Oral Answers to Questions

Jonathan Djanogly Excerpts

Tuesday 8th November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Simon Wright (Norwich South) (LD)]

3. What plans he has to increase the scope of the Freedom of Information Act 2000.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Mr Jonathan Djanogly)]

This month we extended the Freedom of Information Act to a further three bodies—the Association of Chief Police Officers, the Financial Ombudsman Service and UCAS. Additionally, we intend to extend the Act to over 100 more organisations through the Protection of Freedoms Bill. We have also begun consultations with more than 200 further bodies about their possible inclusion. Next year we plan to consult 2,000 housing associations and the housing ombudsman.

[Simon Wright]

I thank the Minister for his response and for the progress made by his Department. As he knows, Network Rail is responsible for spending billions of pounds of public money each year. Will he ensure that that organisation is brought within the scope of the Freedom of Information Act?

[Mr Djanogly]

The Government are committed to making Network Rail more accountable to its customers, and believe that there is a strong case for its inclusion in the FOI.

[Meg Munn (Sheffield, Heeley) (Lab/Co-op)]

Community organisations often have a great deal of trouble getting information out of local councils via the Freedom of Information Act. What plans does the Minister have to make the Act as currently drawn, with the organisations currently included, work better?

[Mr Djanogly]

If the hon. Lady has problems to be addressed, she should write to the Ministry of Justice and we will take them up.

[Sajid Javid (Bromsgrove) (Con)]

5. What steps his Department is taking to provide support for victims; and if he will make a statement.

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[Ian Swales]

Teesside suffers from arguably the worst coroner service in the country, with families now waiting an average of 43 weeks for a verdict. How is the coroner service held accountable, and what can the Minister do to ensure that my constituents get the service they deserve?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Mr Jonathan Djanogly)]

Ultimately, coroners are independent judicial appointments, and as such, complaints must be made through the judicial appointments service. Having said that, I have been in contact with people in Teesside and I shall continue to take an interest in this matter.

[Sadiq Khan (Tooting) (Lab)]

One cannot help but notice the good mood that the Justice Secretary is in today, which I am sure has nothing to do with the spot of bother the Home Secretary is in. May I ask him a question on a similar issue—foreign prisoners? He will be aware that in 2007, the Labour Government negotiated with the EU a prisoner transfer agreement, which comes into force next month, which will mean that no prisoner consent is required, and that the other country must comply with a request for a transfer. The Prime Minister promised the repatriation of thousands of foreign prisoners by personally taking charge of negotiations with individual countries. We all know that he likes to keep his promises, so can the Justice Secretary tell us how many new prisoner transfer agreements have been successfully negotiated with individual countries in the past 18 months, and how many foreign prisoners does he expect to be repatriated this year?

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[Mr Jim Cunningham (Coventry South) (Lab)]

T2. Has the Minister done an impact assessment on the effect of the legal aid reforms on women?

[Mr Djanogly]

Yes, an equality impact assessment was carried out.

[Rehman Chishti (Gillingham and Rainham) (Con)]

T5. According to a written question that I asked the Minister earlier this year, in 2009 the disciplinary punishment of additional days for bad behaviour in prisons was imposed on 11,550 occasions. What steps are being taken to improve discipline and behaviour in prisons?

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[Mr Djanogly]

First, it is important to appreciate that we are keeping £50 million of legal aid in social welfare law for the most urgent and vulnerable people who need it. We need to appreciate that, at the moment, legal aid is often used as a sticking plaster for matters that should properly be dealt with under general advice from citizens advice bureaux.

[Mr Aidan Burley (Cannock Chase) (Con)]

T10. After the riots in the summer, courts such as Cannock magistrates court in my constituency sat late and ensured that the surge in work was dealt with smoothly and efficiently. These late-night sittings have been widely regarded as a huge success, not least by those magistrates who have full-time jobs that require them to work during office hours. What plans does the Secretary of State’s Department have to roll out these evening court sittings on a permanent basis?

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[Jessica Morden (Newport East) (Lab)]

T8. Constituents of mine with serious health conditions who have been turned down for employment and support allowance are still having to wait up to nine months for a tribunal appeal hearing. With more than 40% of them being successful on appeal, what is the Minister going to do to end this unacceptable wait?

[Mr Djanogly]

This is relevant to a number of Departments. We are working with them to ensure that the procedures are such that better determinations are made at the outset so that we get fewer appeals. This is taking up a significant amount of my time. The hon. Lady makes an important point.

[Alun Cairns (Vale of Glamorgan) (Con)]

When a magistrates court is forced to close, does my hon. Friend agree that every effort and flexibility needs to be shown to accommodate those magistrates in alternative courts?

[Mr Djanogly]

Yes, and they are. So far as I know, no magistrates have been forced to resign because of any court closure. They are normally encouraged to join the successor court, although some take the opportunity to resign at that point for their own reasons.

[Huw Irranca-Davies (Ogmore) (Lab)]

The Secretary of State will no doubt share my respect for those who carry out pro bono work, which makes a big impact in my communities and throughout the UK. What does he make of the assertion that cutbacks are going to have to be made in pro bono services because of the cuts to overall provision?

[Mr Djanogly]

I do not see any reason why that should be the case.

[Alok Sharma (Reading West) (Con)]

One of my constituents who was witness to a burglary and theft in the local area has made me aware that the youth defendant who pleaded guilty on two counts was required as part of his rehabilitation order to spend three weeks at summer arts college. Does the Minister believe that it is time to review some elements of the community sentencing framework?

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[Mr Djanogly]

These will have to be looked at in the context of all not-for-profit organisations—citizens advice bureaux and so forth. If the hon. Lady wishes to discuss her particular concerns relating to her particular CLAC, I would be happy to discuss them with her.

[Robert Halfon (Harlow) (Con)]

Following the publication of the Norgrove report, will my hon. Friend reassure anxious fathers in my constituency, including Mr Colin Riches, and will he make every effort to ensure that parents have equal access to children?

[Mr Djanogly]

We have every intention of ensuring that both parents have a meaningful relationship with their children, and we will look carefully at the Norgrove report in order to develop a Government approach to the matter.

[Hugh Bayley (York Central) (Lab)]

The convictions of three world-class cricketers last week shows that even cricket is not immune from corruption. In his role as the Government’s anti-corruption chief, will the Secretary of State look into the problem of corruption in international sporting bodies such as FIFA, and see what Britain can do to drive corruption out of international sport? There has also been controversy involving the Olympics and Formula 1.

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[Sheila Gilmore (Edinburgh East) (Lab)]

A few months ago, the Minister said that the backlog of appeals on social security matters would be resolved through the employment of more people. That was before the summer, but the waiting times seem to be as long as ever. Why is that?

[Mr Djanogly]

There is still a significant number of appeals, but the number is now being stabilised and the delays are being reduced.

[Mrs Mary Glindon (North Tyneside) (Lab)]

Given that probation trusts are experiencing major cuts in their budgets, can the Minister explain how he expects them to do more for less?

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Jonathan Djanogly Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd November 2011 Commons Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Mr Jonathan Djanogly)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government new clause 9—Northern Ireland: information about financial resources.

New clause 17—Extension of scope of legal aid in complex cases—

‘(1) Civil legal services other than services described in Part 1 of Schedule 1 are to be available to an individual under this Part if subsection (2) is satisfied.

(2) This subsection is satisfied where the Director—

(a) has made a complex case determination in relation to the individual and the services, and

(b) has determined that the individual qualifies for the services in accordance with this Part,

(and has not withdrawn either determination).

(3) For the purposes of subsection (2), a complex case determination is a determination—

(a) that the individual has complex, interconnected needs in relation to which the individual requires comprehensive civil legal services, and

(b) not all of those civil legal services would otherwise be available to the individual because they do not all fall within the scope of Schedule 1.’.

New clause 43—Funding for civil legal advice—

‘(1) The Lord Chancellor may make funding available for the promotion of civil legal advice on matters not included in Schedule 1, Part 1 where it appears to the Lord Chancellor that the provision of such services would be consistent with the purpose of the civil legal services provided for under that schedule.

(2) The Lord Chancellor may make arrangements by—

(a) entering into funding arrangements with other Government departments and public bodies to facilitate the provision of services,

(b) making arrangements to support the delivery of civil legal advice through the provision of grant in aid to providers of legal services, including any consortia or partnership arrangements into which providers of legal services may choose to enter, and

(c) any additional arrangements which the Lord Chancellor considers appropriate to ensure the provision of services as set out in subsection (1).

(3) In making any such arrangements the Lord Chancellor shall ensure that value for money is achieved.

(4) Welsh Ministers shall be consulted upon the funding and provision of civil legal advice in Wales.

(5) “Civil legal advice” means the types of services given in section 7(1) and includes advice and assistance which is usually given by any representative in the steps preliminary or incidental to proceedings and as to any appeal, mediation and other forms of dispute resolution, but does not include representation for the purposes of proceedings.’.

Government new schedule 3—‘Northern Ireland: information about financial resources.

Amendment 162, in clause 1, page 2, line 7, at end insert—

‘(c) funding for the promotion of civil legal services, not including representation, on matters not included in Schedule 1, Part 1 where it appears to the Lord Chancellor that the provision of such services would be consistent with the purpose of the civil legal services provided for under that schedule.’.

Amendment 123, in clause 4, page 3, line 25, leave out subsection (4) and insert—

‘(4A) The Director must, except to the extent that section (4B) applies, act under the direction of the Lord Chancellor.

(4B) The Director must act independently when performing any functions or duties under this Part.’.

Amendment 116, page 8, line 29, leave out clause 12.

Amendment 104, in clause 12, page 8, line 31, leave out from ‘station’ to end of line 20 on page 9.

Amendment 125, page 8, line 35, leave out subsections (2) to (7).

Amendment 90, page 9, line 27, leave out subsection (9) and insert—

‘(9) Sections 20 and 26(2) do not apply in relation to this section’.

Amendment 148, page 21, line 7, leave out clause 26.

Government amendments 1, 2 and 25 to 27.

Amendment 69, in schedule 4, page 130, line 36, at end insert—

‘(3A) A transfer scheme shall make pension provision and compensation provision for and in respect of persons who become employed in the civil service of the State under paragraph 1 which is at least as favourable as the pension provision and compensation provision applicable to them immediately before they ceased to be employees of the Legal Services Commission.’.

Government amendment 64.

Amendment 71, page 131, line 9, at end insert—

‘“compensation provision” means the provision of compensation under a compensation scheme;’.

Amendment 70, page 131, line 14, at end insert—

‘“pension provision” means the provision of pension and other benefits under an occupational pension scheme;’.

Government amendments 65, 137, 66 to 68, 138, 19 and 54.

[Mr Djanogly]

We now move on, or perhaps I should say back to, legal aid. When we discussed legal aid on our first day on Report, we had two very constructive, albeit lengthy, debates in which I took more than three dozen interventions. That was partly the reason, along with the many valuable contributions that were made, why we were unable to cover all the groupings—[Interruption.] I know that that disappointed a number of hon. Members in all parts of the House.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

Order. Let us not start where we left off the other day. Let us see if we can make progress. We do not want to run out of time, and I am sure that those on both Front Benches want to make good time.

[Mr Djanogly]

I want to try to avoid delay today, so I shall speak to Government amendments now and respond to the points made in debate later, rather than pre-empting in my opening remarks what hon. Members may have to say about their amendments.

Government new clause 4, which is a technical amendment, has two purposes. First, it seeks to provide clarity about the role of the director of legal aid casework, by ensuring that the exercise of the functions of the office is on behalf of the Crown, and that service as the director is service in the civil service of the state. The second purpose of new clause 4 is to ensure that the Lord Chancellor is treated as a corporation sole for the purposes of part 1 of the Bill.

The new clause is necessary in order to clarify the position in relation to the Lord Chancellor’s ability to hold an interest in land for those purposes, and so applies to charges that transfer from the Legal Services Commission to the Lord Chancellor at the point when the LSC is abolished, and for future charges to be taken over property under clause 24. The statutory charge is the charge that arises under clause 24 on any property recovered or preserved, including costs, by a legally aided person in respect of the amounts spent by the Lord Chancellor in securing their legal aid services and any other amounts payable by them under clauses 22 and 23. The amendment is essential, as the current value of charges held by the LSC is £212 million.

Government new clause 9 and new schedule 3 make provision on information sharing in relation to checking a person’s financial eligibility for legal aid in Northern Ireland. They replicate for Northern Ireland the information gateway for England and Wales created by clause 21 and further provided for in clause 32. Government amendments 26 and 27 are technical amendments that make it clear that regulations made under new schedule 3 will be prescribed not by the Lord Chancellor but by the Northern Ireland Assembly. Government amendment 54 is also a technical amendment that makes it clear that the Bill extends to Northern Ireland for the purposes of new clause 9 and new schedule 3, which create the information gateway, and for the purposes of clauses 38 to 40. I should point out that under paragraph 2(4) of new schedule 3, it will be a criminal offence to use or disclose information contrary to the provisions of paragraph 2.

Government amendments 25 and 64 to 68 relate to the transfer of LSC employees to the civil service when the LSC is abolished. The powers currently set out in the Bill include a power, in schedule 4, for the Lord Chancellor to make transfer schemes to transfer to the Lord Chancellor or the Secretary of State the LSC’s rights, powers, duties and liabilities under or in connection with an LSC occupational pension scheme, of which there are currently two, or compensation scheme. The occupational pension and compensation scheme arrangements for LSC employees are different from those for existing civil servants. When the employees transfer to the civil service and become civil servants, they will join the principal civil service pension scheme.

Amendment 64 confers new powers upon the Lord Chancellor that can be exercised as part of any transfer scheme. Proposed new sub-paragraph (6A), set out in amendment 64, allows for the Lord Chancellor to apply legislation with modifications as far as it is necessary to give effect to any transfer scheme. That is appropriate when transfer schemes are of an administrative nature relating to the specific issues in question. For example, it will allow the Lord Chancellor to provide that an aspect of pensions legislation applies in a particular way to that particular scheme. It will assist, as appropriate, in enabling the continuation of the LSC pension scheme or schemes after the abolition of the LSC so that they can continue for the benefit of their pensioner and preserved members. Those are members who have contributed to the schemes before leaving LSC employment and either draw a pension from the scheme or will be entitled to do so in future.

For compensation scheme arrangements, as well as allowing the modification of legislation, proposed new sub-paragraph (6B), set out in amendment 64, provides that the transfer scheme may amend or otherwise modify the existing LSC compensation scheme. That will allow compensation arrangements for LSC employees transferring to the civil service to be brought into line with those of other civil servants over a transitional period.

Amendment 65 reflects the fact that when LSC employees transfer to the civil service there will no longer be any active members of the two current LSC occupational pension schemes, known as the No. 3 and No. 4 pension schemes. The amendment provides the Lord Chancellor with the power to make a scheme to merge the two residual pension schemes. It is explicit that a scheme exercising this power must not result in members of the pension schemes, or other beneficiaries under the schemes, being deprived of any rights accrued prior to the merger.

The LSC’s No. 3 pension scheme has fewer than 100 pensioner and preserved members, and no current LSC staff members. The No. 4 scheme is for current staff and also has a number of pensioner and preserved members. At present there is much duplication in the administration of the No. 3 and No. 4 schemes, such as producing two sets of accounts and actuarial valuations. Merging the schemes would allow us to cut significantly the administration costs of running two trust-based schemes. The amendment will also give the power to wind up an LSC occupational pension scheme.

Amendment 25 corrects a slip in clause 38(7)(j). The intention was not to make regulations that contain free-standing provision that modifies an Act either directly or indirectly, subject to the affirmative procedure. Amendments 66 to 68 clarify the fact that the regulation-making power provided to the Lord Chancellor under paragraph 10 of schedule 4 can be used in connection not only with transfers affected by schedule 4, but with schemes under schedule 4, meaning schemes dealing with something other than a transfer.

Government amendments 137 and 138 concern schedule 4 to the Bill, which governs transfers of employees and assets following the abolition of the LSC. They are purely technical amendments that simplify existing provisions. Paragraph 10(1) of schedule 4 currently allows the Lord Chancellor to make consequential supplementary, incidental or transitional provision by regulation, and paragraph 10(2)(b) specifies separately that such regulations may include transitory or savings provision. Rather than continue to separate these related provisions, for the purposes of simplification amendment 137 brings them together in a revised paragraph 10(1) and amendment 138 amends paragraph 10(2) to reflect that simplification. That mirrors an identical amendment to clause 115.

Finally, Government amendments 1, 2 and 19 are minor and technical amendments to clause 32 and schedule 5, consequential on the removal in Committee of what was then clause 71.

[Mr Andy Slaughter (Hammersmith) (Lab)]

If the Minister was sincere when he said in his opening remarks that we will make good progress and deal with as many of the groups of amendments as we can today, I applaud him for it, but it is a challenging task. There has been a statement so we have barely four hours left to debate huge chunks of the Bill, which is impractical. It will no doubt be assisted by the fact that, with the exception of the Minister’s Parliamentary Private Secretary, who has just appeared, there is not a single Conservative Back Bencher here. [Interruption.] I apologise to the hon. Member for Hendon (Mr Offord); I thought he was a Liberal Democrat. I withdraw that slur on his character immediately.

There is a serious point. We had a disgraceful situation in the House on Monday when the Minister called in Conservative Back Benchers, one by one, to speak on domestic violence and clinical negligence, particularly as they affect the most severe injuries and brain-damaged children, and to waste time. By wasting time and then voting against amendments that would deal with those issues, the Government prevented us from moving on to a substantive discussion on legal aid. I will not dwell on that point, because I wanted to move on, but I hope that in discussing these amendments, of which there are a broad range, we will be able to do justice to that important subject.

I will speak principally to amendment 123, which stands in my name. I will get my contributions out of the way in one go by speaking to new clause 17, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Makerfield (Yvonne Fovargue), amendment 148, tabled by Liberal Democrat Members, who for some reason rejected a similar amendment I tabled, and new clause 43, tabled by the hon. Member for Carmarthen East and Dinefwr (Jonathan Edwards), which is a very good one. I will say at the outset that we support all those amendments. I will not deal with amendment 116, which stands in my name, because my hon. Friend the Member for Darlington (Mrs Chapman) will make a contribution on that later. For the avoidance of doubt, I will say at the outset that the Opposition will press amendment 116 to a vote, and other hon. Members may wish to press their amendments to a vote.

Amendment 123 deals with a fairly straightforward point, but an important one, which is in no way party political. The independence of the new director has raised considerable alarm and concern across the professions and the voluntary sector, and indeed with anyone who deals regularly with legal aid. We attempted many times in Committee, with a variety of amendments, to try to push at this and get the Government to give a little. We asked for an appeals process, a vetting process before appointment, which would give some independence, and for assurances in relation to the civil service, which will be working in this area. Every amendment, as was the case throughout the Committee’s proceedings, was rejected. I hope—this is the case in other common law jurisdictions which have moved to a similar system—that the Minister is listening to these proposals. This is not an issue that divides the parties on the abolition of the Legal Services Commission, but it is an issue that strongly divides the parties on the adverse influence, be it perceived or real, that the Government will bring to bear on to the director post once it is firmly ensconced within the Department.

There is a trend in this Bill towards Government control and authoritarianism, and we will see it when we debate clause 12, whereby the same director of legal aid will get the power to decide whether legal aid is granted to those in extremis—in the worst circumstances—when they have been arrested. We also see the trend in relation to the constraints on the powers of the judiciary, and, although I doubt that we will get time to debate remand today, I note that the Government wish severely to tie the hands of magistrates and judges in relation to whom they can remand in custody. All the time, these measures restrict either citizens’ rights or the rights of independent parties, whether they be the director or the judiciary, to make decisions.

I heard quite a chilling statement from the Ministry on the radio this morning. I do not know whether other hon. Members heard the compelling interview with Christopher Jefferies on the “Today” programme, which I will not dwell on, because we hope to have time to debate no win, no fee later this afternoon. At the end of the interview no one from the Ministry of Justice—not the Minister, not anyone else—was prepared to come forward. There was simply a statement to this effect: “We believe that deserving cases will still be able to be brought by no win, no fee, but not cases which are too costly or undeserving.”

[Mr Djanogly]

We are talking about legal aid.

[Mr Slaughter]

The presenter made a mistake—I hope the Minister is not making the same one—in relation to talking about legal aid, as presenters often do, but I assure the House that Mr Jefferies was clearly talking about conditional fee agreements and no win, no fee. The answer is—

[Mr Djanogly]

Yes, but we are talking about legal aid.

[Mr Slaughter]

I know the Minister does not want to hear this, but in relation to the director the point is that the Government wish to decide who has merit and who does not. That is the charge that the Government have to answer, and in this case they will do so only by ensuring the independence of the director.

Let me move on, because we are in the midst of a radical reform of the social welfare system. The Secretary of State for Work and Pensions has embarked on restructuring the way benefits are assessed, calculated and provided, local authorities have had budgets radically reduced, and a housing benefit cap is being introduced. In short, the benefits system is in a period of turmoil, and as a consequence the system of checks and balances on state decision making through the first-tier tribunals is also significantly under pressure, such that more staff are being taken on daily to deal with a growing number of appeals against decisions taken by Jobcentre Plus.

When in October last year the coalition produced its Green Paper on the reform of legal aid in England and Wales, we were shocked to see that there were cuts of £450 million, as defined in the latest impact assessment, and that they overwhelmingly came from civil legal aid. Things such as education, employment, welfare benefits, debt, housing matters and clinical negligence were taken out of scope, either in their entirety, as in the case of employment, welfare benefits and clinical negligence, or substantially, as in the case of debt, housing and education.

Means-testing will also change. The Government have proposed the abolition of capital passporting, by which those receiving certain income-based benefits are automatically eligible for legal aid, and the introduction of a new minimum capital contribution, a personal financial contribution towards legal costs.

The philosophy behind the cuts is explained in the Government’s impact assessment, in which they state:

“Legal aid may be regarded as a redistributive transfer of resources from taxpayers to those who are most needy, in relation to both the nature and merits of their case and also to their financial position… The Government may consider intervening if there are strong enough failures in the way markets operate…or if there are strong enough failures in existing government interventions”.

The amendments under discussion simply seek to address the Government’s failure to abide by those principles as set down in their own impact assessment. We are in a period of great need and of great changes to the system, and many meritorious cases are being referred to tribunal. By definition, the financial position of those requiring help with welfare benefits, employment law, debt and housing is necessarily the most precarious of any in society, and £70 a week is often all that stands between some of my constituents and utter destitution. They are in a desperate place.

Let me give the House one example, in relation to eligibility for disability living allowance. There are so many problems with the private contractor Atos that many seriously ill people are being judged fit for work. I leave aside operational issues, such as the fact that, according to its own website, 20% of Atos’s 141 medical assessment centres do not have wheelchair access, because, according to a newspaper report, one third of those refused DLA by Atos have appealed to the first-tier tribunals, and 39% of decisions have been overturned. Furthermore, the report states:

“The tribunals service…has had to double its capacity in the social security section to deal with the large number of appeals, recruiting an extra 170 paid medical panel members.”

In a letter to The Guardian, leading mental health charities and a senior consultant from the Royal College of Psychiatrists say:

“We’ve found that the prospect of incapacity benefit reassessment is causing huge amounts of distress and tragically there have already been cases where people have taken their own life following problems with changes to their benefits.”

These are not just economic issues; they profoundly affect the most vulnerable individuals.

The Government’s proposals will seriously damage access to justice for the most vulnerable in society, and their own impact assessment shows that there will be a disproportionate impact on women. Similarly, there is the potential for the cuts to impact disproportionately on black and ethnic minority clients and on those with disabilities.

That is something the Minister himself acknowledges. When it was put to him that groups with protected characteristics would be affected, he dismissed it, as only a Conservative Minister can, although the Liberal Democrats are getting there, by saying, “Well, that’s because they are disproportionately represented among the most vulnerable.” That is the logic of the Government’s case—“Because vulnerable people get legal aid, and we are cutting it, what do you expect to happen?” Those principles show an absolute absence of moral guidance.

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[Mrs Chapman]

I could not have put it better myself.

It is essential for people who are detained in police custody to have access to free, independent legal advice, not only because they are at their most vulnerable and because evidence obtained from people in custody may be inadmissible if they have not had access to independent legal advice, but because the presence of a solicitor makes a significant difference to the fairness of the investigation and the subsequent smooth progress of the case. It would therefore be utterly inappropriate to introduce a merit test that goes beyond the fact of arrest.

As for a means test, it would in practice deprive many people who failed it of their right to a lawyer, as they would not feel able to afford to pay privately. However, that is not the only reason for not introducing such a test. Applying it would inevitably introduce delay in the process and prevent the police from proceeding as quickly as they would wish. Clients who are in police custody will not have access to documents with which to verify their entitlements, and clients who do not pass the means test are in no position to instruct the solicitor of their choice on a private basis, because they cannot pick and choose and cannot argue about terms and conditions. In short, they will be completely disfranchised, and in the most terrifying position in which the average citizen can find himself.

It should be clear by now that we oppose the new clause. It is no good hoping and praying, as the Liberal Democrats keep doing, that it will be repealed in another place. I urge all Members to join us in the Lobby when we press it to a vote—unless, of course, the Minister has the sense to withdraw it.

[Mr Djanogly]

I welcome the hon. Member for Darlington (Mrs Chapman) on the occasion of her first outing at the Dispatch Box.

Most of what was said by the hon. Member for Hammersmith (Mr Slaughter) concerned the scope of civil legal aid, and was therefore not directly covered by the new clauses and amendments. It would have been good if he had discussed all the amendments that he had tabled, but he could not even do that. However, he certainly showed us once again that he knows how to spend taxpayers’ money, but not how to save it. He mentioned only one saving, when he said that he would have proceeded with criminal contract competition to save money rather than cutting social welfare law. Criminal competition in line with Labour’s model would have secured a very small reduction in the £180 million spent on police station advice—a reduction of only about 10%—which is not really enough. The hon. Gentleman will have to say where else he would make cuts. When Labour tried to address contracting, it failed, and it had to pull its contracting proposals in 2009.

Amendment 123, to which the hon. Member for Hammersmith spoke, is intended to alter the provisions in relation to the independence of the director of legal aid casework. That subject was debated substantially in Committee, but having heard the hon. Gentleman speak about it again, I still fail to understand the rationale behind the amendment, and, as I will explain, I consider it unnecessary. Let me briefly explain the role and key functions of the director, and also explain why I believe that independence is important and why it is already enshrined in the Bill.

Under the provisions, the Lord Chancellor is obliged to appoint a civil servant as a statutory office holder who will be responsible for making funding decisions in individual cases, as well as funding decisions in relation to exceptional case applications under the Bill. The statutory office holder is to be known as the director of legal aid casework. The Lord Chancellor is also obliged to provide civil servants to assist the director in carrying out their functions.

Under the new structural arrangements, clause 4 is potentially the most important provision. It ensures that the director has independence in making funding decisions, and is free from any political interference in making those decisions. That independence is enshrined specifically by subsection (4), which the hon. Member for Hammersmith wishes to delete, and which prohibits the Lord Chancellor from giving guidance or directions in individual cases. There are provisions in the clause that oblige the director to comply with directions given by the Lord Chancellor and to have regard to guidance issued by the Lord Chancellor, but crucially they cannot relate to individual cases.

The protection of the director against interference in individual cases is an important safeguard. The Bill already establishes the director in a way that maintains and protects the director’s independence of decision making. The director is a separate office from the Lord Chancellor created by statute. I therefore believe that the Bill already establishes a proper role for the director, free from any political interference in individual cases. I therefore urge the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.

[Mr Llwyd]

Will the Minister give way?

[Mr Djanogly]

I am sorry, but I do not have time to take interventions.

[Mr Llwyd]

rose—

[Mr Djanogly]

No, I will not give way.

[Mr Llwyd]

On a point of order, Mr Deputy Speaker. I want to ask the Minister whether progress has been made on introducing a clause that would allow an appeal against the granting of bail. A concession was given in Committee, and several Members have tabled amendments, but we will not reach them today. Will the Minister update us?

[Mr Djanogly]

I would dearly have loved to reach the provisions relating to bail, and I think the right hon. Gentleman should ask the official Opposition why we have not done so.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)]

Order. Clearly, that was not a point of order, and the Minister has now dealt with the point raised.

[Mr Djanogly]

I shall now turn to amendments 69, 70 and 71, tabled by the hon. Member for Stretford and Urmston (Kate Green), which address pensions and compensation.

Amendment 69 looks to ensure that Legal Services Commission employees transferring to the civil service are treated fairly. As drafted, the Bill and commitment between the Ministry of Justice and the LSC will achieve that. The Ministry is committed to ensuring that transferring staff are not put in a less favourable position than that of existing civil servants. The Bill protects LSC employees’ terms and conditions at the point of transfer, with the exception of those for pensions and compensation. The Bill also protects employees’ length of service.

When LSC employees transfer to the civil service, they will be enrolled as members of the premium section of the principal civil service pension scheme. The Government Actuary’s Department has determined that that scheme is “broadly comparable” to the existing LSC pension offer. Broad comparability is the standard defined by the Cabinet Office for the pension offer for staff transferred to organisations within the public sector. LSC staff will be able to choose whether to move any entitlement built up in the LSC scheme to the civil service pension scheme, or whether to leave it within the LSC scheme. Those arrangements have been communicated to LSC employees and their representatives. I will write to the hon. Lady on the TUPE point.

New clause 17 was moved by the hon. Member for Makerfield (Yvonne Fovargue). Her significant experience in the field became clear, as it also did in Committee. Many Members spoke to the new clause, including the hon. Members for Bolton South East (Yasmin Qureshi), for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) and for Walsall South (Valerie Vaz), the right hon. Member for Lewisham, Deptford (Joan Ruddock), my hon. Friends the Members for Eastbourne (Stephen Lloyd) and for Bradford East (Mr Ward) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Tom Brake).

The new clause is very broad and would widen the scope of legal aid and increase its cost at a time when we are seeking to focus funding on the highest priority cases. It would have the effect of bringing into scope areas which are not covered in schedule 1—and which we intend no longer to fund—by virtue of their interconnected and complex nature. We have undertaken a comprehensive consultation on legal aid with published impact and equality assessments, and we have received almost 5,000 responses. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton and Wallington pointed out, cases will arise where it will be difficult to separate two or more legal issues in terms of funding. Under the current legal aid scheme, there are provisions in the funding code to cover mixed cases, where the case is partly in and partly out of scope. Those provisions allow funding of the whole case in certain circumstances, and in others they allow funding for aspects of the case. I am pleased to confirm to my right hon. Friend that paragraph 39 of schedule 1 ensures similar appropriate provision in the new scheme. We consider that that approach provides a more proportionate means of dealing with interconnected matters than the new clause proposed by the hon. Member for Makerfield.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Slaughter]

I was not talking about the Minister; I was talking about the Bill. I am not surprised that the Minister’s PPS is embarrassed by the Bill, after sitting through our proceedings in Committee.

The common link between parts 1 and 2 of the Bill is the destruction of access to justice in a way that we have not seen since the introduction of legal aid by a Labour Government after the second world war. The insurance industry is being given one of the biggest pay-offs in history which, as we know from experience, will go into the pockets of their directors and shareholders. While other aspects of this Bill display the startling incompetence of this Government, none shows their intent more truly than the provisions in part 2, which would give the whip hand to large public and private corporations, while taking rights away from ordinary people. What is the point in having rights if they cannot be enforced?

I ask the Liberal Democrats to look at amendment 21, which would deal with cases such as Trafigura and pleural plaques, and amendment 163, which would deal with cases such as that of Milly Dowler, and join us in the Lobby tonight.

[Mr Djanogly]

Amendments 21, 22, 72, 163, 164 and 165 all seek to undermine a fundamental element of the package of reform of civil litigation funding and costs based on the report prepared on behalf of the judiciary by Sir Rupert Jackson and now included in this Bill—the abolition of recoverability of success fees and after-the-event insurance premiums. I must say that I am rather perplexed by the amendments as in Committee the hon. Member for Hammersmith (Mr Slaughter) agreed that the intention of part 2 is

“perfectly sound, and it is one with which we have a great deal of sympathy.”––[Official Report, Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Public Bill Committee, 13 September 2011; c. 501.]

I will also deal with new clause 39, which is on the related but slightly separate matter of recoverable costs for low-value road traffic accident claims.

It is worth emphasising, as the Justice Secretary has just said, that we are not proposing to end conditional fee agreements or no win, no fee deals. What we are addressing is the substantial legal costs that go to lawyers under the current no win, no fee regime. Our reforms are designed to make these legal costs more proportionate, while enabling meritorious claims to be brought. This applies equally to defamation and privacy claims and multinational claims as to other categories of case, but it is worth reminding ourselves of some of the disproportionate costs that have arisen and that emphasise the need for our reforms across the board.

[Chris Bryant]

The Minister referred specifically to defamation and privacy cases. The problem is that in the vast majority of cases—and in every single instance in privacy cases—the awards are so small that if there is no success fee, it will be completely uneconomic for a lawyer to come forward with a CFA. That may not be the Minister’s intention—I take him at his word—but the effect will be to stop CFAs in libel, defamation and privacy cases.

[Mr Djanogly]

In some cases, where the balance is against, that perhaps should be the case. In Naomi Campbell’s defamation case against the Daily Mirror, she received damages of £3,500 but the total costs exceeded £1 million.

In relation to clinical negligence claims, which can of course include substantial damages in catastrophic injury cases, lawyers’ costs are about half of the total damages that are paid out. In 2009-10, for example, the NHS paid out £297 million in damages and £121 million in legal costs, over half of which were no win, no fee costs. One of the leading no win, no fee cases against a multinational company is that against Trafigura. In that case, the claimants’ legal costs were more than £100 million, but the damages recovered were only £30 million. As a result, 30,000 claimants in the Ivory Coast received damages of an average of only £1,000.

[Lisa Nandy (Wigan) (Lab)]

Will the Minister give way?

[Mr Djanogly]

I will not—[Hon. Members: “Go on!”] I am afraid that I do not have time to give way.

It is these high legal costs which led to Sir Rupert Jackson’s review. Specifically in relation to defamation and privacy, it is these high legal costs which led to the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw), when he was Justice Secretary, seeking to introduce similar changes to those we are now proposing to reduce excessive legal costs, but he mistakenly limited them only to defamation and privacy cases. In effect, that is the exact opposite of what the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) proposes in his amendment. The sands seem to have been shifting dramatically in the Labour camp on this issue.

New clause 39, tabled by the right hon. Member for Blackburn, would reduce the amount of fixed recoverable fees on the pre-action protocol for low-value road traffic accidents in the light of the impact of the ban on referral fees. The Department is now reviewing the situation, but to achieve this outcome does not require primary legislation. Instead, a reduction can be implemented through changes to the Civil Procedure Rules. I can give the commitment that we are looking at this. Indeed, my officials plan to consult on appropriate changes to the level of recoverable costs, and any changes will be placed before the Committee for approval. I can also tell him that I do not intend to go to all the trouble of stopping referral fees being paid to claims management companies, only to see those same fees staying with the lawyers rather than going back to consumers in lower insurance premiums or prices in the shops.

[Mr Jack Straw (Blackburn) (Lab)]

I am grateful to the Minister for those undertakings.

[Mr Djanogly]

I shall take each amendment in turn. Amendment 21 would remove clause 41, the effect of which is to amend the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 so that success fees under a conditional fee agreement will no longer be recoverable from a losing party in any civil proceedings. Amendment 22 would remove clause 43. I should make it clear that we have listened carefully to specific concerns about the abolition of recoverability of after-the-event insurance premiums in clinical negligence claims and the impact it would have on funding expert reports. Such reports, which can be expensive, are often necessary in establishing whether there is a case for commencing proceedings, which raises particular issues if recoverability of ATE insurance is abolished. In responding to these concerns, clause 43 provides, by way of exception, for the recoverability of premiums in respect of ATE insurance taken out to cover the cost of expert reports in clinical negligence cases.

Amendment 72 would remove clause 44, which abolishes the recoverability of the costs incurred by membership organisations, such as trade unions, of insuring themselves against the risk of paying costs to another party in the event of losing a claim. I strongly believe that the abolition of recoverability should apply equally to the arrangements for membership organisations in order to maintain a level playing field. Amendments 150 and 151 seek to allow the recoverability of success fees and ATE insurance premiums from a losing party in certain claims for damages against a person who carries on business in more than one country or who owns one or more businesses carried on in more than one country or in different countries.

[Lisa Nandy]

Will the Minister give way?

[Mr Djanogly]

We understand that these amendments seek to protect the rights of individuals—[Hon. Members: “Go on. Give way.”] Oh, all right. How can I resist?

[Lisa Nandy]

I thank the Minister for finally recognising just how strongly so many of us on both sides of the House feel about this issue and how unfortunate it is that we have not been able to make the case today. Unfortunately, we have not had sufficient answers to make Members on both sides of the House feel that these cases will be able to continue. Will he therefore agree to meet a cross-party group of us before the Bill is sent to the other place, so that we can make at least make our case before the Bill becomes law?

[Mr Djanogly]

The hon. Lady will be pleased to hear that I have met the Corporate Responsibility Coalition—CORE—and the solicitors who acted for Trafigura. I have acted for a number of people, and of course I shall be prepared and happy to receive additional representations from her.

We understand that the amendments seek to protect the rights of individuals in developing countries to claim damages against large multinational companies, but the amendments go much wider than that, and would provide that a losing defendant should pay the success fee and ATE insurance premium based on whether it is a multinational company, regardless of the nature of the claim or status of the claimant.

Given the concerns that I have been raising in relation to cases brought by claimants in developing countries, I shall concentrate my response on those cases. The amendments are neither necessary nor appropriate. The Government believe that it will still be possible to bring claims against multinational companies, once our CFA reforms are implemented, but—this is one of the major reasons for our reforms overall—we believe that the costs involved will be more proportionate to the sums in issue. What the proposals in the Bill seek to address is not the validity of the claims, but the iniquity of a system that can allow such disproportionate costs. It is worth emphasising that the current system of recoverable success fees and recoverable ATE insurance premiums, with the consequences for high civil costs, is not seen in any other jurisdiction in the world. CFAs will continue to be available, but the Bill also extends the funding options. The Government seek to allow damages-based agreements to be used for the first time to fund such claims. Group actions in particular are suited to DBAs, as legal representatives may recover their fees as a percentage of the damages awarded to each successful claimant.

Amendments 163, 164 and 165 seek to ensure that success fees continue to be recoverable in defamation and privacy claims. The Government are aware of concerns about access to justice and the ability of those with modest means to pursue claims, often against powerful organisations. I am aware that there are slight definitional differences, which I will not go into. However, all hon. Members will be aware of one of the most high-profile cases, involving the Dowler family, who were successful in their claim against News International.

Education and Training (Young People with Autism)

Jonathan Djanogly Excerpts

Tuesday 1st November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

The short answer to the hon. Gentleman is that it is for Members to take responsibility for their own interests and, as necessary, if they think it appropriate, seek advice from the Registrar, and there is of course an obligation upon Ministers, of which the Minister will be well aware, to comply with the ministerial code, but beyond that no special comment needs to be made on the matter. It is perfectly proper for the Government to decide which Minister should take the proceedings on the Floor of the House.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Mr Jonathan Djanogly)]

Further to that point of order, Mr Speaker. Given that my financial interests have today once again been regurgitated by the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull East (Karl Turner), and given that they formed the subject of a complaint by his colleague the hon. Member for Bassetlaw (John Mann), I think it is wrong of him, almost to the point of being misleading, not to mention that the Cabinet Secretary found, and informed his hon. Friend of the fact, that I had declared my relevant interests, had not acted in conflict of interest and had acted in the public interest. Will the hon. Gentleman now acknowledge that?

[Mr Speaker]

The Minister has put the position, including new evidence, very clearly on the record. However, points of order cannot be the occasion for a debate, which would be wrong. The Minister has clarified the position, Members will have heard it—

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Jonathan Djanogly Excerpts

Tuesday 1st November 2011 Commons Chamber

Brought up, and read the First time.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Mr Jonathan Djanogly)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Amendment (a), after first ‘paid’ in (1)(a), insert

‘will be paid, has made an agreement to be paid,’.

Amendment (b), after ‘pays’ in (1)(b), insert

‘will pay, has made an agreement to pay’.

Amendment (c), after first ‘paid’ in (2)(b), insert

‘will be paid, has made an agreement to be paid,’.

Amendment (e), at end of (4)(b), insert—

‘(2A) A breach of the provisions of this section shall be an offence, punishable on summary conviction by a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or on indictment for a term of imprisonment not exceeding two years, or a fine, or both.’.

Government new clause 19—Effect of the rules against referral fees—

‘(1) The relevant regulator must ensure that it has appropriate arrangements for monitoring and enforcing the restrictions imposed on regulated persons by section [Rules against referral fees].

(2) A regulator may make rules for the purposes of subsection (1).

(3) The rules may in particular provide for the relevant regulator to exercise in relation to anything done in breach of that section any powers (subject to subsections (5) and (6)) that the regulator would have in relation to anything done by the regulated person in breach of another restriction.

(4) Where the relevant regulator is the Financial Services Authority, section [Regulation by the FSA] applies instead of subsections (1) to (3) (and (7) to (9)).

(5) A breach of section [Rules against referral fees]—

(a) does not make a person guilty of an offence, and

(b) does not give rise to a right of action for breach of statutory duty.

(6) A breach of section [Rules against referral fees] does not make anything void or unenforceable, but a contract to make or pay for a referral or arrangement in breach of that section is unenforceable.

(7) Subsection (8) applies in a case where—

(a) a referral of prescribed legal business has been made by or to a regulated person, or

(b) a regulated person has made an arrangement as mentioned in section [Rules against referral fees](2)(a),

and it appears to the regulator that a payment made to or by the regulated person may be a payment for the referral or for making the arrangement (a “referral fee”).

(8) Rules under subsection (2) may provide for the payment to be treated as a referral fee unless the regulated person shows that the payment was made—

(a) as consideration for the provision of services, or

(b) for another reason,

and not as a referral fee.

(9) For the purposes of provision made by virtue of subsection (8) a payment that would otherwise be regarded as consideration for the provision of services of any description may be treated as a referral fee if it exceeds the amount specified in relation to services of that description in regulations made by the Lord Chancellor.’.

Amendment (a) to new clause 19, leave out subsection 5.

Amendment (b), leave out from ‘services’ in (8)(a) to end of paragraph (b) and insert

‘but only where the consideration was proportionate and reasonable in the circumstances.’.

Government new clause 20—Regulation by the FSA.

Government new clause 21—Regulators and regulated persons.

Government new clause 22—Referral fees: regulations.

Government amendment 139.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Djanogly]

New clauses 18 to 22 seek to prohibit the payment and receipt of referral fees in personal injury cases by regulated persons, namely solicitors, barristers, claim management companies and insurers.

I pay tribute at the outset to the work of the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) in pursuing the case for a ban on referral fees. I know that there are some differences between us about the detail of how we should implement the ban—we will come to his amendments in due course—but those differences of detail should not obscure our agreement in principle on tackling this important issue. I acknowledge his efforts in this regard.

I must also mention the consistent campaign by the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir Alan Beith) as Chair of the Justice Committee, who has also been a very keen supporter of the ban. I note that last week his Committee formally welcomed our commitment to the ban, which will be implemented by these clauses. I should also acknowledge the work of the Transport Committee, chaired by the hon. Member for Liverpool, Riverside (Mrs Ellman), before whom I was privileged to appear last month.

My right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State for Justice announced the Government’s intention to ban the payment and receipt of referral fees in personal injury cases by way of a written ministerial statement to the House on 9 September 2011.

I strongly believe that the current arrangements under which lawyers and others are able to pay and receive fees for referring work have led to both higher costs and the growth of an industry that pursues claimants for profit. By introducing the new clause, the Government are taking decisive and much needed action to remove these incentives.

Right hon. and hon. Members will be aware that Lord Justice Jackson recommended that referral fees should be banned as part of his comprehensive package of recommendations to make the costs of the civil litigation more proportionate and this recommendation was echoed by Lord Young in his report “Common Sense Common Safety”. The Bill already includes provisions to implement the other key elements of those recommendations. The referral fees ban under our new clause will complement the wider Jackson reform already in the Bill by further reducing the costs of personal injury litigation and deterring frivolous or unnecessary claims from being pursued in the courts.

The new clause creates a regulatory offence for any breach of the prohibition. It will be for the appropriate regulators, for example the Law Society, the Financial Services Authority or the claims management regulator, to enforce the prohibition. The regulators will also be responsible for taking appropriate action against regulated persons for any breaches. We have thought carefully about how to ensure that all the main players, including insurers, are captured by the ban, which is why there is a separate clause, new clause 20, giving the Treasury powers to make regulations allowing the FSA to enforce the ban under its existing regulatory powers.

There have been calls from some people, but not most people, for the payment and receipt of referral fees to be made a criminal offence. Not least among those who have called for that is the right hon. Member for Blackburn, who has tabled amendment (e) to that effect. We considered the matter carefully but believe that creating a criminal offence would be a very blunt instrument in this case. One would have to prove beyond reasonable doubt that consideration had changed hands for the referral of a potential claimant, but the grounds for determining whether something was or was not a referral fee could be blurred. It would be very difficult to convict in many cases on the basis of the complexity of those arrangements. That is why we consider a regulatory offence to be more appropriate, whereby the principle of what is happening can be looked at by the regulator and a view can be taken.

I am conscious that a criminal offence would impose additional costs on the police and the courts in investigating and enforcing a ban. I believe that a regulatory prohibition covering all the main players in the sector, including lawyers, claims management companies and insurers, is the most appropriate and effective response to the issue. I am confident that the industry regulators are best placed to investigate and enforce the regulatory ban.

[Sir Alan Beith]

As my hon. Friend has indicated, I strongly support the action he is taking, but is it not the case that in many of those circumstances a criminal offence may well have been committed by way of a breach of the Data Protection Act 1998? The problem then is that custodial sentences are not available for someone who is doing that on a large scale and making a great deal of money by releasing personal information and committing a criminal offence.

[Mr Djanogly]

My right hon. Friend makes a good point. It is not one that is covered by the Bill, but it is something that the Government are looking into, and I hope that there will be further developments on that in due course.

[Mr Straw]

I thank the Minister for the generous compliment he paid me, for which I am most grateful. There are plenty of situations relating to financial institutions in the widest sense when conduct might be the subject of a regulatory breach enforced by the regulators, but in more severe cases it could also be a criminal offence. It is a matter of belt and braces. Frankly, I do not understand why he is suggesting that those are alternatives when one complements the other.

[Mr Djanogly]

The reason is that criminalisation would be too blunt an instrument. If we take the example of the straight payment of a fee for a referral, I can see how straight criminalisation would work, but we should appreciate that when that was last banned in 2004 it was a weak provision through which a coach and horses could be driven. What if an insurance company provides insurance to a solicitor in payment for referrals, rather than a straight fee? What if a trade union gives its cheap work to a firm of solicitors in consideration for the solicitors getting its better work? What if a claims management company provides a variety of services to a solicitor in payment for a referral? The point I am making is that the circumstances could be very varied and complex and the straight criminal option would not be appropriate. It would be the principle that counts and it would have to be a regulator that looks to the principle.

We are primarily concerned with removing incentives under the current system with regard to personal injury claims, which is why we are banning referral fees in that area. However, the Lord Chancellor may in future extend by regulation the prohibition on referral fees to other types of claim and legal services and other providers of legal services should the need arise and if the case is made for such an extension.

[Kate Green]

Is the Minister not concerned that that might introduce an element of uncertainty? Although I note what he says about the possibility of extending the provisions to other structures in future, is he not aware that alternative business structures will now be set up by large companies to get around the provisions? How will he address that?

[Mr Djanogly]

Alternative business structures will be set up by the Solicitors Regulation Authority, probably before or just after the end of this year, so the hon. Lady makes an important point. At that stage, claims management companies will be able to purchase solicitors, and vice versa, which means that it would indeed be possible, as we discussed in the Transport Committee, for a claims management company to own a solicitor and effectively act as the advertising arm of a firm of solicitors. However, the important difference is that the claims management companies will then be regulated by the SRA, which will give consumers a significant amount of comfort.

Referral fees are one of the symptoms of the compensation culture in this country. The Government are determined to put an end to them while at the same time addressing the underlying cause of recoverability of no win, no fee success fees.

[Mr Andy Slaughter (Hammersmith) (Lab)]

Following what my right hon. Friend the shadow Secretary of State for Justice said earlier this afternoon, I rise to discuss proposals that have not been given due scrutiny in Parliament. We are all aware that the Government were bounced into taking action on referral fees only by the sustained campaigning by my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw). In their haste to cover up their inaction and disregard of the abuses of the insurance industry, they have failed to consult on their proposals, which are incompetent, ineffective and will lead to problems further down the line. Indeed, it was reported this week that a judicial review has already been launched citing that lack of consultation.

Referral fees are paid by one party to another in exchange for what are essentially sale leads. They are analogous to brokers’ fees, commission for salespeople, marketing agreements or, in the most basic sense, advertising, because each of these represents part of the cost of sales. Every non-monopolistic industry has a cost of sales. Let me take the example of the insurance industry, an industry with which the Minister has more than a passing familiarity. Admiral is the UK’s leading specialist motor insurance company. Last year it received net insurance premium revenue of £288 million, but its total net revenue was £639 million, part of which was made with referral fees. It spent £151 million on the acquisition of insurance contracts and other marketing costs, including brokers’ costs, paying insurance websites and expensive advertising. Those costs drive up premium costs and the desire to make profit also drives up premium prices—Admiral made £283 million in profit last year on its net revenue of £639 million. That is how it works in the insurance industry.

It works in a similar way when law firms pay independent brokers, some of which are known as claims management companies, another area with which the Minister has more than a passing familiarity. They will pay referral fees in order to get leads for their practice. The lawyers often do this because, frankly, they are not very good at sales, marketing or advertising. However, the problems arise in the behaviour that that encourages. Although there are reputable and decent claims management companies out there that bring together those who want help with those who can provide it, there are also many claims farmers, often based overseas, that abuse the system, send unsolicited spam to people’s e-mail accounts and mobile phones and abuse their data.

It is right to deal with people who act in such a way, but the claims management regulator, which until a few weeks ago was the Minister, but which I understand is now the Secretary of State, has proven singularly unable to do so. An internal review of claims management regulation from the Ministry of Justice, dated 25 October 2011—just last week—states:

“It is evident that many of the more objectionable practices of Claims Management Companies such as cold calling in person, unauthorised marketing in hospitals and using exaggerated marketing claims have been reined in as a result of action taken under CMR.”

Nothing could make clearer what delusions have set in with claims management regulated by the Minister, because we all know from personal experience that the opposite is true and that such abuse is still out there at large and, if anything, is increasing. Our constituents are harassed by claims farmers, and their objectionable messages, but the Department that he has mismanaged for the past year and a half believes it is doing an excellent job. That is why we must take corrective action.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Alan Beith]

Like the hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones), I had coal mines in my constituency. There were three working mines there, and I saw evidence of the scandal that he described. It was absolutely dreadful in many ways. Today, I want to ask for clarification of the Government’s intentions in two areas. One relates to the broadening of this issue beyond personal injury. New clause 18 provides for the Lord Chancellor to make regulations specifying wider ranges of legal businesses. I hope that there is a clear intention on the Government’s part, probably involving consultation, to move on to all the sectors in which referral fees have the potential to distort or damage competition or to undermine the position of the consumer. I would like a clear indication that the Government are going to examine a number of other areas.

Secondly, the Minister was very helpful earlier on the question of custodial sentences for breaches of the Data Protection Act, and I hope that that means that the Government have moved on from their position of saying, “We’ll have to wait until the end of the Leveson inquiry.” That represented a complete misunderstanding of the situation. The question of custodial sentences for data protection offences is not primarily about the issues that have been raised in the Leveson inquiry about the media; it is about the everyday circumstances of our constituents whose personal information is abused by the organisations that hold it. That matter ought not to have to wait until the completion of an inquiry into a wider range of issues. I hope that the Minister’s earlier helpfulness will be repeated in implementing a measure on which the House has already decided—namely, that there should be a custodial penalty in such cases.

[Mr Djanogly]

We have had a good, far-ranging debate this afternoon. Given that another important debate needs to be completed by 8 o’clock, I am sorry to say that I shall have to make my way quickly through the points that have been raised. I am pleased to hear at least a grudging agreement in principle with our ban on referral fees from the hon. Member for Hammersmith (Mr Slaughter). I thank my right hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Tom Brake) and all the other right hon. and hon. Members for their support for our desire to implement the ban. I am pleased that the debate today has been about how that should be done, not about whether it should be done.

The hon. Member for Hammersmith asked why we had not consulted on banning referral fees, and I can tell him that Lord Justice Jackson made 109 recommendations, and it would not have been practical to consult on them all at once. It also made good sense to await the outcome of the Legal Services Board’s work in this area. Many respondents to our consultation on implementing Lord Justice Jackson’s recommendations included their views on referral fees. Those views, along with the work undertaken by the LSB and the Transport Committee, have been carefully considered. The hon. Gentleman clearly raised some serious issues relating to the regulation of claims management companies, but they were not directly relevant to the Bill. I must point out that, in the past year, the Ministry of Justice has cancelled 349 authorisations of CMCs, whereas in the last year of the Labour Government, it cancelled only 35.

The hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) asked a number of important questions. If he does not mind, I will write to him about those issues. I can say, however, that under the Compensation Act 2006, it is an offence to provide regulated claims management services unless authorised or exempt. The hon. Gentleman will not be surprised to learn that the exemption applies to trade unions, and that is part of the problem that he rightly highlighted. I was present at the debate that he held on that subject several years ago.

The hon. Member for Hammersmith covered several other matters, but he essentially spoke to tomorrow’s debate, and we will deal with those issues then. My right hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton and Wallington asked about some important aspects relating to the consumer. The Chairman of the Transport Select Committee, the hon. Member for Liverpool, Riverside (Mrs Ellman), rightly mentioned that share premiums had risen by 40% in the last year alone. This is of course a matter of concern, and we have discussed it with the Association of British Insurers. It has said that if the proposals are effected with the other changes to recoverability of success fees in after-the-event insurance, it would hope to see a fall in insurance premiums. I certainly hope that that is a credible position.

As I said at the outset, there is broad support across the House for a ban on referral fees, although there is some disagreement on how best to implement the ban. The right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) spoke to his amendments with typical passion, but I would like to set out briefly why the Government cannot support them. Amendments (a) to (c) to new clause 18 seek to capture within the prohibition all arrangements to pay or receive referral fees, even when a payment has not yet been made. These amendments might have been tabled in support of his amendment to make the payment and receipt of referral fees a criminal offence. However, I am concerned that capturing an agreement to pay referral fees when payment might not have occurred would be very difficult to enforce. A solicitor’s accounts, for example, might well show that a particular payment had been made that could, on the face of it, be a referral fee. However, it is unlikely that agreements, which in some cases might be no more than verbal agreements, could be so readily identified without time-consuming investigation. In any event, we do not think that it is necessary to provide for this eventuality, first because such agreements would be unenforceable under subsection (6) of new clause 19 and, secondly, because whatever might be agreed, the payment of the referral fee would still be prohibited. So, in practice, it is unlikely that a party would enter into an agreement to pay a referral fee when payment would be a breach of the prohibition and the agreement would not be enforceable.

I have already dealt, in moving the new clause, with the arguments against amendment (e), which seeks to create a new criminal offence. I should just reiterate that the Government are fully committed to ensuring that the ban will work effectively.

[Mr Straw]

When I made my point about the banning of referral fees being backed by the criminal law, the Lord Chancellor did not say that he agreed with me, but he did say, on 13 September:

“We are now considering the way in which to put this into practice, but it is likely to be in the form recommended”—[Official Report, 13 September 2011; Vol. 532, c. 879.]

—that is, a criminal prohibition as well as a regulatory one. He appeared to have an open mind about that, so what has changed since then?

[Mr Djanogly]

I have just confirmed with my right hon. Friend the Lord Chancellor that, in the next sentence of that quote, he said that he had not committed to creating a criminal offence.

I can assure the right hon. Member for Blackburn that we have thought long and hard about how to achieve this, and I am aware of the concerns raised in the Justice Committee’s recent report on referral fees and the theft of personal data. The Committee’s Chairman made the point again today that the penalties for breaching section 55 of the Data Protection Act were not sufficient. The Government are keeping the question of whether to introduce custodial penalties for section 55 offences under review, and we will respond to the Justice Committee’s report in due course. However, the issue of how to deal with people such as rogue motor garage workers or nurses who are breaking the law by breaching the Data Protection Act is separate from that of how to introduce a new ban on regulated bodies to prevent them from paying referral fees, which they are currently permitted to do. I strongly believe that our ban, which will stop lawyers, claims management companies and insurance companies from paying and receiving referral fees, will remove the incentives for selling personal data from the whole system. That is because there will be no one for the rogue garage, for instance, to sell the data to, as all the people in the system who can make any profit out of handling claims will be prevented from paying referral fees. My hon. Friend the Member for East Hampshire (Damian Hinds) well set out the complexity involved in this instance.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill (Programme) (No. 2)

Jonathan Djanogly Excerpts

Monday 31st October 2011 Commons Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Mr Jonathan Djanogly)]

I beg to move,

That the Order of 29 June 2011 (Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill (Programme)) be varied as follows:

1. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Order shall be omitted.

2. Proceedings on Consideration and Third Reading shall be concluded in three days.

3. Proceedings on Consideration shall be taken in the order shown in the first column of the following Table.

4. The proceedings shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the times specified in the second column of the Table.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Djanogly]

The right hon. Member for Tooting (Sadiq Khan) mentioned various changes that have been proposed by the Government and the longer Bill that has resulted. We are not denying that, and that is why we have provided the third day. It was good to see the right hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark (Simon Hughes) recognising that. The right hon. Member for Tooting says, “Any time, any place,” and that is today, Tuesday and Wednesday.

Question put.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Jonathan Djanogly Excerpts

Monday 31st October 2011 Commons Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Mr Jonathan Djanogly)]

I beg to move amendment 10, page 99, line 11, leave out from ‘where’ to first ‘for’ in line 13 and insert ‘—

(a) the services are provided to the individual, or

(b) the individual has died and the services are provided—

(i) to the individual’s personal representative, or

(ii) ’.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Government amendment 11.

Amendment 91, page 103, line 3, after ‘family’, insert ‘or other intimate’.

Amendment 93, page 103, line 4, at end insert

‘or where an allegation is made that B has been abused by A or is at risk of being abused by A’.

Amendment 23, page 103, leave out lines 35 to 38 and insert—

‘“abuse” means any incident of threatening behaviour, violence or abuse (psychological, physical, sexual, financial or emotional) between adults who are or have been intimate partners or family members, regardless of gender or sexuality.’.

Amendment 92, page 103, line 35, leave out ‘physical or mental abuse’ and insert

‘any incident of threatening behaviour, violence or abuse (whether physical, mental, financial or emotional)’.

Amendment 74, page 104, line 23, at end insert—

‘(10) For the purposes of this paragraph, evidence that A has been abused by B or is at risk of being abused by B may consist of one or more of the following (without limitation)—

(a) a relevant court conviction or police caution;

(b) a relevant court order (including without notice, ex parte, interim or final orders) including a non-molestation order, occupation order, forced marriage protection order or other protective injunction;

(c) evidence of relevant criminal proceedings for an offence concerning domestic violence or a police report confirming attendance at an incident resulting from domestic violence;

(d) evidence that a victim has been referred to a Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conference (as a high-risk victim of domestic violence) and a plan has been put in place to protect that victim from violence by the other party;

(e) a finding of fact in the family courts of domestic violence by the other party giving rise to the risk of harm to the victim;

(f) a medical report from a doctor at a UK hospital confirming that the applicant has injuries consistent with being a victim of domestic violence, such injuries not being limited to physical injuries;

(g) a letter from a General Medical Council registered general practitioner confirming that he or she has examined the applicant and is satisfied that the applicant had injuries consistent with those of a victim of domestic violence;

(h) an undertaking given to a court that the perpetrator of the abuse will not approach the applicant who is the victim of the abuse;

(i) a letter from a social services department confirming its involvement in connection with domestic violence;

(j) a letter of support or a report from a domestic violence support organisation; or

(k) other well-founded documentary evidence of abuse (such as from a counsellor, midwife, school or witnesses).

(11) For the avoidance of doubt, no time limit shall operate in relation to any evidence supporting an application for civil legal services under paragraph 10.’.

Amendment 94, page 104, line 25, leave out ‘(“A”)’.

Amendment 95, page 104, line 27, leave out ‘other than A’.

Amendment 96, page 104, line 39, at end insert—

‘(1A) Civil legal services provided to an adult in relation to proceedings for financial relief in respect of a child who is the subject of an order or procedure mentioned in sub-paragraph (1).’.

Amendment 97, page 104, line 39, at end insert—

‘(1B) Civil legal services provided in relation to proceedings in which the court is considering giving a direction under section 37 of the Children Act 1989 (direction to authority, where care or supervision order may be appropriate, to investigate child’s circumstances).’.

Amendment 98, page 104, line 39, at end insert—

‘(1C) Civil legal services provided in relation to proceedings arising out of a family relationship involving a child in respect of whom a court has given a direction under section 37 of the Children Act 1989 (direction to authority, where care or supervision order may be appropriate, to investigate child’s circumstances); and “family relationship” has the same meaning for the purposes of this sub-paragraph as it has for the purposes of paragraph 10.’.

Amendment 99, page 105, line 42, leave out ‘to a child’.

Amendment 100, page 105, line 43, leave out first ‘the’ and insert ‘a’.

Amendment 101, page 106, line 1 , leave out first ‘the’ and insert ‘a’.

Amendment 102, page 106, line 3 , leave out first ‘the’ and insert ‘a’.

Amendment 83, page 108, line 44 , leave out sub-paragraphs (5), (6) and (7).

Government amendments 55 to 59.

Amendment 113, page 112, line 5 , at end insert—

‘Immigration: victims of domestic violence and indefinite leave to remain

24A (1) Civil legal services provided to an individual (“I”) in relation to an application by the individual for indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom or a claim by the individual to a right to reside in the United Kingdom, on the grounds that—

(a) I was given leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom for a limited period as the partner of another individual present and settled in the United Kingdom, or had the right to reside in the United Kingdom as the partner of another individual, and

(b) I’s relationship with the other individual broke down permanently as a result of the abuse of I by an associated person.

General exclusions

(2) Sub-paragraph (1) is subject to the exclusions in Parts 2 and 3 of this Schedule.

Specific exclusions

(3) The services described in sub-paragraph (1) do not include attendance at an interview conducted on behalf of the Secretary of State with a view to reaching a decision on an application.

Definitions

(4) For the purposes of this paragraph, one individual is a partner of another if—

(a) they are married to each other,

(b) they are civil partners of each other, or

(c) they are cohabitants.

(5) In this paragraph—

“abuse” means any incident of threatening behaviour, violence or abuse (psychological, physical, sexual, financial or emotional) between adults who are or have been intimate partners or family members, regardless of gender or sexuality.

“associated person”, in relation to an individual, means a person who is associated with the individual within the meaning of section 62 of the Family Law Act 1996;

“cohabitant” has the same meaning as in Part 4 of the Family Law Act 1996 (see section 62 of that Act);

“indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom” means leave to remain in the United Kingdom under the Immigration Act 1971 which is not limited as to duration;

“present and settled in the United Kingdom” has the same meaning as in the rules made under section 3(2) of the Immigration Act 1971;

“right to reside” means a right of residence established under Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and the Council 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC.’.

Government amendments 60 and 61.

Amendment 145, page 112, line 11, at end insert—

‘(1A) Civil legal services provided to an individual for a matter arising out of any rule laid down under section 1(4) of the Immigration Act 1971 making provision for family members to enter or remain in the United Kingdom as the family member of a refugee or beneficiary of humanitarian protection.’.

Government amendments 62, 13, 14, 63, and 15 to 18.

Amendment 103, page 7, line 35, at end insert—

‘(7) But the Director must determine that an individual qualifies for civil legal services where the services relate to a matter falling within paragraph 10 of Schedule 1 and—

(a) the individual has been admitted to a refuge for persons suffering from domestic abuse;

(b) the individual has obtained medical or other professional services relating to the consequences of domestic abuse, or

(c) an assessment for the purpose of possible mediation of a family dispute has concluded that the parties need not engage in mediation as a result of domestic abuse,

and in this subsection “domestic abuse” means abuse of the kind to which paragraph 10(1) of Schedule 1 relates’.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Djanogly]

This rather substantial group of Government and Opposition amendments concerns legal aid for family and immigration matters, including domestic violence issues, as well as certain technical amendments to the Bill. I shall begin with a group of technical Government amendments, before moving on to the family and immigration ones.

Government amendments 10, 11, 13 and 14 amend paragraphs 3 and 33 of part 1 of schedule 1 in order to ensure that funding can be granted to the personal representative of a deceased child, vulnerable adult or victim of a sexual offence who wishes to pursue a civil claim for the benefit of the estate. The amendments are necessary because the Bill, as currently drafted, would limit legal aid to the child, vulnerable adult or victim personally. Where that individual dies, it is clearly right that legal aid should remain available to that individual’s personal representative to pursue a relevant claim on behalf of their estate. It is not necessary to make equivalent changes to other paragraphs in part 1 because relevant paragraphs do not exclude claims being brought by a personal representative. For other paragraphs, the case would either fall away with the death of a claimant or there would be another party who would be equally able to bring the claim.

Government amendments 15 to 18 relate to vetting and barring under section 4 of the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 and applications relating to disqualification orders under sections 31 and 34 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000. The amendments are technical and seek to ensure that funding for advocacy is provided in the relevant tribunal or court for these types of cases. In our consultation paper, “Proposals for the Reform of Legal Aid in England and Wales”, we announced our intention to retain civil legal services for section 4 of the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act, which provides for a right of appeal to the upper tribunal against a decision to keep someone on a barred list from regulated activity relating to children or adults. The consultation paper provided that we would continue to fund those types of appeals to the upper tribunal on the basis that inclusion on a list would have a significant and lasting impact on the life and livelihood of an appellant who might have been included on the list in error.

[Mr Jim Cunningham (Coventry South) (Lab)]

Has the Minister made an assessment of the amendments’ impact on organisations in Coventry such as the citizens advice bureau and the law centre?

[Mr Djanogly]

I expect the amendments to be generally well received.

The Bill currently refers to funding for advocacy being available in the first tier tribunal, and amendments 17 and 18 correct that position by making available funding for advocacy for appeals to the upper tribunal. Amendments 15 and 16 serve a similar purpose but in relation to sections 31 and 34 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act. Appeals under section 31 are to the Court of Appeal, rather than the first tier tribunal, and funding for advocacy for such appeals is already covered by paragraph 2 of part 3 of schedule 1. Appeals under section 34 are to the High Court, and funding for advocacy for such appeals is already covered by paragraph 3 of part 3 of schedule 1.

I now turn to the family and domestic violence amendments, almost all of which have been debated in Committee already. I would like to reiterate why we are taking most private family law cases out of the scope of legal aid. The cost of legal aid, as it stands, is, we believe, simply unsustainable, and legal aid resources need to be focused on those cases where legal aid is most needed. Accordingly, for most divorces, child contact applications or ancillary applications to carve up family assets, legal aid will no longer be available. We believe that it is right to encourage families, where appropriate, to resolve their disputes without going to court. We want to prioritise mediation, which can be cheaper, quicker and less acrimonious than contested court proceedings. Legal aid will, therefore, remain available for mediation in private law family cases, and we estimate that we will spend an extra £10 million a year on mediation, taking the total to £25 million a year.

[Sheila Gilmore (Edinburgh East) (Lab)]

Does the Minister not accept that in many cases where people are separating or divorcing, there is an imbalance of power, whether financial or emotional, and that mediation is simply not suitable for many such cases?

[Mr Djanogly]

I certainly accept that there will sometimes be an imbalance, and in relation to court proceedings themselves, we are proposing other measures—the ability for a judge to give interim orders, for instance—aimed at redressing that imbalance. However, I also accept the hon. Lady’s suggestion that mediation might not be suitable in every case, such as those involving domestic violence. Legal aid will remain available for private family law cases where there is evidence of domestic violence or where a child is at risk of abuse.

[Joan Ruddock (Lewisham, Deptford) (Lab)]

I want briefly to read to the Minister what my constituent Lucy Abell has written to me:

“I work with single parents every day in my job…and know how desperately vulnerable a lot of people are when they are going through an acrimonious separation. The outcomes of children and families are very dependent on what happens during this time, and I find it incredible that the Government thinks these changes will save the government money in the long term.”

She works for Gingerbread and sees such people all the time. She is convinced that what the Government are doing will be terribly damaging for children of those single parents.

[Mr Djanogly]

I am not entirely sure whether the right hon. Lady is talking about all cases of divorce or partners separating, or just those where there is domestic violence. However, I can tell her that in 90% of cases where there is a separating of the ways, the couple will reach an agreement. We are therefore talking about the remaining 10%. What we are saying in terms of policy is that for basic divorce—if divorce can ever be basic—people should not rely on legal aid for carving up the family assets or settling contact issues. However, I want to make it clear that funding for victims of domestic violence who seek a protective order will remain available.

[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

Is it not also important to point out that the family courts have great difficulty dealing with contact issues, many of which are naturally unsuited to such treatment? Frankly, it is not very easy for a court to sort out arguments about whether a child can go to the scout group on a Friday night or whether they have to be with the other parent.

[Mr Djanogly]

My right hon. Friend makes an important point. I can tell him and other hon. Members that it has become clear to me, from my many meetings over the last year and a half with mediators and lobby groups such as those already mentioned, that in the vast majority of cases the parties are better off sorting out their problems together with the help of the mediator. For the most part, mediation is empowering. In most cases, the best way forward is for people to be able to sort out their own futures and those of their children without being told what to do by a judge, and that is what the Government support.

[Kate Green (Stretford and Urmston) (Lab)]

I want to ask the Minister about cases where domestic abuse or violence per se is not present, but where conflict between the parents none the less makes it simply impossible for mediation to work effectively. In the interests of children, will the Minister consider extending legal aid in those circumstances, so that where a mediator knows that mediation simply could not work, the parents will still receive advice?

[Mr Djanogly]

The Government have changed the law through a pre-action protocol. The position from this April has been that where a divorce application is made, the parties have to see whether mediation is appropriate, as has been the case with publicly funded divorce cases. That does not, I hasten to add, mean that the parties have to go to mediation; however, they have to be assessed to see whether mediation is appropriate. I can tell the hon. Lady that the initial findings are very positive indeed. We have adequate mediators, with more than 1,000 mediation units around the country, and all are reporting a significant upturn in business, which is a positive outcome.

[Kate Green]

I agree with the Minister about the desirability of mediation wherever it can work best for all the parties. We would all like appropriate mediation to be used as much as possible in such cases, but will he clarify what he just said? Where a couple is found unsuitable for mediation because of the conflict between them, but where violence or abuse is absent, will they be able to access legal aid?

[Mr Djanogly]

I am afraid that the hon. Lady misunderstands the nature of mediation. In normal circumstances, it is not for the mediator to sit in judgment on the individuals who turn up for mediation. That happens in the assessment. The mediator should explain to the individuals the purpose of mediation and it is for the individuals themselves to decide whether mediation is appropriate. If violence was involved, the mediator might suggest that, in those circumstances, mediation is not appropriate. If domestic violence is involved, the Government believe that legal aid should be provided.

[Mr Jim Cunningham]

rose—

--- Later in debate ---

[Susan Elan Jones (Clwyd South) (Lab)]

rose—

[Mr Djanogly]

I shall give way one more time on this point—to the hon. Member for Coventry South (Mr Cunningham).

[Mr Cunningham]

I want to be helpful to the Minister. Can he clarify how the amendments on legal aid would apply, for example, to rape crisis centres such as the one we have in Coventry? I am not too clear about how that will be affected.

[Mr Djanogly]

The Government are supportive of crisis centres. We have increased our provision for them. The amendments do not in any way affect the issue one way or another. That is a separate policy item.

[Joan Ruddock]

Will the Minister give way?

[Mr Djanogly]

I really must make some headway. If the right hon. Lady will give me a few minutes, I might allow her to intervene again.

We will continue to provide civil legal aid where a person is applying for an order for protection against domestic violence, as with a non-molestation order or an occupation order. We will also continue to waive the financial eligibility limits in these cases. We will still spend an estimated £120 million a year on private family law, including on domestic violence, after our proposed changes. This includes funding for about a quarter of the private family law cases that currently receive legal aid to go to court. We expect to continue to fund them where domestic violence or child abuse results from those cases.

Amendments 92 and 23 would put parts of the definition of domestic violence used by the Association of Chief Police Officers on the face of the Bill in paragraph 10 of schedule 1 in place of the existing definition of abuse. Identical amendments were debated in Committee. The existing definition of abuse used in the Bill is a broad and comprehensive one, explicitly not limited to physical violence. It is used elsewhere in paragraph 3 of schedule 1, which provides for legal aid to be available in relation to abuse of a child or vulnerable adult, and paragraph 11, which provides for legal aid to be available for a person seeking an order to protect a child at risk of abuse. Any consideration of the definition in one paragraph should not be undertaken entirely in isolation from the others—lest confusion should result.

[Caroline Lucas (Brighton, Pavilion) (Green)]

Will the Minister explain why a different definition is being used here from that used in other Home Office and Ministry of Justice documents? A lot of concern has arisen among women’s organisations that there is an agenda here; we would love to know what that agenda is.

[Mr Djanogly]

If the hon. Lady will allow me to get on, I will clarify precisely that.

The definition should also be seen in the light of the Bill’s structure and the purpose of the paragraph in which it appears. Paragraph 10 reflects the underlying policy of ensuring that a party to private law family proceedings who has been subjected to domestic violence by the other party and is likely to be intimidated or otherwise disadvantaged in presenting his or her case should, as a result, be able to have access to legal aid. It does not provide that any individual who has been the subject of, or who is at risk of being the subject of, abuse as defined in that paragraph will qualify regardless of what evidence of abuse might exist. Not every such individual will be intimidated or otherwise disadvantaged in the way the paragraph is intended to address. It establishes a description of legal services and whether an individual qualifies for those services in any specific case. It requires that an individual not only falls within the category in paragraph 10, but meets the criteria to be established in regulations made under clause 10.

[Helen Goodman (Bishop Auckland) (Lab)]

We raised with the Government a couple of months ago the possibility of seeing the regulations in draft before reaching this Report stage. Many Members feel that that would have aided our consideration of these provisions. Why has the Minister not produced those regulations?

[Mr Djanogly]

Because the Bill and relevant clauses are still going through the House and still have to go through the other place. The regulations will be produced once the Bill comes into law.

Those criteria will set out the specific requirements on evidence of the fact of abuse or the risk of abuse. The definition of abuse itself is therefore only a preliminary part of the picture. In that sense, it might be argued that it makes little difference whether definition takes one form or another arguably rather similar form. However, we are still not convinced that the definition should be changed in the way suggested in the amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mrs Helen Grant (Maidstone and The Weald) (Con)]

Does the Minister not accept that the fact that the definition is not specific has the potential to create some uncertainty, and that uncertainty, especially at the beginning of court proceedings, will create even more hardship for the victim, which may well lead to litigation in itself? Is it not possible to be more precise, so that people need not worry about what is and what is not acceptable?

[Mr Djanogly]

I shall be discussing that in a little more detail, but I would answer my hon. Friend’s more general point that the definition could make things harder for a court by saying that the court will in any event have to take a view at some point

[Mrs Grant]

rose—

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Djanogly]

If my hon. Friend will let me finish, I will allow her to intervene again later.

The reference to “any incident”, for example, might be read as securing legal aid for any person who could point to some sort of incident regardless of whether it was serious or minor, such that the victim would not generally feel inhibited about pursuing litigation against the other party. That would not reflect the underlying intention, nor would it be the effect in practice if the regulations required certain forms of proof. The touchstone for whether a party obtains funding must be whether the abuse was such as to inhibit their ability to present their case against the other party. The circumstances that will be accepted as evidence of the abuse will turn on the application by courts, prosecutors and other agencies of their existing criteria. It is when the courts and others have determined that the level of the abusive conduct is such that protective action or prosecution is necessary that legal aid will be available.

[Joan Ruddock]

Given that the purpose of all this is to save money, I must assume that the definition in the Bill means that the Minister expects women, or occasionally men, who would formerly have pursued such domestic violence cases not to pursue them, and not to be eligible. Has he made an estimate of the likely reduction in legally funded cases?

[Mr Djanogly]

I am happy to confirm that this particular definition is not directly related to saving money. It is there because it is a definition that works.

Amendment 23 goes beyond amendment 92 in referring also to the relationship between those involved. It would cover

“intimate partners or family members, regardless of gender or sexuality.”

This part of the amendment is superfluous, because it duplicates sub-paragraph 7 of paragraph 10 of the schedule. The sub-paragraph relies on the definition of associated persons in the Family Law Act 1996, which is wide, and covers the relationships set out in the amendment and more.

Amendment 91 also concerns the relationship between those involved. The Bill provides for legal aid to be available to victims of domestic violence for matters

“arising out of a family relationship”.

The amendment would change the phrase “family relationship” to “family or other intimate relationship”. It is unnecessary for the same reason as amendment 23. Paragraph 10(7) of the schedule defines a family relationship as one between persons who are associated with each other. The definition of “associated persons” in the 1996 Act, on which that paragraph relies, includes two people who

“have or have had an intimate personal relationship with each other which is or was of significant duration”.

The wording of the amendment therefore appears to add nothing.

Amendments 103 and 74 both set out a range of forms of evidence that would be accepted as demonstrating domestic violence for the purpose of qualifying for legal aid in private family law cases. Very similar amendments were debated in Committee, and in this case I can say to the right hon. Member for Lewisham, Deptford (Joan Ruddock) that there would be economic consequences. We want genuine victims of domestic violence to have the benefit of legal aid in such cases, when they would be disadvantaged by facing their abuser as the other party. However, during consultation we have heard many concerns that the proposal in the amendments could lead to a rise in unfounded allegations, and we want to guard against that.

[Susan Elan Jones]

Organisations such as the National Federation of Women’s Institutes and Women’s Aid declare that they are very concerned about the Government’s proposals, so why does the Minister think he is right and they are wrong?

[Mr Djanogly]

Because I and the Government consulted at some length on the proposals and received a lot of positive responses. As a result of that consultation we broadened the definition concerned, so we have listened. Indeed, we have tabled a further amendment today in relation to immigrants to broaden it even further.

[Mr Andy Slaughter (Hammersmith) (Lab)]

I hope the Minister accepts that, although amendment 74 and other amendments would enlarge the evidential tests, they would still require a degree of evidence to be given. That evidence may not come from such limited places as he wants, but it may be from GPs or women’s refuges. Yet he is saying that he cannot accept such evidence, because it would be part of “unfounded allegations”. Is he suggesting that those organisations collude in false allegations?

[Mr Djanogly]

The hon. Gentleman makes a frankly ridiculous comment. He mentioned GPs, and of course a GP is qualified to tell whether someone has been subject to violence. However, they are not always well qualified to tell whether someone has been subject to domestic violence, because they may not have seen the circumstances in the home and may be looking only at the injury of the party coming to their surgery. The Government are looking for objective evidence.

[Mr Slaughter]

I would like the Minister to respond to my question. As the tests in question are evidential tests, not subjective or self-referred, does that support his point about false allegations? Evidence from GPs is commonly used to support cases in criminal trials, including sometimes when a woman is unwilling to give evidence herself because she is intimidated or in fear.

[Mr Djanogly]

The hon. Gentleman makes the exact point that I would have made in response to him. Evidence is used in a trial, but the GP does not make the decision, he gives evidence. We see the trial as being the objective evidence, and that is what we suggest in the Bill.

[Mr Robert Buckland (South Swindon) (Con)]

My hon. Friend makes proper points about the need for courts to make findings of fact. Does he accept, however, that there is a potential problem with regard to undertakings? In proceedings in which undertakings could be a way of sorting out the problem satisfactorily, those advising the parties involved could prejudice their clients’ ability to obtain legal aid in future if domestic violence rears its ugly head again. Will he look again at how we can manage those circumstances so that people are not put in that potentially prejudicial situation?

[Mr Djanogly]

I am happy to consider the particular circumstances that my hon. Friend mentions on the subject of undertakings, but again we are talking about a situation that does not involve an objective test. It would be down to the word of the two people making the undertaking. In certain circumstances that may be correct, but in others it may not.

[Sandra Osborne (Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock) (Lab)]

I worked with Women’s Aid for 16 years, and the Minister is taking us back decades by perpetrating myths about domestic violence that we thought we had seen the end of 30 years ago. Does he not understand that women who are subjected to domestic violence are, by definition, captive victims and there is no one else in the room? To say that they are not going to be believed is taking us back decades. Will he look at this again?

[Mr Djanogly]

Everything the Government have said, and every action we have taken, shows that we take domestic violence extremely seriously. To some extent, the hon. Lady and other hon. Members are approaching this issue from the wrong direction in that they begin by addressing domestic violence, but that is not the right starting point. The starting point for the Government is that we are removing legal aid for private family law, but we are keeping it for domestic violence, as that is of the utmost concern to us. My point, however, is that we need to have objective evidence of domestic violence so that we target taxpayers’ money on genuine cases where the victim needs assistance because they are intimidated or otherwise disadvantaged by the fact of facing the abuser in the proceedings.

[Sheila Gilmore]

Will the Minister give way?

[Mr Djanogly]

I shall make a little more progress first.

The forms of evidence that will be accepted for this purpose are not set out in the Bill. Instead, they will be set out in regulations under clause 10. We believe it is appropriate to set out these detailed provisions in secondary, rather than primary, legislation as it can be amended to respond to particular issues that may arise during the operation of the scheme.

In the consultation, we suggested what might be the forms of evidence of domestic violence, and we listened to the views expressed on that in response. As a result, we have widened the range of forms of evidence, and, furthermore, only one of the forms of evidence would be needed. Legal aid will be available for victims of domestic violence in private family law cases where one of the following criteria is met: where a non-molestation order, occupation order, forced marriage protection order or other protective injunction against the other party is in place or has been made in the last 12 months; there is a criminal conviction for a domestic violence offence committed by the other party against the applicant for funding, unless the conviction is spent; there are ongoing criminal proceedings against the other party for a domestic violence offence by that party against the applicant for funding; the applicant for funding has been referred to a multi-agency risk assessment conference as a high-risk victim of domestic violence, and a plan has been put in place to protect them from violence by the other party; there has been a finding of fact in the family courts of domestic violence by the other party, giving rise to a risk of harm to the victim.

[Kate Green]

Will the fact that there is, for example, a non-molestation order be taken as evidence of suitability for legal aid in family proceedings, and will legal aid be available to enable a victim of domestic violence to get such an order?

[Mr Djanogly]

Yes, it will be. The hon. Lady makes a very important point, which has come up in consultation and has often been misconstrued. For such individuals, legal aid will be provided for the application for a non-molestation order, for example.

It might be helpful if I give an idea of the prevalence of these forms of evidence. About 24,100 domestic violence orders were made in 2010, about 74,000 domestic violence crimes were prosecuted in 2009-10 and there were 53,000 domestic violence convictions. Further, about 43,000 victims of domestic violence were referred to multi-agency risk assessment conferences in the 12 months to June 2010.

[Helen Goodman]

Surely the Minister can see that there is a 21,000 gap between the numbers of those prosecuted and those convicted? Surely he is also aware that the Crown Prosecution Service goes ahead with prosecutions only when there is a reasonable expectation of success in the case? Surely, therefore, he can see that we are not dancing on the head of a pin, as we are talking about 21,000 women every year?

[Mr Djanogly]

Those numbers may overlap to some extent; in other words, someone might not have been prosecuted as there may have been a civil injunction, or perhaps a multi-agency risk assessment conference made the decision.

The forms of evidence we intend to accept will meet a high standard of objectivity. We are concerned that many of the additional forms of evidence suggested in the amendments would rely on the word of those involved and would provide an incentive for allegations where none currently exists. Let me make it clear that I am not questioning the integrity of genuine victims. However, during the legal aid consultation many people were concerned about providing an incentive for unfounded allegations, and the Government share that concern.

[Mrs Grant]

Post-separation violence is very common in domestic violence cases. I am concerned that there is a 12-month time limit on the gateway criteria for family law matters, which means that if the violence occurs after that period many highly vulnerable women and children could fall through the net.

[Mr Djanogly]

That relates to amendment 74. I am going to deal with it and I am sure that my hon. Friend will be pleased with the answer I will give her.

Accepting self-reporting without objective evidence would prevent us from effectively focusing assistance on victims of domestic violence who were unable effectively to present their case against the other party because of the history or risk of abuse by that party. Both amendments refer to evidence from professionals in a variety of roles. I explained that we have widened our criteria so that legal aid will be available where the victim has been referred to a multi-agency risk-assessment conference as a high-risk victim of domestic violence and a plan has been put in place to protect them from violence by the other party. Such referrals can be made by a range of professionals. Furthermore, a finding of fact in the family courts that domestic violence has occurred will trigger legal aid, and a court will be able to assess any relevant evidence.

Amendment 74, to which my hon. Friend referred, would prevent a time limit from applying to any evidence. We have said that a 12-month period, where relevant, will apply. We consider that 12 months will be an appropriate period to protect victims and to enable them to deal with their private family law issues. However, if the criteria were to arise again—for instance, if a second protective injunction is made—the time period would start again. It is also important to remember that legal aid will remain available for exceptional out-of-scope cases where the failure to provide such funding would amount to the breach of an individual’s rights under the European convention on human rights, particularly article 6.

[Sheila Gilmore]

Will the Minister explain how the individual achieves the finding of fact in a family court in order to trigger legal aid if they cannot get legal aid to take proceedings in a family court?

[Mr Djanogly]

The answer is that they can get legal aid to take those proceedings.

Amendment 93 would provide for legal aid to be available for any party in a private family law case who has been the subject of allegations of domestic violence or the risk of domestic violence. We debated an identical amendment in Committee. In considering whether alleged perpetrators should receive legal aid in these cases it is important to remember that we are seeking to protect the most vulnerable in society. Alleged perpetrators would not necessarily fall into that category in the way a victim of abuse would. Furthermore, allegations would not meet the test of clear, objective evidence that would otherwise apply in these cases. Accepting such an amendment would be likely to cost tens of millions of pounds in savings, without achieving the objective of targeting legal aid on those most in need.

I turn to the other amendments relating to private law children cases, such as disputes about custody, where a child is at risk of abuse. These are amendments to paragraph 11 of schedule 1, which provides for legal aid to be available in such cases for the party seeking to protect the child, where there is objective evidence of the risk of abuse. Again, identical or near-identical versions of the amendments were discussed in Committee.

Amendment 96 would provide for applications for financial provision for children to be in scope for legal aid where the child is the subject of one or more of the measures listed in sub-paragraph 11 (1) of schedule 1. The list of orders in that sub-paragraph is intended to cover orders and procedures used to secure protection, and it includes orders under section 8 of the Children Act 1989, which may be used in that way, including contact and residence orders. The effect of amendment 96 would be that applications for maintenance or other financial provision for a child would be in scope whenever a contact or residence order has been made in relation to that child, regardless of any need for protection. The original legal aid proposals were silent on the issue of children at risk of abuse in private law children cases.

We have listened to the concerns raised during the consultation on this point. For example, one party might be seeking an order to bar an abuser from unsupervised contact with a child. We agree that child protection is of paramount importance and we recognise that it would be difficult for the protective party to act in person in cases of potential complexity and heightened risk to the child requiring prompt and clear action. This is a separate rationale to a situation in which the adult has been subject to abuse such that he or she cannot be expected to represent themselves against their abuser.

We do not consider that cases concerning financial provision are of equal priority and nor do they raise the same issues. Financial matters are of lower objective importance than child protection and we would not expect the protecting party to encounter the same level of complexity—still less risk—or need for urgent protective action in a case about financial provision. Furthermore, the person presenting the risk of abuse might not be the other party in the financial provision proceedings. Although protecting a child from abuse is clearly of high importance, it is not appropriate that in a case for financial provision, which is a separate matter from the consideration of protective measures, a distinction should be drawn between maintenance for children considered at risk of abuse and maintenance for other children.

Amendment 97 would bring into the scope of legal aid the entirety of any proceedings in which the court was considering whether to direct the local authority to investigate the circumstances of the child. Under section 37 of the Children Act 1989, the court may make such direction if it appears that it might be appropriate for a care or supervision order to be made. The amendment appears to be unnecessary and, in any event, goes too far. Under paragraph 1 of the schedule, legal aid will be available for public family law cases such as care and supervision proceedings, as at present. We believe that the state should ensure that families are able to challenge decisions made by public authorities about the provision of care for children.

Directions under section 37 of the 1989 Act are considered to be public family law matters for legal aid purposes because they relate to care and supervision orders under paragraph 1(1)(b) of schedule 1. Funding is therefore available in relation to section 37 issues. There is no reason, in principle, why a case could not be adjourned briefly in such a situation to allow the parties to seek a legal aid lawyer for the section 37 issue if that were warranted. Providers are able to use devolved powers to grant immediate funding in emergency situations, subject to means and merits-testing.

Amendment 98 also references section 37 directions and would bring into scope any private family law proceedings that involve a child in respect of whom a direction under section 37 of the 1989 Act had been given, regardless of the outcome of that section 37 investigation. That is a broad proposition that I do not think can be justified.

[Geraint Davies (Swansea West) (Lab/Co-op)]

May I ask why the Minister is discussing amendments that have not been selected by the Speaker? He seems to be referring to amendments 98 and 97.

[Mr Djanogly]

Amendments 94 to 102 have been selected.

Under amendment 98, a section 37 direction, regardless of the outcome of the investigation, would trigger funding for all parties in any private law family proceedings in which the child was involved. A section 37 order in itself does not mean that the child is at risk of abuse. The local authority staff could conclude, once they had completed their investigation, that the child was not at risk and that no further action was needed. If the local authority concluded that action was needed, it would put a child protection plan in place. As I have said, legal aid will be available in private law children cases in which a child is at risk of abuse for a party seeking to protect the child where there is objective evidence of the risk of abuse. A child protection plan will be accepted as objective evidence in criteria that will be set out in regulations under clause 10. That means that if a local authority put such a plan in place, that would trigger funding for the party seeking to protect the child.

Providing for legal aid to be available for any family proceedings involving the child, as amendment 98 would do, would mean that legal aid would not be targeted on proceedings about protection of the child, but could be available for proceedings that might not concern protection at all. For example, a case about financial relief for the parents could be covered if an application were made for financial relief for the child. Given that the words “involving a child” do not give much indication of how closely the child needs to be concerned, it might even be that a case between the parents about a matter that did not directly concern the child was included.

Amendment 98 would also provide for legal aid to be available for all parties to the proceedings. We intend to target funding on the protecting party. Where a party is not the person taking action to protect a child from abuse, the same level of importance and risk would not apply.

Amendments 94 and 95 would also widen the availability of legal aid under paragraph 11 beyond the parties seeking to protect the child. That would mean that legal aid would be available for the other party in private law children cases where a child is at risk of abuse. As I have explained, we decided to keep those cases in scope for the protecting party because protecting children from abuse is paramount. Where a party is not the person taking action to protect a child from abuse, the same level of importance and risk would not apply.

The tests we wish to use to determine the availability of legal aid in these cases are designed to be as objective as possible and to minimise the risk of false allegations. The tests are: where there is a criminal conviction or ongoing criminal proceedings for a child abuse offence; where a local authority has put a child protection plan in place to protect the child; or where there is a relevant finding of fact by the family courts that child abuse has occurred. They will provide clear and objective evidence of the risk of abuse. However, if the particular facts of an individual case mean that failure to provide legal aid for both parties would be likely to result in a breach of the individual’s rights under the Human Rights Act or European Union law, exceptional funding would be available.

I turn now to amendments 99 to 102, which seek to retain legal aid provision for all parties in private family cases where the court has made a child a party to proceedings. Identical amendments were debated in Committee. The Government intend to retain legal aid for a child who is a party in these circumstances. However, as we made clear in Committee, we do not accept that, where a child requires representation, adult family members should as a matter of routine also be given legal aid. There are a variety of reasons for a child to be a party, and not all will involve the complexity of a case. In cases where a child is represented, it does not follow that the case will necessarily be so complex or that the child’s involvement will render the case so complex or difficult as to require representation for all parties.

By their nature, some of the cases will be complex, and we recognise that in some circumstances people will be unable to represent themselves, but we think that those cases will be the exception. The exceptional funding arrangements will ensure that legal aid will be available where required. A failure to provide legal aid in cases where people genuinely could not represent themselves would be likely to breach an individual’s right to legal aid under the Human Rights Act or EU law.

I turn now to the immigration amendments, which include technical Government amendments, Government and Opposition amendments relating to domestic violence immigration cases and other amendments seeking to widen the scope of legal aid for refugee family reunion matters and immigration judicial review cases. Government amendments 61 and 62 will amend paragraph 25(1) of part 1 of schedule 1 to correct an omission in the meaning of asylum in the Bill. That will ensure that persons who make a claim to enter or remain in the UK based on the EU qualification directive are eligible for legal aid. Government amendment 60 will make a similar change to paragraph 25 to cover claims based on article 2 of the European convention on human rights, which sets out the right to life. Although most claims for asylum will be made on the basis of the 1951 refugee convention or article 3 of the European convention on human rights, the amendment will allow funding for cases involving execution and the death penalty; serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict; and unlawful killing.

Government amendments 55 to 58 clarify the wording of paragraph 17(7) of part 1 of schedule 1 with regard to the exceptions from scope to the exclusion of certain types of immigration judicial review proceedings. Amendments 55 and 56 will amend paragraph 17(7)(a) to clarify that the exception applies only to a judicial review of a negative decision in relation to an asylum application where there is no right of appeal to the first-tier tribunal against the decision. Amendments 57 and 58 will amend the exception in paragraph 17(7)(b) to add a reference to section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. Section 94 allows the Secretary of State to issue a certificate on a number of different grounds, for example when an asylum claim is clearly unfounded. The certificate prevents an appeal to the first-tier tribunal being brought while an individual is in the UK. The amendments clarify the position and ensure that the policy is given effect.

Amendment 83 seeks to maintain within legal aid civil funding certain immigration judicial review cases that are very likely to be without merit. We debated an identical proposition in Committee. These are cases that either have already had a hearing on the same, or substantially the same, issue within a period of one year, or are judicial reviews of removal directions where there is less than one year between the giving of the direction and determination of the decision to remove. In response to our legal aid consultation, the Judges Council highlighted the large number of immigration judicial reviews that were without merit and, in effect, clog up the system. Only a minority of those would receive legal aid. As we made clear in Committee, the Government’s view is that it is wrong in principle for such cases to remain within the scope of funding.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Djanogly]

We do have figures, but I do not happen to have them with me. I will write to the hon. Gentleman with figures. Most judicial review cases are funded privately rather than through legal aid, however, and I say that because I have seen the figures, and one needs to know that to understand them.

Government amendment 59 would amend part 1 of schedule 1 to bring domestic violence immigration rule cases into the scope of legal aid, as I announced to the Public Bill Committee on 19 July.

Government amendment 63 would amend part 3 of schedule 1 to ensure that civil legal aid was available for the advocacy of such cases in the first-tier tribunal. Advocacy will also be available in the upper tribunal by virtue of paragraph 14 of part 3.

Under the domestic violence immigration rule, someone on a spousal visa, which is valid for a limited period of time, and whose relationship has permanently broken down as a result of domestic violence, can apply for indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom. As I said in Committee, we accept that these cases are very unusual and different from other immigration cases, given the real risk that without legal aid spouses will stay trapped in abusive relationships for fear of jeopardising their immigration status. The trauma that they may have suffered will often make it very difficult to cope with that type of application, and they are also under time pressure, because they have only limited access to public funds to avoid destitution, so for those reasons we seek to make these amendments to schedule 1.

Amendment 113 adopts the same wording as the Government amendment I have just discussed, but with two differences—one that I am happy to look at further, and one that I think is unnecessary. First, the amendment would include within the scope of funding, civil legal services provided to an individual in relation to a claim by the individual to a right to reside in the United Kingdom, as well as an application for indefinite leave, when their relationship had broken down permanently as a result of domestic violence. EEA nationals and their spouses or partners, if from a third country, have a long-term right to reside in the UK if they are economically active or able to support themselves without becoming an unreasonable burden on public funds.

The Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2006 make provision for third country nationals in such relationships to remain in the UK—that is, their right to reside can continue—if their relationship breaks down as a result of domestic violence. The application is different for those people who apply under the domestic violence immigration rule for indefinite leave to remain. The rules that apply are different. However, I am sure that the hon. Member for Hammersmith (Mr Slaughter) will be pleased to hear that we are looking further at such cases.

Amendment 113 seeks to replace the definition of abuse adopted in the Government amendment and used elsewhere in part 1 of schedule 1 to the Bill with the definition of domestic violence used by the Association of Chief Police Officers. The existing definition of abuse used in the Bill is a broad and comprehensive one, explicitly not limited to physical violence, and it would cover mental as well as physical abuse, neglect, maltreatment and exploitation. Indeed, it would not exclude from scope any of the types of abuse covered by the definition used by ACPO. Furthermore, the proposed definition of abuse would cover intimate partners or family members, regardless of gender and sexuality. That part of the amendment is superfluous, as the proposed Government amendment relies on the definition of associated persons in the Family Law Act 1996, which is a wide one that would cover the relationships set out in the amendment, and more. The second change proposed in amendment 113 is therefore unnecessary, but we will look at the first. I hope that hon. Members will be reassured by that.

Amendment 145 seeks to bring family reunion cases back into the scope of legal aid, at a cost of about £5 million a year. Those cases involve a person who has been granted asylum or refugee status and who sponsors the applications of their immediate family to join them. They are immigration applications, rather than asylum ones, and they are generally straightforward. The UK Border Agency guidance on these cases sets out the presumption of the granting of an application if the relevant criteria are met. The evidence required, such as marriage and birth certificates, should not require legal assistance to collate. The entry clearance officer may, on occasion, ask for DNA testing to prove the family relationship, but that testing would be free of charge to the applicant. These cases should not require specialist legal advice, and it is not therefore necessary for them to remain within the scope of civil legal aid.

[Simon Hughes (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (LD)]

My office handles a lot of asylum and immigration cases, and of course some of them are entirely straightforward, as the Minister has suggested. Does he accept, however, that some family reunion cases are definitely not straightforward? They might involve a child being in a different country from the mother, or someone not having a passport. There could also be real issues involved in proving the relationship. Will he look again at the opportunity for some cases—I am not arguing for the generality—to be eligible for legal assistance?

[Mr Djanogly]

I certainly agree with my right hon. Friend that some immigration cases are complex, and I think that the point that he has raised is one for me to look at after today. I will do so, and I will come back to him on that.

On the basis of everything that I have just set out, I therefore urge the House to support Government amendments 10, 11, 13 to 18 and 55 to 63. I also hope that right hon. and hon. Members will be reassured by what I have said about the other amendments.

[Mr Slaughter]

I shall try to be a little briefer than the Minister—[Hon. Members: “Hear, hear!”] I was about to say that I was going to make some preliminary remarks, but the last time I did that they went on for three hours. I shall address my comments almost exclusively to amendment 74, which stands in my name. The Opposition also fully support amendment 23, tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas), which deals with the related matter of domestic violence. I give notice that we hope to press amendment 74 to a vote later this evening.

The Minister was slightly dismissive when he said that a number of the amendments on domestic violence had been dealt with in similar terms in Committee. They were indeed, and they were dealt with in some of the Committee’s most heated sittings. He has again shown a rather dismissive manner today, although Labour Members gave him a very clear expression of what they think of the Government’s attitude in the Bill to domestic violence. Perhaps he needs to get out more to see what is happening in the real world.

At 1 o’clock today, for example, the Minister could have attended the launch in Committee Room 8 of “Legal Aid is a Lifeline”, in which women speak out on the legal aid reforms. This report on domestic violence was produced jointly by the National Federation of Women’s Institutes and Justice for All. He could have heard the stark, moving testimony of women such as Jenny Broomfield and Sam Taylor, who were—let us make no bones about it—the victims of attempted murder by violent partners who, in at least one case, continued to stalk and pursue them for many years. They find quite abhorrent the Government’s attempt to restrict the criteria to 12 months, which amendment 74 seeks to change, and to restrict the terms of domestic violence. Those women relied on legal aid, in its current form, to get residence for their children, to find a safe place to live and to obtain a separation from their violent partners. They believe that, without it, their plight today would be much worse than it is.

Earlier this afternoon, the Housing Minister launched a very good report by St Mungo’s entitled “Battered, broken, bereft”, one of the leading findings of which was that 35% of women who have slept rough left home to escape domestic violence. It shows double standards and hypocrisy for the Government to cut provisions to tackle domestic violence on the same day in the Commons Chamber. I urge the Minister to listen to voices such as that of the Mayor of London, whose briefing for this debate states:

“The Mayor would like assurances that women who have experienced domestic violence will not be barred from legal aid due to their having a lack of evidence.”

I would also like the Minister to listen to organisations such as Gingerbread, which states:

“Many individuals experiencing violence do not report that violence to the police or seek an injunction via the family courts. This is for a variety of reasons, including lack of faith in the justice system and fear that instigating proceedings would escalate violence. The evidential criteria in the Bill do not reflect the pathways that victims of domestic violence take to find help and support. The eligibility criteria must be broadened to include other forms of evidence such as evidence from a specialist domestic violence support organisation, health or social services.”

Those are the voices that the Minister should be listening to, as well as those that he hears in the Chamber today. So far, he has not done so.

--- Later in debate ---

[Helen Goodman]

As the Minister said, we debated this issue in general at some length in Committee. I shall speak in support of amendments 23, 74 and 96 to 98.

A central concern is the narrow and restrictive definition of “domestic violence” that the Minister is putting into the Bill. Once again, we have heard remarks from him that demonstrate his lack of understanding and his lack of sympathy for people in this situation. He said in Committee, and he said again today, that his criteria

“all avoid self-reporting and involve a significant level of state intervention.”

That is indeed the case. The problem is that in taking that approach, he is treating women as if they are not adults capable of self-reporting. That is why many Labour Members feel that he is taking us back 30 years. He said:

“We are concerned that to include admission to a refuge in the criteria would be to rely on self-reporting”.

He said that he is

“not persuaded that the medical professionals would be best placed to assess whether domestic violence has occurred”

even though

“they may witness injuries”.

He said that he does not believe that, in themselves, allegations of domestic violence are objective. He said, as he said again today, that the tests he wishes to use

“are designed…to minimise the risk of false allegations.”––[Official Report, Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Public Bill Committee, 6 September 2011; c. 359-64.]

That is a problem. If his objective is to minimise the risk of false allegations, then his objective is not to maximise the support that women need.

Following the extremely concerning debate that we had in Committee, on 8 September I wrote to the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, the hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green (Lynne Featherstone), who is responsible for issues relating to women and equalities. On 25 October, I finally received a reply, in which she says:

“You make the point that the definition of domestic violence used in the Bill is much narrower than the ACPO definition. My understanding is that the definition of “abuse” in the Bill is a broad one…We have been assured by the Ministry of Justice that the definition used would not exclude, for the purposes of legal aid and private family law cases, any of the types of abuse covered by the definition used by ACPO.”

This letter is quite extraordinary. She goes on to say:

“The Government is clear that objective evidence will be needed to ensure that legal aid in private family cases is focused on those who may be intimidated and unable to assert their rights as a result of domestic violence or the risk of harm by the other party to the proceedings”.

Her reliance on the assurances from the Ministry of Justice that its definition is the same as that used by ACPO leads me to ask two questions. First, what is the point of a Minister for Equalities who does not check with the rest of the world what is going on? Secondly, did the Minister tell her that his definition was the same as the ACPO one, when everybody knows that that is not the case?

The Minister for Equalities could easily have listened to the Bar Council—not, one would think, a wild group of left-wingers who are determined to promote a feminist picture of the world. One would think that she might have listened to it. It wrote to many Members this week.

[Mr Djanogly]

It is the case that the ACPO definition and the definition in the Bill are broadly similar.

[Helen Goodman]

Broadly, yes, but not precisely—that is the problem. About an hour and a half ago, the Minister accused hon. Members of dancing on pinheads. He is now the one who is doing that. We have demonstrated that under his definition, some 20,000 victims of domestic violence will not get legal aid each year who would get it currently. That is the problem.

I remind the Minister of what the Bar Council is saying:

“The narrow definition of domestic abuse, which is more restrictive than that used by the Home Office and the Association of Chief Police Officers and will limit legal aid to victims of certain ‘types’ of abuse”.

It states that there are:

“Excessively narrow referral mechanisms for victims of domestic abuse, who will not be eligible for civil legal aid if, for example, they have been admitted to a refuge but have chosen not to bring proceedings against their abusive partner”.

--- Later in debate ---

[Ben Gummer]

Again, I regret what the shadow Minister has said. On several occasions, I have sat through three hours of speeches from him in Committee—

[Mr Djanogly]

One speech.

[Ben Gummer]

That was one speech. On several occasions, we had three-hour speeches where points were recycled and regurgitated without use to the legislative process. It is unfortunate that the hon. Gentleman claims that I am padding things out, as I hope that I am addressing points not yet raised in this Chamber. I am going to do so briefly. I feel I should do so, as although I am happy to admit that I am not someone from a legal background and that I do not have a previous interest in this area of domestic violence, I have the experience of sitting in the Public Bill Committee and understanding the arguments put both by the Opposition and the Government in this difficult area. I speak as a layman and I hope to offer my support to points made by Members on both sides of the House.

On amendment 113, tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas), we face a small issue about whether people from the European economic area are caught within this legislation. It will cover only a small handful of people, but the inevitable consequence of missing it out—if that happens—is that there will be some travesty and miscarriage of justice precisely in a case where someone falls through the gap. I hope that the Government will carefully examine that suggestion in the first half of the amendment.

I also fully support what my hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon said about undertakings. I have heard much evidence from people practising in this field who give a reasonable argument that a counter-productive eventuality of this Bill is that, if undertakings are excluded, it could end up greatly prolonging cases, and not only to the detriment of litigants: it would also affect the costs of the court. I hope that his constructive and sensible suggestions, which come with considerable experience of sitting on the bench and acting as counsel, will be taken up by the Government as the fair-minded suggestions that they are.

More broadly, we have a problem on self-reporting. I hope that hon. Members, especially Labour Members, will bear me out on this. Anyone who has contact with the family courts and who talks to family judges will know about the impact that allegations of child abuse have had in private law cases. In the opinion of many counsel and judges, in the past few years, allegations of child abuse have increasingly been made far too readily when no substance is behind the claims. It would be unfortunate if, under the new regime, allegations of domestic abuse and domestic violence were made as a precept to gain legal aid, because that would devalue the claims other people make completely legitimately. That is what is happening in the courts at the moment with allegations of child abuse. Several judges have remarked to me that so often is it claimed that one party or another has committed child abuse, it is beginning to numb the senses of the judges hearing those cases. It would be wrong if a similar situation were to arise with this new regime. The Government must therefore phrase the definition of domestic violence very carefully.

I hope that the Government have heard the concerns of Opposition and Government Members, such as those of my hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon, those that my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe has voiced on several occasions, and those raised today by my hon. Friend the Member for Maidstone and The Weald (Mrs Grant). I can hear from the way in which the Minister has been replying that he understands that some sort of uniformity would be desirable across government and that some recognition of the problems of encapsulating a definition within the Bill will be made here or in another place.

The Opposition went into the last election saying that they would seek cuts to legal aid and that promise has been reiterated both by the Leader of the Opposition, in January, and the shadow Secretary of State, who is sitting on the Front Bench, on several occasions. However, in Committee, the shadow Minister tabled dozens of amendments, some of which were, by his own admission, contradictory and many of which were culled from the handouts given by lobbyists, which extended considerably the Committee’s deliberations when we could have been discussing the meat of the proposals as we have tried to do today. He came to the House with a new amendment having denied the Public Bill Committee the ability to consider properly many of the issues that we should have discussed.

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[Ben Gummer]

I am just coming to that if the hon. Gentleman will listen.

When they table amendments, the Opposition have a duty to explain how their changes would be paid for and what balances would be made elsewhere in the Bill, but so far we have had nothing to substantiate how they would do that, and neither do we have any idea how their changes would fit into the general pattern of the Bill. I cannot therefore vote for their amendment or that of the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion—amendment 113 —as neither is complete and nor have they been properly discussed.

In conclusion, I hope that we can continue our proceedings without trying to politicise the issue of domestic violence. I hope we can discuss the precise provisions in the Bill without throwing what I feel have been intemperate and sometimes misjudged accusations at one side purely because they happen to disagree with the assertions put by the other.

[Mr Djanogly]

First, let me confirm to my hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon (Mr Buckland) and other hon. Members that I have listened carefully to the debate, which has been informed and varied. A significant number of general and more specific issues have come up in our deliberations. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich (Ben Gummer) that the debate has, in some ways, become too polarised given the significant agreement and consensus among all hon. Members about the need to counter domestic violence.

Given the number of issues to address, it is hard to know where to start, but I shall begin with the definition of abuse, which was mentioned by the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd (Mr Llwyd) and the hon. Members for Stretford and Urmston (Kate Green), for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) and for Bishop Auckland (Helen Goodman). The accusation is that the definition of abuse in the Bill narrows the scope of legal aid in comparison with ACPO’s definition. The right hon. Gentleman said that the Bill weakened the definition of abuse. I can confirm to the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion that the definition in the Bill does not require physical abuse. Both the ACPO definition and the Bill definition are very broad and embrace abuse that is not physical, and it is difficult to see what description of behaviour in the ACPO definition would not be covered by the broad description of physical or mental abuse used in the Bill.

The right hon. Gentleman suggested that I said in Committee that to widen the definition of domestic violence would induce self-reporting. As I think my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich was heading towards saying, that confuses the definition of abuse, which determines scope, and the criteria for an individual to qualify. The definition of abuse in the Bill is broad and it is difficult to see how it does not cover that which is covered by the ACPO definition. Neither definition says anything about how abuse is to be evidenced.

My hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon injected a sense of balance into the debate and I noted his condemnation of archaic and unacceptable language. I think we can all agree on that.

The right hon. Gentleman spoke about the Bill and ACPO definitions of domestic violence. To put an end to this issue, let me say that if any right hon. or hon. Member can write to me with a specific, concrete example of abuse that would be covered by the ACPO definition but not by the definition in the Bill I will give the issue serious consideration.

[Kate Green]

I am not going to give the Minister an example of that. If he is so sure that there is such an overlap, why not use the ACPO definition?

[Mr Djanogly]

I look forward to the hon. Lady providing her reasons why that should be the case.

The right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd made a significant number of points for his significant number of amendments, most of which I covered in my preliminary remarks, and I do not intend to go over them all again. However, he mentioned two particular points that I did not cover, so if he does not mind I will concentrate on those.

It is not clear that amendments 92 or 93 would widen the category of services described in paragraph 10 significantly or at all. The definition of abuse used in the Bill is intentionally broad and not limited to physical violence, but it embraces physical or mental abuse. Abuse is stated to include sexual abuse and abuse in the form of violence, neglect, maltreatment and exploitation, but it is not limited to those examples. Therefore, we believe that it is sufficiently flexible to cover cases of genuine abuse, as is the intention. Both amendments refer to physical and mental abuse, which are already explicitly referred to in the Bill’s definition. Additionally, they refer to threatening behaviour, violence and emotional abuse, which are clearly within the scope of physical and mental abuse and so are unnecessary and add nothing to the breadth of the category.

Further reference is made to financial abuse. It is not entirely clear what that would cover outside the context of serious cases where the treatment of one party by the other in relation to the family finances amounts to physical or, in particular, mental abuse, which would include neglect, maltreatment and exploitation in the Bill’s definition, where it is clearly within the definition of abuse in the Bill. Where the financial abuse does not amount to or form part of physical or mental abuse, it could be argued that the amendment would widen the gateway beyond what might be ordinarily understood as abusive behaviour, but in a way where the effect is unclear. For instance, there is no special reference to financial abuse in the provisions of the Family Law Act 1996 to protect against domestic violence or in case law, in contrast to emotional or psychological abuse, so it is questionable what it would add in this regard.

However, the amendment also stipulates that any incident of abuse would suffice to come within the category. On one construction, that would make no difference since the existing definition does not require a course of conduct, but on another construction it might be argued that the explicit reference to any incident could be read as a fetter on the power to define what would be accepted as sufficient evidence of abuse through secondary legislation. That is because the type of evidence acceptable will reflect a certain degree of seriousness. For instance, a family court will not generally make orders relating to minor, one-off incidents, although it will do so in appropriate circumstances, such as a course of conduct of trivial incidents adding up to something more serious.

It is not clear that any challenge to secondary legislation requiring forms of evidence that in themselves are unlikely to arise from minor, single incidents would have any prospect of success, but the risk cannot be entirely ruled out. Were it impossible to prescribe the forms of evidence proposed to date, we estimate that the consequent opening up of eligibility would at the very least double the cost of the domestic violence gateway to £130 million per annum.

The part of amendment 23 that refers to violence or abuse

“between adults who are or have been intimate partners or family members, regardless of gender or sexuality”

is superfluous, since it duplicates the effect of paragraph 10(7), which sets out that for the purposes of the paragraph there is a family relationship between two people if they are associated with each other. That “associated” has the same meaning as set out in part 4 of the 1996 Act, where it is defined very widely and covers a range of relationships no less wide, and in some instances wider, than the ACPO definition.

Amendment 93 would widen the domestic violence gateway so that legal aid would be available for the potential victim in private family law cases where there has been an as yet unproven allegation of abuse, or of the risk of abuse. It would make the gateway extremely wide and, in effect, would mean that self-reporting would have to be accepted as sufficient evidence of domestic violence, making any other evidentiary requirements redundant. It would be difficult to limit very far the forms of evidence of an allegation of abuse, or of the risk of abuse, that would be accepted. We estimate that that would at the very least double the cost of the domestic violence gateway to £130 million per annum.

The amendment refers to allegations that person B has been abused by person A. In paragraph 10 of schedule 1, it is person A who is the victim, and person B who is the abuser—the other way around. However, the amendment does not change the opening proposition, which is that the services are provided to person A. This appears to have the perverse consequence that if the proven abuser, person B, alleges that the proven victim, person A, was the abuser, person A would qualify more easily for legal aid as they would then have to give as evidence only an allegation by person B of abuse or the risk of abuse. That is almost certainly a drafting error, but if it is not, and the intention is instead to ensure that legal aid would be available where either party might be the victim of abuse, that would be unnecessary.

In relation to amendment 97, the intended effect is unnecessary because section 37 proceedings are public law matters and it would be possible, in private law proceedings, for a court that is considering a section 37 order to adjourn so that the parents, if they are not already represented, may have access to legal aid and representation under the public law heading. The actual effect is rather wider. However, the amendment would bring the whole of family proceedings, such as proceedings for residence and contact with children, into scope where the court considers making a section 37 direction, rather than simply consideration of that point. Again, this may be a matter of defective drafting, but if so the entire amendment would be superfluous.

The right hon. Gentleman also asked whether an adjournment would introduce a delay in protecting a child. We would expect a court to adjourn a hearing only if it considered it safe to do so. The only way to avoid the potential of being a section 37 direction being made at a hearing involving unrepresented parents would be by providing legal aid for all private law children cases, which we believe would be a disproportionate response. There is already the potential for section 37 directions to be made in cases involving litigants in person under the present system, but as I have said, legal aid is available and will be in future to challenge such a direction.

A significant number of comments were made in relation to amendment 74. The hon. Member for Hammersmith (Mr Slaughter) indicated that he will want to press it to a Division, so I will spend some time on it. I agree that it is an important matter. He said that he understands our intent. Does he understand that we need to have savings in legal aid? I am not sure what he meant when he said that he understands our intent—[Interruption.] He says that he will address that in a later debate, but I think that it is quite an important issue. In contrast to what he said, his right hon. Friend the shadow Secretary of State recognised in an article published only this morning that

“cuts need to be made”.

Looking at the amendments tabled by Opposition Members, I cannot see where those cuts will be made. We have had a little look at what they are proposing. The estimated costs of the Opposition amendments are: £20 million in debt matters, £5 million in employment matters, £15 million in housing matters, £25 million in welfare benefits matters, £10 million in clinical negligence matters and £170 million in family law matters. The total is £245 million. The taxpayer deserves to know where the money for that will come from.

Let me address the actual effect of amendment 74. To set out in the Bill the circumstances as specified in the amendment that should be accepted as evidence of domestic violence for the purposes of legal aid for the victim in a private family law case would mean that those circumstances, but not those that the Government intend to accept as evidence of domestic violence, would be set out in primary legislation. The Government would therefore have no power at all to amend those circumstances through secondary legislation. They would be in addition to any circumstances set out in secondary legislation for providing appropriate evidence of abuse. We expect that significantly more cases would receive funding if the circumstances set out in either amendment were accepted as evidence. The hon. Member for Edinburgh East (Sheila Gilmore) and others mentioned their concern about the issue of incentives for false allegations of domestic violence, but we received a significant number of responses to the consultation that expressed concern that there might be a rise in unfounded allegations of domestic violence, and the respondents expressing such concerns included the Law Society and the Bar Council.

[Fiona Mactaggart]

The hon. Gentleman is concerned that there might be a rise in unfounded allegations of domestic violence, but does he accept that if his proposals go through there will be an increase in the number of women who are victims of domestic violence and unable to access legal aid?

[Mr Djanogly]

No. Our proposals are aimed at ensuring that those who are subjected to domestic violence are kept within the scope of legal aid.

Many hon. Members have said, “Shouldn’t any incident of abuse trigger legal aid?” Some have said that we should limit it, and the hon. Member for Hammersmith has put in certain but, given his amendment, not very many limitations. The hon. Member for Edinburgh East accused me of being obsessed with false claims. I am not, but we need to appreciate that such a provision would have serious financial consequences, as it would lead to funding in cases in which the abusive behaviour, although unacceptable, might be very marginal.

Clearly, a single incident of abuse can be very serious, but a single one-off incident of non-physical abuse, such as angry and upsetting words spoken during an argument, can be relatively minor, because they have no real effect on the victim’s ultimate ability to face the other party in proceedings.

On amendment 74, specifically, my hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon, my right hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Tom Brake) and my hon. Friends the Members for Ipswich and for Maidstone and The Weald (Mrs Grant) asked whether we would accept undertakings given in civil proceedings as evidence of domestic violence, and I will look at that issue further. The Government’s current position is that a person can give an undertaking, for instance not to be violent towards family members, without admitting to domestic violence, meaning that undertakings may be given in cases where domestic violence has not taken place. We do not think that undertakings would provide sufficiently clear objective evidence that domestic violence has occurred, but we shall look into that further.

My hon. Friend the Member for Maidstone and The Weald also asked whether the fact that the definition of abuse is not specific will make its use more difficult in court, but the definition in the Bill will not be used in proceedings for domestic violence orders under the Family Law Act 1996. There is no definition at all of domestic violence in the 1996 Act, but the courts have experienced no difficulties, so neither the Bill’s definition nor the ACPO definition will be used in such proceedings.

The hon. Member for Hammersmith discussed a finding of fact in a family law court, and he asked how people would get legal aid in that context. They will not get legal aid to bring the case, as legal aid will be triggered only when the court has made a finding of fact, but an applicant will be able to submit written evidence of any abuse if relevant to proceedings, and a judge will be able to intervene to prevent inappropriate questioning.

Several hon. Members, including the hon. Gentleman, made a series of points about the specifics of amendment 74, so let me deal with those, including what would be accepted from various people as evidence in order to qualify for domestic violence. Accepting police cautions would be inconsistent with our proposal to include in the criteria “criminal convictions unless that conviction is spent”, as simple cautions are not convictions and become spent immediately.

A harassment warning is notice that a complaint has been received by the police; it is not considered to be proof that an offence has occurred, and police are not obliged to investigate the allegation. We therefore do not consider that harassment warnings would provide sufficiently clear objective evidence that domestic violence has occurred.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Alan Beith]

What that 61% success rate on appeal demonstrates is a bad decision-making system. Ought not the Minister be more sympathetic to the Justice Committee’s view that Departments that make their decisions so badly that they generate large numbers of successful appeals should be penalised, perhaps even to the extent of contributing to a fund for the advice agencies that help the people who are affected?

[Mr Djanogly]

My right hon. Friend makes a good point. High levels of successful appeals perhaps show that too many cases are going before the tribunals in the first place. The other day, I saw a figure of about 80% for special educational needs tribunals, which was not very impressive either. I can also tell him that I am personally engaging with Ministers in the Home Office, the Department for Work and Pensions and the Department for Education with the specific intention of getting them to work with the Department of Justice to improve their initial decision making. I am pleased to say that they are all are working with us, and that they want to make the system better. This is a matter of significant concern to me, not least because I would like to see fewer appeals relating to my Department coming through the courts and tribunals.

The hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) talked about domestic violence, immigration and legal aid. She also talked about people who fall outside the domestic violence immigration rule, such as EEA nationals. As I mentioned earlier, we are looking at cases of EEA spouses who have suffered dramatic abuse. The right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd mentioned immigration judicial reviews. I think that he accused the Government of putting appellants into a Catch-22 situation because legal aid would not be available for immigration appeals or for some judicial reviews. I can tell him, however, that people will still be able to appeal immigration decisions themselves and, as is often the case at the moment, they will still be able to get legal aid for a subsequent judicial review, as long as it is not on exactly the same or substantially similar issues, or on a removal direction. As I said earlier, we are making various exceptions to the exclusions, which will include ensuring that, when there has been no possibility of an appeal, legal aid will remain for judicial review.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark raised various points about immigration, and I will write to him about those. He specifically mentioned children, as did other hon. Members, so I shall briefly address that point. In most immigration cases, a child’s interests are represented by their parent or guardian. Most cases in which a child is unaccompanied involve an asylum claim, and legal aid will remain for those cases as at present. Unaccompanied children with an asylum or immigration issue would have a social worker assigned to them, whose role would include helping the child to gain access to the same advice and support as a child who was permanently settled in the UK. They could also offer assistance with filling in forms and explaining terms, and give emotional support. Legal support in such immigration cases may be found, if needed, from law centres and from pro bono legal representation. The Refugee Council provides services for separated children, which can include litigation friends.

A number of hon. Members asked how we justified plans that could disproportionately affect women. That question has also been asked in relation to disabled people, ethnic minorities and people who live in rural areas. The equalities impact assessment, published alongside the Government’s response to consultation, sets out our analysis of how the reforms will affect people with protected characteristics as set out in the Equality Act 2010. We have identified the potential for the reforms to have a greater impact on some groups, but we believe that those impacts are proportionate, and justified by the need to meet our objectives, including the pressing need to make savings from legal aid. We are also keeping discrimination claims relating to a contravention of the Equality Act 2010 within the scope of legal aid, which we consider will make a significant contribution to the fulfilment of our public sector equality duty.

The hon. Member for Stretford and Urmston asked about the removal of legal aid in many family cases, which she said would remove access to justice from many people. She asked how that could be right. Legal aid will remain available for family mediation and private family law cases, including private law children and family proceedings and ancillary relief proceedings. We want to encourage more use of such mediation. In ancillary relief cases, courts will be able to make orders for payment against a third party or a party who has the means to fund the costs of representation for the other party. Removing costly and often unnecessary legal aid does not mean removing access to justice. Litigants in person already feature in the justice system. Judges and magistrates currently assist litigants in person without compromising their impartiality, and we expect that to continue.

Finally, I was asked whether we expect all cases to be resolved through mediation. As I said earlier, the answer is categorically no. Cases involving domestic violence and child abuse, and emergency cases will still not be required to go through mediation. In addition, exceptional funding will be available when necessary for the UK to meet its international and domestic legal obligations via a proposed scheme for excluded cases. On that note, I rest my case.

Amendment 10 agreed to.

[Mr Elfyn Llwyd]

I beg to move amendment 80, page 99, line 21, leave out ‘other than’ and insert ‘including’.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Buckland]

I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull East (Karl Turner), who speaks from professional and personal experience on these matters. I am profoundly grateful to him for his candour and passion. I am also grateful to the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd (Mr Llwyd), a fellow practitioner from Wales, who has considerable experience of these matters.

I rise to reinforce some of the points that have been made about some aspects of the proposed reforms. I am sure that my hon. Friend the Minister will accept that it is difficult to define an exceptional case. By the very nature of the category that the Legal Services Commission uses to deal with exceptional cases, they are indefinable. I accept that he will therefore find it difficult to assure us categorically that all cases that cause proper concern—particularly the complex cases involving young children who have had difficulties at birth—will be covered by the Government’s proposals.

We are right to raise these concerns. Clinical negligence cases are somewhat unusual in that the expenditure is incurred at the beginning. The firms of solicitors dealing with such cases are often not the big firms that live in the City of London, but the firms of partners who have developed a degree of experience in such cases and who understand how to relate to the families of people who have suffered from alleged clinical negligence. However, such firms do not necessarily have the resources to enable them to spend lots of money on the preliminary medical investigations that are essential in preparing the ground in such cases.

I support the remarks made by my hon. Friend the Member for Hexham (Guy Opperman), who, in his excellent speech, raised the possibility of producing a joint report, at the beginning of each case, for the NHS—the defendant—and the claimant. That is a good point to make, but we are not in that position yet; we are still in an adversarial position. My deep worry is that a lot of cases will go without the necessary representation or help because those firms do not have the resources to dip into their pockets and to pay the thousands of pounds that are needed to prepare a case for making a claim.

I speak from experience, having served as a member of a funding review panel for some 10 years, and having dealt with appeals made by solicitors against the refusal or revocation of legal aid certificates in cases of clinical negligence. It would be wrong to say that a carte blanche exists at the moment. Even now, it is not easy for solicitors to satisfy the Legal Services Commission. I want to ask the Government to think carefully about the observations made by Members on both sides of the House, and to hesitate before seeking to implement the full thrust of these proposals.

There are several ways of dealing with this question. The first would be the full retention of legal aid for such cases. Another would be its retention for those aged 18 or under who are making claims against the NHS for clinical negligence. A further option would be to allow the provision of legal funding for initial advice and assistance in the preparation of reports before the commencement of any proceedings. Such an option would not cover representation, but it would deal with the preliminary stages. I ask the Government to consider those alternatives very carefully. I know that this matter will be hotly debated in another place, where I am sure full account will be taken not only of what we have said here tonight but of any observations that are made there.

[Mr Djanogly]

Let me first set out the scope of what we are talking about. Clinical negligence spend through legal aid in 2009-10 was about £17 million, consisting of around £1 million for legal help and around £16 million for representation. Closed-case volumes for legal representation in clinical negligence in 2009-10 were just over 2,300. It is estimated that removing clinical negligence from scope will save around £17 million per annum on legal help and representation, taking account of the exceptional funding regime and the estimated income from the supplementary legal aid scheme. Continued spend of £6 million through exceptional funding of the £16 million currently spent on representation in clinical negligence is foreseen. NHS figures for 2010-11 show that 82% of clinical negligence cases, where the funding method is known, were funded by means other than legal aid. That is the current situation.

The NHS Litigation Authority figures for 2010-11 show that of 2,002 legally aided claims, some 718 were claims for children, which represented 36% of claims funded through legal aid. Annexe B of the Government’s impact assessment on the reforms to conditional fee agreements sets out estimated savings of £50 million to the NHS Litigation Authority as a result of abolishing recoverability of success fees, and after-the-event insurance premiums.

[Amber Rudd (Hastings and Rye) (Con)]

On the impact assessment, have the Government assessed how many children who would previously have qualified for clinical negligence aid will no longer qualify when the changes go through?

[Mr Djanogly]

That is hard to say, because it depends on the extent to which children will come within the scope of exceptional funding, but we believe that the figure for exceptional funding will be £6 million, and that a significant proportion of that would be related to children’s claims. I will return to that.

The figure does not account for the NHS Litigation Authority paying after-the-event insurance premiums for policies covering the cost of expert reports in some cases. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Stephen Phillips) made that point very well. Based on figures published by the compensation recovery unit on claims settled, clinical negligence cases made up just over 1% of personal injury claims in 2010-11.

While Opposition Members were speaking, a thought came to my mind. Clinical negligence forms about 1% of the wider personal injury market. The last Government ended legal aid for personal injury claims, except in relation to clinical negligence. I am looking for help from Opposition Members because it is bizarre to hear them defend their position with such vehemence and conviction when their party scrapped 99% of this category. Let me develop the point.

Labour Members seem to be saying that if a drunk driver hit someone and caused brain damage, the injured person would not get legal aid. But if the same victim were brain-damaged to the same extent by a negligent doctor, they seem to be saying that that person should get legal aid—[Interruption.] If I have missed something, I am all ears. The hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull East (Karl Turner) may want to explain why I am wrong. The Opposition must find some consistency in their position.

[Mr Llwyd]

The difference between those two cases is that the person damaged by a drunk driver would undoubtedly claim against the Motor Insurers Bureau, and would be covered.

[Mr Djanogly]

The injured person could make a claim, but so could the person who suffered clinical negligence. The point is, as the hon. Gentleman knows, that the position is inconsistent.

We recognise that many clinical negligence cases involve serious issues, but for most a conditional fee agreement will be a suitable alternative to public funding. According to NHS figures for 2010-11, 82% of clinical negligence cases, where the funding method is known, were funded by means other than legal aid. That is the current position. We therefore consider that legal aid is not justified in such cases, and that our limited funding would be better targeted at other priority areas, such as those involving physical safety, liberty and homelessness. However, we have proposed an exceptional funding scheme to ensure that some individual clinical negligence cases will continue to receive legal aid when failure to do so would be likely to result in a breach of the individual’s right to legal aid under the Human Rights Act 1998 or European Union law.

In considering whether exceptional funding should be granted, we will take into account the client’s ability to present their own case, the complexity of the matter, the importance of the issues at stake, and all other relevant circumstances. As I said to my hon. Friend the Member for Hastings and Rye (Amber Rudd), our impact assessment estimates that we will continue to spend some £6 million of the £16 million that we currently spend on representation in clinical negligence cases.

[Sarah Newton (Truro and Falmouth) (Con)]

I understand the point that my hon. Friend is trying to make, but there is still great concern among my hon. Friends about what help will be available for vulnerable young children who have experienced harm as a result of medical negligence. Can he help us to understand that?

[Mr Djanogly]

As I have said before, we estimate that the vast majority of the £6 million will be for complex and lengthy cases that concern cerebral palsy, brain-damaged children or adult paralysis. We believe that no-win conditional fee agreements will still be available to fund these claims in the new regime. In addition, our reforms provide for a power allowing recoverability of after-the-event premiums in clinical negligence claims to help cover the cost of expert reports in complex clinical negligence cases. We have also announced plans to implement qualified one-way cost shifting in clinical negligence cases, which would mean that claimants would not be at risk of paying their opponents’ costs, as is the case with legal aid. Where CFAs are not available, the exceptional funding scheme will allow funding to be granted in individual excluded cases where the failure to provide funding would be likely to result in a breach of the individual’s human rights.

[Neil Carmichael]

CFAs are awarded in circumstances where the parents will be in a state of considerable grief, or at least have a huge amount of concern, about the well-being of their child, so will there be a sensitive enough arrangement for making the awards and assessing the circumstances?

[Mr Djanogly]

Indeed. As is currently the case, the solicitors awarding the CFA would have to look at the merits and decide whether they wanted to proceed with it. Obviously, the person has to want to instruct the solicitor and the solicitor has to want to take the case; it would cut both ways.

There have been a lot of comments about what assessment has been made of the effects on the NHS of removing clinical negligence from the scope of legal aid. In response to a parliamentary question, the Department of Health indicated that

“the potential effect on the national health service of removing clinical negligence from the scope of Legal Aid will be cost neutral.”—[Official Report, 14 September 2011; Vol. 532, c. 1231W.]

In annexe B of the impact assessment on the reforms, we estimate savings of £50 million to the NHS Litigation Authority as a result of the abolition. My officials are in ongoing consultations and discussions with the NHSLA and stakeholders about how the commissioning of expert reports can be improved so that, for instance, joint reports can be commissioned wherever possible. This, in turn, would help to encourage early notification of claims.

One particular aspect of clinical negligence cases is the significant up-front costs involved in obtaining expert reports. Following consultation, the Government are seeking a tightly drawn power in the Bill to allow the recoverability of after-the-event insurance premiums in clinical negligence cases. The details will be set out in regulations. My hon. Friend the Member for Hexham (Guy Opperman), who lent us the benefit of his considerable experience in the clinical negligence field, made some important points in this regard.

We have to make some difficult choices about legal aid, and we need to focus our limited resources on those who need it most.

[Claire Perry (Devizes) (Con)]

Will the Minister clarify whether eligibility will be income based or based on the child’s condition, vulnerability or need?

[Mr Djanogly]

My hon. Friend’s point goes back to children and their eligibility on the basis of income. A certificate is issued in the name of the minor or the patient and it is their resources that are assessed in the normal way, not those of the litigation friend, children’s guardian or guardian ad litem who is bringing or defending the proceedings on their behalf.

However, in family cases where the applicant for funding is a child, the resources of a parent, guardian or any other person who is responsible for maintaining him or her, or who usually contributes substantially to his or her maintenance, are required to be treated as his or her resources unless, having regard to all the circumstances, including the age and resources of the child and any conflict of interest, it appears inequitable to do so. The applying solicitor should submit appropriate means forms for the child and parents or others responsible for or contributing to his or her maintenance or, more usually in the first instance, explain in the application itself why non-aggregation of means would be appropriate in the circumstances of the particular case, having regard to the position of each of the parents or others on the issues in the case and the party status of the child.

Where children have sufficient understanding to decide that they want to seek an order in family proceedings for themselves and actually start proceedings, there may be no conflict with one or both parents and it may be reasonable to take the means of the parents, or one of them, into account. However, where a child is joined as a party in ongoing proceedings by an order of the court, the assessing officer is likely to accept that the party status of the child justifies non-aggregation.

I hope that that answers my hon. Friend’s point.

[Guy Opperman]

On the tricky issue of cerebral palsy among children, would the Minister consider persuading NHS trusts in all such cases, of which there are not many, to commission an independent report as a first step, before any application for legal aid is made?

[Mr Djanogly]

My response to that applies more broadly than to just cerebral palsy. We believe that the NHS Litigation Authority should more frequently take the initiative in the preparation of reports. Where possible, there should be joint reports, not least to help cases along more swiftly.

Our approach means that public funding will not be available for each and every claim involving a public authority, but it will be available for the most serious cases and to address serious abuses. Most claims for damages will be removed from the scope of legal aid because we have sought to focus our limited resources on cases where the client’s life, liberty, physical safety or home is at risk. Therefore, we do not consider that most claims seeking financial compensation from public authorities merit public funding. However, the Bill ensures that legal aid is available for the most serious damages claims that concern an abuse of position or power, or a significant breach of human rights by a public authority.

[Mr Desmond Swayne (New Forest West) (Con)]

That is the third time that my hon. Friend has referred to human rights. It is as if he was deliberately rubbing salt into the wounds. Members would prefer it, certainly those on the Conservative Benches, if money was available for medical negligence cases, rather than for human rights cases.

[Mr Djanogly]

I am referring to human rights mainly in relation to exceptional cases where the money would indeed go towards satisfying someone’s medical negligence claim.

Other claims will be excluded from scope and alternative sources of funding, such as conditional fee arrangements, may be available for meritorious claims. I confirm for my right hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Tom Brake) that we always have an open mind on these issues. I am happy to engage with him as the Bill progresses.

[Mr Slaughter]

It is good to hear the Minister talking about possible future concessions in this area. To be fair to him, he has always said that the Government’s aim is to protect the most vulnerable. How does he square that with the fact that he has orchestrated the talking out of the main group of amendments today, which affects many of the lowest-income and most vulnerable people in this country? Why are we not getting on to talking about other areas of social welfare law? Is it to protect the hon. Member for South Swindon (Mr Buckland), whose law centre is losing all its funding? Is it to protect the Minister’s coalition allies from withdrawing—

[Mr Speaker]

Order. I think that we have got the gist of it.

[Mr Djanogly]

I say to the hon. Gentleman that I have enjoyed listening to my hon. Friends and to some of his hon. Friends this evening, in what has been a very informed debate. We have heard some expert contributions, not least from my hon. Friend the Member for Hexham, who started by saying that he had acted in 100 clinical negligence cases. I do not think that there has been any time wasting at all—not nearly as much time wasting as when the hon. Gentleman held a three-hour debate on the first group of amendments on the first day in Committee.

[Mr Slaughter]

We spent the first 10 minutes of this debate talking about the Minister’s declaration of interests, which was very substantially overdue. All I would say to him, as a last contribution, is that many people will be watching this debate tonight, particularly in another place. They will draw their own conclusions from his unwillingness to debate those issues.

[Mr Djanogly]

I hope those many people will be as unimpressed as I am by what the hon. Gentleman just said.

Let me address the interaction of legal aid and the Jackson proposals, which was mentioned by three or four hon. Members. In addition to reforming legal aid, the Government are introducing fundamental reform of no win, no fee conditional fee agreements, as recommended by Lord Justice Jackson. During the consultation on his recommendations, concerns were raised about the funding of expert reports in clinical negligence cases. Those reports can be expensive and we need to provide a means of funding them to ensure that meritorious claims can be brought by those who cannot readily afford to pay for them up front. That is why, in making changes to the CFA regime, we are making special arrangements for the funding of expert reports in clinical negligence claims.

The hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull East suggested that victims of clinical negligence who take their cases on CFAs will lose their damages in legal fees. As recommended by Lord Justice Jackson, we are reforming CFAs because of the high costs introduced by changes that were made by the previous Government in relation to the recoverability of success fees and after-the-event insurance. Lord Justice Jackson recommended that there should be a cap on damages in personal injury cases that can be taken in lawyer success fees—the cap should be 25% of the damages, not including damages for future care and loss. The Government have accepted that recommendation, so that victims of personal injury, including from clinical negligence, will have their damages protected under CFAs.

The Civil Justice Council is looking at some of the technical aspects of implementing the Jackson recommendations. I spoke with it on this issue only this morning, when I also attended a conference on issues such as how the 25% cap will work to protect damages.

The hon. Gentleman said that the proposal would be fairer if the Government were not introducing the Jackson reforms, and asked why we were implementing both at the same time. We are considering all those major changes together and in the round. At the same time as seeking to make savings from the legal aid budget, we are taking forward those priority measures that were recommended by Lord Justice Jackson, to address the disproportionate and unaffordable cost of civil litigation. It is essential that those proposals are considered at the same time. The current CFA regime, with its recoverable costs, causes a significant burden on, for example, the NHS. Withdrawing legal aid for clinical negligence without reforming CFAs could increase that burden significantly.

The hon. Gentleman said that claimants in severe injury cases are more likely to be disabled and frail and so forth, and being unable to bring proceedings—[Interruption.]

[Mr Speaker]

Order. The Minister is not quite enjoying the studious attention of the House that I feel sure his words warrant.

[Mr Djanogly]

The hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull East asked how such cases can be excluded from scope. We consider that CFAs are a viable alternative source of funding to legal aid. CFAs are more readily available in clinical negligence cases than in cases for other types of claim that are currently funded under legal aid. We therefore consider that legal aid is not justified in such cases, and that our limited funding will be better targeted at other priority areas.

It was also said that such claims are not just money claims, and that damages ensure quality of life for the claimant for the remainder of their lives, and hon. Members asked how it can therefore be right to exclude them. Legal aid is currently available to those who qualify financially and who have suffered negligent medical treatment to seek damages from any type of public or private medical practitioners. Although those are claims for monetary compensation, we consider that they often raise very serious issues, especially when the damages are required to meet future needs. Some litigants will be vulnerable because of disabilities that result from negligent treatment.

We were then asked how the Government could expect CFAs to make up the shortfall, given that they would not be available in a large number of cases, such as those involving long-term impairment. Our legal aid proposals would ensure that particular cases in which it might be difficult to secure a CFA continue to receive legal aid where the failure to provide such funding was likely to result in a breach of the individual’s rights.

European Account Preservation Order

Jonathan Djanogly Excerpts

Monday 31st October 2011 Written Statements

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Mr Jonathan Djanogly)]

My right hon. Friend, the Minister of State, Lord McNally, has made the following written ministerial statement:

The Government have today decided not to opt in to the European Commission’s proposed regulation creating a European Account Preservation Order to facilitate cross-border debt recovery in civil and commercial matters.

The aim of the Commission’s proposal is to establish a self-standing European procedure for a protective measure to freeze the bank accounts of debtors in cross-border cases. The Government welcome the Commission’s objective. It supports measures which make it easier for both businesses and citizens to resolve disputes and enforce judgments across borders. Many of those who responded to the Government’s recent consultation on this proposal also welcomed its aims and agreed with the Commission that a procedure which made it easier for claimants to take protective measures in cross-border cases would be useful to both individuals and businesses in helping them to recover debts.

However, the consultation also revealed a number of significant problems, in particular a widespread concern that there was a lack of adequate safeguards for defendants. Issues highlighted included that the threshold for obtaining an order was too low, that there is no requirement for the claimant to provide any security to compensate a defendant for losses suffered from the wrongful grant of an order, and that there should be more discretion for courts when deciding whether to issue an order or the amount for which it should be granted.

Given the apparent ease with which an order might be obtained fears were expressed about the possible dangers posed to companies which were in the process of restructuring or rescue where the freezing of a bank account could undermine the rescue and make insolvency more likely.

Concerns were also raised about the burdens the proposal is likely to place on both the Government and banks, in particular through the provisions of access to information on bank accounts.

Although the Government have decided that the UK should not opt in to the proposal now, it intends to participate fully in the negotiations with the hope that sufficient changes will be made to enable a post-adoption opt in.

Deaths of Service Personnel Overseas

Jonathan Djanogly Excerpts

Monday 31st October 2011 Written Statements

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Mr Jonathan Djanogly)]

My hon. Friend the Minister for the Armed Forces and I wish to make the latest of our quarterly statements to the House giving details of the inquests of service personnel who have died overseas. We remain deeply grateful to all of our service personnel who have served, or are now serving, in Iraq and Afghanistan.

We wish once more to express our sincere condolences to the families of those service personnel who have given their lives for their country in connection with the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and in particular the six service personnel who have died since our last statement. Their families, and all the bereaved families, will remain in our thoughts.

Today we are announcing the current status of inquests conducted by the Wiltshire and Swindon coroner, the Oxfordshire coroner, and other coroners in England and Wales. This statement gives the position at 21 October 2011.

To supplement this statement I have placed tables in the Libraries of both Houses, outlining the status of all cases and showing the date of death in each case. The tables also provide information about cases where a board of inquiry or a service inquiry has been held.

Our Departments will continue working closely together to improve our processes. We will continue the Government’s support for coroners who are conducting inquests into operational deaths, and we are grateful to them and their staff for their dedicated work. We wish to express our thanks to all those who provide support and information, both throughout the inquest process and afterwards.

Since October 2007 both Departments have provided additional resources for operational inquests. These resources have been provided to the Wiltshire and Swindon coroner, Mr David Ridley, as prior to 1 September 2011 repatriation of service personnel took place at RAF Lyneham. These measures have been provided to ensure that there is not a backlog of operational inquests. As I confirmed in the last statement, we are also providing additional resources to the Oxfordshire coroner, Mr Nicholas Gardiner, as repatriation ceremonies for those killed on operations overseas now take place at RAF Brize Norton, within his district.

Current status of inquests

Since the last statement there have been 18 inquests into the deaths of service personnel on operations in Iraq or Afghanistan.

A total of 498 inquests have been held into the deaths of service personnel who have lost their lives in Iraq and Afghanistan, including 15 service personnel who died in the UK of their injuries. In three further cases, no formal inquest was held. In two of these cases the deaths were taken into consideration during inquest proceedings for those who died in the same incident. In the third case, where the serviceman died of his injuries in Scotland, it was decided not to hold a fatal accident inquiry.

Open inquests

Fatalities in Iraq and Afghanistan

There are currently 61 open inquests to be concluded into the deaths of service personnel who died in Iraq and Afghanistan and one inquest is yet to be opened. Eighteen of these involve deaths in the last six months. The Wiltshire and Swindon coroner has retained 18 of the remaining open inquests, and 34 are being conducted by coroners closer to the next of kin. Hearing dates have been set in 12 cases.

There is one remaining open inquest into deaths from operations in Iraq.

Inquests into the deaths of service personnel who returned home injured

Nine inquests remain to be held of service personnel who returned home injured and subsequently died of their injuries. Five hearing dates have been set. The remaining four cases will be listed for hearing when the continuing investigations are completed.

We shall continue to inform the House of progress with the remaining inquests.

Cost Protection for Litigants (Environmental Judicial Review Cases)

Jonathan Djanogly Excerpts

Wednesday 19th October 2011 Written Statements

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Mr Jonathan Djanogly)]

I am publishing the consultation paper “Cost Protection for Litigants in Environmental Judicial Review Cases” on 19 October 2011.

This is a formal consultation exercise undertaken by the Ministry of Justice to seek views on the Government’s proposals to codify the current case law on protective costs orders (PCOs) in relation to judicial review claims which fall under the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (the “Aarhus Convention”), including those covered by the Public Participation Directive (Directive 2003/35/EC) (the “PPD”). PCOs are orders developed by the courts which are designed to set a predetermined limit on a claimant’s exposure to a defendant’s costs.

The courts currently retain discretion on both the question of whether a PCO should be granted and the level at which it should be set. The Government have accepted for some time that it would be in the interests of applicants in environmental judicial review cases to provide greater clarity about the level of costs through a codification of the rules on PCOs which sets out the circumstances in which a PCO will be granted and the level at which it will be made.

The proposals in this consultation are designed to establish the basic principles for rules setting out the nature and content of a PCO in a “standard case” and how far, and in what circumstances, it will be possible to depart from the “standard case”.

To keep the overall level of costs down it is also proposed that where a cap on the claimants’ exposure is granted there should also be a linked cap on the liability of the defendant for the claimants’ costs (known as a “cross-cap”).

Copies of the consultation paper are available online, at: www.justice.gov.uk.

The consultation period will be from 19 October 2011 until 18 January 2012 and I will make a further statement regarding the response shortly after the consultation period ends.

Lasting Power of Attorney Donees

Jonathan Djanogly Excerpts

Tuesday 18th October 2011 Written Statements

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Mr Jonathan Djanogly)]

Under section 10(2) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (the Act), an individual who is bankrupt may not be appointed as donee of a lasting power of attorney (LPA) in relation to P’s property and affairs.

The bankruptcy of a donee is also one of the prescribed grounds for an objection to be made to the Public Guardian against the registration of a lasting power of attorney, where the power relates to P’s property and affairs.

Baroness Ashton of Upholland made the following statement in Committee Stage during the Act’s passage through Parliament:

“We have therefore decided that the Office of the Public Guardian will check to see if prospective financial attorneys are bankrupt when an LPA is to be registered. That information will be available to the Office of the Public Guardian throughout and should make it unnecessary for the donee to agree a statement to that effect or for it to be included on the notification. If the donee is bankrupt, then the LPA is invalid. That will achieve the noble Earl's objective” [Official Report, House of Lords, 27 January 2005; Vol. 668, c. 1417-1418.]

In the light of this statement, and although there is no statutory obligation to carry out these extra insolvency checks, this has been the practice of the Office of the Public Guardian since the implementation of the Act in 2007.

The Public Guardian has recently made an assessment of the effectiveness and value of this checking process. From 1 April 2010 to 31 March 2011, over 152,000 LPAs were registered and subject to a search on the ISBR. Of all these checks however, only one attorney was found to have been bankrupt at the point of registration. In addition, these checks can only ever identify bankruptcy at the point of registration—not at any other point in the ongoing life of the LPA as a legal document.

Given the nugatory work and the additional bureaucracy, this practice will cease with immediate effect. Objections to registration of an LPA on the grounds of a donee’s bankruptcy may still be made and in such circumstances the Public Guardian will not register the instrument in line with the Act’s requirements.