OSCE Ministerial Council
David Lidington Excerpts(9 years, 5 months ago)
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The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)
I represented the United Kingdom at the 21st Ministerial Council meeting of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), held in Basel, Switzerland on 4-5 December 2014 and hosted by Swiss Federal President and OSCE Chairman-in-Office Didier Burkhalter. The Council is the key decision-making body of the OSCE and was attended by Ministers from across its 57 participating States.
The Council took place in the final month of a year when the OSCE has been at the centre of the international response to the Ukraine crisis, and this subject dominated the Council. In my interventions in the discussions that took place on 3 and 4 December, I made clear that by its actions Russia was fully responsible for the instability in eastern Ukraine, and that its illegal annexation of Crimea would not be recognised by the international community. I said that Russia must implement its commitments under the Minsk Protocols, by withdrawing military personnel, equipment and weapons from Ukraine’s sovereign territory, ceasing the supply of separatist factions, and securing its border with Ukraine. Only then will there be space for a political solution to the crisis. I also commended the role of the OSCE in facilitating dialogue and providing valuable impartial reporting from eastern Ukraine, in particular its special monitoring mission, to which the UK has provided and will continue to provide significant financial and personnel support.
Similar sentiments were expressed in plenary by US Secretary of State Kerry, German Foreign Minister Steinmeier, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Klimkin and EU High Representative Mogherini among others. It is regrettable that Russian obstruction meant that a declaration on the OSCE’s role in, and support to, Ukraine could not be agreed despite the vast majority of OSCE States' desire to do so. However, in his Chairman's summary
https://www.news.admin.ch/messaae/index.html?lana=en&msQ-id=55531 President Burkhalter noted that many states had expressed the view that the crisis was the result of the pressure of one participating State against another; that the so-called referendum in Crimea had been in contradiction with the Ukrainian constitution; that Russia’s actions in Crimea had been in violation of fundamental OSCE commitments and international law; and that the territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders must be respected.
In the margins of the Council, I attended a meeting hosted by the Lithuanian Foreign Minister with Crimean Tatar leader Mustafa Dzhemilev, who described the restrictions and violations that the Tatars are now experiencing following Russia’s illegal annexation. Separately I met representatives of Russia-based civil society groups, who detailed the worrying trends of restrictions and threats that such groups face from the Russian authorities. Both meetings underlined the need for tough messages to be given to Russia about its conduct both in eastern Ukraine and Crimea, and also within Russia where human rights must be properly respected.
Aside from discussions on Ukraine, the Council agreed decisions or declarations on a number of topics, including on countering kidnapping and hostage-taking committed by terrorist groups; on countering the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters; on enhancing efforts to combat anti-Semitism; on the continuation of the Helsinki +40 process; and on the Transdniestrian Settlement Process. President Burkhalter additionally announced the launch of a panel of Eminent Persons to run through 2015 with the support of the incoming Serbian and German Chairmanships, with a remit to provide proposals on how to rebuild trust and establish respect for core OSCE principles.
I also met Serbian Foreign Minister Ivica Dacic, who will chair the OSCE when Serbia take over from Switzerland at the end of 2014, where we discussed the need for the OSCE to stay strongly engaged on the Ukraine crisis as we move into 2015.
I am placing a copy of the UK intervention in plenary, and of the OSCE Chairman’s summary of the first day of discussions, in the Libraries of both Houses.
It is also available online at:
http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements.
Development Foreign Affairs, Foreign Affairs and General Affairs Councils
David Lidington Excerpts(9 years, 5 months ago)
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The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)
My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for International Development will attend the Development Foreign Affairs Council on 12 December, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs will attend the Foreign Affairs Council on 15 December, and I will attend the General Affairs Council on 16 December. The Development Foreign Affairs Council and the Foreign Affairs Council will be chaired by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, and the General Affairs Council will be chaired by the Italian presidency. The meetings will be held in Brussels.
Development Foreign Affairs Council
Post-2015 agenda
The UK remains at the forefront of the post-2015 discussions, building on the Prime Minister’s co-chairing of the UN high-level panel. Ministers will discuss the EU’s approach to intergovernmental negotiations on post-2015, including agreeing Council conclusions, and reflect on the UN Secretary-General’s synthesis report. The UK will use this discussion to make the case for a more simple, inspiring and relevant set of goals and targets.
Gender
The UK is an international leader on this agenda, as demonstrated by hosting the highly successful Girl summit last summer. In response to the UK’s call for the EU to show greater ambition on women and girls, the Commission will update Ministers on progress on the current EU action plan on gender equality and women’s empowerment, and set out a vision for its successor. The UK will urge the new Development Commissioner to take political leadership and deliver an ambitious gender action plan 2016-20.
Ebola from the development perspective
The Commission and European External Action Service will update Ministers on the latest developments. The UK will reiterate the urgent need to maintain momentum in tackling the immediate crisis, and focus on the social and economic impact of Ebola and on regional preparedness. Ministers will also reflect on what could be done in the medium to long term to support health systems and prevent future outbreaks.
Migration, refugees and development
Ministers will discuss the inter-linkages between migration and development, and will agree Council conclusions. The debate will inform a Commission communication due next year. The UK will be underlining the need for a communication based on sound evidence and analysis.
Foreign Affairs Council
Syria
UN Special Envoy for Syria, Steffan De Mistura, will brief Ministers on the Syria conflict and his plans to de-escalate violence. The EU continues to support Mr De Mistura. Ministers will agree conclusions that condemn the awful human rights abuses being perpetrated by Assad, the instability that violence is creating in the region and the dire humanitarian situation. The UK will argue for the EU to continue to support the moderate opposition in their fight against both ISIL and Assad, calling for Assad to allow the free flowing of aid to all who need it, and reiterating that Assad cannot morally or practically be a partner in the fight against ISIL.
Iraq/ISIL
The priority of this discussion will be the EU strategy on ISIL which is being developed following the August conclusions of the European Council meeting. Ministers will discuss the strategy and their support for it. The UK hopes the EU strategy will help the EU focus on areas where it can bring additional value to the coalition efforts and that it will ensure EU activity is fully co-ordinated and aligned with other coalition efforts. There is also likely to be an assessment of the situation in Erbil and the EU response to the foreign fighter threat.
Ebola
Ministers will take stock of the EU’s response to the Ebola crisis. The EU’s Ebola Coordinator and Humanitarian Commissioner, Christos Stylianides, will present a progress report. The UK will reiterate the importance of member states delivering the funds and staff that they have pledged. Ministers will also discuss how the EU might respond to Ebola over the medium and longer term, drawing on an EEAS-Commission paper. The UK will welcome the proposals for the EU to help rebuild countries affected by Ebola, but will stress that this must not detract from the current crisis response and that the EU’s long-term efforts must be co-ordinated with wider initiatives to improve the global response to health crises.
Bosnia and Herzegovina
The High Representative is likely to brief Ministers on her joint visit with Commissioner Hahn to Bosnia and Herzegovina on 5 December, and on progress of a new EU approach to inject momentum into Bosnia and Herzegovina’s EU accession process. We want conclusions to endorse the EU initiative, mandate Mogherini to negotiate the written commitment and that once the written commitment is signed, the stabilisation and association agreement will come into force. We also want to see GAC conclusions that refer to the annual enlargement package and endorse the FAC’s decision on the EU’s approach to Bosnia and Herzegovina.
General Affairs Council
Enlargement and stabilisation and association process
The General Affairs Council will discuss the Commission’s annual enlargement package (AEP), published on 8 October, and agree conclusions on the enlargement strategy and the western Balkans countries, Turkey and Iceland. The December GAC is the annual opportunity for the Council to take stock and give direction to the EU’s enlargement strategy and pre-accession reform priorities for individual countries. The Government’s views on the package were set out in my explanatory memorandum of 20 October 2014. We will broadly welcome the Commission’s approach in this year’s package, reiterating our continued firm support for future EU enlargement on the basis of strict but fair conditionality, with countries moving forward on merit as they meet the conditions. We will also take the opportunity to reiterate the importance of maintaining the credibility of the enlargement process, including addressing the concerns of many EU citizens around the impact of migration. We welcome recognition of this issue in the package.
Rule of law
Following an initial exchange of views at the November General Affairs Council and further discussions in COREPER, Ministers will consider the presidency’s latest proposals to strengthen adherence to the rule of law within the EU. The Italian presidency intends to focus discussion on the role of the member states, and in particular how to establish further dialogue within the Council to address emerging threats.
Strengthening inter-institutional annual and multi-annual programming
The Commission’s 2015 Work Programme is tabled for discussion at the General Affairs Council. The Italian presidency has also indicated its intention to agree a high-level political declaration on the Council’s intention to work with the Commission and European Parliament on legislative programming in future years. They are yet to confirm whether a draft text will be issued in advance of discussions at the General Affairs Council.
Friends of the presidency on improving the functioning of the EU
Following the final meeting of the friends of the presidency group on improving the functioning of the EU, the presidency will present its report and the GAC will hold a discussion on the recommendations.
Composition of the Committee of the Regions
The GAC will consider the current impasse on the Commission’s proposal of June 2014 to bring the composition of the Committee of the Regions (CoR) back in line with the Lisbon treaty which capped membership at 350. This was temporarily increased to 353 when Croatia acceded to the EU in July 2013. The UK strongly supports efforts to improve proportionality within the Committee of the Regions with a view to reflecting the demographic reality of member states. We will encourage the presidency to urgently facilitate agreement on a proposal that will allow the Committee’s mandate to be renewed in time and includes a commitment for a full review of the composition of the CoR during its next mandate period.
Preparation of the December European Council
The GAC will prepare the 18 and 19 December European Council, which the Prime Minister will attend. The December European Council agenda is expected to include strengthening growth, jobs and competitiveness and investment, and external relations issues—likely to include Ukraine and Ebola.
European semester and Europe 2020 mid-term review
The GAC will discuss the annual growth survey (AGS), which marks the beginning of the European semester process of social and economic co-ordination. The AGS is published alongside the alert mechanism report (AMR), the joint employment report (JER) and the Commission draft budgetary opinions on Eurozone member states. It sets out broad EU level economic and social objectives for the year ahead.
Europe 2020 is the European Union’s 10-year strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. A mid-term review of the strategy was launched with a public consultation in 2014 which ended on 31 October. The mid-term review is due to be discussed in each Council formation before being summarised and presented at the December GAC, ahead of the final presentation to the December European Council.
Follow-up to the June European Council
Ministers will have a thematic debate on the EU’s strategic agenda, focused on the subject: “The EU as a strong global actor”. I will set out the UK’s support for the strategic agenda as set out in the June European Council, and highlight the role of member states in setting EU foreign policy and the need for the EU to play an influential role in world.
Ukraine (UK Relations with Russia)
David Lidington Excerpts(9 years, 5 months ago)
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The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)
I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Maldon (Mr Whittingdale) on securing the debate and, indeed, on the commitment he has shown in this House for some time—and well before the current crisis arose—to understanding Ukraine, its people and its political priorities. I also thank all hon. Members who have taken part in today’s debate.
I want to start the substance of my remarks with Ukraine, because it seems to me that any fair appraisal of the diplomatic crisis we face needs to start with the truth that Ukraine today is an independent sovereign state with a democratically elected president and Parliament and internationally recognised borders, and is entitled, not only morally but in terms of international law, to take its own decisions about its national future.
Furthermore, that sovereignty, that independence and those borders were recognised by Russia itself in treaties that both accompanied and followed the break-up of the USSR. Those borders included Crimea within Ukraine, and until the armed intervention by Russia at the beginning of this year—an intervention, we should remind ourselves, that the Russians persistently denied almost to the day when they announced the award of medals to the soldiers who had served in Crimea—no territorial claim was made over the years since the independence of Ukraine.
The irony of the Russian intervention is that it has reinforced a sense of Ukrainian identity and Ukrainian nationalism not only, and most obviously, in the west of the country, but also in parts of eastern and southern Ukraine where those feelings were more muted. I saw something of that myself when I was in Dnipropetrovsk earlier this year.
Nor am I persuaded by the argument that Russia has somehow reacted to provocation by either the European Union or NATO. President Poroshenko has made it clear that he has no intention of even applying for membership of NATO, and his Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin made it clear at the most recent meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Council that, while Ukraine wished to move towards NATO standards in terms of the effectiveness of its armed forces, this was going to take Ukraine many, many years to accomplish.
As for the idea that there has somehow been EU provocation, let us remind ourselves that the negotiations for an association agreement started as far back as 2007, during the term of President Yushchenko. They were carried through by President Yanukovych, who is never normally accused of being a foe of Russia. When I was in Ukraine in October 2013, I talked to very senior members of the Yanukovych Administration who assured me that the President had decided that that association agreement was what he wanted to conclude.
We need to be clear about what Russia is attempting to do. It is now attempting to prevent Ukraine from successfully building a unified, democratic society based on the rule of law. Rather, its intention—to judge from its actions—appears to be to try to keep Ukraine weak, divided, corrupt and dependent on Russia to determine what its international alignments and mode of internal self-government should be.
Under successive British Governments, we have encouraged and supported Russia to move closer to the values that have underpinned peace and prosperity since the end of the cold war. That is why the United Kingdom has supported the admission of Russia to the G8 and the World Trade Organisation and looked forward to its admission to the OECD. But now, under President Putin, we have witnessed a severe decline in support for those values, a crackdown on civil society and other voices of freedom and independence inside Russia, and a rejection of that offer of partnership. There are clear signs, too, that Russia is not prepared to see its neighbours move in that direction either—and not just Ukraine.
Reference has been made during the debate to the events in Georgia in 2008, but in 2014 alone we have seen increased Russian meddling in the internal affairs of Moldova, the description by President Putin of Kazakhstan as “not a proper state”, the abduction by Russians of an Estonian official from inside Estonian territory—the man is still being detained in prison in Moscow—and the seizure on the high seas by Russia of a Lithuanian fishing vessel, which remains in Murmansk and has not been returned to its Lithuanian owners. We have also seen the interruption of gas supplies to Poland, Slovakia and Hungary. That has been attributed to technical problems, but I think it is a political signal that the Russian Government were unhappy with the reverse flow of gas supplies to—
Mr Lidington
I do not have time.
Those actions are based on a doctrine enunciated by the Kremlin: Russia has the right to intervene wherever it chooses when it claims that it is doing so in support of Russian speakers or ethnic Russians. Like hon. Members on both sides of the argument today, I believe strongly that there is a difference in terms of a defence commitment between NATO allies, where article 5 applies, and between friendly countries that are not part of the NATO alliance. Let us be in no doubt that the enunciation of that doctrine—of that right of intervention—was calculated to sow fear in the Baltic states, and it did so very successfully. Thankfully, it also resulted in a determined response from NATO and the deployment of additional NATO forces on exercises and patrols in the Baltic region.
Mr Lidington
I am sorry, but time is very short indeed.
We know that Ukraine needs support, and the United Kingdom has already spent money on a range of technical assistance programmes to support reforms of financial and economic governance, including tackling corruption. Through our conflict pool, we are also providing a range of programmes, including support for the reform of the Ukrainian armed forces and the supply of non-lethal equipment, as well as support for the OSCE special monitoring mission.
To answer the question from the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden), under the conflict security and stability fund we will improve on our record next year with a particular focus on defence and security reform and constitutional and public sector reform, and on the battle against organised crime and corruption in Ukraine. In my meetings this week with the Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine and with Mayor Klitschko, I made it clear that we welcomed an approach from the Ukrainian authorities in relation to other areas in which they might welcome United Kingdom know-how and technical assistance.
I want to return briefly to the subject of Ukraine’s Euro-integration aspirations and the need for reform. We have a substantial stake, as do other European countries, in Ukraine’s future, through €11 billion in the EU assistance package and a $17 billion International Monetary Fund loan. The EU-Ukraine association agreement represents a clear public commitment by both the EU and Ukraine to a deep relationship and close co-operation. It would be a great mistake for President Putin to see that agreement as a threat. A strong and prosperous Ukraine can only be in Russia’s interest, just as a strong and prosperous Poland has proved to be since the recovery of democracy in that country.
I was asked about sanctions. The answer is that our judgment about sanctions will depend upon Russia’s actions. If the Minsk agreement is implemented in full—if we see an end to the Russian reinforcements of the separatists, we start to see the withdrawal of Russian forces, we see Ukraine getting back control of its borders and the OSCE monitors able to deploy, and we see a genuine ceasefire—at that point perhaps we should consider whether any relaxation of sanctions might be appropriate. But, equally, if we see further military aggression, the EU has done a fair amount of contingency planning for the possibility of further sectoral economic sanctions. The Prime Minister personally and Ministers and officials at all levels are engaged with that work and in work to try to make sure that, despite different systems on the two sides of the Atlantic, there is coherence between the sanctions policy of the United States and that of the EU. I believe we have been able to deliver on that.
I wish to make it clear that our aim is not to cripple the Russian economy—the structural challenges that the Russian economy faces will do that. Russia needs to address those rather than focus on military intervention in its southern neighbour. Our aim is to exert a proportionate and reversible cost for Russia’s illegal actions and to persuade the Russian leadership that this crisis is better resolved through diplomatic means. I agree with those who have said that isolation is also not the answer either; we need dialogue with Russia to resolve this crisis. That is why the Prime Minister and my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary have continued to engage with their counterparts in Russia, and are committed to doing so.
Going forward, we will offer our support to the new coalition Government in Ukraine, both bilaterally and multilaterally, as they need all the support they can get. We will help them with their reform programme and will monitor progress on their commitments and obligations tied to the association agreement, the related EU assistance package and the IMF loan. We will help to strengthen Ukraine’s economy, through technical assistance, to allow for better economic management and we will help Ukraine to address its energy security, through its need to modernise its systems and become more efficient and self sustainable.
We do not seek a hostile relationship with Russia. Indeed, for 23 years the United Kingdom has tried to build a constructive and mutually beneficial relationship with Moscow, and we do not give up on that aim. But, equally, we have to be clear-headed about the actions that we have seen Russia take, particularly in the past 12 months, and act upon the basis of what Russia has actually done rather than upon promises that, so far, have not been implemented in practice. We will support Ukraine, we hope for a better relationship with Russia, but we must be realistic in preparing ourselves for a relationship with Moscow that, I fear, is going to be more difficult and more fractious than we had hoped. That is the choice of Russia’s leaders, who at the moment have chosen to treat Europe and the transatlantic alliance as a strategic adversary, rather than, as we had hoped, a potential partner for the future.
Oral Answers to Questions
David Lidington Excerpts(9 years, 5 months ago)
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Ms Margaret Ritchie (South Down) (SDLP)
8. What recent assessment he has made of the effects of Russia’s ban on EU food imports.
The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)
We estimate that about £4.5 billion of EU food exports stand to be affected, of which the UK share amounts to £39 million. At the same time, import restrictions have led to price increases to Russian shoppers of about 15%.
Ms Ritchie
Russia’s ban on EU food imports has contributed to the creation of an imbalance between market demand and supply in the dairy industry, particularly in Northern Ireland, where we rely greatly on exports. In view of that, will the Minister have immediate discussions with his ministerial colleagues in the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs with a view to pursuing other global markets for the dairy industry?
Mr Lidington
I completely understand the hon. Lady’s point about producers in Northern Ireland. As she knows, some EU compensation arrangements are available, but she has put her finger on the really important point. My colleagues in DEFRA and UK Trade & Investment want to work with producers in Northern Ireland and elsewhere both to access the EU funds available for getting into alternative markets and to promote the excellent produce from Northern Ireland in third markets worldwide.
Sir Richard Ottaway (Croydon South) (Con)
Given that Russia’s food import problems are due to the financial sanctions imposed on it by the EU because of Russia’s illegal behaviour in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, and given that yesterday the rouble had its worst day since the 1990s, does the Minister agree that financial sanctions will bring Russia to the negotiating table, and will he continue with them?
Mr Lidington
Russia has certainly suffered heavily as a result of the imposition of sanctions in the way that my right hon. Friend describes. We have seen a flight of capital out of Russia, as well as the precipitate fall in the value of the rouble. I hope that the Russian leadership will accept that it is in the interests of the Russian people to implement the Minsk agreement with Ukraine in full and, in particular, to return to Ukraine control of her sovereign borders.
Mr Pat McFadden (Wolverhampton South East) (Lab)
Further to the question from the right hon. Member for Croydon South (Sir Richard Ottaway), world leaders rightly made their views known about the Russian actions in Ukraine at the recent G20 summit in Australia. Will the Minister say more about the effect that he thinks the sanctions and the recent fall in the oil price are having on Russia and, in particular, whether he believes that the combined effect is producing a change in Russian attitudes towards fostering nationalism in Ukraine and possibly in other countries with Russian-speaking minorities?
Mr Lidington
I agree with the right hon. Gentleman’s implicit point that we are concerned not just about Ukraine, but about the doctrine of a right to intervene in support of Russian speakers anywhere in the world. The answer to his question is that, sadly, we are not yet seeing a return to serious talks and the implementation of the Minsk peace agreement by the Russian leadership, but the impact of sanctions on the Russian economy, coupled with the decline in oil prices, is catastrophic. It is in the interests of the Russian people that we see a change.
Mr Andrew Robathan (South Leicestershire) (Con)
What assessment has the Minister made of the impact on the people of Russia and on Russian public opinion of the effect of the sanctions and the declining oil price?
Mr Lidington
The people of Russia—ordinary families—are bearing the brunt of the cost of the Kremlin’s adventurism in Ukraine through much higher inflation, a lack of access to high-quality, good-value imported produce, and a decline, every week, in the value of the rouble in their pockets.
Stephen Metcalfe (South Basildon and East Thurrock) (Con)
13. What recent progress the Government have made on the transatlantic trade and investment partnership.
The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)
The seventh round of negotiations concluded in October, and our ambition remains to agree a deal next year that could benefit the average British family by £400 a year.
Stephen Metcalfe
I thank my right hon. Friend for his answer. Will he confirm that as part of his negotiations, he will reiterate that signing TTIP is not the start of the privatisation of the NHS?
Mr Lidington
I can absolutely confirm that to my hon. Friend. In early October, both the United States and EU chief negotiators made it clear in public statements that there would be no provisions in the trade agreement that would limit the ability of Governments to regulate health provision or other public services.
Mr David Hanson (Delyn) (Lab)
At a meeting in my constituency last Friday, those very concerns about the privatisation of the health service were raised, as were concerns about the reduction in minimum standards such as the minimum wage and conditions at work, and about the ability of a UK Government to put conditions on suppliers to the UK. Can the Minister give my constituents some reassurances on those points?
Mr Lidington
I would like to think that the right hon. Gentleman made it clear that he was not going to add to the scaremongering rumours that he has just described, especially given that the Government in whom he served were an ardent champion of this trade deal with the United States. It is clear that the TTIP deal will not limit the ability of Governments to legislate for, or to regulate, public services. It will provide businesses large and small in this country with enormous opportunities to get access to a US market of 300 million customers, and the entire House should be united in supporting that.
Nic Dakin (Scunthorpe) (Lab)
15. What recent discussions he has had with his EU counterparts on freedom of movement within the EU.
Alok Sharma (Reading West) (Con)
T3. The Foreign Secretary has made it clear that any renegotiation with the EU will have trade at its heart, which my constituents welcome ahead of the referendum, but does the Minister envisage concurrent discussions on bilateral free trade agreements with high-growth economies such as India, which will be needed in case the British people choose to leave the EU, or will any such discussions come after the referendum vote?
The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)
As my hon. Friend knows, the treaty provisions are that the EU has exclusive competence over international trade negotiations, which means that we benefit from the collective leverage of a market of about 500 million people in prising open access to third markets. As regards India, the Prime Minister raised with the Indian Prime Minister at Brisbane the need to reopen the EU-India talks on free trade which had been paused because of the Indian election. We hope very much that Mr Modi’s Government will want to take that forward now.
Diana Johnson (Kingston upon Hull North) (Lab)
T5. Is the Minister really saying that Britain has fulfilled its commitment by taking 90 of the most vulnerable Syrian refugees, when 130,000 need to be resettled around the world?
Foreign Affairs Council/General Affairs Council
David Lidington Excerpts(9 years, 5 months ago)
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The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)
My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, attended the Foreign Affairs Council on 17 November, and the Minister for reserves, the hon. Member for Canterbury (Mr Brazier), attended the Defence Foreign Affairs Council and the European Defence Agency steering board on 18 November. Ivan Rogers, UK permanent representative to the European Union, attended the General Affairs Council on 18 November, and Lord Ahmad, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Department for Communities and Local Government, attended the General Affairs Council on 19 November. The Foreign Affairs Council and Defence Foreign Affairs Council were chaired by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, and the General Affairs Council was chaired by the Italian presidency. The meetings were held in Brussels.
Johannes Hahn, Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, Christos Stylianides, Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management and EU Ebola Co-ordinator, Elzbieta Bienkowska, Commissioner for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs and Neven Mimica, Commissioner for International Co-operation and Development were in attendance for some of the discussions at the FAC.
Foreign Affairs Council
A provisional report of the meeting and Conclusions adopted can be found at:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/145816.pdf
Ukraine
Ministers welcomed Ukraine’s parliamentary elections on 26 October and looked forward to the formation of a new Government. There was broad agreement that the EU should continue sending a concerted message to Ukraine about the importance of seizing the opportunity of a new pro-reform Rada to accelerating work on deep-rooted, economic and political reforms. The EU should continue to make it clear that its financial support was linked to progress on a credible, concrete reform agenda. Commissioner Hahn noted that he planned to visit Ukraine before the end of November to meet the newly-formed Government.
The Foreign Secretary was joined by his EU counterparts in making clear that the separatist “elections” on 2 November were illegitimate, illegal under Ukrainian law, and in breach of the Minsk protocol. Ministers called on all parties to implement the Minsk agreements in full, stressing Russia’s responsibility in particular. The Foreign Secretary argued that EU must take action to respond to the worsening situation and separatist elections. Ministers agreed to task the EEAS and Commission with presenting for decision by the end of November a proposal on additional sanctions listings targeting separatists as well as further work on implementing the EU policy of non-recognition of the annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol.
Ministers agreed conclusions which, inter alia, reaffirmed their support of the Minsk agreements and called on Russia to implement its commitments under Minsk. Ministers also expressed concern about the humanitarian situation and welcomed the recent OSCE brokered access to the MH17 crash site and underlined that those responsible for the downing of MH17 would be held accountable.
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Germany set out the rationale behind the UK-German initiative, noting that previous reform attempts had failed and that a new approach was needed. The Foreign Secretary set out the mechanics, being clear that constitutional and institutional reform, as elements of conditionality, remained. He also urged partners to help create momentum by focusing on getting the economy moving and creating jobs—this would create pressure from within for reform.
Many Ministers spoke in favour of the initiative, the need for change, and the good timing. Commissioner Hahn and HRVP Mogherini both took up the initiative enthusiastically. Ms Mogherini concluded that she now had a mandate to take this forward as an EU process, that there was agreement that conditionality would not be reduced and that the initiative would create no precedent. She would visit the region before the December FAC and ask for a written commitment to be included in Bosnian Government programmes and agreed by Parliament.
Ebola
EU Ebola Coordinator and Humanitarian Commissioner Christos Stylianides, just returned from west Africa, praised the UK’s “outstanding job” in Sierra Leone. C Stylianides committed to: follow up with member states to assess needs, support rapid deployment of staff via the ERCC, and organise a high-level meeting in the next few weeks, followed by a bigger conference with the region in due course to look at “the day after Ebola”. The Foreign Secretary debriefed on his recent visit to Sierra Leone, and underlined the urgency of delivering on commitments already made. Longer term, we would all need to step up again to help rebuild the economies of the region. Conclusions were adopted without comment.
Middle east peace process
Ministers agreed conclusions responding to recent tensions by calling for calm in Jerusalem, deploring settlement expansion, and urging a durable ceasefire in Gaza. The conclusions pledge an EU role, through the reactivation and possible expansion of the EU’s CSDP missions in Gaza.
Libya
Ms Mogherini provided a brief update of the situation in Libya and promised to revert to the issue in full, most likely in December. Member states emphasised concerns over the humanitarian situation, irregular migration flows, energy instability and the rise of extremists.
Other business
Ministers agreed without discussion a number of other measures:
The Council adopted conclusions on the action plan on visa liberalisation for Georgia;
The Council approved the EU position for the first meeting of the EU-Georgia Association Council following the signature of the EU-Georgia Association Council and the start of its provisional application;
The Council adopted the EU’s position within the Association councils with Georgia and the Republic of Moldova;
The Council updated information concerning a person targeted by EU restrictive measures in connection with action against Ukraine’s territorial integrity;
The Council adopted the EU position for the thirteenth meeting of the EU-Kyrgyz Republic Co-operation Council on 18 November.
Defence Foreign Affairs Council
The Foreign Affairs Council in Defence Ministers formation was preceded by the European Defence Agency (EDA) steering board. The UK welcomed the work of the EDA on the policy framework for long term defence co-operation but raised reservations over the proposal by the European Parliament to commission and directly fund CSDP projects in the EDA. The Council discussed three agenda items: the EDA 2015 budget, CSDP missions and operations, and the security situation in the broader neighbourhood. The UK blocked an increase to the budget of the EDA for the fifth year in succession and highlighted support for CSDP operations in Bosnia and the horn of Africa. On Ebola, the UK pushed for a greater contribution to the international effort from member states. This was followed by an informal session over lunch on the prospects for CSDP where member states renewed calls for a revised European security strategy. Council conclusions were amended, following a French request, to call for the development of a crisis management concept for a follow on EU mission in the Central African Republic.
General Affairs Council
A provisional report of both meetings can be found at:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/145816.pdf
18 November
The General Affairs Council (GAC) on 18 November focused on: the preparation of the European Council on 18 and 19 December; strengthening inter-institutional annual and multi-annual programming; rule of law; the follow-up to the strategic agenda for the EU agreed at the June European Council; and under any other business, the third meeting of the friends of the presidency group on improving the functioning of the EU.
Preparation of the December European Council
The GAC prepared the 18 and 19 December European Council, which the Prime Minister will attend. The December European Council agenda is expected to cover: economic policy, including further efforts to foster growth, jobs and competiveness; and external relations issues, such as Ebola.
The UK welcomed the strong focus on the economy, and emphasised the need for long-term, sustainable economic growth. Key drivers for achieving this will be the digital economy and the single market in services. The full range of tools should be used to stimulate growth, and the planned EU investment package should include private capital in the mix and be accompanied by ambitious structural reform.
Strengthening inter-institutional annual and multi-annual programming
The Italian presidency updated the GAC on its plans for a political declaration setting out the working arrangements between the institutions on inter-institutional legislative planning.
The GAC also discussed the priorities being considered for inclusion in the Commission 2015 Annual Work Programme, which are drawn from the strategic agenda agreed at the June European Council and Commission President Juncker’s 10 priority points. The UK stressed the importance of completing the internal market, especially in the digital and services sectors. The UK also cautioned that the GAC should not rush in to formalising arrangements on legislative programming for future years, but should first see how arrangements this year have worked in order to ensure the council has the role it needs.
Rule of law
The GAC held an exchange of views on the rule of law and the Council’s role in upholding it, based on an Italian presidency discussion paper. The UK emphasised the need to avoid unnecessarily complex processes and to ensure that any proposals are consistent with the treaties. The presidency agreed to return to the subject at the December GAC.
Follow-up to the June European Council
The GAC held its third discussion of the implementation of the “Strategic Agenda for the Union in times of change” as agreed by leaders at the June European Council this year, focusing this time on energy and climate policy. GAC Ministers debated progress so far on energy union and noted the important steps needed to prepare for the UN climate change summit in Paris next year.
Any other business
The presidency updated the Council on the third meeting of the friends of the presidency group on improving the functioning of the EU which took place on 7 November 2014.
19 November
The session of the GAC on 19 November was dedicated to cohesion policy. Ministers discussed Council conclusions on the sixth cohesion report; the contribution of cohesion policy to EU2020; and the treatment of those operational programmes which are not adopted by the end of 2014.
On the conclusions, the UK emphasised the importance of proportionality in governance and audit, supported by Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands; the UK also argued against an extension of the eligibility period for the 2007-13 period to 2016.
On Europe 2020, the UK stressed that structural reform and the contribution of the private sector was central to delivering the strategy’s objectives.
On the late adoption of operational programmes, the UK stressed the importance of proper management of EU budgetary pressures.
Armoured Vehicles (OSCE Mission in Ukraine)
David Lidington Excerpts(9 years, 6 months ago)
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The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office has today laid a departmental minute proposing a gift to Ukraine.
The United Kingdom is committed to supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Throughout the crisis that has unfolded during 2014, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has played a crucial role in monitoring events on the ground and facilitating dialogue between Ukrainian and separatist factions in the east of the country. The OSCE’s special monitoring mission has been operating in Ukraine since March 2014, and the UK has been a strong supporter of its role, providing nearly £2 million in funding and seconding a number of UK nationals into the mission.
The Minsk protocol, the peace plan and ceasefire agreed between Ukraine and Russia on 5 September has tasked the SMM with significant additional responsibilities, notably monitoring and verifying the ceasefire and monitoring the Ukraine-Russia border. The ceasefire is just about holding but with continued outbreaks of violence, and fatalities. It is therefore vital that the OSCE special monitoring mission receives the funding and equipment it needs to expand to its full capacity of 500 international monitors and be enabled to fulfil its mandate while operating within an often very challenging environment. As part of a package of enhanced support to the OSCE, the UK therefore intends to provide 10 armoured vehicles to the mission, which have been identified as being crucial to allow monitors to operate securely in the more volatile eastern parts of Ukraine.
This package will be funded by the Government’s conflict pool fund—FCO, MOD and DFID. It is in direct response to a request from Swiss Federal President and OSCE Chairman-in-Office Didier Burkhalter, who has written to OSCE Foreign Ministers requesting the provision of people, money and equipment.
The departmental minute sets out the proposal to gift 10 armoured vehicles and associated communications equipment worth £1,169,006 to the OSCE. The proposed gift will consist of the following UK sourced equipment:
10 armoured vehicles (8 x LC200, 2 x LC105)—£1,120,000
10 AV spares kits—£11,266
10 Motorola DM4601 VHF radio plus ancillaries—£4,740
10 Codan Envoy XI HR radio—£33,000
The proposed gift has been assessed against the consolidated EU and national arms export licensing criteria. The proposed gift has been scrutinised and approved by a senior, cross-Whitehall conflict pool approval board, which has confirmed that it fits with the Government’s strategic and delivery objectives. Foreign and Commonwealth Office officials also assessed the project for human rights risks, using the overseas security and justice assistance guidelines established by the Foreign Secretary in 2011. They concluded that the risk of human rights violations arising from the project’s delivery could be successfully mitigated.
The Treasury has approved the proposal in principle. If, during the period of 14 parliamentary sitting days beginning on the date on which this minute was laid before the House of Commons, a Member signifies an objection by giving notice of a parliamentary question or of a motion relating to the minute, or by otherwise raising the matter in the House, final approval of the gift will be withheld pending an examination of the objection.
EU Reform
David Lidington Excerpts(9 years, 6 months ago)
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This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)
Mr Robertson, I welcome you to the Chair this afternoon. I also welcome the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden) to his first outing in Westminster Hall with his new responsibilities. In addition, I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash) on securing the debate. He and I have been discussing these issues for about 25 years—
Mr Lidington
“Since 1990,” my hon. Friend reminds me. And as I will make clear in my remarks, there are some things that we agree upon and other things where there are perhaps some divergences in our respective approaches.
I will start with those areas on which I can find ready agreement with what my hon. Friend said in his opening remarks. I agree with him and other hon. Members when they say that the current levels of unemployment and low growth in Europe are a scandal and a cause of human misery, as well as an important cause of the widespread public discontent and anxiety that we see right across the continent. I also agree with those who have argued today that those economic challenges need to be addressed by a vigorous programme, primarily of supply-side reform, at both national and European level, focusing on the liberalisation of markets, especially in services, on deregulation and on embracing the opportunities offered by free trade. Those economic reforms are right not only for the UK but for Europe as a whole. I also say to hon. Members, frankly, that whether this country were in or out of the EU, endemic low growth and high unemployment in the rest of Europe are very bad news for businesses in this country, given the high proportion of our trade that is done with other EU companies and member states.
I agreed with what my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (Mr Redwood) said when he expressed relief that this country had decided not to take part in the euro. I agree that that would not have been in this country’s interests and I continue to believe that it is not a project that it is in our interests to take part in.
I also agree that for those partners that have committed themselves to membership of the euro, the logic of a single currency and a single monetary policy must be for closer integration of economic and fiscal policy decisions, and in turn for there to be political arrangements to hold such decisions accountable. One of the central political questions for the EU in the years to come—the next decade or so—will be whether we can construct arrangements within Europe that permit those who have committed themselves to a single currency to integrate more closely, while genuinely respecting, and in full, the rights of those who choose to remain outside the euro. That also means ensuring that the EU, in both its rules and its working culture, guards against the kind of caucusing that my hon. Friend the Member for Stone warned us might be a possibility—a caucus among eurozone countries, effectively to write the rules for everybody else regardless of others’ interests or views.
I also agree with the case for more wide-reaching political reform at European level. The EU is too centralised, and is often too bossy. As the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) said, we need to have an EU that shows greater flexibility and that is better able to accommodate the diversity that is needed among the 28 member states that there now are, rather than the six member states the EU started with.
There was some discussion about defence. I agree with those who argued that it is NATO and not the EU that is, and should remain, the key alliance for the maintenance of the security of this country and of Europe as a whole. As my hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot (Sir Gerald Howarth) said in an intervention, we still have a veto in regard to Europe’s common security and defence arrangements and we have exercised that veto in the way that he described.
Sir Richard Shepherd
The Minister will remember the visit of Mrs Merkel to the House of Lords, where she said she was absolutely convinced that what had held Europe peaceful was the EU, whereas I think most people in Westminster Hall today would think that it was, in fact, NATO that did that. Is it not NATO that is really the basis of the security of Europe?
Mr Lidington
I will come to that point a bit later on, but I do not think we need to say that those two institutions are polar opposites. It is true that it was NATO that defended democratic western Europe from Soviet militarism and aggression for more than half a century, and in doing so held out the hope of liberty for the enslaved nations of central Europe. I will come on to the role that the EU has played in the past 25 years in cementing democracies in those countries once they escaped from Soviet rule.
I will briefly continue on defence. Any treaty change that provided for EU armed forces would now need not only the agreement of the UK’s Government, under the requirement for unanimity, but, under the European Union Act 2011, an Act of Parliament and a referendum. Those things would be needed before such a change to treaties could take place.
The UK and Germany have different experiences of Europe. My hon. Friend the Member for Stone drew attention to how Germany, in the mid 20th century, saw the collapse or failure of national identity, institutions and culture, whereas for us that period in our history is very much about the vindication of those things. However, if we look at what has happened in the EU in the past quarter of a century, we have seen not only greater prosperity but how the peaceful collapse of the Berlin wall and the integration of the eastern Länder into the Federal Republic was followed by the establishment of the rule of law, democratic institutions and human rights in parts of our continent where those things had been crushed for most of the 20th century. And contrary to the argument of the hon. Member for Aldridge-Brownhills, I believe that it has been the accession process leading to EU membership that has made possible the institutionalisation of those reforms and entrenched them in a way that did not happen when infant democracies were formed after the treaty of Versailles at the end of the first world war.
The question of the UK’s membership of the EU should be based upon a clear-eyed assessment of our national interest, and in my view it ultimately needs to be decided by a referendum of the British people. However, the House needs to acknowledge that any relationship with Germany, or with the EU generally, that preserves simply the things that we like about membership and none of the things that we find difficult or irksome is not within the bounds of political possibility, and the same is true of the notion that leaving the EU would somehow free this country from the EU’s influence or rules. That has not been the experience of Norway or Switzerland, which can trade freely with the EU but also have to implement EU laws, pay into the EU budget and accept freedom of movement, without having any say or any vote upon those matters.
I think there is the prospect of serious EU reform; I also think there is growing recognition around the table in Brussels and in national capitals that that reform is necessary for the prosperity and the continuation of peaceful democracy throughout our continent; and I believe that under the Prime Minister’s leadership that is what we shall achieve.
US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement
David Lidington Excerpts(9 years, 6 months ago)
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This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)
I, too, welcome you to the Chair, Sir Roger. I congratulate the hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) and my hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) on securing this debate on the mutual defence agreement, which has spread out to consider wider aspects of this country’s nuclear defence policy.
It is noticeable that the debate has been conducted by Members on all sides with a degree of seriousness appropriate to the grave subject that we are debating. I am with the right hon. Member for Warley (Mr Spellar) in saying that whatever side of the argument any of us stands on—whether for or against the UK maintaining a nuclear deterrent—we are in no doubt about the consequences of nuclear warfare. All of us have seen or read about the impact on people in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. We have also seen the impact of nuclear testing in some of the cases that the hon. Member for Islington North described.
I take the view, along with my hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East, that there remains a need for a United Kingdom nuclear deterrent. Although the cold war has ended, significant nuclear capabilities and risks remain. Nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented. Substantial nuclear arsenals still exist. The number of nuclear armed states in the world has increased, and there is a significant risk of new nuclear armed states emerging. Moreover, several of the countries that have nuclear weapons, or are trying to acquire them, are in tense and unstable regions. There is the potential for a new nuclear threat to emerge or re-emerge.
This country’s strategic deterrent is therefore as relevant today as it has ever been. It remains the ultimate guarantee of our security and sovereignty, and a necessary insurance in an uncertain world. I want to be clear, as successive Governments of this country have been, that the United Kingdom’s nuclear weapons are not designed or intended for military use during conflicts. Their objective is to deter and prevent nuclear blackmail, and acts of aggression against our vital interests that could not be countered by any other means. Successive Governments have been clear that the circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might be contemplated are of the most extreme kind.
Jeremy Corbyn
The Minister mentioned the non-proliferation treaty. It is specifically designed to prevent, as the name suggests, nuclear armed proliferation. Is he content about, or has he had legal advice on, provision for nuclear information to be shared by the USA with Britain? That is extrajudicial for both countries and therefore appears to be at odds with the terms of the non-proliferation treaty, which is designed to stop proliferation, rather than encourage it.
Mr Lidington
If the hon. Gentleman bears with me, I will address the issue of the non-proliferation treaty and the bearing it has on the MDA later. I pay tribute to him. He has always, in all his years in the House, taken an absolutely consistent and coherent approach in opposing this country’s deterrent and wanting to see immediate and universal nuclear disarmament. The right hon. Member for Warley, my hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East and I believe that this country’s deterrent remains necessary and important. There is no case for saying that the United Kingdom ought to have an independent nuclear deterrent, but one that was less effective and therefore of less deterrent value than the system of continuous submarine patrols that we have. That point was made more than once in this debate, but I will not pursue it further in the absence of those advocating that policy course.
I referred a moment ago to our alliance on continuous at-sea submarine patrols, and it is worth paying tribute to the fact that for more than 45 years, for every minute of every day, the Royal Navy has successfully operated such patrols, ensuring the safety and security of this country. I hope that the whole House would join me, whatever our views on the need for a nuclear deterrent, in paying tribute to the dedication of the men and women of the Royal Navy, including the crews and support staff and their families. Many of those servicemen and women are away from home for long periods, and their dedication and commitment are fundamental to the success of the United Kingdom’s deterrent operation.
While the international security environment continues to require the UK to maintain a nuclear deterrent, we have an obvious responsibility to maintain the safety, security and reliability of all its elements, including through the replacement and updating of parts of the system as they reach the end of their operational life. The mutual defence agreement has enabled us to collaborate with the United States to ensure that we are able to do that to the highest possible technical standards. The MDA underpins all nuclear defence co-operation between the UK and the US. That co-operation has been of considerable mutual benefit, allowing the United Kingdom to reduce costs significantly while maintaining an operationally independent deterrent. It is in the national defence and security interests of the UK and the US, as well as in this country’s economic interests, for the MDA to continue.
Questions have been posed about the independence of the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent and whether that independence is in practice meaningful, given the MDA and our close collaboration on defence matters with the United States. I want to be absolutely clear that this country’s nuclear deterrent is and always has been operationally independent. The command and control systems involved are UK-owned and controlled. Decision making and use of the Trident system remain entirely sovereign to the United Kingdom. Only the Prime Minister can authorise the employment of the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent, and there are no technical means by which the United States could negate or override a prime ministerial instruction.
It is true that through the MDA we have been able to take advantage of some American know-how, and of a certain amount of American material. We would have been able to provide that for ourselves, but creating an entirely indigenous source of such material, equipment and know-how would have given rise to significant additional expense. It has seemed to Labour and Conservative Governments alike over the years to be common sense to work with the United States to take advantage of its capacity in those areas of nuclear expertise to our mutual advantage, rather than incurring the extra costs ourselves when that was not necessary for the independence and capability of our nuclear deterrent. We have some procurement dependence on the US for certain non-nuclear aspects of the system, but we choose not to manufacture those indigenously because of the economic benefits of working with our closest ally.
[Mr David Amess in the Chair]
On the important question of the relationship between the mutual defence agreement and the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, there have been claims in this debate and at other times that the MDA is at odds with our commitment to a world without nuclear weapons, and incompatible with the commitments we have made under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, particularly those in articles I and VI. The United Kingdom is a leading nation in securing progress in nuclear disarmament, and we should be proud of our record. We have steadily reduced the size of our nuclear forces by well over half since our cold war peak. Our nuclear arsenal is almost certainly the smallest of any of the five states recognised as nuclear weapons states under the NPT.
Our forces peaked in the late 1970s with a total of some 460 warheads of various types and delivery systems. In May 2010, the Prime Minister announced that the figure would continue to be reduced to no more than 120 operationally available warheads, with an entire stockpile of no more that 180 warheads by the mid-2020s. That reduction is already under way. The Government have also announced that we will cut the maximum number of nuclear warheads onboard each deployed submarine from 48 to 40, while reducing the number of operational Trident missiles on each submarine to eight. Those changes have already been completed on at least one of the vessels.
Jeremy Corbyn
May I take the Minister back to my question about the compatibility of the MDA, which is now amended and includes the observation of dangers of proliferation elsewhere in the world, with the original and current objective of the NPT, which is the non-proliferation of nuclear know-how or technology between states? Britain and the USA are not one state. As the Minister reminded us, they are both sovereign, independent nations, so the transfer of nuclear technology from one to the other is surely in breach of the NPT.
Mr Lidington
The hon. Gentleman takes me straight to the point that I was about to make about article I of the NPT, which touches on the transfer of nuclear weapons and devices between countries. The Government regard the MDA as compliant with our obligations under article I for three reasons.
First, nuclear devices or weapons are not transferred to the United Kingdom under the terms of the MDA. As I described earlier, what we receive under the MDA is a certain amount of nuclear technological know-how and some non-lethal elements, such as propulsion systems, that are not prohibited under article I.
Secondly, article V of the original mutual defence agreement—not including the amendments—quite explicitly states that the transfer of nuclear weapons is not permitted.
Thirdly, article I of the NPT refers in particular to transfers from the recognised nuclear weapons states to non-nuclear weapons states. However, the MDA refers to transfers of things other than nuclear weapons or devices from one nuclear weapons state to another, both of which are party to the NPT. I think that that answers the challenge that the MDA is in some way incompatible with article I of the NPT.
The other criticism made is that the mutual defence agreement is at odds with the obligation that we and the other four recognised nuclear weapons states have under article VI of the non-proliferation treaty to work towards multilateral disarmament. I have already described how the United Kingdom has significantly brought down its nuclear arsenal as a contribution to multilateral nuclear disarmament, but we have also been active and continue to be active in a range of multilateral disarmament initiatives.
We remain a strong supporter of the NPT. We signed and ratified the comprehensive test ban treaty as long ago as the 1990s and remain a strong supporter of the treaty both financially and technically, operating our own voluntary moratorium on testing pending the treaty coming into effect. We actively urge the remaining states that have not yet ratified the treaty to do so. We want an early start of negotiations in Geneva on the fissile material cut-off treaty and are an active member of the group of governmental experts that is working on those negotiations, which are currently blocked not by the United Kingdom or any of the recognised nuclear weapons states, but by Pakistan for national reasons.
In addition, we currently chair the forum of the permanent five nuclear weapons states and will be hosting the next annual conference in London in February next year. The purpose of the P5 process is to build transparency and mutual confidence to make it possible for all nuclear weapons states to engage in further rounds of multilateral disarmament. At the same time, we lead an informal working group at the United Nations, discussing the UN’s role in future nuclear security work. This country therefore has a good record of active work on multilateral disarmament that sits perfectly well alongside the arrangements that we have with the United States under the MDA.
Mr Spellar
I thank the Minister for giving way, and I want to highlight the fact that these developments have taken place under Governments of both parties. To what extent can we support, encourage or stimulate the key discussions between the United States and Russia on their agreement, to which the agreements of the other nuclear states are secondary, although important?
Mr Lidington
First, I happily acknowledge that the multilateral disarmament work that I have described has taken place under Governments of both political colours.
Secondly, I agree completely with the right hon. Gentleman that the prime responsibility for leadership in multilateral nuclear disarmament must lie with the two biggest nuclear powers: the United States and Russia. We encouraged the talks that led towards the second strategic arms reduction treaty, which will impose limits for each party of 1,550 deployed strategic warheads from February 2018. We need to see that target fulfilled and would welcome and support its implementation.
One could make a similar point about the talks on an intermediate nuclear forces treaty. There was a bilateral US-Russia treaty back in 1988, but each side now accuses the other of breaching it. For reasons relating to Russia’s conduct in Ukraine, there has been a significant erosion of trust between the US and Russia. It will therefore not be easy to get talks between Washington and Moscow back on course, but I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that it is in the interests of all of us that Russia and the United States are able to rebuild a sufficient degree of trust for meaningful negotiations towards multilateral nuclear disarmament to take place.
I want it to be clear that the United Kingdom is not using the amendments to the mutual defence agreement to upgrade its system’s capabilities. There is no move to produce more usable weapons or change our nuclear posture or doctrine. The amendments to the MDA that we are technically debating this afternoon do not in any way provide for an upgrading of the capabilities of the Trident system. That is a decision for 2016.
The hon. Member for Islington North asked a couple of detailed questions about plutonium tests at Aldermaston and the relationship between the mutual defence agreement and the planned replacement of the Vanguard-class submarine fleet. The Atomic Weapons Establishment has conducted sealed hydrodynamic plutonium experiments, which are sub-critical, do not produce nuclear yield and are fully compliant with the non-proliferation treaty. The experiments were described in a published article in the journal Nature in February 2002. Aldermaston and its experiments are also, of course, fully in line with the commitments we have undertaken in agreeing and ratifying the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. I am therefore advised that what has happened at Aldermaston is fully compliant with our international legal obligations.
Jeremy Corbyn
Two points come from that. First, was the plutonium from the UK, or was it imported from the USA? Secondly, were the results shared with US scientists and military personnel, either at the time or after the experiments took place?
Mr Lidington
I hope the hon. Gentleman will understand if I say I will write to him after the debate to provide him with such detail as I can.
On the relationship between the renewal of the MDA and the 2016 main-gate decision, no submarines or reactors are being built before that decision. However, it is vital, as with any major programme of such complexity, to order certain items where there would be a delay in the programme if we were to wait until after main gate. Some of those transfers will take place under the MDA, but as I said earlier, transfers under the MDA do not include nuclear weapons or nuclear devices.
I hope hon. Members on both sides will recognise that the United Kingdom has been a leading nation on multilateral disarmament. However, successive Governments have also been clear that we will retain a credible, continuous and effective minimum nuclear deterrent for as long as the global security situation makes that necessary.
We are a responsible nuclear weapons state. The mutual defence agreement helps to provide the maintenance and servicing required to ensure the safety, security and reliability of the system, and at a substantial reduction on the costs that would otherwise be incurred. It is fully compliant with our international obligations, it does not hinder the operational independence of the deterrent and it is a key aspect of our defence co-operation with our closest ally. It is clearly in the national interest of the United Kingdom and the United States to continue this co-operation, and the Government’s clear view is that the mutual defence agreement should be renewed.
Foreign Affairs Council and General Affairs Council
David Lidington Excerpts(9 years, 6 months ago)
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The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)
My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs attended the Foreign Affairs Council on 20 October, and I attended the General Affairs Council on 21 October. The Foreign Affairs Council was chaired by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Baroness Ashton of Upholland, and the General Affairs Council was chaired by the Italian presidency. The meetings were held in Luxembourg.
Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, Štefan Füle, Commissioner for International Co-operation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response, Kristalina Georgieva, and Commissioner for Health, Tonio Borg, were in attendance for some of the discussions at the FAC. Commissioner for Inter-Institutional Relations and Administration, Maroš Šefcovic, was in attendance for some of the discussions at the GAC.
Foreign Affairs Council
A provisional report of the meeting and conclusions adopted can be found at: http://www.consilium.europa. eu/uedocs/cms data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/145218.pdf
Introductory remarks
Baroness Ashton expressed cautious optimism at the recent elections in Bosnia, and hoped for the quick formation of a new Government. She briefed Ministers on the E3 plus 3/Iran negotiations, where parties were still a long way apart on key issues.
Ebola
Ministers discussed the need for a rapid and significant increase in the response to the Ebola outbreak in west Africa. The Foreign Secretary called for a rapid and up-scaled response from the EU and its member states, and outlined the UK’s ongoing significant efforts in Sierra Leone. Ministers agreed conclusions which set out an EU guarantee of appropriate care for international health responders, including medical evacuation, and an EU “clearing house” system to help deploy more health workers more quickly.
Libya
Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Bernardino Leon, briefed that a deal among Libyans was achievable and the parties were not far apart. The threat of sanctions had provided leverage. The Foreign Secretary agreed and called on the international community to support the UN facilitated dialogue and to refrain from divisive actions. Ministers agreed conclusions reinforcing the 18 October E3, Italian and US joint statement urging all parties to observe a ceasefire and supporting Leon’s efforts to broker a political solution.
Ira/Syria/ISIL
Ministers agreed conclusions which firmly endorsed UK priorities, pledging EU action to defeat ISIL and supporting military action. They also endorsed a strategy to tackle foreign fighters and underlined that Assad cannot be a partner. Ministers agreed to ban the export of jet fuel to Syria and extended sanctions to 18 new entities associated with the Assad regime.
Middle east peace process
Baroness Ashton briefed Ministers on the 12 October Gaza reconstruction conference in Cairo, where the EU had pledged €450 million, and reiterated that the EU was ready to support a durable ceasefire. There was consensus that the EU should press for the Palestinian Authority to return to Gaza and for restrictions to be lifted, while expressing frustration at the lack of progress and continued Israeli settlement expansion. The Foreign Secretary welcomed international generosity at the Cairo conference. He stressed that the EU’s priority must be supporting a sustainable ceasefire in Gaza, including through a reactivated and potentially expanded border management mission (EUBAM Rafah).
Ukraine
The Foreign Secretary and a number of other Ministers set out the importance of maintaining pressure on Russia and enhancing support to Ukraine. The Commission outlined its financial support and preparations for a donors’ conference, but called for maintaining conditionality, highlighting the importance of reform. The Foreign Secretary and others pressed for a response to rising humanitarian needs as winter approached, and hoped for an early deal with Russia on gas. Ministers agreed conclusions stating that Russia must implement its commitments, including on: withdrawing troops/arms from eastern Ukraine, control of the border, and local elections in separatist-controlled areas.
Other business
Ministers agreed without discussion a number of other measures:
The Council adopted conclusions on Bosnia and Herzegovina; Yemen; Afghanistan; Sudan and Somalia.
The Council approved the 17th progress report on the implementation of the EU strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons and their ammunition covering the EU’s activities from 1 January to 30 June 2014.
The Council amended EU sanctions against Somalia.
The Council reinforced EU restrictive measures against the Syrian regime.
The Council amended the EU restrictive measures in view of the situation in Libya to take account of changes approved at the UN.
The Council extended the EU restrictive measures against five persons from the Republic of Guinea.
The Council approved the High Representative’s report on the 26th monthly review of Operation Althea.
The Council adopted the concept of operations and the operational plan for the EU advisory mission for civilian security sector reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine).
The Council approved the concept of operations for the EU common security and defence policy mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali).
The Council allocated a budget of €17.9 million for activities of the EU mission on regional maritime capacity building in the horn of Africa (EUCAP Nestor) for the period from 16 October 2014 to 15 October 2015.
General Affairs Council
The General Affairs Council (GAC) on 21 October focused on: the preparation of the European Council on 23 and 24 October 2014; the follow-up to the strategic agenda for the EU agreed at the June European Council; protocol 36 of the treaties; composition of the Committee of the Regions; and strengthening inter-institutional annual and multi-annual programming.
A provisional report of the meeting can be found at:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/genaff/145257.pdf
The preparation of the October European Council
The GAC prepared the 23 and 24 October European Council, which the Prime Minister attended. The October European Council agenda is expected to include: the climate and energy policy framework 2030; economic issues; and external relations issues—including Ebola and Ukraine. We also expect the European Council to formally appoint the new Commission, following the vote by the European Parliament on 22 October.
On climate and energy, I emphasised the need for an ambitious 2030 agreement which gives member states flexibility to achieve the necessary reductions in greenhouse gas emissions in the most cost-effective way, and includes substantial measures to improve EU energy security and allow development of low-carbon technologies as core elements the package.
Follow-up to the June European Council
By way of follow-up to the June European Council the GAC held its second thematic discussion of the implementation of the “Strategic Agenda for the Union in times of change” which focused on freedom, security and justice. Due to the cross-border nature of key challenges facing member states, such as immigration and security, it was agreed that there was scope for the EU to add value in this area. The Italian presidency raised the need to deal with the threat posed by foreign fighters and stated that increased EU-level information and risk sharing, as well as further progress on the passenger name records (PNR) directive, would be crucial in tackling this issue.
Protocol 36 of the treaties
I updated the GAC on the UK’s intentions regarding the Prüm and probation decisions, as reflected in the Home Secretary’s statement of 10 July, and laid a statement into the Council minutes to that effect.
Composition of the Committee of the Regions
The GAC considered a Commission proposal to amend the composition of the Committee of the Regions, which would reduce the number of members from 353 to 350 as stipulated in the treaties. Following concerns raised by several member states on Commission handling, Ministers requested further work on the proposal and agreed to return to the matter at a subsequent meeting.
Strengthening inter-institutional annual and multi-annual programming
The Italian presidency outlined its proposals for the Council to examine the Commission’s draft 2015 work programme and establish a framework for working with the Commission and European Parliament on improving inter-institutional annual and multi-annual programming in future years.
I supported early engagement with the new Commission on its work programme and the need for the Council to be fully prepared for discussions with the Commission and European Parliament on strengthening inter-institutional programming. Both of these present an opportunity for the Council to ensure that the Commission’s work is focused on the implementation of the strategic agenda, as set out by the June European Council.
Oral Answers to Questions
David Lidington Excerpts(9 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Jesse Norman (Hereford and South Herefordshire) (Con)
4. What recent assessment he has made of the security situation in Turkey.
The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)
Turkey is an important security partner for the UK in NATO and in actions against terrorism. She faces major challenges because of the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, and we value the Turkish humanitarian contribution and her support for coalition activities against ISIL.
Jesse Norman
I thank the Minister for that reply. The security situation in Turkey remains extraordinarily delicate. What support have the Government given to assist Turkey with those serious security concerns while also respecting the rights and freedoms of its citizens?
Mr Lidington
Only last week we held one of our regular discussions with the Turkish authorities about counter-terrorism co-operation. The subjects discussed included better work to detect explosive traces in material going through airports and how we can better share information about airline passengers to guard against future terrorist attack.
Mike Gapes (Ilford South) (Lab/Co-op)
The Minister referred to Turkey’s role with regard to Syria. Does he agree that it is absolutely deplorable that the Turkish Government are not providing assistance to the besieged people of Kobane and the other Syrian Kurds facing an existential threat from ISIL? Turkey needs to get off the fence and to decide which side it is on. Is it with ISIL, or is it with the civilian population and the Kurds in Syria?
Mr Lidington
The Turkish Government have made it very clear that they are on the side of the coalition and against ISIL. They are now allowing Kurdish fighters to cross through Turkish territory to take part in the fighting around Kobane. It is also worth the hon. Gentleman bearing it in mind that Turkey is providing refuge to 1.5 million people who have fled the fighting in Iraq and Syria, and we ought to acknowledge that contribution too.
Crispin Blunt (Reigate) (Con)
Turkey’s security interests with regard to Islamic State are absolutely engaged, as are those of the other two major regional powers, Saudi Arabia and Iran. If those three countries can be got to agree a political strategy towards Islamic State, we will begin to have a sensible military strategy to underpin it. What work is going on to get those three countries to discuss that seriously?
Mr Lidington
There was a coalition meeting of Ministers in the margins of the recent NATO ministerial meeting at which that political discussion was taken forward. Clearly, we would welcome it unreservedly if it were possible to rally all the regional powers towards a united effort to defeat ISIL and to see the Iraqi Government, the legitimate authorities, re-establish control over all their territory.
Mr Dennis Skinner (Bolsover) (Lab)
For four years, I have noticed that the Tory Con-Dem Government have very much been apologists for Turkey. The Prime Minister indicated that he wanted Turkey in the European Union. Here we are again, apologising, or at least this Front Bench is apologising, for Turkey’s failure to act in concert with the British and Americans. What is it that gets Tory Ministers so engaged in wanting to befriend Turkey and to get it into the EU?
Mr Lidington
The Government do not apologise for upholding the national interest of the United Kingdom by working closely with Turkey, which has been our NATO ally under Governments of different political colours over many decades. There are issues on which we disagree, in which case we make our views clear, but I hope that even the hon. Gentleman would welcome the work that the Turkish Government are doing to try to bring about a reconciliation with the Kurds—something we all want to see.