European Union (Croatian Accession and Irish Protocol) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateDavid Lidington
Main Page: David Lidington (Conservative - Aylesbury)Department Debates - View all David Lidington's debates with the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
(12 years ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
I convey the regrets of my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary who is unable to attend today’s debate. As you know, Mr Speaker, he is in Laos attending to official business on behalf of Her Majesty’s Government.
The Bill provides for parliamentary approval of the Croatian accession treaty and for a protocol on the concerns of the Irish people, the so-called Irish protocol, which is to be added to European Union treaties. The Bill also provides for the secondary legislation that will be required to apply transitional immigration controls on Croatian nationals exercising their right to free movement once Croatia accedes to the European Union.
I very much welcome those transitional immigration controls that will be imposed for the accession of Croatia. We learned from that mistake in 2004 when countries from elsewhere in eastern Europe joined the European Union, and I support the Government’s actions.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his comments. I hope to say more about the transitional controls later, but he will have observed that the Minister for Immigration, my hon. Friend the Member for Forest of Dean (Mr Harper), is here, and I can assure him that the Home Office and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office are working hand in glove on the preparation for Croatian succession.
For many years, EU enlargement has enjoyed firm cross-party support in the House. We can look back to the premiership of the noble Lady Baroness Thatcher to see support being expressed for enlargement covering the newly enfranchised democracies beyond what was once the iron curtain, at a time when it was not fashionable or even believed feasible that those countries of central and eastern Europe could become full members of the European family of nations. Today, for the countries of the western Balkans, including Croatia, that process of accession provides a means of entrenching political stability, democratic institutions, the rule of law and human rights —traditions and values that that part of our continent needs but which were crushed for much of the last 100 years.
I endorse the Minister’s comments. May I invite him to underline that the accession agreement foresees not only the points that he has made but the fact that on accession Croatia will nominate a commissioner, take up a seat on the Council of Ministers and have 12 MEPs?
The hon. Gentleman is right. Our support should not only be about what Europe is or ought to be; I also want to stress the point that enlargement, and Croatia’s accession in particular, is firmly in our national interest.
Just to clarify, as well as the rights and responsibilities that will come to Croatia if we pass this accession Bill, is it also correct that it will have to join the Schengen area and eventually become part of the eurozone, with the agreement that it will join the euro?
Croatia’s accession treaty provides for it to join the Schengen area and the eurozone, but, as the hon. Gentleman knows well, if Croatia is to join either it will be required to meet some further tests. It is already understood in Zagreb and throughout the Schengen area that it will be at least two years before Croatia can contemplate a successful application. I know from the debates on the bids by Bulgaria and Romania to join the Schengen area that the current members look carefully at the strength of internal and external controls over immigration and asylum before they concede the much greater rights of freedom of movement and freedom from all kinds of border checks that go with Schengen membership.
The Minister referred to Romanian and Bulgarian accession. He will recall that before they joined the EU in 2007 they had to clear various hurdles and various parts of their economy had to be shown to be compatible with the EU, but at that juncture there was only a very limited stipulation stating that, if they failed to do so, their accession would simply be delayed by 12 months. Will he go into detail about precisely what hurdles Croatia will have to clear, particularly any penalties if it fails to meet economic requirements?
I want to come to that in greater detail later, but I can say now that the process that Croatia has gone through has been much more demanding than what was expected of Romania and Bulgaria or earlier accession states. One lesson that EU member states drew from the experience of Romanian and Bulgarian accession was that we needed to invent an additional category of accession conditions covering justice and fundamental rights measures. That is now embodied in chapter 23 of the accession process. Those things that, in the case of Romania and Bulgaria, ended up being addressed—in my view, rather unhappily, in terms of the actions of all sides—through the co-operation and verification mechanism post-accession have, in the case of Croatia, been addressed upfront.
We have learned further lessons from Croatia’s accession process. Although chapter 23 has been a significant advance, we recognise that, as we look forward to an accession process that in the Government’s view should embrace all the countries of the western Balkans, we need to find a way of ensuring not only that the accession process provides incentives for, and insists upon, rigorous reforms of the administrative and judicial life of an applicant country but that the applicant country has the opportunity to establish a clear track record of implementing those reforms. With the decision earlier this year to open accession negotiations with Montenegro, a new approach has been introduced under which those chapter 23 measures—and, for that matter, the chapter 24 measures applying to home affairs matters—will be dealt with first. The objective is to open those negotiating chapters early on, to see those reforms under way and then to hold those chapters open until the end of the process, so that it becomes a question not only of seeing reforms enacted but of seeing a consistent track record.
I hope that the Minister will forgive me, but his answer prompts a further question. He referred to the coalition Government’s support for other nations in the western Balkans joining the EU in due course. Would the same apply to Serbia, assuming that Croatia was happy about it and assuming that Serbia wished to join and met all the guidelines? Would the Government approve that too?
Yes, we have made it clear—my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary repeated this in Belgrade in the past couple of weeks—that we support Serbia’s ambitions to join the EU. It is also, however, important that while remaining vigorous supporters of EU enlargement we remain committed to rigorous accession criteria. That is in the interest of the candidate countries and of the integrity of the EU.
My constituency is home to some Bosnian Muslims. The accession of Croatia will erect a much more significant border between Croatia and the other Balkan countries—setting Montenegro aside—particularly the significant ones to the south, Serbia and Bosnia. Before Serbia attains accession, which might be many years ahead, the relationship may change. Does the Minister have any thoughts about how that relationship might change in the future?
I hope that the requirement to police the external EU border between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina will provide an additional incentive to political leaders in the latter to commit themselves with greater energy to the task of political and economic reform, particularly political reform and reconciliation, which is needed if they, too, are to qualify for EU membership.
One of the sadnesses about the western Balkans today is that Bosnia and Herzegovina, which a few years ago saw itself as at the head of the queue of potential new members of the European Union, has now fallen behind not only Croatia, but Montenegro in that race. I want to see Bosnia and Herzegovina move towards EU membership, and for that matter NATO membership too. I hope that one impact of Croatian accession is that people and leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina will see that they need to commit themselves with renewed energy and vigour.
The United Kingdom’s interest in Croatian accession lies partly in the fact that we have a national interest in the long-term political stability of the western Balkans, and partly in the fact that there are economic benefits to expanding the single market. Our trade with the eastern and central European countries continues to grow. To give the House one example, United Kingdom exports to the “emerging Europe” countries of central Europe have trebled over the past 10 years, reaching around £16 billion in 2011. More recently, in the first quarter of this year our exports to countries in the east of Europe have increased by no less than 28%, so in economic terms, amidst the current financial crisis, the project of EU enlargement remains as relevant now as it ever has been to our economic as well as our political interests.
Following the ratification of Croatia’s accession treaty by all 27 EU member states, Croatia is expected to join the EU on 1 July 2013. Meanwhile, we expect Croatia to sustain the momentum of six years of significant reform, particularly on judiciary and fundamental rights issues, so that it meets fully all EU requirements by the time of accession. This is something to which I know the Croatian Government are committed. When I visited Zagreb in July this year to discuss the ongoing reform progress, I was impressed with the dedication in evidence, particularly from the Foreign Minister and the Justice Minister of Croatia. They are very aware of the challenges that face their country and they are keen to prove to us as their neighbours and friends, and to their own citizens, that they can make a success of accession. It is on that basis that we look forward to welcoming Croatia to the EU as the 28th member state.
Is that not a rather pious hope? Once Croatia is a member, if it decides to resile from the commitments, what actions can be taken? What actions have been taken as Hungary has departed from the standards that we would expect from a member of the European Union? The answer is none.
There are within the treaties articles that can be invoked. For example, if a member state departs from fundamental standards of human rights and democratic values that are embodied in the articles of the treaty, ultimately its full rights as an EU member can be suspended. [Interruption.] The hon. Member for Moray (Angus Robertson) reminds me that when a far right party entered the Government of Austria a few years ago, Austria found that it started to get frozen out of normal EU business. So although they may be blunt instruments that are in the treaties, the instruments are there.
There is a provision in the pre-accession monitoring arrangements under which, if Croatia fails to deliver on what she has promised, the Council is entitled to take all necessary measures to deal with the situation. That might, for example, mean that if Croatia were to fail to carry through the necessary market reforms of its shipbuilding sector—I do not expect that—certain EU financial benefits could be withheld until those reforms had been implemented. I do not think we are as lacking in sticks as the hon. Member for Blackley and Broughton (Graham Stringer) suggests.
Let me say this, then I will give way. Croatia has applied for European Union membership both because it sees this as of symbolic political importance and its leaders want to entrench democratic values, human rights and the rule of law in their country, and because Croatia sees some significant economic benefits to participation in the single market. Croatia also wants to move on and apply for Schengen membership. The one thing that Croatia’s leaders know is that if they were to depart from the promises that they have given, their chances of benefiting in the way they hope and their people expect would be reduced accordingly. That remains a powerful motive.
The Minister has led on to the question that I wished to ask. He mentioned application for Schengen and cross-border rights, but the Schengen acquis requires countries to sign up to a great deal of immigration and co-operation in cross-border law and other aspects. Is it expected that the Schengen acquis will be put in place part by part before the application, or is Croatia not expected to do anything in relation to those things? That is relevant as we struggle with opt-ins and opt-outs.
What Croatia has to do is what was set out in the negotiating chapters, particularly in chapter 24, to equip itself to deal with the responsibilities of European Union membership. I shall say a little about the borders issue later to try to address those comments. Membership of Schengen requires Croatia and any other member of Schengen to go further. The pace at which any reforms specific to Schengen are introduced and implemented is a matter between Croatia and the Schengen members. It is difficult for me as a Minister for a country that has chosen to stay outside Schengen and has no intention of joining it to try to prescribe what the pathway should be for Croatia’s hopes to join the Schengen agreement.
In its report the European Scrutiny Committee made a number of criticisms of the Commission’s and the Government’s conclusions about the readiness of Croatia to join the European Union. The Government will of course reply formally to the report of the Scrutiny Committee in due course, but as the Committee has chosen to tag its report to the debate today, I thought it might be helpful to respond to the main thrust of the Committee’s criticisms now, during the debate. We will have other opportunities during later stages of the Bill to explore the points that my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) and his Committee raised, and as I said there will be a formal Government response to the Committee in due course.
I shall try to deal briefly with three or four of the main issues raised by the Committee in its conclusions. Let me take first the issue of war crimes, both co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and domestic war crimes. On co-operation with the tribunal, I want to stress that not just the United Kingdom but the European Commission and the tribunal itself believe that Croatia is fully co-operating with the tribunal. Indeed, the chief prosecutor, Mr Brammertz, has now said that he sees no need for him to visit Zagreb again and he has taken the decision to wind down the status of the tribunal’s office in Croatia. On 3 May this year, while visiting Zagreb, Mr Brammertz said that there were “no outstanding issues” that might burden relations between Croatia and ICTY. On 7 June, in a statement to the UN Security Council, he said:
“The Office of the Prosecutor continues to rely on Croatia’s cooperation to efficiently complete trials and appeals. In the current reporting period (as at 14 May 2012), the Office sent 18 requests for assistance to Croatia. The Croatian authorities have given timely and adequate responses to the requests made and it has provided access to witnesses and evidence as required. The Office will continue to rely on Croatia’s cooperation in upcoming trials and appeals.”
The chief prosecutor, who in the past has been critical of what he saw as shortcomings in Croatia’s level of co-operation with him, has now said that in his view Croatia has co-operated, and continues to do so, in the way he would rightly expect.
The issue of domestic war crimes is a difficult one. One need only look to our own country’s history in Northern Ireland to see how difficult it can be to get to the truth about some of the most vile murders. There are about 1,200 cases on file relating to domestic war crimes in Croatia, but we need to break that total down into three categories. There are about 400 cases for which trials are pending, about 400 where the accused cannot be found and a further 400 or so where the indictments are in a pre-investigative phase but the perpetrator is unknown—it is believed, on the basis of evidence, that a war crime might have been committed but no individual or group of named individuals can be cited as having been responsible. The average length of a trial for a domestic war crime is about six to seven months.
In 2010, four specialised chambers were established to deal with domestic war crimes. In May 2011, new legislation took effect to require the transfer of outstanding cases to those chambers and, in the autumn of 2011, new judges were appointed to those specialist tribunals. So far, 87 cases have been transferred to the specialist tribunals. The Government’s view is that progress has been too slow and that the Croatians need to devote more resources to that work. Our assessment is that the commitments Croatia made can be described as “almost complete” but that more progress is still required. We are confident, given the commitments we have had from the Croatian Justice Ministry, that that acceleration will have taken place by the time we reach the expected accession date.
Some of that progress is simply about procedural reforms: new listing priorities have now been established; prosecutorial standards are being applied better; there is, importantly, improved co-operation between the Croatian and Serbian authorities in investigating war crimes; and the Croatian side has submitted a draft agreement between those two countries for co-operation in the prosecution of such cases. The Commission has said that more still needs to be done to secure the attendance and protection of witnesses, who might well fear for their safety when giving evidence in this kind of case. We think that progress has been slower than it ought to have been but are confident about the seriousness with which the Croatian authorities are taking it.
I will move on to borders and address the point that the former Chair of the European Scrutiny Committee, the hon. Member for Linlithgow and East Falkirk (Michael Connarty), made in his earlier intervention. Croatia has been making good progress. She already has 81 fully operational border crossing points and has given assurances that the necessary infrastructure and technology will be in place to support those crossing points and ensure strong border management by the time she accedes to the EU. The most important outstanding element is the need to provide formal border crossing points in the Neum corridor, which is the very narrow stretch of Bosnian territory that divides Croatia. The Croatians have told us that they are on course to complete the border crossing points in that important area next spring.
After Croatian accession, of course, there will continue to be border controls between Croatia and its European Union neighbours. Because Croatia will not join Schengen straight away, those neighbouring countries that are EU member states already will maintain their border controls with Croatia, so any third-country national who got into Croatian territory, whether before or after EU accession, would still be subject to the same level of controls in a country such as Slovenia, and certainly in the United Kingdom, as they are today. I will add that one key advantage for us of Croatia’s accession is that she will come within the scope of the Eurodac regulation and the Dublin agreement on returns and readmissions, which will be helpful to us in the case of any people who manage to get through and abuse the asylum system and need to be returned to Croatia.
There will obviously be a seven-year transition period on economic migration from Croatia. Can the Minister tell the House—this is a general point relating also to Romania and Bulgaria—whether it would be possible under British law for us to extend that transition period if we think that is right for Britain?
The answer is that we cannot go beyond the period for transitional controls laid down in the treaties. I will say a little more about arrangements for Croatia later. For Romania and Bulgaria, we have extended the transitional controls for the maximum period committed and they have to come to an end by the end of 2013.
May I add a rider to the Minister’s answer? This is without a “notwithstanding” clause to the European Communities Act 1972, but this Parliament could of course do that if it wanted to.
This Parliament can of course pass any legislation it wishes to. In that sense, what my hon. Friend says is constitutionally correct, although I in no way want to mislead him into thinking that the Government intend to introduce such an amendment to the 1972 Act.
My right hon. Friend, far from disappointing me, has enlivened me to rise, and I do so for this very good reason: this is the first time, as far as I am aware, that any Minister has conceded from the Dispatch Box that the constitutional principle of the “notwithstanding” formula is valid. I was delighted to hear what he had to say.
My hon. Friend is tempting me dangerously far from the scope of the debate, but I simply refer him to the happy day we spent in Parliament debating the sovereignty clause of what became the European Union Act 2011. If he looks at Hansard, I think he will find that I stated very clearly that if Parliament wanted to amend the 1972 Act at any stage, it is open for it to do so but—
Order. The right hon. Gentleman is a most earnest and assiduous member of Her Majesty’s Government, but the safest path for him to tread is in the direction of Croatia and the borders thereto.
I am grateful for that rescue, Mr Speaker. I want to move on to one other element of the Committee’s criticisms.
I understand that there has been a long-standing dispute about moneys held in the Ljubljanska banca in Slovenia which, it is suggested, belong to Croatia. Has that issue been resolved?
I discussed that with both the Slovenian and Croatian Governments when I was visiting Ljubljana and Zagreb earlier this year. We encourage both countries to find a bilateral solution. It is clearly not for the United Kingdom to lay down how that should be done, but they need to find a bilateral agreement that is in accord with the various international treaties to which the two countries are party. We hope that they succeed in the very near future.
The Committee was critical of the Government’s assessment that Croatia was making good progress with the reform of the judiciary and the courts. I am conscious that I have given way a lot and that other Members want to speak, but I want to deal with the most egregious element of the problems with the legal system in Croatia: the backlog of civil cases, to which the Committee drew particular attention.
The backlog in criminal cases in Croatia has fallen for some time and continues to fall, and we ought to pay tribute to the work that the Croatians have done to achieve that. They are still finding it a battle to reduce the backlog in civil cases, but it is important that we should not be misled by grand totals of the number of civil cases before the courts.
According to the figures that I have for the first half of 2012, roughly 844,000 new civil cases reached the Croatian courts; in the same period, roughly 836,000 cases were resolved. Although the total number of cases pending increased slightly, it would be wrong to think that 800,000-plus cases simply sat there in the “pending” tray and never moved. The truth is far from that. There has been a reduction in the backlogs in respect of the older cases—those over 10 years old or over three years old. The Croatians have also assigned a significant number of additional judges to focus on the backlog. Again, although we accept that further work needs to be done, we think that Croatia has made good progress and is committed to completing it. We do not believe that that is a reason to delay its accession.
I move on to migration. Croatia has a modest population of about 4.5 million. The potential impact of Croatian migration is relatively small, but we know that appropriate immigration controls are crucial for stability in our labour market, particularly in the current economic climate. Recently, the Home Office published its intention to impose transitional controls on Croatian workers in line with the Government’s policy to impose such controls on workers from all new member states, under the terms provided for in their accession treaties.
The accession treaty for Croatia sets out the framework within which member states may apply transitional controls to Croatian nationals who wish to work in their country. That framework is as follows. During the first two years following accession, the existing 27 member states can apply either national immigration controls or those resulting from bilateral agreements to regulate access to their labour market by Croatian nationals.
From the third year to the fifth year, member states have the option either to continue to apply the same controls as in the previous two years or, if they choose, to grant Croatian nationals the right to move and work freely, in accordance with European Union law. For the fifth year, member states must grant Croatian nationals the right to move and work freely in accordance with EU law. However, if member states find that they are subject to serious disturbance of their domestic labour markets—this has to be an evidence-based assessment of the kind that we seek from the Migration Advisory Committee—those member states may choose to continue to apply controls for a further two years, taking us up to a seven-year maximum period after accession, having first notified the European Commission.
The Home Office will be bringing forward detailed regulations on the transitional controls early in 2013, so the House will have the chance to debate the detail of those ahead of Croatia’s planned accession date. However, the Government’s intention is that for the first two years at least we would continue with the current arrangements under which Croatian nationals who would qualify to come and work here under the points-based system would be allowed to do so, although we do not envisage further relaxation beyond that.
For decades since independence, there have been associations between the former Yugoslavia and the subsequent nations. There are decades of experience of citizens from that part of the world working in Germany and Austria as Gastarbeiter. Based on that assessment, do the Government agree that when the free movement of labour comes into force, those citizens are most likely to travel to countries with which there is an historic association—in the first instance, Germany and Austria?
The hon. Gentleman is right. According to our figures for 2011, about 2,000 Croatians emigrated to other EU member states and half of those went to Germany. UKBA figures for 2011 show that only 115 Croatian nationals were admitted to the United Kingdom to work.
I appreciate the Minister’s argument about the small number of those likely to immigrate legally. The problem is that the equivalent-sized country of Moldova, which has a population of 4.5 million, has a trafficking record similar to that of a country with 50 million people. It is used as a gateway. The problem is not legal migration but whether there is a prospect of the mafia—for want of a better word—of the Balkan states using Croatia as a gateway for people trafficking. That would be the concern. Are the police in Croatia up to dealing with such an influx?
That is a perfectly fair question, but I assure the hon. Gentleman that there is no evidence at the moment that Croatia is being used by traffickers as he says has happened in Moldova. However, people traffickers are extremely professional, well organised multinational businesses. We have to be vigilant and continue to work closely with the Croatian authorities, trying to provide the practical advice, support and training that we have been giving them as they carry out their immigration, asylum, judicial and administrative reforms, so that their own systems are up to scratch in ensuring that they cannot be exploited by traffickers. The Croatian Government would not want that to happen, and nor would we.
Now I want to talk briefly about the Irish protocol. The addition of the Irish protocol to the EU treaties does not have a significant impact for the United Kingdom. It relates to a series of guarantees given to the Irish people as a condition of their ratification of the Lisbon treaty, but it does not change the substance or application of the treaty. It confirms the interpretation of a number of its provisions in relation to the Irish constitution. Helpfully, the Irish interpretation of the Lisbon treaty aligns with our own.
I invite the Minister to take the opportunity to acknowledge that the Irish protocol underlines the rights of member states to set their own tax rates. The Irish Government sought that important guarantee. However, that rings true not just for the Irish Republic but for all member states of the European Union in future, which is welcome.
It is very welcome that the Irish protocol makes that assertion about tax sovereignty, which is in line with our own interpretation of the Lisbon treaty and previous European Union treaties. The Irish protocol also confirms that neither the charter of fundamental rights nor the Lisbon treaty in the area of freedom, security and justice affects the scope and applicability of the Irish constitution as regards the right to life, protection of the family and protection of rights in respect of education. It confirms that the Union’s action on the international stage, particularly under common security and defence policy arrangements, does not prejudice the security and defence policy of individual member states or the obligations of any individual member states. It also deals with other matters specific to Ireland, such as its long-standing position of military neutrality. It was formally agreed by Heads of State and Governments of the 27 member states in June 2009. It amounts to a guarantee in international law that the concerns raised in Ireland were unaffected by the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty. Once all 27 countries have formally ratified the Irish protocol, it becomes binding in terms of the European Union as well as of international law.
The Government’s original intention had been that we might include with this legislation a comparable but differently worded protocol as regards the Czech Republic. That is still stalled in the Brussels decision-making process. The European Parliament has yet to produce an opinion on the Czech protocol, and until that has come out of the Brussels negotiations it would be premature for us to think about bringing forward legislation here in Parliament.
I wonder whether, while negotiating the Irish protocol and the Czech protocol, Her Majesty’s Government considered repatriating any powers to the United Kingdom which could have been part of this treaty negotiation.
As I said, the protocol was negotiated in 2009, so I fear that my hon. Friend’s challenge has to be for my predecessors in office who are now on the Opposition side of the House. Nothing would have been served in terms of the United Kingdom’s interest by our now saying that we would block ratification of the Irish protocol unless we obtained some concession of our own, because the thing at stake would not have been the ratification of the Lisbon treaty but the ratification of the Irish protocol, to which we have no objection and which is wanted by one of those countries with which we have an extremely close bilateral relationship.
Does the Minister accept that the protocol confirms the pre-existing sphere of competence of Ireland under its own constitution, further supplemented by the confirmation in relation to neutrality?
I wanted my right hon. Friend to confirm, as I think he has, that it was open to the UK, as with any treaty negotiation, to use this as an opportunity to negotiate for our own interests, but the Government decided on this occasion that it was not worth doing so.
The point of principle that my hon. Friend makes is certainly right—that during a treaty negotiation it is open to any member state to withhold its consent unless it receives a concession that it is seeking. Obviously, during such a negotiation every member state has to calculate where its national interest lies and what kind of bargain it wants to achieve. However, this is now water under the bridge, as these events took place before the previous general election.
No, the Minister is wrong. What a member state tries to do, across the piece and over a period of time, is to decide what its main priorities may be. That does not mean that every time a treaty is coming up, it decides to put yet another thing on the table. Indeed, I would argue that the problem with the Government’s current approach is that they are trying to fight the European Union on too many fronts at the same time and will not secure any of their intended outcomes.
Order. I am aware that the hon. Gentleman has only just come in, but we do need shorter interventions. I know that he gets carried away, but I am sure that he will be shorter in future.
I am not going to get drawn into a historical battle about my predecessors’ record in office. I would argue that the previous Government were too reluctant to use the leverage that we had from negotiations at the time of the Lisbon treaty, but that is a matter that the House can debate and historians will no doubt wish to comment on in future, and I do not want to spend further time on it today.
The measure before us will provide for the accession of Croatia to the European Union, thus marking another step in the Government’s long-held support—this country’s long-held support under successive Governments—for the enlargement of the European Union. Enlargement has been a project whereby the European Union has benefited from the United Kingdom’s ideas, engagement, and—dare I say it?— leadership over many years and under successive Administrations.
If we compare the history of Europe in the 20 years since the fall of the Berlin wall with the 20 years following the treaty of Versailles, drawing a contrast between, in the earlier period, a time when fragile new democracies collapsed under the strain of domestic political tension, dictatorship and invasion, and, in the 20 years just passed, a time when we have seen democracy, the rule of law and human rights entrenched in ever more countries on our continent, we can see the advantage that European Union enlargement has brought, and we can be proud of our own nation’s contribution to that process. In that spirit, I ask the House to support the Bill’s Second Reading.
I call Michael Connarty. [Interruption.] Sorry, I mean Emma Reynolds.
I remind the hon. Member for Perth and North Perthshire (Pete Wishart) that today’s debate is about Croatia’s accession to the European Union. Should other states wish to join, there will be debates in this House and Parliaments around the EU about that accession, and I am sure that conditions will be attached. I am sure there will be future opportunities to debate the subject to which the hon. Gentleman refers, even if that is not in order today.
To return to the subject, there is concern about conflicts of interest and the funding of political parties and electoral campaigns in Croatia. The European Commission has recommended that a conflict of interest commission “be established without delay”, and the Opposition support that demand. On competition policy, Croatia has taken positive steps to strengthen its anti-trust laws, but further progress is needed in relation to state aid in the steel and shipbuilding industries. As the Europe Minister said earlier, progress is also needed in restructuring the Croatian shipbuilding industry.
On border security, notwithstanding the Minister for Europe’s earlier remarks, Croatia will at some point assume responsibility for the EU’s south-eastern border. What happens on that border will directly impact on the rest of the EU, and indeed the UK, in terms of preventing illegal immigrants from entering the EU, and breaking up and stopping human trafficking—my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow and East Falkirk (Michael Connarty) referred to that issue. Croatia’s role in those areas will be vital, and we therefore welcome increased co-operation between Croatia and its neighbours. I welcome what the Europe Minister has said about the UK’s assistance in that area.
More widely, Croatia has taken positive steps towards accession in a number of areas, which should be welcomed. The police force and courts have undergone important reforms. A new police law has raised standards and removed political pressure, and respect and protection for human rights—in particular LGBT rights—has improved. During the debate in the House last year, I raised the issue of LGBT rights in Croatia, and expressed concern that a gay rights parade in Split had been attacked with no intervention or protection from the police. I am pleased to say that since that debate, gay pride events in Split and Zagreb have taken place peacefully and been protected. The European Commission and MEPs have continued to put pressure on the Croatian Government, and in particular I put on the record my thanks to Michael Cashman, a Labour MEP who has continued to put pressure on that Government for those welcome improvements.
I am sure the hon. Lady would want to join me in paying tribute to the strong personal commitment of Vesna Pusic, the Croatian Foreign Minister, who has made it something of a priority to see that Croatia makes good on its pledges and obligations concerning civil rights of the kind mentioned by the hon. Lady.
I welcome that intervention, and the commitment of the Croatian Foreign Minister in that area.
Clause 4 of the Bill provides
“a regulation-making power to make provision on the entitlement of Croatian workers to work and reside in the UK;”
and I welcome the further clarification provided by the Europe Minister. The Opposition believe that the Government should implement the maximum transition period for Croatian nationals who want to come to the UK to work, as we did when in government with the accession of Romania and Bulgaria.
As I stated in a European Scrutiny Committee debate earlier this year, the Labour party fully supports the Irish protocol, which it helped to negotiate when in office. We value the continued partnership between the UK and the Republic of Ireland, and recognise the special relationship that our two countries share. As we have heard from the Minister, the draft Irish protocol contains safeguards for Ireland on the right to life, family and education, taxation, and Irish neutrality, and it provides a clarification on the application of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union, and the treaty on the European Union, and does not change the content of these treaties. We welcome that clarification, and support the Irish protocol as part of the Bill.
In conclusion, Croatia’s preparations to join the European Union have been more thorough than in previous accessions. An impressive range of reforms have been introduced and valuable lessons have been learned from previous accessions. Croatia’s accession to the EU will send a signal to the rest of the Balkan countries that their future belongs in the EU, and it will provide encouragement and incentives to those Governments not to let up on the pace of reform, but to root out corruption, reform their political and judicial systems, and modernise their economies.
With the leave of the House, Mr Deputy Speaker, I would like to reply briefly to some of the points that have been made. I thank Members of all parties who have taken part in the debate. Although a number of criticisms have been made of the stage that Croatia has reached in preparing for EU accession, there has been pretty nigh universal support for the principle that Croatia should be welcomed as a full member of the European Union.
Let me deal first with the points that have been made about the Irish protocol. I was asked why no referendum was required under the European Union Act 2011. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber (Mr Kennedy) said just now, the truth is that the protocol is declaratory. It changes neither the content nor the application of the EU treaties. The European Council conclusions of June 2009 said that the protocol was
“fully compatible with the Treaty of Lisbon and will not necessitate any re-ratification of that Treaty”.
That was at the heart of the formal opinion set out by my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary in his statement on 2 July this year, in which he explained why, having examined the protocol, as required under the 2011 Act, he had concluded that it fell within one of the exempt categories of legislation.
I should say to the hon. Member for Moray (Angus Robertson) that while I completely accept—and not just in respect of the Irish protocol—that the smaller EU members play a vital and welcome role in the functioning of the European Union, he will also, I am sure, have taken note of the fact that, between Croatia’s application and accession, 10 years elapsed before all the details were sorted out and accession arrangements put in place.
The right hon. Gentleman will forgive me; I think the House would want me to make progress.
My hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg) asked about the lack of action on a police law. In about a week to eight days’ time—well ahead of the proposed Committee stage of the Bill—I will make available to the Committees and in the Library the detailed tables in respect of chapter 23, which was the supporting basis for the report, which the Committees have seen. Those tables are with the Ministry of Justice at the moment. As we did in April, we will make those tables available to the House following the Commission’s October report, and I undertake to do so in good time before the Committee stage.
To deal with the point my hon. Friend made, progress on the police law could be said to have fallen victim to the democratic process. The previous Croatian Government, led by the HDZ, passed a law on the recruitment of police officers shortly before the Croatian general election. After a new Government were elected in Zagreb, they wanted to consider the position and decided that they wished to repeal the law. They have now had detailed discussions with the European Commission and decided to go ahead with the previous law, subject to some amendments. The details of the police law are finalised and we expect everything to be in place well ahead of Croatia’s expected accession date.
The hon. Member for Linlithgow and East Falkirk (Michael Connarty) asked about the risks of trafficking, a subject in which he has taken a long and detailed interest. We have not identified any victims of trafficking from Croatia in the United Kingdom. Indeed, the 2011 report by the US State Department, which ranks countries in terms of their capacity to tackle trafficking and protect victims, designated Croatia as a tier 1 country, alongside the United Kingdom. The evidence suggests that Croatia already has a robust system in place, but clearly we will want to work with the Croatians to ensure that that remains the case. Countries close to Croatia, such as Kosovo and Albania, are indeed source countries for traffickers. The Croatian Government are fully aware of the risks and are committed to strengthening measures to tackle trafficking. For example, Croatia intends to continue training border staff and police. A training programme on trafficking in human beings has been drafted and will be implemented as part of the border police training system. We believe that Croatia is on track to meet its commitment to tackling human trafficking.
The hon. Gentleman also asked about the need for border management. The EU monitoring reports released in April and October highlighted delays in implementing the infrastructure and equipment required for the integrated border management programme. That will be addressed as part of pre-accession monitoring, but in the meantime Croatia continues to make progress. As at August this year, the national border management information system was live at 81 border crossing points, which represents significant progress on 2011, when only 37 were so equipped. In 2011, Croatia apprehended 3,461 illegal migrants, a significant increase on the 1,946 apprehended in 2010. The total number of border officers is now 6,017, of which 4,647 are at the external border. Croatia plans to recruit 406 additional border officers before the end of the year.
The hon. Member for Linlithgow and East Falkirk asked whether Croatia would be obliged to join Schengen. The act of accession provides for much of the Schengen acquis to apply to, and be binding on, Croatia from the date of her accession, but the actual lifting of border controls to other Schengen area member states will not take place at the time of Croatia’s accession. That will take place later, following a separate Council decision, and it will happen only if Croatia meets the requirements of the Schengen evaluation procedures to the satisfaction of the Commission and the existing Schengen area member states.
The hon. Member for Moray asked about the post-accession measures. Articles 38 and 39, relating to safeguards to the single market and to chapters 23 and 24, can indeed be invoked after accession, as well as before it under the special pre-accession monitoring arrangements.
In answer to a further point raised by the hon. Member for Linlithgow and East Falkirk, the conflict of interests commission is in the process of being established, and we expect it to have been established before the end of the year. One reason for the delay is that the Croatian Government have decided to be completely transparent about the process, and they have interviewed every one of the more than 200 applicants for the post involved.
[Official Report, 12 November 2012, Vol. 553, c. 1-2MC.]I shall perhaps have an opportunity to say more about the general issue of anti-corruption measures when we reach the further stages of the Bill. Today, I would simply say that we are now seeing action being taken in high-profile cases, with convictions secured against a former Prime Minister, a former economy Minister and a former defence Minister. At the lower level, too, the Croatian bureau for combating corruption and organised crime has issued indictments against 257 people, secured 209 judgments including 205 convictions, and launched 191 new investigations, all between January and August 2012. Again, that is evidence of the determination of the Croatians to push forward and deliver on their promises to take rigorous measures against corruption.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber rightly referred to the part that Croatia has played in contributing to the international security assistance force operations in Afghanistan. I also look forward to the prospect of Croatia, as a full member of the European Union, serving as a role model for the other countries of the western Balkans and, through her own diplomatic and political activity, leading them towards full integration with the European family of nations, as well as strengthening the institutions that provide for democracy, the rule of law and human rights for everybody. Although there is still work to be done in the months leading up to accession, this Government believe that Croatia has achieved remarkable progress. She is on track to deliver on her promises by the date of accession, and that is why we have brought the Bill to the House and ask the House to support it tonight.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill accordingly read a Second time.
European Union (Croatian Accession and Irish Protocol) Bill (Programme)
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 83A(7)),
That the following provisions shall apply to the European Union (Croatian Accession and Irish Protocol) Bill:
Committal
1. The Bill shall be committed to a Committee of the whole House.
Proceedings in Committee, on Consideration and Third Reading
2. Proceedings in Committee, any proceedings on Consideration and proceedings on Third Reading shall be taken in one day in accordance with the following provisions of this Order.
3. Proceedings in Committee and any proceedings on Consideration shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion one hour before the moment of interruption on the day on which those proceedings are commenced.
4. Proceedings on Third Reading shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the moment of interruption on that day.
Programming committee
5. Standing Order No. 83B (Programming committees) shall not apply to the proceedings on the Bill in Committee of the whole House, to any proceedings on Consideration or to proceedings on Third Reading.
Other proceedings
6. Any other proceedings on the Bill (including any proceedings on consideration of Lords Amendments or on any further messages from the Lords) may be programmed.—(Joseph Johnson.)
Question agreed to.