaign point against the Government. The tone of the Bill is one of collaboration and partnership. As was mentioned in the oral evidence sessions and the early sittings of the Committee, the Bill is unique. It is not a top-down reorganisation—it is filling in the jigsaw puzzle that has been constructed from below upwards, providing the legislative cherry on the top of a cake that has already been baked by local healthcare communities who know what they need. What they need is certainty on workforce planning. The Bill provides the legislative certainty of consistency at national level that will trickle down to local level.

I urge the Minister to listen to the requests for more frequent reporting on workforce planning, better use of data in producing the report and a widening of opportunities to be partners in that report. The Minister and Department have done a fantastic job in allowing the partnership model to evolve. We have moved away from institutional top-down accountability, where there was a competitive spirit between institutions. We have broken that down; the ICPs and ICBs now provide an opportunity for greater partnership working, for the benefit of patients and the outcomes that need to be delivered. This is the missing piece in the legislation.

We need to move workforce needs to a partnership model and away from the top-down approach that clause 33 very much suggests. The Secretary of State holds all the cards on the planning of the report and does not even necessarily have to work with NHS England or Health Education England. In the spirit of the Bill, I urge the Minister to open up the clause and consider the proposal in amendment 94 on Report or in the other place. It is an important change that would make the Bill even better. I urge him to give it due consideration.

[Justin Madders]

I will speak to amendment 94 and the other amendments in my name and the names of my hon. Friends, since they are grouped together and we are clearly all talking about the same thing. There is probably only a cigarette paper between many elements of these amendments and, I hope, the Minister’s position when we get to the end of the debate.

One reason why there are so many amendments and they are all fairly similar is that it was clear from the evidence sessions that this is one of the few areas on which there was complete agreement among the witnesses. Clause 33 is simply nowhere near good enough. Given the importance of workforce issues, which is the most crucial issue facing our NHS and social care system—as the right hon. Member for Kingswood mentioned, social care must be included within this—it is strange that we have really quite a tepid offering in the Bill.

It feels as though the whole question of workforce is firmly in the Department’s “too difficult” box. It knows it has to do something; it knows that without the tremendous efforts of the staff the NHS would simply collapse, but rather than coming up with an effective strategy, it has produced this fig leaf of a clause to create the impression that the issue is being taken seriously and dealt with.

[Edward Argar]

It is now in my inbox.

[Justin Madders]

It is now in the Minister’s inbox, and he will know that what is currently in the Bill does not cut it in terms of the challenges we face. As I often do, I place on record our thanks and admiration for the whole NHS workforce, for turning from theory into reality an organisation that demonstrates the benefits of collectivism and socialism and is one of the nation’s proudest achievements—I certainly expect the Minister to agree with the latter part of that sentiment, if not the former.

I have said this many times before, and I will say it again: without its workforce, the NHS is nothing. It is not only the doctors and nurses, but all the others who contribute to the delivery of a comprehensive and universal service, free at the point of use: the radiographers, the porters, the cleaners and the allied health professionals. I will not list them all, but we should acknowledge that a number of different people contribute towards even the most straightforward engagement with a patient, and we are grateful for each and every one of them and the service they give.

I briefly refer hon. Members to the report by the Health and Social Care Committee on workforce burnout and resilience. It conducted an inquiry into the issue and found that staff shortages were

“ultimately the biggest driver of burnout.”

It was presented with much evidence from staff about feelings of low energy or exhaustion, increased mental distance from or negative feelings about the job, and reduced professional effectiveness. Excessive workload was identified as the key predictor of staff stress, workers’ intention to quit and patient dissatisfaction, and was also highly associated with the level of errors.

I draw this Committee’s attention to some of the conclusions in the report. Paragraph 22 states:

“It is clear from our witnesses that although the People Plan presents comprehensive ambition to address the failings in the culture of the NHS, and address the needs and wellbeing of NHS staff, its delivery will depend on the level of resourcing allocated to these priorities. Without adequate funding the laudable aspirations of the People Plan will not become reality.”

Paragraph 23 states:

“We recommend that the Department publishes regular, costed updates along with delivery timelines for all of the proposals in the People Plan.”

That is something we are trying to turn into reality with our amendments.

Turning to the specifics of amendment 40, paragraph 24 of the Select Committee report states:

“The absence of a People Plan for social care serves only to widen the disparity in recognition and support for the social care components of health and social care. The Government should rectify this as a matter of urgency in their upcoming work to reform the social care sector; and it is essential that it is included in the social care reforms promised this year.”

Some reforms have been promised, but we still await the further White Paper on integration, which we have touched on many times.

“The adult social care workforce has stepped up to the plate during the pandemic. They deserve the same care and attention that the People Plan pledges to NHS colleagues.”

We wholeheartedly agree with the sentiments stated there.

--- Later in debate ---

[Edward Argar]

I am grateful to all the hon. Members for tabling the amendments. They relate to increasing the Government’s accountability for assessing workforce planning and setting workforce projections. Before I turn to their substance, as the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston suspected, I entirely agree with the latter half of his sentiment about the achievement that is the NHS. I am not sure I would necessarily attribute that to unbridled socialism, which tends to fail where it is tried. However, as Opposition Members will know and as set out well in the book written about Nye Bevan by their right hon. Friend the Member for Torfaen (Nick Thomas-Symonds), which I re-read over the weekend, the genesis of the NHS was a complex one, which owed much to all parties in the House.

[Justin Madders]

I am glad the Minister has time to be reading such excellent tomes over the weekend. Can he remind us what the Conservative party did when voting on the original National Health Service Act 1946?

[Edward Argar]

Could the hon. Gentleman remind me what the Labour party did when in government, resulting in the resignation of the architect of the NHS?

The point I make is a serious one. The genesis of the NHS which, quite rightly, we are all proud of and recognise as a great achievement, is far from as simple as sometimes it might be portrayed by both parties in the House. The hon. Gentleman is right to highlight the fact that while the new hospitals we are building, the developments in drugs and therapeutics, and the new technology and new kit are all hugely important, they are limbs of the NHS. Its beating heart is its workforce and he is right to highlight that. I join with him, as I often do on these occasions, in paying tribute to all those who make up that beating heart.

Continuing to grow the workforce remains a top priority for the Government. Although I may disappoint some hon. Members, I am genuinely grateful to those who tabled amendments and spoke to them today, because this is a crucial debate, and I suspect the matter will continue to be raised, not just during the passage of the Bill but, rightly, more broadly. As ever, I am grateful to my right hon. Friend the Member for Kingswood, who brings a high degree of expertise to this subject, as the only hon. Member or right hon. Member to have occupied both the office that I now occupy and that of Minister of State for Universities, Science, Research and Innovation. He brings to the Bill the perspective he has gained from both those offices.

When I got this job back in September 2019, which seems like an age ago, I was responsible for workforce for a few months, until that responsibility was taken on by my hon. Friend the Member for Faversham and Mid Kent (Helen Whately) at the beginning of 2020. One of my first visits was to the University of Lincoln, which had just opened its medical school. That medical school had been campaigned for very hard by my hon. Friend the Member for Lincoln (Karl MᶜCartney), who was out of office at the time, and by the then Opposition Member for Lincoln.

The hon. Member for Bristol South is absolutely right to highlight the importance of local medical schools. Lincolnshire, for example, has a challenge in attracting and retaining a workforce. We are already in the early stages of seeing a growing workforce of people there who are likely to start their careers in Lincoln. When I visited, my right hon. Friend the Member for Kingswood was remembered with fondness. I did not take it personally that they almost seemed disappointed to see me and not him, but that is a reflection of the affection in which he is held and the respect for him in this sector.

As the shadow Minister rightly said, yesterday I again resumed responsibility for the NHS workforce and I look forward to working with him constructively on these matters, which is the way we tend to work. We will consider the role that all stakeholders can play in identifying the needs and opportunities around the workforce. I always value input and I echo the words of my right hon. Friend, which I hope will find favour with the shadow Minister, that that includes input from professional bodies, think-tanks, NHS bodies and the trade unions. There may be times when we disagree, but I look forward to working with all of them constructively and courteously, as I do with the shadow Minister.

This year, we have seen record numbers of nurses and doctors working in the NHS, and the total number of NHS staff has increased to almost 1.2 million. There are over 17,800—2.9%—more professionally qualified clinical staff working in NHS trusts and clinical commissioning groups than in June 2020, including over 2,700, or 2.3%, more doctors and over 8,900 more nurses.

We continue to make good progress towards meeting our manifesto commitment of 50,000 more nurses by March 2024. Encouragingly for future workforce supply, applications for nursing and midwifery courses in England were up 21% this year compared with last year, and we have seen the highest number of students accepting places in the past 10 years. Through Health Education England, we will continue to invest in the NHS and social care workforces, and an additional duty is not required for this to happen.

I will not repeat the point that the shadow Minister very kindly made about the July commission. I will certainly look into the status of the response to that report. He will recognise that even when we do not agree, which is not that often, although there are such times, I endeavour to be efficient and courteous in responding to such matters, so I look forward to picking up on that with my new responsibilities.

[Justin Madders]

I certainly did not intend to upbraid him for not responding, given that he took over responsibility only yesterday. He will be aware of the importance of the report and of an official response.

[Edward Argar]

I am, of course, and I reassure the hon. Gentleman that prior to the reshuffle I was looking at a number of issues related to the recovery of our workforce. A fit, healthy and supportive workforce is crucial to that. I have read and considered the report, and, with my new responsibility, I will endeavour as swiftly as I can to ensure that the Government respond as appropriate to the Committee, and to Committee reports more broadly, in a timely fashion.

We believe that the proposed duty in clause 33, which inserts proposed new section 1GA into the National Health Service Act 2006 in order to require the Secretary of State to produce a workforce accountability report at least every five years, addresses one of the main issues in the current system: the need for greater transparency and accountability for the various bodies involved in the workforce planning process in England. The proposal in the Bill is to ensure that there are proper structures and accountability for ensuring that the necessary workplace planning and projections are carried out and co-ordinated effectively by the various bodies in the system. For example, the report will set out the role and responsibilities of the new ICBs and how they will support the delivery of effective local and national workplace planning.

Draft guidance issued by NHS England, which covers the role of ICBs regarding the workforce, sets out the direction of travel in that regard. It sets out the ICBs’ responsibility to develop system-wide plans to address current and future workforce supply for the local area, with demand and supply planning based on population health needs. The guidance also refers to their responsibility to provide workforce data to regional and national workforce teams in order to support aggregated workforce planning and to inform prioritisation of workforce initiatives and investment decisions.

I fear that my remarks may be a little more lengthy than usual, but I think that that reflects the importance and breadth of this issue. Turning to the other amendments in the group, amendment 2 would require the Secretary of State to publish the report on assessing and meeting the workforce need annually, rather than at a minimum of every five years. I acknowledge the witnesses’ comments, which the shadow Minister has rightly highlighted, but we need to be a little cautious. We cannot predict all future evolution and needs, which is why we have mandated the report to be published at a minimum of every five years. That flexibility allows us to provide an updated report in order to reflect any changes to roles and responsibilities earlier than the statutory required period, if necessary, but requiring an annual report would impose an unnecessarily prescriptive and, I fear, rigid arrangement on the production of this document and would be disproportionate to the level of change in roles and responsibilities that we expect to see in the system on an annual basis. I therefore suspect that it is a matter for debate as to what the most appropriate timescale is—we have therefore set a minimum period, rather than a maximum period.

Amendment 40 seeks to go further than our current duty on reporting workforce accountabilities, by requiring the report to set out the system in place for assessing and meeting workforce needs, both of the health service and of social care. As the shadow Minister has alluded to, and as he and I agree, our 1.5 million-strong social care workforce is an absolutely essential and valued part of the social care system and, indeed, our broader healthcare system in this country. Social care workers are on the frontline, caring for and supporting people at the heart of their communities.

I understand the intention behind the amendment, but I fear that we will not be able to accept it today. The scope of clause 33 as it stands has been carefully drafted to ensure that it reflects the statutory role and responsibility of HEE, which will assist in the production of the report. As a result, the workforce accountabilities report will cover the NHS in England, including primary, secondary and community care; the regulated adult social care workforce where sections of the workforce are shared between health and social care—for example, registered nurses and occupational therapists; and the regulated public health workforce, including doctors and other regulated healthcare professions. Regulated professionals in adult social care are therefore already included in the scope of the report, but HEE has no specific remit for the wider, unregulated adult social care workforce. I can reassure the Committee, however, that the Government are working hard to bring forward a White Paper for adult social care. As the shadow Minister rightly alluded to—he repeated his comments, so I will repeat mine—the proposal set out by the Prime Minister will build on the strong foundations for reform and integration that will be laid through the Bill.

[Justin Madders]

I will not tempt the Minister to tell us what will be in that, but his confidence that it will be an improvement on the current position is noted. Does he anticipate that the White Paper will also include a very clear commitment to a workforce strategy, along the lines that we have discussed?

[Edward Argar]

I do not know whether the shadow Minister has seen what I was about to say, but after two years of doing this together, he has become relatively psychic. I anticipate that the White Paper will set out in detail how we propose to fund social care professionalisation, as well as initiatives or plans to improve workforce wellbeing and further reforms to improve social care recruitment and support.

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[The Chair]

Is everyone content that amendment 94 be withdrawn?

[Justin Madders]

I would just like to say a few words about amendments 40 to 42, if that is acceptable, Mrs Murray. We wish to press amendments 40 and 41 to a vote, with your permission. It is clear from the evidence that there is a demand for something to be done. It is interlinked with patient safety and cannot be ignored. Our main concern is: if we do not do this now, when will we?

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment proposed: 40, in clause 33, page 40, line 7, leave out ‘the health service’ and insert ‘health and social care services’—(Justin Madders.)

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish a report on assessing and meeting the workforce need for both health and social care services.

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[Edward Argar]

I will endeavour not to be on my feet at that moment.

Clause 33 inserts new section 1GA into the National Health Service Act 2006, which sets out a duty on the Secretary of State to report on workforce systems. Under the duty, the Secretary of State is required to publish, at least once every five years, a report describing the system in place for assessing and meeting the workforce needs of the health service in England. A duty is also placed on HEE and NHS England to assist in the preparation of the report, if asked by the Secretary of State to do so.

As we have discussed this morning, the report will describe the workforce planning and supply system for healthcare workers, including those working in the NHS and public health, alongside regulated healthcare professionals working in social care and other sectors in England. The report will be published at a minimum—I emphasise in each of my remarks that word “minimum”, although the shadow Minister may feel that it is not sufficient—of every five years. However, I can commit to that publication cycle being kept under review by the Secretary of State, should circumstances change.

Clause 33 will provide greater clarity and transparency on how the workforce planning and supply system operates in England. The report produced under it will describe in one single document the workforce planning and supply roles and responsibilities of relevant national bodies, including the Department, HEE and NHS England, the new integrated care boards and individual employers, and how they work together in practice at national, regional and local levels.

Clause 33 will complement our ongoing non-legislative steps and investment in workforce planning in England. In July 2021, the Department commissioned HEE to work with partners to review longer-term strategic trends for the health and social care workforce. This important programme will review, renew and update the existing long-term strategic framework for the health workforce—HEE’s framework 15—and will genuinely help to ensure that we have the right numbers, skills, values and behaviours to deliver world-leading clinical services and continued high standards of care.

Alongside the work that we are already doing with NHS England and HEE, clause 33 will further improve accountability for all the bodies involved on the important subject of planning for and meeting future workforce supply and demand.

[Justin Madders]

I will not detain the Committee for long; I have said more than enough on the subject—not persuasively, clearly.

The Minister made the point that I did not think that a minimum of five years was sufficient for a report on the workforce, and that is absolutely correct—and I am not alone, by any stretch of the imagination. Every stakeholder and every person who gave evidence to the Committee said that five years was simply insufficient to deal with the magnitude of the challenge that we face. If the Department really wants to grasp the nettle, it should be taking heed of what those stakeholders said.

The workforce is a very complicated and ever-changing issue. It is part of a world market in healthcare staff. What the right hon. Member for Kingswood said about his amendment was important: simply to dip into other parts of the world when we are running short is not a solution. Not only is it morally difficult to justify, but it does not represent a long-term solution—we are as prone to losing staff to other parts of the world as anyone else. People will remember that the junior doctors’ dispute resulted in an exodus to Australia and other parts of the world. Going around the world and dipping into other countries’ healthcare resources is not a solution to the challenges that we face. We are not going to divide the Committee on clause 33, but we think that it is insufficient.

I repeat the Health and Social Care Committee’s finding that

“workforce planning was at best opaque and at worst was responsible for unacceptable pressure on staff.”

That really cannot be ignored. We cannot keep kicking the can down the road. I hope that when the clause gets to the other place, there is more success in putting the onus on the Government to deal with the challenge.

[Edward Argar]

I hear what the shadow Minister says, and I hope that I can give him some reassurance: the Government will continue to reflect very carefully on the points made both in the debate today and in our evidence session.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 33 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Steve Double.)

Health and Care Bill (Tenth sitting)

Justin Madders Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 21st September 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Edward Argar]

The shadow Minister has made a number of serious points—I am not sure how one spins the wheels when the car is stalled, but none the less I took his point. First, at the heart of this Bill is the fact that we seek to strike the appropriate balance between what is clearly a national health service, accountable to the Secretary of State and Parliament, and local flexibilities and local integration. The debate we will have for the next two hours or so will probably be about whether we have struck that balance appropriately, but that is the core of what we are seeking to do here.

The hon. Gentleman rightly talked about the importance of local authorities in this space. He and I share a common view on that, and he is right: one of the few things in the 2012 Act that I suspect he would have agreed with was the recognition of the public health function of local authorities. We are not seeking to do anything in the Bill to undermine that function in any way. It will not surprise the hon. Gentleman to know that I believe that the Bill provides for multiple layers of integration. Within a local NHS system, at an ICB level and then at an integrated care partnership level, there will be increased integration with local authorities and others, laying the foundations for the ambitious programme that the Prime Minister set out when he spoke earlier in this Session about the health and care levy.

The hon. Gentleman spoke about combined authorities. My recollection—I may be wrong—is that they date to about 2016, rather than 2012, and my understanding of the power is that it does not go against what he was saying, but provides for the continued evolution of the system and enables that delegation to take place. In practical terms, I would envisage that, where local authorities combine and work together, they would have their own arrangements, and we are not seeking to cut across those local working arrangements.

The hon. Gentleman also talked about the ICBs, saying that they are NHS bodies and asking whether this is a threat to local authority delegation of public health functions. My reading of that is that, as I mentioned in my opening remarks on these clauses, there are some public health functions that are NHS and delegated through CCGs, such as GPs participating in child immunisation programmes—hence the reference to ICBs, because they will be replacing CCGs in the new world.

Understandably, the hon. Gentleman talked about funding for public health. On his comments about the bigger picture on funding and spending levels more broadly, I simply remind him of the note left by a previous Chief Secretary to the Treasury:

“I’m afraid there is no money.”

We cannot get away from that context in this space, but more broadly he is right to highlight the importance of public health. The past 18 months have shone a light on public health; under Governments of all political complexions, public health has not always enjoyed that prominence in public debate, external media and other commentary. One thing that I hope will follow on from the terrible events we have endured over the past 18 months is a greater understanding and appreciation of public health and its measures, and for public health to enjoy the support it needs to do its job. I think all Members would agree that one of the few positives has been the recognition of the value of public health and prevention.

I think that those were the main points that the hon. Gentleman raised. I see these clauses as permitting a further evolution of the system and a recognition of the need, ideally, where we can, to further delegate powers from the Secretary of State to lower down within the system. On that basis, I hope the hon. Gentleman and his colleagues will feel able to support the clauses.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 34 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 35 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 36

Power of direction: investigation functions

[Justin Madders (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab)]

I beg to move amendment 108, in clause 36, page 42, line 33, at end insert—

“(10) Nothing in subsection (2) supersedes Part 4 of the Health and Care Act 2021.”

This amendment will ensure nothing in new section 7D of the NHS Act 2006 about the Secretary of State’s powers to direct HSSIB supersedes what is in part 4 of the Bill.

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Mr McCabe, and to see the Minister back again. We heard about his increased workload this morning; I also saw him on the Treasury Bench during the urgent question. I wonder where he finds the time—he should speak to his trade union rep if he feels there are too many demands being placed on his time. We will do our best to ensure that this afternoon is as stress-free for him as possible; if he accepts our amendments, that will go some way towards enabling that.

I will not speak for long on amendment 108 because we will be talking extensively about the Healthcare Safety Investigation Branch later on in the Bill. Concerns have been expressed in briefings received by the Committee and in evidence about some of the relevant provisions in the Bill, particularly on access to information. Clause 36 looks at the proposed power over bodies that have investigatory powers, which include HSSIB. It is difficult for us to accept the clause as it stands without having gone through all the details on HSSIB, because we cannot possibly know whether our concerns will be resolved about how it will operate in practice. That is why we have put forward amendment 108.

The amendment would ensure that the powers in clause 36 do not in any way impede the important principle that HSSIB will be an independent body established by the Bill. In conjunction with further amendments, which we will no doubt get to in part 4, we can all be confident that HSSIB’s independence is sacrosanct. That is important for not just us as parliamentarians, but everyone within the NHS who may have reason to come across HSSIB. It is also important for patients, of course, because they will ultimately be the judges of whether HSSIB has been a success. It would be helpful to understand what the approach will be in relation to maternity investigations. HSSIB has a potentially important role in identifying how providers can sustainably and systematically improve the quality of such investigations and then provide appropriate support. However, ensuring proper accountability, clarity and independence remain important, and this amendment seeks to ensure that those matters are enshrined on the face of the Bill.

[Edward Argar]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman; I made it in rather slower time down to the Chamber to listen to the statement. After one of our sittings last week, I think the hon. Member for Nottingham North was on his feet asking a question in the Chamber before I had even made it out of this room, which shows a certain speed that I can only seek to emulate.

I appreciate that the amendment is linked to the independence of the Health Services Safety Investigation Body. The Government are clear that HSSIB will be independent, which is why it is being set up as a non-departmental public body, with a chief executive—to be known as the chief investigator—and executive and non-executive members. I hope I can reassure hon. Members that clause 36 is a temporary measure to ensure that the current Healthcare Safety Investigation Branch can continue to exist in the interim phase before the new body is established.

As I am sure hon. Members are aware, the merger of NHS England and NHS Improvement means that the NHS Trust Development Authority, of which the Healthcare Safety Investigation Branch is a part, will be abolished. We need the important investigation function that the Healthcare Safety Investigation Branch provides to continue until HSSIB is fully operational which, subject to parliamentary approval, is planned for spring 2023.

The power set out in clause 36 is designed to enable the Secretary of State to direct NHS England, or another public body, to carry out the investigation function in the interim period. I reassure hon. Members that the HSSIB will be independent. Clause 36 is not designed to infringe upon its independence and cannot be used to direct the new HSSIB in how it exercises its functions; it is there simply to ensure the continuity of current investigations until the 2023 start date. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston to consider not pressing the amendment to a vote.

[Justin Madders]

I am reassured to some extent by the Minister’s words, but we have seen over the past 18 months that temporary powers do have a habit of becoming rather more permanent than was originally intended. I think it would be perfectly possible for the Government to include some sort of sunset clause to ensure that the intentions set out by the Minister are adhered to, but we may come back to that. As things stand, we maintain our criticisms, and it would be remiss of us not to push this matter to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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[Alex Norris]

The Minister rightly pointed out my mixed metaphor, so I will undertake to avoid metaphors in this contribution. It is hard not to feel like an undercard to the main event here—that is a simile, of course, rather than a metaphor, and I gave no such undertaking on similes.

I might surprise the Minister by agreeing with bits of what he said: we do not intend to divide the Committee on clause 37 and we do think that there is an important distinction between the powers in clauses 37 and 38, which I think will come out in the debate. However, if we went out to Parliament Square now and straw-polled people walking by, asking them who they thought was responsible for the NHS in England at a national level, I think we would wait a very long time before anyone gave any answer other than the Government and, by extension, the Secretary of State.

[Justin Madders]

And the Minister.

[Alex Norris]

And of course the Minister, through appropriate delegation, and we are all the better for it. The Minister can quote me on that—but not on a political leaflet, as that would be very challenging for me.

Covid has shown that the public think that the politicians they elect are accountable for the decisions taken in the interests of their health, however they might manifest in ordinary life, so I think the repeal of the duty to promote autonomy, set out in clause 62, probably follows inevitably from that. We want an expert-run health service that works together and follows the best available evidence and science, not one that is unaccountable and diverges from the interests and expectations of the public at large.

That leads me nicely to clause 37. It is possibly a tautology to say that if someone is held responsible for something, they ought to have responsibility for it, as the clause set outs. To put that bluntly, with more than £100 billion of spending—40% of the Government’s revenue budget—going into that area, people will expect political accountability. If NHS England is not seen to be acting in the public interest at the highest possible levels, there ought to be a mechanism, by exception, to correct that. It is the exceptional part that is really important.

That is defined negatively in the clause by what the Secretary of State may not do—for example, hiring or firing an individual, which I think is right, or directing the healthcare of a specific person. I do not think the Secretary of State would want to be in that position with important cases of individuals who are in the public sphere, or have the ability to act outside NICE guidelines on drugs or treatment, as happens in such cases. I do not think that is a good system, hard though it may be when prominent cases come to our attention.

That gives us a common-sense reading of what these clauses provide for the Secretary of State. Yes, the buck stops with the Secretary of State and his political colleagues as a collective if there are major failings in the health service or major failings of Government and of leadership, but the clause does not give Ministers carte blanche to pick and choose—undoubtedly with political pressures in mind—whether to involve themselves in the detailed running of the service. I think that will be covered in clause 38.

A concern raised by the Nuffield Trust in evidence was that there should be a stronger mechanism by which such decisions can be scrutinised. Will the Minister address that? I heard what he said about publication of information about the Secretary of State’s decisions, but why not provide for a parliamentary mechanism by which decisions could be scrutinised? That would ensure public confidence that there is no Executive overreach or direction at a low level of how our healthcare service operates, which I do not think would be at all desirable. I hope that the Minister will address that in his remarks.

[Karin Smyth (Bristol South) (Lab)]

I would like the Committee to take a moment to mourn the loss of the principle of autonomy as a guiding driver of the health service over some 20-plus years. That principle is part not just of the Lansley reforms, but of previous Labour reforms, and indeed of reforms by the Government before that. The idea was that the system would become more efficient and responsive with more autonomous units, rather than a great mass of health authorities, hospitals and systems that are rarely understood by local people, and that the competition of autonomous units would drive financial and service efficiency, for example. This is quite a moment, and I do not think we should just let it pass.

When I was a member of a primary care trust, which I may have shared earlier, our local region had “earned autonomy.” That meant that if we did certain things particularly well—bringing waiting times and waiting lists down, or fulfilling financial balance requirements, for example—the local team, board and chief executive would earn more autonomy to do more. In modern parlance, things became more permissive, and they were trusted to do something.

[Justin Madders]

I am a little confused, because my hon. Friend is talking about the end of autonomy, but everything we have heard from the Government is about how permissive the Bill is and how it will leave people free to make their own decisions. I must be missing the point somewhere, mustn’t I?

[Karin Smyth]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for making that point, which we will come on to when we discuss the following clauses. If there is no autonomy, but we are trying to be permissive, we come back to the vexed issue that the Minister alluded to earlier: where the balance lies between national and local accountability. We will come to that in further clauses.

I will not long mourn the loss of autonomy—I am not sure it really worked—but it is a principle for people to locally manage the units. As I said in relation to financial management in a previous session, if it is very clear that a chief executive or a finance director has responsibility for their bottom line, that drives a certain amount of focus and responsibility. I find it a little extraordinary for the Conservative party to be promoting the lack of autonomy. I hope hon. Members will take a moment to reflect on the seismic change we now have in the direction of our public services and the next era of the NHS.

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[Edward Argar]

If I may, I will turn to the amendments first and then the substantive clause. I am grateful to hon. Members for tabling the amendments. I said that the previous clause was coming to the main business of the afternoon, but I now suspect that was but an hors d’oeuvre to the discussion we may have on this clause and this set of amendments.

Amendments 102 and 103 would require the Secretary of State to consult all relevant health overview and scrutiny committees before making a decision on a reconfiguration. Amendment 103 would also require the Secretary of State to have regard to, and publish, clinical advice from the ICB’s medical director. It is of course vital that local views are represented in any reconfiguration. However, although I understand the rationale behind these amendments, I do not think they are strictly necessary. The new power will not replace the important role that local scrutiny and engagement plays in service change decisions; we expect the vast majority of reconfiguration decisions to continue to be managed by the local system, and system players will be encouraged to resolve matters locally where possible.

The Secretary of State will continue to be advised by the Independent Reconfiguration Panel, which is being retained. The focus of the IRP is and will continue to be the patient and quality of care in the context of safe, sustainable and accessible services for local people. It has also provided the system with advice based on its experience to date around critical success factors.

If I may go down a slight rabbit hole here, I would like to put on the record my appreciation for the work of the IRP. Certainly during my tenure in this post, I have consulted it and seen its advice on a number of occasions, and I am grateful for the work its staff do, the speed with which they do it and the benefit I have gained from that advice in making decisions or advising the Secretary of State on particular decisions.

In practice, the Secretary of State will always need to seek appropriate advice from clinicians, local leaders or other experts before making any decision, and all decisions made using the powers inserted by clause 38 and schedule 6 must be published. This will ensure transparency and allow for proper scrutiny of the way the power is being used.

Schedule 6 also includes the requirement for NHS commissioning bodies, including integrated care boards, to give the Secretary of State any information or other assistance required to carry out any functions under the schedule. It is envisioned that the Secretary of State will obtain information from NHS commissioning bodies when making reconfiguration decisions. This will include any representations that an HOSC, stakeholder, patient group or any other interested party have made, if applicable.

All decision making on reconfigurations, at both local and ministerial level, will continue to be guided by the four tests laid out in existing guidance that reconfiguration should be assured against: strong public and patient engagement; consistency with current and prospective need for patient choice; a clear clinical evidence base; and support for proposals from clinical commissioners.

As such, we believe that clause 38 and the guidance that the Secretary of State is required to produce under the powers in schedule 6 will provide sufficient safeguards to ensure that the Secretary of State receives appropriate advice before using the powers in this clause. As a result of not accepting amendment 103, we will also resist amendment 102, which is consequential on amendment 103.

Amendment 104 would require the Secretary of State to publish, alongside any decision they have made under this provision, a statement demonstrating that the decision is in the public interest. The Secretary of State is accountable to Parliament for all his or her decisions. Ministers are expected, as a core principle of the constitution, to act in the public interest, and this is reflected in the ministerial code. In addition, the Secretary of State’s scrutiny and direction-making process on this and any other matter must already take into account the public law decision-making principles, all relevant information and their legal duties, including the public sector equality duty, that adhere to such decisions.

The Secretary of State is also under a number of duties set out in the National Health Service Act 2006, including a duty to promote a comprehensive health service, to secure continuous improvement in quality of services, and to have regard to the NHS constitution. As I have already set out, the Secretary of State will continue to be advised by the IRP, and will seek appropriate advice from clinicians, local leaders or other experts.

As for paragraph 4 of schedule 6, the Secretary of State already has a duty to publish any decision they make on a reconfiguration and to notify the NHS commissioning body of the decision. For those reasons, I urge the hon. Member for Nottingham North to withdraw his amendment—I suspect that I will be unsuccessful in that plea, but I make it none the less.

I will now address clause 38 and schedule 6. The clause inserts proposed new section 68A and proposed new schedule 10A into the National Health Service Act 2006. It also introduces schedule 6, which includes a new intervention power to allow the Secretary of State to call in a reconfiguration of NHS services at any stage of the process, without the need for a referral from a local authority. A reconfiguration of NHS services is a change in service provision that has an impact on the manner in which a service is delivered at the point at which the service is received by the user, or the range of health services available to individuals. That could be, for example, a change in where a mental health in-patient unit is based, building a new stroke unit, or restructuring a whole hospital trust.

The new intervention power will enable the Secretary of State to act as a scrutineer and decision maker for reconfigurations, to intervene where, for example, they can see a critical benefit or cost to taking one or other course of action, or to take action where there is significant cause for public concern. We do not expect or intend to use the power with any regularity, and where it is used, it will be done so transparently. As I have emphasised, the Secretary of State must publish any decisions made about reconfigurations.

Schedule 6 sets out the scope of the reconfiguration powers as they pertain to NHS commissioning bodies, NHS services, NHS trusts and foundation trusts. It introduces a new duty for the relevant NHS bodies to notify the Secretary of State of any proposed or likely reconfiguration. The Secretary of State will be able to take any decision that could have been taken by the NHS commissioning body. That includes the ability for the Secretary of State to decide whether a proposal should proceed, the results the NHS commissioning body should achieve, and the procedural steps that should be taken. As I set out earlier, decision making will continue to be guided by the four reconfigurations tests. The new power will not replace the important role that local scrutiny and engagement play in service change decisions.

As the shadow Minister set out, the public expect Ministers to be accountable for the health service, which includes reconfigurations of it. The clause ensures that decisions made in the NHS that affect all our constituents are subject to democratic oversight. Without it, the Secretary of State’s ability to intervene and take decisions will remain limited, often coming at the end of a long local process. As now, he would not be alerted to a potential change in services until the change became an issue and he would remain powerless to intervene without a formal referral by a local authority.

I am conscious that that existing arrangement satisfies few in Parliament, including Opposition Members, on the occasions when they make representations about the process. However, it will be for this debate to see whether Members feel that the proposed new arrangement satisfies them—I will not prejudge that for a minute, looking at the faces of the Opposition Members. I therefore commend clause 38 and schedule 6 to the Committee.

[Justin Madders]

I congratulate the Minister on his valiant attempts to defend the powers that he wishes the clause and schedule 6 to give his boss.

The Opposition are pretty realistic and do not think that the clause will survive the parliamentary process in its current form. It would save a lot of time if the Minister was to indicate now that he had taken note of the many concerns expressed and that things will change. However, as the clause remains on the face of the Bill, we will have to go through the long and important reasons why it will not be able to stand in its existing form. The Minister will continue to defend the indefensible until it no longer needs to be defended.

We have heard evidence as to why the powers in the clause are not needed and, indeed, why the Secretary of State would not want such powers. Again, we are trying to help the Minister and his Department out by pointing out some of the pitfalls. The clause really is the total antithesis of everything this Bill is supposed to be. The Minister has told us many times that he wants to take a permissive approach, but the truth, as exposed by this clause, is that being permissive is okay until it is not, and then we have the power grab, the micromanagement and the sound of bedpans dropping all the way up to the Secretary of State’s desk. That is the logical conclusion of the clause.

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[Edward Argar]

I fear we may not have consensus in Committee at this point, but none the less I will endeavour to answer some of the points raised. I am always grateful to the shadow Minister for his kind offers of help and assistance, and he will know that I always reflect carefully on the evidence we have heard and on the opinions of hon. Members on both sides of the House. I welcome his welcoming of the publication of the impact assessment in time for him to be able to quote it back at me. Finally, I thank him for his heartfelt and kindly offer of alternative approaches, given his concern for my workload were these proposals to be approved. I am touched on a number of levels by that, and equally by his suggestion that I and others have been engaged in the dark arts of spin—heaven forbid.

In the context of clause 38 and these amendments, right hon. and hon. Members, including my right hon. Friend the Member for Kingswood, have raised a number of important points that bear further reflection. As we have said throughout this process, the challenge with this Bill is striking the right balance between being permissive and ensuring accountability at a national level, and we believe this clause plays a key part in doing so. I disagree with the shadow Minister’s view—although I respect it—that the clause does not strike the right balance, and I do not believe that the powers set out in it are disproportionate, as he has suggested. He has highlighted the role of the IRP. I mentioned my gratitude for its work in my opening remarks, and I was very clear that that work will continue. The IRP will continue to give the valuable advice it has given thus far.

I do not believe that the notification requirements will prove unduly onerous: a notification can be a very simple process. To the shadow Minister’s point about timeliness, process and definitions, we are working very closely with the NHS and other partners to produce guidance that will set out clear expectations about how and when the powers will be used, and how they will be exercised. In his remarks, he touched on a concern that Ministers might be beset by lobbying from the public and others. I would argue that such lobbying would clearly point to greater public engagement with such matters and increased transparency, which are things that we might welcome. For fear of upsetting my hon. Friend the Whip, the Member for St Austell and Newquay, I will pass over the invitation that the shadow Minister and others have extended to my colleagues on the Government Benches to break the Whip. I saw the expression on my hon. Friend’s face when that was suggested, so I strongly discourage any of my right hon. or hon. Friends from contemplating that course of action. Even though a reshuffle has only just happened, there is always another one at some point.

The shadow Minister mentioned the Health Service Journal, which I enjoy reading. All I would say is that we continue to engage with a wide range of stakeholders, as we have done throughout the process. Indeed, I think that in her evidence, Dame Gill Morgan highlighted the collaborative nature of the genesis of this Bill. I intend to continue with an open and transparent approach, discussing with colleagues and engaging with them and others, because we know that we can always learn by listening.

[Justin Madders]

I am finding the Minister’s response very entertaining, but he really does need to tell us exactly what is wrong with the current system that this Bill is going to fix.

[Edward Argar]

I will come to the shadow Minister’s point, but I just want to get through the points he made earlier in his preamble. He mentioned the quote in the Health Service Journal article from a spokesperson for the Department of Health and Social Care, and I think that quote accurately reflects the nature of this Bill. I am grateful to those officials from the Department who ensured that the Health Service Journal got its quote.

I now turn to the substance of the shadow Minister’s argument and some of the gritter points that he, the hon. Member for Bristol South and others have alluded to. Fundamentally, he asked what challenge this Bill seeks to resolve. He asked a few other questions as well, which I will try to answer.

We believe that the Secretary of State should be able to intervene in reconfigurations for which they are ultimately accountable, and that this proposal will increase accountability to Parliament and the community by enabling intervention at an earlier stage. Too often, controversial proposals are referred at the very end of the process after a huge amount of work, effort and expenditure, rather than at an earlier stage when there is already a divergence of opinion in the local community. The Bill gives the Secretary of State an opportunity to take a view—based on advice and on the IRP’s four tests, which will continue to be the basis of that—and to get earlier intervention, where appropriate. That is one of the key reasons.

I will carry on, and the shadow Minister will nod if I am missing anything. He touched on local authority engagement, who can refer, whether there is a diminution in power—I think the hon. Member for Bristol South might have mentioned that—and what qualifies the Secretary of State to make those decisions. He also referred to local knowledge.

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[Edward Argar]

We anticipate the guidance setting out what is proportionate, the criteria and the appropriate point at which an intervention can be considered. I come back to the point that too often, under the current arrangement, proposals come forward right at the end of the process, after huge amounts of expenditure, effort and time, only to be overturned—potentially at the very last moment—on the basis of the referral. Having a measured and proportionate intervention power at an earlier stage is the right approach to save a lot of angst and possibly money, although we do not anticipate that the power will need to be used on many occasions, because the vast majority of reconfigurations are broadly consensual, or reach a local consensus.

The shadow Minister alluded to local authority referrals, and the hon. Member for Bristol South has highlighted the importance of local authorities and local accountability in a number of previous speeches and interventions. The new call-in power will not replace the important role that local scrutiny and engagement play in service change decisions. Decision making on all reconfigurations, as I said, will continue to be bound by the four tests against which reconfiguration should be assured: strong public and patient engagement; consistency with current and prospective need for patient choice; a clear clinical evidence base; and support for proposals from clinical commissioners.

The IRP will continue to provide the independent clinical advice to inform the Secretary of State’s decision making. His scrutiny and direction-making process must take into account the public law decision-making principles, all relevant information and all legal duties, including the public sector equality duty.

In that context, the Secretary of State will also continue to be bound by his duty on quality of service. That includes promoting the comprehensive health service and securing continuous improvement in the quality of services provided. The new call-in power for reconfiguration will allow the Secretary of State to support effective change and to be more responsive to the concerns of the public—and of Members of Parliament as their representatives—at an earlier stage.

[Justin Madders]

Reflecting on the Minister’s comments about why the provision is needed, my understanding is that the power to give the Secretary of State the opportunity to intervene at an earlier stage means that, in effect, local health systems will not spend an awful lot of time and effort coming to decisions that will ultimately be overturned. I wonder whether the Minister can give us any more detail or any thoughts about why, in a system that was generally thought to be working well, a decision could go all the way through that process and, at the end of it, be deemed to be wrong.

[Edward Argar]

One particular example comes to mind, but given that it is a live one, I will not use it. However, if I semi-anonymise it, there are decisions that are made locally and followed through, and only at that last moment is the process challenged—for example, whether a consultation was done properly—so it triggers a potential referral to the IRP, which could see that process overturned. An earlier power to intervene and an earlier opportunity to engage could in many cases avoid that problem and lead to a smoother process.

Let me make a final point. I would expect most reconfiguration decisions to be managed by the local system, and system players will be encouraged to resolve matters locally where possible and not to require any referral to the Secretary of State. Where cases are highly contentious and require ministerial input, our proposals will allow the Secretary of State to intervene. He is accountable in Parliament for reconfigurations. The shadow Minister made the broader point that if we ask who is responsible for the NHS, people will say the Secretary of State, or potentially the Prime Minister. That is already there in people’s minds. It is right that we have commensurate powers in the Bill to enable the Secretary of State to properly discharge that function and accountability.

I remain touched by the hon. Gentleman’s kind concern about the volume of work I may end up having to do as a result of the measure. I do not quite share his concerns, but I am none the less touched by the thought.

I urge the hon. Member for Bristol South, perhaps in vain, not to press her amendment to a Division, and colleagues on the Committee to support the clause.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Health and Care Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Justin Madders Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 23rd September 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Minister for Health (Edward Argar)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship once again, Mrs Murray. With your indulgence, I will speak to each of the clauses in turn.

Clause 51 amends section 88 of the Health and Social Care Act 2012. Section 88 requires that Monitor—or, in future, NHS England—treats an NHS trust that has become an NHS foundation trust as having made an application and met the criteria for a licence. The clause will require NHS England to apply that provision when that queue of NHS trusts waiting to become foundation trusts do so—[Laughter.] I hope the Committee will forgive my gentle reference to what the shadow Minister said last time. On a more serious note, the clause will also require NHS England to apply it when a foundation trust is created as a result of the merger of an existing foundation trust with an NHS trust or another foundation trust, or the separation of one foundation trust into two or more new foundation trusts.

Clause 51 clarifies the situation when new foundation trusts are created, merged or separated and ensures there is no unnecessary bureaucracy as a result. It is an important clarification for NHS England on how to exercise its licensing powers in such situations, should they arise.

We are investing record levels of capital expenditure into the NHS to help it build back better after the pandemic. We intend to set capital expenditure budgets at integrated care board level, and we expect providers to work with ICB partners to agree capital expenditure, in line with the ICB capital plan. To ensure that the interests of the wider system are taken into account at individual provider level, clause 52 provides a new power to allow NHS England to make an order imposing capital expenditure limits for NHS foundation trusts.

That narrow and reserved power will ensure that a limit can be set only for an individually named foundation trust for a specified period, and would automatically cease at the end of that period. The power relates solely to capital expenditure and not to revenue expenditure. NHS England must also consult the foundation trust before making the order. There will be clear transparency, as the order will be published.

In applying to an individual foundation trust in particular circumstances, the power stands in contrast to the capital limits that apply to all NHS trusts. The power is likely to be used where there is a clear risk of an ICB breaching its system capital envelope as a result of non-co-operation by that foundation trust, and when other ways of resolution have been unsuccessful.

NHS England must set out in guidance the circumstances in which it is likely to set a capital limit and how it will calculate it. NHS England intends to work closely with foundation trusts to develop that guidance. I want to make it clear to the Committee that the clauses are not intended in any way as an erosion of the autonomy enjoyed by foundation trusts. Unlike NHS trusts, foundation trusts will continue to have additional financial freedoms, such as the ability to borrow money from commercial lenders. However, the clause is crucial for managing NHS capital expenditure across a system and to ensure that all NHS providers operate within the ICB capital limits. Without that control, other NHS providers may have to reduce their capital spending to ensure that the NHS lives within its allotted capital resources and that resources are spent in a way that best delivers for patients and the taxpayer.

The provisions in clause 53 are largely a consequence of the merger of NHS England and Monitor, in this case reflecting Monitor’s oversight role in relation to foundation trusts. Subsection (1) gives foundation trusts greater flexibility in their forward plans. Paragraph (a) removes requirements currently in the National Health Service Act 2006 concerning the content of the forward plan. Paragraph (b) removes the requirements for the forward plan to be prepared by the foundation trust’s directors and for the directors to have regard to the views of the foundation trust’s governors when preparing the forward plan.

Foundation trusts will no longer be mandated to set out information in the forward planning documentation around non-health service activity and income. The clause also removes the requirement for governors to be mandated to determine whether the foundation trust’s forward plan interferes with the trust’s health service activity.

As the Committee will know by now, and as a consequence of the abolition of Monitor and its merger with NHS England, NHS England will formally become responsible for the support and oversight of foundation trusts, which includes taking on Monitor’s regulatory and intervention powers. That change will enable improved oversight and greater flexibility across the system. Provisions elsewhere in the Bill make the detailed changes, including formally giving NHS England responsibility for giving directions in relation to the content and form of foundation trust accounts. That includes specifying information to be included in the annual reports and accounts of foundation trusts.

The clause is simply part of transitioning the provider-based functions of Monitor into NHS England, ensuring continuity of oversight of foundation trusts’ accounting and forward planning. NHS England will be able to provide fundamental advice and guidance to foundation trusts in the exercise of their functions. Provisions elsewhere in the Bill will formally allow NHS England to monitor the performance of foundation trusts and to take steps to intervene where necessary, which may take the form of advice and support. As we discussed on a previous occasion, however, it may also involve NHS England requesting the trust to take action to remedy emerging issues. At the same time, the clause makes the requirements on annual plans more flexible, to reflect the direction of travel towards system-wide, rather than organisation-specific, planning.

I turn now to clause 54, which inserts proposed new section 47A into the National Health Service Act 2006 and allows an NHS FT to carry out its functions jointly with another person, should the foundation trust consider such arrangements to be appropriate. That would allow a foundation trust to exercise its healthcare delivery functions jointly with another foundation trust as part of a provider collaborative. The clause will make it easier for FTs to work with partners across the health system to develop integrated, seamless services in the best interests of patients.

Clause 55 amends sections 56, 56A and 56B of the 2006 Act, which relate to the merger, acquisition, separation and dissolution of NHS foundation trusts and NHS trusts. It removes the requirement that an application to acquire or merge an NHS FT with another NHS FT or an English NHS trust be supported by the Secretary of State if one of the parties is an NHS trust. NHS England will now consider each application, but the Secretary of State’s role has been strengthened, as he must now approve such applications. However, NHS England will consider the applications and provide advice. That is in keeping with the policy intention that the Secretary of State should have a strengthened accountability role for NHS foundation trusts, in the light of the transfer of Monitor and NHS Trust Development Authority functions to NHS England. NHS England replaces Monitor in the relevant sections of the NHS Act 2006.

Like Monitor, NHS England has a duty to grant the application to merge, acquire or separate if it is satisfied that the necessary steps have been taken to prepare for an acquisition or the dissolution and establishment of new trusts. Additionally, the clause adds a further requirement to each of the sections, which provides that NHS England must refuse an application if the Secretary of State does not approve it. That strengthens the role of the Secretary of State in the process, and it will be for NHS England to take note of the Secretary of State’s comments in taking forward its plans. The clause provides for enhanced oversight and places strategic decision making in the health system in the hands of NHS England, while also conferring a commensurate and important role on Ministers, in line with the direction of accountability set out in the Bill.

Clause 56 relates to the transitioning of the provider-based functions of Monitor and the NHS TDA into NHS England. That will allow NHS England to grant an application by an NHS foundation trust for dissolution. The clause confers the powers that rested with Monitor to transfer or provide for the transfer of property of an NHS foundation trust on its dissolution. Previously, on the dissolution of an NHS FT, Monitor had the power to transfer the property of the NHS FT to the Secretary of State. The clause amends that power so that, when making an order to dissolve an NHS foundation trust, NHS England now has the power to make an order to transfer, or provide for the transfer of, property and liabilities to another NHS FT, an NHS trust or the Secretary of State. The clause also includes a new duty for NHS England to include the transfer of any employees of a dissolved NHS FT in the transfer order.

Taken together, these clauses ensure that foundation trusts are able to play a central role in a more integrated and collaborative healthcare system. As part of that, the clauses also provide NHS England with the powers it will need to help support NHS FTs. I therefore commend clauses 51 to 56 to the Committee and propose that they stand part of the Bill.

[Justin Madders (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair this morning, Mrs Murray. I am glad you enjoyed Tuesday so much that you came back for another round. We will do our best to inform and entertain as we go along.

I am grateful to the Minister for setting out the Department’s position on the clauses. We really need to have another go, don’t we, at trying to understand the landscape for foundation trusts? I have already referred the Committee to the description of foundation trusts when they were first established, as vigorous, autonomous, business-like new organisations that would shake up the NHS and bring choice and competition into healthcare. As we know, there was no evidence that that model did any better than the previous standard trusts, once the high performers had been accounted for.

The Minister’s contention that the clauses do nothing to impinge on a foundation trust’s autonomy is quite the claim. The big change in the clauses is the stripping away of financial autonomy, as set out in clause 52, directly contradicting the many occasions when we have been told that the Bill is all about permissiveness, local decision making and accountability. In clause 55, we also see the Secretary of State giving himself yet more powers.

Clause 52(2) could, in effect, mean there was an indefinite block on foundation trusts using their own capital resources. Will there be any limitations on what is a broad power? I refer to the evidence from Dr Chaand Nagpaul, who touched on that:

“At the moment, we are seeing foundation trusts thinking about their budgets, community providers thinking about theirs, and general practice as well. There is not even collaboration between the community and the hospital. No foundation trust currently has the ability to say, for example, ‘We will go beyond our budget and invest in the community—it may actually reduce our hospital admissions.’ At the moment there is no structure or processes to enable collaboration even within the NHS.”—[Official Report, Health and Care Public Bill Committee, 9 September 2021; c. 93, Q120.]

Dr Nagpaul sets out very well the lack of clarity that we still have about how finances will work at a local level within an ICB, and clause 52 gives foundation trusts even less autonomy in that respect.

On that point, I noted with interest today yet another Health Service Journal article, which talked about how integrated care partnerships may not be up and running for some time after the ICB has been set up. That raises questions about what their role is going to be in helping to form those capital priorities for an integrated care system.

In other evidence, Richard Murray said:

“The bit that I think is really uncertain is how the big hospital schemes get picked. That is the bit that looks very different. Obviously, there is a manifesto commitment.”—

although we know that, in recent times, the Government have not been so keen to follow those commitments. He continued:

“There used to be a process by which it was determined whether providers could afford to repay—if they could do it through loans, or if there was a need system. That is now going off in a completely different place, and I think that is the bit that is not quite clear. How does that work within this system? Who gets to choose how those projects get picked, so to speak?”—[Official Report, Health and Care Public Bill Committee, 9 September 2021; c. 118, Q158.]

I appreciate that the point is slightly off-piste, but as we are talking about capital expenditure it is appropriate to raise it, and I am sure the Minister will take the opportunity in his response to set out that process in more detail. At the same time, can he set out in more detail what the guidance set out in proposed new section 42C would entail? Hopefully we will be able to set out some broad points in respect of that.

While we are on the Minister’s response, will he consider the broader point we made on Tuesday about foundation trusts’ focus on involvement of patients and the public and whether that needs to be strengthened across the board? He needs to think again about the whole question of accountability on ICBs.

To go back to the essential question, are foundation trusts now any different to plain, old-school NHS trusts? Is a foundation trust now a dodo? Is it extinct or on its way out? If an ambitious young chief executive of a trust were to approach the Minister and say they were thinking of putting in an application for foundation trust status, what would the Minister say to them about the benefits of such an application, both to their trust and to the wider healthcare system?

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[Edward Argar]

I am grateful to the shadow Minister for his suggestion of a consolidation Act. I can tell just how much he enjoys the sessions we spend in Committee and how eager he is that, no sooner do we finish, than we are back in another Bill Committee together. In terms of his gentle gibe about reorganisation in another two years, there was roughly a two-year gap between the 1999, then the 2001, then the 2003 and then the 2006 reorganisations of the NHS under the previous Government. I fear this is something that affects Governments of all types.

[Justin Madders]

Indeed, but the point that we would make is that there was such a mess to clear up after 18 years of Conservative Government that we had to do a lot of reorganisations. If the Minister can state for the record that there will be no reorganisations within a specified timescale, we would all be delighted to hear that.

[Edward Argar]

We must always retain flexibility so that the legislative framework reflects the evolving nature of healthcare provision in this country and we can we deliver what all our constituents want us to.

The hon. Gentleman touched on the importance of licensing. The licence applies to anyone providing NHS services, including the independent sector. With the system oversight framework, it provides a tool that helps to ensure quality across all types of providers in a consistent way, hence the importance that we still attach to it.

At the heart of the hon. Gentleman’s speech were his points about foundation trusts, a 2004 innovation. The reason we are introducing these changes is that we recognise not only the ability of foundation trusts to be autonomous, but the need for them to collaborate and integrate. The aim is to create a framework that allows for local flexibility but brings together local services, recognising the synergies that need to exist between all healthcare providers in an area. With the ICB holding the ring, we get local flexibility, but we look at it the local system level rather than the individual provider level. I alluded to it jokingly, but as I promised in our last session I can confirm to him that I was correct that there are no current applications from NHS trusts to become foundation trusts. I said that I was relying on my memory, but I can confirm for the record that my memory was accurate.

The hon. Gentleman talked about the new hospitals programme and capital more broadly. While slightly stretching the scope of the debate, I think that is probably relevant because he was talking about capital, so I am happy to accept that—subject to your judgment, of course, Mrs Murray—as being in scope. In terms of investment in new hospitals, the bottom line is that this is capital provided by the Treasury—by central Government —to build new hospitals where they are most needed. He will have seen the criteria and the approach set out for the next eight schemes, which are currently being considered. An expression of interest is the first stage of that process. A number of criteria are set out—for example, are there safety issues? Is there an urgent need? Will this facilitate transformation and improve patient experience? The criteria are set out publicly.

The next stage, which will take place next year, is the whittling down of the applications to a shortlist and further consideration. I believe it is entirely right that, guided by advice from officials and local NHS systems, Ministers make those decisions, because it is central Government money that is being invested directly in the schemes, rather than the normal capital allocations from NHS England to local NHS systems that are decided at local system level. This is additional, over and above the normal capital allocations.

The hon. Gentleman mentioned proposed new section 42C and asked what it is envisaged the guidance will say, what it will cover, and how it will work. Essentially, we envisage it setting out how and when NHS England and NHS Improvement will exercise the powers—for example, where a foundation trust’s plans potentially put at risk the broader ICB plans for capital, unduly divert resources, or skew the capital allocation in a particular direction. We do not envisage their being used with any regularity, and hope that, as now, broadly, there is a collaborative approach. It is more informal now than envisaged under the provisions, but there is a collaborative approach.

In his broader remarks about the balance between autonomy and freedoms, the hon. Gentleman asked what I would tell a keen and ambitious NHS trust chief executive who was considering taking advantage of the spaces in the queue to become a foundation trust the advantages in doing so are. Essentially, I would say that they should consider what best reflects the local needs for their local healthcare system, because foundation trusts will of course retain freedoms around commercial borrowing and other existing freedoms. The powers that we are introducing act as a safeguard should they be used against the wider interest of the system. There are still advantages, but each NHS chief executive in that situation should consider carefully their own local circumstances and what is most effective in providing for their patients and service users.

My two final points go to what the hon. Gentleman said about the fear that the powers are significant and should be used only as the last resort, and his second point about whether there should be a greater willingness to allow NHS providers to decide how they spend their surpluses, rather than a regulator or central Government deciding. I might be paraphrasing, but I think those were his two key concerns. On his first point, the powers act as a safeguard to allow national-level intervention when local negotiation cannot resolve disputes. I have alluded to what we would use the guidance for, which is to add a bit of flesh to the bones. We think that is best set out in guidance rather than on the face of statute, as circumstances change over time and applying a narrow statutory test could hinder the aims of the clause, which would ensure that NHS spending overall is in the best interests of the public.

To the second point about whether it should be down to NHS providers and systems to determine how they spend surpluses or moneys that they have saved each year for a particular purpose, the hon. Gentleman is right that NHS trusts and foundation trusts operate as autonomous organisations that are legally responsible for maintaining their estates and providing healthcare services. That will continue, but only where there is a clear risk of a trust acting against the wider interest of the NHS system locally and an ICB would the controls be considered for application.

[Justin Madders]

The Minister is setting out the aims, but I am a little unsure what a foundation trust acting against the wider interest of the ICB would look like. Can he give us examples of where that might have happened?

[Edward Argar]

The hon. Gentleman tempts me to give a specific example. The reason we chose the flexibility of using guidance is that we cannot envisage every eventuality, so we will set out in guidance the process and approach. I will try to give him an illustrative example rather than a specific one, if he will allow me. If we have an ICB making collective decisions about where capital investment is most needed at a system level, and if we have a foundation trust with resources deciding to prioritise huge investment in one particular area, that might not necessarily reflect the broadly agreed local priorities in the ICB plan and the ICP plan for that area. I envisage such matters being resolved at an ICB level. I have certainly seen in this job and in a past life, as I suspect the hon. Member for Bristol South has, where informal resolution of these things is often the most effective way, so I would not envisage these powers being used often, but it is important that we have the flexibility that they bring. On that basis, I commend the clauses to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 51 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 52 to 57 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 58

Transfer schemes between trusts

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[Edward Argar]

As the Committee knows, one intention of the Bill is to create more flexibility, alongside the promotion of greater local integration. The clauses help to allow local bodies to work together in different ways to deliver effective health services.

Clause 60 enables NHS organisations, and any other bodies that may be prescribed in regulations, to commission and arrange services collaboratively, not only with other NHS organisations but with local authorities, combined authorities and other bodies that could be specified in regulations. Existing NHS legislative mechanisms make it difficult for the health and care system to work collaboratively and flexibly across different organisations, forcing local systems to adopt complex workarounds to be able to take joint decisions and pool budgets. In that context, back in the day, when I served in a local authority, we used section 75 of the 2006 Act as one mechanism for doing that with the local primary care trust.

In practice, however, those arrangements can sometimes be cumbersome and difficult to manage, and can delay making vital decisions. The new provisions inserted by the clause into the NHS Act 2006 will enable NHS organisations and any other bodies that may be prescribed in regulations to delegate functions to, or jointly exercise functions with, other NHS organisations, local authorities, combined authorities and other bodies as specified in regulations. Where functions are exercised jointly, the provisions will also enable those organisations to pool funds and form joint committees, facilitating partnership working and joint decision making at place and system level.

To ensure that delegation or joint exercise of functions does not lead to reduced accountability for delivering services, we have proposed appropriate safeguards in the clause. The Secretary of State will be able to set out in regulations which functions can and cannot be delegated, impose conditions in relation to delegation or joint exercise of functions, and specify the extent of such arrangements, for example. Furthermore, the parties will be able to agree terms as to the scope of the delegation arrangement. NHS England will have the ability to issue statutory guidance in relation to functions that are being delegated or jointly exercised under the provisions. The relevant body, as defined in the provision, must have regard to such guidance.

The provisions will replace those in existing sections 13Z, 13ZB and 14Z3 of the NHS Act 2006, which provide for the delegation of joint exercise of NHS England’s functions. The clause also amends section 75 of the 2006 Act, which I just alluded to. That section details arrangements between NHS bodies and local authorities so that where a combined authority, for example, exercises an NHS function as part of arrangements under the new provisions, it can be treated as an NHS body. That is in line with how combined authorities are treated for other, similar joint working arrangements.

Clause 61 and schedule 9 focus on the delegation of functions. Clause 61 inserts a new section into the NHS Act 2006 that makes express the assumption that a general reference in the Act to a person’s functions includes any functions that they are exercising on behalf of another person. That means, for example, that a reference in the Act to the functions of NHS England should cover any public health functions of the Secretary of State that NHS England may be exercising on their behalf under section 7A arrangements. The practical effect of this would be, for example, that any general duties that apply when NHS England is exercising its functions would also apply when it was exercising delegated functions. Until now, delegated functions have not been dealt with consistently in our health legislation. While it is not feasible, notwithstanding the suggestion of the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston, to remedy this issue across all health legislation in one consolidating Bill, this clause seeks to produce a more consistent approach.

Schedule 9 contains amendments to the NHS Act 2006 and other legislation to reflect the broader approach taken by clause 61 to delegated functions. Clause 61 also enables regulation to be made to create further exceptions where necessary to ensure that delegated functions are not covered by a provision where this would be inappropriate. Clause 61 addresses an important but technical legal issue in the Bill and is essential for enabling consistent and clear interpretation of our legislation.

These clauses are essential for ensuring that NHS organisations can collaborate effectively with each other as well as with other partners in the system. I therefore commend clauses 60 and 61 and schedule 9 to the Committee.

[Justin Madders]

Members will be relieved to hear that I will not detain the Committee long on this. Clause 60 does what the NHS itself has decided it needs. Over the last six years, we have had various iterations of this integration process, joining things up around joint working, joint bodies and delegation. The provisions try to put all that in one place.

A recurring theme is clarity about the extent of crossovers between local authorities and the NHS. In that respect, proposed new section 65Z5 suggests that local authorities can carry out any function of an NHS body. Could the Minister say more about that? Does it mean that we could see local authorities commissioning—setting up GP surgeries in wellbeing centres? We are assuming that this is one-way and there is no reciprocal arrangement for the NHS to take on local authority functions, so that a foundation trust could not take on an arm’s length management organisation or some other local authority function as a tax-efficient way of avoiding certain liabilities. Could the Minister respond on that?

I also wonder about care trusts, which were the original integrated working teams with the NHS and local authorities. They are rarely mentioned and were largely regarded as unsuccessful. Is there any intention to favour such genuinely integrated bodies? They were used in one recent case by an integrated care provider to get around some of the prohibitions on new trusts. Can the Minister tell us anything about where care trusts now fit into the landscape?

Given the joint nature of the provision, I would like to know why the guidance was published only by NHS England. Should it not have been a joint effort by the NHS and the Local Government Association? Was the LGA consulted and involved in the preparation of the guidance? That perhaps exposes that this is really about the NHS, not about integration across the board. As we have heard today, the ICPs will roll up at some later point, perhaps exposing the reality that this is going to be an NHS-dominated process.

Finally, on the pooling of funds, is there any limit on that? Is that envisaged to be an occasional opportunity, or will it be a more significant step down a road of full funding? Will the Minister set out whether the direction of travel will be quite as dramatic as possibly suggested by the clause?

[Edward Argar]

I am grateful to the shadow Minister for his support for the clauses and for the, as ever, perfectly sensible questions he poses. I hope to reassure him that the intention behind the clauses is not to create tax-efficient organisations or anything like that; it is to create the most efficient organisations for the delivery of joined-up care. I alluded to section 75 of the 2006 Act, which is an example of what many local authorities are doing already.

On guidance, I hope to reassure the hon. Gentleman that, throughout the genesis of the legislation, we worked collaboratively with the Local Government Association, reflecting local authorities more broadly. As we develop guidance, I am clear that the NHS, NHS England and the Government will continue to work with the association to ensure that local government’s view is reflected in the drafting. A number of conversations have already taken place between officials and the LGA. Notwithstanding the debates we may have in this House or how the legislation emerges, I am clear that we will continue to work collaboratively throughout with all the partners involved, even in areas where we may disagree. We will always seek to work with them.

The hon. Gentleman expressed concerns—he will shake his head if I paraphrase him unfairly—about whether the legislation will allow for unlimited or unfettered delegation without checks and balances. Will we be able to transfer anything from an NHS trust to a local authority, or vice versa? The short answer is no. There will need to be a clear line of accountability between the body ultimately exercising the function and the delegating body. Safeguards ensure that any onward delegation is appropriate. That said, there may be circumstances in which a local authority would commission a particular healthcare service linked to other functions of the local authority delegated from the NHS. We would expect that clear accountability to be in place where that is done. We do not envisage the power being used regularly in that way, but there might be circumstances in which it would be.

Regulations may restrict what, where, when and how—and, indeed, to whom—delegations occur. The delegation agreement may also prevent further onward delegation of functions beyond a certain level. In addition—this goes back to the hon. Gentleman’s point about the LGA—NHS England will, I expect, issue statutory guidance on delegation and joint committees, which would include scenarios, case studies, model delegation agreements and similar to show how, in practice, we envisage this working. The guidance would be statutory, and I envisage it being developed in concert with local authorities, represented by the Local Government Association—that is probably the most effective way of doing that.

I hope that I have given the hon. Gentleman some reassurance that there is nothing sinister—for want of a better word—intended in the clauses; they are merely meant to make things easier for local NHS bodies and local authorities, in particular, to co-operate more. That goes back to the integration at the heart of—the thread that runs through—all the legislation.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 60 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 61 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 9 agreed to.

Clause 62 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Edward Argar]

Before I speak to clauses 63 and 64, I crave your indulgence, Mrs Murray: I should have said to the shadow Minister that the previous clauses were about delegation from the NHS to local authorities, not the other way around. I would just like to put that on the record for him, because he expressed a concern about that.

Clauses 63 and 64 have been included in the Bill to help support ICBs and ICPs and to enhance integration across the health and care system. Clause 63 allows NHS England to issue guidance about appointing an individual to roles simultaneously in NHS commissioners and NHS providers, or in relevant NHS bodies on the one hand, and local authorities or combined authorities on the other. We have seen a number of clinical commissioning group and local authority joint appointments that have supported integration and been successful, and we would be keen to see those continue.

The clause further sets a requirement for these NHS bodies to have regard to such guidance when considering making a joint appointment. Joint appointments between organisations can support aligned decision making, enhance leadership across organisations and improve the delivery of integrated care. However, we believe that greater clarity is required to support organisations in making appropriate joint appointments, to avoid conflicts of interest that can be difficult to manage. Before issuing any new or significantly revised guidance, NHS England would be required to consult with appropriate persons.

Clause 63 will allow NHS England to publish a clear set of criteria for organisations to consider when making joint appointments and ensure regard is given to such guidance. That will also provide a safeguard against any conflicts of interest that may arise in the process of making joint appointments.

Clause 64 amends sections 72 and 82 of the National Health Service Act 2006, which deal with the co-operation between NHS bodies and the co-operation between NHS bodies and local authorities respectively. The clause inserts a new power for the Secretary of State to make guidance related to the existing co-operation duties between NHS bodies and between NHS bodies and local authorities. While the existing co-operation duties in sections 72 and 82 relate to both English and Welsh NHS bodies and local authorities, the guidance relates only to England, and the requirement to have regard to guidance issued under this new power will apply only to English NHS bodies and English local authorities.

Our intention is not to produce a single piece of co-operation guidance, which would risk being too general or too wide-ranging to be effective. Rather, we are considering discrete pieces of guidance in specific areas such as delivery of alcohol and drugs services, sexual and reproductive health, or hospital discharge services, to encourage and facilitate co-operation and integration in their delivery.

The clause also amends section 96 of the Health and Social Care Act 2012, which concerns the setting of licensing conditions for providers of NHS services. The licence, as we touched on earlier today, was established in 2013 so that providers of NHS services must meet to help ensure that the health sector works for the benefit of patients. Currently, conditions can be set on co-operation, but these provisions can apply only in certain circumstances.

The clause goes further: it supports system integration, promotes greater co-operation by removing the limitation on setting licence conditions on co-operation, and expands the range of bodies with which co-operation can be required. That will strengthen and reinforce the requirements on providers to co-operate and further strengthens the ability for NHS providers to deliver the system plan.

Co-operation is central to the intentions and underpinnings of this Bill. New guidance and expanding the role co-operation plays in the licensing regime will give organisations greater clarity about the practical expectations for co-operation, help the NHS to build on the innovation, working relationships and positive behaviours that have been seen over the past year, and further embed these behaviours across the health and care system. I therefore commend these clauses to the Committee.

[Justin Madders]

I am sure the Minister will be unsurprised to learn that the Opposition are a little wary of the powers in clause 63. One person doing two jobs is never ideal. I make an honourable exception for the hon. Member for Vale of Clwyd, who, in his other role, plays an important part in contributing to the wellbeing of the nation. Such exceptions are rare, and we think that two jobs for one person is never a sustainable or long-term solution.

We draw a distinction between a secondment, which obviously means that the position is by definition time limited and allows the post-holder to return to their original position. It is often good for career development, and that kind of mobility and interchange between the NHS and local authorities may be a very positive development, particularly with ICBs. However, the idea that there can be a joint appointment of a commissioner and a provider sounds wholly contradictory. Although the Minister has tried to allay our concerns by referring to guidance, it is clear that an NHS body needs to only “have regard” to that guidance. The question remains: at what point does someone step in when there is a clear and detrimental conflict of interest? We will see what the Minister has to say, but it we may need to keep a very close eye on that.

Clause 64 is a rather less obvious power grab by the Secretary of State, but it is one all the same. Clearly, he is not satisfied with the extent of co-operation between NHS bodies, because the Secretary of State now wants to be able to tell them how to co-operate. The guidance is to be issued, and a duty is to be placed on NHS bodies to follow it, or else face the consequences. What of? It is good old-fashioned persuasion—the willingness to work together for the greater good. It is actually the case that the Secretary of State wants two goes at this, as there are further powers to issue guidance in respect of NHS bodies and local authorities, which currently have to co-operate in order to advance the health and wellbeing of people.

Surely it is the case that they are doing that already. I cannot think of any reason why they would not co-operate, but what would be the sanction if they do not? Can the Minister tell us who he thinks these errant councils are that are not co-operating? Between myself, my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham North and the Minister himself, we must have over a quarter of a century of experience in local government, and I cannot think of any occasion when councils were anything other than co-operative with the NHS. That is my experience, but if the Minister can help fill in the gaps, I would be most obliged.

[Edward Argar]

The shadow Minister tempts me to name and shame. He may be tempting me in vain. He raised three key points. One was about one person doing two jobs. To paraphrase him, he asked how that would work and why it was appropriate. He also mentioned conflicts of interest and asked why it was necessary and appropriate for the Secretary of State should have these powers.

To his first point, the clause is about driving greater integration. During my time as a member of Westminster City Council many years ago, we had a joint appointment. Our director of public health, if I recall correctly, was also an NHS appointment and she sat in both organisations in the senior management structure. It was extremely effective. Conflicts of interest, as we would envisage here, were managed both within the system and in accordance with guidance and principles of appointments and appropriate governance. That worked extremely well. It was not so much one person doing two jobs, but where the job was needed and the job description fitted both organisations, it delivered a real synergy and better outcomes.

There are circumstances where it can work. I would not have envisaged it being used essentially so that one person has multiple roles and jobs, but there are occasions when there is a benefit from someone sitting jointly in two organisations to help drive that integration and shared understanding. We can create, as we are doing here, mechanisms and structures to help drive integration and co-operation, but as the hon. Member for Nottingham North will know, and as the hon. Member for Bristol South will know from her time in the NHS, we can have those structures, but ensuring that organisations work effectively often relies on individuals, personal relationships and the trust that builds up at that level.

[Edward Argar]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady, but those joint appointments have always gone on—they have existed for many years. The example I referred to was in about 2008 or 2009, and it worked extremely well, as both organisations benefited from that individual being a part of both. Our clauses seek to ensure that those joint appointments work well and effectively.

The hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston asked why the powers sit with the Secretary of State rather than with the local NHS or NHS England. I am afraid that he will not tempt me into naming any particular local authorities or otherwise. The NHS is a critical part of our health and care system, but integration and co-operation need to go beyond the NHS itself, encompassing the role of local authorities in this space, which we all recognise. I hope that that co-operation will be consensual and voluntary, as the hon. Gentleman said, but it is important that the Secretary of State, with his accountability to this place and to the public, sits above that system. I would argue that he is in the best position to offer guidance on how that system can co-operate, and to help to resolve matters.

[Justin Madders]

One of the things that we have been told consistently is that integration and joint working are already well under way on the ground, and that the Bill is, in part, just putting a legislative seal on that work. If that is correct, why does the Secretary of State need those additional powers?

[Edward Argar]

Because we wish to take the opportunity to further drive forward the integration. The system has evolved, but we want to be more ambitious. The powers reflect the fact that the Secretary of State is able to take that wide perspective to most effectively see those two organisations coming together at a macro level—at the national level. That does not mean that I am denigrating in any way the evolution that is already occurring voluntarily in a whole range of areas around the country.

I sense that the hon. Gentleman is still unconvinced by joint appointments, so I will say a little more about them before I conclude, although I might still leave him unconvinced. There are already very few prohibitions on joint appointments, and we see an increasing number of them. In some cases, however, there could be a perception, or a reality, of a potential conflict of interest that could be difficult to manage or could lead to a perception of bias. We recognise that, which is why we have proposed the power to issue guidance to help organisations make the right joint appointments and to help them understand what factors to consider when deciding whether to proceed down the route of a joint appointment. The new powers for NHS England to issue guidance will ensure that there is a clear set of criteria against which to judge joint appointments when considering whether to make one. Bodies will have to have due regard to that guidance. I believe that the powers are proportionate.

[Justin Madders]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way again. One of the critiques that we have developed —I hope that he has noticed—is that the Secretary of State has given himself an awful lot of powers and abilities to intervene. It seems highly incongruous that in the specific example of joint appointments, where there would be a clear role for the Secretary of State to intervene, he has not availed himself of the opportunity to do so.

Health and Care Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Justin Madders Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 23rd September 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Karin Smyth]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 67 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 11 agreed to.

Clause 68

Procurement relations

[Justin Madders (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab)]

I beg to move amendment 95, in clause 68, page 61, line 32, leave out “health care services” and insert “services required”.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 99, in clause 68, page 61, line 35, at end insert—

“(1A) The regulations must provide that no contract for the provision of the services specified in subsection (1)(a) and subsection (1)(b) may be awarded other than to a relevant authority unless a formal competitive tendering process provided for by the regulations has been followed.”

Amendment 96, in clause 68, page 62, line 1, at end insert—

“(3A) The regulations must—

(a) include the power for integrated care boards to continue to commission the services provided by an NHS trust or Foundation Trust without any requirement for any re-tendering process,

(b) require that, prior to commencing any formal procurement process for a service provided by an NHS provider, where the contract value exceeds a threshold set by the relevant integrated care partnership, the integrated care board must conduct a public consultation and publish the business case for opening the service to a competitive tender process,

(c) require an assessment to be made of alternative ways of providing a service using NHS providers before a contract with a non-NHS provider may be extended or renewed,

(d) be based on the assumption that the NHS is the preferred provider of services, and

(e) require providers to pay staff in line with NHS rates of pay and to provide terms and conditions of employment at least equivalent to NHS terms and conditions.

(3B) NHS England must publish a report each year on the proportion of contracts subject to the regulations which are awarded to each of NHS, third sector, local authority and independent sector providers.

(3C) NHS England and each integrated care board must publish a plan every three years on reducing the provision of NHS services by private providers and increasing the capacity of NHS providers to provide those services.

(3D) Integrated care boards must publish, in full and without any recourse to commercial confidentiality, all—

(a) bids received for contracts,

(b) contracts signed, and

(c) reports of routine contract management.”

New clause 12—NHS as the preferred provider of NHS contracts—

“(1) The NHS is the preferred provider of NHS contracts.

(2) NHS contracts must be provided by NHS suppliers unless the NHS supplier is unable to fulfil the terms of that contract.

(3) Where the NHS is unable to fulfil the terms of a contract, a competitive tender must be held to identify an alternative provider.

(4) For the purposes of this section—

(a) ‘alternative provider’ means private companies and independent sector treatment centres, and

(b) general practice and GP-led community services are NHS suppliers.”

This new clause would establish NHS suppliers of services as the preferred providers of NHS contracts. Independent sector providers could hold NHS contracts after winning a competitive tender.

[Justin Madders]

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair this afternoon, Mr McCabe. We have arrived back at the start: the need to end the bureaucratic, expensive and ultimately corrosive requirement for compulsory competitive tendering for health services, which led the drive from NHS England and its former chief executive to first ignore the Lansley Act and ultimately push for its repeal. It turned out that trying to implement the requirements of that Act gave rise to all the problems the Opposition foresaw a decade ago.

Has the Minister seen any impact assessment of the benefits to the NHS of removing the requirements? Is he able to give us a total amount of the cost to the NHS of this folly over the past decade? Is he able to quantify exactly how much public money has been spent on lawyers and consultants going through all the hoops that were laid down by Lansley? I am not just talking about the extra work in putting the contracts out to tender in the first place, never mind the millions that will have been spent on defending and justifying decisions taken from disappointed bidders, which is a big part of it as well. Let us not forget that, as a result of that legislation, we had the obscene spectacle of the NHS being sued by Virgin Care. That certainly was not one of the benefits trailed by the Government of the time back in 2012.

--- Later in debate ---

[Justin Madders]

I picked up some interesting points. There was, I think, some common ground with the Minister about the mistakes of the past. From the contribution of my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol South, I think we have found one positive aspect of section 75, which is that it brought her to this place. At last, there is something positive to say, because we do not mourn its passing. As she said, at the time, not a single ounce of support existed for those rules outside of the coalition Government, but we will not go over all the old ground again.

In his response, the Minister talked about the “any qualified provider” regime that was introduced in 2009. My understanding is that, had we been successful at the 2010 election, we would have moved to “a preferred provider”, but, of course, when we look at the commitments made in 2010, we can forget David Cameron’s promise not to reorganise the NHS. We will see whether the Minister’s promises in respect of that are as robust.

The Minister says that what matters is the best outcome for patients, and we absolutely agree with that. We think that the best outcome for patients will be stability and a regime in which the NHS is the preferred provider, because all the evidence points to better outcomes for patients.

I am grateful to the Minister for not characterising me as dogmatic, because I do not wish to be. I wish to be pragmatic. The idea of putting into the Bill some requirements about what we expect from the regulations is a perfectly reasonable position to take, but until we see those regulations, we cannot be sure about what they will include. By supporting the amendment, what we hope to include is a base position that injects a degree of transparency, which is what has been lacking over the past 18 months, and the Bill clearly fails to refer to any particular issues in that regard. Our view is that the purpose of this Bill should be to reinforce the NHS—to bolster it—by using a preferred provider, which is why we wish to put our amendment to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Edward Argar]

I will be brief because we covered key aspects of clause 68 in debates on the amendments. The clause inserts proposed new section 12ZB into the NHS Act 2006. Section 12ZB allows the Secretary of State to make regulations setting out the regulatory framework for the procurement of healthcare services, to better meet the needs of the NHS.

Section 12ZB provides further information about the content of those regulations. They may contain provision in relation to the objectives of procurement, and they may contain provisions ensuring transparency, fairness and effective management of conflicts of interest, as well as provision for the purpose of verifying compliance with the regime. The new section also allows for NHS England to publish guidance about compliance with the new procurement requirements to which relevant authorities, as defined in the section, must have regard.

The NHS has sent us a clear message that the current regime for arranging healthcare services is not working. It is confusing, overly bureaucratic and does not fully support the integration and efficient arrangement of services and collaboration in the best interest of patients, which, of course, run through the Bill like a golden thread. Through the clause, we will develop a new provider selection regime for the NHS and public health—a bespoke NHS regime that will give the NHS and local government more discretion over how they arrange healthcare services. Informed by the consultation run by NHS England earlier this year, it will aim to enable collaboration and collective decision-making—recognising that competition is not the only way of driving service improvement. It will aim to reduce bureaucracy on commissioners and providers alike, and to remove the need for competitive tendering where it adds limited or no value.

We recognise that in many cases competition can be beneficial for procurement. Where a competitive tender is the best way for an NHS commissioning body to secure value and quality in its healthcare provision, it will be used. However, it will no longer be the default that contracts in the NHS are automatically put out to tender. All decisions about provider selection will continue to be made in an open and transparent way, considering key criteria and applying them to decision making, in the best interests of patients and the taxpayer. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Justin Madders]

I will not repeat all my comments from earlier, to save the Committee’s time. I have two remaining specific questions, which I hope the Minister can address. The clause says that regulations “may” be produced. Can he state for the record that there will be regulations? Can he also give us some indication of when they are likely to be made and when they are likely to take effect?

[Edward Argar]

I can reassure the hon. Gentleman that “may” is the technical language used in drafting such legislation, but we intend that they will be made. I am afraid I will disappoint him on the second part of his question, because I would not presume to say exactly when; that will be down to the passage of this legislation and then the usual wait and the discussions through the usual channels on securing an appropriate slot for the regulations. I hope I have given the hon. Gentleman a modicum of reassurance.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 68 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 69

Procurement and patient choice: consequential amendments etc

[Justin Madders]

I beg to move amendment 97, in clause 69, page 62, line 26, at end insert—

“(1A) In the National Health Service Act 2006, in section 272(6), after paragraph (za), insert the following paragraph—

‘(zaa) regulations under section 12ZB,’”.

This amendment would require a draft of procurement regulations under new section 12ZB of the National Health Service Act (inserted by clause 68) to be laid before, and subject to approval by resolution of, each House of Parliament.

I will not detain the Committee long on this amendment. Following on neatly from our previous discussion, it requires that the regulations, which I am now assured will be produced, are subject to a resolution of approval by both Houses. I do enjoy spending time in Delegated Legislation Committees with the Minister, and I hope we will be able to do that again as a result of this amendment’s being accepted.

[Edward Argar]

I am, as ever, grateful to the hon. Gentleman. The amendment would require a draft of procurement regulations under new section 12ZB of the National Health Service Act to be laid before, and subject to approval by resolution of, each House of Parliament. As set out in our delegated powers memorandum, the powers created by clause 68 amend the NHS Act 2006. In line with the vast majority of regulations made under that Act, these powers will be subject to the negative procedure in section 272(4) of that Act.

As demonstrated by the passage of the Health and Social Care Act 2012, there is significant parliamentary interest, both in this House and the other place, in the rules for determining how healthcare services are arranged. However, it is vital that we strike the right balance between democratic scrutiny and operational flexibility. The negative procedure provides that balance, ensuring transparency and scrutiny, while also providing sufficient flexibility to ensure that the regulations continue to drive high-quality services and value for money.

We have consulted extensively on the proposals for these regulations to ensure that we are delivering the flexibility, transparency and integrated approach that the NHS has asked for. The engagement exercise undertaken in early 2019 collected views from across the health sector, and the proposals put forward by NHS England around procurement gained widespread support, with 79% of respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing with the proposals.

Earlier this year NHS England consulted on further detail of the proposed regime that should apply when healthcare services are arranged in future, following removal of the current requirements. NHS England received a range of responses from NHS national and representative bodies. In addition to written feedback, it met NHS colleagues and external stakeholders. We have been and continue to be as transparent as possible in our approach to these proposals. Therefore, I suggest that the hon. Gentleman amendment’s is unnecessary.

[Justin Madders]

In the light of the Minister’s comments, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Edward Argar]

I will be very brief. The clause will remove the specific healthcare procurement rules that currently apply to NHS commissioners when arranging clinical healthcare services. Specifically, it will repeal sections 75 to 78 and schedule 9 to the Health and Social Care Act 2012 and revoke the National Health Service (Procurement, Patient Choice and Competition) (No.2) Regulations 2013. It also makes other minor, consequential amendments in relation to these changes and the introduction of the power to make a new provider selection regime for procurement of healthcare services under clause 68.

--- Later in debate ---

[Edward Argar]

I will try to be as brief as I can, while giving the Committee the information it wishes to have.

This package of measures is aimed at promoting collaboration in the NHS, reflecting a shift towards integration between commissioners, providers and other partners as a way of improving the healthcare people receive. Clause 70 allows for the removal of Monitor and the Competition and Markets Authority’s duties to co-operate in the exercise of their functions as concurrent competition regulators. Instead, they are replaced with a duty on NHS England to share regulatory information with, and provide assistance to, the CMA where the CMA requires it to exercise its functions.

Clause 71 removes the Competition and Markets Authority’s role in reviewing mergers solely involving NHS foundation trusts, NHS trusts or a combination of both. The CMA has led a number of investigations into NHS provider mergers or acquisitions in recent years. Although it has approved all but one merger, the investigations have been costly and time-consuming for the organisations involved.

We recognise the CMA’s important role in investigating alleged infringements of competition law and particular markets if it sees issues for consumers with reducing competition. However, as has been alluded to, the NHS is not a true market, and it has become clear that the CMA is not the right body to review NHS mergers. Instead, NHS England will continue to review all NHS provider mergers to ensure they have clear benefits for patients and the taxpayer. The CMA will retain its merger control powers in relation to the private healthcare and pharmaceutical industries, where competition plays a greater role. The NHS should be able to make decisions about provider mergers itself. Without this clause, NHS provider mergers will still be subject to costly, time-consuming investigations.

Building on the experience of the last few years, the Bill will clarify the central role of collaboration in driving performance and quality in the system. As part of that, under clause 72, we are looking to remove Monitor’s role as a concurrent competition regulator. However, although we are removing Monitor’s competition regulation functions, it is right that NHS England should continue to share regulatory information with and provide assistance to the CMA so that the CMA can carry out its functions. The clause will ensure that the CMA has the information and assistance it needs to do that in respect of its competition functions to prevent anti-competitive behaviour in the wider sector. That will ensure that the CMA can continue to make sure that the healthcare sector works for consumers, patients and the taxpayer.

The clause removes Monitor’s competition functions, which it exercises concurrently with the CMA. It also inserts schedule 12, which makes consequential amendments in relation to the removal of Monitor’s competition functions. The Health and Social Care Act 2012 allowed Monitor to exercise some of the functions that the CMA holds under the Competition Act 1998 and the Enterprise Act 2002, but solely in relation to the provision of healthcare services in England. Those included powers to take action on anti-competitive agreements and conduct in the sector and powers in relation to mergers in the sector.

The Bill will enhance collaboration between different NHS commissioners, providers and local authorities. We therefore expect that NHS England’s primary role, following its merger with Monitor, will be to support commissioners and providers to deliver safe, effective and efficient care, rather than to act as an economic or competition regulator.

While competition will continue to play an important role, including through patient choice and the new provider selection regime, it is right that the duties and role of the merged NHS England give greater weight to fostering collaboration and integration rather than enforcing competition, and that competition regulation is left to the CMA. The concurrent competition duties and functions of Monitor should therefore be removed. Schedule 12, inserted by clause 72, makes the necessary consequential amendments to take account of the removal of Monitor’s competition functions. The clause allows NHS England to work collaboratively with organisations to deliver the best possible services to patients.

Finally, clause 73 removes the CMA’s role in reviewing contested licence conditions. The licence conditions have not changed substantially since they were first agreed in 2013. However, NHS England and NHS Improvement’s oversight of the NHS has changed significantly. Their primary role is to support the delivery of safe, efficient and effective care. The merged NHS England, as provided for under this Bill, should be able to set its own licence conditions for providers and regulate providers of NHS services without needing to refer matters to an external competition regulator such as the CMA.

NHS England will remain under duties to consult with local organisations on revised licence conditions. That, alongside the removal of the CMA’s review functions, ensures that any decisions remain in the interests of the NHS as a whole. In addition, NHS England’s accountability arrangements to the Secretary of State and Parliament offer a further safeguard against disproportionate changes to licence conditions. Sufficient safeguards, such as those that I have mentioned, ensure that providers have input into any proposed changes, without the need for oversight from a third party.

We therefore believe that these measures deliver the changes that the NHS has been asking for to help it deliver the long-term plan and recover from the pandemic. I therefore commend them to the Committee.

[Justin Madders]

I will not detain the Committee long, but perhaps we need a minute to pause, because, as my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol South said on Tuesday, this marks the end of an era. Monitor is gone, competition is no more, and procurement is gone—I think—and become bespoke, to be determined in more detail in the regulations. Perhaps even more stark is the fact that ICBs now have providers on the board, having jettisoned the GPs, and that NHS England is now both an actual commissioner and a systems manager for both commissioners and providers. It feels like we are going back to the future.

As the Minister said, these clauses end the role of the Competition and Markets Authority. This is the final nail; it is perhaps the final recognition that the wild promises made about the 2012 Act have failed to achieve what they said they would. The expectations that Lansley set out back then have failed to produce any desirable results. I do not know whether Government Members wish to shed a tear at this point for the end of these measures, but, for Opposition Members, health is not a commodity; it is a right. Health is not a product, and the NHS is not—and never can be—a market.

As we see the end of the ideological attempt to create a market, Opposition Members cheer the bidding into history of this failed experiment, which should never have occurred. Turning to the actual substance of the clauses, as the Minister set out, they do what is necessary to achieve that aim.

Question put and agreed to. 

Clause 70 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. 

Clauses 71 and 72 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 12 agreed to.

Clause 73 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 74

Special Health Authorities: removal of 3 year limit

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 75 and 76 stand part.

[Edward Argar]

Clauses 74, 75 and 76 repeal the three-year time limit on special health authorities, restate the requirements for special health authorities and NHS trusts to keep proper accounts and records, and repeal the powers of the Secretary of State to make a property or staff transfer scheme.

Together, along with the provisions in the Bill to merge NHS England and NHS Improvement and the powers we will discuss in part 3 of the Bill in a few weeks’ time, these technical changes will help ensure that we have flexibility in the arm’s length body landscape to support the delivery of a world-class healthcare system.

Clause 74 repeals legislative provisions that currently impose a three-year time limit on any newly established special health authority. When the three-year time limit was initially imposed under the Health and Social Care Act 2012, it was envisaged that any future special health authority would have time-limited functions and therefore be temporary in nature. This has not proved to be the case.

The NHS Counter Fraud Authority is the only special health authority created since the time limit was introduced. The Government consider it unnecessary for the NHS Counter Fraud Authority, or any other special health authorities that are established in future, to undergo the process of extending their lifespan every three years. As well as repealing the time limit, the clause sets out changes to the statutory instrument used to create the NHS Counter Fraud Authority, to reflect the fact that there is no longer an abolition date.

Clause 75 simply tidies up provisions in the current legislation in respect of requirements to keep accounts. It restates the requirements for special health authorities and NHS trusts to keep proper accounts and records. It also restates a number of requirements in relation to the auditing and publication of accounts. This clause does not create any change in existing arrangements.

Finally, clause 76 abolishes powers taken in the Health and Social Care Act 2012 to transfer property, rights and liabilities from bodies abolished or modified by that Act. Those powers are now spent, so we are removing the clause to ensure neatness of the statute book, especially as a number of bodies in the 2012 Act are being abolished by this Bill. However, we have retained the ability to make transfer schemes in respect of previously transferred property and rights.

The Bill allows property, rights and liabilities that have been transferred previously under section 300(1), to subsequently be transferred to a Minister of the Crown, NHS England, an integrated care board, an NHS trust or foundation trust, or a qualifying company. That will ensure clarity that rights, property and liabilities are properly allocated and maintained, and not lost to the NHS.

These technical changes will support the wider intentions of the Bill to have a flexible and responsive national architecture for managing the healthcare system. I therefore propose that these clauses stand part of the Bill.

[Justin Madders]

I will not detain the Committee for long. We are enjoying the Minister’s conversion as regards the folly of the 2012 Act, this being another example of things not turning out as originally envisaged. As he said, these clauses are necessary and we will not oppose them.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 74 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 75 and 76 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 77

Abolition of Local Education and Training Boards

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Justin Madders]

I have a couple of questions for the Minister. We would more accurately describe this as a reflection of the reality on the ground, and how local education and training boards have not really been the vehicle for change that they might have been. Their original rationale was to

“build a system that is responsive to the needs of employers, the public and the service at local level.”

It seems odd that this is happening, given that the thrust of the rest of the Bill is to increase local autonomy, but I understand that the regional people boards will be taking up the majority of the slack. It raises the question of how exactly the undoubted variation in recruitment and training needs within ICBs and regions will be addressed, and how ICBs will interact. I would like to hear from the Minister about that. There is also a concern from the British Medical Association that this could mean the loss of dedicated local support systems for GP trainees, and there is some need for clarity on how that function will be met.

[Edward Argar]

The shadow Minister is right in surmising that once LETBs are abolished, their functions will be discharged by HEE directly in the manner he has set out. On his specific questions, HEE will continue to have responsibility for workforce planning and will engage with regional people boards, integrated care boards and the regional directorates of NHS England to carry out this function. Those responsibilities will be set out in a report that we will publish describing the system for assessing and meeting the workforce needs of the health service in England, as debated in relation to clause 33—to which we may yet return, either on the Floor of the House or in the other place.

We are not removing local or regional workforce planning from the statute, as the hon. Gentleman suggested; HEE will continue to have responsibility for that workforce planning. The LETBs were sub-committees of HEE and reported to the HEE board in any case, so clause 77 just removes some of the rigidity in respect of how HEE had to operate. As is the theme throughout this legislation, this clause seeks to give a greater degree of flexibility and permissiveness to allow the system to adapt to changing needs. On that basis, I ask that it stand part of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 77 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 78

Hospital patients with care and support needs: repeals etc

Health and Care Bill (Fourteenth sitting)

Justin Madders Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 19th October 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Edward Argar]

I am grateful to you, Ms Elliott, and I challenge colleagues to remember what I was saying just before the Division.

On amendment 130, having the non-executive members remove one of their own members—essentially, their colleague—could very likely create a conflict between board members, because I would not expect that to be an easy decision for any of them. Of course, we want an effective, cohesive and united board with the Secretary of State stepping in only when a real issue needs to be addressed.

We would not expect those powers to be used very often, and ideally they would never need to be used. However, it is important to have those safeguards, which would allow action to be taken quickly should there be concerns about a non-executive member of the board.

Finally, I will speak about amendments 129 and 132 to 135, which look to mandate the creation and role of a chief finance officer for HSSIB. If I have understood the wording of amendment 129 correctly, the intention is to ensure that the chief finance officer of HSSIB is one of the executive members. As HSSIB is an independent NDPB, the recruitment of the executive members will be led by the non-executive members. It will be for them to take decisions about the composition of the executive members of the board, taking into account the balance of skills and experience required to lead the organisation in its vital work.

If the non-executive members were of the view that a chief financial officer’s skills would help the board’s work and complement the knowledge, skills and experience held by the existing non-executive and executive members, this would be a board role. There is nothing in the Bill, as it is currently drafted, to prevent the non-executive members from doing that.

It will be important for HSSIB, as an independent body, to be fully on top of finance and accounting decisions, and that is already reflected in the Bill. The constitution, which is set out in part 1 of schedule 13, includes a number of requirements in relation to funding and finance to ensure that that is managed correctly by HSSIB. For example, paragraph 12(1) of schedule 13 expressly states that HSSIB must exercise its functions economically, as well as effectively and efficiently. Paragraph 16 relates to the use of income from charges, and paragraphs 18 and 19 relate to the accounts of HSSIB. It is for HSSIB to decide how best to ensure it fulfils these duties, but I hope it is reassuring that the constitution underlines the importance of running HSSIB economically and the requirements for annual accounts, as would be expected of a public body.

Amendments 132 to 135 look to remove from the Secretary of State the responsibility to set the remuneration for non-executive members of HSSIB, and to give that power to the chief finance officer instead. The amendments present some challenges, which I will outline here.

In respect of public appointments, the governance code for public appointments states that

“Ministers must be consulted before a competition opens to agree the job description for the role, the length of tenure and remuneration.”

A number of non-departmental public bodies follow this code, such as the Care Quality Commission, the Human Tissue Authority and the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, to name a few. There is no reason why the arrangements for HSSIB should differ from those of other non-departmental public bodies.

We wish to ensure the independence of HSSIB’s board, and I know that hon. Members feel strongly about that, too. Giving a chief finance officer control over the remuneration of non-executive members means that the Secretary of State and, via the Secretary of State, Parliament would not have full oversight of how public money is spent. Although I am sure that the non-executive board members would act with the utmost integrity, we must ensure that the legislation supports them to do so as far as possible, and that we do not deviate from standard practice in public appointments. For those reasons, I ask hon. Members not to press their amendments, and I commend this clause and schedule to the Committee.

[Justin Madders (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair this afternoon, Ms Elliot. I am grateful to the Minister for setting out the Department’s position on the clause and the accompanying schedule. The proposed amendments relate to the establishment of HSSIB. As he has said, it builds on the work carried out by the Healthcare Safety Investigation Branch, which was established without statutory basis in 2016 and became operational in April 2017.

The Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee identified in April 2016—more than five and a half years ago—that this legislation was necessary, and I am pleased to see that it is finally being brought forward. The Health Service Safety Investigations Bill, which was introduced in the House of Lords in 2019, did not proceed because of the calling of a general election, on which the Opposition do not wish to linger.

As other members of the Committee may have done, I have raised with the Healthcare Safety Investigation Branch both system-wide issues and individual matters on behalf of constituents. My experience has suggested that there are wider issues that need investigating, so we welcome this opportunity to discuss and set out in legislation the powers and remit of the body.

Unfortunately, some details are lacking from part 4 of the Bill, which we think represents a missed opportunity to set them out a bit more precisely. We should not miss the opportunity to ensure that this body can truly improve healthcare, as we will demonstrate with our amendments, notwithstanding what the Minster has said. We are trying to do our utmost to ensure that HSSIB has the independence, the resources and the influence it requires to operate at its maximum potential. Lessons must be learned from the experience of the Healthcare Safety Investigation Branch, which has undoubtedly had some impact. However, in many ways, its work has not had the impact it might have had, because its reach has been limited for a variety of reasons that are entirely out of its control.

Keith Conradi, the chief investigator of the Healthcare Safety Investigation Branch, touched on that during the second sitting of this Committee, when he commented on how the branch had been operating in shadow form, without any real powers. We have discussed the powers of HSSIB, especially in terms of access to information and compelling people to co-operate with investigations. However, it is what happens after the final report, and ensuring that those recommendations are acted on, that will have the largest impact on patient safety and driving through improvements.

A recent example of the work of the Healthcare Safety Investigation Branch is its investigation into wrong site surgery, through the wrong patients being identified in outpatient departments. The reference for the investigation was evidence from the NHS national reporting and learning system that the incorrect identification of patients is a contributing factor in patients receiving the wrong procedure. The safety recommendation to NHS England was to lead a review of risks relating to patient identification in out-patient settings, and to assess the feasibility to enhance or implement systematic controls such as technological options or the use of the NHS unique identification number. NHS England responded by stating that the work would require an understanding of the true scale and impact of the risks through observational study, which would be resource heavy. It said that, without evidence of the risk, that would did not justify the cost. Hence, the recommendation was considered but not acted on.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

We now come to amendments 127 to 135, which have just been debated. Does the hon. Gentleman wish to move any of these amendments?

[Justin Madders]

The Committee will be relieved to know that I will not move every single one of them. What the Minister said about the pre-appointment process is helpful. As my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol South said, it is not a perfect solution—

[The Chair]

Mr Madders, the opportunity to debate was before. You just need to indicate which amendments you wish to move.

[Justin Madders]

I wish to move amendments 130 and 131, and I will not press amendments 127 to 129 and amendments 132 to 135.

Amendment proposed: 130, page 204, line 32, leave out “The Secretary of State” and insert

“A majority of non-executive members following a vote”.—(Justin Madders.)

This amendment would give a majority of non-executive members the power to remove a person from office following a vote.

--- Later in debate ---

Division 26

Ayes: 5

---

Labour: 5

Noes: 10

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Conservative: 10

[Justin Madders]

I beg to move amendment 131, in schedule 13, page 204, line 37, leave out sub-paragraph (4).—(Justin Madders.)

This amendment would remove sub-paragraph 4 from schedule 13 of the Bill, which confers powers on the Secretary of State to remove a person from office in HSSIB.

--- Later in debate ---

[Edward Argar]

This clause sets out what HSSIB will be doing. Its remit will be to investigate qualifying incidents in England occurring in the NHS and also in the independent sector. Its aim is to improve learning from events of harm and reduce the risk of reoccurrence for future patients across the whole health system. The Bill defines qualifying incidents as incidents that occur in England during the provision of healthcare services and that have or may have implications for the safety of patients. Based on its findings, it will be for HSSIB to recommend improvements to systems and practices.

I want to come on to an important point about the role of investigations. The aim of the investigations will not be to apportion blame but to foster a strong learning culture and make sure that, ultimately, patients get the best care they rightly deserve, wherever they are patients. For that reason, we have specified that HSSIB’s investigative function is not for the purposes of assessing or determining blame, civil or criminal liability or action to be taken by a professional regulator in respect of an individual. That important point is reflected throughout the HSSIB provisions, including in respect of the requirements and admissibility of HSSIB reports. I will expand on those points when we reach those specific provisions. I hope that being clear on those points in legislation will foster a culture of openness and continuous improvement and learning, so that the whole of society benefits.

[Justin Madders]

As we have heard, the clause covers investigations of incidents with safety implications, confirming that qualifying incidents must take place in England during the provision of healthcare services, with the investigations identifying and addressing risks by

“facilitating the improvement of systems and practices”.

I do not know whether the Minister can neatly sum up what “facilitating” actually means in this context, but as we will cover in other clauses, there are certainly some concerns about how exactly improvements will be delivered—some have been touched on already.

Keith Conradi confirmed during his appearance before the Committee that currently, recommendations are monitored “informally” by NHS Improvement, and he suggested that a “pan-regulation-type body” might be needed to consider

“whether the outcome…mitigated the patient safety risk.”––[Official Report, Health and Care Public Bill Committee, 7 September 2021; c. 61, Q79.]

That sounds like a suggestion that needs consideration, because it would ensure that recommendations made by HSSIB and the responses from NHS England, or whichever appropriate body is required to respond, are acted on and assessed.

If we are to improve patient safety, it seems unusual not to have any provision or mechanism to follow up on recommendations. Earlier, I referred to the recent investigation into the identification of outpatients, where, sadly, the recommendation was not acted on, largely because of the cost of complying with it. The Bill does nothing to clarify how funding will be made available to act on recommendations from HSSIB on improving patient safety. What mechanism will be in place for when recommendations are not followed, or for when they are followed but do not have the desired effect?

We must avoid the scenario in which HSSIB is essentially a toothless body whose well-intentioned recommendations are simply kicked into the long grass. In response to the Select Committee’s investigation into the safety of maternity services in England, the Healthcare Safety Investigation Branch stated that

“for various reasons, some trusts have struggled to recognise the information we are presenting to them or to prioritise the actions necessary to address the risks. We understand the many pressures on trusts and that maternity services are a product of systems not all within the full control of individual organisations; sometimes solutions do not appear easily achievable.”

In a nutshell, the Bill fails to set out how that very real problem will be addressed under HSSIB, which demonstrates why we have been arguing for further consideration of how monitoring and assessment of recommendations is to be delivered.

--- Later in debate ---

[Justin Madders]

I beg to move amendment 101, in clause 95, page 86, line 37, at end insert—

“(10) Following any direction under subsection (2) the HSSIB may—

(a) request additional funding in order to carry out the investigation; and

(b) at the discretion of the chief investigator, decline to carry out the investigation.

(11) Following any direction under subsection (2) the Secretary of State—

(a) must have no further involvement with how the investigation is pursued;

(b) may not give a direction which directs the outcome of an investigation; and

(c) must have no involvement in the formulation of the investigation’s recommendations.”.

This amendment would ensure that HSSIB would maintain its independence following any direction from the Secretary of State to carry out an investigation and can request additional funding in order to carry out the investigation.

I hope my voice holds out, although I hope I will not be speaking for quite as long on this amendment. It addresses a familiar theme. It seeks to preserve the independence of HSSIB’s decision making, with particular reference to clause 95 (2), which gives the Secretary of State the power to direct HSSIB to carry out investigations.

The Joint Committee on the Draft Health Service Safety Investigations Bill raised concerns about the role of the Secretary of State in making representations about investigating an incident. The Government agreed to remove the mention of the Secretary of State to make it clear that the role would not amount to a direction by a Minister. In that light, it is difficult to understand why the Government have now decided to install a power on the Secretary of State to direct investigations. It is questionable whether such a power is even needed, if HSSIB falls into line with the practice of the Healthcare Safety Investigation Branch, which can accept referrals from anyone. If the Secretary of State has concerns relating to patients, he should surely be able to put those matters to HSSIB anyway, as anyone who has safety concerns can. HSSIB can then reach a decision based on the criteria that it has set out on whether to investigate, which we will return to later.

If HSSIB becomes the investigatory body for the Secretary of State, depending on how often the power is used, that could downgrade other safety concerns and also erode public, patient and staff confidence that HSSIB is a truly independent body. The Joint Committee on the Draft Health Service Safety Investigations Bill commented:

“Our witnesses were united in stating that HSSIB will be neither trusted nor effective unless it is, and is seen to be, independent of both health service bodies…and the Department of Health and Social Care. Only this will provide confidence that HSSIB will neither cover up failures by clinicians and trusts nor conceal issues that might cause political embarrassment.”

By allowing the Secretary of State the power to direct the investigations, trust in HSSIB is brought into question. The amendment would make it clear that if the power is needed—the Minister can try to convince us that it is—HSSIB could request additional funding in order to carry out that investigation, and the chief investigator would have the power to decline to carry out the investigation. It would also ensure that if the investigation does proceed, the Secretary of State has no further role once it has started. If this power is needed, we think the amendment would create sufficient safeguards to ensure the independence of HSSIB, by ensuring that the chief investigator cannot have its own judgment and decisions superseded by the Secretary of State.

[Edward Argar]

I am grateful to the shadow Minister for bringing this discussion before the Committee today. [Interruption.] I will talk for a little while to allow him enough time to have a glass of water to try to preserve his voice and mine for another few hours at least. As he set out, the amendment seeks to ensure that HSSIB would be able to make its own decision on whether to pursue an investigation requested by the Secretary of State and ask for funding; it would also ensure that if an investigation went ahead, the Secretary of State would have no influence on the detail of that investigation.

I reassure the hon. Gentleman that, as I said earlier, we remain fully committed to the independence of HSSIB, which is of course the reason why we want to establish it as a non-departmental public body with its own statutory powers. Under our approach, the Secretary of State would be able to direct HSSIB to carry out an investigation, but only if there has been an incident that has caused particular concern. The power to direct at subsection (2) is only in relation to carrying out an investigation; it is not about directing the outcome for an individual. That is an important distinction—we can ask them to do it, but it is not about directing the outcome. I believe that is right for the Secretary of State with responsibility for the health of the nation to have a power to direct the carrying-out of an investigation, so that he is able to respond to emergent or ongoing safety priorities or issues of concern, asking that they be considered.

The measure will ensure effective and proportionate accountability between the Department and its arm’s-length bodies, and between the Department and the House and the other place. However, while the Secretary of State may request an investigation, as I have said, he cannot direct the body on how to conduct any particular investigation and will have no role in it, as he does not have any such power. I hope that offers some reassurance to the shadow Minister. The measure therefore does not encroach on the independence of HSSIB’s findings, which are one of the key concerns that the amendments seek to draw out or shine a light on, so I hope I have provided some reassurance.

In addition, should HSSIB wish to discontinue an investigation, it may determine to do so, setting out the reason why it will not be investigating an incident. That would include any investigation, including one requested by the Secretary of State. HSSIB could discontinue an investigation, but would have to explain its thinking, which is not an unreasonable balance to seek to strike.

To turn to the question of funding, the amendment seeks to ensure that, in the case of a request by the Secretary of State to carry out an investigation, HSSIB may ask for additional funding. We have estimated, in our current analysis of workloads, HSSIB is likely to carry out up to 30 investigations a year, which allows sufficient flexibility to ensure that in the event that an investigation requested by the Secretary of State goes ahead, adequate resources remain.

On the process for the Secretary of State requesting an investigation, the limitations on the Secretary of State’s ability to be involved in the investigation, and the ability of HSSIB to determine whether it will pursue an investigation further, I hope that I have offered sufficient reassurance to the Committee. Therefore, I hope that the shadow Minister will consider withdrawing his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Edward Argar]

I take the hon. Lady’s point. That is not the intention, to prejudge or predetermine. It is what is sought with the investigation. I take the point about the language, which is important. The measure in essence requires HSSIB to notify the public that it is looking into a particular circumstance or complaint. I think “issues” still works, but I take her point that we cannot prejudge, and nor should HSSIB, where its investigation is going, which rabbit hole it will take it down, what it might find, but that is a point of language. I hope that I have reassured her, but I accept that we always need to be careful about the language.

[Justin Madders]

I am grateful for the Minister’s investigation, but I am still not clear why an additional power needs to be set out in the Bill. My understanding is that anyone can make a referral anyway, so why this has to be set out in black and white is a mystery to me. Despite what the Minister has said, it is important to have the amendment in the Bill, because it will give patients and the public confidence that there will not be interference or challenges that undermine the notion of independence. We will press the amendment to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Division 28

Ayes: 5

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Labour: 5

Noes: 10

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Conservative: 10

[Justin Madders]

I beg to move amendment 122, in clause 95, page 86, line 37, at end insert—

‘(10) The Secretary of State must by regulations lay out a process to challenge a decision made by HSSIB not to investigate a qualifying incident.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to put in place a mechanism through which any decision by HSSIB not to investigate a qualifying incident could be challenged.

We have had some discussion about the matters that may be chosen by HSSIB to be investigated, but it is probably more pertinent for the purposes of considering this amendment that we discuss what happens when HSSIB decides not to investigate. Amendment 122 would require a mechanism to be put in place so that any decision by HSSIB not to investigate a qualifying incident could be challenged. If the independence of the body and faith in its purpose are to be protected, it is essential that there is a mechanism whereby HSSIB decision making can be challenged. That is especially true when we consider the role of families in the investigation process.

My experience with HSSIB came when a patient safety concern was raised by a constituent, and after that concern was not investigated it brought home to me the distress and feeling of being let down by a refusal to investigate. Without a mechanism to challenge such a refusal, faith in HSSIB could be damaged by effectively creating a dead end to further inquiries.

I should point out that in the particular circumstances that I have just referred to HSSIB agreed to a meeting and it set out in more detail its reasons for not investigating, but that might not be possible in all situations. That meeting aided my constituent’s understanding of why their request was refused, but it did not actually mean that they agreed with HSSIB’s decision. Consequently, our view is that there needs to be some sort of process—we do not intend to set out today what it should be—set out in regulations to ensure that those who make a referral have the opportunity to articulate their concerns if that referral should not go on to be investigated. In conclusion, if the purpose of HSSIB is to improve patient safety, we should ensure that collaborative approaches are enshrined in legislation, and we believe that a mechanism along the lines of what we have set out in the amendment would go some way towards achieving that.

[Edward Argar]

I am grateful to the shadow Minister for setting out the background to his amendment, with which he seeks to ensure that a process is set out in regulations to allow the challenging of a decision by HSSIB when it has decided not to investigate a qualifying incident. However, I have to say that I do not think that this measure would necessarily be proportionate. The Bill already sets out, in clause 95 (8) and (9), that where HSSIB makes a decision not to pursue an investigation, it may explain the reasons behind that decision and communicate those reasons to those people with an interest.

It may be that the Government or others want to understand more about how HSSIB reached a decision, but setting out within regulations a fixed process to challenge HSSIB’s decisions would again risk being disproportionate. If HSSIB discontinues an investigation that it has started, then it must publish a statement that reports that it has discontinued the investigation and give its reasons for doing so. I believe that gives a high level of transparency in that circumstance.

I do not believe that it would be proportionate to take the same approach when an investigation has not even been commenced. The key theme running through these discussions, which we have heard about in our consideration of previous clauses, is the independence of HSSIB, and its ability to determine these matters and make its decisions in an independent way. I fear that this amendment sits slightly uneasily with that principle.

As I said, we intend HSSIB to carry out an estimated 30 investigations a year, so there is not the intention, even at the outset, that HSSIB should investigate all qualifying incidents. It is for HSSIB to determine that, so I do not think it would be the best use of HSSIB and its expertise to go through a formal process to explain why it has determined not to investigate incidents. We want HSSIB’s resource to go into investigating the qualifying incidents that it has determined to investigate.

I suspect we will return to this theme again in the course of our discussions, but I believe it is important that, as the expert body, HSSIB is given the autonomy to make its own decisions about what to investigate. Any such decision would of course need to stand up to scrutiny, and of course, as part of our own arrangements, we will need to ensure consistency, while at the same time ensuring that HSSIB’s autonomy is respected as it should be. That is a difficult balance, but it is one we need to ensure we strike. I therefore encourage the shadow Minister to not press his amendment to a Division.

[Justin Madders]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Edward Argar]

During our debate on amendments 101 and 122, we discussed a number of the key themes that run through clause 95. This clause sets out that, as an independent body, HSSIB will be able to decide its own priorities and determine which qualifying incidents it investigates. We would expect this to be the result of referrals it receives, but also its own intelligence. The clause also gives the Secretary of State powers to direct HSSIB to carry out an investigation when, for example, there has been an incident that has caused a particular concern, and it allows the Secretary of State to request a report to be produced by a specified date.

I appreciate that, as we have heard today, some could argue that the clause could be perceived to encroach on the independence of HSSIB. I hope I set out in my earlier remarks why I do not take that view, and why I believe it is right that the Secretary of State, who has responsibility for the health of the nation, has such a power and is able to respond to emerging, ongoing safety priorities or issues of concern. I believe that this measure strikes the right balance, providing the Secretary of State with that flexibility while ensuring effective and proportionate accountability. HSSIB is not bound to follow the instruction, but it is bound to explain why it deems it unnecessary, or why it has determined it should not pursue a particular investigation request.

[Edward Argar]

I am very grateful to my hon. Friend for making that point, and I put on record my gratitude—our gratitude—to him for his work, which he alluded to. He is right: one of the key things we would hope HSSIB would seek to do, where it was supported by the evidence, is to join the dots where there is a systemic issue—not just in an individual trust, for example, but an underlying issue for the Department or the NHS as a whole—and be able to reflect that in its decisions on what to work on and how to broaden the scope if it deemed that to be necessary.

Clause 95 provides that whenever HSSIB decides to undertake an investigation, it is required to make a public announcement, setting out briefly what it will be investigating and what it expects to consider during the investigation. I take the point made by the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire: that announcement should give the public an indication of the fact that something is being looked at, but it should not limit which leads—for want of a better way of putting it—HSSIB decides are worthy of investigation and of following. HSSIB will also be able to get in contact in advance with anyone who it thinks may be affected by the investigation. This may, for example, include patients, families or any individual who has referred the incidents to HSSIB, a trust or other healthcare provider.

Finally, there may be occasions when HSSIB decides not to investigate an issue or to discontinue with an investigation. Clause 95 covers those scenarios. If HSSIB decides to discontinue the investigation of an issue, we have set out that it should make a public statement explaining the reasons for doing so. If HSSIB decides not to investigate a qualifying incident, it will be able to give notice of the decision to those who it considers might be affected by it and to explain the reasons to those who have an interest in it.

I hope colleagues on the Committee will agree that the provisions are necessary for HSSIB to be in control of the qualifying incidents and to investigate and to ensure transparency about what investigations are being carried out or discontinued by the agency. We expect that the Secretary of State’s power of direction will be exercised extremely sparingly but it can ensure that crucial patient safety issues can always be focused on where appropriate. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.

[Justin Madders]

These processes will be critical if HSSIB is to function properly. The Minister has had three or four attempts to explain why the Secretary the State needs the power to direct when he can make referrals anyway, but we are still to understand why that power needs to be there. If the Secretary of State asked HSSIB to undertake an investigation, it would jolly well get on and do it. That aside, we will not be voting against the clause.

Question put and agreed to.  

Clause 95 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. 

Clause 96

Criteria, Principles and Processes

[Justin Madders]

I beg to move amendment 123, in clause 96, page 87, line 22, after “State,” insert—

“(aa) trade unions,

(ab) patients,”

This returns to the issue of the criteria for investigations. If they were set out in the Bill, that would perhaps allow the power to direct to be mitigated in some way. We would then at least know whether the directions given by the Secretary of State were reasonable, judged against HSSIB’s own criteria. There is a void in the clause because it should set out unambiguously what criteria are applied when decisions are made. It is silent on that, and the response might be that that is deliberately so in order that HSSIB be truly independent. That might be a slightly stronger argument if the Secretary of State were not hand-picking most of the main positions in the body.

We have been asked to give HSSIB a blank cheque, but clause 96 says:

“The HSSIB must determine and publish—

(a) the criteria it will use in determining which incidents it investigates,

(b) the principles which are to govern investigations,

(c) the processes to be followed in carrying out investigations”.

We think it not inconsistent with the body’s independence for Parliament to have a role in setting out what those processes will be, particularly if they result from consultations with stakeholders, patient groups, trade unions and so on.

Although I appreciate that subsection (7) requires consultation with the Secretary of State and

“any other persons the HSSIB considers appropriate”

for there to be any revision to criteria, principles and processes, it does not set out a statutory requirement for wider involvement to take place. During consideration of the draft Health Service Safety Investigations Bill, the Royal College of Nursing recommended that consultation on criteria take place with healthcare professionals, patients and families to ensure that any investigation remained patient focused. Given the importance of the criteria in HSSIB’s function and the reach it will actually have, establishing the body without any such framework does not allow it to be scrutinised in the way that we would like.

To return to the point made by the RCN on investigations being patient focused, subsection (1)(d) does allow some limited focus to ensure that patients’ families are involved in investigations

“so far as reasonable and practical”

and that anything published is easily accessible and understood. That is welcome, and it enshrines the recommendations made by individuals, Healthwatch and the Nursing and Midwifery Council to the Joint Committee on the Draft Health Service Safety Investigations Bill. Matthew McClelland, the NMC’s director of fitness to practise, said it was critical to do that to

“put patient voices right at the centre of investigations”.

We wholeheartedly agree. That position is also supported by Healthwatch England, which commented that

“you can learn only if you really engage people properly in that process.”

However, we can see no set role for patient groups in establishing criteria, principles and processes. The Opposition think that side-lining such groups in the legislation sets the wrong precedent for their future involvement. Our amendment would change subsection (7) to create a safety net, ensuring that the patient voice and staff views are at the heart of any further consultations on changes considered by the branch.

[Edward Argar]

Clause 96 outlines that HSSIB must determine and publish certain criteria, principles and processes, including the criteria that it will use when deciding which qualifying incidents to investigate. The hon. Gentleman’s amendment would require HSSIB specifically to consult trade unions and patients when considering or reviewing criteria, principles and processes. I am not convinced that that is the most appropriate approach.

The clause, which I suspect we will turn to immediately after the debate, includes a number of references to “patients and their families”. HSSIB will need to set out how it will involve them in investigations as far as is reasonably practicable. It will also need to ensure that such processes are easily accessible and understood by families and patients.

I am sure that families and patients will be very much part of HSSIB’s considerations, as they are for the current Healthcare Safety Investigation Branch. However, the decision about who is consulted is best left to HSSIB, which will be best placed to determine who is appropriate. Again, that goes to the point of independence and flexibility to follow the evidence and determine where it thinks is the most appropriate place to go.

Similarly, on trade unions, as I have said in the Committee, while on occasion I suspect I may not agree with them, I recognise the vital role that they play in our country’s democracy. Again, it is important that HSSIB can judge when or whether to consult with them, depending on the issue involved. An approach where some groups are specified in legislation as needing to be consulted but not others may give the impression that some organisations or groups carry greater weight. It is important that, as HSSIB looks at each qualifying incident, it can judge what is the most appropriate balance for consultation.

The amendment would also mean that specific groups would always need to be consulted when it may not be appropriate in each case, dependent on the circumstances under consideration. I therefore think it is right that it will be for HSSIB to make decisions as to who it considers appropriate to consult. I hope that, in the spirit of striking the right balance in preserving HSSIB’s independence, the hon. Gentleman might consider withdrawing his amendment.

[Justin Madders]

The Minister is right; it should be up to HSSIB to decide who it consults. That is why it is seems superfluous to have a requirement in the clause that it must consult the Secretary of State. However, I cannot imagine a circumstance in which HSSIB would not want to consult him or her. Indeed, I cannot imagine patient groups and trade unions not being part of the conversation in most circumstances. We think we will need to keep an eye on this as matters progress. However, we have made our point and will not press the amendment to a vote, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Edward Argar]

Clause 96 provides that HSSIB determines and publishes the criteria it will use when deciding which qualifying incidents to investigate, as well as the timescales by which investigations will be completed. The clause therefore ensures that HSSIB will be transparent in how it will work and will have the flexibility to determine the most appropriate investigation methods depending on the type of inquiry. The current body, the Healthcare Safety Investigation Branch, has a wealth of experience and has been conducting investigations since 2017, so it already has a solid base to build on to inform the criteria, principles and processes for its future investigations.

--- Later in debate ---

In determining the criteria, HSSIB must consult the Secretary of State and any other person it considers appropriate. HSSIB must review the criteria, principles and processes within three years of first publishing them and then at least once every five years thereafter. It must consult the Secretary of State and other persons it considers appropriate as and when determining and revising such criteria, principles and processes. The overall aim of the clause is to encourage continuous improvement in how investigations are carried out, using any important learning to inform the new criteria, principles and processes that will be followed, and ensuring that HSSIB is at all times accessible to patients and their families. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Justin Madders]

As the Minister said, this is an important clause as it will ensure some transparency in HSSIB’s operation. Like him, Opposition Members welcome the emphasis on patients and their families and on making sure that the body’s processes are accessible and easily understood by them, because that is at the heart of making sure that HSSIB is a success. It will not be successful unless people can see and understand exactly how things have changed. As we know from many tragic cases in the NHS, one of the most important things that families want is to know that things have changed, so that whatever terrible incident happened to them and their loved ones does not happen to someone else in the future.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 96 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 97

Final reports

[Justin Madders]

I beg to move amendment 124, in clause 97, page 88, line 15, leave out subsection (7) and insert—

“(7) The final report must be sent to the Secretary of State.

(8) Within 12 months of each final report being sent to the Secretary of State under subsection (7), a report must be laid before Parliament setting out the steps the Secretary of State has taken as a result.”.

The amendment seeks to ensure that each investigation report produced by the HSSIB is sent to the Secretary of State, who must report to Parliament on what steps have been taken as a result.

The clause deals with the final reports of HSSIB, which essentially will be about the manner in which improvements to systems and practices can be facilitated by the body. While the provision requires a final report to be published, only in subsection (7) is there a requirement for the report to be sent to the Secretary of State, and only in those cases where a direction has been given by the Secretary of State to investigate. Given the role of HSSIB, and to ensure that its functions are met, the amendment would require all final reports to be sent to the Secretary of State, who must present them to Parliament within 12 months outlining what steps had been taken. That would offer a safeguard and ensure some oversight from Parliament in considering HSSIB’s effectiveness and the improvements being made on patient safety.

As the Joint Committee on the Draft Health Service Safety Investigations Bill commented:

“There was widespread agreement among our witnesses that there would be more confidence in HSSIB’s independence were it to be accountable to Parliament rather than to the Secretary of State. When asked whether accountability to Parliament might not also be seen as political influence, Professor Toft responded that accountability through a cross-party committee was more likely to inspire confidence than to a single Minister, and that a committee was more likely to scrutinise and not to give directions.”

If there is to be faith in HSSIB, we must heed the Joint Committee’s warnings and ensure that the reporting mechanism is sufficient to ensure confidence in the body and to prevent reports from simply being filed away without scrutiny. I hope that the Minister will agree that confidence in HSSIB and its effectiveness to improve patient safety are integral and that he will support the amendment. There has been a little concern about placing requirements on the Secretary of State throughout proceedings on the Bill, so I hope that a requirement for him to present a report once every 12 months would not be too onerous but will be considered an appropriate and acceptable measure.

[Edward Argar]

Clause 97 deals with HSSIB’s final report following an investigation and sets out what a report should include, such as the overall findings, with analysis of what has happened. If the report concerns an investigation that the Secretary of State directed HSSIB to undertake, HSSIB will be required to send a copy of the report to the Secretary of State. I understand that the purpose of amendment 124 is to require the Secretary of State to consider the report and then report to Parliament within 12 months on what action has been taken as a result. Although I can certainly see that the purpose of the amendment is to ensure transparency, accountability and follow-up, I am not convinced that it is the right way to achieve that understandable and legitimate aim.

We expect HSSIB to conduct about 30 investigations a year, which means that the Secretary of State would need to report on 30 separate reports. I worry that that would be unnecessarily burdensome without delivering significant improvements in patient safety. The final HSSIB report will be published, and we expect that the recommendations will most likely be directed at and actioned by others. Organisations are required to respond to HSSIB’s recommendations, and HSSIB may publish those responses. Therefore, it is not necessary for the Secretary of State to publish an additional report, particularly if there is no action for the Secretary of State to take following HSSIB’s recommendations.

Parliament will be able to use its normal routes to hold Ministers to account and ask what progress has been made following these reports, which of course will be published by HSSIB and open to public scrutiny. I do not consider it necessary for HSSIB to send the Secretary of State a copy of the report, as this will be available to everybody without that additional step. I will therefore encourage the shadow Minister to consider withdrawing his amendment.

[Justin Madders]

The Minister makes some fair points, and we are aware that there are other channels to pursue these matters. However, it did seem a bit incongruous that the Secretary of State would have certain requirements on him if he directed a report but not otherwise. Again, we will see, as the body moves forward over the next few years, whether the scrutiny arrangements in place are indeed effective, so we will not press the amendment to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Edward Argar]

Clause 97 deals with HSSIB’s final report following an investigation. It sets out that a report should include the overall findings, with analysis of what has happened. It is important that the emphasis of any such report is put on identifying risks to the safety of patients and addressing those risks by facilitating the improvement of systems and practices in the provision of NHS services or other healthcare services in England. Therefore, HSSIB should include recommendations about how any risks should be addressed. If an investigation has been commissioned by the Secretary of State, HSSIB will be required to send a copy of the report to the Secretary of State.

As I have mentioned previously, we are clear that the purpose of any investigation is to address issues so that we improve patient safety. We want to ensure that the NHS gains as much as it can from all investigations, even if they may not always relate to the NHS. The clause therefore sets out that if the investigation relates to an incident that has not occurred during the provision of NHS services, HSSIB must consider whether the systems and practices in the provision of NHS services could be improved.

The clause also sets out that there should be no assessment of blame, civil or criminal liability, or whether regulatory action should be taken against an individual in the report. That is not the role of HSSIB investigations, and any such assessment would discourage individuals from speaking candidly to HSSIB and could result in lessons not being learned. HSSIB plays a complementary but very different role from the police and regulators. Finally, the clause allows HSSIB to release protected material as part of the report if certain criteria are met.

The purpose of this clause is to set out the expectations on reporting from HSSIB following an investigation. I therefore commend it to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 97 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 98

Interim reports

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Edward Argar]

These clauses continue on the same theme as clause 97 and focus on HSSIB’s reports. I turn first to clause 98, which essentially allows HSSIB to publish an interim report with findings, recommendations and conclusions before the final report. The aim of the interim report is to address urgent risks to the safety of patients or issues that are known early in an investigation, so that swift action can be taken and lessons can be learned across healthcare systems as findings emerge.

Clause 99 requires HSSIB to share a draft of an interim report or a final report with those who are likely to be adversely affected by it, and to seek their comments—that might be NHS staff or other participants. HSSIB may also share a draft report with any other person who they believe should be sent a copy, which might include patients and families. That is to ensure that the interim and final reports are robust and an accurate reflection of what has happened, adding to the rigour of the investigation. It also gives individuals an opportunity to respond to adverse findings in advance of publication of the report.

Clause 100 describes what needs to happen once an interim report or a final report is published by HSSIB. It requires the addressees of the report to provide a response to the recommendations within the timeframe specified by HSSIB, and HSSIB may publish the response. The clause will ensure that it is clear and transparent what actions will be taken to address the recommendations. The clause is drafted to ensure that it does not encroach on the devolved competence of Wales. For example, the duty to respond to recommendations would not apply to any body that is or could be established by the Welsh Parliament. HSSIB may still make recommendations to persons in Wales, and certain types of organisations would be required to respond—for example, a private sector organisation in the health sector. The clause will ensure that there is follow-up to the recommendations in the report from HSSIB.

Finally, clause 101 sets out that unless the High Court makes an order to the contrary, final and interim reports prepared by HSSIB following an investigation, including drafts of the reports, are not admissible in proceedings to determine civil or criminal liability, proceedings before any employment tribunal, proceedings before a regulatory body—including proceedings for the purpose of investigating an allegation—and proceedings to determine an appeal against a decision made in any of the above types of proceedings. That is a demonstration of our commitment, as mentioned before, that we want the investigations to provide useful learning and foster a continuous improvement mindset for the benefit of all patients, rather than apportion blame.

There may be circumstances whereby a person involved in the above proceedings applies to the High Court for the report to be admissible. In that case, it will be for the High Court to determine whether it is in the interests of justice for such information to be made admissible, using the test set out in the Bill: whether the interests of justice are served by admitting the report and outweigh any adverse impact on investigations by deterring people from giving information to inform an investigation and any adverse impact on securing the improvement of the safety of healthcare services provided to patients in England. I suspect this is a theme that we will explore when we debate subsequent clauses and amendments. I know that the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire will wish to explore it further when we reach those clauses.

Clause 101 clarifies the circumstances under which a report can be used in legal proceedings. It is an important element of ensuring that safe space works in the way we intend, strikes an appropriate balance and encourages individuals to speak to HSSIB in a candid way. However, we rightly also provide the High Court order safeguard, so that the interests of justice can also be taken into account where appropriate. We believe that strikes an appropriate balance in this particular context, and that these clauses set out important provisions regarding HSSIB’s reports. I therefore commend the clauses to the Committee.

[Justin Madders]

I am grateful to the Minister for setting out the provisions here, and the ability to produce interim reports under clause 98 is welcome. We can all envisage circumstances in which such action would be of benefit. I note that the requirement to circulate the report to all interested parties in draft form also applies to interim reports. On clause 99, which is about draft reports, I agree that it is right that HSSIB should be able to judge for itself to whom it is appropriate for the draft report to be made available. Under clause 99(4), however, is there a need for comments that are not accepted in the draft stage to be published alongside HSSIB’s response, explaining why those comments have not been accepted at the same time as the final report is published? I do not think that is something that needs to be prescribed in legislation, but it may be something that HSSIB considers doing in some form, and I would be grateful for the Minister’s comments on the desirability or otherwise of such a move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Edward Argar]

I take the hon. Lady’s point. As I set out in response to earlier amendments and preceding clauses, I believe that we have struck the right balance on the obligation to respond and act, but I acknowledge, as I frequently do in these Committees, her expertise, particularly in this area, having sat on the Committee that previously considered the matter. I think that we have struck the right balance, but I am always happy to reflect further.

I can give the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston, within bounds, the reassurance, or agreement with what he is saying, that he seeks, with a caveat: I would hope that transparency and publication should be at the fore, but in doing that, and determining the other points that he raised, as he acknowledged that is for HSSIB to reflect on and consider within the context of its independence. I would hope, and expect, that it would consider extremely carefully exactly such points as those that he made, because they sounded like sensible points, as is often the case with him.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 98 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 99 to 101 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 102

Powers of entry, inspection and seizure

[Justin Madders]

I beg to move amendment 125, in clause 102, page 90, line 21, leave out subsection (6).

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause stand part.

Clauses 103 to 105 stand part.

[Justin Madders]

Clause 102 deals with power of entry, which amendment 125 seeks to qualify somewhat. There is no doubt that these powers are necessary. The evidence that Keith Conradi gave to the Committee was that HSIB would have liked to have had the powers already, so it welcomes their inclusion in the Bill. One would hope that the need for compulsion and the use of force, as set out in the clause, will be rarely needed, but time will tell. Of course, we would expect such powers to be exercised proportionately and reasonably in any event.

Our amendment would delete clause 102(6), which once again appears to place significant powers in the hands of the Secretary of State, effectively enabling them to block any investigations or inspections that HSSIB might want to undertake under the clause on the grounds of national security. Of course, we are not suggesting for a minute that national security issues are not a legitimate issue for the Secretary of State to be concerned about, but I really am struggling to think of a situation where investigations in the NHS on issues of patient safety could also properly be considered matters of national security. If the Minister can provide me with a list of patient safety incidents in recent times in which investigations have not been concluded because national security implications have intervened, we will reconsider our objections to subsection (6). On the face of it, however, it just looks like another unnecessary power grab by the Secretary of State that again risks compromising the independence of HSSIB.

It is also a concern that there appears to be only one person who can decide whether something is a matter of national security. That person is the Secretary of State. He and he alone decides what is a national security issue and members of the Committee will see how that means that we have to place a lot of trust in someone who should not really get involved in these investigations. Why is it this Secretary of State and not the Home Secretary or the Defence Secretary who might be better placed to judge matters of national security? Why have this power at all? We are asking what the real or imaginary problem is that this power is attempting to solve.

Clauses 103 to 105 provide a power to compel individuals to co-operate. We hope that, as time moves on, we see the need for that power to be used less and less. I hope that we all want to see over time a shift away from the defensive culture that sometimes pervades the NHS. The adage that one volunteer is better than 10 pressed men applies here. Some of the softer issues that may arise around the organisation may come out more easily in the context of someone being able to talk candidly and voluntarily about their experiences. I accept that not everyone will feel comfortable doing that, which is why the powers may be necessary, but the key is not the power to compel people to give evidence but the power to instil confidence that there is a safe space for discussions on patient safety.

[Dr Whitford]

Does the shadow Minister agree that this relates to the whole issue, which we will come on to shortly, of protecting the safe space and the protective materials that go along with that? Some of the discussions may involve someone revealing their own errors or weaknesses or talking about interpersonal relationships. They are very sensitive issues that we cannot compel someone to talk about. We can make someone turn up, but we simply cannot compel them to discuss things that make them feel more vulnerable.

[Justin Madders]

The Scottish National party spokesperson sets out very well why we do not want the power to have to be used any more than is necessary. The quality of the investigations would not be as good as we would want and lessons may not be learned that could otherwise have been learned.

I have a few questions for the Minister on some of the specifics in the clause. Under clause 103(1)(a), the requirement is that a person must attend

“at a specified time and place”.

I would expect such a request to be given with reasonable notice and to take place at a reasonable time. It does not state that in the Bill, but one would hope that that is a given. Anything that the Minister can say on that would be helpful. It also raises the question about whether such a request could be blocked by an employer requiring a person to be in work at the same time. Clearly in those circumstances, the employer may have an interest in the investigation as well. Will the Minister say something about guidance being issued on the importance of ensuring that individuals who receive such requests are in fact supported by their employers to comply with them?

If someone attends an interview, do they do so alone or do they have the right to be accompanied by a work colleague, a trade union rep or even a lawyer? They may not want any of those people there but, given that one of the grounds for refusing to comply with a request under subsection (3)(c) is that documents are protected by legal professional privilege, I suggest there might be a role for the legal profession. I am not trying to generate more work for my former colleagues when I say that.

Is there a reason to challenge such a request? If we are in the realms of compulsion, the person will probably be not the most useful person from which to obtain information. They may have health issues or other legitimate grounds for declining the request, so what do they do in such circumstances? If the Minister could provide any insight on that, it would be useful.

Finally, I want to ask questions about the criminal offences set out in clause 105. It is probably right that there should be a sanction on those who obstruct and those who refuse to comply or, indeed, provide false or misleading information. Subsection (5) says there will be a fine, but what level of fine does the Minister envisage it will be? Does he have a view on whether an act that leads to a fine might also constitute professional misconduct if the individual were a member of a royal college, for example? A referral to the regulator might have a more powerful effect than a fine. Those are a few matters for the Minister to consider and I hope that he will address them in his response.

--- Later in debate ---

[Justin Madders]

In the light of the Minister’s comments and his expectation that the powers will rarely be used—we will hold him to that—I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 102 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 103 to 105 ordered to stand part of the Bill.  

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned—(Steve Double.) 

Health and Care Bill (Sixteenth sitting)

Justin Madders Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 26th October 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Whitford]

We are now discussing the health services safety investigation body, and I rise to speak to amendments 86, 91 and 88, which are the main substantial amendments, with amendments 87, 89 and 90 being consequential on those three. HSSIB will not apply in Scotland, but having been a surgeon for over three decades and having been involved in quality improvement and the Scottish patient safety programme, I will be watching it with interest. We want it to succeed, and I am sure the other nations in the UK will want to learn from it, so it is important that it is not simply drowned at birth and that we get it right at this stage.

HSSIB is based on the principles of the air accidents investigation branch, and we on the prelegislative Committee felt that the most central and important part was the safe space protected materials. The main priority is learning from incidents, mistakes and errors and looking at how to prevent them from happening in future; it is not about blaming individuals. That is because most incidents in the NHS are system-related, rather than individual-related. Errors and mistakes will happen, particularly when NHS staff face workforce shortages and are covering more patients than normal. The pandemic might mean that they are working outside their comfort zone. They also work long hours, and sometimes the system will cause a mistake. We should be designing a system that prevents a simple mistake or error from delivering harm to a patient. That is the critical aim, and that has been the focus of the Scottish patient safety programme, which was introduced in operating theatres in 2007, when I was still working as a surgeon.

That programme made the World Health Organisation checklist compulsory. It involved a discussion at the beginning of operation lists and time out with the whole theatre team before the operation started, so that patient safety and the responsibility to prevent wrong site surgery, which the shadow Minister raised previously, is made everyone’s responsibility. The whole team stops and is quiet, and everyone goes through that final check before the operation starts. A former Health Minister from this place visited Scotland but never made that checklist compulsory in England. I do not understand why not.

This issue is not in need of investigation by HSSIB, but it does demonstrate that it is necessary for someone learning from an incident to recognise and admit candidly that they have made a mistake. Such mistakes could include putting the wrong mark on a patient, putting the wrong side on the consent form, or putting the X-ray up the wrong way around. Whatever led to the error, we need people to be willing to completely admit to their mistakes, and to then create systems to prevent that mistake from resulting in harm to the patient. That is why the safe space is so critical—otherwise NHS staff, clinicians, and anyone else involved will not be candid—and it is why the prelegislative Committee felt it was important to be absolutely focused on protecting it. The aim is to design safety nets to protect the patient.

Amendment 86 seeks to change the orientation of the Bill. The Bill defines protected materials very widely and creates exceptions. It implies that other organisations cannot get on with their investigations because HSSIB is getting in the way. The amendment seeks to define protected safe space materials very narrowly. HSSIB would only hold copies of records. That means that the originals—the safe space testimony of witnesses or others —would still be held by the NHS. Patients and families could still give permission for their testimony to be disclosed, thereby avoiding the need to repeat it to another agency, but evidence could not be forcibly disclosed. Other bodies could not use HSSIB as a substitute and say, “Oh well, if you’ve investigated it, we won’t bother. We’ll simply copy what you’ve found.”

Amendment 88 to clause 107 would remove the potential for the Secretary of State to simply expand the disclosure exceptions later on. There is a big list in clause 107 of what could be changed. Schedule 14 lists the authorised reasons and persons who would access disclosure. Amendment 91 seeks to remove coroners from that list. If coroners are given access to testimony, other people do not understand why they should not be given access, too. We have probably all been lobbied about that by the ombudsman and the freedom of information bodies. If that happens—if more people access the safe space raw testimony—it will no longer be a safe space and the system will simply not match the achievements of the air accident investigation branch in getting such frank and candid evidence. People can be summoned and made to respond to factual questions, but will they discuss poor interpersonal relationships in a team, people not working together and all the things that could contribute to a bad atmosphere or system?

In the prelegislative Committee we felt that there were two key reasons for disclosure to go ahead regardless. The first obvious one is if there is an ongoing significant risk to patient or public safety, and the other is if there is a criminal prosecution because of someone’s actions or because they have breached the disclosure rules. The Bill states that access can be granted to safe space materials via the High Court. That is how it is for air accident investigations. It is felt that the High Court will weigh up the importance of admitting the disclosed materials versus the chilling effect that could have on future investigations and people giving evidence to them. It is important to keep the High Court provision in place and to trust it as the main route for other bodies or individuals seeking access to safe space testimony or records.

It is important to recognise that aviation is among the safest industries because of the safe space provided when investigating air accidents. It is not always a matter of investigating catastrophes; it is also about investigating near misses and working out why an accident did not happen. Was it by the grace of God, or did something kick in, and should processes and procedures be changed?

The amendments would strengthen the safe space, help ensure the willingness of NHS staff to come forward to give honest testimony, and protect that testimony so that it could be used to reduce any future harm to patients.

[Justin Madders (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to see with you in the Chair, Mrs Murray. I will speak to amendment 136, as well as the other clauses and amendments in the group. I will not repeat the points made by the Scottish National party spokesperson, the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire, in her excellent introduction, but I will draw the Committee’s attention to a few salient points.

First, amendments 86 and 87 seek to create a new definition of protected material. We support the amendments because, as the SNP spokesperson said, it is important to turn this around and try to create as much certainty as possible by defining protected materials as far as possible. I suspect that the Minister will tell us that the amendments are unnecessary, but we certainly feel that it is better to over-prescribe now than to undercook the Bill and find out in two or three years’ time that some loophole ends up having the chilling effect that we have discussed several times.

I am aware of the counter-argument that there should be no restrictions or protected material if an individual is not capable of being identified, but that is a rather risky strategy. It would not remove the risk of people being able to identify someone simply by working out who was doing what at a particular time and what evidence they gave. It also does not help to build the confidence necessary to deliver the safe space that the Bill is trying to achieve. Certainty and clarity are needed wherever possible, and defining materials that are to be considered a safe space and protected will assist in that aim.

Turning to clauses 106 to 108 on disclosure, it is appropriate to make clear in clause 106 that the disclosure of protected material is prohibited, but we think that clear statement is rather undermined by the ability of the Secretary of State in clause 107 to make regulations to change that. As I have said, the parameters of safe space should be clear, consistent and constant. That is why amendment 86 in particular ought to be supported. The Secretary of State is once again giving himself more powers—a theme we have picked up throughout the Bill—and that is of concern.

Let us not forget that this Bill has been floating around in various guises for about five years, so we do not think it is acceptable or, indeed, necessary for the Secretary of State to reserve for himself greater ability to move the goalposts at some later date. If we do not know now what protected material and safe space are, we are never going to know. Amendment 88 commends itself on those grounds alone. Any ability for the Secretary of State to change the boundaries risks undermining trust and confidence. If those taking part in investigations do not have trust in the safe space provided, it is likely that they will not feel confident enough to be as candid as we would like them to be. If the Minister feels that exceptions are needed, they should be on the face of the Bill; they should not be slipped in by regulations at a later date.

The independent advisory panel of the Healthcare Safety Investigation Branch has also offered a view and stated that staff would not speak up if there was a risk of exposure of identity, and any issues regarding the limits of disclosure are best dealt with by the High Court, not by the Secretary of State in further regulatory procedures.

A related concern on disclosure is that an HSSIB employer who reveals information showing that the organisation itself is failing to properly discharge its responsibilities would commit an offence if he or she knew or suspected that what they were disclosing was protected information. Given the work that they are likely to undertake, I think we can all see that that is likely to be the case. It would not be needed to show that the disclosure had caused, or was likely to cause, harm, and there would be no reasonable excuse defence and no protection under whistleblower legislation. Yet under clause 108(4) a reasonable excuse defence is available to third parties that disclose information to them provided by HSSIB. Will the Minister explain that discrepancy and what protections might be available to whistleblowers who work for HSSIB?

Turning to amendment 91, it is right that considerable concern has been raised about the proposal to allow coroners to access protected material, because it could mean individual coroners routinely requesting material from HSSIB investigations. I hope it is clear to members of the Committee the ramifications that could have on healthcare professionals’ willingness to be fully engaged and open with HSSIB investigations.

Another consideration—and another reason why we think this is a bad idea—is that there is variation in coronial practice around the country. There is a risk that one coroner or region could be more proactive than others, and could undermine confidence in the system as a whole. It is right that coroners have their own discretion and powers, but the chilling effect would be obvious should only one coroner make a stand on a particular issue.

There is also the question of cost. If HSSIB needs to challenge these decisions, which I am sure it will want to from time to time, it will have to spend considerable amounts on legal fees to do so. Surely its resources would be better spent on delivering its core objectives, rather than on trotting off to the High Court every five minutes to deal with inquisitive coroners.

The Joint Committee on the Draft Health Service Safety Investigations Bill concluded:

“We recommend that the draft Bill be amended to put beyond any possible doubt that the ‘safe space’ cannot be compromised save in the most exceptional circumstances, and therefore that the prohibition on disclosure applies equally to disclosure to coroners.”

That is why we believe that amendment 91 should be supported.

I also refer to the evidence submitted by the independent advisory panel of the Healthcare Safety Investigation Branch, which said of the proposal that there is in fact no parallel in the transport sector—from which the idea for this body was originally conceived—and nor is there any evidence from its experience of the transport sector that such an approach would be necessary. Obviously, we are dealing with different orders of investigations. Certainly, the number of people who would die in an air accident is very different from an incident in the NHS, and we would also expect there to be a significant number of patient safety issues that do not apply to the air sector. However, HSSIB has been going for a considerable time and it has not had any circumstances or incidents where it thinks this power would have made any difference.

HSSIB’s approach to protective disclosures does not limit the powers of coroners to conduct investigations in their own way—there is nothing in there that takes away from their current situation. The independent advisory panel also said that areas of prohibited disclosure should be highly specific and as limited as possible, and expressed the view that disputes regarding the prohibition of disclosure should be determined through an independent judicial process in the High Court, which is already provided for in the Bill.

Finally, I will say a few words on our amendment 136, which is a probing amendment. We want to raise the concern articulated to us that, although it is important that any evidence gathered by HSSIB remains protected, for the reasons we have been discussing, there may be occasions when it would be appropriate for some information to be shared with a patient, or the family of a patient, who has been involved in any qualifying incident. I certainly would not envisage such a power being used routinely. Indeed, the amendment places the discretion entirely in the hands of the chief investigator, who may decide not to use that power at all. However, there may be occasions when certain information, handled correctly—and at the very least on condition of confidentiality, and quite possibly with the consent of the individual or organisation that has provided the evidence—could be passed on to those with a direct interest in the matter, whose knowledge and understanding of what had gone wrong would be improved by the disclosure of the information.

That would still not be considered to be admissible evidence for any proceedings. Given the chief investigator’s desire to keep the concept of safe spaces as secure as possible—which should always be the primary consideration—we can see why that might be put at risk, but I want to flag up this as an issue. Patient groups have long-running concerns that the defensive culture that so often pervades the NHS when something goes wrong does little to aid the ability of patients and their families to get to the bottom of what went wrong. There are always concerns about medical negligence or professional competence proceedings, but rarely do families go into these situations looking for compensation. They are far more likely to want an explanation and an assurance that measures are being put in place so that nobody else will have to go through what they have. In any event, the proposed powers are not too dissimilar to those set out in paragraph 2 of schedule 14.

[Dr Whitford]

I want to echo that. I have been involved as an external for significant adverse event reviews, and it has always been my experience that what the family wants to find is that it will not happen again. I therefore feel that we have to trust HSSIB that the duty of candour will mean that there is discussion with the family as we go. That should be the culture across the NHS. The problem is that the more threatened clinicians feel by litigation, the more defensive they become. If the whole orientation can be changed to be about learning and preventing rather than blaming, we will probably get better relationships with families and better, open duty of candour discussions.

[Justin Madders]

I thank the hon. Lady for that intervention, which articulates well what we are trying to highlight. It is a question of culture, which legislation can go only so far in addressing. As a Parliament, we need to address what more we can do to engender greater openness in the NHS. When things go wrong, there are better ways of handling that than what happens at the moment. When we have an £8 billion a year clinical negligence bill, it is incumbent on us all to look at ways that we can reduce that as well as assisting patients and their families to gain a better understanding of what has gone wrong.

[Edward Argar]

It is, as ever, a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Murray.

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire not just for her amendments but for the opportunity to debate the issue, which goes to the heart of the challenges we face. I think there is broad consensus on clauses up to clause 119, perhaps with a challenge or a tweak here and there, but the provisions that we are considering are the one bit, as I know from the hon. Lady’s work on pre-legislative scrutiny and when the Bill was previously considered, that remains challenging. It is a matter of striking the appropriate balance to ensure the proper functioning of judicial authorities at the same time as achieving the overall objective of what we are trying to do with HSSIB: foster that learning culture, understand what goes wrong and avoid a repetition of it. It ultimately comes down to a subjective view of where that balance is most appropriately struck.

Clauses 106, 107, 108, 109 and 117, and schedule 14, address how HSSIB will protect the material it holds and outline the concept of safe space. Before getting into the detail of the clauses, I want to acknowledge that there has of course been extremely good and well-informed debate outside the Committee about how broad or narrow safe space should be; whether it should be as defined in the Bill with exceptions, or, to use the suggestion of the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire, flipped around to be the converse of that; and the merits of HSSIB sharing or not sharing information with other organisations. I feel it is important to set out how we came to the balance we propose.

The hon. Lady mentioned a previous Minister who visited Scotland. I am very conscious that I have a kind, outstanding invitation to visit from her and I look forward to taking that up at some point soon, I hope. I also spoke to the Scottish Cabinet Secretary for Health and Social Care, who endorsed that invitation. I therefore look forward to being able to come not only to Edinburgh, but possibly to Ayrshire, and finding a way to shoehorn that into the visit.

Key to our vision for a new model for investigations is that they are conducted in a safe space so that patients, families, NHS staff and other participants in an investigation are encouraged to speak freely and candidly and have the confidence that the information they provide will be protected, save in the most exceptional circumstances.

The objective is to encourage that open flow of information and get to the bottom of what may have happened with the best possible information available. Without guarantees that that information will not be shared—again, save in very limited circumstances, which I will come on to—we risk, as the hon. Lady said, eroding the confidence of all those who candidly trust HSSIB with that information.

We propose that information, documents, equipment or other items held by the new body in connection with an investigation will be considered protected material and must not be shared, apart from in certain limited circumstances, such as when necessary to address a serious and continuing risk to the safety of a patient or to the public, and then only to the extent necessary to allow a person to address the risk.

It is also important that people have certainty that the information they provide will not be used for the purposes of blame or liability. The current investigation branch does a good job under the current legislative framework but can only operate a weakened form of safe space. In addition, it has no powers to impose sanctions. We need to address that and put the HSSIB on a par with similar investigation bodies in the transport sector, as colleagues have said. Non-compliance with safe space protections may result in criminal sanctions.

[Edward Argar]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. I should say that, even now, I am sure that many people in the health sector co-operate voluntarily, even when it is potentially challenging for them to do so. They do so because they want to foster that culture. This proposal will take that a step further forward and make it even easier for people to do so with confidence and to overcome any reticence that might exist because of, as she said, the fear of blame, the fear of opening up about something and the need to protect their sector and organisation, as they see it. She is absolutely right, and the key is to try to create a learning, rather than a blaming, culture. That is why the balance we strike in the definition of the safe space and exceptions to it is so important. We may or may not reach a consensus on where the balance should be struck, but this debate goes to the heart of the efficacy of the new body and how it will operate.

The Bill therefore sets out, on a statutory footing, a much stronger and more robust form of safe space. Clause 106 is the cornerstone of that. It is key to ensuring that all participants are completely candid with the information that they share, and it enables more thorough investigations and the development of meaningful recommendations. Investigations where protected material is held in the safe space should improve openness and co-operation between all participants and identify risks to the safety of patients, so that patients, families and the wider public can benefit from the experience of better investigations, and improvements can be made to the systems and practices in the provision of healthcare in England.

We believe that we have reached the right, balanced position after a lot of careful thought. In dealing with this legislation, my predecessors and I, along with my right hon. Friend the Member for Mid Bedfordshire (Ms Dorries), who is now Culture Secretary, wrestled a lot with the question of how to strike the right balance. I therefore turn to amendments 86 and 87. I am pleased that there is, I think, a consensus among all Members across the Committee that we need to protect materials, and about the value attached to protecting materials in the safe space, which is a key part of our approach to improving patient safety by allowing individuals to feel able to speak candidly.

Amendment 86 seeks to list in detail the types of material that will fall under the definition of protected material, while amendment 87, as the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire set out, is consequential on that. The definition given in clause 106(2) is intentionally broad. HSSIB will carry out a range of investigations, and it would be impossible to identify prospectively, in advance, all the material that will need to be gathered and should be protected by the safe space. By having a broad definition, we can give greater confidence to those who speak to HSSIB that all the material that it collects will be appropriately protected. There are very specific exceptions, which I will come on to.

As a future-proofing mechanism, the materials that are protected have not been listen in detail in the Bill. New technologies and ways of recording data are developing at a rapid pace. It is vital that HSSIB is able to adapt as these developments reach the frontline, rather than having to rely on returning to this House for further amendments to primary legislation. Listing the types of material in detail would have a number of practical implications. If we had a specified list, we could inadvertently leave out material that should be protected, when the vast majority of material the HSSIB will gather would be protected under the current definition. The Government endeavour to get everything right, but, as we all know, often do not.

[Justin Madders]

rose—

[Dr Whitford]

rose—

[Justin Madders]

Does the Minister think that there is anything missing from the amendment that ought to be included?

[Edward Argar]

I will take the intervention from the hon. Lady, and I will address both together.

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The shadow Minister raised a concern about inconsistency in how different coroners in different areas might approach the matter. In a past life at the Ministry of Justice, I had responsibility for the coroners system as a Parliamentary Under-Secretary. Over the past decade, we have seen considerable modernisation of the current coronial system in this country, with the appointment of a Chief Coroner—a role that is assumed by a High Court judge. They have sought to bring much consistency, and there has been training and work with coroners—performance management is the wrong word—from the centre to ensure greater consistency of decision making and approaches. That will reduce the potential for significant inconsistencies or differences of approach—for example, a particular coroner may decide to take a very liberal approach and request all sorts of things, while another may say, “I do not need any of that”—which I think is what the hon. Gentleman is concerned about. A lot of work is being done to secure greater consistency and greater clarity, with guidelines promulgated by the Chief Coroner to deliver that. In this space, I would similarly expect the Chief Coroner to take a very close interest in guiding coroners.

[Justin Madders]

I appreciate the work that has gone into ensuring greater consistency among coroners. The fact remains, however, that, as the Minister said, these are independent judicial positions, and coroners are entitled to make decisions as they see fit. I do not think that that concern has been adequately addressed yet.

[Dr Whitford]

rose—

--- Later in debate ---

I have heard concerns—I think they were behind what the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston was saying—that the regulation-making power could be used as a way of disclosing information in relation to a particular investigation, or that the Secretary of State could exercise it—arbitrarily is the wrong word—in a way that caused that concern to arise. For the avoidance of any doubt, clause 107(3) provides that the regulation-making power cannot be used in that way. The regulation-making power uses the affirmative procedure, so to would of course be subject to debate by this House and the other place before it was made law, providing a degree of democratic scrutiny.

[Justin Madders]

I understand what the Minister is saying: we need the ability to make regulations to give us some flexibility. Equally, the definition of protected material is broad, to give Ministers and HSSIB flexibility as well. It seems that there is a bit of cakeism going on here.

[Edward Argar]

I think I know what the shadow Minister means by cakeism. I see his point, but I think the Bill strikes the right balance by building in a further degree of flexibility, but with the safeguard of the affirmative procedure. As he knows, because he has debated such things with me in the past, the affirmative procedure is not always a friend to Ministers in obliging them to come to this House and debate and explain everything. It is, however, an important democratic safeguard when regulation-making powers are inserted into primary legislation, and that is why we have adopted the affirmative procedure in this context. I hope that that gives him a degree of reassurance that the Secretary of State’s regulation-making power is simply a future-proofing mechanism, with sufficient parliamentary and democratic safeguards attached to it.

It is crucial, of course, that the integrity of investigations is protected and that we take a careful approach to how information is protected, so that there is public confidence in the work of HSSIB. That goes to the heart of what we are seeking to achieve with this part of the legislation. To ensure that confidence, the Bill provides for the creation of offences for unlawful disclosure. That is the backbone to the creation of statutory safe space. Clause 108 creates three offences of unlawful disclosure. The offences extend to HSSIB and connected individuals, individuals who are no longer connected with HSSIB, and persons who are not connected with HSSIB but receive certain protected material. It is important that we send a robust message that there will be consequences if protected information is disclosed unlawfully. It will be a criminal offence, and the person who commits an offence will be liable on summary conviction to a fine.

Clause 109 prevents a power in any other legislation from being used to require the disclosure of any protected material by HSSIB, or to seize protected material from HSSIB. That is, as we have debated, with the exception of certain parts of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, which allows coroners to require disclosure in some circumstances due to provisions made in schedule 14 of the Bill. However, that provision respects the devolution settlement agreement and therefore does not apply to any provision that is within the legislative competence of the devolved Administrations. The clause will help to enhance HSSIB’s safe space protections by prohibiting the unauthorised disclosure of protected material. It is important to ensure that safe space cannot simply be breached by the use of a power elsewhere in another part of the statute book, and this provision makes that position entirely clear.

As we have debated, safe space encourages all participants to be completely candid with the information that they share with HSSIB, enabling more thorough investigations into what went wrong. That will also help more widely to protect the “learning, not blaming” culture that hon. Members have spoken about and that HSSIB is hoping to embed.

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[Edward Argar]

The clauses address HSSIB’s relationships with other bodies, including with the devolved Administrations.

Clause 110 places a requirement on HSSIB and a number of listed bodies, including the Care Quality Commission, NHS England and the commissioner for patient safety, to co-operate with each other when they carry out investigations into the same or related incidents. The duty to co-operate relates to the practical arrangements for co-ordinating those investigations.

Clause 110 would not require the sharing of any protected material held under the safe space. It will also require HSSIB to publish guidance regarding when an incident may be considered related to another incident. That will ensure that there is the necessary clarity across all organisations as to when co-operation is required in often complex investigations. HSSIB will, of course, still be able to co-operate with bodies that are not listed in clause 110, and the current investigation branch has already established many strong relationships with bodies not covered in that list.

However, clause 110 is crucial if we are to ensure that there is a consistent and cohesive approach to investigations in the same area or related areas. It is important that we encourage organisations to co-operate in this way so as to ensure that multiple investigations touching on the same incident can be delivered in the most stream- lined way. For example, the clause would compel two organisations that wished to interview the same individual to co-ordinate. Similarly, if two organisations need to visit a clinical area, it is important that they co-operate to minimise the impact on the day-to-day running of that clinical area.

Clause 110 helps to ensure that information is accessed effectively and efficiently. It ensures that organisations can carry out the important but different roles that they have in an efficient manner and also minimises disruption to patients and to others involved.

Clause 111 places a requirement on HSSIB to comply with any request for assistance from a relevant NHS body. That assistance would be in connection to an investigation into any incident that may have occurred during the provision of NHS services or at premises at which NHS services are provided. NHS England or the Secretary of State may also request that HSSIB provides a relevant NHS body with assistance. Assistance can be provided to trusts, foundation trusts, NHS England and the newly formed integrated care boards. Such assistance may include advice, guidance and training for those organisations in connection with an investigation.

The purpose of HSSIB’s investigations is to identify risks to the safety of patients and to address those risks by facilitating the improvement of systems and practices in the provision of NHS services or other healthcare services in England. HSSIB is designed to encourage the spread of a culture of learning within the NHS, and clause 111 allows HSSIB to support others in undertaking investigations and to share knowledge gained from its own investigations. The clause will help HSSIB to promote better standards for local investigations and improve their quality and effectiveness. To this end, HSSIB will disseminate information about best practice and standards to be adopted.

Clause 111 will also enable HSSIB to provide assistance to bodies other than relevant NHS bodies if they request assistance in relation to any matter connected with the carrying out of investigations. That will help to encourage the spread of learning and enable HSSIB to share its expertise across the wider healthcare sector, both within the UK and abroad, if requested. It will be able to charge a fee for such activities. Of course, we would not expect HSSIB to provide such assistance should doing so significantly interfere with the exercise of any of its investigative functions, and protections are included in the clause to ensure this.

Finally, clause 112 enables HSSIB to enter into agreements to carry out certain investigations relating to Wales and Northern Ireland, a provision that the Welsh Government and the Northern Ireland Executive were keen to see included. Those investigations would identify risks to the safety of patients and help to facilitate improvement of systems and practices. Investigations would not assess blame or involve the determination of any civil or criminal liability. It is important that HSSIB has the opportunity to share its expertise and help facilitate greater learning and improvement outside England. The clause allows HSSIB to charge for such investigations in Wales and Northern Ireland but only to cover the costs incurred through the course of the investigation. Of course, we would not expect HSSIB to provide such assistance should it significantly interfere with the exercise of its core investigative functions and, again, protections are included in the clause to ensure that.

These clauses are crucial to ensure that HSSIB has strong working relationships with NHS bodies, as well as regulators and, where requested, the devolved Administrations. I therefore commend the clauses to the Committee.

[Justin Madders]

As we have heard, the clauses deal with the requirement to co-operate and I will not go over the ground that we have already trodden on in respect of degrees of co-operation and how that might make a material difference to ultimate success. We hope that the many organisations listed in clause 110 will respond not simply because of the legislation but because the no-blame culture to which this body aspires is just as relevant to them as it is to individuals.

Is the long list of organisations in clause 110(3) the totality of NHS bodies or bodies associated with the NHS, or with running NHS services? I think the Minister mentioned that there may be others that have been involved but that are not in this list. Has any of them been excluded from the list and, if so, why?

The power to levy charges on NHS bodies for assistance shows why our amendment requiring the creation of the post of chief finance officer would have been sensible. While there are sanctions for individuals who block investigations and there is a debate about where co-operation ends and obstruction starts, I am unclear whether there is a similar sanction that could be imposed on the bodies listed in clause 110. Has the Minister considered that? Is there a process whereby the buck will stop with a named individual in any of these organisations or is that dealt with later in the Bill?

[Karin Smyth]

My point concerns the practical implementation, given the examples where the organisations currently do not work together or share, and the issues about real accountability. I have a case that I have dealt with since 2016, which preceded me by some four years, involving an individual going through the complaints system. It resulted in the parliamentary ombudsman’s report wanting details to be shared between the trust, NHS Improvement and the Care Quality Commission. In August this year, the trust admitted that it had not provided any such details to NHS Improvement or the CQC. There seems to be no recourse in respect of that lack of communication and accountability between the existing organisations.

My concern on co-operation is about adding HSSIB to a system that does not work now in terms of ensuring that recommendations are shared and acted upon. The intent on co-operation in clause 110 is welcome, but what assurance can the Minister give that that wider culture of co-operation, delivery and implementation of recommendations will be improved by the addition of HSSIB? There is an opportunity for HSSIB to do that, but that would require all those other organisations, named and perhaps unnamed, to also look to their own house to make sure that in the interests of those patients the recommendations are acted upon.

--- Later in debate ---

[Edward Argar]

The clauses relate to the oversight of HSSIB’s functions. Clause 113 enables the Secretary of State to direct HSSIB to exercise its functions within a specified time period and in such a manner as the direction prescribes. That direction-making power, on which I suspect the shadow Minister the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston will question me, will apply only in the event that the Secretary of State considers that HSSIB is failing or has failed to exercise any of its functions, and that that failure is significant. Directions must be in writing and will ensure that appropriate action can be taken by the Secretary of State in the event of any failure on the part of HSSIB to exercise its functions.

Independence as a concept is fundamentally important, and indeed at the heart of HSSIB, and will be a crucial way to ensure that patients, families and staff have trust in its processes and judgments. However, the clause serves to help to safeguard the trust placed in HSSIB by patients and families in the event of its significant failure to exercise its functions. We believe this is a sensible and proportionate provision, which ensures that HSSIB is performing its vital functions. To maintain the independence of the investigatory process, such directions made by the Secretary of State will not be able to influence the outcome of any HSSIB investigation.

We do not expect to use the power—in fact, I hope that we will never have to use it—but it is right that the Secretary of State has the power to act in the event of significant failure. That is consistent with similar existing powers available to the Secretary of State in relation to other non-departmental public bodies, including the Care Quality Commission. Should HSSIB fail to comply with such directions, the clause enables the Secretary of State to choose to make arrangements either to undertake the exercise of HSSIB’s functions themselves or for another body to undertake them. That will ensure that the important investigatory work is sustained and delivered at the appropriate high standard, should HSSIB have experienced significant failures in achieving that.

Clause 114 requires the Secretary of State to undertake a review of and prepare a report on the effectiveness of HSSIB in undertaking its investigation function. That report must be prepared, published and laid before Parliament within four years of clause 94 coming into force, which sets out its investigation function. Given the trust that patients, families and staff will place in HSSIB’s processes and investigations, it is vital that Government is transparent to the public and parliamentarians regarding the performance of the new body. That report will be key to ensuring such transparency and to helping to facilitate learning and improvements within HSSIB. I therefore commend the clauses to the Committee.

[Justin Madders]

As the Minister has anticipated, clause 113 troubles me somewhat. We have talked extensively about the importance of independence and the need for HSSIB to have the confidence of those with whom it interacts so that it is fully effective. Once again, in common with much else in the Bill, we see that the Secretary of State gets to hand himself extensive powers to interfere with HSSIB. Subsection (1) basically places judgment about the exercise of that power in the hands of the Secretary of State. It is his opinion that counts, and no attempt is required to evidence-proof a failing. HSSIB is apparently unable to challenge that judgment. Subsection (5) states that that failure only has to be a failure to exercise its functions properly. That is qualified a little by subsection (1)(b), which says that the failure has to be significant, but unfortunately that is what the Secretary of State considers significant, nobody else. With all that together, the Secretary of State has pretty much a blank cheque to step in and interfere any time he likes, so long as he considers that there has been a significant failure.

However, it gets worse. Subsection (2) allows the Secretary of State to direct HSSIB in whatever manner he determines, which I would have said is about as far away from independence as we can get—until I read subsection (4), which allows the Secretary of State to step into HSSIB’s shoes and do its job himself. I am sure he has other things in his diary at the moment, but the idea that he can come in and undertake the functions of what is meant to be an independent body is simply unacceptable. I can do no better than refer to the evidence that Keith Conradi gave to the Committee:

“Ultimately, we end up making recommendations to the Department of Health and Social Care, and in the future I would like to ensure that we have that complete freedom to be able to make recommendations wherever we think that they most fit.”––[Official Report, Health and Care Public Bill Committee, 7 September 2021; c. 60, Q78.]

The Secretary of State having the power to effectively step in and start running the body, either directly or indirectly, at a moment’s notice, will not help with that freedom. Why does that need to be in the Bill and hanging over the body the whole time?

There is a suggestion that the Health and Social Care Committee would be better placed to administer this function, or at the very least that the Secretary of State should require its agreement before exercising this function. I agree that that Committee might be better placed than one person to have oversight of HSSIB. Perhaps we should consider which group will be best placed to have oversight of HSSIB, to ensure that it is truly independent.

The Secretary of State is tasked with carrying out a review of HSSIB. I am pleased that any subsequent report would be laid before Parliament, but again it is the Secretary of State undertaking that review—his judgment alone. Clause 114 says that the report must be laid within four years of the Bill’s passage. Is there a particular reason why four years was chosen? I am sure the Minister anticipated that question, so I hope he will be able to answer. My reading of the clause is that a report is required after four years, and after that there is no further requirement. It seems rather remiss for there to be no ongoing commitment to review HSSIB.

On clause 113, there are concerns that the oversight of HSSIB will be carried out by the same person who appoints its members, can remove them at a whim, sets remuneration, directs investigations, sets the funding and consents to the criteria of processes. There appears to be a clear conflict of interest. While I accept that there is a role for the Secretary of State, it is not necessary for this role to be so far reaching and overbearing. HSSIB is meant to be an independent non-departmental public body, but the role given to the Secretary of State throughout the Bill suggests that that will not quite be the case. The Bill firmly situates its functions under the Health Secretary, which is far from the definition of a non-departmental public as separate body from the sponsoring Department. Non-departmental public bodies tend to be responsible to Parliament, rather than the Government. Placing scrutiny powers with Parliament and ensuring that a framework document is in place to inform the basis of performance monitoring, rather than placing all the power in the Secretary of State’s hands, would be the best way to achieve this.

I have to say that the fact that the Secretary of State can pretty much pick all the main players in HSSIB does not say much about his confidence in his own judgment about these decisions, if he needs these sweeping powers up his sleeve just in case. I suspect that he was not the person responsible for these appointments, but the point remains that there are still questions over whether this is needed. I know the Minister said that this power would hopefully not be used, but if that is the case, why does it need to be in the Bill?

--- Later in debate ---

[Edward Argar]

I am grateful to the shadow Minister for his comments. I semi-predicted where I thought he might be going with his challenges, and I hope I can offer him reassurance.

First, at the heart of this is the fact that with an NDPB, an executive agency or any other public body, ultimately the Secretary of State is accountable, quite rightly, to this place for the operation of that—not for the operational decisions, but that it functions as an effective public body. Therefore, we never know, but I suspect that there may be a day—not necessarily in the immediate or near future—when the hon. Gentleman is sitting in my office or the Secretary of State’s office, and he would want, quite rightly, where there is a significant failure of an organisation, to be able to take action to address that. That is what the clause provides for.

Those powers would be used only in extremis, and only where

“HSSIB is failing or has failed to exercise any of its functions, and…the failure is significant.”

These are terms of which there is a legal understanding. It is not carte blanche for the Secretary of State, as I think the hon. Gentleman suggested in a debate on a previous clause, to get up one morning and say, “Do you know what I feel like doing? I feel like exercising these powers.” It is not possible to do it in that way. These are understood terms that set a very high bar for interventions.

Secondly, these powers are analogous to similar powers that the Secretary of State has over other NDPBs, or the CQC, as I said in my opening remarks, and other organisations in this space.

[Justin Madders]

I am not suggesting that anyone might wake up in the morning and decide on a whim to do this, but the fact of the matter is that, as the clause is drafted, if the Secretary of State was minded to do that, there is nothing that would stop them being able to do it, is there?

[Edward Argar]

I come back to the point that I have just made to the hon. Gentleman. Terms such as “the failure is significant” are understood terms, and of course public law principles would apply to decisions made by the Secretary of State, such as reasonableness and proportionality. I do think that this is both analogous to powers that the Secretary of State has over similar bodies and also proportionate.

Similarity, I do not believe that the clause questions or brings into question the independence of HSSIB. We recognise that that is fundamental to its success, and that is why it would be used only if the body

“is failing or has failed…and…the failure is significant.”

I come back to those understood terms, and that is a very high bar that would be subject to public law principles.

On the report that the hon. Gentleman mentioned, why is it four years—why not three, two or five? We think that four years is an appropriate and reasonable length of time for the new body to become established and to show what is working and what is not, so that we can see a meaningful report on how it has functioned over a number of years. As he said, the House would have the ability to debate that report, if it chose to do so. The report would be laid before the House and he could call a debate, if he was still in the same role at that point. Given that he has served in his Front-Bench role even longer than I have served in mine, I suspect that, much though he enjoys doing so, he may be hoping for a change by then.

The other point is that, just because this is the only report that is formally specified, it does not mean that there would not be the opportunity for other reports or reviews to be undertaken regularly. As the hon. Gentleman knows, we do that with other public bodies from time to time. It is right that Governments of whichever complexion review the NDPB landscape. We talked about ALBs earlier in our consideration of the Bill, and about the ability to move functions around depending on whether they are best exercised by the existing body or elsewhere, which reflects the same point.

I hope that gives the hon. Gentleman some reassurance that there is no desire on the part of the Secretary of State or me to add to our current workload, or indeed, should the day come, to add to the hon. Gentleman’s workload, were he to occupy this office—or indeed to that of the hon. Member for Nottingham North, whom I would not wish to exclude. The words used and the public law principles that apply would mean that the provisions would be commensurate with the powers over other bodies, and proportionate. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Edward Argar]

These clauses cover further detail regarding offences created in part 4 of the Bill and interpreting part 4 of the Bill more generally. Clause 115 specifies that when an offence created by part 4 is committed by a company, an officer of that company may also be liable for that offence. This would be the case where it could be proven that such an offence was committed with the consent or involvement of an officer of the company or that such an offence could be attributable to neglect by an officer of the company. Hence the officer and the company who commit the offence are both liable and can be punished accordingly. Company officers who are liable in such a way would include any person who would purport to act in that capacity, including any directors or managers in the company.

It is important that any offences set out in part 4 of the Bill are capable of being fully enforced, and this means ensuring that the right actors are held to account and are therefore also deterred from committing such offences in the first place. Ensuring that both an individual and an organisation can be held to account shows clearly the commitment to maintaining a high standard of investigation and information protection, and to protecting the principles of safe spaces more widely.

Clause 116 specifies that when an offence created by part 4 of the Bill is committed by a partnership, a partner may also be liable for that offence. This would be relevant in an instance where, for example, a GP partnership commits an offence. The clause allows proceedings to be brought in the name of the partnership as well as the individual partners. Similarly to clause 115, where an offence is committed by an partnership and it can be proven that such an offence was committed with the consent or involvement of a partner or could be attributable to neglect by a partner, the partner and the partnership that commit the offence are both liable and can be punished accordingly. The clause also provides that where a fine is imposed on the partnership, it must be paid out of partnership assets. However, should a fine be imposed on a partner, that fine would be paid by the partner as an individual.

The committing of offences set out in part 4 of the Bill would reduce trust in HSSIB’s investigatory processes, and therefore it is important that the right actors are held to account should such offences be committed. Ensuring that both the partnership and individual partners can be so held to account is important for the same reasons I have discussed in relation to company officers under clause 115. The corporate structure itself should not make any difference: we want to ensure that the investigatory process and the principles of safe space are always upheld and protected. Both clause 115 and 116 are common provisions in relation to offences. They ensure that the appropriate actors are covered, but also add a further deterrent effect that can help avoid offences being committed in the first place.

Clause 118 inserts schedule 15 into the Bill. Schedule 15 makes the relevant consequential amendments to other Acts of Parliament to ensure that HSSIB, as a new non-departmental public body, is referenced in relevant legislation. This includes relevant public body, health, employment and equalities legislation and means that HSSIB must comply with the relevant legislation, such as the Freedom of Information Act.

Finally, clause 119 sets out the defined terms used in part 4 of the Bill. The clause is crucial to ensuring that the HSSIB provisions are correctly interpreted and provides the necessary clarity on key terms. I therefore commend these clauses and this schedule to the Committee.

[Justin Madders]

I am not going to spend an awful lot of time on these clauses and this schedule, because the Minister has set them out very well, but I want to come back to his reference to clause 110 and the obligations on those who hold senior positions in NHS bodies. Regarding offences committed, the Minister said that there would not be the same need for punishments to follow failure to co-operate. I wonder whether that is consistent. Could he set out how offences committed by officers of a body corporate could be equated to offences committed by those who are running NHS bodies, or whether there is any discrepancy there that he would like to address?

[Edward Argar]

I will also endeavour not to detain the Committee for too long. I do not believe there is any discrepancy; I believe there is consistency there. The shadow Minister has highlighted what is essentially a technical point in the read-across between the two, and over the next couple of hours I will quickly check on that to make sure that I am right. I do not think there is any inconsistency there, but he has raised an interesting technical point, and I will review it. I hope he will forgive me if I do not give a technical answer right now, but I may shoehorn it in somehow this afternoon, keeping it in order by relating it to a clause that we will discuss subsequently. That will be a challenge, because we are about to finish the HSSIB clauses, but if there is anything to add to what I have just said, I will endeavour to work it in later this afternoon.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 115 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 116 to 118 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 15 agreed to.

Clause 119 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Steve Double.)

Health and Care Bill (Seventeenth sitting)

Justin Madders Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 26th October 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Whitford]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr McCabe.

The amendment brings us back to a knotty problem I have raised previously: although the Bill was brought forward as predominantly a Bill for England, it does have an impact on the devolved Governments, who saw it the day before it was launched. There is absolute support in Scotland, and I am sure across all the devolved nations, for strong healthcare agreements with other nations outwith the EU, particularly Switzerland and the European Free Trade Association countries, which are not currently covered, but it has to be remembered that the delivery of healthcare is a devolved issue. We are trying to ensure that that is recognised in the Bill, so that the UK Government, who absolutely have the right to negotiate international agreements, work much more closely than we have seen them do so far on how the technicalities should work in the devolved health services.

Amendments 110 and 111 relate to the same issue: the fact that the devolved nations, and certainly the Ministers concerned, were not involved in the development of these clauses. There is no mention of them, and no mention of how they will be involved in shaping any healthcare agreements or health insurance card. That is what we are now calling for.

[Justin Madders (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Mr McCabe. I shall speak in support of amendment 146, which stands in my name and the name of other Opposition Members. There is a temptation to get teary-eyed and reminisce about the 2017-19 Parliament; it is almost overwhelming, but I will resist and battle on.

What we are discussing in this clause amounts to a significant amendment to the Healthcare (European Economic Area and Switzerland Arrangements) Act 2019, on which I had the pleasure of leading for my party, opposite not one but two of the Minister’s predecessors. I hope that the same fate will not befall this Minister as befell his predecessors who dealt with this legislation—although one of them actually got a promotion. Clause 120 renames that Act the perhaps more snappily titled Healthcare (International Arrangements) Act 2019, which is what the original Bill was called until Parliament, in its wisdom, decided that as this was a Brexit Bill, it was better to have it deal with matters associated purely with Brexit, and not to slip in wider powers almost wholly unrelated to our decision to leave the EU.

The clause gives the Secretary of State power to make regulations to pay for healthcare provided outside the United Kingdom where the payments give effect to a healthcare agreement. In the context of what has come before, that is no surprise, and it is certainly something we would expect to be pursued. It also means that the Secretary of State will be able to make regulations on the payment of healthcare provided in another country where the healthcare is outside the scope of healthcare agreements if he thinks that payment is justified by exceptional circumstances and the healthcare is provided in a country with which the UK already has a healthcare agreement. This discretionary power could, for example, be exercised to pay for a specific treatment that falls outside the scope of an existing healthcare agreement.

Not content with giving himself the power to enter into further healthcare agreements outside the EU, by doing this, the Secretary of State effectively gives himself another power to make further payments if he later discovers that there was another matter that he thinks we should have been paying for that had not been covered by those agreements. It may be that that situation would only arise in exceptional circumstances, but the whole genesis of the original Bill was that it was considered sensible to retain reciprocal healthcare arrangements with countries in the EEA, whereas the clause implies that things may not be quite so reciprocal in future. I wonder what the dynamic will be in negotiations with third countries if, on our side at least, we can just authorise further payments outside any agreement anyway.

These are potentially extraordinarily wide powers, and the regulations would be subject only to the negative procedure. Our amendment is not only consistent with the importance of parliamentary scrutiny, but would ensure value for money. The original Bill contained a similar power to that in the clause and was considered by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee in the other place. It set out clearly the power’s potential impact:

“If, without such amendment, the Secretary of State wished to fund wholly or entirely the cost of all mental health provision in the state of Arizona, or the cost of all hip replacements in Australia, the regulations would only be subject to the negative procedure.”

[Interruption.] The Minister is chuckling. He may well know that I have used that quote before, because it highlights the extreme examples that are possible under the Bill. The Committee continued:

“Of course, these examples will not be priorities for any Secretary of State in this country.”

We should hope not. While the Minister may be able to rule out those two specific examples today, we have to consider how the powers could be used, and not just how they might be expected to be used.

The concern that this is a very broad power has been further strengthened by the inclusion of the power to make payments outside healthcare arrangements. We have to ask what the Secretary of State is trying to solve by giving himself these additional powers. Let us look at what the powers do. There is no limit to the amount of payments he can make. There is no limit on who can be funded worldwide. There is no limit to the type of healthcare being funded. Such powers without qualification or any criteria being applied in the Bill are simply unacceptable, so a resolution of both Houses should be required, alongside an impact assessment of the costs and demands any regulations might place on the NHS.

On the costs, there is no limit on what the Secretary of State might pay. If we are to assume that this will come out of existing departmental budgets, who will receive less? I mention this not just in the context of extra payments that the Secretary of State may make for things not covered by agreements, but in terms of the burden on the NHS of delivering any new obligations, because, to be blunt, cost recovery has been suboptimal. As the Law Society of Scotland said:

“As the NHS has never been very effective in reclaiming the fees owed to it by overseas visitors to the UK, the UK may find itself substantially worse off financially when new arrangements for funding cross-national use of health services are put in place.”

The Government need to raise their game on cost recovery, and if there is an additional administrative burden on the NHS in setting up new systems of cost recovery because of new agreements reached, we need a commitment from the Minister to adequate resources to ensure that those services are delivered and the cost recovered.

We support the concept of reciprocal healthcare arrangements. They are a very good thing for our citizens and for visitors to the country, but it cannot be right to give the Secretary of State such a blank cheque. Amendment 146 will ensure transparency, accountability and a proper assessment of the obligations entered into by virtue of regulations under the clause.

[The Minister for Health (Edward Argar)]

The hon. Gentleman alluded to being shadow Minister during the passage of the previous piece of legislation, and that reflects once again his longevity in his post. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire for amendment 110, and for bringing the issue before the Committee. It is right that we debate and air it in this forum. I am aware of the concerns, which she expressed extremely clearly, about the Secretary of State’s ability potentially to confer functions on, or delegate functions under the 2019 Act to, Ministers from the devolved Administrations. She highlighted the perfect example: the challenge that we inevitably face with elements of the devolution settlement. Delivery may rest with the devolved Administration, and is therefore a devolved power; concluding international agreements is a reserved matter and therefore one for the UK Government.

Understandably, the point of principle on both sides is not to concede consent but, from our perspective, to consult. I will come on to that in a minute. I appreciate the perspective brought by the hon. Lady and her colleagues in the Scottish Government. Let me reiterate the UK Government’s strong commitment to meaningful and ongoing engagement with the DAs on reciprocal healthcare. There is already a statutory obligation under section 5 of the 2019 Act to consult the devolved Administrations before making any regulations under the Act in areas within the competence of the devolved legislatures.

We are working with officials in the devolved Administrations on the development of a memorandum of understanding setting out how we will fulfil that duty in practice. Indeed, the memorandum goes further in undertaking to engage and consult the devolved Administrations, not just at the end of the implementation stage but from a much earlier stage. I appreciate that the hon. Lady may say that, although that is progress, it does not go far enough. I believe that good progress is being made, but I suspect that on Report, I will have to report back on where we have got to, and whether we have managed to find a way forward. The work continues to be done.

Turning to amendment 110, the regulation-making powers in HEEASAA—I was going to say that was a shortened version of the Act’s title; I might just refer to “the aforementioned Act”, which may save us a little time—are important as they provide the UK Government with the ability to implement international reciprocal healthcare agreements. The Government fully support the devolution settlement and, as I say, we would not normally confer functions on the devolved Administrations under the Act without their agreement and consent.

To date, we have used the power only to ensure that Ministers in the devolved Administrations can have a role in authorising planned treatment applications if they wish, but we need to ensure that when negotiating agreements and committing to international obligations we can be confident that we can implement them. Further, we are keen to ensure that Ministers in the devolved Administrations can continue to have a role in devolved planned treatment applications. I reassure the hon. Lady that we continue to explore the issue with the DAs. I do not want to pre-empt what may emerge from that. For that reason, I encourage her not to press the amendment to a Division at this stage. She may reserve her right to do so at a subsequent stage in the passage of the legislation.

Amendment 111 would introduce a duty to seek the consent of the DAs before making regulations relating to international reciprocal healthcare agreements that contain a provision within a devolved competence. Reciprocal healthcare agreements benefit all our residents across the UK, providing safeguards and support for our most vulnerable, as well as greater opportunities to travel, for work or leisure. Where an agreement is in place, those living in the UK can access affordable healthcare when they need it when travelling abroad.

As I have said on multiple occasions, we recognise the need to work with our friends in the devolved Administrations, but we cannot include a statutory consent requirement. That would risk the UK Government not being able to comply with our international obligations, and it would, in a sense, give the devolved Administrations a veto over a reserved matter. I do not understate the complexity of the way the constitutional settlement works in this context.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Does the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston wish to press amendment 146?

[Justin Madders]

I thought at one point that the Minister was going to accept the amendment, given the way he was talking about the importance of parliamentary scrutiny and impact assessments. He will not need to be reminded that on a number of occasions in the past 18 months the Department has not produced those impact assessments when regulations have been produced. As he has clearly become a full-blooded Brexiteer, given his comments today, I am minded to press the amendment to a vote because it is about Parliament taking back control.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Whitford]

We have had a lot of debate over recent years about whether we are aiming for lowest common denominator or to achieve the highest standard. The concern is about delegating or creating new grades of staff who are not expected to have the same level of qualification or training as the people they may be replacing within the health service. That is not always to the benefit of patient safety. We are really calling for meaningful engagement, which is not what we have seen before. It is important to recognise the impact that it would have on the devolved nations.

I totally recognise that professionals need to be able to work across the UK, but it should be about aiming for people to have the training, professionalisation, standards and regulation that they require and which is comparative to the job that they are doing and the service they are delivering for patients. We spent the whole morning on patient safety. The standard of the staff who deliver the care is the most important thing for patient safety. However, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Justin Madders]

I beg to move amendment 142, in clause 123, page 105, line 13, at end insert—

“(f) After subsection (2B) insert—

(2C) The regulation of health professions and social care workers must be used where possible to raise professional awareness of rare and less common conditions.”

This amendment would require professional regulators to support improved awareness of rare and less common conditions amongst health and care professionals.

May I clarify that there will be a debate on the substantive clause afterwards?

[The Chair]

There will be, if you so wish.

[Justin Madders]

I do so wish. I will not detain the Committee long on amendment 142. We are seeking to find ways of increasing awareness of rare and less common conditions among healthcare professionals. I readily accept that the amendment may not be a perfect vehicle for doing that, but the recent UK rare diseases framework included increasing awareness of rare and less common conditions among healthcare professionals as one of its four priority areas, partly due to the challenges that people within the community face in receiving accurate and timely diagnoses in primary care.

What mechanisms can be introduced to help to raise awareness of rare and less common conditions among healthcare professionals? Will the Minister consider introducing reforms to workforce training and resourcing to facilitate that because among the raft of the entire professional regulation process and a range of development issues, continuing development about and awareness of rare conditions is at the heart of proper and effective regulation?

[Edward Argar]

Amendment 142 would introduce a legislative requirement in section 60 of the Health Act 1999 for health and care professional regulators to raise professional awareness of rare and less common conditions where possible.

The purpose of regulating healthcare professionals is to protect the public. Regulators set the standards that registered professionals must meet; they also set standards relating to education and training. By ensuring that the standards are met, the regulators ensure that on an ongoing basis professionals have the right behaviours, skills, knowledge and experience to provide safe and effective care.

Section 60 of the Health Act 1999 provides powers to make changes to the professional regulatory landscape through secondary legislation. Each professional regulator has its own legislation that can be amended under the powers in section 60, which provides the framework for its establishment and remit. Although I have sympathy with the amendment’s aim and the points made by the hon. Member for Ellesmore Port and Neston about the need to ensure that health and care professionals are aware of rare conditions, I do not believe that writing such a requirement into section 60 of the 1999 Act is quite the right approach to achieve that.

All the healthcare professional regulators have the same set of objectives, which were placed on a consistent footing by the Health and Social Care (Safety and Quality) Act 2015. Those objectives are to protect, promote and maintain the health, safety and wellbeing of the public; to promote and maintain public confidence in the professions regulated under the Act; and to promote and maintain proper professional standards and conduct for members of those professions.

A key part of delivering those objectives is setting standards that require professionals to have the necessary skills and knowledge to practise safely. That includes knowledge and awareness of rare conditions where that is necessary for an individual’s practice. Regulators set the standards that healthcare professionals are required to meet in order to practise. Professionals have a duty to ensure that they provide a good standard of practice and care, which includes keeping their professional knowledge and skills up to date. That is set out in the guidance issued by the regulators.

For example, the General Medical Council’s “Good medical practice” sets out the standards required of a registered doctor. It specifies that a doctor must keep their professional knowledge and skills up to date, must be familiar with guidelines and developments that affect their work, and must recognise and work within the limits of their competence. That provides a clear framework that requires doctors to have knowledge of rare conditions where that is necessary for their practice.

The exact knowledge and skills required for each healthcare professional cannot be known or set by the regulator, but the current legislative requirements put in a place a framework that requires each professional to maintain the skills and knowledge needed to practise safely, including knowledge of rare conditions.

As experts in regulation, it is the responsibility of the regulators to determine what role they need to play in raising issues such as awareness of rare and less common conditions among their professionals. For those reasons, I encourage the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston to consider withdrawing his amendment.

[Justin Madders]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Edward Argar]

The clause provides additional powers that will widen the scope of section 60 of the Health Act 1999 and enable the Privy Council to make additional changes through secondary legislation.

The powers will enable the abolition of an individual health and care professional regulatory body where the professions concerned have been deregulated or are being regulated by another body; the removal of a healthcare profession from regulation where that is no longer for the protection of the public; or the delegation of certain functions to other regulatory bodies through legislation which previously had not been allowed. The powers will enable the regulation of group of workers concerned with physical and mental health, whether or not they are generally regarded as a profession, such as senior managers and leaders.

The UK model of regulation for healthcare professionals is rigid, complex and needs to be flexible and to change to better protect patients, support our health and care services and to help the workforce meet future challenges. The case for reforming professional regulation has long been acknowledged. Stakeholders have long expressed concern that having nine separate professional regulatory bodies is inefficient and confusing to the public. Our 2019 public consultation response reflected the desire for fewer regulatory bodies to deliver benefits to the professional regulation system. In addition, an independent review of the regulatory landscape, in particular the existing roles of regulators, has been commissioned and is due to report by the end of this year.

The powers in clause 123 will enable future changes to be made to make the professional regulatory landscape more streamlined and work more flexibly. The powers will also make it easier to ensure that the professions protected in law are the right ones and that the level of regulatory oversight is proportionate to the risks to the public.

--- Later in debate ---

The policy decisions underpinning the powers also take into consideration the Government response to the Law Commission’s review of UK law relating to the regulation of healthcare professionals and the recent review, led by Tom Kark QC, of the fit and proper persons test. This clause forms part of a wider programme aimed at creating a more flexible and proportionate regulatory framework for healthcare professionals that is better able to protect patients and the public, and I commend it to the Committee.

[Justin Madders]

As the Minister has told us, the clause seeks to amend section 60 of the Health Act 1999 in relation to making changes to the professional regulatory landscape through secondary legislation. It will simultaneously widen the scope of section 60 and extend the Secretary of State’s powers. Members may have picked up a theme by now: whenever there is a chance for the Secretary of State to seek more power, he uses this Bill to obtain it.

At the moment, the Government have powers to bring new professions into regulation or make modifications through secondary legislation, but can remove a profession from regulation only through primary legislation. This clause will enable the removal of a profession through secondary legislation and makes it clear that a profession would be removed from regulation only when that was no longer required for the purpose of protecting the public—but then I would hardly expect a statement from the Government about deregulating only where there is a risk.

While at one end of the spectrum one could argue that virtually all interactions with patients might have some element of risk, the more balanced view might be that while not all interactions carry the same risk, it is likely that all professions at some time undertake acts where the consequences of mistakes for the patient will be significant.

I am left wondering exactly what the yardstick will be and what criteria will be used to determine when there is no longer a need to protect the public. Is that the only criterion to be applied? Does professional regulation not also help to facilitate consistent common standards? What is lacking at the moment is any sense of the principles that will be followed to inform decisions to bring professions into regulation or to remove them. Will patient organisations, representative bodies and regulators be consulted on any new criteria to be applied?

I appreciate that, as the Minister said, section 60 of the Health Act 1999 already contains requirements that legislation should be published in draft, subject to a three-month consultation, specifically with affected professionals and service users, but it would be helpful if he confirmed that that is the absolute minimum. I have to say, though, that even if the answer to that is yes, it seems a fairly minimal procedure for abolishing an entire profession. I am not sure that will cut it in terms of Parliament, never mind the public being satisfied that due diligence has been done to assess the overall risk profile of any particular role in the system. I am concerned about where that would leave matters such as professional indemnity insurance, as well as about any knock-on effect on the reassessment of bandings under agenda for change.

The more one looks at this, the harder it is to see how it could be done properly in the timescales envisaged. There are just under 700,000 registered nurses in the UK. One can see how resource-intensive it would be if every one of them responded to a consultation to abolish their profession. I suspect the Minister will tell us that he has no plans to abolish professional regulation for doctors and nurses, but imagine if he did. This process would be wholly inadequate, which leads to the question: what exactly does the Minister, or more accurately the Secretary of State, have in mind when it comes to these powers? If we got some answers on that today, it might help us to decide whether these procedures were adequate and also whether the powers are necessary at all.

Moving the power to abolish professions to secondary legislation is not putting scrutiny and transparency at the forefront, and doing so without putting any indication on the record of which professions are being considered for derecognition under this power does not instil confidence that this power grab has been considered properly or is in fact needed at all. The implications for the devolved nations, particularly Scotland, are also important. There are differences in regulation and it is not clear what would happen if there were a difference of opinion between England and the devolved nations.

Clause 123(2)(d) inserts new subsection (2ZZA) into the Health Act 1999. I would welcome the suggestion that the scope of regulation could be extended to others who might not necessarily be regarded as professionals. It remains to be seen who or what this power will be used for, but I question whether the vehicle proposed is sufficient. More needs to be done. The 2019 Interim NHS People Plan states:

“It cannot be right that there are no agreed competencies for holding senior positions in the NHS or that we hold so little information about the skills, qualifications and career history of our leaders. A series of reports over the last decade have all highlighted a ‘revolving door’ culture, where leaders are quietly moved elsewhere in the NHS, facilitated by ‘vanilla’ references. These practices are not widespread, but they must end.”

I do not know whether this will be the right vehicle for tackling this issue, but it certainly needs tackling.

On clause 123(3) and the power to abolish regulatory bodies, the case has been made rather better—most notably by the Health and Care Professions Council, which sees this as an opportunity for some much needed modernisation, with a multi-professional regulatory model that would allow regulators to retain their individual identities and independence. That would see each regulator continue to operate its own register, oversee fitness to practise processes, liaise with relevant professional bodies and set its own educational standards relating to the professions they regulate, but there would be greater collaboration, with shared back-office services and other resources, which would presumably improve efficiency.

That approach has some benefits although I am also mindful of the evidence submitted by the Professional Standards Authority, which warned:

“Any mergers would be likely to lead to a period of turbulence of three-to-five years.”

It may be of interest that the authority also said that in the coming five or so years, it expected turbulence in the NHS and referred to the Bill as part of that turbulence. Of course, there are also the issues that we have discussed many times in this place about the pandemic’s impact.

On the overall impact of clause 123, I am sure that we can all agree on the need for robust, independent processes to ensure that any decisions made are in the public interest and based on a clear assessment of the risk of harm arising from practice. It is an obvious thing to do. It is important that individuals belong to a profession because that provides a framework of standards to uphold, encourages expertise and respect, and brings a higher level of professionalism, and, crucially, accountability to the public. However, it is far from obvious how the clause will assist those aims or why in going down the road of deregulation we would want to put those important principles at risk.

[Edward Argar]

I am grateful to the shadow Minister. His points coalesce around a number of key themes that I shall seek to address. He highlighted his concern about why we would do this and the potential disruption of either a lack of regulation in some spaces were we to abolish regulators or of that caused by moving functions. The key point here is that this is about creating a power that enables flexibility in the system that is not currently there. It is not that we have any direct or immediate plans to do this but about creating, in the context of the opportunity provided by the legislation, a framework whereby we could move powers around. There are some points sitting underneath that which I shall try to address.

The current section 60 powers are limited in terms of the changes they can deliver in the professional regulatory framework. We can use secondary legislation to bring a new profession into regulation and create a new regulatory body, but we do not have equivalent powers to remove a profession from regulation or close a regulatory body and move functions without primary legislation. Widening the scope helps us to ensure that professional regulation delivers public protection more consistently and efficiently, recognising the dynamic, to a degree, nature of evolving professional regulation.

On his concern about abolishing regulators, I know the hon. Gentleman will appreciate that there is no intention of doing that. But he rightly asks, “But what if?” It is the role of the Committee to look at that. Were a regulator to be abolished, that would not necessarily mean that the professionals they regulate would cease to be regulated. Current legislation allows a number of professions to be regulated by a single body, and that creates the mechanism to allow those movements and transfers.

To give an example that some might raise, would that mean that the GMC could be abolished? It is an extreme example, but hopefully it illustrates the point. The scope of the power to abolish a regulator covers all health and care professional regulators. However, the key point is that a regulator will be abolished only if the professions have either been moved to another regulator or removed, or deemed to be removed, from regulation altogether. Any use of this power is subject to existing legislative provision, namely a public consultation and the affirmative procedure. However, to take the example I gave, there are no plans to abolish the GMC, because clearly there would always be a need for continued regulation of medical practitioners. Therefore, given that the GMC regulates them, it would continue to do so.

Underpinning that concern is whether the removal of a specified profession entirely from regulation would increase in any way risks to public safety. Again, a profession would only be removed entirely from regulation following an assessment that showed the profession no longer required regulation for the purposes of public protection and that risks could therefore be safely managed, effectively and efficiently, outside statutory regulation. Given the nature of the professionals that we are talking about here, that would be highly unlikely in any of those spaces and I do not anticipate it. Any use of the power to remove a profession from regulation would be subject to consultation and, again, the affirmative parliamentary procedure.

The counterpoint could be why more professions are not included in regulation. From time to time we debate particular professions as new treatments, such as cosmetic treatments, emerge. Given the risks that some may pose, the question of whether there should be greater regulation then arises. Although statutory regulation is sometimes necessary where there are significant risks in the use of services that cannot be mitigated in other ways, we believe that it is not always the most proportionate or effective means of assuring the safe and effective care of service users. Therefore, each situation needs to be assessed carefully on its own merits. We have seen colleagues from the across the House making the case for regulating different aspects of professions, or service providers that have effectively become professional or are providing a service that is regularly used. Rather than a blanket approach, we believe that remains the right way.

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[Justin Madders]

I beg to move amendment 116, in clause 124, page 106, line 34, at end insert—

“(4A) In subsection (4) in paragraph (e), after “examiners” insert “including the requirement to investigate stillbirths and deaths related to childbirth”.”

This amendment would extend the medical examiner remit to look at still births and maternity cases.

This place has come a long way in recognising, discussing and acting on the tragedy that is baby loss. It has taken us a long time to get there, and there is still a long way to go, but we hope that this amendment will help us to continue on that journey.

The Minister will be aware of the November 2017 announcement on the possibility of coroners being asked to conduct inquests into stillbirths and the subsequent consultation—I believe he was the Minister who initiated that consultation, which was needed. In 2017 the Court of Appeal highlighted the need for reform. It said that the law relating to coronial investigations of stillbirths had not changed since 1887, and:

“Still-birth is a tragedy that continues to befall many families in advanced societies but it was a phenomenon more common in the past… The public interest in establishing whether a child was or was not stillborn, and if it was not how it came by its death, is apparent and continuing.”

I am sure those words will resonate with all Members, who will recognise that during the tragedy of stillbirth, parents will want to know why it has happened to them. Although a coronial investigation is no guarantee that answers will be forthcoming, it may relieve the sense of loss that they feel and may help in some small way.

The Government response to the consultation has been delayed somewhat, and they have said that they are not seeking to replace the role of the NHS in investigating stillbirths, but coronial investigations would

“supplement and support those investigations and ensure that coroners can contribute to the learning and play a role in reducing the stillbirth rate.”

Any update on when the response to the consultation will be published would be appreciated.

In essence, the amendment seeks to build on the comments made by the Royal College of Pathologists, which stated when that announcement was made back in 2017 that medical examiners should in fact play a far greater role in investigating stillbirths, as

“medical examiners are ideally placed to identify trends relating to deaths”

and to highlight areas for further improvement. The Government’s roll-out of medical examiners so far has not included investigations into stillbirths. The purpose of the amendment is to get underneath the rationale for that and to press for the issue to be reconsidered. If we are to have a separate debate on clause stand part, I will leave my comments there in order for the Minister to respond.

[Edward Argar]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving us, through amendment 116, an opportunity to debate and discuss this issue. Every stillbirth and death related to childbirth is a tragedy, and it is only right that we remain absolutely committed to supporting parents and families during such a difficult time. However, we are not convinced that this amendment is necessary in order to do that, and I will explain why in due course.

Following the passage of the Bill, the Secretary of State will make, in relation to England, regulations underpinning the medical examiner system, which will set out that the functions of medical examiners include confirming the cause of non-coronial deaths as stated by the doctor on the medical certificate of cause of death. The intention is that that will include confirming the cause of deaths of mothers in childbirth. As part of proposals to improve and digitise the medical certificate of cause of death, we are proposing the introduction of a new section on the certificate that will allow information relating to pregnancy at the time of death to be recorded. Recording information relating to pregnancy on the medical certificate of cause of death will provide a more accurate way to measure maternal deaths, and bring the certificate used in England and Wales in line with certificates used in other countries.

On stillbirths specifically, it is the case that between March and June of 2019, as the hon. Gentleman alluded to, the Ministry of Justice—I was in the Department at the time, as he set out—and the Department of Health and Social Care jointly consulted on proposals for coroners to investigate term or post-term stillbirths. The proposals are intended to improve the independence and transparency of reviews through independent investigation by coroners as judicial office holders outside the NHS. Work on analysing the responses to the consultation was delayed during the covid-19 pandemic, but the Government hope to publish the response to the consultation as soon as possible.

The Civil Partnerships, Marriages and Deaths (Registration etc) Act 2019 also requires the Secretary of State to make arrangements for the preparation of a report on whether and how the law ought to be changed to require coroners to investigate stillbirths, and provides a power to make those changes within five years. At such a time as the response to the consultation on proposals to provide coroners with new powers to investigate term stillbirths is published, it will be appropriate for the position on medical examiners also, potentially, to be considered.

There are existing processes for investigations of stillbirths, including the perinatal mortality review tool, introduced in 2018, and investigations by the Healthcare Safety Investigation Branch. I would like to highlight the importance of parents having the opportunity to be involved in the reviews and investigations. In early 2018 the perinatal mortality review tool was introduced to support NHS maternity and neonatal units in England, Wales and Scotland to undertake high-quality, standardised reviews of the circumstances and care leading up to and surrounding each stillbirth and neonatal death. The aim of the perinatal mortality review tool is to support objective, robust and standardised reviews to provide answers for bereaved parents about why their baby died, as well as ensuring local and national learning to improve care and, ultimately, prevent future baby deaths.

Since April 2018 the Healthcare Safety Investigation Branch has been responsible in England for all NHS patient safety investigations of maternity incidents that meet the criteria for the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists’ Each Baby Counts programme, of which there are approximately 1,000 cases each year. That includes all cases in which a term baby was considered to be alive and healthy at the onset of labour but the birth outcome was severe brain damage, intrapartum stillbirth or neonatal death, and maternal deaths, to identify common themes and influence system change.

Both the perinatal mortality review tool and the Healthcare Safety Investigation Branch provide the opportunity for parents’ involvement in the investigation of stillbirths, which is essential to help provide answers for bereaved parents and to improve care.

I will not prejudge what the response might be to the consultation that we spoke about earlier, but I invite the shadow Minister to perhaps draw his own conclusions about my thinking on this, given that I believe it was my signature on the front of that document and I was the Minister who fought to be able to launch it. On that basis, I gently encourage him to consider not pressing his amendment to a vote on this occasion.

[Justin Madders]

In the light of the Minister’s encouragement, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Edward Argar]

Clause 124 will amend the statutory medical examiner system in the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 so that English NHS bodies may appoint medical examiners to scrutinise deaths, instead of local authorities. Appointment of medical examiners by NHS bodies will facilitate their access to patient information in order to scrutinise the proposed cause of death while remaining clinically independent of the case. The medical examiner system will introduce a level of independent scrutiny, improving the quality and accuracy of the medical certificate of cause of death and thereby informing the national data on mortality and patient safety.

The medical examiner system will increase transparency and offer bereaved people the opportunity to raise concerns. It will provide new levels of scrutiny to help identify and deter criminal activity and poor practice. New duties on, and powers for, the Secretary of State to ensure enough medical examiners are appointed by English NHS bodies and are provided with sufficient resources and monitoring will help to facilitate and develop this system. As a result of the introduction of the medical examiner system, all deaths would be scrutinised by either a medical examiner or coroner, irrespective of the decision to bury or cremate, thus bringing the system on to an equal footing. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.

[Justin Madders]

As the Minister has outlined, the purpose of medical examiners is to provide greater safeguards to the public by ensuring proper scrutiny of all non-coronial deaths; to ensure the appropriate notification of deaths to the coroner; and to provide a better service for the bereaved and, importantly, give them an opportunity to raise any concerns to a doctor who was not involved in the care of the deceased. It will also hopefully improve the quality of death certification and mortality data. These are all worthy aims that we can support, so the challenge for the Minister is to set out how the Government will benchmark the success or otherwise of medical examiners in achieving those aims. For example, can he tell us what improved quality of mortality data will actually look like? Does he envisage this leading to further system changes down the line, or is it too early to tell?

Another area I would be grateful for a little more detail about is set out in proposed new section 19(A3) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, which gives the Secretary of State the power to

“give a direction to an English NHS body—

(a) requiring the body to appoint or arrange for the appointment of one or more medical examiners,”

setting out the funds and resources that should be made available to such employed medical examiners, or setting out the means and methods that may be employed to monitor the performance of those medical examiners. Can the Minister tell us exactly who that body might be? Does the Secretary of State have a view on how many medical examiners might be needed, and what the appropriate level of funding might be?

I also want to ask about clause 124(8), which amends section 20 of the 2009 Act. That section provides a power to make regulation to require a fee to be payable in respect of medical examiners’ confirmation of cause of death. The clause will require any such fee to be payable to an English NHS body, rather than a local authority. Does the Department have a position on fees? Are they desirable? Has a level been set for them? What consultation has taken place about that level, and indeed the principle of charging a fee? It would be a shame if medical examiners were not accessible to the majority of people because of a barrier being created by a fee. If the Minister could answer those questions, it would be appreciated.

[Dr Whitford]

The recommendation to introduce a medical examiner system was one of the strongest recommendations from the Shipman inquiry, and Shipman was convicted in 2000, over two decades ago. As a professional, we saw an entire industry of appraisals and various other systems introduced to the NHS that took up hours and hours of clinical time, whereas there was nothing to actually review death certificates—either their accuracy or who was issuing them—and to spot unusual patterns. Obviously, it can be the case that a GP practice covers a hospice or some other setting where there are likely to be increased numbers of deaths and, therefore, death certificates, but it has taken an awfully long time to get to this point. Scotland introduced its medical examiners six years ago, in 2015.

The Minister has talked about all certificates being reviewed, but I would be interested to know the degree of depth to which they are going to be reviewed. It is unlikely to be possible to have a detailed inquiry on every death certificate, so in what way will they be streamed for further intervention, review or interaction with clinicians to understand what happened? That may not be clear from just looking at the certificate. Clearly, patterns of certification and patterns of death would become obvious to a medical examiner and may produce very interesting and useful information.

Health and Care Bill (Eighteenth sitting)

Justin Madders Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 27th October 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Minister for Health (Edward Argar)]

Ah, a promotion—almost.

[Justin Madders (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab)]

Mrs Murray, it really is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this morning. I echo the comments from the Scottish National party spokesperson. She is correct that the Bill gives the Secretary of State extensive powers—almost carte blanche in some areas—to change the law. We think that taking back control means Parliament taking back control. Elected politicians are meant to serve the people, not the other way round. Some very valid points have been made about the themes and issues across the Bill, and we echo those.

[Edward Argar]

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair again, Mrs Murray, and to hear of the inadvertent promotion of the shadow Minister. I am sure it is only a matter of time, certainly if his longevity in his current post and being master of his brief are anything to go by.

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire for raising this matter. I will address amendments 114 and 115 together, as one is consequential on the other, and then I will address the clauses. As the hon. Lady rightly says, she has raised this matter with me not only in this Committee but outwith it. I would have been surprised had she not wished to air it in Committee, which is exactly what we are here for.

The amendments would require the Secretary of State to seek the consent of Ministers of the relevant devolved Administrations before making a consequential amendment to any matter that falls within the competence of the devolved legislature. Provisions such as clause 130—she suggested I might say this—are perfectly common in UK Acts of Parliament, and we believe they remain within the spirit of the devolution settlement. The UK Government’s clear position is that, in and of itself, clause 130 would not give rise to the legislative consent motion process, for reasons that I will set out. We deem that a requirement for the consent of the DAs for its use would therefore be inappropriate.

This power will enable the UK Government to make consequential amendments that might be necessary following the passage of the Bill. That includes most of the amendments that need to be made to secondary legislation as a consequence of the Bill’s provisions As such, amendments were not included in the Bill. There may also be minor changes, such as amendments to names of particular bodies—the hon. Lady knows me and the position that Her Majesty’s Government take on these things extremely well—as a result of measures in the Bill.

It is also prudent to retain the power to amend legislation in the event that anything has been missed. It is important for everyone concerned that we have the ability to make such amendments should they be needed to ensure that the legislation works as intended and that we are able to do so quickly, as required.

As I said, this power is quite common in UK legislation, particularly in a Bill as large as the Health and Care Bill, which—as we know, as we reach the end of the current set of clauses—comprises 135 clauses and 16 schedules. There are many examples of similar powers to clause 130 in existing legislation. Perhaps the one with the greatest relevance, giving the most directly analogous example, is section 303 of the Health and Social Care Act 2012.

As a general principle, it is appropriate that the authority passing the legislation makes the consequential provisions that flow from it, as that authority will be most familiar with the provisions of the legislation and the changes to other legislation that it necessitates. We are seeking legislative consent from the devolved Administrations in respect of a number of provisions in the Bill and we have debated those in recent days, but clause 130 does not, in and of itself, give rise to the LCM process. It is the substantive provisions in the Bill, on which any amendments under clause 130 would be consequential, that do or do not, as the case may be, give rise to the LCM process.

Finally, although this power will enable the UK Government to make consequential amendments to devolved legislation, in practice, any amendments would be discussed with the DAs, officials and legal advisers prior to and throughout the drafting process. These arrangements follow wider good practice and expectations of collaborative working.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Norris]

Let me come back briefly on a couple of issues. First, I am grateful for the contribution of the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire and, in particular, her point about non-medical practices dressed up as medical practices. That is a particularly insidious way to inflict abuse on another person, and I completely agree with her that that is an absolute violation—it is as totemic as that.

We will all have taken great encouragement from the Minister’s response. I am grateful for that. I associate myself with the comments he made about the hon. Member for North West Durham—I should have said that in opening. Between us, we will ensure that he sees a copy of the proceedings, and he can take great encouragement from what the Minister said.

It was particularly welcome to hear that the Government intend to legislate in this space, with the intent for that to be at the earliest opportunity. That is good news, and the Opposition will support them in that process. I gently say—I know he enjoys these exchanges—that we are currently considering primary legislation, so this is definitely the earliest opportunity. If there are moments for the Government to revisit this issue on Report or in the other place, he will find colleagues very welcoming of that.

I do not want to shatter the consensus that has grown by dividing the Committee, so I do not intend to press either new clause to a Division. However, on new clause 2, we will look at what the expert panel says. I will be interested to see the divisions in opinion—I have not been able to find them. We look at these things on their merit, but the commitment to see the report before Christmas was welcome and will give great heart to campaigners in this space. The Opposition look forward to seeing the proposals and will be keen to support them if they can achieve the goals that we seek. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 3

Annual parity of esteem report: spending on mental health and mental illness

“Within six weeks of the end of each financial year, the Secretary of State must lay before each House of Parliament a report on the ways in which the allotment made to NHS England for that financial year contributed to the promotion in England of a comprehensive health service designed to secure improvement—

(a) in the mental health of the people of England, and

(b) in the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of mental illness.”—(Justin Madders.)

This new clause would require the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care to make an annual statement on how the funding received by mental health services that year from the overall annual allotment has contributed to the improvement of mental health and the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of mental illness.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Justin Madders]

I beg to move, that the clause be read a Second time.

The Minister referred to my longevity in post, which gives me the advantage of having had this debate with him previously. That does not make it any less important; in fact, the subject has only risen in importance in the intervening period. That is why the Opposition were pleased to put our name to the new clause, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Newton Abbot (Anne Marie Morris).

In March, the Centre for Mental Health reported:

“There are…many areas where parity of esteem has not yet been realised. Mental health problems account for 28% of the burden of disease but only 13% of NHS spending.”

Parity of esteem is the principle by which mental health must be given equal priority to physical health. Many of us assumed that it had always been there, but debates have gone on over the years and, as that figure suggests, it is still some way from being achieved. The founding National Health Service Act 1946 spoke of a comprehensive health service, securing the improvement of both physical and mental health, and the National Health Service Act 2006 said the same. That principle was enshrined in the Health and Social Care Act 2012—at least, the parts of it that remain.

In operational terms, the Government require NHS England to work for parity of esteem for mental and physical health through the NHS mandate. However, there are reports that this requirement falls down at a local level. Certainly as a constituency MP, I have a whole range of stories of people not being able to access treatment in a timely manner, or being pushed around the system with very little effect and discharged from care before it was appropriate, with consequences we can all imagine. It is difficult to overestimate how challenging that is, not just for the individuals, but for the local commissioners when they face competing pressures.

We are not suggesting that the 20% to 30% gap should be closed entirely, but we should be looking to at least get on the road towards delivering true parity. There was a missed opportunity earlier in this Bill when we suggested that one of the mandated positions on the integrated care board should be a mental health representative. Should that have been accepted, the ambitions behind the new clause would have been much easier to achieve. It is about not just getting on the road to financial parity, but actually changing the culture so that disparities can be addressed. It does sometimes seem that mental health is the Cinderella service: the one that gets cut first at the expense of the more visible services where people, understandably, can see if a particular service is shut down.

It should go without saying that it is part of the Secretary of State’s normal duties to promote mental health care, but that is something that has been sadly missing. While we do not want to get into an exact science on spending, we do think that much more can be done in terms of delivery and outcomes. Looking at some of the hard facts, it is clear how far we have to travel. One in four mental health beds has been cut since 2010; just last year, 37% of children referred by a professional to mental health services were turned away. That is a shocking statistic, and I am sure most Members will have similar stories from their own constituencies of people in desperate need of help—young people whose entire lives could change by getting the right help at the right time, but who are not able to access services despite there being an obvious clinical need.

That must change. We need parity to mean something in practical terms. We hope that the new clause would create a shift in culture by requiring the Secretary of State to lay a report before Parliament addressing whether the aim of parity of esteem has been delivered.

[Dr Whitford]

The shadow Minister speaks about people who have been referred to mental health support but are not able to get it. Is there not a need to be moving that further upstream? Young people in particular struggle to access child and adolescent mental health services, and often that is because there is not resilient support within schools and there is no counselling at an early point when they are struggling that might mean they do not need to go to a specialised service. As there is none of that, their mental health may deteriorate until the only option is to join a long queue to attend a hospital unit. Therefore, should we not shift to looking at wellbeing—both physical and mental wellbeing—and the resilience of children and young people who have suffered over the past 18 months?

[Justin Madders]

I am grateful for the intervention—that is a very fair point. I recently spoke to a CAMHS worker who made that very point. One of their frustrations was that problems were not being addressed by early interventions, which only stores up more difficulties for later. Again, that is a symptom of the fact that we do not have parity of esteem, because early interventions can ultimately make a huge difference. We would like to see better access to services and appropriate waiting times being established for a wider range of mental health services, so that people with mental health problems know the maximum time for treatment, as is the case for people with physical health problems. I know the Department has been consulting on that fairly recently, and we think it would be a step change in how we assess and prioritise mental wellbeing.

Parity of treatments is required. Psychological therapies that are approved and recommended by the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence should be delivered as per the NHS constitution, and they should be put on a par with NICE-approved drugs. People need 24/7 access to mental health teams. The A&E presentations that we hear so much about have to be considered—that is probably not the optimum way to deal with such issues. There is a whole range of matters that really could make a practical difference in delivering parity of esteem, and we think that the report proposed in the new clause would be a way to drive through some of those changes.

I will not push for a vote on new clause 3, but we wanted to highlight the urgent need for more support for mental health services throughout the UK. Hopefully, the Minister will at least acknowledge that more needs to be done in this area.

[Edward Argar]

I welcome the spirit in which the shadow Minister brings this issue to the Committee. He is right to highlight not only the words “parity of esteem” but what they mean in practice, the importance of mental health services—particularly after the past year and a half with the rise in people suffering from mental health problems—and the challenges posed every day to our mental health services, irrespective of the pandemic. I suspect that throughout their time in this place, all Members present will have had multiple pieces of constituency casework relating to this issue, and particularly to CAMHS.

It is absolutely right that the shadow Minister has focused our debate on ensuring that mental health services are sufficiently funded to improve access, care and outcomes for patients. We know that, historically, mental health services under successive Governments have not received the same level of funding as NHS-funded services for physical health. By virtue of section 1(1) of the National Health Act 2006, which was inserted by the Health and Social Care Act 2012, the Secretary of State has a “duty to promote comprehensive health service” in England

“designed to secure improvement—

(a) in the physical and mental health of the people of England, and

(b) in the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of physical and mental illness.”

Although there may be many things in the 2012 Act that I suspect Opposition Members do not agree with, I suspect they will agree with that clear objective. Given what the shadow Minister said, I am sure they do.

In line with that duty the Secretary of State, through the NHS mandate, ensures that NHS England must seek to treat mental health with the same urgency as physical health. That is monitored through three metrics: mental health services’ real-term expenditure growth, the number of people accessing Improving Access to Psychological Therapies services, and the number of children and young people accessing NHS-funded mental health services. The Secretary of State has a legal duty to keep under review the progress in meeting mandate objectives. NHS England and NHS Improvement provide reports on the above metrics for the Government’s review on a regular basis, and they have governance mechanisms in place to monitor both mental health spend and service delivery.

--- Later in debate ---

[Justin Madders]

I am grateful for the Minister’s comments. If the investment standard is being met across the board, perhaps it is the investment standard that needs looking at rather than the services themselves. We are all aware that there is a lot more to do in this area. As the Minister rightly says, no doubt we will return to it, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 5

Support provided by the NHS to victims of domestic abuse

“(1) Each Integrated Care Board must—

(a) assess, or make arrangements for the assessment of, the need for support for victims of domestic abuse using their services;

(b) prepare and publish a strategy for the provision of such support in its area;

(c) monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of the strategy;

(d) designate a domestic abuse and sexual violence lead; and

(e) publish an annual report on how it has discharged its duties relating to the provision of services to victims of domestic violence under the Care Act 2014.

(2) An Integrated Care Board that publishes a strategy under this section must, in carrying out its functions, give effect to the strategy.

(3) Before publishing a strategy under this section, an Integrated Care Board must consult—

(a) any local authority for an area within the relevant Integrated Care Board’s area;

(b) the domestic abuse local partnership board appointed by the local authority for an area within the relevant clinical commissioning group’s area under section 58 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021; and

(c) such other persons as the relevant local authority considers appropriate.

(4) For the purposes of subsection (4), “local authority” means—

(a) a county council or district council in England; or

(b) a London borough council.

(5) An Integrated Care Board that publishes a strategy under this section—

(a) must keep the strategy under review;

(b) may alter or replace the strategy; and

(c) must publish any altered or replacement strategy.

(6) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about the preparation and publication of strategies under this section.

(7) The power to make regulations under subsection (7) may, in particular, be exercised to make provision about—

(a) the procedure to be followed by an Integrated Care Board in preparing a strategy;

(b) matters to which an Integrated Care Board must have regard in preparing a strategy;

(c) how an Integrated Care Board must publish a strategy;

(d) the date by which an Integrated Care Board must first publish a strategy; and

(e) the frequency with which an Integrated Care Board must review its strategy or any effect of the strategy on the provision of other provision in its area.

(8) Before making regulations under this section, the Secretary of State must consult—

(a) all Integrated Care Boards; and

(b) such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.”—(Alex Norris.)

This new clause would require Integrated Care Boards to publish a strategy for the provision of support for victims of domestic abuse using their services and designate a domestic abuse and sexual violence lead.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Alex Norris]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

For Opposition Members in Committees of this type, as we assemble the issues that we prioritise in proceedings, we have to be a bit of a magpie and pinch things along the way, so I want to recognise that this new clause is pinched from the hon. Member for Newton Abbot. I am grateful to her for tabling this and for the level of thought that she put into the amendment, which is a very good one.

Earlier in the proceedings, we discussed integrated care board plans and their responsibility to engage with the Domestic Abuse Commissioner. I was grateful for the commitments that the Minister made. There was a common understanding that the health and social care system has a crucial role in both preventing and tackling domestic abuse and in supporting victims and survivors. That sounds self-evident, but we are not in that position in this country yet, and we could do much better. I hope we can build on that consensus with the new clause, which requires integrated care boards to publish a strategy for the provision of support for victims of domestic abuse using their services and to designate a domestic abuse and sexual violence lead.

I will not repeat the arguments that I made earlier regarding the scale of domestic abuse, but it is worth reiterating top lines, particularly the global statistics from the World Health Organisation, which show that 30% of women have experienced some form of physical and/or sexual violence by an intimate partner in their lifetime. In this country it is one in four, so it is of a similar order of magnitude. The Government’s own estimate is that it costs health services £2.3 billion annually. A common refrain from the sector, with which I meet a lot, as I did before coming to this place, concerns the impact it could make with a fraction of that money if it was put into statutory services or the services that it provides. We should think about that investment model.

In discussing the new clause, I want to take the opportunity to cover something that we have not previously considered, namely domestic abuse, which tends to be against women but also concerns people with disabilities. According to Stay Safe East, disabled people and, most specifically again, disabled women, experience higher rates of domestic abuse than those who do not have disabilities. Abuse against women with disabilities is likely to be more violent and to happen over a longer period before the victim discloses it or can access help. The really sad thing is that if the victim––who is living with a disability––is not heard, there is a significant risk that they will then be sent home by the system to be cared for, in the very loosest sense, by their abuser. None of us would want that but it is the sort of thing that happens at the moment because we do not have a strong enough grip. I hope that we can use the new clause and the Bill generally to take more active steps to address that problem.

There is clearly a significant need for specialist domestic abuse services, which are crucial to enable women’s recovery in particular. Often, such services take on the work of statutory services and provide vital advocacy for women facing health exclusion, particularly in respect of services supporting black and minoritised women. It came out strongly in the debate on what is now the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 that we need specific and specialised services for those who are at greatest risk of being excluded. We did not quite get there in those provisions. I confess to using every legislative and parliamentary opportunity to keep pushing at this because it is really important and we can do much better.

We know that medical staff receive some training in adult safeguarding and, in a few hospitals, even on domestic abuse and sexual violence. But the skills and time to communicate with people with, say, learning disabilities or cognitive issues, with deaf survivors or with very elderly people who might be less likely to disclose personal information are not always available, and certainly not universally. The new clause seeks to put the onus on the integrated care system to get organised around this, to specialise and to prioritise it. It should be a priority across the system.

--- Later in debate ---

[Justin Madders]

It is a pleasure to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol South, who said what should not really need saying, but still needed to be said, because being open and transparent is the highest form of accountability. Given the history of the NHS as the archetypal public service, one would expect it to be the model of openness and transparency. Maybe it was at one point, but we are a long way from that now. In a public service on the scale of the NHS one would expect the sharing of best practice to be the norm and openness to be the standard. Unfortunately we know that it is not, and one has to ask what it is people want to hide from others.

We know of classic examples of how a secretive approach has made matters far worse than they were. The various inquiries have shown that these methods have not only prevented things from being released, but have actively protected colleagues, units and even trusts from what might, at the very least, be considered reputational damage. Many have said that the best disinfectant is sunlight—or words to that effect—and the best governance comes when things are open and transparent. The best checks and balances are only possible if all information is shared properly.

I will quote from the code of conduct for NHS boards, agreed two decades ago between the NHS Appointments Commission and the Department of Health. I believe it is as valuable today as it was then. It says,

“Health needs and patterns of provision of health care do not stand still. There should be a willingness to be open with the public, patients and with staff as the need for change emerges. It is a requirement that major changes are consulted upon before decisions are reached. Information supporting those decisions should be made available, in a way that is understandable, and positive responses should be given to reasonable requests for information and in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act 2000.”

I think we all understand what that seeks to achieve: be open and transparent, listen and engage. History suggests that this has been applied patchily at best.

One of the inevitable consequences of the shift to a belief in the markets was the idea that bits of the NHS were only semi-attached to the greater body and had their own paths to travel and own priorities. Some of these bodies were expected to behave like businesses and were given the illusion of having a bottom line or a surplus. They were told that their incomes depended on how many customers they had through their doors and that they would win more through competition with other providers in a quasi-market. That led them to become more insular, self-serving and closed. Why would they want to share information with their competitors? That may sound a little extreme, but there are plenty of examples of that kind of behaviour, which tips over into, essentially, reputational management—being seen to be good and one of the best, but actually covering up some of the worst.

Openness and transparency have been eroded as a result. We saw in the Francis report a renewed focus on openness and transparency, which was meant to lead to better patient outcomes—in theory, at least. The renewed interest in openness gave rise to this statement from the report:

“It is a basic and just expectation of the public that organisations are open, honest and transparent about their performance standards, about the rights of patients and about what happened, and why, if things go wrong. This is the only way to begin to restore full public trust in the NHS.”

Sadly, that was not the end of the matter.

The Lansley Act—the Health and Social Care Act 2012—pushed, I am afraid, many trusts in the opposite direction. Despite the Francis report and talk of duties of candour, we still have horrific reports of failures within the NHS. Those failures often illustrate a refusal to be open and honest, showing a scant regard for whistleblowers and a culture of denial and refusal to accept the challenges. In part, this is another remnant of the Lansley Act. Once the emphasis is on competition, reputation management and business-like behaviours and away from public services, we begin to lose openness and transparency.

Let us go back to the key principles of the NHS as a public service that is accountable to us all, as public services should be. NHS business should be conducted in a way that is socially responsible. The NHS is one of the largest employers in many communities, and it should be forging an open, positive relationship with local communities, working with staff, partners and stakeholders to set out a vision for the organisation in line with the expectations of their communities, patients and the public. None of that can be done in secret, behind closed doors. NHS organisations should not only discuss but demonstrate to the public that they are concerned about and determined to deal with the wider health of the population, including how it relates to the organisations’ own impact on the local economy, the local environment and so on. They should reflect the values of engagement, which should be at the forefront of all decision making, and transparency, which should be there in all dealings.

Health and Care Bill (Nineteeth sitting)

Justin Madders Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 27th October 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I thank the hon. Lady for her point of order. I should point out that this is not a matter for the Chair. Mr Speaker has encouraged everyone to wear masks when they are not speaking. It would be extremely helpful if people were to abide by that. The hon. Lady’s point is on the record and I am sure it will be drawn to Mr Speaker’s attention.

[Justin Madders (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab)]

Further to that point of order, Mr McCabe. I understand that it is out of your hands, but this is an important matter for the safety not only of Members but of all staff here. We are in a smaller room than we have been recently, so circulation is probably not as good as we would like. When was the most recent risk assessment on this Committee meeting, and what did it say about the wearing of masks?

[The Chair]

I have just been advised that there was a statement from the Commission yesterday, but I do not believe there has been a specific assessment in relation to the Committee meeting in this room or any update on that. Again, I point out to the hon. Gentleman that it is not an issue for me. His point is on the record and it will be drawn to Mr Speaker’s attention. I am not sure there is a great deal more that we can achieve at this stage.

--- Later in debate ---

The key aim of the last 30 years was to have local responsibility for financial performance as close to the patient as possible. We need to understand clearly where the money went for the population as locally as possible. It does seem counter-intuitive that a Tory Government are completely abandoning that aim with these new organisations and not going down a route of a locally elected and accountable chair. The new clause offers a good governance commission, and I do not know anyone who could disagree with good governance given what we have gone through in the last year. A good governance commission would be based on clear transparent criteria to start building a better culture in the NHS and make our local NHS more accountable to local people.

[Justin Madders]

It is a pleasure to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol South, who gave a superb analysis of why the new clause is important and she picked up on many of the themes that we have already debated. The topicality of NHS senior management is there for all to see, with some of the recent headlines being orchestrated to divert from the growing waiting list crisis in the NHS.

Our view is that NHS senior management cannot be all that bad because they have seriously outperformed the private sector on efficiency for nearly a decade. If the NHS is one of the most efficient services in the world as many international studies have demonstrated, that is a credit to the managers who form a relatively small proportion of the overall workforce. I hope the Minister will join us in congratulating NHS managers, along with all the other brilliant staff, who have got us through the pandemic over the last 18 months—although, as we know, we are not through it yet. The contrast with some of the political decisions made has been exposed recently by the joint report by the Health and Social Care Committee and the Science and Technology Committee.

As we have discussed on a number of occasions, the Bill seems to specialise in the centralisation of power, with more and more being explicitly given to the Secretary of State. Do we want the Secretary of State appointing every chair, non-executive and chief executive, even in bodies that are meant to be independent from the Department? Amendment 18, which we debated earlier, would have gone some way to addressing that: alas, it was not to be. This is a serious issue that needs tackling. My hon. Friend is an expert on these matters through her own knowledge and experience, and I absolutely support what she has said.

While good governance might sound a little cheesy, I am sure that we could spend a lot of time discussing what exactly this new clause should be called.

I think we can all understand what good governance means and what it should look like, because we have certainly seen what it does not look like in how the Department operates at the moment. As my hon. Friend said, there was something similar in place previously, before it was burned in the bonfire of quangos under the coalition Government. Something should be in place, be it a revitalised appointments commission or even some independent standing committee or panel—something that has independent oversight of these very senior positions.

As we have said before, we would like more direct democracy in our integrated care boards. We are not going to get that, by the looks of it, but we would at least like some independence in appointments. When my ICB chair is finally appointed, I want him or her—it is a “him” at the moment, and it is an interim position—to be looking outwards, not upwards to NHS England all the time. That is something that a good governance panel would help facilitate.

A fit and proper person test should be applied independently, even to get on a shortlist, and there should be some process for removing those who should not be on there. This needs to be applied by people who are independent and competent, and not people who are already on the lists or making the appointment decisions. Perhaps we should even have some people who have oversight of how people in senior positions are appraised, trained and supported. There is a lot of experience and expertise out there that we could harness. I hope that, whatever this body ends up looking like, it can assist the NHS in dealing better with issues such as diversity, succession planning and leadership—all areas on which we can always strive to do better.

I hope that nobody mentions bureaucracy or cost as an excuse to leave things as they are. We know from published NHS experience that having an appointments commission was not really an overhead; in fact, it was a valuable resource that, in the end, saved money. We know how much it costs to replace someone who has proved unsuitable, and to undo the mistakes that they made. Appointing the right people in the first place is the best solution. The Minister will, of course, be aware of the importance of recruitment and retention across the whole NHS. I think that we can do more in respect of senior leadership roles.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol South said, transparency is key throughout the systems. Where the funding goes is a key question that will become even more key as we move into the ICBs, with larger areas and different funding streams merging into one. Transparency will be important there. Of course, there will be local differences, as she said, but there should still be accountability to someone for where that money goes and who is taking those decisions. We have what we have described as a permissive approach to running ICBs at the moment, but that does not mean that we cannot have transparency and accountability. That is why we support the new clause.

[The Minister for Health (Edward Argar)]

It is nice to see you back in the Chair, Mr McCabe. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Bristol South. Although we may not fully agree, again I take the new clause in the spirit in which she tabled it. I will reflect on what she said, but I will also set out why I cannot accept what she is proposing. I will always reflect on what she says and proposes; when she proposes things, they are well thought out. We may come to different conclusions, but the points she made are certainly deserving of reflection. I can give her that assurance up front.

As in our oral evidence sessions, I join the hon. Lady and the shadow Minister in paying tribute to those in our amazing NHS and care workforce. It is also important that we recognise, as I think she said during questioning of witnesses, that the complexity of the organisations we are talking about—the complexity of an acute trust, for example—means that strong and effective leadership, both financial and administrative, are hugely important to the overall success of the enterprise of our NHS. I therefore join her in paying tribute to those staff who often find themselves, particularly in media commentary and similar shorthand critiques, on the receiving end of criticism. People may ask, “What are they there for?”. They are hugely valuable—just as much as frontline clinicians, nursing staff and those who work in the canteens or clean the wards. It is a team.

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[Edward Argar]

Although I do not always agree with the hon. Lady, I find myself in complete agreement with her. She made a couple of points that referred back to those made by the hon. Member for Bristol South. The hon. Lady is absolutely right that the system needs high-calibre, high-quality people with the right skills, particularly given what we are seeking to do with integrated care systems. We must foster an environment in which those high skills are valued, continually reinforced and refreshed.

On the point about the Kark review, the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire is right. How should I phrase this delicately? People may move on, or be moved on, from posts because it was not a success for whatever reason; I will phrase it like that. We need to look at the challenge posed by those people suddenly reappearing in another equivalent senior post in a different part of the country. There may be a reason why someone has not been a success that is not due to particular circumstances or something beyond their control, and we need to look at the recycling of those people who have not been found to have hit the mark. We need to look at that carefully.

[Justin Madders]

Will the Minister give way?

[Edward Argar]

I see the look on the shadow Minister’s face, which makes me wonder what is coming.

[Justin Madders]

I am not trying to catch the Minister out. I can think of a specific example where what he mentioned has happened. I am, frankly, angry that this individual has been able to do that. What does the Minister think can be done to ensure that the revolving door is shut on those whom it deserves to be shut on?

[Edward Argar]

The shadow Minister is right. It is a challenge, and it is something I continually reflect on, because it intersects with legal employment rights, the nature of the terms on which someone leaves, how these matters work and the fact that NHS trusts around the country are individual. It is not a simple issue. It is one that I continue to reflect on. I hasten to add that it is not just the shadow Minister but Members from both sides of the House who have, on occasion, raised the issue. It requires further thought and reflection.

New clause 8 would involve creating a new special health authority, effectively, to provide independent oversight of NHS appointments. I recognise the importance of such appointments, and everyone would agree that good governance arrangements should and must be in place for managing them. Appointments to NHS trusts, NHS England and special health authorities are public appointments; they are managed in line with the principles of the governance code for public appointments and are regulated by the Commissioner for Public Appointments. The chair of an ICB would be appointed by NHS England, with the approval of the Secretary of State. That reflects a point that has been considered on a number of occasions during the passage of the Bill, namely that the ICB is accountable to NHS England and, through it, to the Secretary of State and, ultimately, Parliament, as part of a national health service.

I acknowledge what the hon. Member for Bristol South said about the need for people to be answerable and responsive to their local community. The counter-challenge is avoiding the fragmentation of the national health service and the vertical arrangement. She mentioned police and crime commissioners, and although our police forces operate in a similar way, the difference is that we have never had a national police force. Each force is based on a county—or a city, in the case of the Metropolitan Police Service—and works on a locality basis, as local authorities do.

--- Later in debate ---

The hon. Lady made a valid point in that context. When I took over responsibility for workforce a few weeks ago, on top of my other responsibilities, I undertook the exercise of asking about, among other things, the gender split and the black, Asian and minority ethnic proportions at chief executive officer level. It will not surprise the hon. Lady to know that the answer was not clear cut, because then there was the challenge, “Ah, but what’s a CEO versus a managing director? What counts and what doesn’t?”. There is still a little bit of to-ing and fro-ing over definitions. However, I think the hon. Lady will be encouraged to learn that at the CEO level, the gender balance is very good compared with swathes of the public sector. On my preliminary assessment, however, there is a lot more work to do in terms of diversity and inclusion, so she raises an important point.

[Justin Madders]

This is a slightly cheekier question than my last one. Has the Minister conducted a similar exercise in his own Department?

[Edward Argar]

In respect of Ministers or senior civil servants? When it comes to Ministers, though I suspect that is not the point he wishes to push—

[Justin Madders]

I think we can see who the Ministers are, at least this week. I was referring more to the senior civil servants.

[Edward Argar]

I like to think that I am a constant in the Department, this week and in previous weeks. It is piece of work that we have done. If one looks at the very senior civil servants—the directors general and permanent secretaries—there is a good gender balance. He is absolutely right, however; having assumed responsibility for workforce more broadly a few weeks ago, it is a piece of work that I want to do. I was responsible for the implementation of the Lammy review and race disparity audit when I was at the Ministry of Justice, and it is an interest that I have taken with me to my new Department. The last year has been a little bit busy, but it is something of which I have not lost sight.

I do not believe that it is necessary to create a new body to oversee appointments, given that good governance arrangements are already in place. I therefore remain unconvinced by the argument. As ever, and as behoves me when the hon. Lady proposes something, I will continue to reflect on it carefully.

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[The Chair]

Therein lies a lesson for us all.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 11

Consultation with staff and patients on service changes

“(1) The Secretary of State must consult staff, staff representatives and patient representatives on any changes in services which fall within the definition of reconfiguration of services or which impact on the roles of more than 20 staff and publish the results of the consultation.

(2) NHS England, ICBs, NHS Trusts and FTs must publish a response to the results of consultations undertaken under subsection (1) and have due regard to the outcome of any consultation.

(3) Where significant changes to services are proposed by any NHS body, that body must produce a business case using the Five Case Model recommended by Her Majesty’s Treasury, or other requirements as set out in guidance prepared and published by the Secretary of State under this section.

(4) The business case mentioned in subsection (3) must be published for consultation and the responses to the consultation taken into account when a decision is taken whether to implement the change.”—(Justin Madders.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Justin Madders]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

We have wandered down the avenue of reconfiguration before in this Committee, and I am sure that we will do so again. The Opposition have been far from reassured about the Secretary of State’s ability to intervene at any moment when there is the slightest hint of movement in a podiatry clinic or a change of hours at a walk-in centre, but that is where we are.

We all know that in a few more White Papers’ time, there will be more changes in the NHS and in social care, and possibly more integration—who knows what is in store for us? There will be changes in the way that services are delivered, with, we hope, the aim of making them better. For more than three decades, there has been an acceptance that changes to services can be of vital interest to the patients who receive them and the staff who deliver them.

The Committee has already discussed several times the importance of involving people in those debates, and there is an acceptance that there must be a process that engages with patients and all service users. That is what we are trying to achieve through new clause 11. I hope we all agree that any proposals to change the way that services are delivered have to be subject to consultation with patients and, as we have seen in other parts of the Bill, with carers. I hope that we start from that uncontentious common ground. The big issue is just how well that consultation is delivered in practice.

At this point, I take the Committee to the Cabinet Office guidelines of 2018 and the consultation principles, particularly paragraph D, which states:

“Consultations are only part of a process of engagement. Consider whether informal iterative consultation is appropriate, using new digital tools and open, collaborative approaches. Consultation is not just about formal documents and responses. It is an on-going process.”

The NHS does not always understand that they should consult before making a decision, and not on a decision that has already been made, using consultation as a tick-box or rubber-stamp exercise. Genuine consultation, with open dialogue on both sides, before decisions are made almost always results in a better decision in the end.

Of course, the Minister will tell us that the NHS constitution talks about those things and pledges,

“to engage staff in decisions that affect them and the services they provide, individually and through their representative organisations and local partnership working arrangements, and empower all staff to suggest ways to deliver better and safer services for patients and their families.”

That is a pledge, not a requirement, and those fine words are often ignored when it comes to consultations with staff groups.

Even the Health and Social Care Act 2012—the Lansley Act—accepted that there were issues, because it states:

“In exercising functions in relation to the health service, the Secretary of State must have regard to the NHS Constitution.”

Having due regard to the constitution also formed part of the licensing conditions for NHS Providers.

We know what “due regard” means and we have already debated its limits. We know that it means that there must be some sort of formal documentation to demonstrate that consideration has been given to representations. Even that sometimes does not happen, or it happens after a decision has been made. On a number of occasions, no attempt has been made to empower staff and proactively ask for their views on how to deliver the service in a better or safer way for patients. A decision is made and presented as a take it or leave it.

A helpful factsheet that was issued for the 2012 Act states:

“Our reforms will enable change to be driven from the bottom-up, by the clinicians who know the health needs of their patients best, and underpinned by proper local engagement, partnership working and effective local authority scrutiny.”

I draw the Committee’s attention to the words “partnership working”. Again, the NHS can do better in respect of that.

In the new clause, we are trying to codify something that the NHS should be doing anyway when we look at the documents, guidelines, explanatory notes and good intentions, but on a number of occasions fails to do. We therefore move from “due regard” to an actual requirement. That is a beacon of best practice, which we should aim for rather than watering it down. What harm can it do? What is the disbenefit of involving the people who know the service best and deliver it on the ground? That is why there must be consultation with patients, their carers and staff.

The latter part of the new clause provides that there has to be an agreement to provide a business case. Any significant proposal should have a business case attached to it. Paragraph C of the Cabinet Office guidelines states:

“Give enough information to ensure that those consulted understand the issues and can give informed responses. Include validated impact assessments of the costs and benefits of the options being considered when possible; this might be required where proposals have an impact on business or the voluntary sector.”

It stands to reason that giving people the full pictures means that they can give a fuller and more informed response. That is at the heart of the new clause. It will mean delivering better outcomes, better services for patients and better engagement with staff. If we refer back to the evidence sessions––gosh, some six weeks ago; it seems longer but it was only six weeks––this was one of Unison’s highest priorities. Witness Sara Gorton said of principal staff involvement

“I think trade unions and staff would feel as though they had a stake and would be reassured that they had involvement in future decisions with workforce implications made by those new bits of the system if that pledge were placed in the legislation and were the underpinning principle.”––[Official Report, Health and Social Care Public Bill Committee, 9 September 2021; c. 93, Q119.]

That is what we are seeking to do here.

It goes without saying that any significant service change should have the business case disclosed, as we discussed earlier with the new clauses tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol South. Business cases are where proposals are developed and where challenge, and teasing out of alternatives and improvements, can be found. That is the heart of what good consultation should be. We value our staff and the input they can have. We value the impact that service changes can have on patients and the importance of involving them at an early stage with full information. That will improve decisions in the long run and that is why new clause 11 should be supported.

[Edward Argar]

I am grateful to the shadow Minister for giving us the opportunity to debate this issue further. As he suggested, we have touched on it at various other points in the passage of the legislation, but it is right that we debate it again.

The new clause would require the Secretary of State to consult staff, staff representatives and patient representatives on any reconfiguration of services or any service change impacting more than 20 staff. NHS bodies would be required to publish their response to the results of any such consultation and an NHS body proposing significant changes to services would need to produce a business case in a specific model to be published for consultation.

Health service bodies are already under wide-ranging duties on public involvement and consultation on proposals for changes in commissioning arrangements and the reconfiguration of services set out under the National Health Service Act 2006 and regulations made under the Act. In addition, the current guidance issued by NHS England makes clear the importance of engagement and appropriate consultation. That approach will continue to be reflected under new guidance produced under the reconfiguration provisions in the Bill, set out at paragraph 8 of new schedule 10A inserted into the 2006 Act.

Guidance can provide a level of detail that is not always suited to inclusion in primary legislation and allows for flexibility so that the system can work as efficiently as possible. That approach has worked well under the current reconfiguration system and guidance has played an important part. The Government are unconvinced that there is a need for an additional duty to consult patients’ representatives when NHS commissioners and providers must already involve service users in any proposals to change health services delivered to those users and which service users can access.

Moreover, it would not be appropriate for the Secretary of State to carry out a consultation for each reconfiguration or service change affecting staff. To run national consultation for every local change would be disproportionate. It would not be the best use of resource or lead to the local level of engagement that is so important. It is right that NHS bodies responsible for arranging for or providing health services should lead the consultations on proposed changes. These should be done primarily at local level with local expertise. There is always a challenge between the national and the local. I was not quite sure whether the hon. Member for Bristol South was alluding to that when she said that she was more Morrison than Bevan, and suggested that I was more Bevan than Morrison in my approach. Neither comparison has been made about me in the past, but when I next see her, I will ask. There is a real challenge in the local-national balance that runs through several clauses and in respect of the way the NHS has operated for decades.

The new clause would require consultation not just of patients but of staff and staff representatives. Staff views are of course vital in the design of service changes. That is made absolutely clear in the current guidance issued by NHS England, which repeatedly emphasises the need to involve clinicians whose practices would be affected by proposed changes. This approach will not change in the future, and updated guidance will continue to reflect that position and ensure that affected staff provide meaningful input.

--- Later in debate ---

I may or may not be successful but, for the reasons that I have set out, I encourage the shadow Minister not to press his new clause to a Division.

[Justin Madders]

We are not going to push the new clause to a vote, because we recognise when the Minister is not for turning—I am not sure whether he likes that comparison. But I have a couple of reflections on what he said. He was obviously very keen that the Secretary of State not get involved in lots of consultations, but of course he gives himself the power, under the Bill, to do that in relation to any reconfiguration of any size, anywhere in England. That does, I think, highlight a little bit of inconsistency.

The Minister said that there was plenty of guidance and the Government did not want the inflexibility that putting something in legislation would develop. We take the view that actually what we are trying to show is that the guidance does not work to the extent that we would want it to, which is why we think that having something in legislation is an important baseline. It does not prevent further guidance and flexibility from being built in on top of that. I know when we are not going to persuade the Minister, but I think that this is a matter that we will need to return to many times. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 12

NHS as the preferred provider of NHS contracts

“(1) The NHS is the preferred provider of NHS contracts.

(2) NHS contracts must be provided by NHS suppliers unless the NHS supplier is unable to fulfil the terms of that contract.

(3) Where the NHS is unable to fulfil the terms of a contract, a competitive tender must be held to identify an alternative provider.

(4) For the purposes of this section—

(a) ‘alternative provider’ means private companies and independent sector treatment centres, and

(b) general practice and GP-led community services are NHS suppliers.”—(Justin Madders.)

This new clause would establish NHS suppliers of services as the preferred providers of NHS contracts. Independent sector providers could hold NHS contracts after winning a competitive tender.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

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[Alex Norris]

That is a very kind offer and I am almost certainly going to avail myself of it. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 16

Licensing of beauty and aesthetics treatments

“(1) No person may carry on an activity to which this subsection applies—

(a) except under the authority of a licence for the purposes of this section, and

(b) other than in accordance with specified training.

(2) Subsection (1) applies to an activity relating to the provision of beauty or aesthetics treatments which is specified for the purposes of the subsection by regulations made by the Secretary of State.

(3) A person commits an offence if that person contravenes subsection (1).

(4) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about licences and conditions for the purposes of this section.

(5) Before making regulations under this section, the Secretary of State must consult the representatives of any interests concerned which the Secretary of State considers appropriate.

(6) Regulations may, in particular—

(a) require a licensing authority not to grant a licence unless satisfied as to a matter specified in the regulations; and

(b) require a licensing authority to have regard, in deciding whether to grant a licence, to a matter specified in the regulations.”—(Justin Madders.)

This new clause gives the Secretary of State the power to introduce a licensing regime for cosmetic treatments and makes it an offence for someone to practise without a licence. The list of treatments, detailed conditions and training requirements would be set out in regulations after consultation with relevant stakeholders.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Justin Madders]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

It will be noted that new clause 16 has attracted considerable support from a wide range of Members across the House. I pay tribute to the beauty, aesthetics and wellbeing all-party parliamentary group, whose work in the area has been influential in producing the new clause. Many of the Members who put their name to it are also members of that group. I pay tribute to a constituent of my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Mr Jones), Dawn Knight, who has been assiduous in this area, as has my right hon. Friend himself. Their tireless campaigning, which I suspect will continue for some time, has been vital so far. This is such an important area and it needs an awful lot of attention. We know there is a lot more to be done.

As we know, cosmetic treatments can include a wide range of procedures aimed at enhancing or altering appearance. Many common treatments are offered on the high street and include lip fillers, injectables, thread lifts, semi-permanent make-up, laser treatments, piercings and—one that we are more familiar with—tattoos. Perhaps one day the Minister will show us all of his. If the Minister wants to respond on that point, he is more than welcome to.

[Edward Argar]

He clearly knows something I do not.

[Justin Madders]

Many of these procedures are becoming increasingly popular. There is a well-articulated concern that non-medically and medically trained practitioners are performing treatments without being able to evidence appropriate training, or the required standards of oversight and supervision. One need only look on Facebook, for example, to see the proliferation of adverts for all types of treatments. These are usually done by unlicensed individuals who call themselves doctors. We have talked recently about the lack of proper regulation of social media. Although such a debate is not for today and falls outside the scope of the new clause, it is a matter that also needs to be addressed.

Cosmetic treatments can cause serious harm if not carried out correctly, in a safe environment and by competent, trained practitioners. Anything that punctures the skin carries the risk of the transmission of blood-borne viruses. There are countless tragic stories of people who have had life-changing injuries and conditions as a result of poor treatments. The amendment seeks to put the protection of the public at the forefront by giving the Secretary of State power to bring into force a national licensing scheme for cosmetic procedures. It would be a departure from the wild west we face at the moment. We recognise that significant research and engagement with all stakeholders would be needed to develop a scheme that will work well for all cosmetic treatments, as well as providing a practical and efficient system that will be understood and adhered to by members of the public, regulators and practitioners.

Any new scheme would have to have some flexibility in order to capture new cosmetic treatments coming on to the market in future. It would need to be able to set standards for training, qualifications and competency requirements of practitioners, including, we think, periodic checks of premises. Importantly, it would provide for continuous professional development of the practitioner. There would be a requirement for indemnity insurance and access to redress schemes for members of the public to be provided, should complications arise as a result of any aesthetic procedure. There are a number of sad stories about supposedly reputable companies doing damage to their customers, going into liquidation and their insurers then refusing to pay out. I do not think any Member wants to see that happening anymore if we can do something about it.

We would hope that any licensing scheme would have the characteristics that I have set out, and there would be accompanying sanctions for those who contravene it. At present, there is no provision to ensure that prescription-only medicines, such as Botox and anaesthetic creams, adrenaline and hyaluronidase, which are prescribed by regulated prescribers, are actually prescribed in accordance with safe practice. For example, beauty therapists are reliant on registered prescribers prescribing injectables, such as Botox, which they are unable to obtain without a prescription.

Although doctors are required to have a face-to-face individual assessment of each service user prior to prescribing to third parties, such as beauty therapists, a significant body of evidence exists to confirm that individual assessments are not actually taking place in many cases and that telephone prescriptions are being provided remotely. The proposed licensing scheme would provide a requirement for all prescribers to be officially named and to operate in accordance with required practice standards.

Of equal importance is the need for a licensing scheme to close the loophole that currently exists relating to the import of unlicensed injectable products from Korea, such as Botulax. There is a registration scheme in England for certain specialist treatments, such as electrolysis, tattooing, piecing, semi-permanent make-up and acupuncture. However, some of the riskier and newer types of cosmetic treatment cannot be included within the scope of the current regulatory regime. The system also does not allow regulators to specify conditions, qualifications or competency requirements, or to remove anyone from the practitioner register.

Only a small handful of areas across England have introduced their own licensing schemes in order to protect the public—London, Nottingham and Essex are notable examples. There are currently two Professional Standards Authority-approved voluntary registers of accredited practitioners, and one voluntary register of approved education and training providers that operate in the sector. However, joining is not mandatory, which means there are many unaccredited practitioners providing treatments to members of the public without any checks.

The creation of a national licensing scheme in England for practitioners of cosmetic treatments would ensure that all those who practise are competent and safe for members of the public, and it would also cover some of the newer practices not covered by existing licensing laws. There is a large body of support for such a move, including the Chartered Institute of Environmental Health, the Royal Society for Public Health, the Institute of Licensing, the Joint Council for Cosmetic Practitioners, the UK Public Health Network, the Faculty of Public Health and Save Face, as well as about 90% of the public, accordingly to at least one survey.

The Minister is keen on giving the Secretary of State additional powers, but I know that he is also keen on finding savings wherever possible. Were he to support this new clause, there would undoubtedly be a saving to the wider NHS in the long run—for example, through reduced visits to A&E and GPs to correct mistakes made by poorly trained and unregulated practitioners.

Here are some examples of the impact on the NHS of that lack of regulation: outbreaks of infection at skin-piercing premises, resulting in individuals being hospitalised and, in some cases, disfiguration and partial removal of the ear; second and third-degree burns from lasers and sun beds; allergic reactions due to failure to carry out patch tests or medical assessments, which have led to hospitalisations; and blindness in one eye caused by the incorrect administration of dermal fillers. Those are all tragedies for the individuals involved and mistakes that could be avoided. They are a cost to the NHS and to wider society. I believe that a system of licensing would put a stop to a lot of those tragedies.

[Dr Whitford]

I rise to support the new clause. As a surgeon working in general surgery, I know that, as many of these new techniques emerged, the pressure on the NHS became obvious—for example, as a result of local infections and extensive necrosis. Fillers can also migrate. That might seem a minor side effect, but it can create a lot of psychological and mental health distress for the person who went ahead with the procedure and ended up disfigured because the filler was incorrectly administered. Botox has become ubiquitous, but we should remember that it stands for botulinum toxin, which is one of the most dangerous toxins on the planet. It is used in tiny doses, but it can still cause problems if incorrectly administered.

In addition to these aesthetic techniques, which have become extensive because they appear minor and are often delivered by people without significant training—part of their danger is that they are projected to the public as being very simple techniques—we have the issue of more extensive cosmetic surgery, such as breast surgery, abdominal uplifts, liposuction and so on, which involve anaesthetic—often a general anaesthetic—and major intervention. The public think that plastic surgeons and cosmetic surgeons are the same. Although a plastic surgeon, who is a trained and licensed NHS surgeon, may also carry out cosmetic surgery, there are many clinics providing cosmetic surgery that is not carried out by plastic surgeons. Here the side effects and repercussions for a patient can be quite extensive, and indeed they have previously led to loss of life, which in some cases has been well publicised.

If this issue is taken forward, I would like to see a recognition that both these minor aesthetic interventions and cosmetic surgery should be regulated.

[Edward Argar]

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston for bringing this discussion before the Committee today, and I join him in paying tribute to my right hon. Friend the Member for Romsey and Southampton North (Caroline Nokes) and the right hon. Member for North Durham. I know that both are tenacious campaigners, and both are due to meet me in the coming days to discuss their work in the context of the all-party group and the constituency case, exactly as the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston mentioned.

I also pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Sevenoaks (Laura Trott) for her success, within a year or so of coming to this place, in getting her private Member’s Bill through. It imposed some further restrictions in relation to botulinum toxin treatments or procedures, particularly in terms of the age limit from which they could be undertaken.

This new clause would give the Secretary of State the power to introduce a licensing regime for beauty and aesthetics treatments, and make it an offence for a cosmetic practitioner to practise without a licence. I appreciate the intention behind the new clause, and I am sympathetic to its intended purpose. As we are aware, cosmetic treatments are an ever-expanding, multi-million pound industry, and we need to ensure that that industry operates in a safe way.

The breadth of the recent beauty, aesthetics and wellbeing all-party group inquiry into non-surgical procedures, which the shadow Minister alluded to, demonstrates that this is an extremely complex area to tackle and address. There is a huge range of non-surgical cosmetic procedures available, which vary in their level of complexity and invasiveness. The Government are carefully considering the findings of that report and the need for additional regulation in this area in the light of it.

We are considering the case for a licensing system alongside the other specific, and in some cases more narrow, recommendations made in the all-party group’s report. As part of that, we need to work further with stakeholders and within Government to clarify the scope of any further regulation and which procedures it might apply to. The private Member’s Bill introduced by my hon. Friend the Member for Sevenoaks came into force at the start of October. It prohibits the availability of botox and dermal fillers to under-18s, apart from in a very narrow set of defined circumstances. We will consider the impact and effectiveness of this important legislation in parallel with the all-party group’s report in assessing whether to expand further the role of local authorities in overseeing cosmetic procedures.

I reassure the Committee that my priority is to ensure that the right regulatory framework is in place to provide consistent and high standards of practice, and the Government are committed to improving the safety of cosmetic procedures through better training for practitioners and clear information so that people can make informed decisions about their care. I hope I can reassure the Committee that we are actively considering whether increased oversight of practitioners performing some of the most invasive non-surgical procedures is the right way forward, and one that we could work with.

We continue to explore carefully how to achieve a proportionate system of practitioner regulation. The all-party group’s report is a very valuable contribution to that work and that active assessment. As soon as that work has been done, we will look to determine the need for and scope of further regulation in this area, and we look forward to reporting our conclusions from that assessment in early 2022. I therefore encourage the shadow Minister not to press the new clause to a Division, and I invite him to work with us in looking at the issue.

[Justin Madders]

I am encouraged by what the Minister has said. I am pleased to hear that he is meeting the right hon. Member for Romsey and Southampton North and my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham shortly, and that we will hopefully have some progress on this in the new year. In the light of that information, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 17

Secretary of State’s duty to maintain safe staffing levels

“After section 1G of the National Health Service Act 2006 (but before the italic heading after it) insert—

‘1GA Secretary of State’s duty to maintain safe staffing levels

The Secretary of State has a duty to maintain safe staffing levels in the health and care service in England.’”—(Justin Madders.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Justin Madders]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

This is a probing new clause, and I will not press it to a vote. I am not sure that this is the best legislation for it, but we are trying to make some points about the importance of patient safety. I hope we can all agree that for good care to be central, there need to be enough staff, not just notionally through some measure of the number of posts, but by ensuring that those people are actually in place at the time of giving care. We can have a debate about what level of staffing is enough. For a long time, the issue was left to the good sense of managing clinicians but, of course, that has always been strongly impacted on by the level of budget that could support staff.

Across the world, much attention has been placed on setting out what levels of staff and skill are needed in various settings to achieve the required levels of safety. The debate is not at any fixed point in time, because pathways, models of care, and staffing skills and mixes develop and evolve, but there will always be a correlation between safe staffing and levels of funding. It is a sad fact that our NHS, which should find planning easy as a single national system, has struggled for some time in almost every of aspect of workforce planning. It has shied away from asking questions about safety that come when the available workforce is not matched to the resources. At the end of the day, it is the patients who lose out when we are in that situation.

Much of the discussion on this topic historically has focused on the nursing workforce, which is by far the biggest of the staff groups. The Royal College of Nursing put out guidance pre-covid and during covid and set out where the legal responsibilities lie. It also pointed out recently:

“These are unprecedented times. Nursing staff in almost all settings are facing challenges beyond what were ever expected. Staffing levels are poor in many places, on most shifts and care is being compromised as a result”—

“care is being compromised” can be read to mean unsafe staffing levels.

New clause 17 calls for a duty to be placed on the Secretary of State to ensure that there are in fact safe staffing levels, even if there is not a specific legislative requirement in England. I say in England because in Wales, Labour has led the way with the Nurse Staffing Levels (Wales) Act 2016. In Scotland, the Health and Care (Staffing) (Scotland) Act 2019 became law, although I understand that covid has meant that there has been some delay in its implementation. I also understand that Scotland included social care staff in that remit.

A decade ago, research showed that low levels of nurse staffing are linked to worse patient outcomes and unsafe conditions. Before 2013, decisions to assess and review staffing levels were made locally, with little national guidance. However, the Francis inquiries in 2010 and 2013 identified nurse staffing as a patient safety factor that contributed to the care failings identified at Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust. They highlighted that decisions about nurse staffing were made without full consideration of the risks to patient safety. Francis said:

“So much of what goes wrong in our hospitals is likely, and indeed it was, in many regards, the case in Stafford, due to there being inadequate numbers of staff, either in terms of numbers or skills”.

In response to that statement and the Francis inquiries, the Department of Health developed four strands of policy that aimed to create safe nurse staffing levels in the NHS. The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence published guidance for safe staffing in all NHS acute hospitals in 2014. It endorsed the safer nursing care tool to help hospitals to plan their staffing. There was a National Quality Board report outlining the principles that NHS trusts were expected to apply in relation to planning staffing, and trusts were required to monitor the differences between planned and achieved nurse staffing levels and to report them through NHS Choices.

A lot of emphasis was placed on the providers of care, and rightly so. They should use their staff effectively and efficiently to keep patients safe. However, there is also a wider responsibility on commissioners—that is where I think we have fallen down—to ensure that providers do what is required, and on system managers and others who allocate the resources, to ensure that they do it in a way that permits safe levels of staffing. Community, maternity and learning disabilities are all nursing specialities where shortages are most acute. Our new clause makes it clear that all settings would have to adhere to the same standards, with no distinctions, because we believe that good and safe care should be for everyone.

In 2013, the National Quality Board set out 10 expectations and a framework within which organisations and staff should make decisions about staffing that put patients first. The document, entitled “Putting people first”, made it clear that safe staffing was both a collective and individual responsibility and central to the delivery of high-quality care that is safe, effective, caring and responsive. In England we have a website full of guidance, and NHS boards are required to take that guidance into account or have regard to it, but there does not appear to be anything similar for social care. Of course, the point I am trying to make, rather unsubtly, is that that is just guidance.

Looking more broadly, the NHS entered its new planning mode from 2015, and we had the emergence of sustainability and transformation partnerships. There was a requirement for them to design local plans to develop, recruit and sustain levels of staff with the right skills, values and behaviour in sufficient numbers, and in the right locations, to ensure the safety of patients. The plans were developed in great haste, but they did not actually go anywhere. Now we are to have more structured ICBs and new plans, but we still do not have a national workforce plan, which means that ICBs cannot plan properly either.

It would be good to know not just the levels of vacancies, but the gap between the staffing needed to maintain safe levels of working and what is actually in place. We touched on this aspect earlier, and we hope the Government respond positively even if they do not accept the new clause. I am sure the Minister will agree that safe staffing levels are better than unsafe levels. We should all agree that it is possible and desirable to enshrine in law guidance from experts on what constitutes safe levels of staffing in various settings and scenarios. We should absolutely be allowed to know when unsafe levels of staffing occur, especially when it becomes an endemic issue due to staff or funding shortages.

As we have mentioned before, we do not want to overburden the Secretary of State, because he already has a number of new powers under the Bill that will keep him busy. We have tried to remove the attempts to give him more work through the power grab, but it would not be for the Secretary of State to do the rotas or phone round for additional staff in the mornings. He just has to ensure that the duty to have staff levels of staffing is fulfilled by those delivering the service. Any wisdom that the Minister can provide on issues around defining, establishing and enforcing safe staffing, and on who carries the systemic responsibilities, will be greatly appreciated.

[Dr Whitford]

There is no question but that the workforce in both health and social care is one of the biggest challenges across all four nations of the UK. As the shadow Minister highlighted, both Scotland and Wales have passed legislation and aspire to having in law what level should be aimed at, which is quite important. Although covid has impacted in terms of staff leaving the service and the demand on the service, Brexit has also had a huge impact, in that there was an almost 90% drop in European nurses coming to the UK within just months of the referendum. The situation has not recovered, and that impacts right across the system and indeed in social care, where European citizens represented a significant part of the workforce.

When I first came to this place, the former Health Secretary, the right hon. Member for South West Surrey (Jeremy Hunt), talked very much about patient safety but claimed that, in essence, doctors were not really available in the NHS outwith nine to five, and that this was causing what were called “weekend deaths”. Having worked long hours for over three decades, I was a bit afraid that my husband would think I was having serial affairs if I was working only nine to five in the hospital, so I refuted that utterly. However, the evidence available at the time was that the only staff ratio that had any provable impact on patient outcome was that of fully trained, registered nurses—not trainees, not associates and not assistants—to patients. Obviously, that ratio changes, based on the dependency of the ward—whether it is an ordinary ward, a high-dependency ward or an intensive care ward. That is what leads to the basic formula in safe staffing legislation, and England does not have it.

Although covid, Brexit and other things have impacted on the ability of Scotland and Wales to achieve what they aspire to, the guidance has been there for years and it has not been achieved, as the shadow Minister said. Having safe staffing ratios in hospitals is critical, but what action should be taken if that safe level of staffing is not there? What work should not be done so that patients with emergencies can be cared for properly? Otherwise, there is pressure on management to get things done where they want to see throughput. Sometimes, staff simply end up between a rock and a hard place, and that drives staff out of the service. Ultimately, coming home after an exhausting shift feeling that they have delivered poor care because they were covering too many patients is demoralising. It undermines the retention of staff and adds to the problem.

[Edward Argar]

I am grateful to the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston, for his framing of the new clause in his opening remarks.

The new clause would place the Secretary of State under a statutory duty to maintain safe staffing levels in the health and care service in England. I fear that its effect would be to detract from the responsibility of clinical and other leaders at a local level to ensure safe staffing, supported by guidance—I certainly take on board the point about guidance made by the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire—and regulated by the Care Quality Commission. I am afraid that the Government cannot agree with the new clause as worded for a number of reasons, which I will enunciate for the shadow Minister to illustrate my thinking.

First and foremost, we do not believe that there is a single ratio or formula that could calculate what represents safe staffing. It will differ across and within an organisation and, indeed, across organisations. Reaching the right mix requires the use of evidence-based tools and, crucially, the exercise of professional judgment and expertise and a multi-professional approach.

Consequently, we think that responsibility for staffing levels is best placed with clinical and other leaders at a local level, responding to local needs and supported by guidelines, all overseen and regulated by the CQC. Those guidelines, notwithstanding the challenges posed by the hon. Lady and the shadow Minister, are issued by national and professional bodies such as the National Quality Board and National Institute for Health and Care Excellence. They are based on the best available clinical evidence and are designed to ensure patient safety.

Appropriate staffing levels form a core element of the CQC’s registration regime for health and social care providers. Providers are required by the CQC to provide sufficient numbers of suitably qualified, competent, skilled and experienced staff to meet the care and treatment needs of the people using the service at all times. Staff must also receive the support, training, professional development, supervision and appraisals necessary to carry out their role and responsibilities.

Secondly, the new clause would require the formulation of safe staffing ratios against which performance could be assessed. I fear that that could be a retrograde step and inhibit the development of the skill mixes needed for a more innovative and productive future workforce, which will be crucial to the successful implementation of the new models of integrated care that the Bill is intended to support. Just as there is no one-size-fits-all approach for the new models of care, there will be no identikit approach to the mix of staff needed. The ultimate outcome of good quality care is influenced by a far greater range of issues than how many of each particular staff group are on any particular shift, according to a prescribed ratio. It requires the professional expertise and judgment of those who know the situation best in a given circumstance. The point I seek to make is that, although those numbers are a key part, they are not the only part.

This is, perhaps, more of a technical point than a point of substance, but the specific wording of the new clause is incredibly broad. It would potentially require the Secretary of State to assess safe staffing levels across all healthcare settings across the whole of England for all medical and clinical staff. Such a duty would, I fear, be challenging to implement, notwithstanding the shadow Minister’s assertion that he would not expect the Secretary of State to sit there each morning going through shift rotas and shift patterns himself. It would be challenging for not only the Department but the wider system and, in particular, clinical leaders in individual settings.

For those reasons, while I appreciate the sentiment and the objective sought by the shadow Minister, I do not believe the new clause is the appropriate practical solution.

[Justin Madders]

I am grateful for this Minister’s response. I am not surprised that he is not prepared to the support the new clause. Unfortunately, I think there is a large chasm where responsibility for workforce issues probably lies, and this is an example of that. It was certainly not our intention to expect the Secretary of State to deliver each individual setting, but for someone in the system to have that responsibility of advising the Secretary of State. No doubt we will return to this. We will see the practice in the devolved nations and how that has proved to be a success or otherwise, which may strengthen or weaken the argument. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 18

Workforce responsibilities of integrated care boards

“(1) Each integrated care board must at least every two years publish a report setting out an analysis of the current workforce, the workforce requirements to enable the Board to fulfil its duties over the following 2, 5 and 10 years, and the plans the Board has to close any gaps identified.

(2) In drawing up the report the Board must consult—

(a) the Trusts and Foundation Trusts that provide services in its area,

(b) providers of primary care in its area, and

(c) the recognised trade unions.”—(Justin Madders.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Justin Madders]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

We are back on the workforce. We had a brief discussion about the proposals in clause 33 on the Secretary of State and workforce planning, and how they are by universal acclaim wholly inadequate. Now is not the time to repeat that debate, although I may shoehorn in one or two references to it. We hope that at some point there will be a better proposal on the national efforts to assess and meet workforce needs.

The new clause tries to repeat the intentions of the amendment to clause 33, and to take some of that thinking and translate it to ICB level. That makes a lot of sense to us, and in an ideal world some of the national plan would be made up of individual local assessments of need and add together the 42 ICBs into one national workforce plan. We will see where we end up with that. As I said, we have had some attempt at this with each STP trying to produce its own plan to a very abrupt timetable. I do not think anyone actually added up all their assessments to come up with a national figure. Because of the truncated timetable they faced, there was not a great deal of engagement with the workforce on that.

There is therefore a bit of a precedent in the work that was done on that. It is probably what you would call a gap analysis: what is needed against what we are likely have unless something is done to close that gap. The new clause follows that approach, which has had some support in some other areas. We felt that a two-year cycle was about right, with reporting on that two-year cycle covering short, medium and longer-term need.

It is hard to see why we will not have local plans if we are going to have national plans, to make sure that there is alignment when, as we hope, the Government come back with something better on clause 33. Looking at the total staff in the NHS and social care for an ICS, some of the larger ones will be running into hundreds of thousands of people. It is hard to think of any system with that many staff where some sort of workforce planning is not going on. If we are looking at things across system level, as the ICS is, surely workforce needs across the system would be part of that. We know that ICBs, together with the relevant trusts and foundation trusts, have the general duty to produce a plan annually, setting out how they propose to exercise their functions over the next five years. They will not be able to do that without the right staff.

A lot of the ground work entailed in the new clause will have been done already. It is our intention that it will try to remove any possibility of blame shifting, where inadequate resources lead to reduced services and the service providers are blamed, rather than those who hold the purse strings in Whitehall. The reporting required by the new clause will make it clear whether there are enough staff to meet all the reasonable requirements of the ICB.

The other key point covered by the new clause is who is consulted in the local planning process. We believe it vital that recognised trade unions are involved. That should be a given anyway, in the light of the general commitments from the NHS over partnership working, but as we have covered before, we think that needs to be explicit in the legislation because of the behaviour of a few NHS bodies in trying to marginalise staff involvement in recent times.

The ICBs will new bodies, and they will need to understand the importance of partnership working from day one. If the levelling-up and devolution agendas are to continue to flourish, surely the regional and sub-regional identification and development of skills in this important area ought to be part of the mix. It feels, I am afraid, as though the whole issue of workforce is being assiduously side-stepped by the Department. That is the Department’s prerogative, but it is a mistake and it is those on the frontline who will bear the brunt. We need someone to take responsibility, so why not the ICBs?

Without its workforce, the NHS is nothing. We are grateful to each and every one of its staff for the work that they do. We owe it to them, the patients and the taxpayer to have in place a proper system of workforce planning. Although we do not pretend that the new clause is the whole answer, it would begin to put in place the building blocks to achieve that.

[Edward Argar]

The new clause would place a new statutory responsibility on integrated care boards to publish, at least every two years,

“a report setting out an analysis of the current workforce, the workforce requirements to enable the Board to fulfil its duties over the following 2, 5 and 10 years, and the plans the Board has to close any gaps identified.”

Under the new clause, ICBs drawing up that report would be placed under a statutory duty of consultation with the trusts and foundation trusts in their area, providers of primary care and the recognised trade unions. The Government’s view is that that is an unnecessarily prescriptive duty on ICBs, and that clause 33 —alongside our non-legislative work and investment—remains the right way to develop the NHS workforce.

On the workforce nationally, what is needed is greater transparency and accountability for the various bodies involved in workforce planning. Clause 33 requires the Secretary of State to produce a report describing the workforce planning and supply system—including the roles of DHSC and its arm’s length bodies; NHS bodies, including ICBs and others; and how they work together—to provide that greater transparency.

To support local ICBs on workforce matters, work is already being taken forward on workforce planning through NHS England and NHS Improvement’s draft guidance to ICBs on the discharge of their functions. The draft NHSEI guidance, published in August 2021, states that the intended outcomes for ICBs will include,

“Growing the workforce for the future and enabling adequate workforce supply”,

as well as,

“Leading coordinated workforce planning”.

The guidance notes state explicitly that ICBs will have the responsibility to develop

“plans to address current and future predicted workforce supply requirements”,

which I believe addresses the core intention of the shadow Minister’s new clause.

The production of those plans will require ICBs to develop and regularly refresh collaborative workforce plans for their integrated care area, with demand and supply planning based on population health needs. As part of that work, we can expect ICBs to work with local stakeholders in their areas. ICBs will also be supported by Health Education England on such workforce planning matters. Under the guidance, ICBs will also have the responsibility to provide workforce data to regional and national workforce teams to support workforce planning and inform the prioritisation of workforce initiatives and investment decisions.

We join the shadow Minister in putting on the record our gratitude to our health and care workforce, but we think that that guidance already sends a strong signal to the system about the importance of the issue, and we therefore do not support his new clause.

[Justin Madders]

I am not surprised, although I am a little saddened, that the Minister has once again adopted the permissive rather than prescriptive approach. We think that the issue is so important for the NHS that it needs a firmer hand. I am sure that I will quote back to him his comments about the need for greater accountability and transparency in workforce planning, because that is something that we absolutely agree on. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 19

Secretary of State’s duty to provide access to occupational health services to NHS staff

“After section 1G of the National Health Service Act 2006 (but before the italic heading after it) insert—

‘1GA Secretary of State’s duty to provide access to occupational health services to NHS staff

The Secretary of State must provide access to occupational health services to meet the reasonable requirements of all persons who are employed in an activity which involves or relates to the provision of services as part of the health service in England.’”—(Alex Norris.)

This new clause would place a new duty on the Secretary of State to provide access to OH services to meet the reasonable requirements of all NHS staff. The duty would apply to all healthcare professionals delivering health care including doctors, dentists, nurses, midwives, pharmacists, healthcare scientists and the allied health professions.

Brought up, and read the First time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Justin Madders]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

One of the livelier arguments during the passage of the Lansley Act was about trusts doing lots more private patient work. Under the Act, up to 50% of a trust’s income could be derived from private patients. That was obviously an attempt to take the NHS in a whole new direction. The previous private patient cap was removed, and a new definition of “principal purpose” was brought in.

We need to be clear that this new clause is not about the parallel argument that we sometimes have about private providers doing more NHS-funded work, though that is a major concern when we hear the news that the private sector is now doing more hip replacements for NHS patients than the NHS. We are in a slightly ludicrous and paradoxical situation: private providers are doing more NHS-funded work, while NHS providers are doing more private work. The new clause tries to put the brakes on that. We say: why not just build up NHS capacity to the point where it does all NHS-funded work, so that the need to keep dipping into the private sector is removed?

The 2011 argument is mirrored in the way the original foundation trusts, when invented, were allowed to develop private patient income, but only to a very low level. That was not a great situation, but it recognised that there were already a few NHS organisations, mostly in London, for which private patient income was so significant that there would be a risk of destabilisation if that income were blocked. The point at the time was that the amount permitted then was acceptable, but that it should go no further. Incidentally, the plain-old NHS trusts could do as much private patient work as they were allowed to by the Secretary of State, who could direct them to do it. If memory serves, he allowed one trust to become the private patient income league table toppers at one point. It did not want to become a foundation trust. What a strange and paradoxical world we live in.

Anyway, in 2011, the cap was raised from 3% to 50%, which started many hares running. We heard predictions of a whole new generation of private patient units being built, and that we would be back to the old days when the NHS was the largest provider of private patient care. Fortunately, that never happened. In the real world, there are now only around a dozen trusts that have any significant private patient income, and it is not increasing at a significant rate, although recent developments in Oxford suggest that the issue has not gone away.

One might argue that in those circumstances there is no need for the new clause, but we would say that there is every need to renounce the approach set out in Lansley, and to go back to a public NHS. The only reason for gaining income from private patients is to benefit the NHS as a whole, not to benefit one NHS organisation. This is a real and live issue, as we saw during covid. There were tensions, and every spare bed was vital; indeed, every spare bed is vital now to support the mammoth effort that is needed to bring down waiting lists. In all seriousness, why would we sanction a trust’s building more private patient capacity, when waiting times for NHS treatment continue to go up? Then we go, as we have done in recent times, cap and wallet in hand to the private providers and pay them huge sums to allow the NHS the option of using their services and capacity, as we did during covid. As we saw recently, that did not get used anything like as much as it should have been. That might be a fortunate thing, but it was a shocking lack of value for money. The report by the Centre for Health and the Public Interest on the contract with the private sector found that none of the five objectives set for the contract were achieved, with large amounts of healthcare resources wasted.

--- Later in debate ---

[Edward Argar]

The hon. Gentleman’s new clause would effectively prevent NHS foundation trusts from increasing their income from private patients year on year unless a number of specified conditions were met.

If hon. Members are students of history, they will recall that in 2012 we abolished the private patient cap, while clarifying that the foundation trusts’ principal purpose was

“the provision of goods and services for the purposes of the health service in England”,

meaning that foundation trusts must make the majority of their income from NHS activity. That was a more rational and sensible way of managing the issue than the previous cap, which caused practical problems for some NHS organisations that wanted to become foundation trusts and were prevented from doing so by the prescriptive nature of the previous regime. We also retained the requirement that additional income be used to benefit NHS patient care. It has been used across the system to offset maintenance costs, finance alternative transport such as park and ride, and fund patient care.

I should also be clear that we are talking about a very small percentage of the NHS’s income. The most recent set of provider consolidated accounts for 2019-20 shows income from non-NHS sources as 2% of income, of which less than 1% relates to private patients. Again, all that income has gone to improving care for NHS patients.

The new clause introduces a new cap by a different door; it creates a requirement for foundation trusts to agree with their ICB and ICP their income from non-NHS sources, and if they raised more than in the previous year, they would no longer be fulfilling their primary function as a foundation trust. That would be a significant bureaucratic and administrative burden on foundation trusts, and it would require them to either forgo raising additional income, or seek agreement via a multi-stage process before raising it.

The provision would also mark a significant new restriction on foundation trusts’ freedoms and autonomy, and could potentially dissuade some from wishing to become foundation trusts. As all non-NHS income must benefit NHS patient care, and an NHS foundation trust must always have as its primary purpose the delivery of NHS services, I fear that would potentially be putting ideological purity over practical interests and the practical working of the system.

New clause 23 would only apply to foundation trusts, as I read it, not NHS trusts. NHS trusts do not have a limit on the amount of income they can raise from private patients, and a very small number of trusts raise significant income in this way. Putting an additional requirement on foundation trusts before they can raise non-NHS income, but not doing the same for NHS trusts, would potentially further unbalance the playing field and give an additional nudge in the direction of foundation trusts.

The hon. Gentleman raised the issue of the costs or spending on the independent sector in the context of the pandemic response. I have been clear throughout that when the accounts are fully consolidated and audited, those figures will have to be reported. I cannot say exactly when that process will be complete, but it is a requirement that those accounts be gone through, consolidated and audited. I would hesitate to give him an inaccurate figure, but it is my intention for those figures to be made available at the appropriate time. With that, I invite the hon. Gentleman to consider withdrawing his new clause.

[Justin Madders]

I hesitate to withdraw the new clause, because I have to say that the Minister’s arguments about not wanting to deter foundation trusts from making applications rang a little hollow, but we would not want to be accused of preventing that procession from continuing. We have set out very clearly why we do not think this residue from the 2012 Act should remain on the statute book. We think it sends out the wrong message and is actually unhelpful at this time, but we will not push the new clause to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 24

Requirement for NHS trusts to publish Royal College invited review reports

“Each NHS Trust in England must publish the reports produced by Royal Colleges of invited reviews of the Trust, including any conclusions and recommendations.”—(Justin Madders.)

This new clause would require Trusts to publish Royal College invited review reports.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Justin Madders]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The clause seeks to require all trusts to publish reports produced by royal colleges following invited reviews, including any conclusions and recommendations. Invited reviews are advisory, non-regulatory and non-statutory ways for healthcare organisations to assure patient safety and improve patient care through the use of a collaborative, independent, objective and expert review process undertaken by medical royal colleges when asked. Invited reviews have a clear and important role in supporting improvements in services. They aid trusts in understanding issues within departments or teams, particularly where these are multifactorial and involve team dynamics. An independent, external expert opinion is often invaluable in helping senior clinicians see a different viewpoint and in articulating where and why professional differences of opinion in practice are occurring.

The reports can help move issues of contention forward and improve relationships. Trusts value the insight and objective evidence of these reviews, particularly where quality issues have been raised. They are often a vital tool in resolving a complex, seemingly intractable issue. They are also invaluable in ensuring the NHS can continually learn, improve and deliver the safest and best quality care for patients. However, we think that can only be achieved if the information and learning within the reports is shared for the benefit of others across the system.

Independent and external expert reviews are a key part of any assurance process. To us, their value is beyond dispute. How the organisation being reviewed responds to the report produced is again crucial. Although we would expect in most cases the organisations to accept those recommendations and do what is required, we know that does not always happen. Shockingly, BBC “Panorama” revealed that, of 111 invited service reviews over five years, only 16 were put into the public domain. Panorama accuses trusts of burying important reports on patient safety. The invited reviews are organised by the Academy of Medical Royal Colleges, which follows the published framework. The framework has a section on openness and transparency:

“Where a healthcare organisation has commissioned an invited review of clinical activity in response to concerns about the quality of patient care, they should also be open and transparent with patients, their relatives and the public…Healthcare organisations should also work closely with their regulators and share information about invited reviews with them proactively where necessary to ensure that the safety of patients can be maintained.”

As with all such external reviews, there is a balance between protecting certain information, for example by attributing views or comments, and being open. For such reviews it is necessary that those interviewed or otherwise asked to become involved are happy to do so and happy to speak out confidentially. As we discussed earlier, ensuring that staff and whistleblowers feel safe to come forward and disclose information about an incident is critically important.

The new clause does not intend to get in the way of that protection. It is deliberately not prescriptive about the timing of publication, so that trusts maintain appropriate control. It is not about blame or ensuring that trusts are named and shamed when improvements are needed; it is about transparency. In the NHS, after mistakes have been made, it is vital to have transparency to ensure that necessary improvements are made.

It is concerning that so many reports produced by royal colleges have not been shared with the public and therefore we do not know whether they have been acted upon. As part of the conditions of an invited review, trusts are in effect signing up to publishing and showing the findings. Yet, as we know, that is not happening.

Everything favours openness, although patient-identifiable information would of course have to be redacted. On some occasions, there may be other reasons for part of the report to be withheld, but not the overall conclusions and certainly not the recommendations. That would ensure proper accountability for the follow-up and implementation of the recommendations or, in some cases, a justification for why the organisation did not accept or act on the recommendations.

We have talked several times already about the defensive culture that pervades parts of the NHS and how it sometimes gets in the way of what patients and families want. They want answers and assurances. Most of all, they want the truth. These reviews are part of that truth. We have had the same argument many times, because, although the NHS claims to be open and transparent, it is often not.

Given the fragmented and convoluted set of organisations within the new structure, it is harder to know sometimes who will be responsible for what. With the present system, there is always the issue of who owns the report, who controls what is published and who follows up and ensures that the necessary changes are made. That is why we believe that that the disinfectant of sunlight is vital. We should know everything unless there is a good reason for us not to, not the other way round. We should not be required to protect the reputation of bits of the NHS or even the reputations of those individuals who have failed to do their jobs properly.

We have heard in the many scandals how things were known by a few, but they failed to act and prevented anyone else from acting on the information they had. Sadly, it is necessary to be clear about rules. There ought to be some sort of sanction for those who have broken rules of publication. It may not always be easy for the individuals or the individual organisations, but it is almost certainly always going to be in the interests of the NHS as a whole.

The Academy of Medical Royal Colleges and the CQC are looking at guidance on invited reviews at the moment. The new clause seeks to focus the Minister’s mind on an issue that has not gone away. I know it is controversial. I hope the Minister can give us some assurances that his Department is committed to developing a system that works better in this area and puts patients at the heart of everything that happens.

Unfortunately, in the last financial year prior to the pandemic, there were 472 serious patient safety issues classified as never events across the NHS in England. There is work to be done to get the NHS to the level of patient care and safety that we would want to see. It is only by seeking to understand why these events happened in the first place and the circumstances that led to them that we can ensure they never happen again. That is the heart of what most patients and their families want to know.

We believe that the safety of patients should be a golden thread running through every aspect of healthcare delivery and we will do everything in our power to make sure that the NHS is one of the safest and most supported healthcare systems in the world. I ask the Minister to tell us why the reviews should not be published on a regular basis. Is 16 reports out of 111 being published good enough? We certainly do not think it is.

I will finish on a quote from the Francis report. We have mentioned this one already, but it needs repeating as it is so important. He said:

“It is a basic and just expectation of the public that organisations are open, honest and transparent about their performance standards, about the rights of patients and about what happened, and why, if things go wrong. This is the only way to begin to restore full public trust in the NHS.”

We hope that this new clause, by requiring publication of the reviews, will go some way to restoring confidence and increasing the transparency that patients deserve.

[Edward Argar]

The new clause would require each NHS trust in England to publish any report by a medical royal college of an invited review of the trust. That includes any conclusions and recommendations. It is right, as the hon. Gentleman mentioned, that trusts are open and transparent in managing any concerns about the quality and safety of their services, and, in particular, regulators should have access to any royal college invited review of a trust.

I have considerable sympathy with the intention of the new clause. We all want to improve patient safety and care, and I recognise the key role that transparency can play as part of that. However, I will explain why I am not convinced that this objective is best advanced by acceptance of this particular new clause. Managing concerns about clinical quality openly and transparently is essential for trusts if they are to provide consistently high quality, safe care, to show quality of leadership and to maintain trust in the trust and the service it delivers.

When the CQC finds that there has been a failure to do so or that fundamental standards of care are not being met, it is reflected in the CQC’s reports and ratings and in the range of enforcement powers it can use. The CQC’s inspection teams maintain ongoing engagement with trusts and make it clear that they expect trusts to be open and honest about issues of quality and safety of services. Furthermore, the CQC has been clear with trusts that reports, including invited reviews by royal colleges, should be made available to relevant commissioners and regulators, including the CQC. The CQC, NHS England and NHS Improvement expect trusts to take prompt actions to address appropriate recommendations, and the framework for invited reviews from the Academy of Medical Royal Colleges is clear that trusts and royal colleges undertaking reviews should share any serious patient safety issues from reports with the CQC.

As part of the CQC’s monitoring and inspection activity, it assesses how trusts have acted on recommendations from these reviews, including implementing any learning to make improvements. Since July 2018, the CQC has set a very clear expectation on trusts to share copies of the full final report of external reviews, including those by royal colleagues, and to inform it of steps they are taking to implement any recommendations. The CQC, working with providers, NHS England, NHS Improvement and the Academy of Medical Royal Colleges, has seen improvement in the development of an open and transparent culture.

The CQC has powers to compel a trust to share an invited review where it is aware of that review. Where serious issues of care are uncovered, NHS England and NHS Improvement can also compel a trust to take whatever steps are necessary to address them. This includes the sharing of an invited review to itself. The CQC is now reviewing its regulatory model, including its approach to monitoring and gathering evidence from providers. In doing so, it will continue to work with trusts and royal colleges, including on sharing and responding to findings from external reviews to encourage a culture of openness and transparency.

There are robust and transparent systems in place to ensure that providers learn from and improve their services. This includes publishing more than 100 reports every year, covering 40 clinical specialisms as part of the clinical audit programme by NHS England and NHS Improvement. NHS England and NHS Improvement also publish regular data on patient safety incidents, other safety indicators and patient safety alerts. They also provide support to challenge providers to improve governance and culture.

Invited reviews are a voluntary process. They are an advisory, non-regulatory and non-statutory way for trusts to assure patient safety and quality of care through the use of an independent review, but compelling the publication of the full report could lead to some unintended consequences. First, it could discourage some trusts from commissioning these invited reviews. That could lead to trusts overlooking specific actions to address safety and quality concerns and opportunities for improvements and learning. Secondly, it could lead to trusts inviting consulting firms and other professional bodies with less expertise in the delivery of clinical care than a team from the royal college to undertake reviews. Thirdly, invited reviews can vary widely in their scope and may not be directly patient safety-related. Therefore a blanket requirement to publish all reports may not be appropriate.

Fourthly, the specific information that a trust can make publicly available will vary from review to review, depending on the circumstances. Invited reviews can often involve sensitive and complex circumstances and cover confidential issues about staff and patients. Trusts need to take account of legislation on patient confidentiality and data protection each time a report is developed. It may therefore not be possible for every invited review to be a published document. The Academy of Medical Royal Colleges recommends that trusts should take steps to make available to the public a summary of the review and the steps they are taking.

Finally, requiring publication of invited reviews could attract attention in a way that affects staff morale and organisational learning, and not in a constructive way. It could make future invited review reports weaker or drive necessary conversations and actions off the record. For these reasons, while I can understand the hon. Gentleman’s point and where he is coming from, we believe that the mechanisms already in place are sufficient and achieve the right balance.

[Justin Madders]

I am slightly heartened by what the Minister said there. He obviously takes the matter seriously. We are not going to press this to a vote, because we recognise that there is some concern in the sector about this proposal. I ask him to reflect on what he said about a requirement possibly discouraging trusts from seeking invited reviews in the first place. That shows that reputation management is still at the forefront of their considerations rather than patient safety. That is the heart of the problem that we have been seeking to tease out with this new clause. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 25

“Secretary of State’s duty to report on disparities in maternal mortality rates

The Secretary of State must prepare and publish a report each year on variation in the quality and safety of England’s maternity services and disparities in maternal mortality rates in England, including the steps being taken to address these disparities and improve outcomes for patients.”—(Justin Madders.)

This new clause lays a duty on the Secretary of State to prepare and publish a report on variation in the quality and safety of England’s maternity services and disparities in maternal mortality rates in England, including what steps his department is taking to address these disparities and improve outcomes for patients.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Justin Madders]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

This clause, in the words of Ronseal, does exactly what it says on the tin. It lays a duty on the Secretary of State to prepare and publish a report on variation in the quality and safety of England’s maternity services and disparities in maternal mortality rates in England. The report would include details of the steps that the Department was taking to address these disparities and improve outcomes for patients. We all know that this issue is of paramount importance and has been debated in the House several times recently. I hope that the Minister agrees that it is important that we take whatever steps we can to tackle all forms of inequality in our society and this is another example of how that manifests itself.

Covid has sharpened our awareness of health inequalities, but it is clear that it is not just with respiratory viruses where health outcomes can be staggeringly different for different groups. Maternity services are one of the areas where we can and must do far better. The Care Quality Commission report “Safety, Equity and Engagement in Maternity Services”, published in September, highlighted continued concern about the variation in quality and safety of England’s maternity services and presented analysis of key issues that persisted in some maternity services. It also highlighted where action was still needed to support vital improvements. In the UK’s poorest areas the stillbirth rate is still twice that in the UK’s most affluent ones, with pre-pandemic figures showing that babies in the poorest areas have a 73% excess risk of neonatal death. All mothers and babies deserve the very best care and it simply cannot be right that where people live might dictate the quality of the maternity care received. Action is needed to eradicate maternal inequalities.

It is not just geographical and socioeconomic inequalities that need to be tackled but ethnic inequalities. Evidence from MBRACE-UK––Mothers and Babies Reducing Risk Through Audits and Confidential Enquiries across the UK––shows that the maternal mortality rate is more than four times higher for black women compared with white women. The maternal mortality rate for Asian women is almost twice as high compared with white women. Those inequalities are an injustice, and we need action to address them.

I recognise that many black, Asian and minority ethnic women also do not feel that they are listened to during childbirth. A lack of cultural competency and medical training means that complications are not always spotted early enough. For example, black women have shared experiences of how anaemia has not been picked up soon enough because of their skin colour. We really ought to be doing better than that.

The Government have said that they have hosted several roundtables with experts and have commissioned more research to better understand the issue. However, they believe that a target to address maternal mortality disparities would have limitations in improving the quality of care. Why do they hold that view? NHS England’s long-term plan includes targets for addressing health outcomes in other areas. We need action to address the unacceptable disparities in maternal mortality rates as well.

The Joint Committee on Human Rights found that over 60% of black people did not believe that their health was equally protected by the NHS compared with white people. As we know, covid has had a disproportionate impact on BAME communities.

If not a target, then a report would ensure accountability and focus minds to address these unacceptable injustices. New clause 25 would put explicit accountability on the Secretary of State not only to monitor and report on variation in maternity services but, crucially, to set out the steps needed to tackle it. We need a national strategy to address this country’s health inequalities, which must include serious and urgent action to end the mortality gap between black, Asian and ethnic minority women and white women. The new clause is, of course, not the complete answer, but I hope the Minister will agree that it would be a welcome step in the right direction.

[Edward Argar]

Again, I am grateful to the shadow Minister. The new clause would require the Secretary of State to publish a report each year on variation in the quality and safety of England’s maternity services and on disparities in maternal mortality rates in England. Again, I understand the intention behind the new clause, which the hon. Gentlemen set out clearly, as it is paramount that we do all we can to ensure the safety of expectant mothers and their babies, which involves understanding and taking steps to address the variation in quality and safety of England’s maternity services and disparities in outcomes.

However, several organisations and bodies already publish reports each year on the variation of quality and safety of England’s maternity services and the disparities in maternal mortality rates. First, the CQC monitors, inspects and regulates maternity services across England to ensure they meet standards of quality and safety. Following an inspection, it provides findings, recommendations and an overall rating of the trusts. It also publishes monthly reports following inspections of maternity services and annual reports that explore areas for improvement in maternity services across England.

Secondly, “Better Births”, the report of the national maternity review, recommended that a nationally agreed set of indicators should be developed to help local maternity systems to track, benchmark and improve the quality of maternity services. In response, NHS England and NHS Improvement, in partnership with NHS Digital, have produced a national maternity services dashboard. The dashboard enables clinical teams in maternity services to compare their performance with their peers on a series of clinical quality improvement metrics, or CQIMs, and national maternity indicators, or NMIs, for the purposes of identifying areas that may require local clinical quality improvement.

Thirdly, MBRRACE-UK publishes annual reports on maternal deaths, stillbirths and neonatal deaths across the UK. Stillbirth and neonatal mortality rates are provided for individual NHS providers, commissioning boards, and local authorities in England, Scotland, Wales and the Crown dependencies. It would not be possible to report annual maternal mortality rates by NHS trusts because the numbers are very small—it would not be a meaningful statistic. That would also potentially risk individuals being identified and could result in contravention of data protection legislation.

The reports by MBRRACE-UK also look at health inequalities; its analysis has identified significant differences in maternal mortality rates, which the shadow Minister mentioned, between women from black or Asian minority ethnic backgrounds and white women, and between women from lower and higher socioeconomic backgrounds.

Finally, the National Maternity and Perinatal Audit, or NMPA, is a large-scale audit of NHS maternity services across England, Scotland and Wales. The NMPA publishes trust-level data and evaluates a range of care processes and outcomes to identify good practice and areas for improvement in the care of women and babies.

--- Later in debate ---

Due to the significant number of projects the Department has already undertaken in relation to the matter, and to avoid the potential additional burden of reporting and validating data on maternity staff and the duplication of the publication of information, I argue that—while I appreciate the intent behind it—the new clause is not necessary, and I would therefore encourage the shadow Minister not to press it to a Division.

[Justin Madders]

I will disappoint the Minister this time. We will push the new clause to a vote, because we think that it is really important. While the Minister has set out a whole range of reports that have been issued and work that is being done, due to the scale of the injustice we have set out, there needs to be a concrete commitment from the Secretary of State to not only publish the data, but set out the steps he is taking to address the inequalities.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

Health and Care Bill (Twentieth sitting)

Justin Madders Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 28th October 2021 Public Bill Committees

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Justin Madders (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 40—Definition of carers—

“(1) The National Health Service Act 2006 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 275 (Interpretation) insert—

‘“carer” includes carers as defined by Section 10(3) and 10(9) of the Care Act 2014; parents of disabled children with reference to Section 97 of the Children and Families Act 2014; unpaid carers of disabled children as in Section 1 of the Carers (Recognition and Services) Act 1995; young carers with reference to Section 96 of the Children and Families Act 2014; and young carers with reference to Section 63 (6) and Section 63 (7) of the Care Act 2014.’”

This new clause inserts a definition of carers into the National Health Service Act 2006 which includes parent carers and young carers as well as adults caring for adults.

[Justin Madders]

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair this morning, Mr Bone.

The NHS needs to have a core duty to have regard to carers and to promote their health and wellbeing. New clause 39 would put on a statutory footing the requirement for integrated care boards to collect information on carers and their families, and then to use it to develop strategies to promote their health and wellbeing. This is an attempt to ensure a strategic approach to the need for the NHS to demonstrate that it has considered carers in its policies and practice. In other words, all parts of the NHS would have to think carer.

The new clause would avoid situations arising in which carers had been omitted from consideration, for instance in hospital discharges, by ensuring proper care-proofing throughout the entire NHS. We believe that could help integration. Social care sees carers as an equal partner in care and very much part of the system, but sometimes there is a less favourable experience in the health service.

There would also be benefits to the NHS overall, through improved health and wellbeing, improved satisfaction with services, reduced admissions and readmissions, reduced crisis and reduced need. The new clause would avoid the significant omission of carers in recent guidance and improve the general approach to carers. It would also be good for NHS staff, one in three of whom couple working in the NHS with unpaid caring for family members and friends. Research shows increased job satisfaction when employers recognise carers, and the Minister will know how important it is to improve retention rates.

There is definitely an issue here. Surveys have consistently shown a problem, with 55% of carers saying that they agree or strongly agree with the statement, “I feel invisible to the NHS”. They are often providing more than 50 hours of care a week, which is more than a full-time job, and are essential to the NHS, yet that goes unrecognised. There are a range of other statistics on how carers feel about the recognition of their role; 56% agree or agree strongly with the statement, “Health services and professionals do not share information with me, even if it is essential for me to be able to care”. More than half are not involved in decisions on hospital discharge, two thirds of carers do not feel listened to by healthcare professionals about their willingness and ability to care, and a majority are not given enough information and advice when a person they care for is discharged from hospital to care for them safely. Most carers—60%—say that at the point of hospital discharge, they receive insufficient support to protect the health and wellbeing of the patient, or their own health.

Under the Health and Social Care Act 2012, carers have parity of esteem, and an equal right to receive information and advice and to have their needs considered. The Government accept that that is right for social care, so we think it should apply equally in healthcare. The NHS has very few responsibilities towards carers when compared with the social care sector. Carers were left out of the original Joint Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation decision on vaccination, even though they were in the green book. They were completely left out of the White Paper that underpinned this Bill; they were left out of two versions of the “Discharge to Assess” guidance; and they barely get a mention in integrated care partnership guidance—there is one reference in there to unpaid carers.

Several organisations are keen to support the approach set out in the new clause, including the Patients Association and the MS Society. The new clause would serve as an important marker in laying out the importance of carers, and it would help us work towards proper strategies to ensure that their value is recognised and that they are supported.

Turning to new clause 40, carers are mentioned in clauses 5 and 19, but are not defined anywhere. They could in theory include carers of any age. The new clause seeks to ensure absolute clarity about who the term “carer” refers to: it would refer to unpaid carers only—not volunteers or paid staff, but friends and family, commonly, who provide care. This keeps the definition consistent with other legislation, and includes parents of disabled children and, most importantly, young carers, who are particularly vulnerable to being forgotten. Young carers face more health inequalities than other children of the same age, and that persists into young adulthood. Every GP patient survey has shown that it is essential that it is made clear and explicit in legislation that provisions on carers include young carers.

In conclusion, we want to acknowledge the vital contribution that carers make, which can be quantified as running into billions of pounds. The NHS could not function without the daily support of unpaid carers, and during the pandemic the extra caring responsibilities that carers took on stopped the NHS being completely overwhelmed. These new clauses ensure carers’ needs will be at the heart of NHS decision making and polices. That is why we hope the Minister is sympathetic to them.

[Edward Argar]

New clauses 39 and 40 focus on carers. First, I join the shadow Minister, as I suspect all hon. Members wish to, in recognising and paying tribute to the enormous amount of work that carers, both formal and informal, do. We want to strengthen the system by which carers are supported, and ensure that those receiving care have choice and control over how they access services.

New clause 39 would create an obligation on integrated care boards to collect information, and understand and respond to the needs of carers with regard to their health and wellbeing. The Bill provides an opportunity to ensure the views of carers are properly embedded in integrated care boards. The Bill confers a duty on integrated care boards to promote the involvement of carers, along with those who access care and support, in decisions relating to the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of illness, and care. There are equivalent provisions for NHS England-commissioned services.

Furthermore, the joint strategic needs assessment, prepared by health and wellbeing boards, will continue to have to consider the needs of carers, and that will shape the strategy developed by the integrated care partnership and the plans of the ICB. That means the services commissioned through these routes in the area where a carer lives will have considered the impact on carers in that community. Carers UK has welcomed the clauses for recognising

“the crucial role carers play day in, day out supporting their relatives’ health”,

and it says the clauses

“give carers more of the visibility they need within health legislation.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Mary Kelly Foy]

For those who do not know, I should say that I was a carer for my severely disabled daughter for 27 years. Maria died six years ago; she suffered with cerebral palsy. I was very fortunate to be in a local authority that recognised the need for respite for carers. I was lucky enough to have a very generous package of six weeks, and that allowed me to engage with public life, have a social life and just recharge my batteries. However, other local authorities do not give such generous packages; it is a postcode lottery. When carers can no longer look after their loved one and that person has to be placed in social care, the cost to the public purse is huge.

On young carers, the issue is not just the caring role of young children. My children were classed as young carers, and the package they had was to enable them to enjoy social activities with other young people. They felt very left out of normal activities, because I was spending most of my time looking after Maria. It is very important that carers recognise that there is help out there, and help has to be consistent. As we know, local authorities have had their budgets cut massively, so what was once perhaps a gold star service for carers is down to a much lesser service.

A lot of carers I knew did not think they were carers and did not really want anything from the state. They said, “We’re just doing it because this is our loved one, and this is what we need to do.” However, the needs, health and wellbeing of unpaid carers are so important if we want them to continue doing the fantastic job that they do.

[Justin Madders]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for relaying her family’s experience. She has articulated far better than I could why it is so important that we support carers, and young carers in particular.

I have listened to what the Minister said about the new clauses. I think he is keen to support this agenda, and there is clearly quite a lot of change happening in the Department over the next few months. We will keep an eye on how the issue of carers sits within that, and how ICPs work in practice, and will not push our new clauses to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 41

Review of implementation of NHS continuing healthcare by integrated care systems

“(1) Chapter 3 of Part 1 of the Health and Social Care Act 2008 (quality of health and social care) is amended as follows.

(2) After section 46A insert—

‘46B  Review and performance assessments: integrated care systems

The Commission must, each year—

(a) conduct a review of the implementation of NHS continuing healthcare by integrated care systems,

(b) assess the performance of these systems following the review, and

(c) publish a report of its assessment.’”—(Justin Madders.)

This new clause would require the review and assessment of NHS continuing healthcare systems.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Justin Madders]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Continuing healthcare ought to be something that we do not need to think about in a truly integrated care system. Hopefully, when the next White Paper comes along, it will address some of our issues with continuing healthcare—no doubt the Minister will tell us whether that is correct.

We all know that continuing healthcare is a huge source of contention between the NHS and local authorities. Arguing about who pays for what is not productive or efficient, and of course it is always the patient who is stuck in the middle. I have numerous examples, as I am sure other hon. Members do, of constituents who have been wrangling, for years after the care was provided, about who is picking up the bill for what. It seems a highly bureaucratic, unfair and at times deeply distressing experience for the families involved.

It has been clear for decades that we are moving into a world where many people will have multiple long-term conditions, with both health and social care needs. The new clause was tabled with that in mind, and with the assistance of the Motor Neurone Disease Association. As one would expect, those with MND often fall into the CHC web. I cannot allow a reference to MND to pass without paying tribute to Rob Burrow and the many other magnificent campaigners who have put the spotlight on the challenges that those diagnosed with MND face. I had the privilege of knowing Rob when he was a professional sportsman, and he has taken equal vigour, determination and courage into this field. He has been an absolute star in campaigning on these issues.

Under the current complex and poorly understood rules, some qualify for free social care—in other words, the NHS pays for it, rather than the local authority—but it is for adults only, and in order to qualify there has to be an assessment by professionals of all a person’s needs. If the needs change, the eligibility can change, and of course there are endless arguments about what the needs are at any particular time. That demonstrates why the integration of care is very important and will probably be more efficient in the long run. Those in receipt of, or possibly eligible for, continuing healthcare should be fully involved in the assessment process and kept informed. Carers, who we have already discussed, and family members should also be consulted. There are the personal experience aspects of the process to look at, as well as the arguments about who pays for what.

The new clause accepts that we cannot fix all these things overnight. It suggests that in some cases someone should be responsible for ensuring that the system works properly in the interests of those with continuing needs. This is all part of the wider application of proper openness, and of transparency being the strongest and best form of good governance.

Clinical commissioning groups have a legal responsibility to meet the assessed health and care needs of every person in their area who is found eligible for continuing healthcare. Their responsibilities are laid out in the national framework and supporting guidance, but I am afraid there is extensive evidence that they do not always fulfil those responsibilities, and that the monitoring of delivery of continuing healthcare is inadequate. In 2018, a Public Accounts Committee inquiry on continuing healthcare found:

“NHS England is not adequately carrying out its responsibility to ensure CCGs are complying with the legal requirement to provide CHC to those that are eligible.”

It also found that

“there are limited assurance processes in place to ensure that eligibility decisions are consistent”,

and that existing measures

“may not go far enough to address the variation in performance”

across CCGs. These findings were echoed in a November 2020 report by the Parliamentary and Health Services Ombudsman, which warned that

“people continue to be seriously let down by failings in the way…healthcare is handled by CCGs.”

Patient organisations, represented collectively through the Continuing Healthcare Alliance, have reported a wide range of significant problems in CHC delivery, including CCGs not adhering to the national framework or associated guidance for assessment and care delivery, leading to significant inconsistency and variation across the country. Not enough data is collected about who receives continuing healthcare and multidisciplinary teams are frequently not used to conduct assessments, which leads to them sometimes being carried out by individuals with no knowledge of that person’s history or their medical condition. Care packages are frequently inadequate to assess needs, particularly when individuals require complex care or specialist care input. There is no effective system or process in place to monitor the quality of delivery across the country, to address that unwarranted variation and to take action when commissioners fail to live up to their legal responsibilities in respect of CHC.

We are seeking to address some of those issues through the new clause. We have what we would describe as an accountability gap, where there is no effective mechanism to monitor delivery of CHC and hold to account those who are meant to be responsible for delivering it. It goes without saying that people in receipt of CHC are sometimes the most vulnerable in the population, by definition, and it is surely unacceptable that a group of individuals continue to be let down by a failing system with no mechanism to identify and address those failings.

We hope that the new clause will address that issue and support better patient experience and outcomes with CHC. I do not intend to press it to a vote, but I would appreciate some responses from the Minister. The issue is not going to go away, so I would like his thoughts about the future of the whole idea of continuing healthcare and how we best monitor and ensure consistency and compliance throughout the country. Any thoughts on how we can make the system better would be most welcome.

[Edward Argar]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman and join him in paying tribute to the work of the MND Association and other campaigners who do so much to bring these issues to our attention, both as individual MPs and in debates such as this.

The new clause would impose a new duty on the Care Quality Commission to conduct a review and assess the performance of NHS continuing healthcare, or CHC, by integrated care systems each year. It would also require the CQC to publish a report of its assessment. Again, as with many of the hon. Gentleman’s proposals, I understand and have a degree of sympathy with the intention behind what he seeks to do with the new clause. It is right that clinical commissioning groups, as they are currently called, are held accountable for NHS continuing healthcare within their local health and social care economy. That will also be the case with the national move to integrated care boards, where the board will discharge those duties and be accountable for NHS continuing healthcare as part of its NHS commissioning responsibilities.

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for suggesting that the new clause is, in essence, a probing amendment to highlight the issue, because I am not convinced that it is necessarily the most effective way of doing that, although it certainly airs the issue in Committee. I reassure him that the Government share his view about the importance of ensuring adequate oversight in how health and social care services are delivered, including in this space.

First, by way of some reassurance, NHS England has a core role in overseeing ICBs in the exercise of their functions. The Bill requires NHS England to assess the performance of each ICB every year and ICBs are required to provide NHS England with their annual report, which will include oversight of NHS commissioning and thus, in that context, continuing healthcare.

In addition, as Members will be aware, we have debated an amendment to give the CQC a duty to assess integrated care systems at a system level. The intention is for these reviews to provide the public and the system with independent assurance of the work within the ICS and, in particular, the effectiveness of joined-up working and integration. They, too, will be a valuable way to improve the services provided. The scope would include NHS commissioning and NHS continuing healthcare. We also intend for the CQC to work closely with NHS England, which will be conducting its own assessment of integrated care boards. We therefore think that those are the most effective vehicles for that oversight.

However, I share the hon. Gentleman’s view and suspect that we will all, possibly with a degree of regularity, have constituency cases about continuing healthcare payments and whether the system is working efficiently or otherwise. Local healthcare systems must continue to focus on this and seek to do what they can to make the system as smooth and efficient as possible. We believe that the mechanisms in the Bill are an effective way of doing that, but that in no way implies that individual systems should stop looking at ways of continuing to improve that provision and the mechanism by which continuing healthcare funding is delivered to individuals.

[Justin Madders]

I am grateful to the Minister for his comments—it seems that the message has been received. Obviously, if the ambitions in the Bill to improve integration, collaboration and joint working are to be delivered, this will be one area where we would expect to see significant improvements. I have no doubt that we will return to this in future, but I beg to ask leave the withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 42

Alcohol product labelling

“The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision to ensure alcoholic drinks, as defined by the Department for Health and Social Care’s Low Alcohol Descriptors Guidance, published in 2018, or in future versions of that guidance, display—

(a) the Chief Medical Officers’ low risk drinking guidelines,

(b) a warning that is intended to inform the public of the danger of alcohol consumption,

(c) a warning that is intended to inform the public of the danger of alcohol consumption when pregnant,

(d) a warning that is intended to inform the public of the direct link between alcohol and cancer,

(e) a full list of ingredients and nutritional information.”—(Alex Norris.)

This new clause requires the Secretary of State to introduce secondary legislation on alcohol product labelling.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Health and Care Bill (Twenty First sitting)

Justin Madders Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 28th October 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Alex Norris]

I certainly did not intend to add complexity; I was hoping for clarity and consistency. Nevertheless, as the Minister says, those roles are currently functioning effectively, so I will not divide the Committee.

I would say to the Minister and his colleagues, however, that we need a real watching brief on this matter, because assuming that the Bill continues its onward journey and establishes those ICS footprints, there will be a range of different outcomes and organisational cultures. The stronger systems will be those in which the DPHs are at the heart of insight and decision making, and the reverse will be a defining characteristic in systems that are not as good. I certainly hope that we consider the Care Quality Commission reviews that were included in an earlier new clause, and any sector-led improvement, as well as the work those systems do to reflect on what they do and do not do well.

One of the criteria for both streams of improvement ought to be what the DPH does, how central they are, and how sighted they are on decision making. As I have said, in good systems that will be good, and in weak systems it will be weak. Those criteria would be a bellwether of how good the local ICS footprint is. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 45

Duty on integrated care boards to have regard to net zero commitment

“(1) The National Health Service Act 2006 is amended as follows.

(2) After section 14Z43 (inserted by section 19 of this Act) insert—

“14Z43  Duty to have regard to net zero commitment 

When procuring or commissioning goods and services on behalf of the NHS, integrated care boards must have regard to NHS England’s commitment to reach net zero by 2040.””—(Justin Madders.)

This new clause would place a duty on integrated care boards to have regard to NHS England’s commitment to reach net zero by 2040.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Justin Madders (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Ms Elliott. I will be brief in speaking to the new clause. What we are seeking to achieve is pretty clear: for integrated care boards procuring or commissioning goods and services on behalf of the NHS to have regard to NHS England’s commitment to reaching net zero by 2040.

We can assume that the Government fully support the commitment made by NHS England. We were all transfixed by the goings-on in Committee yesterday, so we may have missed the part in the Chancellor’s statement about investment in net zero and in the NHS, but perhaps the Minister will say a little more on that. I suspect that although he will accept that ICBs should have regard to the overall commitment, he will say that the new clause is unnecessary as NHS England already has a commitment that will percolate down to ICBs. We would say that NHS England can achieve that target only by working through ICBs, which will, of course, have the ability to commission more than £100 billion-worth of services.

We may end up yet again in the realms of the permissive versus prescriptive debate, but the power of public sector procurement is a massive issue, and there is no bigger part of the public sector than the NHS, which is the responsibility of the Minister’s Department. We should be very much on the front foot in using that to deliver the commitment to net zero.

Of course, we have yet to see what will replace the public contracts regulations in Government procurement as a whole. It is hoped that the same commitment to green issues will be in the mix somewhere, but until we know what that looks like, the new clause presents an opportunity to enshrine in law a commitment that I think most if not all Members want to see delivered.

[Edward Argar]

There is no doubt that the climate emergency is also a health emergency. Climate change threatens the foundations of good health, with direct and immediate consequences for our patients, the public and the NHS.

The NHS accounts for around 4% to 5% of UK emissions, and the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston is right to highlight the critical role the NHS has to play in achieving net zero. Although I have some sympathy with the intention of the new clause, I remind the Committee of the commitment. The commitment to be net zero by 2040 applies only to NHS direct emissions, such as those from building energy and does not apply to supply chain emissions that are the target of the new clause. While ICBs should and will consider the environmental impact of their procurement, that consideration must go wider than the commitment made by NHS England to net zero direct NHS emissions.

To support that work, NHS England is already leading the way on the agenda through a dedicated programme of work, which includes ambitious targets for achieving net zero for the NHS carbon footprint plus by 2045 and for its direct emissions by 2040. We fully welcome and endorse those ambitions. As part of that programme of work, under the 2021-22 NHS standard contract, every trust is expected to have a green plan. As NHS England has made clear in its guidance on green plans, published in June 2021:

“Every trust and every ICS is expected to have a Green Plan approved by that organisation’s board or governing body. For trusts, these should be finalised and submitted to ICSs by 14 January 2022. Each ICS is then asked to develop a consolidated system-wide Green Plan by 31 March 2022, to be peer reviewed regionally and subsequently published.”

On the question of procurement, the NHS is already publicly committed to purchasing only from suppliers who are aligned with its net zero ambitions by 2030. Earlier this year, NHS England set its road map giving further details on the expectations of suppliers to 2030. That work is supported by a broad range of additional action on NHS net zero. NHS England will publish the world’s first net zero health building standard; it will apply to all projects being taken forward through the Government’s new hospital programme, which will see 48 new hospitals built across England by 2030—I can almost see the slightly cynical smile through the hon. Gentleman’s mask.

I know the shadow Minister will argue that the new clause would give impetus to the NHS to move towards net zero in the work it is already doing. I am afraid I am not convinced that it is necessary, given the substantial work already under way. The NHS is already showing its commitment, backed up by clear plans.

[Justin Madders]

I wonder whether the Minister’s nickname in the Department is Steady Eddie, given his consistent responses to many of my new clauses and amendments—consistent, but not always correct. It is very important that the commitment is delivered. We are clearly going to have a disagreement about the best legislative framework in which to do that, but I am not going to push this to a vote. It is clearly an issue that all Members are very keen to see delivered.

I am sure that we will debate the new build programme on a number of other occasions—we may get beyond how many new hospitals it is and on to some of the wider issues. It is a matter we will come back to on a number of occasions.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 46

Exclusion of NHS bodies from ability to withhold information requested under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 on commercial grounds

“(1) Section 43 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 is amended as follows.

(2) After subsection (3), insert—

‘(4) Subsection (2) does not apply to information held by NHS England, integrated care boards, NHS Trusts and NHS Foundation Trusts except to the extent that subsection (5) applies.

(5) Subsection (2) applies to information held by NHS England, integrated care trusts, NHS Trusts and NHS Foundation Trusts relating to another organisation if disclosure of the information would in the opinion of the organisation pose a real and significant risk to the commercial interests of that organisation.’” —(Justin Madders.)

This new clause would prevent NHS bodies from withholding information on commercial grounds unless the information related to another organisation and that organisation considered that its disclosure would pose a real and significant risk to the commercial interests of that organisation.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Justin Madders]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

New clause 46 would amend the Freedom of Information Act 2000. It is a recognition that, as a result of the move to integrated care systems, the whole concept of the NHS being run as individual businesses really ought to go. We have already pointed out in our discussions the apparently contradictory duties placed on NHS bodies in this regard. Some consider themselves as quasi businesses and refuse to disclose their business plans or provide information about their business dealings under the Freedom of Information Act. That makes it difficult for staff to understand the precise nature of proposals. I will come to some examples of that later. I have to say that they take their lead from the Government a bit in that respect. As we are no longer in the era of markets and competition, and NHS bodies no longer have to compete with one another, commissioners really do not need to enter into complicated contractual arrangements. So there is not really the need for them to cite commercial confidentiality as a reason not to comply with FOI inquiries. The interests of trusts, the public and patients should be aligned. They should not be subservient to wider commercial interests.

The Minister may say that this is not an issue, that the NHS is already open and transparent and that everything is sweetness and light in the garden. It certainly should be, but we think there are occasions when that has proven not to be the case. It might also be argued that NHS trusts and foundation trusts have to have some protection from FOI requests so that they can conduct their affairs properly when they are properly engaged in commercial activities such as procurement. That might well be the case, but we can illustrate from the experience of trade union colleagues, especially in the case of contracts for clinical services placed with private providers in the outsourcing of facilities to subcos, that the reality is somewhat different. We often hear that the staff representatives hear that the trust they work for is considering outsourcing some service. Of course, these are the staff who carry out that particular work. Rumours and leaks slip out before there have been any discussions with trade unions, but the trust has already made the decision to outsource and starts talks on TUPE transfers before any real dialogue has taken place.

There is a great deal wrong with that approach, given the requirements that we have talked about previously with regard to the NHS constitution. The point here is that, where management have refused to discuss anything other than the results of a decision that they have already made, staff and trade unions often have to resort to FOI to get answers to the questions they are asking. They put in their FOI request relating to how the trust has made its decision to outsource the service. Then they get the reply, “We’re not going to tell you, because it is commercially confidential.” I think the fear of trusts is not that a commercial interest is endangered but that its reputation is going to be damaged. They are not confident about negotiations with staff representatives and know that the cases that they have built are painfully weak and will not stand up to rigorous external examination.

Staff, understandably, are anxious and curious because they know that their terms and conditions are often tucked away in the business case under the heading “Savings”, which is where the debate really ought to be. That is why we never get to the truth of these things. So it is not really an issue of commercial confidentiality. It is about refusing to be open and transparent about the true intentions. This has been well documented with the subco sagas. In around 20 cases, trusts had decided to form subcos to deliver facilities management services. We could look at all the tax implications of that and the ducking and diving that follows, but we are not going to do that. We need to point out that in those cases the subcos are fully owned by the parent trust. There is no intention for them to procure anything, because that is what forming the subco delivers. There is no information or collection of details on bids from other organisations. There is no commercial competition aspect to this at all. In many cases, trusts are asked by the staff to provide the business case for going down the subco road and the answer they get back is, “Well, we are not giving you that because it is commercially confidential.” The trusts may have at least pretended to look at options, and even scored them, to arrive at the decision they have already made, but why is that process secret? Who would receive a commercial advantage from seeing that information? The trusts might argue that disclosure of the financial case might give the bidders information that they could exploit, but if there is a proper competitive tendering process, that should not be an issue at all. Even if it were, the recourse is to redact the numbers in the one or two places where they are most sensitive. The rest of the business case ought to be disclosed, but that is not what happens.

Let us assume for a moment that the trust has made a strong case, as it will have to do under the new provider selection regime. Will the new regime set out disclosure requirements in respect of business cases and so on? Looking at what NHS trusts do, are they actually put at a disadvantage by having to disclose their business case? We know what will be in those business cases, as the Treasury sets out guidance as to what is required, and most of the cases are about a rationale for change. That should not be a secret, and the old Office for Government Commerce set out guidance that covered how FOI requests were to be dealt with during the various stages of a public procurement. That guidance said clearly that business cases can and should be disclosed.

I will briefly address the wider issue of FOI requests. As the Minister may or may not be aware, I am a regular submitter of FOIs to his Department—indeed, all Government Departments and the wider NHS—and I have to say that over the past few years I have been more disappointed than delighted by the responses I have received. Many are rejected for a variety of reasons. It seems I am not alone in that respect: only this week, openDemocracy issued a new report on FOIs, called “Access Denied”, so I think we can all guess what they found. I will run through a few highlights from that report anyway: it said that 2020 was the “worst year on record” for FOI transparency. The Government exploit legal loopholes to deny access to information and, most controversially, the clearing house that openDemocracy reported on last year does not simply advise Departments on their responses, but plays a much more hands-on role, which includes drafting responses to FOI requests. I do not think that is because they want to help Departments to be as transparent as possible, but because they want to help them to avoid revealing the truth. Transparency and a commitment to the principles of freedom of information start at the top with the Department, and it should be leading on this subject.

On a slightly more positive note, there are better examples. There are trusts that work with their staff and even with the wider public and patients. They have open discussions. They do not hide their case; they make their case. If they have to engage in a tender process, they involve staff in specifications, options appraisals and questions to bidders at every stage of the process. If they can do it, why can’t every trust do it? The answer is that trusts can wriggle out of their obligations by using these loopholes in the Freedom of Information Act request procedure, and nobody is able to challenge that. It is time that changed, which is why I ask the Minister to support this new clause.

[Karin Smyth (Bristol South) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Ms Elliott. I rise briefly to support my hon. Friend and echo everything he has said. I have spent a great deal of my time in this place looking at the issue of wholly owned companies, trying to stop them from happening and questioning why they are happening. I think I remember sitting opposite the Minister in an Adjournment debate talking about the excitement of VAT rules and tax exemptions, a subject that is beyond the individual ken of most of us, but once we dig into it we find that the mixed messages the Government gave were not very helpful, and that underlying this problem is the culture of secrecy.

We have alluded to why this is so important: we need the openness provided by agenda meetings and locally accountable people—people we can actually talk to about our health services—and setting that culture from the top is really important. Ultimately, this is about patient safety, because once we have a culture in which there is a presumption of denying information and having to jump through hoops to get it, that permeates the entire organisation. That, sadly, is why we continue to revisit problems with patient safety. This issue is therefore really important, and I hope the Minister will look favourably on the new clause.

[Edward Argar]

I can reassure the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston, that I am not aware of how many FOIs he tables, which is possibly as it should be; it suggests that they are handled in the appropriate way by officials, and not by me. I am sure he keeps officials busy with those requests.

I think we can all agree that transparency and openness are of key importance but—this is where the hon. Gentleman and I may diverge slightly in our views—it is also vital that genuinely commercially sensitive information is adequately protected. Section 43 of the Freedom of Information Act recognises the balance that needs to be struck. It exempts from disclosure any information that would, or would be likely to, prejudice the commercial interests of any person, including the public authority holding the information. It is, however, as he will be aware, a qualified exemption. Merely identifying that the information is commercially sensitive is not enough. The public authority holding the information must weigh up the “genuine public interest” arguments in favour of and against disclosure.

I remind the Committee that there is a robust system in place for testing such decisions. We have an independent commissioner who can scrutinise the decisions, who has the right to see the information in question and who is more than capable of challenging public authorities where he believes that disclosure is in the public interest. Beyond that, of course, those requesting the information have a right of appeal to the tribunal.

There genuinely needs to be a level playing field between public and private contractors, but the new clause would, I fear, place NHS bodies at a disadvantage in some commercial negotiations. It could mean that the NHS was not able to protect its commercially sensitive information, whereas other parties could. I struggle to see how an uneven playing field would benefit the general public and protect taxpayers’ money. I fear that the new clause would also place a significant additional burden on NHS bodies at a time of real strain and, as I have highlighted, there are already remedies in place that meet its stated aim.

I am also concerned about the power the new clause could place in the hands of those conducting commercial negotiations with the NHS. It would be for them, not the public authority, to decide if and when the release of information would pose a real and significant threat. It is difficult to see how the opinion of the organisation could be tested or challenged through the usual route of appeal, as they would not be a public authority within the scope of the Act. The Information Commissioner’s Office would be assessing an NHS body on the basis of judgments reached by a third party. I also point out that

“pose a real and significant risk”

is not a test used elsewhere in the Freedom of Information Act, and so could be open to novel interpretation by the originator of the material. For those reasons, I do not think that the new clause would achieve in a fair way what the hon. Gentleman seeks.

[Justin Madders]

I am relieved to hear that the Minister is not personally dealing with my FOI requests. I know he is very busy dealing with all the foundation trust applications in his in-tray. He made some fair points about ways in which the new clause might cause unintended consequences, but we wanted to put on record our concern about the way the Freedom of Information Act has been used by some trusts to avoid proper scrutiny. As my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol South said, this is unfortunately part of a pattern in patient safety issues, and that is obviously something we have discussed in this Committee. I will not put the new clause to a vote, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw it.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 49

Protection of the title of “nurse”

“(1) A person may not practise or carry on business under any name, style or title containing the word “nurse” unless that person is registered with the Nursing and Midwifery Council and entered in sub part 1 or 2 of the register as a Registered Nurse or in the specialist community public health nursing part of the register.

(2) Subsection (1) does not prevent any use of the designation ‘veterinary nurse’, ‘dental nurse’ (for which see section 36K of the Dentists Act 1984) or ‘nursery nurse’.

(3) A person who contravenes subsection (1) is guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level four on the standard scale.”—(Justin Madders.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Justin Madders]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

This is another Ronseal new clause: it does exactly what it says on the tin—it seeks to create legal protection for the use of the title “nurse”. The title “registered nurse” is protected, but “nurse” is not, meaning that, legally, anyone can call themselves a nurse. Under current legislation, people could operate under that title even if they had no nursing qualifications or experience, or had been struck off. To protect the public, the title should be limited to those, such as registered nurses and dental nurses, who are registered with professional regulators. That would put it on a level with other titles, such as paramedic and physiotherapist, which are limited to those on professional registers.

The issue of the title of nurse not being protected in law has long caused concern to the profession. There are many examples where the title has been abused. We have seen people campaigning for election calling themselves nurses when they were not—I appreciate that that is outside the Minister’s responsibility, but it shows the power of the title, its significance and the risk we are trying to deal with through this new clause.

Earlier this month, an anti-vaccination campaigner who denies the existence of covid-19 told Nursing Times that she planned to continue to call herself a nurse despite having been struck off by the Nursing and Midwifery Council for putting the public at risk of harm. Professor Judith Ellis, chair of the Tropical Health and Education Trust and former interim chair of the NMC, has campaigned for years for protection of the nurse title, and we commend her for her work. She said:

“It is totally unacceptable that when someone in the UK describes themselves as a ‘nurse’, the patient or their relatives have no way of knowing, or indeed checking, if that individual has the knowledge or skills to safely care for them or their loved ones. The title ‘nurse’ needs to be protected.”

Nursing is the most trusted profession in the UK, yet someone ill or vulnerable could trust a person calling themselves a nurse and that person might be nothing of the sort. NHS England’s chief nursing officer, Ruth May, has committed her support to protect the title of nurse in UK law. She said:

“The protection of a professional title provides assurance that someone using that title is competent and safe to practise”,

adding that she is

“committed to doing all we can to strengthen protection of the public.”

I welcome anything the Minister can say about this issue; I do not know whether the Department is considering it, but I have heard rumours that it might be. We have talked on a number of occasions about patient safety, transparency and openness, and this measure would be entirely consistent with those aims. Can the Minister give us some comfort or confidence that we might be able to make some progress on this important issue?

[Dr Philippa Whitford (Central Ayrshire) (SNP)]

I rise to support what the shadow Minister said. It has indeed been an area of contention for many years not only that nurses who have been struck off can use the title but that the title is used loosely. We touched on the same issue when we talked about regulation and about aesthetic procedures: when these titles of doctor, and particularly nurse, are used the public have a perception of what that means. They assume it means a registered and regulated practitioner, and therefore the patient is given far too high a degree of trust in the person simply from the use of that title. It should be a protected title.

--- Later in debate ---

[Edward Argar]

I go back to the point I made: there are some perfectly legitimate professions—where there is an expectation and understanding of what they do and a respect for what they do—who use that title, as she alluded to. That is why we have to think a little more carefully about how we might do that, and whether it is the most effective way of assuring and enhancing patient safety.

Protection of title is only one part of the protection regime; it is important, of course, but there are other parts. We should also look at prosecutions of protection of title offences, which are extremely rare; we need to look at that in the context of how that might be enforced. Part of the reason for that is the availability of offences such as fraud by false representation that carry more substantial penalties including custodial sentences, which, I suspect, are sometimes the mechanism used to prosecute in such cases. Depending on the context in which the title is used, other legal action could be taken against a person, including criminal proceedings, civil proceedings and employment disciplinary proceedings, particularly where the person used the title to gain work or employment. There is also the opportunity to prosecute employers who hold their staff out to be regulated healthcare professionals when they are not.

To give some succour to the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston, we are committed to reviewing the protection of titles as part of the ongoing Government review of the regulation of healthcare professionals.

[Justin Madders]

rose—

[Edward Argar]

Just one more sentence, then I will give way to the hon. Gentleman before I sit down.

We need to gather further evidence to better understand the case for change and whether it represents the most effective and enforceable way to promote patient safety. However, I will certainly carefully consider the proposals he has put forward, in that context, as will my colleagues. I have a few sentences left, so I will give way while I can.

[Justin Madders]

The Minister is sympathetic and has highlighted why the issue needs careful consideration throughout the debate. Are we able to get a formal commitment to public consultation on the issue from the Minister today?

[Edward Argar]

The shadow Minister pushes me a little further than I can go today. However, what I can say is that I have considerable sympathy with what he has said. I will undertake to look at what he and the right hon. Member for Leicester South have said in the context of that review.

Any subsequent change from that review and from consideration thereof probably sits most effectively, in terms of legislative reform, as part of the reform programme for the Nursing and Midwifery Council, which is most effectively taken forward via secondary legislation under section 60 of the Health Act 1999. In the context of that review, and any secondary legislation flowing from it under section 60, we will look at what he set out in his new clause.

[Justin Madders]

I am grateful to the Minister for his positive comments. We were probably pushing our luck with getting a formal commitment from him, but it sounds like we are probably as close as we are going to get to progress on the matter without pushing the new clause formally to a vote. We will keep a close eye on the issue and will, no doubt, come back to it if progress is not made in orderly time. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 50

Access to innovative medicines and medicinal products review

“(1) The Secretary of State must undertake and publish a review of the use by the NHS of innovative medicines and medicinal products.

(2) The review must—

(a) conclude before 31 December 2022;

(b) consider ways to improve the use of innovative medicines and medicinal products within the NHS in England.

(3) The review may consider—

(a) the creation of a specific pathway to assess medicines and medicinal products for rare and less common conditions;

(b) improvements to the way in which patient and clinical experience is accommodated when considering the adoption of new medicines and medicinal products.”—(Alex Norris.)

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to carry out a review of the assessment and use of innovative medicines and medicinal products, and to consider how to improve access to medicines and medicinal products for people with rare and less common conditions in particular.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Alex Norris]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause would put a helpful requirement on the Secretary of State to undertake a review of the assessment and use of innovative medicines and medicinal products, which I believe would be a positive step forward. Medical innovation, including new drugs and cutting-edge treatments, produces life-saving and life-changing results, and those benefits are particularly felt by those with rare and genetic diseases.

Health and Care Bill (Twenty Second sitting)

Justin Madders Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 2nd November 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Karin Smyth (Bristol South) (Lab)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Mr McCabe. I will not delay the Committee too long on this new clause, but it is an important one to consider. We had a good discussion last week on the needs of carers, although I am not sure we resolved it satisfactorily. Carers do a huge amount of work on behalf of their families. As my hon. Friend the Member for City of Durham so eloquently said, they want to do that work, but many of them essentially keep our services going. Without them, the demands on our services would be so much greater.

[Mr Peter Bone in the Chair]

All of us who have met or who know young carers recognise the particular stresses and strains on them from caring for their relatives. They do astonishing work. Again, as my hon. Friend said, many feel that they are doing it because these are their loved ones; they do not feel like they are carers in many cases, but they are. Often people then do not come forward, if they are not known to the authorities, to make that clear. That is often because of fear of what that might mean for the family set-up they find themselves in.

The new clause draws attention to the needs of young carers, particularly following hospitalisation. It would require trusts and local authorities to be cognisant of who is caring for a person when they are discharged, particularly where young carers are involved. When the issue was first drawn to my attention—particularly the need to highlight the different needs of young carers—I must confess that I thought that these things were routine in good care settings. Obviously, the situation into which someone is being discharged should be fully known and recognised, and their needs met. We had a good discussion about that and we know that that does not happen, but the pressure on young carers is particularly acute. As part of that discussion last week, I almost intervened on the Minister to ask that when we are considering carers more generally, we highlight young carers separately. A hospital needs to know and understand that the person going back home will be in the charge of a young carer, and the local authority needs to make sure that a needs assessment is conducted.

The new clause suggests that should happen before the patient is discharged. Clearly, the Bill is instigating a new process, which will look at post-discharge. We had a good debate about that. As my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham North said from the Front Bench, doing that assessment differently may be better in the long run—we do not know. In particular, when it comes to young carers taking up that role, it is even more acute that it is recognised in the new arrangements.

I will not move the new clause to a vote, but I would like the Minister to be cognisant of young carers and assure us that these needs will be highlighted to hospital trusts and local authorities in the discharge planning process.

[Justin Madders (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Mr Bone. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol South for introducing the new clause. She set it out very well and she is right to highlight the interplay with the section 78 provisions in the Bill, because there is a risk of some jarring if we do not get this right.

As we know, the 2011 census reported that there are almost 166,000 young carers between the ages of five and 17 in England. However, research carried out by the University of Nottingham and the BBC in 2018 suggested the figure could be much higher, with around 800,000 children providing care. It is estimated that nearly 260,000 of those carers are providing high levels of care, so there is certainly an issue out there.

As we know, being a young carer has a significant impact on children and young people. Caring for other family members inevitably affects school attendance and exam results, with many young carers paying a heavy price for their dedication to their families. It often limits their ability to take up their full academic options. On average, young carers achieve a grade lower than their peers in their GCSEs and are less likely to go to university. Every single classroom in the UK is likely to have at least one young carer.

As my hon. Friend said, the new clause would ensure that arrangements for discharging patients without a care needs assessment do not unduly impact on young carers. Their needs must still be identified when an adult is discharged from hospital. But the new clause goes further than that: it applies to all discharges, so there must always be a check to see if a young carer is involved. One might think that a check ought to done anyway, but evidence shows that it is patchy at best. Before covid, hospitals were struggling with the many issues we have discussed in relation to staffing. It is not always easy for people to do everything they would want to do before discharge. The new clause would put into law what is already being done in the best-practice examples.

There is already, in theory, a general right to an assessment under the Children and Families Act 2014 and the Care Act 2014. The Children and Families Act states that all young carers under the age of 18 have a right to a needs assessment as a responsibility of the local authority, which

“must take reasonable steps to identify… young carers within their area who have needs for support.”

However, Barnardo’s 2017 report “Still Hidden, Still Ignored” identified that young carers were “slipping through the net.” The report led to many recommendations, including Barnardo’s calling for hospital staff to actively ask questions to identify young carers at the point of discharge. Hospital staff are in a key position to ask questions to ensure young people do not slip through the net, and it is clear that more needs to be done in this area. The new clause offers one way of reducing the possibility that young carers slip through the net.

As my hon. Friend said, young people are often reluctant to identify as young carers. They do not want to get their parents into trouble sometimes, and it can be a difficult conversation. The new duty would take a lot of that pressure away because the responsibility would sit with the hospital professionals to ask the patients on discharge. That would stop the young person feeling responsible for involving official services in family life. Of course, we want local authorities to be able to identify these people to ensure the right support is in place.

--- Later in debate ---

[Karin Smyth]

The Minister will not be surprised to hear that I do not think that is sufficient. I will not press the matter to a vote, but, as my hon. Friend the Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston said, when it comes to things being on request it is problematic, and that is the crux of the matter, as in the guidance that the Minister read out. I understand the need for hospitals to not have lengthy discharges—and it is not good for the patient—but sorting out the hospital’s problem on the backs of young people and carers is not a good message that we want to send from here.

I appreciate that the Minister in his final comments said that this would be very much part of the thinking about discharges, but we should also remember that these young people have really had the most shocking experiences in the last two years with covid, and are already—again, as my hon. Friend said—falling massively behind. Added to the destruction from covid, many young carers live in some of the most disadvantaged families, really keeping those families together, so they are further left behind.

On the Minister’s exhortations to the service and local government, it would be helpful to further underline the strength of those, and I am sure that most of the Committee feel that. Young carers have had probably the worst of times during covid and for them now to have to shoulder more responsibility because of the discharge problem and the need to get people out quickly would further exacerbate the situation. They need more help, not less, and I hope that that will be communicated back to the service. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 65

Review of the surgical consultant appointment process

“The Secretary of State must review the National Health Service (Appointment of Consultants) Regulations 1996 and its most recent guidance and, within six months of the passage of this Act, publish a report on the surgical consultant appointment process.”—(Justin Madders.)

This new clause requires a review of the legislation which governs the NHS surgical consultant appointment process.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Justin Madders]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 70—Appointment of surgical consultants—

“(1) The National Health Service (Appointment of Consultants) Regulations 1996 (S.I. 1996/701) are amended in accordance with subsection (2).

(2) In paragraph (1) of regulation 2, in the entry for ‘relevant college’, in sub-paragraph (d), for ‘and its associated Faculty of Dental Surgery’, substitute ‘, the Royal College of Surgeons of Edinburgh, the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Glasgow and each of their associated Dental Faculties’.”

This new clause would add the Royal College of Surgeons of Edinburgh, the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Glasgow and each of their associated dental faculties to the colleges who may be involved in the appointment of NHS consultants.

[Justin Madders]

The proposed new clause was inspired by the Royal College of Surgeons of Edinburgh, who made representations about what we think is a lacuna in the current regulations that needs filling. According to the National Health Service (Appointment of Consultants) Regulations 1996 and subsequent guidance issued by the Department in 2005, only the Royal College of Surgeons of England is permitted to review surgical consultant job descriptions and send a Royal College representative to the advisory appointment committee. Although the process applies only to non-foundation trusts, the 2005 guidance encourages foundation trusts to follow that process as it provides a structured, quality approach to consultant appointments. Given that the 2005 guidance remains the most up-to-date advice available to trusts, the Academy of Medical Royal Colleges continues to recommend that foundation trusts follow the process.

The net effect of the regulations and guidance has been to formally exclude the Royal College of Surgeons of Edinburgh from the entire surgical consultant appointment process. Given its size and the distribution of its fellowship throughout England, it is keen to help trusts, whether they are foundation trusts or otherwise, in their ability to appoint and retain senior surgical professionals. I understand the Royal College of Surgeons of Edinburgh has raised this anomaly with the Department on a number of occasions—I can see the Minister nodding—and it has been told that any changes to the regulations or the guidance would require legislative approval, so the opportunity has been taken today to slip the new clause in to try to resolve that.

As we know, we have record waiting lists of some 5.7 million—probably rising. It is clearly an important priority for everyone that the backlog is tackled, and the new clause would go some way to ensuring that the NHS is a resilient and sustainable surgical body to be able to meet the challenge. We see it as a tidying-up exercise that is long overdue.

New clause 70, tabled by the Scottish National party spokesperson, the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire, goes a little further than new clause 65 in terms of the requirements put on the Department. I hope the Minister understands the sentiment behind our tabling the new clause. This long-standing issue needs legislative remedy, and I hope that this is the opportunity to put it right.

[Dr Philippa Whitford (Central Ayrshire) (SNP)]

I rise to speak to new clause 70 and in support of new clause 65. I agree with the shadow Minister that these are very much technical new clauses to correct an anomaly. There are three royal colleges of surgeons in the UK: the Royal College of Surgeons of England, the Royal College of Surgeons of Edinburgh and the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Glasgow. Consultant surgeons may be appointed from among the fellows of any of the three colleges. The exams they sit and the qualifications they carry are considered absolutely equal.

The challenge when recruiting a new consultant, as the shadow Minister highlighted, is that the appointment panel, which must review the job description and take part in the interview, is limited purely to those who have graduated with their fellowship from the English college. The appointment panels have a mix of representatives from local organisations, specialty bodies, if it is a specialty surgical appointment, and the royal colleges, so while fellows of all the royal colleges may be involved in appointments to English trusts as specialty representatives—such as breast cancer, which was my specialty—some are excluded from being college representatives. It is often really challenging to bring these panels and committees together.

The aim of the new clause is simply to widen the pool of assessors available to trusts in England and, indeed, as the shadow Minister highlighted, to foundation trusts. It is simply an anomaly that two of the colleges in the UK are not included. The new clause aims to correct that and to make the appointment of new consultants easier for trusts and foundation trusts in England. I hope that the Minister will accept both the spirit and the detail of new clause 70.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

I call Dr Justin Madders.

[Justin Madders]

Thank you, Mr Bone, but I am sure you would not want me to attempt any medical procedures.

I have heard what the Minister has said; clearly it is still under active consideration by the Department. As we know, there will be many more legislative opportunities in the coming months and years—I hope we will get an opportunity to crack this. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.

[Dr Whitford]

I accept the Minister’s reassurance that they will finally look at correcting this anomaly; I hope that he will take that forward. It is something that we will be looking for. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 66

Support provided by the NHS to populations at risk of malnutrition

“(1) Each integrated care board must—

(a) assess, or make arrangements for the assessment of, the need for support for patients and/or populations at risk of malnutrition, including social and clinical/disease related malnutrition, using their services;

(b) prepare and publish a strategy for the provision of such support in its area;

(c) monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of the strategy; and

(d) designate a malnutrition lead.

(2) An integrated care board that publishes a strategy under this section must, in carrying out its functions, give effect to the strategy.

(3) Before publishing a strategy under this section, an integrated care board must consult—

(a) any local authority for an area within the relevant Integrated care board’s area; and

(b) such other persons as the relevant local authority considers appropriate.

(4) For the purposes of subsection (3), ‘local authority’ means—

(a) a county council or district council in England; or

(b) a London borough council.

(5) An integrated care board that publishes a strategy under this section—

(a) must keep the strategy under review;

(b) may alter or replace the strategy; and

(c) must publish any altered or replacement strategy.

(6) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about the preparation and publication of strategies under this section.

(7) The power to make regulations under subsection (6) may, in particular, be exercised to make provision about—

(a) the procedure to be followed by an integrated care board in preparing a strategy;

(b) matters to which an integrated care board must have regard in preparing a strategy;

(c) how an integrated care board must publish a strategy;

(d) the date by which an integrated care board must first publish a strategy; and

(e) the frequency with which an integrated care board must review its strategy or any effect of the strategy on the provision of other provision in its area.

(8) Before making regulations under this section, the Secretary of State must consult—

(a) all integrated care boards; and

(b) such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.” —(Alex Norris.)

This new clause would require integrated care boards to publish a strategy for the provision of support for patients and/or populations at particular risk of malnutrition using their services, and designate a malnutrition lead.

Brought up, and read the First time.

--- Later in debate ---

Ahead of last week’s Budget, the British Dental Association warned of a “last-chance saloon” for NHS dentistry, stressing that Government spending on NHS dental services has fallen by a third in real terms over the last decade. Sir Robert Francis QC, the chair of Healthwatch England, who gave evidence to the Committee, joined the BDA in urging the Treasury to commit adequate funding to ensure the recovery and long-term sustainability of our dental services, highlighting that it would take an additional £879 million just to restore resourcing back to 2010 levels. That, of course, was the theme of the Budget, was it not—pretending that the last decade had not happened? Yet in this area there was no new funding, and we have not heard a commitment that a single penny of the billions pledged for the recovery of NHS services will go to dentistry.

[Justin Madders]

As my fellow shadow Minister quite rightly points out, this is a huge issue for most constituency MPs. I am not surprised to hear what he said about this being the No.1 complaint to Healthwatch, because behind GP access, dental access is now a huge issue. Before the pandemic, dental services in the Cheshire area were contracted to attend to 55% of the local population’s dental health needs. Clearly, that is insufficient, but the challenges of the pandemic have only made matters worse. I encourage my hon. Friend to continue to raise this very important issue.

[Alex Norris]

I am grateful for that intervention. It is sobering to hear that 55% was what we started with; we know that it will be less than that now. That rather picks away at the idea of a universal healthcare service.

To finish where I was going with my previous point, if I am wrong about where recovery funding for the NHS is going, and there is to be investment in dentistry, I hope that the Minister will correct me. I would be delighted if that was the case, because the BDA is warning—again, this is something that we will have picked up on in our constituencies—that morale among NHS dentists is at an all-time low. Almost 1,000 dentists in England have stopped providing NHS services in the last financial year. There was the failed contract—I know there is enthusiasm for contract reform in the Department and we will support the Department on that, but we are running out of time to have anything ready for April. In fact, we are probably already too late in that regard. The shambles of the negotiations before Christmas last year that led to the breakdown and the imposition of targets really whittled away at good will and caused a lot of upset.

Almost half of NHS dentists are saying that, unless things change, they intend to hand back their contracts or reduce their NHS commitment. This exodus of dentists from the NHS will have a disastrous and lasting impact on our ability to access NHS dentistry. If 55% is the summit of our ambition, goodness me, where will we go from there? The British Dental Association talks about the last-chance saloon; it is not hyperbole to say that we will not have NHS dentistry in the medium term if we do not have a course change.

More and more people are being pushed into the private sector. That creates market forces that mean that it is almost a self-fulfilling prophecy that dentists—both new ones entering the profession and those who have come to the end of their tether with their NHS contract—go into the private sector. We are seeing significant growth in that space as people living in pain seek drastic action. We will see more pushed on to dental insurance if people do not want to be worried about their finances. That is what privatisation looks like. We will not have NHS dentistry in the medium term unless we do something about this issue—that is the wrong way forward.

New clause 68 makes a very modest ask; it asks the Secretary of State to do what any Secretary of State should want to do: commit to universal access to NHS dentistry and say how it will practically be achieved. At the moment, we have a yawning gap. In that lack of leadership, we will see the drip, drip, drip of the loss of NHS dentistry, until we no longer have it.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Thank you for that bogus point of order.

[Justin Madders]

Further to that point of order, Mr Bone. I echo the Minister’s thanks, not only to you and the other Chairs, Mrs Murray, Mr McCabe and Ms Elliott, but to the Clerks, who have been described to us as very patient and helpful—great qualities in such a long Bill Committee—and to the other parliamentary staff, the Doorkeepers and the Hansard Reporters. As the Minister said of his officials, we too have a great team—though probably a smaller one—of researchers who have been fantastic in giving us the information that we need to make the arguments. I also thank the Whips—it would be remiss of me not to—without whom none of this runs as smoothly as it does. On that note, I thank the Committee for its indulgence.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill, as amended, accordingly to be reported.

Health and Care Bill

Justin Madders Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 22nd November 2021 Commons Chamber

[Edward Argar]

I am afraid I am about to conclude. I suspect that the hon. Gentleman will come back in with a speech and I will endeavour to pick up on that in the wind-ups.

There are a number of similar amendments, such as amendment 101 in the names of the hon. Members for Wirral West (Margaret Greenwood) and for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas). I hope they might feel, to some degree, reassured by our amendment and the intent behind it, but that is obviously for them to say. We believe that the Government’s amendment puts beyond doubt what we believe was already entirely clear but were determined to put beyond doubt—that ICBs will not and cannot be controlled in any way by the private sector, as NHS-accountable bodies guided by the NHS constitution and with NHS values at their heart. These principles, I believe, irrespective of other debates we may have this evening, command respect from both sides of this place. I therefore commend the amendments to the House.

[Justin Madders (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab)]

A wide range of issues that are part of this group of amendments demonstrate the cold reality of this Bill. It is a jumble sale of bits and pieces. Of course a Bill can be wide-ranging, but having breadth is not the same as having coherence, or indeed clarity. Such are the issues within scope in this grouping that I will not comment directly on every new clause and amendment but hope to have time to say at least a few words on those emanating from the Opposition Front-Bench team, as well as on any Government new clauses or amendments that we oppose. Some amendments refer to matters that have been dealt with in Committee where we have expressed our views and put forward amendments that failed to persuade the Government. Sadly, we have insufficient time to go over the same ground again, particularly given the rapid shifting of the goalposts we have seen in the past week.

I turn first to integrated care boards, or ICBs, and, more widely, the issue of governance. The question of governance and accountability remains an important matter to us and needs greater clarity than currently appears in the Bill. For Members who may not be familiar with the detail, the Bill proposes yet another reorganisation of the NHS, creating 42 new integrated care systems where decisions on how NHS and care spending will be made. The decision-making bodies within these systems are the ICBs, replacing the CCGs, which fall away into the annals of history alongside the primary care groups, the primary care trusts and all the other permutations that we have seen.

Our discussions on these matters in Committee showed that our disagreements tended to centre around an intention by Government to limit what is in statute and to leave maximum flexibility at local level, as opposed to our desire to ensure that safeguards and protections were in place for those matters we felt were too important to be left out. It is wholly ironic, therefore, that the Bill proclaims, on the one hand, local freedoms and flexibilities, yet on the other proposes sweeping top-down powers for NHS England and the Secretary of State. Our view remains that some flexibility is fine to allow shaping to local needs, but that some key principles need to be put into the Bill to ensure that there are no misunderstandings or unintended consequences.

We know that the genesis of this Bill has been the realisation that increasingly large parts of the NHS were ignoring the 2012 Lansley Act. Along with changes to procurement and pricing, this grouping deals with the main elements of reversing parts of that Act. We could spend all our time referring to what we said 10 years ago, and how the Health and Social Care Act 2012 has proved to be the disaster that we said it would be, but we will spare the Government the “We told you so” lectures, because even those on the Government Benches are now aware that the 2012 Act has been among the worst policy mistakes in the history of the NHS. Whether that damage was worse than the damage done by a decade of austerity remains to be seen, but repairing the damage done by austerity is not for today, as there is little in the Bill to address the ongoing consequences of a decade of underfunding, particularly the wholly appalling waiting times that we now see across the board.

--- Later in debate ---

[Geraint Davies]

Perhaps my hon. Friend can illuminate me. I was going to ask the Minister who owns the assets of the ICBs. Can the ICBs sell some of those assets and rent them back as a service? What constraints are there to stop people on the board enabling that, because they have some strange link to the people buying the assets?

[Justin Madders]

At the moment, ICBs are not a legal entity, so they do not own anything. When the Bill comes into force, they will effectively take over mainly administrative buildings from the CCGs, and the trust will hold ownership of most of the assets. We hope that there will not be the risks that my hon. Friend outlines, although it is not impossible for ICBs to set up their own trusts at some point in the future.

We do not believe that the question of private providers sitting on the place-based boards can be left open in this way, because this is really about who runs the NHS. There is a complete and utter incompatibility between the aims of private companies and what we say should be the aims of the NHS and the ICBs. I can do no better than refer to the evidence of Dr Chaand Nagpaul from the Bill Committee. He identified the concern perfectly:

“We forget at our peril the added value, the accountability, the loyalty and the good will that the NHS provides. We really do…I am saying that it does matter. Your local acute trust is not there on a 10-year contract, willing to walk away after two years. It is there for your population; it cannot walk away.”––[Official Report, Health and Care Public Bill Committee, 9 September 2021; c. 90, Q113.]

Those final words sum it up perfectly. Put a company on the board, and its interest lasts as long as the contract, and those interests will of course not be the same as the NHS’s anyway. A company’s primary concern is the shareholders, not the patients. With that clear and unanswerable concern about conflicts of interest, we invite the Government to withdraw their amendment and support ours.

We have already had some discussion of who goes on the ICB. Apparently, the answer is not the most appropriate people chosen by an independent external process or individuals directly accountable to the public; the answer is left to guidance that leaves open the risk that voices we think need to be heard will slip through the net. Our amendment 76 deals with that by setting out the requirements for ICB membership. Allocating scarce NHS resources should be robustly debated and will always be political. Tough choices have to be made, so we need people on the ICB who will be there to cover all the necessary interests for the wider good.

If Members look at what amendment 76 suggests, I hope nobody would argue that those interests do not have to have some voice. The public, patients, staff, social care, public health and mental health—which of those can be safely ignored and which has no part to play? As I have already mentioned, there is a major area of uncertainty because of the complete absence of anything that sets out how the much-vaunted place-based commissioning will work. Who will sit at the place-based table is, I am afraid, still completely opaque.

The next major area covered in the Bill is a further deconstruction of Lansley with the removal of compulsory competitive tendering for clinical services. We have seen the NHS proposals for a provider selection regime to replace the regulations under section 75 of the 2012 Act. That is to be regarded as a work in progress, so our amendment 72 covers the issue and would reintroduce some safeguards into how our money is spent. Since its inception, the NHS has always relied on some non-NHS providers, with the model developed for GPs being an obvious example. However, in recent decades there has been an increase in the use of private providers of acute care, most notably in diagnostics and surgery.

To be clear, we on the Opposition Benches believe that the NHS should be the default provider of clinical services. If it is not the only provider, it should be the predominant provider in geographical and services terms. Where a service cannot be provided by a public body because the capability or capacity is not there, there is still the option to go beyond the NHS itself, but that should be a last resort and never a permanent solution. Amendment 72 therefore sets out a clear framework for how we could achieve that. We hope that extra transparency and extra rigour would mean we avoid buying stuff that is unsuitable and sits in container mountains, stuff that does not meet specifications, and stuff made by companies that have no experience, but are owned by friends and family. In short, we would stop the covid crony gravy train.

The use of private sector capacity in the covid emergency turned out to be a farcical failure. It became very clear, very quickly that it was not there to support the NHS; it was there just to make profits. Use of private providers through dodgy deals during the PPE scandal has highlighted the need for greater transparency and greater capacity in the NHS. We can never allow a repeat of what we have seen there. We need the rigour set out in the amendment to be put into legislation, rather than left to guidance. We need to be able to challenge NHS bodies that do not comply, as well as Ministers who try to flout the rules.

I will now deal with new clause 49, saving the best—or more accurately, the worst—until last. Because of how Report stage works, it has fallen to me to express our opposition to this measure, rather than my expert colleague, my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester West (Liz Kendall), who shares my dismay at what has been produced and how it has been presented to us. Starting with the process, it is wholly wrong to bring such a fundamental change forward as a last-minute addition to this Bill. That means it cannot be debated properly today. There is no impact assessment and, as we have already heard, this change was not discussed in Committee at all. In fact, in 22 Committee sessions spanning some 50 hours, we never once heard mention of this amendment coming forward or discussion on the care cap. Indeed, when this Chamber was busy debating the social care levy, we were beavering away in Committee on the Bill, oblivious to the fact this measure was coming down the track. If the Government cannot even get their decision-making processes integrated, what hope is there for integrating health and social care?

As we know, the aim of the new clause is to remove means-tested benefits from the costs that count towards the care cap. As has been pointed out far and wide by Members from all parts of the House, that change adversely impacts some more than others. It is a wholly regressive measure, to say the least, to give support through means-testing, but then to penalise people later for receiving it in the first place. We will vote against this iniquity, and I hope many Conservative Members will vote with us. They should be used to the Prime Minister’s broken promises by now; this is their chance to make the point that he should stand by what he says.

[Mike Amesbury]

Does my hon. Friend agree that it is Robin Hood in reverse? I encourage Conservative Members who wax lyrical about levelling up, particularly in the north, to do the right thing.

[Justin Madders]

My hon. Friend must have sneaked a look at my speech, because I will say later that it is Robin Hood in reverse.

[Barbara Keeley]

The proposal is grossly unfair. I gave the example earlier that in our region, 15% of people with dementia will reach the cap, whereas 34% would have under the Dilnot proposals. The cap also does not protect working-age adults who are accessing social care, or people with a disability, but Sir Andrew Dilnot’s proposals would have done. It is the second major area in which the proposal is grossly unfair.

[Justin Madders]

Again, my hon. Friend must have read my speech because I will make that point later. The proposal shows that the Bill is not a plan to fix social care but a very thin attempt to change parts of the system. There are many other elements that clearly need dealing with.

In case Conservative Members need reminding, in the Prime Minister’s first speech on taking office, he promised to,

“fix the crisis in social care once and for all, with a clear plan that we have prepared”.

We are still to see that plan. What we have is a new tax and a broken promise.

[Alison McGovern (Wirral South) (Lab)]

My hon. Friend and neighbour is making an excellent speech. We should be talking about a plan for social care, but we are actually talking about a tax on the people who have lost out over the past decade and more from the excessive house price growth in the south compared with other parts of the country. This is a tax that doubles down on inequality, rather than addressing it.

[Justin Madders]

I thank my hon. Friend and neighbour—I am getting all my neighbours in tonight. She makes a brilliant point: the proposal exacerbates regional inequalities through an unfair tax and is certainly not a plan to fix social care. Hon. Members should look at what my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester West has said about what needs to be done to tackle the social care crisis in this country; it is an awful lot more than putting in place a cap that benefits only some people in certain parts of the country.

Not only will the proposal not stop people having to sell their home to pay for their costs, but it will bake in unfairness for a generation. It does nothing for working adults with long-term care needs, who seem to have been completely missed out, as my hon. Friend the Member for Worsley and Eccles South (Barbara Keeley) said. It is not what was promised, but hon. Members do not have to take my word for it. Let us listen to the experts. Age UK says:

“The change the Government has announced makes the overall scheme a lot less helpful to older people with modest assets than anyone had expected. It waters down Sir Andrew Dilnot’s original proposal to save the Government some money, but at the cost of protecting the finances of older home owners…This feels like completely the wrong policy choice and we are extremely disappointed that the Government has made it”.

The King’s Fund says of people with more modest assets that,

“the Prime Minister’s promise that no one need sell their house to pay for care…doesn’t seem to apply to them.”

Instead, it will only “benefit wealthier people”.

[Barry Gardiner]

My hon. Friend referenced the Prime Minister’s statement that nobody would have to sell their house to pay for social care. I know that my hon. Friend would never seek to call the Prime Minister a liar in this Chamber, but does he wonder, as many hon. Members do, why the Bill appears to be turning the Prime Minister’s words into a lie?

[Justin Madders]

I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention—I think. What I can say here and what I might say outside are not the same, and I do have to finish my speech, so I will leave it there. I am sure that the public will make up their own minds about the veracity or otherwise of comments made by the Prime Minister.

Sir Andrew Dilnot said that the proposals will create a north-south divide, that those with assets of £106,000 will be hardest hit and that anyone with assets under £186,000 will be worse off than under his proposals. According to the Health Foundation, assuming care costs of about £500 a week, those with assets of £150,000 will take a year and a half longer to reach the cap than they would have under the Dilnot proposals, those with assets of £125,000 will take four and a half years longer, and those with assets of under £106,000 will never reach the care cap. Contrary to what the Minister has said, people with assets of £106,000 or less will not benefit from the proposal at all.

Health and Care Bill

Justin Madders Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 23rd November 2021 Commons Chamber

[Edward Argar]

I am grateful for the manner in which the hon. Lady puts her points. She is right; we have debated this previously. We have been publicly clear that we do not believe that the exemption or exception should be extended to the ombudsman. She is right that there are campaigns saying we should have no exceptions or that we should widen the exceptions. We believe we have struck the right balance with this measure, while respecting the fact that a coroner is a judicial office holder and has a very specific function to perform, as set out in legislation in—this is where my memory may fail me—the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, which recognises their particular and special status. I suspect that she and I may have to agree to disagree on whether the appropriate balance is struck, but that sets out why we have done what we have done.

How best to achieve an effective safe space is complex and the current drafting has been arrived at through years of detailed policy work, including pre-legislative scrutiny before the Health Service Safety Investigations Bill was introduced in the other place in autumn 2019. The issue was also debated at length in Committee, and I look forward to hearing contributions from Members on that, particularly the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire.

Turning to the two minor and technical Government amendments to the health service safety investigations body provisions, amendment 24 is a technical amendment to clarify the definition of “investigation” that applies to part 4 of the Bill. Investigations carried out by HSSIB by agreement under clause 114, which relate to Wales and Northern Ireland, were never intended to be part of the main investigation function of HSSIB and therefore will not be covered by the safe space or other investigatory power provisions provided for in the Bill. The amendment ensures that the drafting of the Bill fully reflects that original policy position. I hope that hon. Members on both sides of the Chamber will be content to pass this technical amendment.

Finally, I turn to Government amendment 88 to schedule 13. Schedule 13 contains a regulation-making power which allows the Treasury to vary the way any relevant tax has effect in relation to associated transfer schemes. Regulations made under this power will be used to ensure that no unintended tax consequences arise. The amendment ensures that value added tax is included in the taxes which the Treasury can, by regulations, vary when considering the transfer schemes in this Bill. Without this amendment, it is possible that complications with VAT bills may arise when transfer schemes are made and transactions take place. It is for those reasons that I ask hon. Members to support this amendment.

I am conscious that other hon. and right hon. Members may wish to speak to their amendments. I look forward to addressing those that I have not directly addressed thus far when I wind up debate on this group of amendments. With that, I conclude.

[Justin Madders (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for his introduction. It seems like only yesterday that we were having a similar exchange across the Dispatch Box.

I will begin with our new clauses 28 and 29 and amendment 10. This discussion about workforce could well be the most important of all today. Just this weekend, Chris Hopson from NHS Providers was trying to get the Government to acknowledge the seriousness of the problem when he tweeted:

“93k NHS staff vacancies. £6bn spend on temporary staff to fill gaps. 55% of staff working unpaid extra hours each week. 44% saying they’ve felt ill with work related stress. NHS desperately needs long term workforce planning. Govt must make this happen this week.”

Everything comes back to workforce and the failure to invest in it consistently over a sustained period. Today we have a chance to correct that.

While we favour our new clause 29, it is obvious that amendment 10 has captured the attention of many and may well be put to a vote. In many ways, as the Minister said, it closely mirrors what we have put forward, so I will be making my general points on both the new clauses and the amendment. In supporting amendment 10, I pay tribute to the right hon. Member for South West Surrey (Jeremy Hunt), the Chair of the Health and Social Care Committee. Given his previous role, he is well placed to have an informed view on what needs to be done, and he has done that with this amendment without undue hype or drama. The support he has obtained more widely from stakeholders outside the House is impressive; indeed, the way he has united just about the entire sector shows not only his powers of persuasion, but the importance of the issue. He has come close to uniting the entire sector in the past, but that was usually in opposition to something he was proposing, rather than in support. There may be many other areas where we have disagreed in the past, but that does not diminish our support for his call.

[Jeremy Hunt (South West Surrey) (Con)]

May I just comment that it feels a lot better this time?

[Justin Madders]

Let us just say that the more I hear of the right hon. Gentleman, the more I like what he has to say—I will leave it there.

We all accept the urgent need to address the workforce crisis, but I cannot find anyone who thinks that what the Government have put forward in clause 34 is the solution.

[Alex Sobel (Leeds North West) (Lab/Co-op)]

A doctor in my constituency, Dr Tom James, told me that he and his colleagues in the hospital were demoralised, exhausted and at the end of their tether, particularly after the covid crisis, in a building that was falling apart around them. He said there was no more goodwill, and the Government needed to grab hold of this crisis and resolve it. Are new clause 29 and amendment 10 not a minimum, rather than a maximum, for what we should be looking to achieve?

[Justin Madders]

New clause 29 and amendment 10 are the starting point, not the whole answer. They are a framework for getting this right in the future and offering the workforce, which, as the Minister said, has given so much in recent times, some hope that there will be better times along the way. I will refer later to the report by the Health and Social Care Committee on workforce burnout, which brought home just how demoralised the workforce have become and why they need to be given some positive news today.

[Rachael Maskell]

Anyone who on Sunday was on the March with Midwives will understand the real crisis now facing that profession—a particularly acute once since it is also about women’s health. Is there not a need to ensure that plans are not just on paper, but expedited, so that we are sure of seeing real delivery of those much-needed staff?

[Justin Madders]

Like just about every profession and sector in the NHS, midwives are under tremendous pressure and are understaffed. We need a clear plan, and a plan that is delivered. Of course, having a plan is not the whole answer, which is why it is important that we hear regular reports back from the Secretary of State on progress. That is why we hope amendment 10 will be supported.

[Emma Hardy]

One reason I want to emphasise the importance of new clause 28 is that we are anticipating a greater demand for mental health services, and therefore a greater demand for mental health professionals working in the NHS. Only by having regular reviews will we be able to anticipate what that demand will be and prepare accordingly.

[Justin Madders]

My hon. Friend is correct; we could not have anticipated what has happened in the past 12 to 18 months, but we can see what it means moving forward. Regular reviews of demand are critical, and we know that training these highly qualified and skilled staff takes time, which is why a longer-term view and approach are required.

[Richard Fuller]

I want to pick up on the increasing demand for mental health services. Does the hon. Gentleman accept that in general, it is utterly impossible to meet the expectation of increasing demand for health services without vast improvements in the efficiency with which people working in the health and care sector deliver that service? Is it not a shortcoming of both the Government and the Opposition that there is not an intense focus on solving that problem of labour cost productivity? Without that, we will not be able to meet current needs and we certainly will not meet future needs.

[Justin Madders]

We are always looking at ways to improve productivity, but we know that on the current figures there are 100,000 staff vacancies in the NHS. No amount of productivity gains will cover for that.

[Munira Wilson (Twickenham) (LD)]

The hon. Member for North East Bedfordshire (Richard Fuller) talks about efficiency, but the figures show that in 2019-20, some £6.2 billion was spent on bank and agency staff. If we are talking about efficiency and using all the extra money the Government are saying they will put in to catch-up, we need to provide value for money for the taxpayer. Therefore, long-term planning to recruit the right skills is critical.

[Justin Madders]

I thank the hon. Member for her intervention. The point about agencies and locum spend is not a new one. It will be interesting to see the figures for the last 12 to 18 months when the Minister has finally ratified them, because I suspect they will be even higher than those we have heard recently.

[Dr Whitford]

Having spent over three decades in the NHS, I know that this is not just about senior staff and what are called frontline staff. It is said, “We’ll protect frontline staff, but we’ll cut administrative staff or backroom staff.” However, if I am not in a clinic with the right results with the right patient at the right time, I am a waste of space. In actual fact, we need to look at the whole team. There is a sweet spot where I am working flat out but I have a team who are helping me. If we cut any of those, then we lose efficiency, and as the hon. Member for Twickenham (Munira Wilson) said, costs are going up, so we are becoming not more productive, but less productive.

[Justin Madders]

I thank the hon. Member for her intervention. Indeed, this actually covers some of the debate we had in Committee. There has been a rhetoric coming out of Government in recent months that managers are somehow a cost burden and that administrative staff do not actually help deliver the services. Of course, as the hon. Member has just pointed out, they are a vital source of support for those on the frontline.

[Dr Murrison]

The hon. Member is being generous in giving way. Would he avoid the temptation to suggest that productivity is in some way simply a demand for hard-pressed people in health and social care to work harder? It is not that at all. It is just doing what they want to do, which is to work smarter and thus get more out of the system, which I think is what the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire (Dr Whitford) has just said.

[Justin Madders]

I accept what the right hon. Member has said. There has been a gap in investment in IT and other things that make people’s jobs easier and more efficient, and that has been a characteristic of NHS spending over the last decade.

With your permission, Madam Deputy Speaker, I will try to make some progress, but it is important, as we have talked about the staff, that we pay tribute to all those who make the NHS what it is today. On Nursing Support Worker Day, I pay tribute to all those who work in wards, clinics and community settings to support our nurses and provide that essential hands-on care to patients.

Our care system does indeed face a crisis—over waiting times, over recovery—but as with all other crises, the root cause is inadequate funding. The most visible and significant symptom is an inadequate workforce, plus the scandal of social care provision. There is no plan at the moment; it is just a plan for a plan. When we talk about a workforce crisis, that cannot be in any way a reflection on the huge value and contribution of the workforce we have now.

There are particular positive aspects to amendment 10 to which I would like to draw attention. Explicit recognition of the need to consult with the workforce through trade unions is very welcome. The planning covers health and social care, which is also absolutely essential. Given the scope of the review, the timescale is about right—every two years is demanding, but not too onerous—but a regular update each year might be preferable. However, the main point, which I have made already, is to compel a regular report and review of demand. The central role is that the Secretary of State has a duty to get planning done, and we hope that will be a crucial lever for the change we need to see.

If the amendment has a weakness, it is probably the one we have touched on already, which is that it does not ensure that the plan is feasible or delivered. A plan that shows the gap is not a plan unless it has a credible funding solution alongside it. Even if that is not explicit in the amendment, we assume that funding would follow any such assessment and plan that is set out. Our suggestion would be that any such financial projections in a plan are subject to the same level of independent expert verification as we see with the Office for Budget Responsibility. Since all the various think-tanks are going to do an assessment anyway, we may as well have a built-in process for verification.

[Rachael Maskell]

Does my hon. Friend agree with me that many of the recruitment challenges often sit in outsourced services in the private sector, and as a result it is really difficult to find the complement of staff required because people want to work in the NHS? That needs to be taken into consideration in any workplace plan.

[Justin Madders]

I thank my hon. Friend for her intervention and I will later talk a little about outsourcing and the role it has to play. We believe that plans should be built from the bottom up, not from the top, and that implies the involvement of ICBs, NHS trusts and foundation trusts. ICBs and their strategic arms, integrated care providers, will not be functional for some time. That is a shame, but it does not mean we should not proceed with the amendment.

The scale of the workforce challenge is well established: high rates of vacancy, inadequate levels of retention, and much more. It goes far deeper than numbers and structures, to issues of workforce terms and conditions, particularly in social care. It must also cover cultural issues, as there is a clear indication that all is not well in the NHS in terms of diversity. There is also whistleblowing, and aspects of how staff are nurtured and supported. At its very best, the NHS is very good, but unfortunately that is not the story across the board. It should be good in every part.

On that theme, let me mention the continuing disgrace in the way that some members of the NHS workforce are treated. I find it unacceptable that cleaners, porters, catering and IT staff are still being outsourced by trusts that are trying to make tax savings or outsource services to the lowest bidder. Perhaps the Minister can look into the current dispute at South Warwickshire in that regard, as we do not think that is a template to follow. Workforce planning is not a problem that can be solved quickly, although increased funding in social care could help that. For the NHS, the long term is indeed a long time—for example, the time needed to develop and train GPs and consultants. More money is not the only answer; technology and reform of the way we work must all be part of the mix. However, the labour-intensive nature of care will not fundamentally change, so we must look at workforce numbers as the priority. It is often said that failing to plan is the same as planning to fail. Some colleagues believe that a failure to plan is exactly that—a route to ending the NHS as we know it by showing that it fails. However, the Bill suggests an acceptance that a plan is needed, and work is under way. Hopefully that work is not being handed out to more consultants, of whom we see enough already.

Labour will support the amendment tabled by the Chair of the Health and Social Care Committee, which we hope will be pushed to a vote. I hope I have not been too effusive in my comments about him—I have a reputation to maintain after all—but I will refer to the excellent report done by his Committee on workforce burnout, which in many ways is the cornerstone of what we are debating. In its conclusion, the Committee said:

“The emergency that workforce burnout has become will not be solved without a total overhaul of the way the NHS does workforce planning. After the pandemic, which revealed so many critical staff shortages, the least we can do for staff is to show there is a long term solution to those shortages, ultimately the biggest driver of burnout. We may not be able to solve the issues around burnout overnight but we can at least give staff confidence that a long term solution is in place.

The way that the NHS does workforce planning is at best opaque and at worst responsible for the unacceptable pressure on the current workforce which existed even before the pandemic.

It is clear that workforce planning has been led by the funding envelope available to health and social care rather than by demand and the capacity required to service that demand. Furthermore, there is no accurate, public projection of what health and social care require in the workforce for the next five to ten years in each specialism. Without that level of detail, the shortages in the health and care workforce will endure, to the detriment of both the service provision and the staff who currently work in the sector. Annual, independent workforce projections would provide the NHS, social care and Government with the clarity required for long-term workforce planning.”

That conclusion shows what we are trying to achieve today. That is the nub of it: if not now, when? When will the Government finally accept the obvious that has been staring them in the face for years?

New clause 29 would require the Secretary of State to lay before Parliament a fully funded health and care workforce strategy to ensure that the numbers, skill and mix of healthcare staff are sufficient for the safe and effective delivery of services. It builds on other amendments, and seeks further assurances by putting patient safety and safe staffing levels at the heart of workforce planning, by setting out how the Government will be required to act to assess and rectify shortages. It seeks to ensure that the workforce will be on a sustainable footing in future. Patient safety should be our primary concern. We have the evidence base: when there are not enough registered nurses, mortality rates change and health outcomes are worse. I accept that the level of detail in the new clause is significant, but we consider that necessary to underscore the importance of setting out how this will be delivered.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Richard Holden (North West Durham) (Con)]

I thank the hon. Member for giving way, and I apologise to the Minister for not being here at the very start; I was on a train back from a ministerial visit in my constituency. I would just like to pay tribute to some of the campaigners who are in the Public Gallery at the moment, particularly those from Karma Nirvana, the Iranian and Kurdish Women’s Rights Organisation, the Middle Eastern Women and Society Organisation, and the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists. Does the hon. Member agree that it is those campaigners and charities who have worked on this issue for a very long time who have really brought it to the fore—they have just been supported by some Members of this House—and that it is they who deserve the credit?

[Justin Madders]

I thank the hon. Member for his intervention. I think he is being very modest, but he is absolutely right that these things do not happen by accident. It is often the hard work, over many years, of campaigners and campaign groups who being these issues to the fore and do the diligence and the hard work behind the scenes that leads us to the sort of outcome that we will hopefully get today—an end to this abhorrent practice.

On the hon. Member’s other amendment, new clause 22, we also want to see hymenoplasty ended. It has no medical benefit whatsoever. As the Minister said, there is currently an expert panel looking at the issue, and he is waiting on its recommendations. I think the outcome is in little doubt, to be frank. However, I wonder whether the Minister can give us an assurance that, should those recommendations turn out to be as we would expect, he will be able to act on them quickly and get something down in statute as soon as possible so that we do not miss the boat.

Turning to the amendments on the health services safety investigations body, much of the proposed legislation is the same as that proposed in the other place, and there were extensive debates on this matter in Committee. There are, however, issues that remain, which are covered by amendments we will be debating today. I can imagine the other place having quite a lot to say about some of these issues. In general, we support the move to the new body, but over time attention must be applied to some aspects of the way it will function in practice. Our major reservation is, yet again, with the involvement of the Secretary of State. Our amendment 74 would have the effect of leaving out clause 115, which is another clause that gives the Secretary of State extra powers to interfere.

Our general observation would be that there is far too much extra power going to the Secretary of State in the Bill anyway, but we are particularly concerned at the powers set out in clause 115, which give him what we consider to be wholly unnecessary powers to direct. It is pretty much a blank cheque to enable him to step in and interfere any time he likes as long as he considers that there has been a significant failure. Under subsection (2), the Secretary of State can direct the HSSIB in whatever manner he determines, which I would have said is about as far away from independence as we can get—until we get to subsection (4), which means the Secretary of State can also effectively step into the HSSIB’s shoes and undertake the duties himself. I can do no better than refer to the evidence Keith Conradi gave to the Public Bill Committee, when he said:

“Ultimately, we end up making recommendations to the Department of Health and Social Care, and in the future I would like to ensure that we have that complete freedom to be able to make recommendations wherever we think that they most fit.”––[Official Report, Health and Care Public Bill Committee, 7 September 2021; c. 60.]

We also support the amendments put forward by the spokesperson for the Scottish National party, the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire (Dr Whitford), which are important in preserving the principle and status of protected spaces. We feel it is important that they cannot be nibbled away at, as the Bill currently allows.

The purpose of amendment 57, which we also tabled in Committee, is simply to delete clause 127, which deals with the role of the Secretary of State in professional regulation. So far, we have had no convincing explanation of why the Secretary of State needs these powers. If there are no professions that he wishes to remove, we do not need the clause. If there are, he should say so, so we can have a debate now on whether it is appropriate to hand over those powers to him.

Finally, on new clause 1, I pay tribute to the all-party parliamentary group on beauty, aesthetics and wellbeing, whose work in this area has been influential in producing it. Many of the group’s members have put their name to it. As we know, cosmetic treatments can include a wide range of procedures aimed at enhancing or altering appearance. Many of those procedures are becoming increasingly popular and new clause 1 speaks to the well-articulated concern that non-medically and medically trained practitioners are performing treatments without being able to provide evidence of appropriate training, and without required standards of oversight and supervision.

I hope the Members moving new clause 1 will have the opportunity to speak to it, as there are far too many stories of people suffering horrific, life-changing injuries. There would undoubtedly be a saving to the NHS in reduced visits to accident and emergency and GPs to correct mistakes made by poorly trained and unregulated practitioners. We therefore think the new clause has value. Some of the impacts on the NHS from the lack of regulation include outbreaks of infection at a skin piercing premises, resulting in individuals being hospitalised; disfiguration and partial removal of an ear; second and third-degree burns from lasers and sunbeds; allergic reactions due to failures to carry out patch tests or medical assessments, which led to hospitalisation; and blindness in one eye caused by the incorrect administration of dermal filler.

New clause 1 seeks to put the protection of the public at the forefront by giving the Secretary of State power to bring into force a national licensing scheme for cosmetic procedures. Clearly, given that this is a departure from the wild west we face at the moment, we recognise that significant research and engagement with stakeholders will be needed to develop a scheme, as well as the provision of a practical and efficient system for people to become regulators and practitioners. If that does not make it on to the face of the Bill today, we hope this is an issue the Government will return to shortly.

[Jeremy Hunt]

I rise to speak in support of amendment 10 but, before I do, I also want to express strong support for amendments 40 to 43, tabled by the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire (Dr Whitford), which will make a big difference in making the new health services safety investigation body a success. I strongly encourage the Minister to listen to what she says later not just with the deference due to an experienced surgeon, but with the enthusiasm to follow a doctor’s advice, because what she says is extremely important.

I also thank the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston (Justin Madders) for his generous comments about me. Having sat opposite him at the Dispatch Box on many an occasion, I realise how difficult they must have been for him to say. He must have wrestled with those thoughts for a long time, and I am delighted that he has been able to unburden himself today.

The hon. Gentleman was absolutely right to focus on burnout in the NHS workforce. All of us would agree that NHS and care staff have done a magnificent job looking after us and our families in the pandemic, but right now they are exhausted and daunted. They can see that A&E departments and GP surgeries are seeing record attendances. They can see nearly 6 million on waiting lists, which is more than one in 10 of the population. They also have the vaccine programme and covid patients.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)]

Fantastic. I am grateful to the Minister for his brevity; he can see how many people are trying to catch my eye.

[Justin Madders]

Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker—[Interruption.] It has been a long day, Mr Deputy Speaker, but we will get there.

I will speak to the amendments tabled in my name and those of my right hon. and hon. Friends. As the Minister said, this group of amendments covers a large range of important areas, so I will be brief.

New clause 27 flags up the issues around waiting times. Passing any amendment requiring a report is, of course, not a total solution, but it might be a source of focus. As Labour has said many times since 2010, winter pressures, waiting times and the flight into private healthcare to get earlier treatment have exacerbated the issues.

[Mr Tanmanjeet Singh Dhesi (Slough) (Lab)]

Many of my constituents find it increasingly difficult to book an appointment with an NHS GP or dentist, forcing them either to go private or to suffer without treatment. Does the shadow Minister agree that, after a decade of failure and misguided policies, the Government must take urgent remedial action? However, the term “waiting time”, to which he has just referred, is not mentioned once in the Bill.

[Justin Madders]

My hon. Friend is right that one of the criticisms we have levelled against the Bill is that it does not address the issues and challenges facing the NHS. I will take no further interventions, because I am conscious that many Members have contributions to make.

I will move swiftly on to our two amendments dealing with inequality and to new clause 64 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham East and Saddleworth (Debbie Abrahams). To show that this is an NHS and social care Bill, not just an NHS Bill, local authorities need to be more involved and more emphasis must be placed on wellbeing and better outcomes. We support the NHS triple aim—improving health, quality of care and cost control are, of course, important functions. Nevertheless, we live in a country where significant inequalities remain, and narrowing those gaps should be a national priority.

Research from the IPPR last month highlighted the 10-year gap in life expectancy between a person living in the poorest community and a person in the best off. That gap doubles when we talk about healthy life expectancy. Tackling that disparity must be a priority in the Bill. The Secretary of State for Health and Social Care said in his first speech that said he wanted to tackle the “disease of disparity”, so why is that missing?

Turning to clause 39—one of my favourites—why it remains in the Bill is a mystery given that the previous Secretary of State, the right hon. Member for West Suffolk (Matt Hancock), who requested these powers, is no longer in the role. Perhaps he will give us his insight into that later on. It is the absolute antithesis of the Lansley view that politicians should be distanced from NHS operational issues and makes a mockery of the overall thrust of this Bill, which is about encouraging local decision making. It is no exaggeration to say that, taken literally, clause 39 and its accompanying schedule 6 require the Secretary of State to be told if there are, or even if there might be, proposals to vary service—even moving a clinic from one location to another nearby.

As has been pointed out by wise heads, the power is not one that many Secretaries of State should want to get involved in. A Secretary of State who used it could be accused of favouring certain areas or decisions for political purposes. The well-articulated fear is that it will be used to block necessary but unpopular changes and that expediency will rule. Such decisions should be left to the clinicians or maybe the health economists but not politicians. Labour opposes this new power and would gently say to the Minister, “Be careful what you wish for.”

Finally, the issues around discharge to assess are complex. As we worked our way through in Committee, we heard evidence from many stakeholders, and it is fair to say that views on the matter were polarised. We are led to believe, and have some confirmation, that this development is working well for some acute settings, helping ease the perennial and disruptive issues around delayed transfers of care, but in other places we hear voices calling for much greater caution and for tougher safeguards or even, as amendment 60 requests, to stop it altogether. While we have sympathy with amendment 60, it would only pose more problems for the NHS if it was passed, so we have opted in our amendment 73 just to tighten up on safeguards.

Of course the real solutions are far more complex and would require higher investment both in the NHS and in social care. It should be mandatory that all aspects of ongoing care have been properly discussed and agreed with the patient and carers prior to discharge. An assessment should include carers with special attention if a child carer is involved, and there is a concern that unpaid carers will not be identified and consulted at the point of discharge.

The system for step-down care outside acute hospitals must be adequate, and there must be sufficient high-quality and funded places in care settings of all kinds. We are literally a whole generation away from having that kind of system, even if the funding started to become available today. On a related point, new clause 63 from the hon. Member for St Albans (Daisy Cooper) also deserves support.

I will leave my comments there, as I know many hon. Members want to speak.

[Mrs Theresa May (Maidenhead) (Con)]

I rise to speak in support of amendments 93 to 98, whose purpose is very simple.

The Health and Social Care Act 2012 established parity of esteem between physical and mental health in their treatment in the national health service. The Bill is silent on the issue. I know that Ministers have given assurances, in a variety of ways, that it is not the Government’s intention to move away from that parity of esteem, but if that is the case, the answer is simple: accept the amendments. The Government do not even have to write them; they have been written for them. There would then be absolutely no doubt about the continued commitment to ensuring parity of esteem between physical and mental health.

Mental health was clearly in the long-term plan for the national health service that I was pleased to see introduced. It was there because of the need to accept, as Members across the House do, that for too long mental health has not been given the attention that it deserves. People who were suffering with mental health problems were not getting the services that they need.

It will take time to ensure that we can provide for all, but sadly the issue has been exacerbated by the pandemic. In March 2021, there were 26% more referrals for mental health services than in March 2019, before the pandemic. The Centre for Mental Health reckons that 10 million additional people will need mental health care as a result of the pandemic. I am particularly concerned about the impact on young people; I am sure that Members across the House are seeing young people in their constituencies whose mental health may have been suffering anyway, but has suffered even more as a result of the pandemic.

More people now require mental health services. The Government talk a lot about dealing with the backlog that is a result of the pandemic, but it is only ever spoken about with reference to surgery or operations. The great danger is that in their focus on dealing with that backlog, which we all accept is necessary, the Government will push the issue of mental health services to one side.

The amendments stand in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne (Sir Charles Walker), in my name and in the names of Members across the House—there is cross-party concern. I say to the Minister once again: it is very simple. If the Government wish to maintain parity of esteem between physical and mental health and ensure that people with mental health problems are given the services and care that they need, they must put uncertainty to one side, accept the amendments and make it clear that physical and mental health will be treated with parity of esteem in our national health service.

Health and Care Bill

Justin Madders Excerpts

Consideration of Lords amendments
Wednesday 30th March 2022 Commons Chamber

[Mike Wood (Dudley South) (Con)]

At its best, our national health service provides truly world-class care. That is down to the skill, passion and professionalism of its workforce. As hon. Members will know, I have personal reason to forever be grateful to the NHS, and particularly the staff at Russells Hall Hospital in Dudley. While new hospitals, equipment and technology are all crucial, they are nothing without the health and social care staff who are the beating heart of our health service.

However, I am concerned that Lords amendment 29 does little more than add to an already onerous level of bureaucracy in our NHS. Providing a report every two years instead of every five does not improve the record number of doctors and nurses. The Government are already committed to reviewing the long-term strategic trends in the health and social care workforce, and to developing a workforce strategy, and clause 35 of the Bill already commits to a workforce review every five years. That in itself will be quite an arduous task.

Huge steps have been taken in investing in the future of the NHS workforce, including by funding a 25% increase in places since 2016-17. That means 7,500 more medical schools training places in England over the past six years. The shadow Health Secretary is obviously right to say that the population has grown in recent decades, but I think it has grown by 8% since 2010, while the number of doctors working in our NHS is up by about one third. Clause 35 allows for medium and long-term workforce plans, and offers a sensible balance between the need for such work and the need to minimise unnecessary bureaucracy. That is why I will not support the amendment.

Turning to Lords amendment 30, while I recognise the arguments made by Opposition Members, I do not agree with them or believe that clause 40 should be removed from the Bill. I believe it contains sensible powers. We expect the Secretary of State to be responsible for our national health service—for the services provided in every part of the country. There was much opposition and controversy when provisions reducing that responsibility were introduced in previous legislation. If he is to exercise that responsibility, he must have the powers to do so.

Voters and Members of Parliament expect the Secretary of State to be able to take action where health services have been reduced. On 11 November, a few weeks before the by-election in North Shropshire, the leader of the Liberal Democrats, the right hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton (Ed Davey), questioned the Prime Minister at Prime Minister’s questions about the closure of Oswestry ambulance service. If we are to question the Prime Minister or the Health Secretary on the closure of services such as ambulance stations or hospitals, then it is only right that the Secretary of State should, in extreme circumstances, have the power prevent those closures. Our voters expect that, and frankly so do the Opposition.

[Justin Madders (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab)]

I wish to speak to Lords amendment 29 on the workforce. The most important thing I learned during my five years as a shadow Health Minister is that everything comes back to the workforce. We can have the grandest plans, strategy documents, reorganisations, integrations and configurations—all of which are probably in this Bill, in various forms—but it will all count for very little if the fundamental cog in the machine, the workforce, is not a central part of those plans. The consistent failure to invest in, and provide a plan for, the workforce, so that it can meet demand over a sustained period is at the root of the challenges that the NHS and social care face today. We now have a chance to correct that.

Let us look at some of the challenges. There are 93,000 NHS staff vacancies; £6 billion-plus has been spent on temporary staff to fill gaps; and more than half of staff are working unpaid extra hours each week, with 44% saying that they have felt ill with work-related issues—little wonder, given that retention remains a huge issue. We need a plan, and we need to give staff some semblance of hope that we are listening—that the claps on a Thursday were not just an empty gesture; that the tributes that we rightly pay here to their dedication are not meaningless platitudes; and that there is a determination to do something about the persistent rota gaps that mean that staff are both exhausted and demoralised.

The Health and Social Care Committee report on staff burnout says:

“It is clear that workforce planning has been led by the funding envelope available to health and social care rather than by demand and the capacity required to service that demand.”

That is rather the nub of it. Health and social care are both demand-led systems, yet the funding and therefore the workforce capacity are not linked to demand. Until that central issue is addressed, we will keep coming back to the many varied and unfortunate consequences of an overstretched and under-resourced workforce.

I suspect that the Minister—who I have a lot of time for, even though he is often wrong on these things—might privately think that a long-term workforce plan might be a good idea, not just to ensure that the NHS can plan properly and to move forward on a sustainable footing, but because that might help his Department when it goes into negotiations on the spending round with the Treasury, as it will be able to point to an independently verified assessment of workforce need. If the amendment has a weakness, it is that it does not ensure that any plan is actually feasible, because there is no requirement in it that any plan be fully funded. However, a plan that shows, for all the world to see, a clear funding gap would be helpful to the Minister, because it would allow him to go to the Treasury with a clear and objective demand. As he knows, I like to be helpful to him, so I hope that on this occasion he can support the amendment.

This debate is timely because it comes on a day when two surveys have been released that lay bare the crisis that we face. One survey shows that public satisfaction ratings with the NHS are reported to be at a 25-year low—a quarter of a century of surveys there—and another shows that the number of NHS staff who would recommend their trust as a place to work has plummeted. Those two facts are intertwined and symptomatic of the workforce crisis that the amendment is trying to address.

The question we must ask ourselves, if we choose not to support the Lords amendment, is whether the Government’s existing plans create sufficient accountability and rigour to deliver the transformative approach that the amendment would. In my view, it introduces a level of robustness to workforce planning that is currently missing. For the reasons I have set out, we owe it to the workforce, to patients and to those in receipt of social care to put workforce planning on the strong footing that the amendment would deliver.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)]

I am surprised that the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) does not wish to speak. [Interruption.] Oh, he does. I hope he will be brief, so that the Minister will have time to answer the debate.

Health and Care Bill

Justin Madders Excerpts

Consideration of Lords amendments
Monday 25th April 2022 Commons Chamber

[Matt Hancock (West Suffolk) (Con)]

I rise to support the compromise measure on reconfigurations and to ask the Government to take forward the work on UK-wide statistics with vigour and gusto.

First, on reconfigurations, it is right and reasonable that the largest organisation in the country, which is funded by taxpayers through the taxes that every single citizen pays, should be accountable to Ministers who are in turn accountable to this House. Although that principle has been accepted in the Bill across the board and in general terms, the other place has decided that it should not apply in the specific circumstances of reconfigurations. It is vital that when a reconfiguration happens, not only the clinical voices but the voice of the local community should be heard. The two need to go together. The best way to make happen any reconfiguration that is needed on clinical grounds is to engage the local community and get it onside. If we are to save lives through a reconfiguration, we can win the argument, but only if we engage and make the argument. In my experience, too often a reconfiguration was put on the table, perhaps for good clinical reasons but without enough local engagement, and in practice the process just ran into the sand.

I welcome the six-month delay—I hope the Secretary of State will work quicker than six months most of the time, but it is a good backstop; I welcome the de minimis threshold, because relatively small reconfigurations happen all the time; and I welcome the removal of some of the bureaucracy in the amendment. To my hon. Friend the Minister, who has done a magnificent job on the Bill right from the start, before it even came to this House—I thank all his officials for their service—I say: let us take this compromise but say clearly to the other place, “Thus far and no further.” The principle of democratic responsibility for the NHS and for winning the argument with the public about its local design is at the heart of the Bill and it must stand.

In the final minute I have in which to speak, let me make a point about statistics. Those on the Treasury Bench have decided not to include in the Bill measures on the UK-wide measurement of health services and on the interoperability of data in the four nations of the UK, but I put on the record the importance—I hope the Minister reiterates this—of getting UK-wide measurements. In Wales, it was decided to discontinue the measurement of some aspects, especially in respect of A&E performance. A suspicion was raised—I am sure this could not possibly have been true—that those measurements were discontinued so that unfavourable comparisons with England could no longer be made. If that were true, it would be an outrage. I very much hope that it is not, but we should put it right anyway and measure NHS service delivery throughout the UK on the same basis, so that comparisons can be made, so that we can learn about and improve services across all four nations, and so that accountability can properly apply to the four different Governments who run the four parts of the one NHS, which operates across this United Kingdom.

[Justin Madders (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab)]

I rise to speak to the Lords amendment on workforce—probably for the dozenth time during the Bill’s passage. I make no apologies for repetition because some things are worth repeating and the importance of our workforce can never be understated. Everything comes back to workforce: the grandest plans, strategy documents, reorganisations, integrations and configurations will all count for very little if the fundamental cog in the machine and the glue that holds the whole thing together—the workforce—is not a central part of those plans. The consistent failure to invest in the workforce and to provide a plan for it so that it is able to meet demand over a sustained period is at the root of many of the challenges that the NHS faces today. We should correct that.

On Friday night, a constituent contacted me as he suspected he had dislocated his hip and had been told that his situation did not warrant an ambulance. Eventually, he managed to get to A&E, but in the end he went home without receiving treatment because it was so busy that people were standing outside the department. That is just one example, but there are countless others like it—the frustrated constituents who can never speak to their GP; the many people left in agony because waiting lists are at record levels; those whose teeth rot away because they cannot get dental treatment; and those who receive no help for their mental health issues because they do not reach the threshold for intervention. Every one of those examples arises because, to a greater or lesser extent—I would say to a greater extent most of the time—there simply are not enough staff to meet the demand.

There is a pattern of disconnection in respect of the action required to meet the Government’s ambitions, let alone getting the NHS to meet its constitutional targets. Unless workforce is addressed in a meaningful way as part of all the plans and strategies issued, the Government are just fooling themselves that their plans are credible and deliverable. Even if the Government wish to fool themselves, they are not fooling anyone else. They are certainly not fooling us Members on the Opposition Benches or the 100 or so health and social care organisations that support what we are trying to achieve with the workforce amendment.

The most recent Department-commissioned NHS workforce strategy, the People Plan, did not include a forecast on staffing numbers. When asked about it, Baroness Harding, who authored the plan, said that the strategy did not include staff numbers not because

“the Government disagreed with the numbers”

but

“because we could not get approval to publish the document with any forecasts in it.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 7 December 2021; Vol. 816, c. 1814.]

Perhaps that means the Government do have figures but just do not want us to see them. If that is right, perhaps the Minister could let us in on the secret when he responds. If that is not right, will he tell us what other organisation with more than a million staff manages to operate successfully without accurate figures on workforce projection?

In addition to the obvious arguments about why we need accurate information on workforce requirements, it is important that we collect such information for existing staff, because they need hope that help is on the way. We need to show that those claps on a Thursday night were not an empty gesture and that there is a determination to do something about the persistent rota gaps that mean staff are both exhausted and demoralised. Just look at some of the challenges we face: 93,000 vacancies; a £6 billion annual spend on agency staff; staff working extra unpaid hours; and some 40% off with work-related stress at some point or other. With all those things conspiring together, it is little wonder that retention is an issue, so we need to give staff hope that we have an answer—that we have a plan. As the Select Committee report on workforce burnout said:

“The way that the NHS does workforce planning is at best opaque and at worst responsible for the unacceptable pressure on the current workforce which existed even before the pandemic.”

With so many challenges currently facing the NHS, why do we want to make it worse by refusing to accept the evidence before our eyes? It is no coincidence that NHS satisfaction ratings are reported to be at a 25-year low at the same time as record numbers of NHS staff say they would not recommend working at their own trust. Those issues are not disconnected in any way, which is why we need to support the workforce amendment.