Ukraine (UK Relations with Russia)

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Thursday 11th December 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Whittingdale]

I will say a little more along those lines, but I very much agree with the hon. Gentleman. The idea that what has happened has been somehow at the instigation of the west and America ignores the fact that the people of Ukraine have the right to choose their future. They have overwhelmingly demonstrated—most recently in parliamentary elections, which I want to speak a little about—that they see their future as moving closer to the west and to Europe, and they do not wish to move away from that and back in the direction of Russia. We must respect their right to make that choice.

At the moment, the greatest violence is taking place in eastern Ukraine, and a war is going on in what is known as the Donbas region. There are violations of the Minsk accords every day. Civilian areas are being shelled, there are shootings, and an extremely fierce battle has been raging over several days and weeks for Donetsk airport, where despite the Russians deploying some of their best troops—the Spetsnaz—we understand that they have suffered heavier casualties and the Ukrainians have managed to repel them.

We are told by the Russians that there are no Russian troops in that part of Ukraine, but we know that there are regular movements of military vehicles across the border, and we understand that anything up to 10,000 regular Russian troops are in eastern Ukraine, not to mention the tens of thousands lined up along the border. So-called humanitarian convoys regularly cross into eastern Ukraine. The Red Cross or international observers have not been permitted to inspect those humanitarian white lorries, and local reports state that the most recent humanitarian convoys have contained ammunition.

The battle is fierce and has resulted in heavy casualties. In the summer a strong tank battle resulted in something like 70% of Ukrainian armour being destroyed by Russian forces. President Poroshenko has said that at the latest count, 1,250 Ukrainian servicemen have been killed and 3,000 injured, but casualties have not been only on the Ukrainian side.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Unpleasant though the alternatives are, given that Russia will clearly not allow pro-Russian forces in the east of the country to be militarily defeated, which is the least worse of these two outcomes? Either those areas are allowed to become relatively autonomous, or the situation is fought to a military finish, the only outcome of which—given that the west will not intervene militarily—would be Russian occupation of the whole country.

[Mr Whittingdale]

I will come on to what we need to do to respond to the Russian intervention. To some extent, I agree with my hon. Friend that we need political reform, but it should not only be about the two regions in Donbas. If he will forgive me, I will continue my current theme but I promise I will come back to that.

I want to talk not only about the fighting that is taking place in Ukraine, but about the massive abuse of human rights. We have Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe observers in eastern Ukraine, but confidence that they can monitor to the desirable extent is limited. I have heard criticism that they have been unable to carry out proper monitoring of the situation.

There has been a massive population displacement, from both Crimea and Donbas—something like 1.5 million people have been displaced, and that may well be an underestimate. Hostages have been taken. Nadiya Savchenko, the Ukrainian servicewoman who was elected to the Ukrainian Parliament, is being held in Russia. Wearing my other hat as Chairman of the Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport, I should mention that we are conscious that Oleg Sentsov, a distinguished Ukrainian film director, was abducted and is being held in Moscow. With my hon. Friend the Member for North Thanet (Sir Roger Gale), I attended a conference last week of the Council of Europe to discuss media freedom and the importance of the protection of journalists. We heard about two journalists who are being held hostage. There have also been a number of casualties among journalists.

If we listen to and watch Russian media, we get a completely different picture. There is no account of that whatever. The Russian propaganda machine is insistent that the Kiev Government are a bunch of fascist gangsters who have been imposed on the population. The Russians make regular claims of abuses by Ukrainian troops, and often produce photographs of bodies—it later becomes apparent that the photographs were taken during other conflicts many years ago.

Perhaps the most outrageous Russian media manipulation took place after the shooting down of Malaysian Airlines MH17. There was overwhelming evidence, which is now widely recognised throughout the western world, that the airliner was shot down by Russian separatists using a surface-to-air missile that they had managed to obtain. Despite that, Russian media initially told us that the aircraft had been shot down by the Ukrainians, because the Ukrainians had mistaken it for President Putin’s plane and were trying to shoot him down. Another claim was that the incident was a plot dreamt up by the west, which had flown an airliner full of dead bodies over Ukraine that could then be brought down to discredit the Russian separatists. Even this week, pictures have been produced in Russian media claiming to show a jet fighter that shot the plane down.

Despite the fact that those pictures were obviously faked, the concern is that a huge number of people believed the story. A substantial proportion of the Russian population—the majority—are convinced it is true. I therefore welcome the Prime Minister’s recognition of the importance of countering that propaganda, which he gave me when I raised the matter with him after the statement on the G20. He said that President Obama had also recognised the need to counter Russian propaganda. I welcome the launch in this country of Ukraine Today, an English-language channel that will try to set out events accurately. I hope we and the Ukrainians do what we can to increase our efforts to get out the truth of what is happening. I welcome the intention of the new Ukrainian Government to set up a national public service broadcaster, which they have suggested could be modelled on the principle of the BBC.

What do we need to do to put pressure on Russia, and make it clear that its behaviour is unacceptable and that there must be penalties? Sanctions were first imposed after the annexation of Crimea and there has been a gradual escalation since then. Many people say that sanctions are pointless and have no effect, but they clearly are having a significant effect on the Russian economy. There has been a sharp downward revision in its prospects for growth, and they have affected the Russian currency and the Russian stock market. In my view, we need to do more. I would like to see a strengthening of sanctions. I recognise that that requires international agreement. The Minister and the Prime Minister have been at the forefront in pressing for the strongest response from the international community, but I have been alarmed by reports that some have been suggesting that perhaps we can now begin to relax sanctions. I hope the Minister can reassure me that we will make the case as strongly as possible that there is no justification to relaxing sanctions. If the current destabilisation continues, there may even be a case for strengthening sanctions still further.

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[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

It is 33 years since I first met my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh), and it is a real pleasure to sit beside him in the Chamber today and listen to his very sensible remarks about a situation that might see him classified as a bit of a peacenik. [Interruption.] He snorts at the suggestion. However, the circumstances in which we met all those years ago were the depths of the cold war. We co-operated with our colleague Tony Kerpel and others sadly no longer alive, such as George Miller, to do everything we could to counter communist-inspired campaigns to undermine the defences of western Europe in general and NATO in particular. Therefore, I do not think that either of us has a track record of being soft on the Russians. Why is it, then, that without having compared notes, we both find ourselves today urging caution in this scenario?

My hon. Friend concentrated on his historical analysis. I will concentrate on a rather simpler analytical approach. It boils down to one clear proposition: do not make military threats that cannot be or are not intended to be fulfilled. If military threats are made under those circumstances and they are not then fulfilled, there is a danger that your credibility is undermined for a time later, when you might have to issue a threat of retaliation that you intend to fulfil, and your adversary will not believe you mean it. That is how wars can start by mistake; because people do not take each other’s statements of position seriously.

Why does that relate specifically to Ukraine? It relates to Ukraine because the danger of the approach we are taking toward Ukraine in our rhetoric is to lump that non-NATO country together with other countries that are members of NATO. I must say to my hon. Friend the Member for Maldon (Mr Whittingdale), whom I congratulate on securing the debate and on the way in which he presented his case, that I agree entirely with his view of the condemnation-worthy activities that Russia is carrying out. However, I do not agree with saying that if Russia gets its way in Ukraine and in places such as Moldova and Georgia, then its next step will be to threaten the Baltic states, because we must not lump these things together.

NATO membership must never be offered glibly, lightly, or without thought of the consequences. [Interruption.] I am glad that my hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart) agrees. We must consider the consequences of offering NATO membership without a serious intent to apply article 5 in circumstances of potential war. We all know what article 5 means: if any NATO country is attacked, the attacker is automatically at war with all the other members of NATO.

I never tire of making the point I am about to make. I have made it many times before and I am not going to be deterred from making it again; it is, indeed, a point about deterrence. In order for deterrence to work, it is not only necessary to show that if someone is attacked, the consequences—the retaliation—will be unacceptable; one must also show that it will be unavoidable. One must not give the potential aggressor any reason to gamble that he might be able to commit an act of aggression without facing the consequences.

When countries came together to form the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the intention was precisely to remove that uncertainty, which had existed in the 1930s. Then Hitler was able to gamble, while picking off one country after another, that the western democracies would do nothing. In fact, he got away with it in several countries, in a succession of aggressive manoeuvres, but then picked on one country too many and ended up involved in a war with the United Kingdom—or the British empire, as it still was at the time—on which he did not originally wish to embark.

By talking tough in military terms on the question of Ukraine, we are, as my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough suggested, in danger of avoiding the realities on the ground. As I have pointed out before, when Russia stood in control of the whole of central and eastern Europe, there were periods when one country after another tried to shake off the communist yoke. We saw it in East Germany in 1953; we saw it in Hungary in 1956; and I personally remember seeing it in Czechoslovakia when I was 16 years old in 1968. At that time, when Czechoslovakia seemed to have got out from under totalitarian control, I argued very strongly that we should offer it NATO membership in order to try to protect it. I realise now, because I am rather more experienced in the ways of the world, that that would have been a counsel of madness, because given our ability to protect the country that we would be promising to protect, the promise would have been totally lacking in credibility.

It totally lacks credibility to suggest that countries such as Georgia and Ukraine should be offered NATO membership. Not many people are present in the Chamber today, but I predict—I hope I never have occasion to see this prediction come true—that if the country about which we were concerned were a NATO member, the Chamber would be packed, and that is because we would effectively be debating whether we were prepared to start world war three on behalf of that country, whichever NATO member it happened to be.

I agree entirely with my right hon. Friend the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee that the Baltics must be our red line. I was very interested to hear my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Beckenham mention in an earlier intervention how, during his time in NATO, he had expressed concern about the extension of the NATO guarantee to so many countries from central and eastern Europe. I must say that I felt we were stretching the elastic to its limit when we extended that guarantee to the Baltic states, but I accept that we have a long history of trying to secure the independence of those states, stretching right back to the days of the Russian revolution itself. Therefore, there is a significant degree of credibility that we would be willing to resist militarily an invasion of the Baltic states, but that is not true in the case of Ukraine.

I can imagine four principal scenarios in Ukraine. The first is that, in an ideal world, Russia will have a change of heart, or sanctions will work and she will withdraw and restore the pro-Russian areas of Ukraine to Kiev’s control. I think that a fairly unlikely outcome. The second scenario, which in my opinion would be the best, would be an agreed decision to create an autonomous area within Ukraine, comprising the pro-Russian elements and territories. The country could therefore continue as a political entity, but with a loose federal structure.

[Geoffrey Clifton-Brown]

My hon. Friend is talking about dividing up a sovereign nation. Surely it is a question of self-determination and up to the people of Ukraine to decide that.

[Dr Lewis]

Yes, in an ideal world it would be, but there is a slight problem with that scenario, namely that the Russians have the power to impose a solution and nobody else is willing to fight them to prevent them from doing so. That is the hard reality. We may not like the situation any more than we liked that in 1968 when Russia imposed its will with the crushing of the Prague spring; but I do not think anybody would suggest even now, with the benefit of hindsight, that it would have been right to provoke world war three at that time. In situations where we are up against people with a lot of power, we have to contain them until political affairs evolve gradually in the direction we want them to go.

[Sir Edward Leigh]

indicated assent.

[Dr Lewis]

I am glad that my hon. Friend agrees with me.

Let me deal with the other two scenarios before drawing my remarks to a conclusion. The third scenario is a split. It would be either a de facto split, which is being referred to as a frozen conflict—in other words, the pro-Russian communities would end up in control of their areas, glaring at Kiev and vice versa—or a de jure split, which would obviously be a less satisfactory solution than an agreed decision to stay together with an appropriate amount of autonomy.

Finally—this is the dread scenario, which really could happen—if we really were crazy enough to offer military assistance to Kiev and encourage it to think that there would be enough military supplies to enable it to overwhelm its adversaries in the pro-Russian parts of the country, it is an absolute certainty that Russia would respond militarily. In any conflict of that sort, Russia would prevail and it would not then be content to confine itself to the pro-Russian areas; it would invade and take over the whole country.

It is what is colloquially called a no-brainer that if the Russians are determined—however wrongly, as my hon. Friends have variously suggested—not to let the pro-Russian provinces go, and they are not prepared to do so, the best outcome we can hope for is an agreed negotiation of autonomy for those areas. Such agreements are not unprecedented. It took us 38 years to reach some sort of agreement even in a province such as Northern Ireland, which was a rather less fraught or challenging situation than the one that we and the international community face in Ukraine.

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[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

I did not intend to speak in the debate, but I was listening to it from afar and was stirred to come, hot foot, to the Chamber by the opening speech from my hon. Friend the Member for Maldon (Mr Whittingdale). I therefore apologise if my speech, which will be short, is a bit disjointed.

I am clear on Russia’s strategic military aim. My good and hon. Friends have alluded to it already and we are all talking along the same lines. In military terms, it is at the very least to secure a land corridor to Crimea. Some Members, such as my hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot (Sir Gerald Howarth), have suggested that the aim is to go as far as Odessa, but I think that the immediate strategic aim is to get to Crimea. The Black sea is crucial as it is a warm water entry and exit point. In the 1950s, as everyone in the Chamber knows, Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders never believed for a moment that Ukraine would not be a part of the Soviet Union or Russia. Khrushchev gave it away because of that assumption.

As I mentioned in an intervention, 20 years ago, when I was chief of policy at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, I argued that we have to be very careful as we move eastwards. I was concerned at that time about the idea that the Baltic republics would become part of NATO, because militarily I find it very difficult to think of how to defend that situation, particularly when there is a Russian enclave to the west. That is a scenario we have already rehearsed in this debate.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

I know time is limited, but I wanted to point out that the only way we can defend NATO countries that are out on a limb is by having tripwire forces. That would show a potential aggressor that, while they might occupy those countries, they would let themselves in for a very long war with other countries that would be able, eventually, to liberate them.

[Bob Stewart]

I totally agree with my hon. and very good Friend. That was exactly my role as a young officer in West Berlin—a British tripwire—in case the then Soviet Union decided to take over.

[Bob Stewart]

I am afraid I totally agree—some tripwire indeed. A big stumbling block, although I was not quite as big then.

[Dr Lewis]

You were in spirit.

[Bob Stewart]

I thank my hon. Friend.

I slightly disagree with those who say that Putin alone is the problem. Putin is Russian, and he represents a Russian point of view, and the Russian attitude towards Ukraine comes from history. I totally take the point about how Stalin dealt with Ukraine, but fundamentally Ukraine is a sort of glacis plate—to use the old term—to protect mother Russia. I also understand that a lot of Russians feel antagonism towards NATO, because sometimes, looking at it from their point of view, it appears to have been quite aggressive.

Over the past few years, Russian anxieties have been well stoked by western actions. As we have discussed, there has been talk of Ukraine joining NATO. I remember reading carefully through the EU negotiations with Ukraine, and there, in one of the sub-paragraphs, I saw a couple of lines about the EU sending troops to start exercises in that country. Nothing could have been a bigger red rag to the Russians. I got it from the House of Commons Library, and I am sure it was publicly obtainable.

I totally support our policy of trying to stop Russian expansion, but despite the sanctions, which, as we have demonstrated, are biting, I suspect that de facto Russia will gain its land corridor, either by negotiation or by agreement, to Sevastopol. That link from Russia to Sevastopol and the Black sea fleet will be on dry land at some point. We will have to recognise that as a fact of life.

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[Dr Julian Lewis]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

[Mr McFadden]

I need to make some progress, and allow the Minister to wind up.

The issue between Ukraine and Russia is not the only relevant factor. We should also consider the economic health and the strength of democracy in Ukraine itself. Of course those issues are related, because as long as Russia backs the separatists in the east, it will be all the more difficult for Ukraine to recover and stabilise economically. Indeed, as well as the geopolitical aim that was referred to by the hon. Member for Beckenham, it may be a Russian aim never to allow Kiev to have full economic control of the east.

Ukraine has a new President and a new Parliament, and they have the urgent task of not only defending the country’s territorial integrity, but stabilising the economy and delivering honest government. There has been a 7% contraction in Ukraine’s GDP this year, and inflation is running at around 22%. The IMF now believes that, on top of the $17 billion aid package that was announced in April this year, a further $15 billion is needed. The Ukrainian economy is in deep trouble, and in urgent need of stabilisation.

In governance terms, too, the country needs both reform and help, and Britain could play a valuable role in that regard. In the early 2000s, this country offered help to new democracies of eastern Europe in the form of advice on and assistance in the running of Ministries, robust budgeting, and the transparency of actions. That help was valuable and important to those countries at the time. Would the Minister consider offering similar help to Ukraine at this difficult time—if it has not already been offered—so that it can improve its governance, enhance transparency, and increase confidence in the democratic process?

The situation both within Ukraine and between Ukraine and Russia poses great dangers for stability and for peace. A huge amount of commitment and vigilance has gone into developing a network of states that do not transgress one another’s borders and do not foment nationalist and separatist movements within states. We defend this settlement and realise its value.

Of course there is potentially a different future for relations between Russia and other European states. Russia could cease aggression. It could let Ukraine choose its own path. It could respect the territorial integrity of other states. That path would lead to the lifting of sanctions, it would improve conditions for the Russian people, and it would gain Russia greater respect in the world. So we should be firm, we should be resolute in helping, and we should offer our assistance to Ukraine in terms of the sanctions and the governance help I have set out, but we should also be clear that this alternative future remains open to Russia and that it is far preferable to the current direction of relations between us.

[The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Maldon (Mr Whittingdale) on securing the debate and, indeed, on the commitment he has shown in this House for some time—and well before the current crisis arose—to understanding Ukraine, its people and its political priorities. I also thank all hon. Members who have taken part in today’s debate.

I want to start the substance of my remarks with Ukraine, because it seems to me that any fair appraisal of the diplomatic crisis we face needs to start with the truth that Ukraine today is an independent sovereign state with a democratically elected president and Parliament and internationally recognised borders, and is entitled, not only morally but in terms of international law, to take its own decisions about its national future.

Furthermore, that sovereignty, that independence and those borders were recognised by Russia itself in treaties that both accompanied and followed the break-up of the USSR. Those borders included Crimea within Ukraine, and until the armed intervention by Russia at the beginning of this year—an intervention, we should remind ourselves, that the Russians persistently denied almost to the day when they announced the award of medals to the soldiers who had served in Crimea—no territorial claim was made over the years since the independence of Ukraine.

The irony of the Russian intervention is that it has reinforced a sense of Ukrainian identity and Ukrainian nationalism not only, and most obviously, in the west of the country, but also in parts of eastern and southern Ukraine where those feelings were more muted. I saw something of that myself when I was in Dnipropetrovsk earlier this year.

Nor am I persuaded by the argument that Russia has somehow reacted to provocation by either the European Union or NATO. President Poroshenko has made it clear that he has no intention of even applying for membership of NATO, and his Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin made it clear at the most recent meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Council that, while Ukraine wished to move towards NATO standards in terms of the effectiveness of its armed forces, this was going to take Ukraine many, many years to accomplish.

As for the idea that there has somehow been EU provocation, let us remind ourselves that the negotiations for an association agreement started as far back as 2007, during the term of President Yushchenko. They were carried through by President Yanukovych, who is never normally accused of being a foe of Russia. When I was in Ukraine in October 2013, I talked to very senior members of the Yanukovych Administration who assured me that the President had decided that that association agreement was what he wanted to conclude.

We need to be clear about what Russia is attempting to do. It is now attempting to prevent Ukraine from successfully building a unified, democratic society based on the rule of law. Rather, its intention—to judge from its actions—appears to be to try to keep Ukraine weak, divided, corrupt and dependent on Russia to determine what its international alignments and mode of internal self-government should be.

Under successive British Governments, we have encouraged and supported Russia to move closer to the values that have underpinned peace and prosperity since the end of the cold war. That is why the United Kingdom has supported the admission of Russia to the G8 and the World Trade Organisation and looked forward to its admission to the OECD. But now, under President Putin, we have witnessed a severe decline in support for those values, a crackdown on civil society and other voices of freedom and independence inside Russia, and a rejection of that offer of partnership. There are clear signs, too, that Russia is not prepared to see its neighbours move in that direction either—and not just Ukraine.

Reference has been made during the debate to the events in Georgia in 2008, but in 2014 alone we have seen increased Russian meddling in the internal affairs of Moldova, the description by President Putin of Kazakhstan as “not a proper state”, the abduction by Russians of an Estonian official from inside Estonian territory—the man is still being detained in prison in Moscow—and the seizure on the high seas by Russia of a Lithuanian fishing vessel, which remains in Murmansk and has not been returned to its Lithuanian owners. We have also seen the interruption of gas supplies to Poland, Slovakia and Hungary. That has been attributed to technical problems, but I think it is a political signal that the Russian Government were unhappy with the reverse flow of gas supplies to—

[Dr Julian Lewis]

Will the Minister give way?

[Mr Lidington]

I do not have time.

Those actions are based on a doctrine enunciated by the Kremlin: Russia has the right to intervene wherever it chooses when it claims that it is doing so in support of Russian speakers or ethnic Russians. Like hon. Members on both sides of the argument today, I believe strongly that there is a difference in terms of a defence commitment between NATO allies, where article 5 applies, and between friendly countries that are not part of the NATO alliance. Let us be in no doubt that the enunciation of that doctrine—of that right of intervention—was calculated to sow fear in the Baltic states, and it did so very successfully. Thankfully, it also resulted in a determined response from NATO and the deployment of additional NATO forces on exercises and patrols in the Baltic region.

[Dr Lewis]

Will the Minister give way?

[Mr Lidington]

I am sorry, but time is very short indeed.

We know that Ukraine needs support, and the United Kingdom has already spent money on a range of technical assistance programmes to support reforms of financial and economic governance, including tackling corruption. Through our conflict pool, we are also providing a range of programmes, including support for the reform of the Ukrainian armed forces and the supply of non-lethal equipment, as well as support for the OSCE special monitoring mission.

To answer the question from the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden), under the conflict security and stability fund we will improve on our record next year with a particular focus on defence and security reform and constitutional and public sector reform, and on the battle against organised crime and corruption in Ukraine. In my meetings this week with the Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine and with Mayor Klitschko, I made it clear that we welcomed an approach from the Ukrainian authorities in relation to other areas in which they might welcome United Kingdom know-how and technical assistance.

I want to return briefly to the subject of Ukraine’s Euro-integration aspirations and the need for reform. We have a substantial stake, as do other European countries, in Ukraine’s future, through €11 billion in the EU assistance package and a $17 billion International Monetary Fund loan. The EU-Ukraine association agreement represents a clear public commitment by both the EU and Ukraine to a deep relationship and close co-operation. It would be a great mistake for President Putin to see that agreement as a threat. A strong and prosperous Ukraine can only be in Russia’s interest, just as a strong and prosperous Poland has proved to be since the recovery of democracy in that country.

I was asked about sanctions. The answer is that our judgment about sanctions will depend upon Russia’s actions. If the Minsk agreement is implemented in full—if we see an end to the Russian reinforcements of the separatists, we start to see the withdrawal of Russian forces, we see Ukraine getting back control of its borders and the OSCE monitors able to deploy, and we see a genuine ceasefire—at that point perhaps we should consider whether any relaxation of sanctions might be appropriate. But, equally, if we see further military aggression, the EU has done a fair amount of contingency planning for the possibility of further sectoral economic sanctions. The Prime Minister personally and Ministers and officials at all levels are engaged with that work and in work to try to make sure that, despite different systems on the two sides of the Atlantic, there is coherence between the sanctions policy of the United States and that of the EU. I believe we have been able to deliver on that.

I wish to make it clear that our aim is not to cripple the Russian economy—the structural challenges that the Russian economy faces will do that. Russia needs to address those rather than focus on military intervention in its southern neighbour. Our aim is to exert a proportionate and reversible cost for Russia’s illegal actions and to persuade the Russian leadership that this crisis is better resolved through diplomatic means. I agree with those who have said that isolation is also not the answer either; we need dialogue with Russia to resolve this crisis. That is why the Prime Minister and my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary have continued to engage with their counterparts in Russia, and are committed to doing so.

Going forward, we will offer our support to the new coalition Government in Ukraine, both bilaterally and multilaterally, as they need all the support they can get. We will help them with their reform programme and will monitor progress on their commitments and obligations tied to the association agreement, the related EU assistance package and the IMF loan. We will help to strengthen Ukraine’s economy, through technical assistance, to allow for better economic management and we will help Ukraine to address its energy security, through its need to modernise its systems and become more efficient and self sustainable.

We do not seek a hostile relationship with Russia. Indeed, for 23 years the United Kingdom has tried to build a constructive and mutually beneficial relationship with Moscow, and we do not give up on that aim. But, equally, we have to be clear-headed about the actions that we have seen Russia take, particularly in the past 12 months, and act upon the basis of what Russia has actually done rather than upon promises that, so far, have not been implemented in practice. We will support Ukraine, we hope for a better relationship with Russia, but we must be realistic in preparing ourselves for a relationship with Moscow that, I fear, is going to be more difficult and more fractious than we had hoped. That is the choice of Russia’s leaders, who at the moment have chosen to treat Europe and the transatlantic alliance as a strategic adversary, rather than, as we had hoped, a potential partner for the future.