EU Reform

William Cash Excerpts

Tuesday 18th November 2014 Westminster Hall

[Sir William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

It is a great pleasure, Mr Robertson, to serve under your chairmanship. In 1997, shortly after the Maastricht rebellion, Thomas Kielinger of Die Welt wrote a pamphlet entitled “Crossroads and Roundabouts” about Germany and the United Kingdom in Europe—the contrast between the German vision of Europe and the UK’s commitment to its Parliament and its own national interest. We have done the roundabout; now we are truly at the crossroads of the EU and perhaps even of our relationship with Germany. Is it really the case that in this country we are disproportionately preoccupied with our own national concerns?

I am introducing this debate about the UK and Germany in the EU—the first devoted specifically to the subject, I think—about which, in the interests of our mutual relationship, we must be both realistic and straight with each other, as we were yesterday in discussions with the Bundestag European affairs committee.

I warned John Major before Maastricht that the treaty, which I urged him to veto, would lead to a European Government and a German Europe. I campaigned for a referendum on that and the petition to Parliament received many hundreds of thousands of signatures. In my book of that time, “Against a Federal Europe”, I wrote:

“The answer to the German question lies primarily in Germany itself and that to hand her the key to the legal structure of Europe with a majority voting system gravitating around alliances dependent on Germany simply hands her legitimate power on a plate.”

That is now becoming clearer by the day. I also wrote then:

“Britain wants to work together with Germany in a fair and balanced relationship, based on free trade, cooperation and democratic principles. She does not want to be forced into a legal structure dominated by her. Plans for a united Europe stray into the darkest political territory, and must be firmly rejected.”

I wrote that in 1991. In 1990, I had written that

“if Germany needs to be contained, the Germans must do it themselves…now is the time for the Germans to prove themselves”.

In the words of the German philosopher, Thomas Mann, in 1953:

“We do not want a German Europe, but a European Germany.”

I argued that we were embarking on

“a European Germany and a German Europe”

because the two ran together after Maastricht. As Bismarck himself said:

“I have always found the word ‘Europe’ on the lips of those politicians who wanted something from other Powers which they dared not demand in their own names.”

He meant their own national interests. It is also to be recalled that, as Friedrich Karl von Moser stated:

“Each nation has its main characteristic. In Germany it is obedience. In England it is liberty.”

[Mark Field (Cities of London and Westminster) (Con)]

My hon. Friend and I have talked many times about these matters, for obvious reasons. Does he accept that a British exit from the European Union would be the single most likely thing to provide the German dominance of Europe to which he refers? Is it not very much within the modern German mentality to see the European Union as a way of containing elements of some chapters of their history—of which, understandably, they are not proud? They see a strong European Union as being the way in which the dominance of Germany can be kept at bay.

[Sir William Cash]

I understand that point and my hon. Friend has made it to me before. All I can say is that it depends on the structure being created and the irreversibility established by the treaties themselves as put into legislation. As I shall explain in a moment, the consequence of the existing structure is to create an imbalance in favour of Germany and a disadvantage for the United Kingdom in several areas. That is what we must evaluate because we want a peaceful and stable Europe; unfortunately, however, what is happening now is creating instability, and I believe the European Union as it was conceived will ultimately be undermined. Our parliamentary system is the bulwark of the liberty and democracy that saved us and Europe. That is no anachronism today.

The problem we now face in an increasingly assertive German Europe is one increasingly at odds with British national interests. For me, that was one of the mainsprings of the Maastricht rebellion and it has been exacerbated by successive treaties, including Lisbon—against which, notably, the Conservative party was united.

The situation is getting worse. For example, we are told that the single market is the prime reason, or certainly one of the prime reasons, for our engagement in the European project. Although more than 40% of our trade is with Europe, our trade deficit with the other 27 member states is £56 billion, whereas the German surplus with the same member states is £51.8 billion. At the same time, we have a substantial surplus with the rest of the world with the same goods and services. I fundamentally disagree with the CBI’s analysis.

A host of individual problems give rise to concern—for example, the regulatory system in the City of London. I wrote about that in the Financial Times, warning the City against the consequences, and we have lost case after case in the European Court of Justice. There is the ports regulation, opposed by port employers and the trade unions. There is the change in the patent courts system. There is the lack of a reciprocal policy of liberalisation in relation to energy, professional services and other matters. There is over-regulation, particularly of small businesses, on which no substantial progress is ever made, and which is calculated to cost about 4% of EU GDP.

The effect on our economy is deep. Our growth is being dragged down by the sclerotic eurozone, whose problems in many countries, such as Italy and Greece, are blamed on German currency and export manipulation.

[Mr Jim Cunningham (Coventry South) (Lab)]

The hon. Gentleman mentioned the single market. Logic says that anyone signing up to a single market gets a central bank and a single currency. Surely the horse has bolted. I remind the hon. Gentleman that it was the Labour party that gave the British people a referendum and the five economic tests.

[Sir William Cash]

I entirely accept the hon. Gentleman’s second point about the referendum; I have never disputed that. Far from it—it was an extremely good thing, although back then it was about a kind of Europe different from the one we are now experiencing.

I voted for the Single European Act, but I tabled an amendment to preserve the sovereignty of the Westminster Parliament. If that amendment had been allowed for debate, which it was not, it would have changed the whole nature of the matter. I was strongly supported by Enoch Powell, who understood that if we were to have a single market that did not work, the only way to retrieve the situation would be through some form of “notwithstanding” formula of the sort I have returned to over and again in subsequent years.

German economic policy is obsessed with fiscal discipline and large current account surpluses. Without the euro, currency adjustments would control Germany’s ability to export cheaply. German economic efficiency, combined with the single currency, allows for artificially cheap German exports at the expense of Mediterranean countries, which can deflate their currencies to offset cheap German goods, drawing money and jobs north and leaving the southern Governments unable to finance their deficits through economic growth.

German insistence on fiscal discipline is, as Wolfgang Munchau made clear in yesterday’s Financial Times, ideological and a deeply held response to the crisis of the 1930s. The result will be the destruction of the Mediterranean export economies while simultaneously deepening the damage through austerity on a massive scale. An attempt to impose German-style labour laws and fiscal discipline on those countries will fail and will not bring the required efficiency to compete with Germany.

The eurozone, which is dominated by Germany, is a disaster, as is increasingly recognised publicly by some of my Labour colleagues, and it seriously damages our economy. Furthermore, although we are told that consensus is the norm, the political consequences of the present treaties mean that, as of 1 November this year, the majority voting system in the EU Council of Ministers has been profoundly changed, subject only to a compromise transitional arrangement called the Ioannina compromise.

Germany and France with two small states can now effectively determine European decision making. The consensus is insufficiently transparent and is achieved primarily because the member states know the outcome of a given vote, which in any case does not sufficiently correspond to our concerns. In my European Scrutiny Committee, we have been very critical of how Coreper functions and the manner in which we are unable to achieve our objectives. We also have some critical things to say about UKRep.

Indeed, VoteWatch Europe has demonstrated that when the UK has voted between 2009 and 2012, it has done so in favour with the majority of member states in 90% of all votes. That strongly suggests that most European Commission proposals go through in practice. Therefore, the change in the voting system will tend to affect British interests increasingly adversely.

Professor Roland Vaubel of Mannheim university has examined the voting system and argued that the outcome is one of regulatory collusion, favouring Germany in particular. One must recognise that Germany makes a very substantial net contribution—£13 billion in 2013 compared with our £8.6 billion, although our contribution is rising. In return, Germany now acquires disproportionate advantages under the voting system and through its economic influence in Mitteleuropa.

In his speech in Berlin on 13 November, John Major reinvoked the concept of subsidiarity and he did so again on “The Andrew Marr Show” on Sunday. He said that subsidiarity is the answer and that we must

“nail it down as a matter of European law”.

I do not know which planet John Major has been living on since Maastricht, but that is already a matter of EU law. When he promoted subsidiarity in the Maastricht treaty, I described it as a con trick. In my 30 years on the European Scrutiny Committee, I have never come across a single example of the direct application of subsidiarity. Even John Major now reports its failure, and his speech in Berlin was a catalogue of the failures of his European policy at Maastricht.

The European Union is not an abstract concept. It is about the daily lives of our voters, to whom we are directly accountable, across a vast range of matters. The list of chapters in the consolidated treaties sets out the immense impact that the European Union now has on us all.

The European Scrutiny Committee, of which I was elected Chairman in 2010, argued strongly and unanimously in November 2013 that the Government should reintroduce the veto. We were promised that the veto would never be abandoned when the White Paper was issued in 1971; that was the basis of our voluntary acceptance of the treaties by our Parliament in the passing of the European Communities Act 1972, yet so many other additional competences have been added since. That paper described the veto as being in our vital national interest, and stated that to abandon it would even endanger “the very fabric” of the European Community itself. Somebody out there understood where all this could lead, as it has.

The Prime Minister, to his credit, did veto the fiscal compact, although my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (Mr Redwood) will remember a conversation that we had with him shortly beforehand. My Committee proposed the application of the formula

“notwithstanding the European Communities Act 1972”

to our Westminster legislation when it is in our national interest to do so. We could thereby override European laws and the European Court of Justice when necessary, as we can and should, under our own flexible constitutional arrangements unique to the United Kingdom among the 28 member states, thus regaining our right to govern ourselves in matters of vital national interest.

Those proposals were rejected by the Government, which shows how weak our negotiating stance really is in relation to the need to change fundamentally our relationship with the EU in the interests of our parliamentary democracy and the needs of our voters.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Am I right in thinking that my hon. Friend has referred to the fact that Germany—the country on which this debate is focused—has a sort of parliamentary supremacy as a safeguard in its legislation, and that that is what he has tried to introduce for the United Kingdom? Can he tell us how well it works for Germany?

[Sir William Cash]

The short answer is that in the German constitution, in the preamble to the Basic Law of 1949, an assumption is built in for a united states of Europe. Unfortunately, therefore, a change in the German constitution would be required to enable the Karlsruhe court to override the provisions of the Basic Law. Therefore, Germany faces a real constitutional question that we do not, because we do not have a written constitution and we have the inherent right, within our own Parliament, to make the kind of adjustments that we want in this area.

To refuse to accept our Committee’s proposals—I say this with great respect to the Minister—is not merely walking away; it is not even engaging with the real problem, which is the dysfunctional structure created by successive treaties and the disadvantages that that creates for the United Kingdom.

All that demands a direct return to democratic accountability at Westminster—not the Maastricht-based co-decision with the European Parliament, which I opposed at the time, and not the manner in which the majority voting system and the so-called consensus have led to us being put at significant disadvantage from time to time in matters of our national interest. Those are increasingly becoming a matter of concern following the change in the voting system as of 1 November.

[Mark Field]

Does my hon. Friend not accept that many in continental Europe would say that Britain has a permanent exclusion from the single currency, is not signed up to the Schengen agreement, and in fact, under Maastricht, was also exempt from the social chapter, although that exemption has now gone? He talked about the fiscal compact, which technically speaking was not a veto, but essentially was done at eurozone level.

If we are going to continue to opt out, does my hon. Friend not recognise the concern that, as we become ever more marginalised from the centre of Europe, the case for staying in the European Union will become ever weaker? Is that the path down which he now wishes to take us, and if so—

[John Robertson (in the Chair)]

Order. The hon. Gentleman will have the chance to make a speech later.

[Sir William Cash]

I have said many times on the Floor of the House that I think we have reached the point where we will have to leave the treaties, for all the reasons that I have given and will give. The opt-outs are merely indications of the profound uncertainty with which Britain entered the European Union in the first place. As I pointed out, the veto was a completely unconditional promise for the future, and that has now been whittled away. As I will explain, there are more and more reasons why we are at the exit door. Those are not purely economic, but political.

The European project, based on Maastricht and the successive treaties, has undermined the credibility and efficacy of European integration. That is now reinforced by the practical and visible impact of endemic protests and riots in the streets of European cities and by vast unemployment in several member states, in which youth unemployment has reached obscene levels of up to 60%. I predicted that when I wrote about it in the early 1990s, and I added that it would be followed by massive waves of immigration from central and eastern Europe when the Maastricht system failed, with the consequent emergence of the far right. No one can say that that has not happened now.

[Mr John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that the Germans’ problem now is that to make a success of their single currency, they need a political union with massive transfers of money from the rich parts to the poor parts of the union, as we have in the sterling currency union or as exists in the dollar currency union, but that is exactly the kind of system that the United Kingdom would never accept, and that is why, at the crossroads, we need a different relationship?

[Sir William Cash]

That is completely right. We need a different relationship with the EU as a whole that also includes the eurozone, because the eurozone, which is causing so much of the dislocation in Europe, is dominated by Germany, and the German financial and fiscal policies, which I have described already, have that enormous impact in destabilising the eurozone.

This is where I really part company with statements made by some members—senior members—of our Government. I am referring to the consequences of the eurozone. We were told at the time when it was evolving, with the banking union and all the rest of it, that it was, in effect, a natural course of events that we could not prevent. Actually, it has created the very instability that is most likely to lead to the destruction of the European Union itself. That is the problem. It is not just a negative view that I am trying to put across; it is the fact that it is destabilising Europe. It is creating problems of a kind that can get completely out of control, with catastrophic consequences not only for this country but for Europe as a whole. That is why the argument that I am seeking to advance is that actually this is a real problem for Europe as a whole. It is not anti-European to be pro-democracy.

[Mr Jim Cunningham]

It was remiss of me not to congratulate the hon. Gentleman on acquiring the debate. I know the views that he has held over many years. My point is this. During the last economic downturn, the Germans, for example, did not dictate British economic policy; it may be argued that British economic policy was dictated to Europe. I do not see the hon. Gentleman’s logic. If he feels that the European market as it is constructed now is causing major problems in Europe, why should we pull out of that situation, rather than rebalancing Europe? That is what I do not understand about the argument that he is making.

[Sir William Cash]

The short answer to that is that we do not need to be in the European Union to trade with Europe, because it needs us—for example, in relation to Germany’s export of cars—on a monumental scale. I have already given the figures for the surplus that Germany runs with the other 27 member states. Furthermore, we have a global economy to which we can address our economic and trading concerns, and we are achieving a substantial surplus with the rest of the world, selling the same goods and services. What I am arguing is on the balance of judgment as to whether it is in our interest to subordinate our parliamentary system of government and the democracy that goes with it in order to achieve a trading relationship that at best is extremely debatable and, in certain instances, is positively disadvantageous.

Let me turn to the issue of defence, which is so fundamental to our national interest. Unlike John Cleese’s immortal words in “Fawlty Towers”, “Don’t mention the war”, we must never forget the reasons why we were confronted in two successive world wars by unprovoked aggression from Germany. We must look to the greater historic landscape in our mutual interests and we must look to resolve our real differences about the structure as well as individual issues within the EU.

Ten days ago, at a formal conference in Rome under the Lisbon treaty, comprising chairmen of national parliamentary committees for all 28 member states and the European Parliament, the German delegation formally proposed a defence Commissioner and a defence Council of Ministers and reinvoked the idea of an EU military headquarters. As Chairman of the European Scrutiny Committee, I argued passionately against that, as did the right hon. Member for Gordon (Sir Malcolm Bruce) and the hon. Member for Ilford South (Mike Gapes), the former Chairman of the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs. The British delegation defeated the proposal, but the German delegation insisted that

“it will have to be put back on the agenda at the next conference”

and added ominously that

“Great Britain will simply not be able to maintain their line”.

That harks back to previous German attempts to establish a European defence policy with majority voting and must be repudiated once and for all.

[Sir Gerald Howarth (Aldershot) (Con)]

My hon. Friend is making a very important point because, as he knows, defence is the only area of European activity—I will not call it policy—where the United Kingdom still has a veto, a veto that I twice used to prevent any increase in the budget of the European Defence Agency. But is he also aware that the former Foreign Secretary, our right hon. Friend the Member for Richmond (Yorks) (Mr Hague), and I, at the Foreign Affairs Council meeting, vetoed the idea of an operational headquarters for the EU, because it would have served further to undermine the cornerstone of European defence, which is the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation? We must resist any further attempt by the Germans, the Poles or the French to create a defence identity within the EU.

[Sir William Cash]

We are all indebted to my hon. Friend for his time in the Ministry of Defence. What he said is well known to me, but ought to be better known outside the House. This is crucial. The question, whether we have an EU military headquarters moves us into very dangerous territory. I will show my hon. Friend the full transcript of the exchanges between me and the German delegation on this matter. I do not have time to go into it now, but I can assure him that I set out some very powerful arguments, including by making reference to article III of the 1990 treaty, which dealt with the question of the restrictions on Germany in relation to the manufacture and distribution of nuclear weapons, which went back to the original NATO treaty of 1949. Also, of course, I mentioned in particular the role of NATO in relation, for example, to the Baltic states and the rest of it. NATO is there; it is the cornerstone, as my hon. Friend rightly says.

[Mark Field]

I very much agree with what my hon. Friend has said and with the intervention by our hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot (Sir Gerald Howarth), but does he not think that we would be greatly assisted in making the case for ensuring that there is no change in the European defence mechanism if we honoured our own commitments to ensure that at least 2% of our GDP is spent on defence and, given the insecurities of this world, rather more in the years to come?

[Sir William Cash]

I very much agree with that. Of course, there is this wave of counter-cyclical agreement and disagreement between my hon. Friend and me. Actually, that is encapsulated in a personal matter. We were, through our respective families, involved in the battles in Normandy, which I will not go into now, but which he knows about and I know about and which were extremely poignant and extremely relevant to what went on at that time.

[Mark Field]

My hon. Friend is far too modest to go into great detail or perhaps did not want to embarrass me, but I should point out that although his father served in the British Army, my great-uncle was serving in the Panzer regiment for the opposite side during that particular battle.

[Sir William Cash]

That was on 10 July 1944. My father got the military cross, and my hon. Friend’s great-uncle was on the other side, but there we are.

We must also—this is very delicate territory—remain clear that the United States, which has for more than 50 years impressed on the United Kingdom the importance of a more integrated Europe, must not be allowed to persuade us against our national interest in relation to the question of defence. However, this is not by any means only about defence. As I have explained, it is also about our economy and our trading relationships, which are punctuated by constant tensions embedded in our European relationship that, to a greater or lesser degree, are based on our alleged obligations under European law.

Most recently there was the budget surcharge issue, but there are also disputed areas of policy such as the European arrest warrant and, of course, the current wave of concern over immigration and freedom of movement, on which we are warned against infringing European law and on which we had very interesting exchanges with the Bundestag’s European affairs committee yesterday. It takes the view that one has to distinguish between workers and people, and that it is our fault that we have ended up where we are now, but as the shadow Minister, the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden), heard me say last night, of course we believe that that was the consequence of decisions taken by the former Labour Government. But there we are.

It must be said, however, that the European rule of law is itself a moveable feast at the whim of certain states. For example, in 2003, Germany and France themselves broke the stability and growth pact with impunity when it suited them. We are currently reminded by a proliferation of articles and books about the collapse of the Berlin wall that the German question, and its embodiment in European and our own and their political history, remains a constant national interest. In fact, very rarely do we talk about Germany in this country, but in Germany and in France they talk about it almost incessantly. Indeed, I recall taking part in a debate on the future of Europe in the then dilapidated Reichstag when the Berlin wall was still up, and putting my hand against the wall itself, and I recall a member of the German delegation vigorously waving his arms as I heard him through the Bakelite headphones vociferously remonstrating that, as he put it,

“my heart and soul rages with fervour and passion at the thought of a single government and a single parliament in this Reichstag.”

I warned the meeting that such language would merely rekindle old tensions—and that was before the wall came down.

As Peter Watson, who rightly reminds us in his book “The German Genius” about the great contribution of Germany to industry and art, said in a book review last week,

“no one has yet succeeded in explaining the collapse into barbarism that followed the First World War.”

I would add that nor has sufficient attention been given to the question of how to deal with a European Union—created to avoid everything that had happened in the aftermath of the first and second world wars—dominated, as it now is, by a peaceful but assertive Germany, based on a framework delivering supposedly irreversible policies that have delivered instability throughout Europe and vitally affected our own economy, our national interest and Westminster democratic accountability. Insufficient attention has been given to how we deal with that problem, and it is not just for us but for all the European member states, and Germany in particular.

Furthermore, far from containing German domination of the EU, the treaties have stimulated it. For all the protestations, the European Union has morphed into an increasingly undemocratic Europe, with Britain unacceptably relegated to the second tier and with Germany largely predominant over the whole, as well as the low-growth eurozone.

The Prime Minister was entirely right to state in his Bloomberg speech:

“Our national Parliament is the root of our democracy.”

We must address the question of a fundamental change in our relationship with the EU and the reassertion of sovereignty at Westminster and in our democracy. Those are the reasons why we were able to prevail in the dark days from 1940 to 1945, and we must not underestimate their importance today. Now we must do so again on those principles, but in very different circumstances. It is not enough merely to reform at the margins. We must resolve the European, and therefore the German, question in our own time. If negotiations for that purpose, above all else, cannot be resolved, we must leave the treaties and lead Europe on the right road to stability and peace, both for ourselves and for Europe—including Germany—as a whole. We must be, as Churchill said, “associated, but not absorbed.” For that purpose, we must pursue a policy of an association of nation states.

The Prime Minister’s purported renegotiations do not, at present, tackle the fundamental structural question of the treaties. The Foreign Secretary is right to indicate that we must never go into a negotiation unless we are prepared to get up from the table and walk away, but it is essential that we are told what our red lines are, and that they address the fundamental changes that we need within the EU. Immigration is, of course, a major issue, but the question of our borders is not simply a question of immigration. It is a question of parliamentary democracy and jurisdiction, and therefore it is about more than the symptoms of our problems with European integration and its impact on our entire political and economic national interest. Trade alone is not the arbiter of freedom and democracy; it flows from them, as do the laws that affect our economy and that have been so disadvantageous to us, as I have indicated already, in many areas.

The renegotiations cannot be successful in our national interest without a fundamental change in the architecture of the European Union. If we do not renegotiate and achieve such fundamental change, Germany’s predominance in the project will increase and the United Kingdom will be required to leave the EU. We must not be continually subjected and subordinated to being in the second tier of a two-tier Europe.

We are now at an historic moment at the crossroads of the European Union, which can be evaluated only on a broad historical landscape. I voted yes in 1975, and I attempted to reserve our Westminster sovereignty in the Single European Act in 1986. Maastricht and European Government changed all that. Britain and Germany have historically had, and still have, very different visions of Europe. We look to our borders, and Germany looks towards a broad, roaming European vision—a political union without borders.

Not so long ago, I referred in the book I mentioned, “Against a Federal Europe”, to Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who was Foreign Minister of Germany for 15 years and was one of the most powerful architects of reunification and the current European Union. Although he repudiated his former loyalties, Genscher stated:

“We Germans can be the architects of a united and indivisible Europe”

and that a strong Germany was good for Europe. In my analysis in 1999, from which I do not demur, I said that the assertion of a strong Germany being good for Europe

“begs many questions. Germany’s economic strength derives from the fact that she saturates the EC”—

as it was then—

“and Eastern Europe with her exports; if as seems likely, she consolidates this position via the single market, while gaining de facto control of the single currency, one could well envisage a scenario in which a strong Germany was bad for Europe. If industries in other countries were weakened or depleted by German domination and if the single currency removed the competitiveness of weaker economies, while the social charter…insulated German workers from competitively low wages abroad, then one could well imagine economic decline and rising unemployment on the periphery of the EC financing the German stranglehold.”

Who would argue today that that has not happened? I noted that at the 25th anniversary of the collapse of the Berlin wall, when Dr Michael Stürmer was asked on “Newsnight” how Germany had achieved such predominance, he indicated that it was “by default”. I reserve judgement on that.

Furthermore, we are not simply talking about Germany’s economic impact on other member states, whatever subsidies or defensive alliance through NATO they may receive in return. As I have said, the preamble to the German Basic Law of 1949 includes a policy leading to a United States of Europe as one of the constitutional foreign policy goals of Germany. As all those factors have aggregated, it has become ever more important for the United Kingdom to look to its own future. To that we must turn our determined attention, while seeking peaceful co-operation and trading relationships within Europe and with Germany. There will be no peace in an unstable Europe, which will implode with disastrous consequences. Such instability is inherent in the imbalanced structure of the whole, not only of the eurozone. We all want peace in Europe, but to ensure such peace we must restructure the treaties, not simply tinker with them.

We must clearly put this to Germany and the EU as a whole. The United Kingdom cannot and must not allow our democracy, in this Parliament, from which all political and economic action flows and which has saved Europe and herself for generations, to be in any way compromised. As William Pitt stated in his Guildhall speech in 1805:

“England has saved herself by her exertions and will, as I trust, save Europe by her example.”

[Several hon. Members]

rose—

--- Later in debate ---

[The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)]

Mr Robertson, I welcome you to the Chair this afternoon. I also welcome the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden) to his first outing in Westminster Hall with his new responsibilities. In addition, I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash) on securing the debate. He and I have been discussing these issues for about 25 years—

[Sir William Cash]

Since 1990.

[Mr Lidington]

“Since 1990,” my hon. Friend reminds me. And as I will make clear in my remarks, there are some things that we agree upon and other things where there are perhaps some divergences in our respective approaches.

I will start with those areas on which I can find ready agreement with what my hon. Friend said in his opening remarks. I agree with him and other hon. Members when they say that the current levels of unemployment and low growth in Europe are a scandal and a cause of human misery, as well as an important cause of the widespread public discontent and anxiety that we see right across the continent. I also agree with those who have argued today that those economic challenges need to be addressed by a vigorous programme, primarily of supply-side reform, at both national and European level, focusing on the liberalisation of markets, especially in services, on deregulation and on embracing the opportunities offered by free trade. Those economic reforms are right not only for the UK but for Europe as a whole. I also say to hon. Members, frankly, that whether this country were in or out of the EU, endemic low growth and high unemployment in the rest of Europe are very bad news for businesses in this country, given the high proportion of our trade that is done with other EU companies and member states.

I agreed with what my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (Mr Redwood) said when he expressed relief that this country had decided not to take part in the euro. I agree that that would not have been in this country’s interests and I continue to believe that it is not a project that it is in our interests to take part in.

I also agree that for those partners that have committed themselves to membership of the euro, the logic of a single currency and a single monetary policy must be for closer integration of economic and fiscal policy decisions, and in turn for there to be political arrangements to hold such decisions accountable. One of the central political questions for the EU in the years to come—the next decade or so—will be whether we can construct arrangements within Europe that permit those who have committed themselves to a single currency to integrate more closely, while genuinely respecting, and in full, the rights of those who choose to remain outside the euro. That also means ensuring that the EU, in both its rules and its working culture, guards against the kind of caucusing that my hon. Friend the Member for Stone warned us might be a possibility—a caucus among eurozone countries, effectively to write the rules for everybody else regardless of others’ interests or views.

I also agree with the case for more wide-reaching political reform at European level. The EU is too centralised, and is often too bossy. As the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) said, we need to have an EU that shows greater flexibility and that is better able to accommodate the diversity that is needed among the 28 member states that there now are, rather than the six member states the EU started with.

There was some discussion about defence. I agree with those who argued that it is NATO and not the EU that is, and should remain, the key alliance for the maintenance of the security of this country and of Europe as a whole. As my hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot (Sir Gerald Howarth) said in an intervention, we still have a veto in regard to Europe’s common security and defence arrangements and we have exercised that veto in the way that he described.