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Written StatementsMy right hon. Friend the Senior Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Baroness Warsi, has made the following written ministerial statement:
Today, on 10 December, UN human rights day, I will host the London launch of the UK’s campaign for election to the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) for January 2014 to December 2016.
The UK is committed to strengthening the UN’s mechanisms for driving progress on international adherence to human rights standards, demonstrated by our constructive and thorough approach to our universal periodic review, led by the Ministry of Justice in May. Membership of the HRC would reaffirm our commitment to human rights and fundamental freedoms across the world.
We have been a strong supporter and active contributor to the HRC since its inception in 2006. Through the HRC, we have been able to turn rhetoric on human rights into accountability and lasting change, leading initiatives on issues including the prevention of torture and combating intolerance. Though the HRC, we have called to account those countries who commit the most serious and widespread violations against their own citizens, for example in Belarus, Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Most recently, the HRC has been at the forefront of the international response to the crisis in Syria, mandating the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Syria to investigate human rights violations and abuses. Membership of the HRC will help ensure the UK stays at the front of efforts to hold those responsible for crimes in Syria to account.
We would use a place at the table to promote appropriate attention to country situations and to priority human rights themes. We would fight hard against those who seek to weaken or undermine international human rights mechanisms.
Throughout our campaign we will focus on four key human rights priorities: protecting those most vulnerable in societies, working towards human dignity for all, responding proactively to evolving challenges, and keeping human rights at the heart of multilateral priorities.
This year, Ministers agreed the HRC should be the UK’s top priority international election for 2013. A budget of £30,000 has been allocated between this and one other priority international election the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ).
For colleagues who are interested, I have today placed a more detailed background note in the Libraries of both Houses.
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Written StatementsMy right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and I will attend the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) on 10 December, and I will attend the General Affairs Council (GAC) on 11 December in Brussels. The Foreign Affairs Council will be chaired by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Baroness Ashton of Upholland, and the General Affairs Council will be chaired by the Cypriot Presidency.
Foreign Affairs Council (FAC)
EU-Russia Summit
Ministers will discuss the EU-Russia summit which will be held in Brussels on 21 December. While I do not expect conclusions to be issued, we will aim to ensure that this meeting, the 30th such summit, delivers concrete results for the EU in its relationship with Russia. The discussion provides an opportunity for the UK to steer the EU’s objectives for the summit and to ensure discussion focuses on concrete achievable outcomes, such as: resolution of the Siberian overflight charges; movement on market reform; positive developments in the energy relationship; underlining member states’ concerns on human rights and democratic standards; and a more effective partnership for modernisation.
Western Balkans
Ministers will review the situation in the countries of the western Balkans, in advance of the discussion of EU enlargement at the GAC the following day. This will be an opportunity to consider the latest developments in the EU-facilitated dialogue between the Prime Ministers of Serbia and Kosovo: the UK welcomes the leadership of Baroness Ashton on this and is keen to see further improvement in the relations between the two sides. There may also be some discussion of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the pace of reform has recently slowed and renewed progress is badly needed, as well as consideration of the situations in Macedonia and Albania. I do not expect conclusions.
Southern Neighbourhood
There will be a discussion on Syria. Further to a UK drive to increase EU support to Syrian civil society, I anticipate that the European External Action Service (EEAS) will present its vision on how the EU can support civil society in coping with the consequences of the ongoing conflict and better prepare it for political transition. We also expect discussion on the relationship between EU member states and the newly formed Syrian National Coalition. Having successfully amended the EU arms embargo (and sanctions package) by setting a three-month renewal period, we will make fresh arguments in support of amending the arms embargo ahead of the March 2013 deadline in a way that offers sufficient flexibility to increase practical support to the Syrian opposition.
Ministers may also take stock of recent events in Libya, including how to support the priorities of the new Prime Minister, Ali Zidan, and his Government which have now taken office. There will be an opportunity to discuss the provision and co-ordination of international assistance to the new Libyan authorities.
The Council may discuss events in Egypt following President Mursi’s 22 November constitutional declaration. The situation on the ground is changing rapidly, but we will argue for the EU to respond appropriately to the latest developments and clearly underline support for continued progress towards democracy.
Middle East Peace Process
The discussions on the middle east peace process will focus on follow-up to the 29 November UN General Assembly resolution, including the EU’s response to the Israeli decisions to build 3,000 new housing units in East Jerusalem and the west bank, to unfreeze planning in the area known as E1 and to withhold tax revenue from the Palestinian authority. EU Ministers will also discuss facilitating a rapid return to credible negotiations in order to secure a two-state solution. We will reiterate our condemnation of the Israeli decision, underlining the threat this poses to the two-state solution, and stress the need to continue work to build on the May FAC conclusions. We will also emphasise the need for the US, with the strong and active support of the EU, to do all it can in the coming weeks and months to take a decisive lead and push the peace process forward urgently. Additionally, the UK will stress the need to build on the Gaza ceasefire and to address the underlying causes of the conflict including more open access to and from Gaza for trade as well as humanitarian assistance, and an end to the smuggling of weapons. The UK will support conclusions covering these points.
EU-US
This item has been re-scheduled from November’s FAC. Ministers will have the opportunity to discuss the EU’s priorities with the US following the US presidential elections on 6 November and the re-election of President Obama. I expect the discussion to cover a spectrum of leading international issues, including the global economy and a possible EU-US free trade deal.
Ukraine and Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
We also expect Ministers to agree conclusions on Ukraine and the DRC.
General Affairs Council (GAC)
There is a substantial agenda for the GAC in December. There is a legislative deliberation on the statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union; a presentation by the Commission on the annual growth survey; preparation for the European Council on 13 and 14 December; endorsement of the 18-month programme for the Presidencies of Ireland, Lithuania and Greece; and a discussion on enlargement, covering all potential candidates and including the adoption of EU common positions for the accession conference with Iceland. Due to the large agenda, I expect many of these items to be brief and I expect most of the discussion to focus on the preparation for the European Council on 13 and 14 December and on enlargement.
Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union
The Cypriot Presidency hopes to secure agreement on a selection method for additional judges at the general Court of the Court of Justice of the European Union: we have not yet received the final proposal for this. I remain concerned at the current backlog at the general Court, which is damaging to the interests of British business. My priorities in the discussion will be: to ensure that there is proportionate common law representation among any additional judges; that the costs of additional judges are covered within existing budgets; and that the selection method provides the Court with the stability it requires to function effectively.
European Semester and the Annual Growth Survey
The Commission will present key elements of the 2013 annual growth survey which can be found on the Commission’s website.
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/ags2013_en.pdf
The annual growth survey sets out the Commission’s views on the economic priorities for Europe for 2013, focusing on fiscal consolidation, promoting economic growth and employment. The survey, which represents the first stage of the 2013 European semester, focuses on growth-friendly fiscal consolidation measures across the EU. The European semester is the EU-wide framework for co-ordinating structural reforms and growth-enhancing policies. We do not expect this item to be opened for substantive discussion but, in the event that it is, I will be supporting the focus on growth.
Preparation for the December European Council
The agenda for the December European Council will cover: economic policy, including economic and monetary union and banking union; defence; enlargement; and foreign policy. The last two items are covered by the separate sections of this written ministerial statement on enlargement and on the Foreign Affairs Council.
The bulk of the European Council meeting will focus on agreeing a legislative framework for banking union and an agenda for further economic and monetary integration in the Eurozone.
At the December European Council the Prime Minister will seek to ensure the integrity of the single market at 27, including in the context of the banking union and the European Banking Authority. We will also press for further progress on growth and ensure that the timetable for further integration in the Eurozone progresses at the right pace and in the right way. I will argue that these concerns should be addressed prior to the December European Council so that solutions to these issues can be put to leaders on 13 and 14 December. The December European Council agenda item on defence will pave the way for further discussion in 2013. I will argue for a focus on developing capabilities, enhancing operational effectiveness and strengthening the European defence industry.
The 18-month programme for the Presidencies of Ireland, Lithuania and Greece
The GAC has been asked to endorse the 18-month programme of the Council. This sets out the combined programme for the Irish, Lithuanian and Greek Presidencies of the European Council covering the period January 2013 to June 2014. I expect the programme to be published shortly.
Enlargement
Ministers will seek to agree conclusions taking stock of progress on EU enlargement, and on the stabilisation and association process in the western Balkans. The Commission released their annual enlargement package on 10 October. In this communication, the Commission recommended: (i) opening accession negotiations with Macedonia; and (ii) granting Albania candidate-status subject to the completion of three specific measures and evidence of continued commitment in the fight against organised crime and corruption. We believe the communication to be a broadly fair and balanced assessment.
We will seek conclusions reconfirming the European Council’s support for EU enlargement and recognising that the accession process gives strong encouragement, to political and economic reform and reinforces peace, democracy and stability. We agree with the Commission’s view that closer relations with the EU should be based on the principles of delivery on commitments, fair and rigorous conditionality, and good communication with the public. We agree that key challenges remain for most enlargement countries, including in the area of the rule of law. We also support a focus on freedom of expression and regional co-operation, particularly for the western Balkans countries.
I set out the Government’s views on the Commission’s reports in my explanatory memorandum of 18 October. We will seek Council conclusions welcoming Croatia’s continued progress towards meeting all of its commitments in full before its expected accession on 1 July 2013, while reiterating the Commission’s call for Croatia to sharpen its focus to ensure this is achieved.
I will seek conclusions that provide a fair and balanced assessment of Turkey’s progress, which will inject much needed momentum into the process to allow accession negotiations to move forward in 2013. I will argue that Iceland should be commended on the progress made in accession negotiations this year, while recalling the need for Iceland to address existing obligations, such as those identified by the European Free Trade Association Surveillance Authority under the European economic area agreement.
I also expect the Council to welcome the opening of accession negotiations with Montenegro in June 2012, while calling for early progress in the area of the rule of law, in line with the new approach to accession negotiations endorsed by the Council in December 2011.
Following the FAC discussion of 10 December, the GAC will discuss the Commission’s enlargement package for the western Balkans countries. We remain fully supportive of a future for all of the western Balkans countries in the EU, once conditions are met. We want the European Council to commend good progress on reform in Macedonia through the high-level accession dialogue, and hope the European Council will be able to build on this by agreeing to the Commission’s fourth successive recommendation to open accession negotiations.
In the absence of a further report from the Commission, the December European Council will not be in a position to grant candidate status to Albania; we will want it to call on Albania to make early progress on reform implementation and establish a track record on tackling organised crime and corruption to enable a decision in 2013. I will argue for Council conclusions that underline that Serbia still needs to make real progress to deliver a “visible and sustainable improvement” in its relations with Pristina before accession negotiations can be opened, while noting that this remains in reach if recent progress continues. We want the Council to welcome the Commission’s assessment that a stabilisation and association agreement with Kosovo is feasible and to signal that negotiations should begin as soon as possible. We agree with the Commission’s assessment that Bosnia and Herzegovina’s progress on its EU agenda has stalled. We will want the Council to press the leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina to make progress and deliver quickly on those issues they themselves have agreed to, for example, on the EU road map agreed in June.
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Commons Chamber5. What recent discussions he has had with his EU counterparts on protecting the integrity of the single market.
I regularly discuss the single market with my counterparts both at bilateral meetings and in formal sessions of the Council.
With the Prime Minister increasingly marginalised and nobody believing a word that comes out of the Scottish First Minister’s mouth, what can the Minister do to protect the £9.7 billion of exports from Scotland to the EU, and to ensure that there is a credible single market in future?
I fear that the hon. Gentleman wrote his question before he saw the outcome of the European Council at the end of last month. Given the emphasis he places on trade, I am sure he will have warmly welcomed our Prime Minister’s intervention to secure the free trade agreement between the EU and South Korea, which is already delivering opportunities for British businesses. I am sure he will also welcome the British Government’s strong support for the opening of trade negotiations between Europe and Japan, which was agreed last week.
Now that the penny has finally dropped within the eurozone that it cannot have monetary union without fiscal union, which in turn leads to closer political and economic union, what guarantees can the Government give that a caucus within the eurozone will not override UK interests within the single market?
This is something to which we are giving priority both in the immediate discussions on banking union and in all future negotiations on the future of the EU. I can give some reassurance to my hon. Friend. The requirements of the single market are written into the treaties and the terms of numerous items of EU legislation. On top of that, all 27 Heads of State and Government have made repeated commitments at European Councils that they are committed to defend the integrity of the single market.
But the Minister knows how important access to the single market is to our ability to attract foreign investment in, for example, car manufacturing. Surely he admits that there is a growing resistance in Europe to what is seen as the Government’s à la carte approach to their membership. Does he accept that that is becoming dangerous to our economic interests?
Our colleagues in the EU fully accept that we have taken a sovereign decision, which I thought was supported on both sides of the House, to stay out of the euro. It therefore follows that we do not take part in certain arrangements. However, I also find that my European counterparts are eager to work closely with us on measures to develop free trade further; to strengthen the single market—for example, to cover the digital economy, transport and energy—and to find ways to cut the cost and complexity of regulation, which applies to all European businesses.
There appear to be a number of siren voices now starting to question the value of the single market to the United Kingdom. Will the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, together with the Treasury and the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, do some detailed work to set out the exact value to the UK of our being part of the single market, and put that work in the Library?
A lot of this type of information is likely to emerge from submissions by businesses and their representative organisations to the balance of competences review which is now under way. To take one example, British car manufacturers would probably face tariffs of just under £1 billion a year were we to be outside the single market and paying the 10% tariff to export to the EU. Membership of the single market directly sustains jobs and prosperity in places such as Swindon, Solihull and Washington New Town.
7. What steps he is taking to encourage Israel to avoid civilian casualties in Gaza.
13. What discussions he has had with his EU counterparts on the UK’s position at the December 2012 European Council meeting on the development of a banking union.
I have made it clear to my colleagues in the European Union that while we accept that the eurozone needs a banking union, the detailed arrangements need to safeguard the interests of those member states that will not be part of the eurozone or of the banking union.
This Government are relatively friendless in Europe in this regard. How will they ensure that any agreement on a banking union will continue to allow the UK to stay in the room during negotiations on shaping the supervisory rules?
I reject the hon. Gentleman’s caricature of our position. We are playing an extremely active and constructive part in the negotiations. We recognise that getting the arrangements for a banking union sorted out is of real importance to our friends and partners who have committed themselves to the single currency, and that their financial stability will be of great benefit to the United Kingdom’s economic interests.
The International Monetary Fund’s Christine Lagarde said at the weekend that a banking union was the first priority in saving the eurozone. If the Minister agrees with that, will he tell us precisely how many EU states agree with his plan for double majority voting to ensure that rules applying to banks in Britain are not dictated by a banking union bloc through the European Banking Authority?
All 27 EU Heads of State and Government said in the conclusions to the October European Council that, in the arrangements for a banking union, there needed to be a “level playing field” between the ins and the outs, as well as safeguards
“in full respect of the integrity of the single market in financial services.”
Has my right hon. Friend had an opportunity to read the blueprint published over the weekend by Mr Barroso, which contains 50 pages of detailed proposals for a full banking, fiscal and, ultimately, political union? Does he think that any of the proposals that this country has made have the remotest chance of being listened to in the context of that document, and of what Mr Noyer said the other day? Lastly, will my right hon. Friend ensure that the European Scrutiny Committee receives an early explanatory memorandum from the Government on those proposals?
I know that the legendary intellectual agility of the Minister of State will enable him to provide one pithy reply to the three questions that have just been posed.
I read President Barroso’s comments with interest. He was of course talking not about the immediate negotiations on a banking union but about the longer-term development of the eurozone and how to safeguard its stability. That objective is in the interests of the United Kingdom, but it is true to say that at some stage there needs to be a sensible, grown-up conversation between all members of the EU to work out the right architecture for a future Europe in which some will be members of the single currency and others will remain outside it.
At the recent European Union Council, the UK held a quadrilateral meeting with the Danes, the Dutch, the Swedes and the Finns. Will the Minister take this opportunity to outline the areas of common interest with those nations, and to underscore the importance of joint working with our northern European neighbours?
We talk to our northern European neighbours and, indeed, to other member states about the whole range of issues on the agenda of any particular European Council meeting. The countries that are not in the single currency certainly have a common interest in ensuring that whatever arrangements the eurozone may agree—they are some distance from agreeing among themselves about the right design at the moment—they take proper account of the integrity of the single market and the interests of those who are not part of the euro.
Following the failure of the Government’s too little, too late approach to the recent EU budget negotiations and given the Government’s isolation in Europe, there are now indications that the Prime Minister is preparing to cede powers and influence over the eurozone banking union in return for minor tweaks to the EU budget. Is there not now a real risk that the Government will neither secure a good deal for British taxpayers nor deliver safeguards to British business on the banking union?
That was another script written before the European Council concluded. I have to say to the hon. Lady not only that this Government have a confirmed commitment and record of working to secure the national interest of the United Kingdom, but that that record sits in stark contrast with the record of the shadow Foreign Secretary, who gave away £7 billion of the United Kingdom’s rebate when he held this office.
T4. Do Ministers consider it a possibility that next year it could be a UK Government priority and a European Union priority to seek to end the division of Cyprus once its new President has been elected in February, given the good will that I understand exists in both communities in Cyprus—in part—in Turkey, and, I hope, in Greece?
I certainly hope that that will prove possible, but clearly a major new initiative must await the outcome of the Cypriot presidential election in February. I hope that whoever is elected will set ambitious goals, working with Turkish Cypriot leaders, the guarantor powers, the United Nations and others to bring about a settlement that would be profoundly in the interests of all communities on the island.
In view of heightened international anxiety about the possible use of chemical weapons in Syria, the United States has indicated that it is preparing contingency plans. Can the Foreign Secretary say whether the British Government’s assessment of that potential threat has been heightened in recent days, and whether the United Kingdom is contributing, or has already contributed, to international contingency planning?
T5. As chairman of the all-party group on Azerbaijan, yesterday I met representatives of the Azerbaijan Foundation of Democracy Development and Human Rights Protection. They made clear to me their strong desire to see the development of a free press in Azerbaijan. What can Britain and the British Government do to promote a free and unregulated press in Azerbaijan and the south Caucasus?
I share my hon. Friend’s view that a free press is integral to democracy in any country. The British Government have provided funding for professional training for journalists in Azerbaijan, and we support vigorously the work of the Council of Europe, the European Union and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe to encourage and promote media freedom both in Azerbaijan and more widely in the southern Caucasus region.
T3. On trade with the middle east, what discussions have been held with the European Commission on the labelling of settlement goods?
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Written Statements The Under-Secretary of State for Defence, my hon. Friend the Member for South West Wiltshire (Dr Murrison) responsible for international security strategy attended the European Defence Agency Steering Board and the Defence Foreign Affairs Council (Defence FAC) in Brussels on the morning of 19 November. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary attended the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) in Brussels on the afternoon of 19 November. They both attended a lunch for Foreign and Defence Ministers. I attended the General Affairs Council (GAC) in Brussels on 20 November.
Foreign Affairs Council, Defence Foreign Affairs Council, and related meetings
These meetings were chaired by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Baroness Ashton of Upholland. Commissioners Piebaigs (Development), Barnier (Internal Market and Services), and Füle (Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy) were also in attendance for some of the discussions.
A provisional report of the meetings and all conclusions adopted can be found at:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/133604.pdf.
European Defence Agency (EDA) Steering Board
An EDA Steering Board at Defence Ministers level was held immediately before the Defence FAC. Norway was present for the first time since signing a co-operation agreement with the EDA.
The Steering Board agreed the EDA work programme 2013 and the EDA work plan for 2013-15. In addition to these action points, the Steering Board endorsed a pooling and sharing code of conduct to be implemented voluntarily at national level and received an update on the interaction between defence and wider EU policies.
Defence Foreign Affairs Council
The three current EU military operations. Operation Atalanta (counter-piracy). Operation Althea (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and the EU training mission Somalia (military training mission) were discussed in the Council. The Minister expressed the UK’s support for these ongoing operations.
The Minister raised the UK’s desire to increase the utility of Battle groups including through better use of their constituent capabilities. The NATO Secretary-General was present throughout the operational discussions, focusing on the importance of EU and NATO co-operation.
Commissioner Barnier briefed Ministers on the work of the defence taskforce designed to foster a stronger and more competitive European defence industry ahead of the December 2013 European Council discussion on defence. The High Representative concluded that the issue deserved further attention in spring 2013 and that the EDA should continue to represent member states’ views on the taskforce.
The Minister successfully secured a budget freeze for the European Defence Agency (EDA) for 2013, making clear that in the current financial climate, when we were making cuts to the UK defence (and other) budgets, we must seek continuously to drive efficiency and scrutinise every pound spent on defence. For this reason, we could not accept a budget increase at this time. The Council subsequently agreed to freeze the EDA budget for 2013 at the same level as 2012 (€30.5 million).
Defence and Foreign Ministers Lunch
Mali
Foreign and Defence Ministers discussed the situation in Mali, including planning for a possible EU training mission. Ministers agreed conclusions on Mali, and recognised the need for EU action. UK Ministers stressed the need for adequate planning, including force protection and co-ordination with the planned Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) operation. The High Representative said that the European External Action Service (EEAS) would adapt the crisis management concept on this basis and that she was considering appointing an EU special representative for the Sahel.
2013 European Council on Defence
Ministers held an orientation debate in view of the substantial debate on defence matters that is set to take place at the European Council in December 2013.
Ministers endorsed the High Representative’s intention to frame the debate around the EU’s collective ambition to act as a security provider through the common security and defence policy (CSDP) as part of a comprehensive approach; to work closely with strategic partners to develop defence capabilities; and to innovate, notably through a strong industrial and technological base. UK Ministers stressed that a successful debate should focus on practical issues including how to ensure that Europe develops better defence capabilities; that our defence industrial base is well placed to produce these capabilities; and that we improve the delivery of CSDP missions and operations.
Foreign Affairs Council
Middle East Peace Process
Ministers agreed conclusions calling for an urgent de-escalation of the violence in southern Israel and Gaza; strongly condemning rocket attacks on southern Israel; and stressing the need for all sides to fully respect international humanitarian law. The conclusions stated that the current situation underlined once more the urgent need to move towards a two-state solution allowing both sides to live side-by-side in peace and security.
The High Representative urged EU unity on the possibility of a Palestinian application to the UN General Assembly to upgrade their status to that of a non-member observer state. The Foreign Secretary stated that if the Palestinians could not be persuaded to delay the EU should strive to maintain unity, and that whatever the outcome of the vote the EU should take an activist approach to reinvigorating the peace process.
Southern Neighbourhood
Ministers reviewed developments in Syria, Egypt, Libya, and Lebanon.
Ministers agreed conclusions on Syria, expressing their concern at the situation and its regional impact; welcoming the outcome of the Doha meeting; considering the national coalition for Syrian revolutionary and opposition forces as the legitimate representatives of the aspirations of the Syrian people; and committing to increased humanitarian assistance. The conclusions reiterated the full support of the EU to the efforts of the joint special representative of the UN and the League of Arab states, Lakhdar Brahimi, in finding a political solution to the crisis.
The conclusions also reiterated the EU’s commitment to increase further its humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of all affected population throughout Syria and refugees in neighbouring countries, bearing in mind the deteriorating humanitarian situation and the approaching winter, and called on all donors to do the same.
Ministers discussed the EU-Egypt Task Force. The High Representative was of the view that progress had been made.
On Libya, Ministers discussed the dispatch of a fact- finding mission on a potential CSDP border management mission following the formation of the new Libyan Government.
Ministers agreed conclusions on Lebanon condemning the recent violence; supporting the Lebanese institutions; calling on all parties to engage in dialogue; and commending Lebanon for its support to Syrian refugees and disassociating itself from the Syrian conflict.
Yemen
Ministers agreed conclusions on Yemen, welcoming the progress made in the first year of Yemen’s political transition; urging continued momentum; and criticising those seeking to derail the transition. Ministers welcomed pledges of economic support to Yemen and encouraged these to be translated into concrete action.
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
Ministers agreed conclusions that condemned the resumption of hostilities by the M23; demanded that external support to the M23 stop; delivered a clear message to the Government of the DRC that it needed to strengthen efforts to establish security and the rule of law in the east; encouraged the United Nations Organisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) in its role to protect civilians; and tasked the EEAS to present a strategic approach outlining how the EU could assist in resolving the crisis.
The High Representative updated the Council on the deteriorating situation in the eastern DRC following the advances by the M23 over the weekend. The situation was dire and humanitarian impacts severe. Commissioner Piebaigs agreed that the humanitarian situation was serious and worsening; there were an additional 650,000 internally displaced persons since the recent flare-up in violence.
Cuba
Ministers approved starting a process towards upgrading EU relations with Cuba. The High Representative noted that the existing framework for EU-Cuba relations, the common position, was 16-years-old and losing relevance. The EU needed to decide how best to engage in support of the ongoing reform process or it risked being left behind. An EU-Cuba agreement could codify existing elements of co-operation with Cuba and put it on a stronger footing. However, the High Representative noted the need to proceed cautiously given remaining concerns over human rights. The process should be stoppable and the existing common position should remain in place throughout any negotiations on a new agreement.
Ukraine
Ministers discussed the situation in Ukraine following the parliamentary elections of 28 October. They also considered how to take forward the EU-Ukraine relationship, including the association agreement and deep and comprehensive free trade agreement. The High Representative concluded that Ministers might need to consider the issue further at the December Foreign Affairs Council.
EU-US
A planned discussion of the United States was removed from the agenda due to time constraints.
Other business
Ministers agreed without discussion a number of others measures, including:
Noting the single progress report on the development of the EU military capabilities from November 2011 to October 2012.
Noting the report by the head of European Defence Agency about its efforts for improving the defence capabilities of participating member states.
Adoption of guidelines for the European Defence Agency’s work in 2013.
Adoption of conclusions on the development of military capabilities.
Approval of a draft security arrangement between the European Space Agency Security Office and the European Defence Agency Security Office for the protection and safeguarding of classified information exchanged between the European Space Agency and the European Defence Agency.
Allocation of €1.86 million from the EU budget to support arms export control in third countries.
Approval of the 13th progress report on the implementation of the EU strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons and their ammunition, covering activities during the first half of 2012.
Noting the annual report on the control of military technology and equipment exports, in accordance with common position 2008/944/CFSP.
Adoption of conclusions on the review of Council common position on the EU arms export control framework
Approval of the EU’s position for the third review conference of the convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and their destruction (CWC), scheduled to take place in April 2013.
Adoption of conclusions on the action plan on visa liberalisation regarding the Republic of Moldova.
Adoption of conclusions establishing a human rights dialogue between the EU and South Africa.
Setting the ceiling for member states’ contributions to the European development fund for 2014, the annual amount of the contribution for 2013 and the amount of the first instalment of the contribution for 2013.
Adoption of conclusions endorsing the joint Caribbean-EU partnership strategy.
General Affairs Council
The GAC was chaired by the Cypriot EU Presidency, Mr Andreas Mavroyiannis, Deputy Minister for European Affairs. A provisional report of the meeting can be found at:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/genaff/133629.pdf
Informal dinner hosted by the President of the European Council
The night before the plenary session of the GAC the President of the European Council, Herman van Rompuy, hosted an informal dinner meeting to discuss the multi-annual financial framework (MFF) ahead of the special European Council on 22 and 23 November. This meeting gave member states the last opportunity to highlight their views on the draft European Council conclusions released on 13 November. Together with my like-minded colleagues, I argued that the proposed level of the MFF, at €973 billion commitments, was still too high at a time of fiscal austerity, and in excess of the UK’s demand of a real terms freeze on payments. I highlighted several areas of the budget, including the Connecting Europe Facility, which could see significant reductions from the Commission’s original proposal while still enabling above inflation increases.
The proposed text also included suggested changes to the Own Resources system, including to the UK rebate. I made clear that this, along with proposals to extend macro-economic conditionality to apply to the UK, was unacceptable.
Some other countries argued in favour of a larger budget, or for specific considerations for domestic priorities such as cohesion funding or the common agricultural policy.
Cohesion Policy Legislative package
On 20 November it was felt unnecessary to have further discussion on the MFF following the extensive exchange of views the previous evening. The first key item on the agenda was a discussion on cohesion policy where the presidency sought agreement to a partial general approach (PGA) to another legislative block. PGAs were agreed on 17 blocks at the GACs in April, June and October. These two additional blocks covered financial management and the common strategic framework; agreement of these final two blocks gave the presidency a mandate to enter into informal discussions with the European Parliament.
The Council was able to agree to the PGA on the basis that nothing was agreed until everything was agreed. Poland, Italy and Slovakia also submitted a statement calling for further political discussions on cohesion policy and sought for this commitment to be incorporated within legislation. Despite supporting the principle of further political discussion I argued that including this within legislation was unnecessary. I also asked for sufficient time to be provided to enable consultation with national Parliaments due to the ongoing difficulties we have had ensuring sufficient time for Parliamentary scrutiny. Despite these additional issues, the GAC was able to reach agreement on the PGAs in the spirit of compromise.
The presidency also presented its conclusions for the informal meeting of Ministers for cohesion policy which took place on 6 November.
European Commission Work Programme for 2013
The Commission set out the main elements of their proposed work programme for 2013. This included a sizable portion of the programme devoted to developing Economic and Monetary Union proposals. The Commission emphasised that they sought to focus on areas that could create stability and promote Europe’s competitiveness. The work programme included the Single Market II proposals and the Commission expressed their hope that these proposals could be agreed before the end of this European Parliament. There were other reforms cited, such as on climate change and energy policy, and establishing a European public prosecutor. The Commission also hoped to achieve trade deals with the US and Japan and for an ambitious agenda for 2013 on enlargement and neighbourhood policy.
Ireland, who will take on the EU Presidency in January, welcomed the proposals and emphasised the importance of progress on trade agreements and enlargement on which we will work closely with them. I argued that in all areas of EU business we would look for efforts to ensure that the regulatory burden is minimised, both through active consideration and through the use of rigorous impact assessments for each new proposal.
Preparation for the European Council on 13 and 14 December
In a follow-up to the 18 and 19 October European Council the President of the European Council, Herman van Rompuy, will send a letter on the single market to EU Leaders with an update and outline of action required at the European Council on 13 and 14 December to deliver the progress sought in the previous European Council conclusions.
The December European Council agenda covers Economic and Monetary Union proposals including on Banking Union, discussion of the Single Market Acts I and II, defence and enlargement. Foreign policy issues are also likely to be discussed but these will be determined closer to the time. The Commission hope the European Council will endorse the Single Market Act II, and make real progress on Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Capital Requirements Directive IV.
In this discussion I emphasised the need to maintain progress on these areas but also to ensure that the integrity of the Single Market is preserved. I also expressed the UK's support for an ambitious enlargement agenda that promotes stability in both candidate and neighbourhood countries.
I will continue to update Parliament on future Foreign Affairs Councils, Defence Foreign Affairs Councils, and General Affairs Councils.
(11 years, 8 months ago)
Written StatementsOn 5 December 2011, Official Report, column 6WS, I informed the House of our plans to make a large collection of colonial administration files available to the public over a two-year period.
We have today made the fourth tranche of files available for the public to view at the National Archives (TNA) at Kew. This marks the halfway point. I am pleased to confirm that we remain on track to complete the transfer of the entire collection of files to TNA by the end of 2013 as per the schedule published on the FCO website. As promised, we have kept redactions to an absolute minimum. I am very grateful to the independent reviewer, Professor Anthony Badger, for overseeing this work with such care and commitment.
It remains the case that the FCO is still unable to confirm the existence or destruction of 170 boxes of top secret colonial administration files known to have been returned to the UK. There is some evidence that the Singapore top secret colonial administration files were destroyed as part of a review of FCO post files in the 1990s. The FCO continues to search for these files or for further evidence of their destruction.
The work on the colonial files has, regrettably, caused a short-term backlog in the regular annual transfer of some FCO departmental files from 1981 and 1982. Additional staff resource has been allocated to tackle this. We will publish on the FCO website a timetable to transfer the remaining 1981 and 1982 files between 2013 and 2015.
In his statement to the House on 5 May 2011, Official Report, column 24WS, my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary undertook to implement in full the recommendations of the Cary review into the colonial administration files. These included an up-to-date inventory of the FCO’s archival holdings. This has brought to light a large accumulation of other material outside the FCO departmental file series, much of which is over 30-years-old and therefore overdue for review. The FCO has not identified any colonial administration files among these papers beyond those currently being transferred. In keeping with this Government’s commitment to transparency, we will be publishing a copy of the high-level inventory of these “Special Collections” on the FCO website. We remain fully committed both to complying with our public records obligations and to doing so with maximum transparency.
(11 years, 9 months ago)
Written StatementsI wish to inform the House that, further to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs’ oral statement launching the Balance of Competences Review—12 July 2012, Official Report, column 468 and written ministerial statement on 23 October 2012, Official Report, column 46W—the Foreign and Commonwealth Office is today publishing its call for evidence on the foreign policy aspects of the review.
The foreign policy report will be completed by June 2013 and will provide an analysis of the balance of competences between the EU and the UK in foreign affairs strategic defence issues and civil protection. The report will not produce specific recommendations and will not prejudge any future policy.
The call for evidence will be open until 28 February 2013. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office, working with other interested Departments, will take a rigorous approach to the collection and analysis of evidence. The call for evidence sets out the scope of the report and includes a series of questions on which contributors are asked to focus. Interested parties are invited to provide evidence, which will be published (subject to the provisions of the Data Protection Act) alongside the final report in June 2013.
As the review will be objective and evidence-based, it will be important to encourage a wide range of interested parties to contribute. The Department will therefore pursue an active engagement strategy, consulting widely across Parliament, the devolved Administrations, think-tanks, business and civil society in order to obtain evidence to inform our analysis. The EU institutions and our foreign partners will also be invited to contribute, as will members of the public.
I am placing this document and a copy of the call for evidence in the Library of the House. They will also be published on the Balance of Competences Review pages on the FCO website. If there are any further questions regarding the foreign policy report please consult the website or contact:
clive.hughes@fco.gov.uk (020 7008 3936/1670);
deepali.kulkarni@.fco.gov.uk (020 7008 5740); or
NEP-EU2@MOD.uk (02072182594) on defence issues; or
civilprotectioncompetence@cabinet-office.x.gsi.gov.uk (0207 276 0902) on civil protection matters.
(11 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberI have my hon. Friends, obviously, whose help and advice are always most welcome.
I look forward to the Minister’s response, but I am pretty confident that my interpretation is correct, and we therefore do not support the amendment.
I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Bury North (Mr Nuttall) for tabling the amendment. He was prompted to so by the seriousness of these issues, and the right hon. Member for Leicester East (Keith Vaz) rightly complimented him on that.
The issues that my hon. Friend spoke about are very important, and I can give him one immediate reassurance. He feared that this might be the last time that Parliament could discuss potential migration from Croatia and, indeed, other aspects of Croatia’s accession process, but there will be at least two further opportunities. First, next year, probably in the spring, the Home Office will bring forward the statutory instrument to provide the detail on and to implement the transitional arrangements on migration. That legislative instrument will have to be dealt with by the affirmative procedure, so I would expect a debate in a statutory instrument Committee, attendance at which is open to any Member of the House, and subsequent approval to be given by the House as a whole in the normal way, as for any other statutory instrument.
Secondly, next March we are expecting the European Commission to publish its third and final interim report on monitoring how Croatia has made progress with the various accession chapters of the negotiating process. That report will be subject to the normal parliamentary scrutiny process. It will go to the European Scrutiny Committee, and it will be open to the Committee, if it so chooses, to refer it for debate on the Floor of the House or in a European Committee.
Is that not the real issue? The reports from the European Commission that we have before us are full of hope, but they say, in effect, that Croatia is not compliant and that in some areas it is going backwards. The big issue on immigration is not what the hon. Member for Bury North (Mr Nuttall) talked about; it is that the new EU boundary with Bosnia is insecure. Beyond the Report stage, this House will not have a full chance to debate the Commission’s third report.
It will be for the European Scrutiny Committee to choose whether to refer the Commission’s third report for debate in the House. As I said on Second Reading, the Croatian Government have made enormous progress towards implementing their integrated border management plan and establishing on the EU external border a system of fully operational border control posts, which are part of its accession process. The key outstanding issue is the Neum corridor, where a small part of Bosnia and Herzegovina divides two pieces of Croatian territory. However, matters are now well under way to put the border control posts in place and to make available the relevant technology and trained staff. It is not just the Commission’s view, but that of the British Government, too, that Croatia is fully on course to meet the obligations into which she has entered.
Could the right hon. Gentleman clear up a matter of fact? The House of Commons research paper states:
“A further issue is weaknesses in border management: Croatia’s border with Bosnia and Herzegovina will be one of the longest in Europe, posing challenges to EU security, and Croatia has so far made only moderate progression.”
Footnote 42 notes that that information came from the European Commission on 10 October 2012, which was not long ago. The Commission is clearly saying that progress is not being made, which is in direct conflict with what the right hon. Gentleman is saying.
We debated this at some length on Second Reading, but I will take advice and might give a detailed answer later in today’s proceedings.
In response to the point raised by the right hon. Member for Leicester East, we acknowledge that there have been unacceptable delays to the processing of applications from Romanian and Bulgarian citizens. The UK Border Agency has taken action to provide additional staff resources to deal with that and is confident that the Government’s published target standards for turning around such applications will be met by the new year.
I hope the Committee will forgive me if this has been covered in earlier debates when I was not present, but is it true that if Croatia acceded to the European Union, it would be easier for the International Criminal Court to serve an indictment on an alleged war criminal who happened to be Croatian than is currently the case because Croatia is not a member of the European Union?
I am not certain about the position of the International Criminal Court, but I will either respond to that question later in the debate or write to my hon. Friend. What I will say is that, in the context of this amendment, which relates to migration, once Croatia has become a full member of the European Union, the normal EU arrangements to combat illegal migration and to secure the return of illegal migrants, overstayers and others will become fully operational. As I hope to say if I reach the later stages of my planned remarks, there is already evidence that Croatia has been very energetic in preparing for those new duties and in implementing a system for dealing with illegal third-country migrants, and that will be to the benefit of every European Union member state.
Perhaps it would be helpful if I followed up on the intervention by the hon. Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart) on the potential arrest of a European Union citizen. That, of course, would be subject to the existing procedures for a European arrest warrant, which, indeed, would be beneficial in trying to deal with serious crime, including international war crimes. Would that not underline the total folly of a member of the European Union walking away from a commitment to use European arrest warrants, which the current Tory Government are considering doing?
I am not going to get drawn into a further debate about the 2014 opt-in, opt-out decision on justice and home affairs. As the Government have pledged, there will be ample opportunities to debate that at length in the House.
I think that everybody in the House shares the concerns of my hon. Friend the Member for Bury North about the need to ensure the appropriate management of potential labour market risks, particularly at a time when there are serious tensions in the UK labour market. At the same time, we have to acknowledge that the principle of freedom of movement has given enormous opportunities to British citizens. Roughly 1 million British people live and/or work in other member states of the European Union at present.
Applying the amendment to line 7 on page 1 of the Bill would make it say that the accession treaty would be approved,
“except for those provisions requiring the full application”.
It would, therefore, be a conditional approval of the treaty and I do not believe that the European Court of Justice could rule us in breach of treaty obligations, because Croatia would not have them until the treaty was ratified under our normal constitutional procedures, which, thanks to the European Act 2011—which the Minister presided over—require an Act of Parliament that is unqualified.
I simply do not think that we can have 27 countries agreeing unanimously on a treaty text and committing themselves to ratifying it, only for 26 countries to ratify it while one country chooses to do so up to a point and not ratify one particular element. My hon. Friend was right in his earlier intervention that it is legally and constitutionally possible for a separate protocol or derogation to be negotiated at the time of an accession treaty to exempt one or more member states from particular obligations. However, that has not happened with any other accession treaty hitherto.
The United Kingdom, under successive Governments, has been committed to the enlargement of the European Union since Margaret Thatcher championed the idea when the iron curtain began to crumble. I remain, in that respect, an enthusiastic Thatcherite. The entrenchment of not just free and open markets, but, even more importantly, the rule of law and democratic institutions in eastern and central Europe that has been brought by enlargement has been of benefit to the long-term strategic interests of the UK, as well as being in the interests of Europe as a whole.
The Minister has made an important point. He should not hide his light under a bushel. I urge him to make that point more forcefully and regularly to his Back Benchers.
My hon. Friends know where I stand on these issues. We always have a good-tempered but serious debate. The points that my hon. Friends have raised this afternoon reflect concerns that are expressed by many thousands of people—
Possibly by millions of people, in every constituency in this country. It is right that Parliament should be seen to be paying close attention to those concerns, which are being ably expressed by my hon. Friend the Member for Bury North in supporting the amendment.
Croatia has a small population of only 4.5 million people. The levels of emigration from Croatia to EU member states are currently very low. The official Croatian statistics suggest that in 2011, about 2,000 Croatians migrated to EU member states. The hon. Member for Moray (Angus Robertson) is right that half those people went to Germany and that a fair number of the others went to Austria.
The UK Border Agency’s statistics state that in 2011, 115 Croatian nationals were admitted to the UK for the purposes of employment. Of course, those 115 people will have had to meet the same tests as anybody else who comes here from a third country anywhere else in the world. They will have had to apply successfully under the points system or perhaps as a person of independent means. If we look at the patterns of migration from Croatia and the history of Croatian migration to this country, and set that in the context of a small country with a small population, the Government judge that there is little risk of a mass migration of Croatian nationals to these shores when the seven-year transitional period is up.
I do not think that the travel is likely to be one-way. For example, several thousand British people are now resident in Bulgaria, largely because the Black sea coast is an attractive place in which to settle and is less expensive than the parts of Spain and the western Mediterranean that had previously been fashionable. I can envisage the Adriatic coastline of Croatia becoming a magnet for people from elsewhere in Europe who are seeking a warmer climate in which to settle. I therefore do not think that freedom of movement will be exercised in one direction only.
In conclusion, the accession treaty, which has been signed by all member states already, provides for only a temporary imposition of transitional controls up to a maximum of seven years. It is not possible to extend transitional controls on Croatian nationals beyond the seven-year period. The Government’s careful judgment is that the existing flexibility provided by the accession treaty will protect the stability of the United Kingdom labour market as we would wish. I hope that, having heard the assurances that I have given, my hon. Friend the Member for Bury North will choose not to press his amendment.
We have had a useful and interesting debate on the amendment. I thank the right hon. Member for Leicester East (Keith Vaz), who is not in his place, the hon. Member for Wolverhampton North East (Emma Reynolds), the Minister and all the Members who have intervened.
I suspect that the Government’s view on this matter and the stance that is widely taken by Members will only add to the concerns of many of my constituents and, as the Minister has said, of people across the United Kingdom.
I want to reiterate what I said on Second Reading about the Opposition’s support for the Irish protocol, which the Labour Government helped to negotiate. As the hon. Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg) said, the protocol clarifies but does not amend the Lisbon treaty. It contains assurances that Ireland retains decision-making rights on the right to life, on family and education, on taxation, and on Irish neutrality. It was the Labour Government’s judgment at the time and it is the Opposition’s judgment now that the Irish people have rightly been offered those assurances on the application of the Lisbon treaty.
Finally, I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Blackley and Broughton (Graham Stringer). The protocol does not reform the EU and is not a renegotiation of the EU-Ireland relationship. It also does not repatriate power from the EU to Ireland.
Clause 2 provides parliamentary approval for the purposes of section 2 of the European Union Act 2011 for a proposed protocol to be annexed to the treaty on the EU and the treaty on the functioning of the EU following the concerns of the Irish people in relation to the treaty of Lisbon; that has become known in shorthand as the Irish protocol. The clause also confirms, as required by section 2(3) of the 2011 Act, that no referendum is required under that Act for the Irish protocol to be ratified by the UK.
In June 2009, the Heads of State and Government of the 27 EU member states adopted a formal decision on the concerns of the Irish people about the treaty of Lisbon. The decision gave a legal guarantee, binding in international law, that certain matters of concern to the Irish people would be unaffected by the entry into force of the treaty of Lisbon. As my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg) said, those matters included taxation policy, policy on the right to life, policies on education and the family, and Ireland’s traditional policy of military neutrality. It was noted in the June 2009 European Council conclusions that the content of the decision is fully compatible with the treaty of Lisbon and does not necessitate any re-ratification of the treaty.
The Heads of State and Government also agreed in June 2009 that, at the time of the conclusion of the next accession treaty, the provisions of the decision would be set out in a protocol to be attached to the EU treaties. The effect is to ensure that the guarantees given to the Irish during the Lisbon ratification process will have full treaty status and be binding in EU law.
Although it is true that the Irish protocol clarifies and does not change either the content or application of the Lisbon treaty, and in no way alters the relationship between the EU and its member states, it has a positive effect, as my hon. Friend has pointed out. The consequence of all member states ratifying the protocol is that it will have full treaty status. In effect, it is added, as a protocol, to the list of EU treaties and is binding in EU law. Although it is declaratory and clarificatory in purpose, the declaration and clarification take the form of something that can be justiciable in future litigation at the European Court of Justice, as my hon. Friend said.
No, the treaties apply equally to every member state unless an explicit derogation or opt-out is laid down in a protocol or in the body of a treaty—that is the case with the UK’s and Denmark’s right not to join the euro. In this case, the Irish protocol does not provide an opt-out or derogation. Instead, it serves as a formal justiciable clarification of certain provisions of the treaty that apply equally to all member states of the EU. In the hypothetical case that my hon. Friend describes, it would be for the UK or any other member state to cite the protocol in support of its arguments.
The Minister is a mind reader—that was exactly the point I was about to ask him about. Does the protocol therefore effectively apply to all member states and not just to Ireland?
Yes, that clarification is of benefit to every member state, should such litigation be necessary in future.
The protocol was adopted at an intergovernmental conference in Brussels on 16 May 2012 and signed by all 27 member states. It must now be ratified by them before it can formally enter into force. As I have said, I believe that the clarifications that are provided square with the UK’s interpretation of the treaties; I support what my hon. Friend has said on this. The protocol is therefore helpful to us, and I commend it and clause 2 to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 2 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 3 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 4
Freedom of movement for Croatian nationals as workers
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
I am sorry to trouble the scorers again, Mr Crausby. I hope I will not be the only one trying to be the Mr Pietersen of the Committee for this afternoon’s proceedings. My batting pace would never be quite as fast as his—I am probably more of a Mr Boycott, particularly when it comes to anything to do with the European Union.
The transition arrangements for the free movement of people are an important part of the treaty. What is important here is that the time has come for us to recognise that we need to look at whether the free movement of people is something the United Kingdom can any longer support. The commitments we have made to our immigration policy throughout the European Union have made a nonsense of the rest of our immigration policy. We discovered that yesterday, when we asked a very distinguished person to come and be the head of one of the most important institutions of our country. He will have to queue up in Croydon, even though he is married to a British lady, his children are British subjects and he is a subject of the Queen. If he were coming from Croatia, he would be subject to transition arrangements that would make it a good deal easier for him to come here. That does not seem to be a sensible way of establishing our immigration policy.
There are two problems: first, the number of people who have the right to reside and work here from the European Union, which is legion; and the very tight controls that we have to have on everybody else in the world to make the system vaguely work at all. It is out of balance that countries with which we have much closer and longer standing associations than Croatia—I think, of course, of India, Canada, Australia, South Africa and Zimbabwe—and with which we have had intimate relationships, do not have the transition arrangements to allow their people to come and work here. They have to go through an extremely arduous and onerous process. Even if their grandparents were British citizens, they find it very difficult to get here. On the other hand, if they come from member states of the EU they can just waltz in, or if they cannot waltz in, they can come in under transition arrangements. After a mere seven years at the most, they will be able to come in freely. This has become disproportionate.
In that sense, enlargement has created a problem for Europe. In other ways, enlargement is much to be welcomed, and I agreed with the Minister when he quoted the noble Baroness—something that should be done in this Chamber more often to reinforce any argument that is being made. We have found that there are simply too many people who are eligible to reside here. Transition arrangements are not really enough. They ameliorate to some extent the problem of Croatia, but Croatia is not the problem. As we have already discussed, there are only a little more than 4 million people in Croatia, and unless they were all going to come here and leave Croatia empty for us to go and have our holiday homes there as the Minister suggested, there would not be any real immigration problem from Croatia. It is what has happened in the past, and the effect that that has had on other nations with which we are friendly and with which we have long-term relationships and historic ties, that I am referring to.
I am pleased that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Home Department has decided to look into this to see whether the free movement of people is something we can continue to cope with. I think that we cannot, and as we reform our relationship with Europe, it is one of the aspects of the European Union—I accept that it is a fundamental aspect—to which we can no longer subscribe.
The previous Government looked at this issue, and the current Government have also tried to raise it. It is a concern for people across the country—it was raised with me during the 2010 election campaign—and I am sure the Minister will have something to say about it. In terms of treaty obligations on the freedom of movement, nationals from other EU member states who come here to work have certain rights and responsibilities. It is certainly true that some of those rights, benefits and payments, from which nationals benefit, although only after a qualifying period, are a concern. We tried to change them when in government, but European treaties and European law prevented us from doing so, and I think the current Government are having the same problems.
The clause deals with the free movement of people, but the hon. Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg) took the opportunity to make a wider point. Regardless of one’s point of view, it is certainly true that if a change were made it would require a substantial and wholesale amendment of the founding treaties. The 26 other member states—soon to be 27—would have their own opinions on that. Such a renegotiation would be long and difficult if the Government were to attempt to embark on it.
Clause 4 outlines, in its various subsections, how the transitional regulations will be structured. I do not propose, unless the Committee presses me, to go through each subsection in detail this afternoon. Suffice it to say that the Home Office will come forward in 2013 with a statutory instrument to implement the transitional regulations. I am sure that there will be ample opportunity at that point for the House to examine in detail exactly what those arrangements propose and how effective they will be in practice. They will no doubt go to a statutory instrument Committee and then to the House of Commons as a whole.
My hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg) used the debate on clause 4 to open up broader concerns about freedom of movement. There is no doubt that this issue troubles a lot of people, as he and my hon. Friend the Member for Bury North (Mr Nuttall) pointed out. I do not want to go overboard on this point. However, the fact that transitional controls were not imposed on the previous groups of countries joining the EU, along with the fact that the number of people who were thought likely to come from those countries to the UK was underestimated—the estimates were wrong by a considerable margin—has sapped public confidence in the principle of freedom of movement. It is therefore right that we should say clearly not just that rigorous transitional controls will be employed in the case of Croatia, but that it would be our intention to apply transitional controls to the full extent permitted to any future new accession country to the European Union. That is both right and a way of providing reassurance to our citizens.
People are understandably worried when they see suggestions that the principle of freedom of movement is being interpreted in a way that stretches beyond the rights set out in the treaty—primarily, the right to work and to seek work—and is at risk of being abused by people moving to gain from a more generous welfare system in an EU member state.
My hon. Friend is right that those things undermine confidence in the system, despite the fact that freedom of movement has brought significant benefits not only to British citizens working and living elsewhere in Europe, but to British employers and consumers, who have made free use of the advantages of freedom of movement in terms of the skilled people coming to this country. I can assure him that this Government, along with other Governments, take these risks seriously and are concerned about potential abuses of freedom of movement. My hon. Friends in the Department for Work and Pensions have been talking to their counterparts in other member states about that point. The Government intend to pursue the matter and take it very seriously. I hope that that did not lead me too far from the content of the debate and that it provides my hon. Friends with a measure of reassurance.
I am sorry to interject, but as Labour seems to recognise this concern—such recognition has been lacking in the past—perhaps it is time to have a full and frank debate about it, especially in terms of welfare claimants and the cost to the NHS of people who possibly would not have been here had there been similar transitional arrangements in the past. Is there a chance, through informal channels, of starting a sensible debate?
The Government are always willing to listen to constructive ideas, from whichever side of the House they come. We have announced the review of the balance of competences. When my right hon. Friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary launched it, he said that we would welcome contributions and proposals from interest groups throughout British society and political parties on both sides of the House. If anybody wants to propose a way of limiting potential abuses of freedom of movement, they would be welcome to do so.
Just for the record, as I set out earlier, what the hon. Member for Daventry (Chris Heaton-Harris) says is simply not true. When the Labour party was in government, we were very concerned about welfare payments being made when they perhaps should not have been, especially when it came to child benefit. Our Ministers made representations about that to European institutions and tried to do something about it, but to be perfectly frank, we hit a brick wall—and that is exactly what this Government are finding too. There is no difference between our parties on this issue.
Order. It would be nice if we could get back to clause 4 stand part.
Indeed, Mr Crausby. I welcome the outbreak of bipartisanship.
Finally, one of the lessons is the importance of building alliances with other member states on these issues, because we are far from being the only country that has these concerns.
I thank the Minister for giving way, as I know he wants to conclude. He said he did not want to go through the clause subsection by subsection, but will he take the opportunity to clarify the different applicable maximums between England and Wales, on one hand, and Scotland and Northern Ireland on the other? Some of his hon. Friends may feel that those of more dodgy intent could be motivated to stay in England and Wales, rather than Scotland or Northern Ireland.
This boils down to differences in the legal systems operating in different parts of the United Kingdom. I presume that the hon. Gentleman is referring to subsections (4) to (6).
Subsection (4) provides that an offence by virtue of these regulations will be a summary offence and that any fines or prison sentences imposed will not exceed the applicable maximum levels or terms on the relevant scale. Subsections (5) and (6) provide clarity on the maximum prison terms applicable for these offences and the differences between maximum terms of imprisonment in England and Wales, and Scotland and Northern Ireland. For England and Wales, the maximum possible prison term is 51 weeks. For Scotland and Northern Ireland, the maximum possible prison term for an employee or a deception offence is three months, whereas for an employer this stands at six months.
Subsection (6) further clarifies that if the offences were committed in England and Wales before the commencement of section 154(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, they will be liable for the same penalties previously outlined for Scotland and Northern Ireland—three and six months respectively—but, as the Committee will know, section 154(1) has not yet commenced, so the applicable maximums for the whole United Kingdom will remain at three and six months respectively for the time being. I hope that that provides the hon. Gentleman with the assurance he seeks.
We have had an interesting debate on some of the concerns in the Committee and the country about the freedom of movement, but I think there has also been a consensus in support of transitional regulations. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 4 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 5
Orders under section 4: Parliamentary control.
I beg to move amendment 1, page 4, line 4, at end insert ‘or subsequent’.
I appreciate that the hon. Members for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg) and for Bury North (Mr Nuttall) are seeking to improve parliamentary scrutiny of these matters by providing for the use of the affirmative procedure for any statutory instrument arising from clause 4. I very much look forward to the Minister’s response. Given that the Government do not seem to have much business for us to scrutinise at the moment, surely there might be time for such provision. I did not go through the Lobby once last week—to my disappointment—so we would welcome any move towards increased parliamentary scrutiny and we await the Minister’s response with bated breath.
The purpose of amendments 1 and 2 is to require that any regulations to implement the transitional restrictions pursuant to clause 4 be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. Amendment 5, standing in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Bury North (Mr Nuttall), would give Parliament the opportunity to amend the initial set of regulations on transitional controls. By contrast, the Bill as drafted would require that the initial regulations made pursuant to clause 4 be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure, but that subsequent regulations, if any, be subject to the negative resolution procedure. That would provide Parliament with the opportunity to give or deny approval, but not to amend the regulations.
I would not impute that to my hon. Friend, but I was conscious of the fact that Simon de Montfort, despite his contribution to our constitutional developments, ended up being slain at the battle of Evesham, after which his body was hacked apart and the various portions sent to please those members of the nobility who had taken the lead in supporting Prince Edward against him. Although I have absolute confidence in the generosity of spirit with which my hon. Friend spoke, I hope I can count on him to speak for all members of the European Scrutiny Committee and on others to adopt a different role towards de Montfort than he has taken today.
I have thought carefully about the amendments that my hon. Friends have proposed. The initial regulations that we intend to make pursuant to clause 4 would set out in detail the scheme of restrictions to be applied to Croatian nationals. They would set out the circumstances under which a Croatian national may be authorised to take employment and the penalties that may be applied for any breach of the restrictions. It is clearly appropriate that there should be a presumption that such regulations, setting out a broad scheme of controls and penalties, should require the positive approval of the House. We are therefore providing for the affirmative resolution procedure. However, any subsequent regulations pursuant to clause 4 are likely to be different in character and to have only a limited and technical purpose. For example, it may become necessary to make technical adjustments to the regulations to reflect European Court of Justice case law on the exercise of free movement rights or to adjust the circumstances in which work authorisation may be given, to reflect particular labour market circumstances.
Let us look at the precedent of the regulations applied to Bulgarian and Romanian nationals, recalling that our intention is to apply the same transitional regime to Croatian migrants as already applies to migrants from those two countries. There have been subsequent amendments to the original regulations, but to address minor and technical issues. For example, further amendments to the regulations have referred to arrangements for students undertaking employment during their holidays or vocational employment linked to their studies. Those amendments have brought the treatment of such students into line with the treatment extended to third-country nationals. There have also been technical changes to the arrangements for family members of Bulgarian and Romanian workers, which the treaty required be lifted once the restrictions had been in force for two years.
Those were matters concerned with responding to legal issues about the proper administration of restrictions, as they arose, rather than matters pertaining to their general shape and force. Equally, it might prove necessary to make amendments to the initial regulations simply in order to ensure that they take account of changes made to the controls applied to third-country nationals. I do not think it is proportionate that amendment of the regulations to deal with this kind of technical issue should require the affirmative resolution procedure.
Of course, if a future hypothetical Government were, through sleight of hand, to use the negative resolution procedure to make a more substantive change to the character of the transitional regulations—which I am sure that this Government would not do—I am confident that the political reaction in the House of Commons would be such as to require, through a prayer tabled under the normal procedures of the House, a debate and vote in Committee and then in the House as a whole. It is unlikely that such a major amendment would be brought forward, however, and there are sufficient safeguards in our proposals. It is probable, however, that there will be a need for minor and technical amendments to be made. The negative resolution procedure accords with the precedent adopted in respect of previous accessions and it is proportionate to the case.
My hon. Friend the Member for Bury North tabled amendment 5, which would allow Parliament to amend the secondary legislation. He will know that the procedure that he is proposing does not fall within the normal forms of House approval. I do not blame him for raising the subject; it has cropped up in more than one debate since I have been a Member of Parliament. However, it would be wrong to use the Bill as an occasion for adopting what would amount to a significant precedent in how Parliament holds the Government to account. There might be a case for what he is proposing, but it would best be addressed, if it is going to be, as a matter of general principle rather than in this way.
Under our current procedure, secondary legislation is not subjected to the type of line-by-line scrutiny and the possibility of amendment that we afford to primary legislation. The affirmative process, which we are suggesting for the first set of regulations, requires a motion in favour in both Houses before the regulations can be made. The House will be able to reject the draft statutory instrument if it is not content with it. The Government believe that that is an appropriate level of scrutiny, and that the use of the negative resolution procedure for what are likely to be minor and technical amendments is also proportionate to the probable course of events. I hope that, having heard those assurances, my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset will be willing to withdraw his amendment.
I have listened to the Minister with great care. The problem with comparing anybody to the great figures of history is that so many of them came to a sticky end. That does not, however, undermine the valour of their actions before they met their sticky end. It is the way of politics nowadays that people are reshuffled, whereas in olden times they were rather more finally dealt with. This is perhaps one respect in which I am a moderniser, in that I am glad and reassured that political careers now end more gently than they did in times gone by. I was comparing my right hon. Friend the Minister to Simon de Montfort at the height of his powers when he was successfully commanding the country and advancing democracy.
The mood of the Committee today suggests that it would probably not vote in support of my amendment, and I shall therefore seek leave to withdraw it. However, I would just add that, to use an old cliché, a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush. It would be an advantage to place in the legislation a requirement for the affirmative resolution procedure, because we cannot guarantee what future Governments will do or, more particularly, what the European Court of Justice will do. The Minister referred to that possibility. There is a risk that the Court could make a highly political judgment that would change the regulations or cause them to be changed by the Government. That could allow the Government to use the negative resolution procedure, because the decision had come from the ECJ, without giving the House the opportunity to debate a genuinely important political matter. I regret that Her Majesty’s Government are not going to accept my proposal, but I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 5 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 6
Extent, commencement and short title
Clause 6(1) makes provision for the territorial extent of the Bill. It extends to the whole of the United Kingdom. Subsection (2) indicates the intention that the Bill, should it be granted Royal Assent, will come into force immediately, and subsection (3) provides for the short title.
The purpose of the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bury North (Mr Nuttall) is to delay the entry into force of a specific clause. The amendment would require a motion in both Houses before clause 1, the element of the Bill providing approval for the Croatian accession treaty, could enter into force. I must say plainly to the Committee that in the Government’s view delaying Croatia’s accession to the EU, as proposed in the amendment, would not be helpful to the UK in securing its objectives in EU enlargement policy and it might cause some damage to our interests overall. I intend to respond in detail to the points raised about some of the outstanding questions in respect of Croatia’s progress towards meeting the Commission’s benchmarks in the various accession chapters.
I start by saying that the Government have, as my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg) pointed out earlier, enhanced the role that Parliament has played in the approval of EU decision making through the European Union Act 2011. The Scrutiny Committees in this place and in the other place have also followed the Commission’s monitoring reports on Croatia’s progress towards accession. The Government’s judgment, on the basis both of the Commission’s successive monitoring reports and of our own bilateral engagement, is that Croatia is on track to be ready in full to accede to the EU on 1 July 2013. The Croatian Government have already responded positively to the October call for action on the remaining areas by preparing an action plan to address outstanding concerns, as they did in response to the Commission’s monitoring report in April. The treaty also includes a range of safeguard measures that could be imposed, both before and after accession, in specific areas where reforms were not complete. For example, the Commission is empowered under the accession treaty to recover all state aids paid by the Croatian Government to state-owned shipyards if Croatia does not meet EU requirements under chapter 8, on competition, by the time of accession.
As my hon. Friend said, the Government always have the option, as a final resort, in the wholly unexpected event of Croatia not being ready, of holding back from depositing the instrument of ratification. In reality, if there were such a crisis—if some new Administration in Croatia did not commit themselves to the accession process with the enthusiasm that we see from the current Croatian Government—that would not just be a matter for the United Kingdom; it would be a matter for a very large number of member states and for the EU institutions.
We do not expect to need to use those safeguards. In answer to the point made by the hon. Member for Caerphilly (Wayne David), let me say that I have talked to Commissioner Füle about Croatian accession as well as to members of his team in the Commission. We need to emphasise that while the Commission is doing its job in going through the fine print of what Croatia has done and checking to what extent it has met the benchmarks laid down for it, Commissioner Füle personally and the accession team he leads remain very confident that although more needs to be done between now and July, Croatia is on track to be ready for accession at the date set down for it to join the European Union.
The hon. Gentleman also mentioned Štefan Füle’s comments about regional issues. As he knows—this came up on Second Reading—there are some outstanding issues with Slovenia, in particular, but the solution does not lie wholly in Croatia’s hands. A long-standing banking dispute going back to the break-up of the former Yugoslavia is still unresolved and the UK continues to urge both Slovenia and Croatia to find a way forward to settle that bilateral dispute in a way that respects the relevant international agreements. We have also said—this applies not only to Croatia but to other accessions—that bilateral disputes should not be used as an excuse to block progress when a candidate country is meeting its accession benchmarks.
We agree with Commissioner Füle that there is more work to be done. We have supported him in urging the Croatian leadership at the most senior levels to keep up its work to complete the outstanding tasks. The Croatian Government assured Commissioner Füle when he visited Croatia on 25 and 26 November that of the 10 key issues that the Commission had highlighted, work on seven would be completed by the end of 2012 and on the remaining three by the end of January 2013. Those assurances and the knowledge of how far Croatia has come and how committed its Government are to delivering in full on their obligations cause both Commissioner Füle and the UK Government to be confident that Croatia is in the right place to have crossed those hurdles by July 2013.
As a number of hon. Members have said, the accession process has been much more rigorous for Croatia than it was for Bulgaria and Romania, and because of that Croatia is better prepared for membership than those two countries were before their accession. The level of transparency and accountability in the Croatian judiciary has increased significantly over the reform period, institutions have been established and continue to develop to verify assets and conflicts of interest, and noteworthy progress has been made on investigations of and convictions for high-level corruption, most recently with the conviction of the former Prime Minister, Ivo Sanader, who was convicted of corruption and sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment. There could be little more by way of a clear demonstration of the independence of the Croatian courts and of Croatia’s determination to show clearly to her future partners that no one is exempt from an independent judicial process and rigorous laws against corruption.
My hon. Friends raised a number of more detailed questions about Croatia’s readiness for membership. I want to try to respond to them, as they all involved serious matters. Let me first take the question of the police, to which my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset referred. In the run-up to the December 2011 general election in Croatia, one of the last acts of the outgoing Government was to approve a package of amendments to the police Act, which was seen as allowing for political influence in the promotion of officers. Following the election of the current Government, the new Interior Minister attempted to introduce changes to the amendments, drawing on his own experience as a previous police director general, to create a system that was demonstrably based on merit and transparency. However, the European Commission expressed concern with certain details of the new law, and the United Kingdom raised the need for consultation with the Commission to ensure that Croatia embedded reforms and conformed with the EU acquis. The Croatian Government therefore delayed their domestic legislation process to take account of the Commission’s recommendations and to bring their own reforms into line with EU best practice.
The Commission has now approved proposed amendments to Croatia’s police law and we understand that these will be finalised and adopted by the end of the year, but already on the basis of the police Act in Croatia, further byelaws have been adopted, including a code of ethics for officers, the appointment of a director general of the police, and various ordinances on the conduct of officers and procedures.
My hon. Friend the Member for Bury North spoke about the pressures on the Croatian system of civil justice, and he is right to say that between December 2011 and June 2012 the number of unresolved cases in the civil justice system rose by 0.6% from 827,102 to 832,919, but it would be a mistake for the Committee to look at those totals and make the assumption that nothing had changed. Those are aggregate figures that conceal very significant changes and significant improvements.
What happened overall was that more new cases came into the Croatian civil justice system than were resolved by the Croatian civil justice system, but if we look at the old cases, we see that during that six-month period the number of cases that were more than 10 years old fell by nearly 5%, and the number of cases that were more than three years old fell by more than 4%, so we can honestly say that Croatia made good progress. The Croatian Government have introduced measures such as a new enforcement Act, new powers for their financial agency to recover fines, a new courts Act, new civil procedure and penal procedure codes to improve case management within the Croatian court system, and modern IT systems to help the courts transact their business more efficiently.
Finally, on budgets, it is true that the Commission has said that it wants €15 billion more in the multi-annual financial framework compared with its original proposals, and that that €15 billion includes €10 billion supposedly earmarked for Croatia. Our position all along has been that although Croatia should be entitled to funding on the same basis as other member states once it joins the EU, the EU budget must look for priorities and savings have to be found to accommodate additional expenditure. The position set out by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister remains as he expressed it yesterday: we are going into these negotiations determined that the outcome we will accept will be a cut or at most a real-terms freeze in the EU budget.
I believe that further enlargement of the EU will help to promote the security, stability and prosperity of Europe and of the United Kingdom; that the expansion of the single market will benefit this country by bringing increased trade opportunities to a wider market; and that bringing Croatia into that single market will benefit the opportunities for UK business.
I think that relates much more to Third Reading, when the Minister will have an opportunity to deal with the question.
I am grateful for that guidance, Mr Crausby. I have some details on that matter and will be happy to speak about it on Third Reading.
Member states signed the Croatian accession treaty with the firm intention that it should be ratified by 1 July 2013. We believe that new member states should be able to join the EU when they have fulfilled their commitments as part of the tough and demanding accession process and are ready to take on the obligations of membership. Given the progress Croatia has made and the transparent commitment of its Government to completing the reforms that are still outstanding, we think there is no reason to delay this legislation coming into force and that we can be confident, on the basis of evidence, that Croatia will be ready. We should be eager to grasp the opportunities for the United Kingdom, both political and commercial, that stem from EU enlargement. Therefore, I think it is right to ask my hon. Friend the Member for Bury North to withdraw his amendment and for the House to support clause 6 as it stands.
I have listened carefully to the Minister and to the debate. I must say that if Croatia is as ready for accession as the Minister would have us believe, my proposed amendment would not hold that up. Croatia would complete all the requirements put on it and would be able to satisfy Members of this House, and when a Minister of the Crown laid an order before us we would happily pass it. However, I heard what the Minister said and feel that my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg) and I, despite the views we have put forward, are perhaps in a minority in the Committee, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 6 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
The Deputy Speaker resumed the Chair.
Bill reported, without amendment.
Third Reading
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
I thank all right hon. and hon. Members who have participated in our debates on the Bill. It is hard to single out individual Members, but I would like, as always, to express my thanks to the members of the European Scrutiny Committee for their work, particularly the Chair, my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash), and my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg). In this afternoon’s debate and throughout our proceedings my hon. Friend the Member for Bury North (Mr Nuttall) has been active, concerned and sincere in the questions and challenges he has posed to those on the Front Bench. I would like to thank the hon. Member for Wolverhampton North East (Emma Reynolds) for her support for the Bill and that of the official Opposition. I also wish to put on the record my gratitude for the outstanding work of Government officials not only in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, but in the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice, in putting together this legislation.
The enlargement of the European Union and the establishment of the single market are two of the EU’s greatest achievements. Both are initiatives for which the United Kingdom can claim considerable responsibility and in which it can take great pride. The EU, alongside NATO, has been an instrument of peace and reconciliation that has helped to spread and entrench democracy and the rule of law across Europe, including swathes of our continent where those traditions and values were crushed for most of the 20th century. The single market has opened up prosperity and opportunity to hundreds of millions of people, to the mutual benefit of us all.
That is why the United Kingdom supports further, conditions-based enlargement. Croatia’s accession will further demonstrate the transformative power of enlargement, marking the historic moment at which the first of the western Balkan countries that were involved in the wars of the 1990s as Yugoslavia broke up joins. Croatia’s accession negotiations were closed in June 2011 following six years of significant reform. As I have explained, Croatia has faced the most demanding and challenging negotiations of any candidate country. As my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary made clear when he visited the Balkans this October, the Government fully support the ambitions not only of Croatia but of all countries of the western Balkans one day to join the European Union. That is a further reason why we believe that it is so important that Croatia’s accession is a success; it is blazing a trail that we hope that other countries of the western Balkans will, in due course, follow.
My right hon. Friend is absolutely right that Croatia should have had to face a very high test to join the European Union. Does he regret that when Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU, they were not subject to the same rigour?
When I talk to Bulgarian and Romanian Ministers, they are the first to say that the current situation is deeply unsatisfactory. They feel at times that they are treated as second-class members of the EU, while other member states feel that the standards required at the time of accession were not fully met; hence we have the co-operation and verification mechanism. It is to the credit of Štefan Füle and the European Commission that they have learned from that experience. Chapter 23, in particular, was created explicitly to avoid any repetition of what happened with Romania and Bulgaria.
We have strengthened things even further in the light of our experience with Croatia. The policy now adopted by all member states and the Commission is that for future candidates, beginning with Montenegro, chapters 23 and 24 will be addressed first in any accession process, opened early but then kept open until practically the end. That means that justice and home affairs reforms, including impartial administration of policing, will be taken through national Parliaments and put into law. It also means that as the years of accession negotiations continue, we will see a track record built up so that at the end nobody can be in any doubt that the criteria have been met and that the country concerned is truly committed and ready for the obligations of membership.
That brings me on to the questions from Members on both sides of the House as to whether Croatia is ready. I will not repeat what I said during our debate on the last group of amendments, but I do want to respond to the comments of the hon. Member for Blackley and Broughton (Graham Stringer) about Croatia’s record in dealing with immigration and the management of its immigration and asylum systems and border controls.
Croatia has made substantial progress to deliver the necessary reforms required in border management and migration policy. The implementation of Croatia’s new immigration Act began in January, bringing migration legislation in line with that in other European countries. Croatia is already co-operating both with its immediate neighbours and with the EU on the return of illegal migrants and has apprehended 2,370 illegal migrants during this monitoring period. Croatia drafted a new migration strategy in July. We expect it to be finalised by the end of the year and adopted in early 2103.
In 2006, Croatia adopted an integrated border management action plan. This provided a comprehensive framework for the preparation of the external border once it joined the European Union, and it has kept its priorities under review and has been ready to amend them as it has moved towards accession. Croatia already has 81 fully functioning border crossing points. We have made it clear, as has the European Commission, that completion of the remaining BCPs is a priority and the Croatian Minister of the Interior has given us an assurance that they will be completed.
Although there is still work to be done over the next few months, Croatia has put in place strong foundations to manage migratory pressures. The most crucial outstanding requirement is the reconstruction of the two land border crossings at Klek and Zaton Doli in the new corridor between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Intensive work is now under way to ensure that those border crossings and the other outstanding BCPs are complete prior to accession, and our understanding is that the work on the outstanding BCPs will be completed and delivered next spring, ahead of Croatia’s planned accession date.
Our judgment is that there is no cause to fear that Croatian accession will lead to an impact on the United Kingdom through illegal migration, asylum or human trafficking. Let me explain our reasons for that judgment. First, there will continue to be border controls between Croatia and neighbouring EU countries after accession. This will continue until Croatia fully implements the Schengen acquis, which is subject to its own evaluation process. As a result, third-country nationals will continue to be subject to the same levels of controls after accession if they seek to leave Croatian territory to go to another EU member state. There is not expected to be any significant increase in illegal immigration to the UK as a consequence of Croatia’s accession.
Secondly, Croatia does not present a high risk to the UK as either a source or transit country for illegal migration. Thirdly, we have not identified any victims of trafficking from Croatia in the UK. As I noted on Second Reading, in 2011, the US State Department’s “Trafficking in Persons Report”, which ranks countries in terms of their capacity to tackle trafficking and protect victims, designated Croatia as a tier 1 country, alongside the United Kingdom. That means that Croatia is viewed as fully compliant with the minimum standards of the US’s Trafficking Victims Protection Act, so again I think we have good reason to be confident about Croatia’s record.
The Commission’s monitoring helpfully identifies those issues that remain outstanding, but it is also clear that the Commission expects Croatia to be ready on time and we share that assessment. Following the publication of the Commission’s October report, the Croatian Government prepared an action plan, a copy of which has been shared with the two parliamentary scrutiny Committees. That action plan was a clear indication that the Croatian Government have grasped what they need to do, and it is now up to them to deliver.
The Government support EU enlargement and the benefits it will bring to the UK. We are in favour of Croatia joining the EU, we believe that it is well on its way to demonstrating its readiness to join the European Union and we are fully confident that it will be ready by next July. The impact that Croatian accession will have in promoting stability and sending a message of hope across the western Balkans should be welcomed by every party in this House. I commend the Bill, and its Third Reading, to the House.
(11 years, 9 months ago)
Written StatementsMy right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs will attend the Foreign Affairs Council on the afternoon of 19 November. The Under-Secretary of State for Defence, my hon. Friend the Member for South West Wiltshire (Dr Murrison) responsible for international security strategy will attend the European Defence Agency Steering Board and the Defence Foreign Affairs Council on the morning of 19 November.
There will be a joint lunch for Foreign and Defence Ministers to consider the issues outlined below. These meetings will be held in Brussels and will be chaired by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Baroness Ashton of Upholland.
I will attend the General Affairs Council on 20 November, and the preceding dinner with President van Rompuy on 19 November. The meeting will be chaired by the Cypriot Presidency.
European Defence Agency (EDA) Steering Board
At the EDA Steering Board, Ministers will be expected to agree as usual the EDA’s budget and work programme for the forthcoming year and its indicative work plan for the next three years. Also on the agenda are the EDA’s approach to pooling and sharing and the defence contribution to the development of EU policies. The pooling and sharing report gives a progress update of ongoing activity such as the helicopter training programme and maritime surveillance networking, proposes new opportunities for pooling and sharing, and includes the code of conduct for pooling and sharing which Ministers are expected to adopt. Ministers will be updated on EDA work on the interaction between defence and wider EU policies such as industry and market, research and innovation and European space policy.
Defence Foreign Affairs Council
The agenda is expected to focus on EU operations and the defence taskforce.
EU Operations
The session on EU operations should open with an update on the current state of play in each of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations. It is anticipated that discussion could then focus on the future of the EU training mission in Somalia (EUTM). The UK is supportive of a third mandate for EUTM Somalia, so we will look to push for extension of the mandate and to set out our thinking on the design of that mandate. The Mali operation is the subject of a specific discussion during the joint lunch, so we do not expect it to be discussed during this session.
Defence Taskforce
Ministers will receive an update from the European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services on the EU defence task force’s efforts in supporting competitiveness, and on innovation of the European defence industry within the internal market. The defence taskforce is an internal EU Commission body co-chaired by the Commission’s DG Market and DG Enterprise, established in 2011 to identify measures to improve the internal defence market and improve the European defence industrial base. It is focused on the three main areas of the internal market, the Commission’s defence industry policy and defence research and development.
Defence and Foreign Ministers Lunch
Mali
Over an informal lunch, Ministers will discuss the draft crisis management concept being drawn up as part of the planning process for a CSDP mission to Mali. We do not expect conclusions to be issued from the lunch. This is an opportunity for the UK to express its support for accelerated planning towards a CSDP mission while ensuring that due rigour is applied to that planning process.
2013 European Council on Defence
Ministers will have an orientation debate on CSDP ahead of the 2013 European Council on defence. The December 2012 European Council will commission the relevant EU institutions to conduct preparatory work through the course of 2013. The discussion at the FAC will centre on this tasking. We welcome the European Council looking at this issue and will be pushing for a tasking framed around enhancing European military effectiveness and a more efficient European defence industry.
Foreign Affairs Council
Southern Neighbourhood
Ministers will review developments in Syria, Lebanon, Libya, and Egypt.
Ministers are likely to discuss recent events in Syria and their impact on EU efforts to support a peaceful transition. The UK is pushing for agreement to the full renewal of the EU’s restrictive measures on Syria which come up for renewal on 1 December, and will encourage other member states to increase their humanitarian aid.
On Lebanon, following the bomb attack in Beirut on 19 October, we expect conclusions which will condemn that attack and reiterate the EU’s strong commitment to Lebanon’s stability and independence. The conclusions will reiterate the EU’s support for the work of the Lebanese armed forces and urge all Lebanese parties to engage in the dialogue being led by President Sleiman.
Ministers may take stock of recent events in Libya, including the appointment of Prime Minister-elect Ali Zidan and progress in the approval of his Government. There will be an opportunity to discuss the provision and co-ordination of international assistance to the new Libyan authorities.
On Egypt, the Council will discuss follow-up to the EU-Egypt taskforce in Cairo which takes place on 13-14 November. The taskforce is a key moment in resetting the EU’s relationship with Egypt. We will continue to encourage greater emphasis on the principles of more-for-more in the follow-up to it, in line with EU ambition to use the ENP to incentivise reform. The taskforce will also discuss work, including in the UK, to improve repatriation of assets stolen from transition countries.
Yemen
It is almost one year since the transition process in Yemen began with the signing of the Gulf Co-operation Council Initiative on 23 November 2011. The transition remains broadly on track, with President Hadi successfully appointed after an interim election in February, and the formation of a national unity Government. The proposed conclusions would show our support for these efforts but also encourage the Yemenis to continue in this vein through the successful preparation and launch of an inclusive national dialogue, and preparations for full national elections in 2014.
Middle East Peace Process
The middle east peace process discussions will focus on the prospect of a Palestinian application to the UN General Assembly to upgrade their status to that of a non-member observer state. The UK will emphasise the need for EU countries to vote in a manner which advances our shared goal of realising the two state solution. We will make clear that we are encouraging the new US Administration to act quickly to put its full weight behind ensuring the Israelis and Palestinians return to substantive negotiations resulting in the resolution of the conflict.
Ukraine
There will be an in-depth discussion of Ukraine following the parliamentary elections on 28 October. The discussion will consider how to take forward the EU-Ukraine relationship in the light of the elections and other developments. We do not expect there to be conclusions in November.
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
Ministers are expected to agree conclusions which will highlight our concerns about the insecurity in eastern DRC; condemn the actions of M23 and other armed groups; call for the cessation of all outside support for M23; and underline the importance of the Government of the DRC showing leadership in resolving the problems. Ministers will also have the opportunity to consider what steps should be taken next to help to resolve the situation.
Cuba
Ministers will discuss the current situation in Cuba and the future of EU-Cuba relations. EU-Cuba relations are currently governed by the 1996 common position, which can be found at:
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX: 31996E0697:EN:NOT.
EU-US
Ministers will have the opportunity to discuss the EU’s priorities with the US following the US presidential elections on 6 November and the re-election of President Obama. We expect the discussion to cover a spectrum of leading international issues, including the global economy. We will stress the importance of an EU-US trade deal.
General Affairs Council
The key item of discussion will be the preparation for the November European Council on the multi-annual financial framework (MFF). The General Affairs Council (GAC) has led on the preparation of the MFF, which has been discussed at every GAC over the past year. Key issues such as the overall size of the MFF 2014-20 and the composition of spend in the different headings will be taken forward to the November European Council.
In addition to the MFF we expect this GAC to discuss the Commission’s work programme for 2013, follow up on the agreements reached at the October European Council and the agenda for the December European Council.
Multi-annual Financial Framework
Ministers will focus initially on issues around cohesion policy, on which the presidency hopes to secure a partial general approach on two remaining negotiating blocks: financial management, and the common strategic framework. Financial management deals with the processes for examination and acceptance of accounts and for financial corrections. The common strategic framework is an annex to the common provisions regulation which provides a strategic orientation at EU level for the funds.
The main item will be preparation for the special November European Council on 22 and 23 November. This will be discussed at a dinner with President van Rompuy on 19 November and again during the Tuesday 20 November session.
The Cypriot Presidency has produced various iterations of the “negotiating box” which now has an upper ceiling of numbers for the MFF. The presidency has made it clear that they expect further downward revisions and I will be arguing that the upper ceiling is far too high.
I expect a further version of the negotiating box to be issued before the GAC. This will be available at:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/special-reports/mff/negotiating-box.
I will be emphasising the strength of feeling on budget size in the UK as demonstrated by the recent vote in the House of Commons.
I will also emphasise again that we will not agree to any changes to own resources, including the UK abatement.
Follow-up to the October European Council and agenda for December European Council
At the October European Council the Commission was urged to make progress on implementation of the growth compact and to speed up delivery on growth enhancing measures such as concluding trade agreements. The Commission have indicated that they will undertake to put proposals on a range of issues on the table before the end of the year. I will urge the Commission to press forward on the issues we consider priorities, including the annual growth survey and the internal energy market, but also to maintain momentum in other areas such as the trade agenda, where the need for progress was highlighted in particular in the October European Council. I will emphasise the need for progress on trade deals with Singapore, Japan, Canada and also the United States, which the Prime Minister discussed with President Obama when they spoke after his re-election.
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Ministerial CorrectionsI shall perhaps have an opportunity to say more about the general issue of anti-corruption measures when we reach the further stages of the Bill. Today, I would simply say that we are now seeing action being taken in high-profile cases, with convictions secured against a former Prime Minister, a former economy Minister and a former defence Minister.
[Official Report, 6 November 2012, Vol. 552, c. 803-4.]
Letter of correction from David Lidington:
An error has been identified in a statement given during my closing speech on 6 November 2012.
The correct statement should have been:
I shall perhaps have an opportunity to say more about the general issue of anti-corruption measures when we reach the further stages of the Bill. Today, I would simply say that we are now seeing action being taken in high-profile cases, including in the current trial against a former Prime Minister, and the convictions secured against a former economy Minister and a former defence Minister.
(11 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
I convey the regrets of my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary who is unable to attend today’s debate. As you know, Mr Speaker, he is in Laos attending to official business on behalf of Her Majesty’s Government.
The Bill provides for parliamentary approval of the Croatian accession treaty and for a protocol on the concerns of the Irish people, the so-called Irish protocol, which is to be added to European Union treaties. The Bill also provides for the secondary legislation that will be required to apply transitional immigration controls on Croatian nationals exercising their right to free movement once Croatia accedes to the European Union.
I very much welcome those transitional immigration controls that will be imposed for the accession of Croatia. We learned from that mistake in 2004 when countries from elsewhere in eastern Europe joined the European Union, and I support the Government’s actions.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his comments. I hope to say more about the transitional controls later, but he will have observed that the Minister for Immigration, my hon. Friend the Member for Forest of Dean (Mr Harper), is here, and I can assure him that the Home Office and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office are working hand in glove on the preparation for Croatian succession.
For many years, EU enlargement has enjoyed firm cross-party support in the House. We can look back to the premiership of the noble Lady Baroness Thatcher to see support being expressed for enlargement covering the newly enfranchised democracies beyond what was once the iron curtain, at a time when it was not fashionable or even believed feasible that those countries of central and eastern Europe could become full members of the European family of nations. Today, for the countries of the western Balkans, including Croatia, that process of accession provides a means of entrenching political stability, democratic institutions, the rule of law and human rights —traditions and values that that part of our continent needs but which were crushed for much of the last 100 years.
I endorse the Minister’s comments. May I invite him to underline that the accession agreement foresees not only the points that he has made but the fact that on accession Croatia will nominate a commissioner, take up a seat on the Council of Ministers and have 12 MEPs?
The hon. Gentleman is right. Our support should not only be about what Europe is or ought to be; I also want to stress the point that enlargement, and Croatia’s accession in particular, is firmly in our national interest.
Just to clarify, as well as the rights and responsibilities that will come to Croatia if we pass this accession Bill, is it also correct that it will have to join the Schengen area and eventually become part of the eurozone, with the agreement that it will join the euro?
Croatia’s accession treaty provides for it to join the Schengen area and the eurozone, but, as the hon. Gentleman knows well, if Croatia is to join either it will be required to meet some further tests. It is already understood in Zagreb and throughout the Schengen area that it will be at least two years before Croatia can contemplate a successful application. I know from the debates on the bids by Bulgaria and Romania to join the Schengen area that the current members look carefully at the strength of internal and external controls over immigration and asylum before they concede the much greater rights of freedom of movement and freedom from all kinds of border checks that go with Schengen membership.
The Minister referred to Romanian and Bulgarian accession. He will recall that before they joined the EU in 2007 they had to clear various hurdles and various parts of their economy had to be shown to be compatible with the EU, but at that juncture there was only a very limited stipulation stating that, if they failed to do so, their accession would simply be delayed by 12 months. Will he go into detail about precisely what hurdles Croatia will have to clear, particularly any penalties if it fails to meet economic requirements?
I want to come to that in greater detail later, but I can say now that the process that Croatia has gone through has been much more demanding than what was expected of Romania and Bulgaria or earlier accession states. One lesson that EU member states drew from the experience of Romanian and Bulgarian accession was that we needed to invent an additional category of accession conditions covering justice and fundamental rights measures. That is now embodied in chapter 23 of the accession process. Those things that, in the case of Romania and Bulgaria, ended up being addressed—in my view, rather unhappily, in terms of the actions of all sides—through the co-operation and verification mechanism post-accession have, in the case of Croatia, been addressed upfront.
We have learned further lessons from Croatia’s accession process. Although chapter 23 has been a significant advance, we recognise that, as we look forward to an accession process that in the Government’s view should embrace all the countries of the western Balkans, we need to find a way of ensuring not only that the accession process provides incentives for, and insists upon, rigorous reforms of the administrative and judicial life of an applicant country but that the applicant country has the opportunity to establish a clear track record of implementing those reforms. With the decision earlier this year to open accession negotiations with Montenegro, a new approach has been introduced under which those chapter 23 measures—and, for that matter, the chapter 24 measures applying to home affairs matters—will be dealt with first. The objective is to open those negotiating chapters early on, to see those reforms under way and then to hold those chapters open until the end of the process, so that it becomes a question not only of seeing reforms enacted but of seeing a consistent track record.
I hope that the Minister will forgive me, but his answer prompts a further question. He referred to the coalition Government’s support for other nations in the western Balkans joining the EU in due course. Would the same apply to Serbia, assuming that Croatia was happy about it and assuming that Serbia wished to join and met all the guidelines? Would the Government approve that too?
Yes, we have made it clear—my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary repeated this in Belgrade in the past couple of weeks—that we support Serbia’s ambitions to join the EU. It is also, however, important that while remaining vigorous supporters of EU enlargement we remain committed to rigorous accession criteria. That is in the interest of the candidate countries and of the integrity of the EU.
My constituency is home to some Bosnian Muslims. The accession of Croatia will erect a much more significant border between Croatia and the other Balkan countries—setting Montenegro aside—particularly the significant ones to the south, Serbia and Bosnia. Before Serbia attains accession, which might be many years ahead, the relationship may change. Does the Minister have any thoughts about how that relationship might change in the future?
I hope that the requirement to police the external EU border between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina will provide an additional incentive to political leaders in the latter to commit themselves with greater energy to the task of political and economic reform, particularly political reform and reconciliation, which is needed if they, too, are to qualify for EU membership.
One of the sadnesses about the western Balkans today is that Bosnia and Herzegovina, which a few years ago saw itself as at the head of the queue of potential new members of the European Union, has now fallen behind not only Croatia, but Montenegro in that race. I want to see Bosnia and Herzegovina move towards EU membership, and for that matter NATO membership too. I hope that one impact of Croatian accession is that people and leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina will see that they need to commit themselves with renewed energy and vigour.
The United Kingdom’s interest in Croatian accession lies partly in the fact that we have a national interest in the long-term political stability of the western Balkans, and partly in the fact that there are economic benefits to expanding the single market. Our trade with the eastern and central European countries continues to grow. To give the House one example, United Kingdom exports to the “emerging Europe” countries of central Europe have trebled over the past 10 years, reaching around £16 billion in 2011. More recently, in the first quarter of this year our exports to countries in the east of Europe have increased by no less than 28%, so in economic terms, amidst the current financial crisis, the project of EU enlargement remains as relevant now as it ever has been to our economic as well as our political interests.
Following the ratification of Croatia’s accession treaty by all 27 EU member states, Croatia is expected to join the EU on 1 July 2013. Meanwhile, we expect Croatia to sustain the momentum of six years of significant reform, particularly on judiciary and fundamental rights issues, so that it meets fully all EU requirements by the time of accession. This is something to which I know the Croatian Government are committed. When I visited Zagreb in July this year to discuss the ongoing reform progress, I was impressed with the dedication in evidence, particularly from the Foreign Minister and the Justice Minister of Croatia. They are very aware of the challenges that face their country and they are keen to prove to us as their neighbours and friends, and to their own citizens, that they can make a success of accession. It is on that basis that we look forward to welcoming Croatia to the EU as the 28th member state.
Is that not a rather pious hope? Once Croatia is a member, if it decides to resile from the commitments, what actions can be taken? What actions have been taken as Hungary has departed from the standards that we would expect from a member of the European Union? The answer is none.
There are within the treaties articles that can be invoked. For example, if a member state departs from fundamental standards of human rights and democratic values that are embodied in the articles of the treaty, ultimately its full rights as an EU member can be suspended. [Interruption.] The hon. Member for Moray (Angus Robertson) reminds me that when a far right party entered the Government of Austria a few years ago, Austria found that it started to get frozen out of normal EU business. So although they may be blunt instruments that are in the treaties, the instruments are there.
There is a provision in the pre-accession monitoring arrangements under which, if Croatia fails to deliver on what she has promised, the Council is entitled to take all necessary measures to deal with the situation. That might, for example, mean that if Croatia were to fail to carry through the necessary market reforms of its shipbuilding sector—I do not expect that—certain EU financial benefits could be withheld until those reforms had been implemented. I do not think we are as lacking in sticks as the hon. Member for Blackley and Broughton (Graham Stringer) suggests.
Let me say this, then I will give way. Croatia has applied for European Union membership both because it sees this as of symbolic political importance and its leaders want to entrench democratic values, human rights and the rule of law in their country, and because Croatia sees some significant economic benefits to participation in the single market. Croatia also wants to move on and apply for Schengen membership. The one thing that Croatia’s leaders know is that if they were to depart from the promises that they have given, their chances of benefiting in the way they hope and their people expect would be reduced accordingly. That remains a powerful motive.
The Minister has led on to the question that I wished to ask. He mentioned application for Schengen and cross-border rights, but the Schengen acquis requires countries to sign up to a great deal of immigration and co-operation in cross-border law and other aspects. Is it expected that the Schengen acquis will be put in place part by part before the application, or is Croatia not expected to do anything in relation to those things? That is relevant as we struggle with opt-ins and opt-outs.
What Croatia has to do is what was set out in the negotiating chapters, particularly in chapter 24, to equip itself to deal with the responsibilities of European Union membership. I shall say a little about the borders issue later to try to address those comments. Membership of Schengen requires Croatia and any other member of Schengen to go further. The pace at which any reforms specific to Schengen are introduced and implemented is a matter between Croatia and the Schengen members. It is difficult for me as a Minister for a country that has chosen to stay outside Schengen and has no intention of joining it to try to prescribe what the pathway should be for Croatia’s hopes to join the Schengen agreement.
In its report the European Scrutiny Committee made a number of criticisms of the Commission’s and the Government’s conclusions about the readiness of Croatia to join the European Union. The Government will of course reply formally to the report of the Scrutiny Committee in due course, but as the Committee has chosen to tag its report to the debate today, I thought it might be helpful to respond to the main thrust of the Committee’s criticisms now, during the debate. We will have other opportunities during later stages of the Bill to explore the points that my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) and his Committee raised, and as I said there will be a formal Government response to the Committee in due course.
I shall try to deal briefly with three or four of the main issues raised by the Committee in its conclusions. Let me take first the issue of war crimes, both co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and domestic war crimes. On co-operation with the tribunal, I want to stress that not just the United Kingdom but the European Commission and the tribunal itself believe that Croatia is fully co-operating with the tribunal. Indeed, the chief prosecutor, Mr Brammertz, has now said that he sees no need for him to visit Zagreb again and he has taken the decision to wind down the status of the tribunal’s office in Croatia. On 3 May this year, while visiting Zagreb, Mr Brammertz said that there were “no outstanding issues” that might burden relations between Croatia and ICTY. On 7 June, in a statement to the UN Security Council, he said:
“The Office of the Prosecutor continues to rely on Croatia’s cooperation to efficiently complete trials and appeals. In the current reporting period (as at 14 May 2012), the Office sent 18 requests for assistance to Croatia. The Croatian authorities have given timely and adequate responses to the requests made and it has provided access to witnesses and evidence as required. The Office will continue to rely on Croatia’s cooperation in upcoming trials and appeals.”
The chief prosecutor, who in the past has been critical of what he saw as shortcomings in Croatia’s level of co-operation with him, has now said that in his view Croatia has co-operated, and continues to do so, in the way he would rightly expect.
The issue of domestic war crimes is a difficult one. One need only look to our own country’s history in Northern Ireland to see how difficult it can be to get to the truth about some of the most vile murders. There are about 1,200 cases on file relating to domestic war crimes in Croatia, but we need to break that total down into three categories. There are about 400 cases for which trials are pending, about 400 where the accused cannot be found and a further 400 or so where the indictments are in a pre-investigative phase but the perpetrator is unknown—it is believed, on the basis of evidence, that a war crime might have been committed but no individual or group of named individuals can be cited as having been responsible. The average length of a trial for a domestic war crime is about six to seven months.
In 2010, four specialised chambers were established to deal with domestic war crimes. In May 2011, new legislation took effect to require the transfer of outstanding cases to those chambers and, in the autumn of 2011, new judges were appointed to those specialist tribunals. So far, 87 cases have been transferred to the specialist tribunals. The Government’s view is that progress has been too slow and that the Croatians need to devote more resources to that work. Our assessment is that the commitments Croatia made can be described as “almost complete” but that more progress is still required. We are confident, given the commitments we have had from the Croatian Justice Ministry, that that acceleration will have taken place by the time we reach the expected accession date.
Some of that progress is simply about procedural reforms: new listing priorities have now been established; prosecutorial standards are being applied better; there is, importantly, improved co-operation between the Croatian and Serbian authorities in investigating war crimes; and the Croatian side has submitted a draft agreement between those two countries for co-operation in the prosecution of such cases. The Commission has said that more still needs to be done to secure the attendance and protection of witnesses, who might well fear for their safety when giving evidence in this kind of case. We think that progress has been slower than it ought to have been but are confident about the seriousness with which the Croatian authorities are taking it.
I will move on to borders and address the point that the former Chair of the European Scrutiny Committee, the hon. Member for Linlithgow and East Falkirk (Michael Connarty), made in his earlier intervention. Croatia has been making good progress. She already has 81 fully operational border crossing points and has given assurances that the necessary infrastructure and technology will be in place to support those crossing points and ensure strong border management by the time she accedes to the EU. The most important outstanding element is the need to provide formal border crossing points in the Neum corridor, which is the very narrow stretch of Bosnian territory that divides Croatia. The Croatians have told us that they are on course to complete the border crossing points in that important area next spring.
After Croatian accession, of course, there will continue to be border controls between Croatia and its European Union neighbours. Because Croatia will not join Schengen straight away, those neighbouring countries that are EU member states already will maintain their border controls with Croatia, so any third-country national who got into Croatian territory, whether before or after EU accession, would still be subject to the same level of controls in a country such as Slovenia, and certainly in the United Kingdom, as they are today. I will add that one key advantage for us of Croatia’s accession is that she will come within the scope of the Eurodac regulation and the Dublin agreement on returns and readmissions, which will be helpful to us in the case of any people who manage to get through and abuse the asylum system and need to be returned to Croatia.
There will obviously be a seven-year transition period on economic migration from Croatia. Can the Minister tell the House—this is a general point relating also to Romania and Bulgaria—whether it would be possible under British law for us to extend that transition period if we think that is right for Britain?
The answer is that we cannot go beyond the period for transitional controls laid down in the treaties. I will say a little more about arrangements for Croatia later. For Romania and Bulgaria, we have extended the transitional controls for the maximum period committed and they have to come to an end by the end of 2013.
May I add a rider to the Minister’s answer? This is without a “notwithstanding” clause to the European Communities Act 1972, but this Parliament could of course do that if it wanted to.
This Parliament can of course pass any legislation it wishes to. In that sense, what my hon. Friend says is constitutionally correct, although I in no way want to mislead him into thinking that the Government intend to introduce such an amendment to the 1972 Act.
My right hon. Friend, far from disappointing me, has enlivened me to rise, and I do so for this very good reason: this is the first time, as far as I am aware, that any Minister has conceded from the Dispatch Box that the constitutional principle of the “notwithstanding” formula is valid. I was delighted to hear what he had to say.
My hon. Friend is tempting me dangerously far from the scope of the debate, but I simply refer him to the happy day we spent in Parliament debating the sovereignty clause of what became the European Union Act 2011. If he looks at Hansard, I think he will find that I stated very clearly that if Parliament wanted to amend the 1972 Act at any stage, it is open for it to do so but—
Order. The right hon. Gentleman is a most earnest and assiduous member of Her Majesty’s Government, but the safest path for him to tread is in the direction of Croatia and the borders thereto.
I am grateful for that rescue, Mr Speaker. I want to move on to one other element of the Committee’s criticisms.
I understand that there has been a long-standing dispute about moneys held in the Ljubljanska banca in Slovenia which, it is suggested, belong to Croatia. Has that issue been resolved?
I discussed that with both the Slovenian and Croatian Governments when I was visiting Ljubljana and Zagreb earlier this year. We encourage both countries to find a bilateral solution. It is clearly not for the United Kingdom to lay down how that should be done, but they need to find a bilateral agreement that is in accord with the various international treaties to which the two countries are party. We hope that they succeed in the very near future.
The Committee was critical of the Government’s assessment that Croatia was making good progress with the reform of the judiciary and the courts. I am conscious that I have given way a lot and that other Members want to speak, but I want to deal with the most egregious element of the problems with the legal system in Croatia: the backlog of civil cases, to which the Committee drew particular attention.
The backlog in criminal cases in Croatia has fallen for some time and continues to fall, and we ought to pay tribute to the work that the Croatians have done to achieve that. They are still finding it a battle to reduce the backlog in civil cases, but it is important that we should not be misled by grand totals of the number of civil cases before the courts.
According to the figures that I have for the first half of 2012, roughly 844,000 new civil cases reached the Croatian courts; in the same period, roughly 836,000 cases were resolved. Although the total number of cases pending increased slightly, it would be wrong to think that 800,000-plus cases simply sat there in the “pending” tray and never moved. The truth is far from that. There has been a reduction in the backlogs in respect of the older cases—those over 10 years old or over three years old. The Croatians have also assigned a significant number of additional judges to focus on the backlog. Again, although we accept that further work needs to be done, we think that Croatia has made good progress and is committed to completing it. We do not believe that that is a reason to delay its accession.
I move on to migration. Croatia has a modest population of about 4.5 million. The potential impact of Croatian migration is relatively small, but we know that appropriate immigration controls are crucial for stability in our labour market, particularly in the current economic climate. Recently, the Home Office published its intention to impose transitional controls on Croatian workers in line with the Government’s policy to impose such controls on workers from all new member states, under the terms provided for in their accession treaties.
The accession treaty for Croatia sets out the framework within which member states may apply transitional controls to Croatian nationals who wish to work in their country. That framework is as follows. During the first two years following accession, the existing 27 member states can apply either national immigration controls or those resulting from bilateral agreements to regulate access to their labour market by Croatian nationals.
From the third year to the fifth year, member states have the option either to continue to apply the same controls as in the previous two years or, if they choose, to grant Croatian nationals the right to move and work freely, in accordance with European Union law. For the fifth year, member states must grant Croatian nationals the right to move and work freely in accordance with EU law. However, if member states find that they are subject to serious disturbance of their domestic labour markets—this has to be an evidence-based assessment of the kind that we seek from the Migration Advisory Committee—those member states may choose to continue to apply controls for a further two years, taking us up to a seven-year maximum period after accession, having first notified the European Commission.
The Home Office will be bringing forward detailed regulations on the transitional controls early in 2013, so the House will have the chance to debate the detail of those ahead of Croatia’s planned accession date. However, the Government’s intention is that for the first two years at least we would continue with the current arrangements under which Croatian nationals who would qualify to come and work here under the points-based system would be allowed to do so, although we do not envisage further relaxation beyond that.
For decades since independence, there have been associations between the former Yugoslavia and the subsequent nations. There are decades of experience of citizens from that part of the world working in Germany and Austria as Gastarbeiter. Based on that assessment, do the Government agree that when the free movement of labour comes into force, those citizens are most likely to travel to countries with which there is an historic association—in the first instance, Germany and Austria?
The hon. Gentleman is right. According to our figures for 2011, about 2,000 Croatians emigrated to other EU member states and half of those went to Germany. UKBA figures for 2011 show that only 115 Croatian nationals were admitted to the United Kingdom to work.
I appreciate the Minister’s argument about the small number of those likely to immigrate legally. The problem is that the equivalent-sized country of Moldova, which has a population of 4.5 million, has a trafficking record similar to that of a country with 50 million people. It is used as a gateway. The problem is not legal migration but whether there is a prospect of the mafia—for want of a better word—of the Balkan states using Croatia as a gateway for people trafficking. That would be the concern. Are the police in Croatia up to dealing with such an influx?
That is a perfectly fair question, but I assure the hon. Gentleman that there is no evidence at the moment that Croatia is being used by traffickers as he says has happened in Moldova. However, people traffickers are extremely professional, well organised multinational businesses. We have to be vigilant and continue to work closely with the Croatian authorities, trying to provide the practical advice, support and training that we have been giving them as they carry out their immigration, asylum, judicial and administrative reforms, so that their own systems are up to scratch in ensuring that they cannot be exploited by traffickers. The Croatian Government would not want that to happen, and nor would we.
Now I want to talk briefly about the Irish protocol. The addition of the Irish protocol to the EU treaties does not have a significant impact for the United Kingdom. It relates to a series of guarantees given to the Irish people as a condition of their ratification of the Lisbon treaty, but it does not change the substance or application of the treaty. It confirms the interpretation of a number of its provisions in relation to the Irish constitution. Helpfully, the Irish interpretation of the Lisbon treaty aligns with our own.
I invite the Minister to take the opportunity to acknowledge that the Irish protocol underlines the rights of member states to set their own tax rates. The Irish Government sought that important guarantee. However, that rings true not just for the Irish Republic but for all member states of the European Union in future, which is welcome.
It is very welcome that the Irish protocol makes that assertion about tax sovereignty, which is in line with our own interpretation of the Lisbon treaty and previous European Union treaties. The Irish protocol also confirms that neither the charter of fundamental rights nor the Lisbon treaty in the area of freedom, security and justice affects the scope and applicability of the Irish constitution as regards the right to life, protection of the family and protection of rights in respect of education. It confirms that the Union’s action on the international stage, particularly under common security and defence policy arrangements, does not prejudice the security and defence policy of individual member states or the obligations of any individual member states. It also deals with other matters specific to Ireland, such as its long-standing position of military neutrality. It was formally agreed by Heads of State and Governments of the 27 member states in June 2009. It amounts to a guarantee in international law that the concerns raised in Ireland were unaffected by the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty. Once all 27 countries have formally ratified the Irish protocol, it becomes binding in terms of the European Union as well as of international law.
The Government’s original intention had been that we might include with this legislation a comparable but differently worded protocol as regards the Czech Republic. That is still stalled in the Brussels decision-making process. The European Parliament has yet to produce an opinion on the Czech protocol, and until that has come out of the Brussels negotiations it would be premature for us to think about bringing forward legislation here in Parliament.
I wonder whether, while negotiating the Irish protocol and the Czech protocol, Her Majesty’s Government considered repatriating any powers to the United Kingdom which could have been part of this treaty negotiation.
As I said, the protocol was negotiated in 2009, so I fear that my hon. Friend’s challenge has to be for my predecessors in office who are now on the Opposition side of the House. Nothing would have been served in terms of the United Kingdom’s interest by our now saying that we would block ratification of the Irish protocol unless we obtained some concession of our own, because the thing at stake would not have been the ratification of the Lisbon treaty but the ratification of the Irish protocol, to which we have no objection and which is wanted by one of those countries with which we have an extremely close bilateral relationship.
Does the Minister accept that the protocol confirms the pre-existing sphere of competence of Ireland under its own constitution, further supplemented by the confirmation in relation to neutrality?
I wanted my right hon. Friend to confirm, as I think he has, that it was open to the UK, as with any treaty negotiation, to use this as an opportunity to negotiate for our own interests, but the Government decided on this occasion that it was not worth doing so.
The point of principle that my hon. Friend makes is certainly right—that during a treaty negotiation it is open to any member state to withhold its consent unless it receives a concession that it is seeking. Obviously, during such a negotiation every member state has to calculate where its national interest lies and what kind of bargain it wants to achieve. However, this is now water under the bridge, as these events took place before the previous general election.
No, the Minister is wrong. What a member state tries to do, across the piece and over a period of time, is to decide what its main priorities may be. That does not mean that every time a treaty is coming up, it decides to put yet another thing on the table. Indeed, I would argue that the problem with the Government’s current approach is that they are trying to fight the European Union on too many fronts at the same time and will not secure any of their intended outcomes.
Order. I am aware that the hon. Gentleman has only just come in, but we do need shorter interventions. I know that he gets carried away, but I am sure that he will be shorter in future.
I am not going to get drawn into a historical battle about my predecessors’ record in office. I would argue that the previous Government were too reluctant to use the leverage that we had from negotiations at the time of the Lisbon treaty, but that is a matter that the House can debate and historians will no doubt wish to comment on in future, and I do not want to spend further time on it today.
The measure before us will provide for the accession of Croatia to the European Union, thus marking another step in the Government’s long-held support—this country’s long-held support under successive Governments—for the enlargement of the European Union. Enlargement has been a project whereby the European Union has benefited from the United Kingdom’s ideas, engagement, and—dare I say it?— leadership over many years and under successive Administrations.
If we compare the history of Europe in the 20 years since the fall of the Berlin wall with the 20 years following the treaty of Versailles, drawing a contrast between, in the earlier period, a time when fragile new democracies collapsed under the strain of domestic political tension, dictatorship and invasion, and, in the 20 years just passed, a time when we have seen democracy, the rule of law and human rights entrenched in ever more countries on our continent, we can see the advantage that European Union enlargement has brought, and we can be proud of our own nation’s contribution to that process. In that spirit, I ask the House to support the Bill’s Second Reading.
I call Michael Connarty. [Interruption.] Sorry, I mean Emma Reynolds.
I remind the hon. Member for Perth and North Perthshire (Pete Wishart) that today’s debate is about Croatia’s accession to the European Union. Should other states wish to join, there will be debates in this House and Parliaments around the EU about that accession, and I am sure that conditions will be attached. I am sure there will be future opportunities to debate the subject to which the hon. Gentleman refers, even if that is not in order today.
To return to the subject, there is concern about conflicts of interest and the funding of political parties and electoral campaigns in Croatia. The European Commission has recommended that a conflict of interest commission “be established without delay”, and the Opposition support that demand. On competition policy, Croatia has taken positive steps to strengthen its anti-trust laws, but further progress is needed in relation to state aid in the steel and shipbuilding industries. As the Europe Minister said earlier, progress is also needed in restructuring the Croatian shipbuilding industry.
On border security, notwithstanding the Minister for Europe’s earlier remarks, Croatia will at some point assume responsibility for the EU’s south-eastern border. What happens on that border will directly impact on the rest of the EU, and indeed the UK, in terms of preventing illegal immigrants from entering the EU, and breaking up and stopping human trafficking—my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow and East Falkirk (Michael Connarty) referred to that issue. Croatia’s role in those areas will be vital, and we therefore welcome increased co-operation between Croatia and its neighbours. I welcome what the Europe Minister has said about the UK’s assistance in that area.
More widely, Croatia has taken positive steps towards accession in a number of areas, which should be welcomed. The police force and courts have undergone important reforms. A new police law has raised standards and removed political pressure, and respect and protection for human rights—in particular LGBT rights—has improved. During the debate in the House last year, I raised the issue of LGBT rights in Croatia, and expressed concern that a gay rights parade in Split had been attacked with no intervention or protection from the police. I am pleased to say that since that debate, gay pride events in Split and Zagreb have taken place peacefully and been protected. The European Commission and MEPs have continued to put pressure on the Croatian Government, and in particular I put on the record my thanks to Michael Cashman, a Labour MEP who has continued to put pressure on that Government for those welcome improvements.
I am sure the hon. Lady would want to join me in paying tribute to the strong personal commitment of Vesna Pusic, the Croatian Foreign Minister, who has made it something of a priority to see that Croatia makes good on its pledges and obligations concerning civil rights of the kind mentioned by the hon. Lady.
I welcome that intervention, and the commitment of the Croatian Foreign Minister in that area.
Clause 4 of the Bill provides
“a regulation-making power to make provision on the entitlement of Croatian workers to work and reside in the UK;”
and I welcome the further clarification provided by the Europe Minister. The Opposition believe that the Government should implement the maximum transition period for Croatian nationals who want to come to the UK to work, as we did when in government with the accession of Romania and Bulgaria.
As I stated in a European Scrutiny Committee debate earlier this year, the Labour party fully supports the Irish protocol, which it helped to negotiate when in office. We value the continued partnership between the UK and the Republic of Ireland, and recognise the special relationship that our two countries share. As we have heard from the Minister, the draft Irish protocol contains safeguards for Ireland on the right to life, family and education, taxation, and Irish neutrality, and it provides a clarification on the application of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union, and the treaty on the European Union, and does not change the content of these treaties. We welcome that clarification, and support the Irish protocol as part of the Bill.
In conclusion, Croatia’s preparations to join the European Union have been more thorough than in previous accessions. An impressive range of reforms have been introduced and valuable lessons have been learned from previous accessions. Croatia’s accession to the EU will send a signal to the rest of the Balkan countries that their future belongs in the EU, and it will provide encouragement and incentives to those Governments not to let up on the pace of reform, but to root out corruption, reform their political and judicial systems, and modernise their economies.
With the leave of the House, Mr Deputy Speaker, I would like to reply briefly to some of the points that have been made. I thank Members of all parties who have taken part in the debate. Although a number of criticisms have been made of the stage that Croatia has reached in preparing for EU accession, there has been pretty nigh universal support for the principle that Croatia should be welcomed as a full member of the European Union.
Let me deal first with the points that have been made about the Irish protocol. I was asked why no referendum was required under the European Union Act 2011. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber (Mr Kennedy) said just now, the truth is that the protocol is declaratory. It changes neither the content nor the application of the EU treaties. The European Council conclusions of June 2009 said that the protocol was
“fully compatible with the Treaty of Lisbon and will not necessitate any re-ratification of that Treaty”.
That was at the heart of the formal opinion set out by my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary in his statement on 2 July this year, in which he explained why, having examined the protocol, as required under the 2011 Act, he had concluded that it fell within one of the exempt categories of legislation.
I should say to the hon. Member for Moray (Angus Robertson) that while I completely accept—and not just in respect of the Irish protocol—that the smaller EU members play a vital and welcome role in the functioning of the European Union, he will also, I am sure, have taken note of the fact that, between Croatia’s application and accession, 10 years elapsed before all the details were sorted out and accession arrangements put in place.
The right hon. Gentleman will forgive me; I think the House would want me to make progress.
My hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg) asked about the lack of action on a police law. In about a week to eight days’ time—well ahead of the proposed Committee stage of the Bill—I will make available to the Committees and in the Library the detailed tables in respect of chapter 23, which was the supporting basis for the report, which the Committees have seen. Those tables are with the Ministry of Justice at the moment. As we did in April, we will make those tables available to the House following the Commission’s October report, and I undertake to do so in good time before the Committee stage.
To deal with the point my hon. Friend made, progress on the police law could be said to have fallen victim to the democratic process. The previous Croatian Government, led by the HDZ, passed a law on the recruitment of police officers shortly before the Croatian general election. After a new Government were elected in Zagreb, they wanted to consider the position and decided that they wished to repeal the law. They have now had detailed discussions with the European Commission and decided to go ahead with the previous law, subject to some amendments. The details of the police law are finalised and we expect everything to be in place well ahead of Croatia’s expected accession date.
The hon. Member for Linlithgow and East Falkirk (Michael Connarty) asked about the risks of trafficking, a subject in which he has taken a long and detailed interest. We have not identified any victims of trafficking from Croatia in the United Kingdom. Indeed, the 2011 report by the US State Department, which ranks countries in terms of their capacity to tackle trafficking and protect victims, designated Croatia as a tier 1 country, alongside the United Kingdom. The evidence suggests that Croatia already has a robust system in place, but clearly we will want to work with the Croatians to ensure that that remains the case. Countries close to Croatia, such as Kosovo and Albania, are indeed source countries for traffickers. The Croatian Government are fully aware of the risks and are committed to strengthening measures to tackle trafficking. For example, Croatia intends to continue training border staff and police. A training programme on trafficking in human beings has been drafted and will be implemented as part of the border police training system. We believe that Croatia is on track to meet its commitment to tackling human trafficking.
The hon. Gentleman also asked about the need for border management. The EU monitoring reports released in April and October highlighted delays in implementing the infrastructure and equipment required for the integrated border management programme. That will be addressed as part of pre-accession monitoring, but in the meantime Croatia continues to make progress. As at August this year, the national border management information system was live at 81 border crossing points, which represents significant progress on 2011, when only 37 were so equipped. In 2011, Croatia apprehended 3,461 illegal migrants, a significant increase on the 1,946 apprehended in 2010. The total number of border officers is now 6,017, of which 4,647 are at the external border. Croatia plans to recruit 406 additional border officers before the end of the year.
The hon. Member for Linlithgow and East Falkirk asked whether Croatia would be obliged to join Schengen. The act of accession provides for much of the Schengen acquis to apply to, and be binding on, Croatia from the date of her accession, but the actual lifting of border controls to other Schengen area member states will not take place at the time of Croatia’s accession. That will take place later, following a separate Council decision, and it will happen only if Croatia meets the requirements of the Schengen evaluation procedures to the satisfaction of the Commission and the existing Schengen area member states.
The hon. Member for Moray asked about the post-accession measures. Articles 38 and 39, relating to safeguards to the single market and to chapters 23 and 24, can indeed be invoked after accession, as well as before it under the special pre-accession monitoring arrangements.
In answer to a further point raised by the hon. Member for Linlithgow and East Falkirk, the conflict of interests commission is in the process of being established, and we expect it to have been established before the end of the year. One reason for the delay is that the Croatian Government have decided to be completely transparent about the process, and they have interviewed every one of the more than 200 applicants for the post involved.
[Official Report, 12 November 2012, Vol. 553, c. 1-2MC.]I shall perhaps have an opportunity to say more about the general issue of anti-corruption measures when we reach the further stages of the Bill. Today, I would simply say that we are now seeing action being taken in high-profile cases, with convictions secured against a former Prime Minister, a former economy Minister and a former defence Minister. At the lower level, too, the Croatian bureau for combating corruption and organised crime has issued indictments against 257 people, secured 209 judgments including 205 convictions, and launched 191 new investigations, all between January and August 2012. Again, that is evidence of the determination of the Croatians to push forward and deliver on their promises to take rigorous measures against corruption.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber rightly referred to the part that Croatia has played in contributing to the international security assistance force operations in Afghanistan. I also look forward to the prospect of Croatia, as a full member of the European Union, serving as a role model for the other countries of the western Balkans and, through her own diplomatic and political activity, leading them towards full integration with the European family of nations, as well as strengthening the institutions that provide for democracy, the rule of law and human rights for everybody. Although there is still work to be done in the months leading up to accession, this Government believe that Croatia has achieved remarkable progress. She is on track to deliver on her promises by the date of accession, and that is why we have brought the Bill to the House and ask the House to support it tonight.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill accordingly read a Second time.
European Union (Croatian Accession and Irish Protocol) Bill (Programme)
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 83A(7)),
That the following provisions shall apply to the European Union (Croatian Accession and Irish Protocol) Bill:
Committal
1. The Bill shall be committed to a Committee of the whole House.
Proceedings in Committee, on Consideration and Third Reading
2. Proceedings in Committee, any proceedings on Consideration and proceedings on Third Reading shall be taken in one day in accordance with the following provisions of this Order.
3. Proceedings in Committee and any proceedings on Consideration shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion one hour before the moment of interruption on the day on which those proceedings are commenced.
4. Proceedings on Third Reading shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the moment of interruption on that day.
Programming committee
5. Standing Order No. 83B (Programming committees) shall not apply to the proceedings on the Bill in Committee of the whole House, to any proceedings on Consideration or to proceedings on Third Reading.
Other proceedings
6. Any other proceedings on the Bill (including any proceedings on consideration of Lords Amendments or on any further messages from the Lords) may be programmed.—(Joseph Johnson.)
Question agreed to.