European Union (Croatian Accession and Irish Protocol) Bill

Kelvin Hopkins Excerpts

Tuesday 6th November 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Lidington]

Yes, we have made it clear—my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary repeated this in Belgrade in the past couple of weeks—that we support Serbia’s ambitions to join the EU. It is also, however, important that while remaining vigorous supporters of EU enlargement we remain committed to rigorous accession criteria. That is in the interest of the candidate countries and of the integrity of the EU.

[Kelvin Hopkins (Luton North) (Lab)]

My constituency is home to some Bosnian Muslims. The accession of Croatia will erect a much more significant border between Croatia and the other Balkan countries—setting Montenegro aside—particularly the significant ones to the south, Serbia and Bosnia. Before Serbia attains accession, which might be many years ahead, the relationship may change. Does the Minister have any thoughts about how that relationship might change in the future?

[Mr Lidington]

I hope that the requirement to police the external EU border between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina will provide an additional incentive to political leaders in the latter to commit themselves with greater energy to the task of political and economic reform, particularly political reform and reconciliation, which is needed if they, too, are to qualify for EU membership.

One of the sadnesses about the western Balkans today is that Bosnia and Herzegovina, which a few years ago saw itself as at the head of the queue of potential new members of the European Union, has now fallen behind not only Croatia, but Montenegro in that race. I want to see Bosnia and Herzegovina move towards EU membership, and for that matter NATO membership too. I hope that one impact of Croatian accession is that people and leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina will see that they need to commit themselves with renewed energy and vigour.

The United Kingdom’s interest in Croatian accession lies partly in the fact that we have a national interest in the long-term political stability of the western Balkans, and partly in the fact that there are economic benefits to expanding the single market. Our trade with the eastern and central European countries continues to grow. To give the House one example, United Kingdom exports to the “emerging Europe” countries of central Europe have trebled over the past 10 years, reaching around £16 billion in 2011. More recently, in the first quarter of this year our exports to countries in the east of Europe have increased by no less than 28%, so in economic terms, amidst the current financial crisis, the project of EU enlargement remains as relevant now as it ever has been to our economic as well as our political interests.

Following the ratification of Croatia’s accession treaty by all 27 EU member states, Croatia is expected to join the EU on 1 July 2013. Meanwhile, we expect Croatia to sustain the momentum of six years of significant reform, particularly on judiciary and fundamental rights issues, so that it meets fully all EU requirements by the time of accession. This is something to which I know the Croatian Government are committed. When I visited Zagreb in July this year to discuss the ongoing reform progress, I was impressed with the dedication in evidence, particularly from the Foreign Minister and the Justice Minister of Croatia. They are very aware of the challenges that face their country and they are keen to prove to us as their neighbours and friends, and to their own citizens, that they can make a success of accession. It is on that basis that we look forward to welcoming Croatia to the EU as the 28th member state.

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[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

Not nationalist? I do apologise.

If a country has weak borders, it undermines the free movement of people within Europe.

[Kelvin Hopkins]

There has been discussion in recent years of the possibility of passport controls at internal borders. If there were, and if everyone had to carry a passport if they were not a resident of a country, we would solve some of that problem.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I am very reluctant to see controls on the free movement of people within the UK. We ought to have secure borders, and the extension of the EU has weakened our border controls and allowed member states to give their citizenship away. One recent case is Hungary, which sells citizenship. If Hungarian citizenship is sold, UK citizenship is also effectively sold, because people will have the free right to move and settle here. In due course of time, when the provisional practices that apply to countries such as Croatia, Bulgaria and Romania end, their citizens will also be able to work here.

That ought to concern us. I agree with my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary, who has said that we need to look at the whole question of the free movement of people, because of certain extraordinary anomalies within it, which were highlighted on “The World Tonight” on Radio 4 last night. The programme explained the difficulties that UK citizens have in bringing in a dependant who is not an EU national. However, a member of another EU nation state who is resident in the UK can bring in a dependant who is not an EU national.

One could argue that the structures of the free movement of people in the EU are in fact racist, because they deny the right of people from Commonwealth countries, who are often non-white, and who have very close associations with the UK, to come here, when people within the EU, with whom we sometimes have very little connection, can come here. We must therefore look at the free movement of people of the EU. It used to be a rich man’s club, but it is a European man’s, and indeed woman’s, club that excludes members of the Commonwealth who are not also EU members, who are often not white. This is a serious question for us to think about. Is the basis of the free movement of people within the EU fundamentally a racist principle? We need to consider whether seven years will be enough for Croatia, and whether we should amend British law to restore controls over immigration that are fair to people across the world, and that do not discriminate favourably towards Europeans but unfavourably towards others.

Croatia might not be ready to join and might fail to meet the requirements of the EU. On tackling corruption, the Commission is concerned that only three people have been found guilty of abuse of office. The Commission states:

“The implementation of the Law on the Police should be ensured, in particular to depoliticise the police and increase professionalism”.

The fact that that problem has not been tackled is a difficulty. What if we cannot have confidence in the police in a country that is about to join? Even if it is not part of Schengen, it will be part of the European arrest warrant arrangements, but it does not have a de-politicised police force or one that has been made sufficiently professional. Are we really, after the middle of next year, going to allow British subjects to be arrested on the say-so of a Croatian court, when Croatia has a police force in which even the European Commission does not have confidence?

The European Scrutiny Committee report shows that what is sought from Bulgaria and Romania is not happening. The same applies to some extent to Croatia. Is there an autonomously functioning and stable judiciary? That, too, relates to justice and home affairs agreements. We allow the judiciary of foreign countries to have an effect on subjects of Her Majesty going about their business in the UK, but countries that are joining the EU do not meet basic standards. The report states that we have not seen

“concrete cases of indictments, trials and convictions regarding high-level corruption and organised crime”.

We are therefore concerned that the state is corrupt at the highest level, yet we are allowing it to join before the problems are sorted out. That is once again the triumph of hope over experience—can letting them in and hoping to sort it out possibly be the right way forward when we have so many commitments through joint recognition of standards in fellow member states? We are also concerned that Croatia does not have

“a legal system capable of implementing the laws in an independent and efficient way.”

We must be more careful and prudent. Widening is a good thing—it is splendid to have a wider rather than a deeper EU—and it is good thing that newly emerged democracies have been able to come into the EU fold. However, when we have so many commitments to the EU that can be enforced upon us by foreign countries, is it right that we should let them in before the requirements have been met or without installing protections for ourselves by amending the treaties? I therefore have concerns that the opportunity to negotiate repatriations of power to the UK that could protect us from some of the inadequacies of the Croatian state before it joins the EU has not been taken—whether by the previous Government or this one is beside the point.

In that context, it is worth looking at what Ireland has done. As we know, Ireland was bullied by the EU into voting twice. That was a classic example of the EU believing in democracy for others but not for itself. It is a question of it saying, “Vote as often as you like until you give the right answer, and then you don’t need to vote again.”