(10 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, just to confirm, the noble Lord will be speaking after the Minister.
As the song used to say, “It Should Have Been Me”, but there we go.
The key starting point in this debate is the relationship between the SIA, its responsibilities, the Home Office and the people it serves. Quite self-evidently, Ministers decide and have responsibilities under Clause 12 to ensure that the SIA produces an annual report on its performance. It enables the Secretary of State to issue directions to the SIA on what it should be doing if it is not doing what it should be doing, ensures that the Secretary of State has the power to appoint board members, including the chair, and requires the Secretary of State’s approval for the SIA’s operational guidance that will be issued in due course. Ministers will be accountable to this House and the House of Commons for the performance of the SIA. If there is to be an advisory board in place, I suggest that the House of Commons and this noble House suit that purpose down to the ground; they will hold Ministers to account for the performance of the SIA.
In the first instance, I am surprised. Obviously the concept of the Department of Government Efficiency, or DOGE, has not yet floated across the channel to the noble Lord, Lord Frost, or the Opposition Front Bench, because this set of amendments creates another set of bureaucracy to oversee the SIA and an interface between it and Home Office Ministers. It adds bureaucracy and cost, but not a great deal of value. In doing so, it also confuses the relationship between the Home Office’s direct responsibility to this House and Parliament and the responsibilities of the Security Industry Authority.
Does the Minister accept that the major expansion of bureaucracy in the Bill comes from the regulatory requirement of so many small premises in the first place? That is the expansion of government activity under the Bill and I feel—I cannot speak for others—very sceptical about it. Does he agree that it is a bit rich, having been willing to preside over this huge expansion of activity, to criticise those of us who want to see it properly monitored to do its job efficiently?
The noble Lord calls it bureaucracy; I call it life-saving measures. The Bill is about putting in place life-saving measures to ensure that, in the event of a terrorist attack, individuals know what to do. That might save lives downstream. That is a type of bureaucracy that I am quite happy to accept. There are many burdens and bureaucracies in life, such as health and safety legislation, mine legislation and road safety legislation. There is a whole range of burdens that are there to save lives and this is the same process.
As I said earlier, there is no doubt that everyone in this Committee would like to save lives. It is a question of balancing whether the Bill and all that it does is life saving. If that is the answer, then there is no debate. If the narrative is, “We’re on the side of life saving, and anyone who doesn’t go along with this Bill, or is critical of it, doesn’t care about life saving”, then what are we having this debate for?
I want to reflect on the “collaborative nature” put forward in Amendment 33. The very people who really care about life saving are all the different local groups, and the amendment simply suggests that there could be a collaborative approach. I know that it has been described as a quango. I have always thought of the party opposite as people who are interested in stakeholders and local groups. There are so many groups in scope of the Bill that you cannot just go to some big organisation that represents them. The amendment refers to having more of them involved.
I accept that, which is why this Government—and the previous Government—undertook several consultations, opened themselves up to scrutiny by the Home Affairs Committee, had widespread consultation on changes to the Bill after this year’s general election, which we reflected on, and have listened to concerns about continuing further bureaucracy. The judgment of the Government is that this legislation is an effective way of helping ensure that we put in place protection measures in the event of a terrorist attack. To do that, we have to issue guidance via the Home Office and the Security Industry Authority. The further level of bureaucracy mentioned in the amendments would not help with that. We have had pre-legislative scrutiny and two public consultations and have engaged with law enforcement groups, victims’ groups, the Martyn’s law campaign team, Survivors Against Terror and parliamentarians generally. The statutory board would be an additional administrative layer that would be unnecessary and unhelpful.
Amendment 34 seeks to ensure that we judge the performance of the SIA at a time when it is not yet up to speed on the actions it will take in relation to this legislation. It is neither possible nor fair to judge the performance of the regulator so early in its lifespan. Ministers will examine that under the issues in Clause 12 that we have responsibility for.
Amendment 36 seeks to ensure that changes are made to the enforcement regime. As we see it, the enforcement regime has been developed drawing on lessons from existing regulators. The SIA will use different measures as appropriate to the breach in question. The SIA’s approach will be aligned with the Regulators’ Code. While Clause 20 sets out particular matters that the SIA must take into account, including the recipient’s ability to pay, the list is not exhaustive. If we impose that statutory duty, for example, to consider the views of local authorities, we will create additional burdens for the SIA and for local authorities that would provide that information.
Amendment 44 from the noble Lord, Lord Frost, again provides an additional level of bureaucracy that is not required to be able to hold the SIA to account. Overall on these amendments, there should be clarity about the SIA’s role. The Bill sets out clarity on that. There are currently powers for Ministers to intervene on a range of matters relating to the SIA, including the appointment of the chair and members. Ministers will be held to account on their performance.
The Government want the Bill to succeed. Therefore, between Royal Assent and any implementation date, Ministers will be on the case week in, week out to make sure that the SIA is fit for the purpose designed by the Bill, delivers, has appropriate guidance, involves all the organisations impacted by the Bill downstream and puts in place a range of measures to help support the training and development of people to make sure the Bill functions as we intend it to. Advice is good, but we have been through a big consultation, and this House and the other House have the ability to hold us to account. The amendments are therefore unnecessary in order to make effective use of the SIA.
For me, the amendments water down a core element of the Bill, which is about individual responsibility—people taking responsibility for ensuring that an organisation or an event at a venue has thought about what it will do in the eventuality of an attack. That is the key purpose of this Bill.
Thirdly, it would be useful if the Minister could write a letter or bring forward proposals to illustrate how volunteers will be treated with due respect and that it will be understood that this legislation must not put them off, which is why an information campaign is so important. A public information campaign should reassure people.
I am grateful to noble Lords for their amendments.
Amendment 35, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, looks at the timing of the payment period across regimes where a time is specified under Clause 17(5). I hope I can reassure him by saying that the period of 28 days in the Bill is a common period across other such regimes. The key point to make to the noble Lord, in relation to his amendment, is that the period currently specified at Clause 17(5) establishes a period that is not less than 28 days, beginning with the day on which the notice is given.
The key point is that the SIA may determine a period for a penalty payment. That might well be 42 days, 62 days or 38 days, but it will not be less than 28 days. It may be greater than 28 days, depending on the person’s circumstances and any representations they make before the SIA issues a notice. Once notice is given, the period may be subsequently varied, and a person has the right to appeal a penalty notice to the tribunal. The Bill is not being prescriptive, except in the sense that there is a minimum period of 28 days. After that, the period is for determination accordingly. I suggest that the noble Lord reflects on his amendment in due course, because I think the Bill meets the objective of his amendment, which is to give individuals a longer period should they require one.
Amendments 35A, 35B, 36ZA and 37ZA in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Murray of Blidworth, address some really important issues, which are how we encourage, nurture and involve volunteers and make sure that any regulatory regime does not frighten them off or stop them from taking part. It is a noble aspiration from the noble Lord, and one that I would share generally. However, I do not share it in the sense of the amendments he has brought forward. The thought behind them is extremely important, however.
Volunteers, as the Committee will know, play a critical role in communities across the country. The Bill is designed to ensure that we support volunteers at a time of crisis, in the event of a terrorist attack, by providing for a nominated person to act properly and take steps to deal with that attack. I remind the Committee of the main purpose of the Bill, which is to ensure there are plans in place, mostly under Clause 5, with a responsible person making the split-second decisions needed in the moment of a terrorist attack.
The noble Lord has acknowledged the step we have already taken of increasing the threshold from 100 people to 200. There are some 10,000 community centres across the country, and we estimate that only 13% will now be in scope. The vast majority of community halls will not be in scope. But again, I come back to the basic principle of the Bill: someone has to hold the responsibility for devising the plan under Clause 5 for the various measures that need to be taken. In doing that, other volunteers and members of staff are not liable for any action in the event of a breach of those plans; it is only the responsible person.
The basic tenor of the noble Lord’s amendments is whether the responsible person will no longer step up to the plate because they are worried about the consequences of not meeting the obligations under the legislation. Again, I say to him that the purpose of the Security Industry Authority is not to jump from step A, which is a plan, to step X, which is to take someone to court and put them in prison. The purpose of the Security Industry Authority is to ensure that guidance, support, nurturing and help are available. It is to ensure that the people who take on that onerous responsibility have that support to meet the obligations of the Bill. Yes, there is a penalty in the event of a failure; ultimately, however, the purpose of the SIA is to offer the guidance to make sure that the penalty does not happen.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for Amendment 37. I hope I can reassure her that the Security Industry Authority already has robust safeguards and processes in place for discharging its duties under the Private Security Industry Act 2001, which ensure that it is therefore compliant with data protection legislation. The Government’s clear expectation is that the SIA will apply the existing safeguards that it has under the 2001 Act when implementing its new regulatory functions under this Bill.
Furthermore, as an arm’s-length body, the SIA must ensure that any disclosures of information under the Bill do not contravene data protection legislation, including the Data Protection Act 2018, or the prohibitions in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. The regulator will be able to share information only in accordance with the parameters in the Bill—shortly to be an Act —and other applicable legal requirements, such as those under data protection legislation as a whole. I hope that those three bits of legislation—the Private Security Industry Act, the Data Protection Act and the Investigatory Powers Act—give the noble Baroness the assurances that she seeks.
My Lords, I am not sure that I am reassured, because I do not understand how opposing points can be taken into account. If it is data protection legislation that governs—if that is what prevails—why do we need this subsection at all? I have not looked at the Private Security Industry Act to which the Minister referred, so I will certainly look at that and at what he has just said. I do not want to be difficult; I just want to get an understanding so that everybody understands it, not just me.
Would it help the noble Baroness if I ensure that I write her a letter between now and Report, which will be announced shortly, so that she has clarity on her concerns? To save her having to look it up, I will also send her the relevant section of the Private Security Industry Act 2001.
Sending me the reference will do; computers are wonderful—mostly. I am grateful for that. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(10 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I speak in support of Amendments 21 and 23 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich. These amendments propose the removal of Clauses 5(4) to 5(6) and 6(4) to 6(6), which currently contain Henry VIII provisions granting Ministers the power to amend by regulation primary legislation relating to public protection procedures, including the ability to make them more onerous.
These are important amendments and I support them for several key reasons. First, they uphold parliamentary sovereignty and democratic accountability. The inclusion of Henry VIII clauses in the Bill would, in effect, bypass the scrutiny of Parliament by allowing Ministers to unilaterally change key aspects of public protection procedures. Such powers should be granted in only the most exceptional circumstances, where there is a clear and pressing need for flexibility.
In this case, however, the procedures in Clauses 5(3) and 6(3) have already been carefully considered and subject to full scrutiny, and will be endorsed by Parliament upon the Bill’s passage. It is therefore difficult to justify granting Ministers the ability to unpick these provisions without returning to Parliament for proper debate and approval.
Secondly, granting such sweeping powers undermines legal certainty. The security landscape is undoubtedly complex and may evolve over time, but that is precisely why legislation must provide a stable and predictable framework. If Ministers can alter public protection procedures by regulation, it will create uncertainty for the businesses, public authorities and other stakeholders that will implement these security measures. This uncertainty could hinder the very objective that the Bill seeks to achieve in enhancing public protection.
Furthermore, the inclusion of Henry VIII clauses risks undermining public trust. Effective public protection measures require the co-operation and confidence of the public and stakeholders alike. If these measures can be altered without consultation or parliamentary oversight through the proper primary legislation process, it may lead to perceptions of arbitrary governance and erode confidence in the fairness and transparency of security regulations.
I am not blind to the Government’s need for flexibility in responding to emerging security threats. However, existing mechanisms allow for swift and proportionate responses without the need for unchecked ministerial power. Maintaining proper parliamentary scrutiny is essential to preserving the legitimacy of any regulatory framework. The amendment strikes a necessary balance between security and democratic accountability. It ensures that any future changes to public protection procedures remain, as they should, subject to the robust oversight of Parliament. I urge the Government to accept this amendment and demonstrate their commitment to parliamentary sovereignty, legal certainty and public trust.
I will now speak to the important amendments to Clause 32 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich. They address the regulatory powers granted to the Secretary of State regarding the thresholds for qualifying premises and events under the Bill. Amendment 38 seeks to require that any reduction in the thresholds for qualifying premises and events be justified by a change in the threat level from terrorism. While I appreciate and respect the intention behind this amendment, I must approach it with some caution. The need to ensure that security regulations are proportionate to the prevailing threat level is, of course, essential. However, linking regulatory changes exclusively to a shift in the formal threat assessment may create unnecessary rigidity.
Security risks are often multifaceted and not always captured by changes in official threat levels. Local intelligence, emerging patterns of behaviour or other factors may necessitate adjustments to security requirements even when the formal threat level remains static. For this reason, although I appreciate the noble Lord’s desire for transparency and justification, I am somewhat hesitant to fully support his amendment. None the less, I commend the focus it places on ensuring that regulatory changes are evidence based and justified.
I am more supportive of his approach in Amendment 39, which would require the Secretary of State to consult relevant stakeholders before making regulations under this section. This is a measured and sensible proposal that aligns with the principles of good governance. The wording, adapted from the Fire Safety Act 2021, provides a strong precedent for such consultation requirements.
Consultation is essential not only for ensuring that regulatory changes are practical and effective but for fostering buy-in from those directly affected by these measures. Venues, event organisers, local authorities and security experts are on the front lines of implementing public protection measures. Their insights and experiences are invaluable in shaping regulations that are both proportionate and workable. Moreover, consultation promotes transparency and accountability, helping to build public trust in the regulatory framework. In a democracy, it is only right that those affected by significant changes to security requirements have the opportunity to contribute their views and understand the rationale behind decisions.
In conclusion, while I take a cautious approach to Amendment 38, Amendment 39 takes a better approach. I urge the Government to look at this proposal as a possible safeguard for ensuring that regulations are both effective and democratically accountable.
My Lords, the Dispatch Box can sometimes be a lonely place, but such is life. I hope I can give some comfort to noble Lords who have contributed on the points that they have raised, while also explaining where the Government are coming from.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, for his amendments and his constructive approach to the Bill’s proposals. It was good to talk to him outside the Chamber as well as having this debate. He has had support from the noble Baronesses, Lady Suttie and Lady Fox of Buckley, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst. My noble friend Lord Harris of Haringey also made strong comments on the use of Henry VIII powers. The noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, from His Majesty’s Opposition Front Benches broadly speaking supported the bulk of the noble Lord’s amendments, with some concerns over Amendment 38. Ironically, it is on Amendment 38 that I can potentially offer the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, most warmth today. I shall try to give the House some comfort on these points and, hopefully, some explanation.
I welcomed the scrutiny of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee and of the Constitution Committee, of which the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, is a member. The Government carefully assessed each of the delegated powers in the Bill so as to draw them as narrowly as possible and to find alternative mechanisms which remove the need for secondary legislation where possible. Our view, and this is consistent with what we said in opposition, is that Henry VIII powers should be included only where they are necessary to ensure that the legislation continues to operate as intended and where there is a justification for those changes. I believe that is reflected in the scrutiny of the two committees, as the only concern raised was about the linked powers in Clauses 5(4) and 6(4). For the reasons I will set out, the Government still consider the powers covered by these amendments to be necessary.
On Amendments 21 and 23 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, I take everything he says to the Committee—and to the Government outside the House—as important and serious. His amendments seek to remove powers that would enable the Secretary of State to add, remove or otherwise amend the public protection measures listed in Clauses 5(3) and 6(3). Members of the Committee will remember that Clause 5 covers a number of measures, such as evacuation, invacuation, preventing individuals leaving premises or providing information to individuals on premises or at an event. They are reasonable measures that can be taken, but the changing nature of terrorism means that over time methodologies may change.
As the ways in which acts of terrorism are carried out change, so too may the many ways in which we need to respond to them. The Government want to keep the legislation under review to ensure that it effectively deals with the terrorist threat while being—this goes to the heart of what the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, said—appropriate, proportionate and done in a reasonable way. These powers better enable the Government to respond to changes appropriately and maintain this balance.
The measures in Clause 5(3) are already constrained. They can be used only to achieve the public protection outcomes of the future Act. The Secretary of State may add further procedures only if it is considered that they would reduce the risk of physical harm to individuals. Similarly, the power to remove or amend the existing public protection measures may be exercised only where it is considered that such changes would not increase the risk of physical harm to individuals. The powers in Clause 6(3) are similarly restricted. The Secretary of State may add further measures only if it is considered that they would reduce the vulnerability of premises or events or reduce the risk of physical harm to individuals. Similarly, the power to remove or amend the existing public protection measures may be exercised only where it is considered that such changes would not increase the vulnerability of premises or events.
There are limited, straightforward proposals in Clauses 5 and 6, which set down a number of potential measures that are in place. Any change under those Henry VIII powers would be subject to the affirmative procedure. Before any regulations under these provisions are made, both Houses of Parliament would have the opportunity to debate and scrutinise changes to the public protection procedures and measures through these powers. Those limitations will help safeguard against unnecessary use of those powers by any future Secretary of State, in line with making sure that the public protection measures in Clauses 5 and 6 are met.
I believe, although I may be in a minority of one among today’s speakers, that the proposals in the Bill are sufficient for any Henry VIII power used in this circumstance to be brought back to the House for affirmative resolution and for the House of Commons to have a similar potential vote in due course. I do not have sympathy with those amendments, although I understand where they are coming from.
However, I will be honest; when I first saw Amendment 38, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, I said to colleagues that I thought he has a point—and, if the Committee will bear with me, I think he does. Amendment 38 proposes to look at how we can reduce the qualifying threshold figures, saying that regulations can be made
“only if the Secretary of State is satisfied that the reduction is justified by a change in the threat from terrorism”.
There is potentially room there for discussion with the noble Lord outside this Chamber before Report, which is not too far hence, to look at whether we can reach an accommodation to agree that broad principle.
I am grateful to all noble Lords who have taken part in this short debate. I shall not try to summarise the excellent speeches that were made—they will come much more clearly in the form that they were made than they would from any summary of mine—but I will pick up a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, who emphasised consultation. As I said at Second Reading, this Bill has in many ways been a model of careful consideration. Look at the work that the Home Affairs Select Committee did on it, the work that was done in another place, the way that this Government have listened, and the way that people right around the country were consulted before these measures, procedures and thresholds were reached. In previous groups, the Minister, quite rightly, has sought credit for the depth of that consultation and the care with which those crucial figures, procedures and measures were arrived at. So although I might not have used exactly the same words as the noble Baroness, Lady Fox—she said that to introduce Henry VIII clauses and apply them to these central elements of the Bill when it has already been consulted on makes a mockery of it—I entirely understand where she is coming from.
I am very grateful to the Minister for what he has said. I think he described it as a half concession—and one must take what one can get—on Amendment 38 and the idea that changes to the thresholds should be motivated by a change to the terrorist threat. However, I urge him, while he is in that generous mood, to heed the very strong terms in which the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, expressed himself on Amendment 39. If you were seeking a Henry VIII clause in these circumstances, and claiming as your model the Fire Safety Act 2021 which has a duty to consult—I might say a very weak duty to consult only such people as seem to the Secretary of State appropriate—why can that not be followed through into the text of this Bill?
The Minister gave an assurance from the Dispatch Box that there would be appropriate consultation—I think he said that; I do not want to put words into his mouth—although he did say that, on some minor issues, it might be internal consultation only. If the Minister is prepared to say that from the Dispatch Box, let us hope that all his successors are as well inclined to the idea of consultation. But is it really a great stretch to put those words into the Bill as well? I hope that, just as we reflect before Report, the Minister will reflect as well.
If the consultation power is too wide—and I think the Minister took the point that perhaps Amendment 39 applies to a whole range of changes—it could of course be narrowed. Amendment 38 is restricted to specific aspects of the Bill and it would be quite possible to redraft a consultation power that was equally narrow.
While I am on my feet and we are all beginning the process of reflection before Report, might the Minister consider applying the logic that he has brought to Amendment 38 to the lists in Clauses 5 and 6? After all, if reductions in the threshold, as the Minister seems minded to accept, require a change in the terrorist threat—or that there could at least be debate as to whether that is an appropriate precondition—why should not an expansion of the lists similarly require a change in the threat?
The reason I would put is that a change in the threshold would involve bringing a large number of other potential businesses and outlets into the scope of the provisions of the Bill. The changes in Clauses 5 and 6 may tweak or look at the protections available or what other support and training should be given, but they do not bring into scope further premises.
I am grateful for that clarification and answer, but Amendments 38 and 39 are not just about a changing of the threat; they are also about consultation. While the Minister is thinking about consultation in relation to the thresholds, I wonder whether he might think about something similar in relation to changing the lists.
The Minister has offered me half a concession. What I was offering him just now was perhaps half an olive branch. It was a way of possibly coming back on Report with something slightly different from my amendments to Clauses 5 and 6. I think we all have reflecting to do. I am extremely grateful for what I think has been a most useful debate. For the moment at least, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 24, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and to Amendments 24A and 24B in the name of my noble friend Lord Sandhurst. Amendment 24 seeks to remove subsections (5) and (6) of Clause 8, probing the implications of this clause for commercial agreements, as highlighted by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation’s note on the Bill.
The amendment rightly seeks to probe how these provisions will affect contractual relationships between private sector actors. There is a genuine concern that the current wording could place undue financial and legal burdens on businesses by interfering with existing agreements. This could lead to significant commercial disputes and unnecessary litigation, ultimately hindering the smooth operation of commercial partnerships.
While public safety is undoubtedly a priority, we must ensure that our approach to security does not inadvertently create a minefield of legal uncertainty for businesses. Subsections (5) and (6) appear to grant broad and potentially disruptive powers that may override established contractual terms. In doing so, they risk undermining commercial stability and discouraging investment in venues and events that play an important role in our social and economic life.
Furthermore, these provisions may disproportionately impact small and medium-sized enterprises that lack the legal and financial resources to navigate complex contractual adjustments. Removing subsections (5) and (6) would encourage a more co-operative and practical approach, allowing businesses to work with public authorities to achieve security objectives without unnecessary interference in their commercial arrangements.
The independent reviewer’s concerns highlight the need for clarity and a balanced approach. Instead of imposing rigid requirements that disrupt commercial agreements, we should be looking to develop guidance that promotes collaboration between duty holders and security authorities. With this amendment, this House can signal our intention to maintain security measures that are both effective and commercially workable.
Amendment 24A in the name of my noble friend Lord Sandhurst is a simple amendment which seeks to establish the Government’s reasons for requiring one senior individual to be responsible for the duties under the Bill for those premises and events with an enhanced duty. This should be something that the Minister can resolve with a clear answer today, and I hope he will be able to give that answer today.
Amendment 24B, also in the name of my noble friend Lord Sandhurst, seeks to establish the timeframe in which decisions by the tribunal have to be made. Clearly, events will need swift decisions from the tribunal if the decisions are to be made before the events themselves are held, and it is surely right that all organisations deserve timely determinations from the tribunal. Can the Minister tell us what his expectations are in this regard? Can he confirm that the Government have assessed the impact of this new duty on the tribunal on waiting times for determinations?
I urge the Government to reconsider the necessity of these subsections and to work toward a more proportionate and practical solution.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, for their amendments. I will try to deal with both in due course.
First, Clause 8(5) and (6) introduce a co-operation requirement between persons responsible for those premises under the Bill and those with any other form of control of enhanced duty premises and qualifying events. I make it clear to the Committee that this clause relates to the enhanced tier of premises, not the standard tier, so this would be responsible for the very top end of the arena-type premises. The responsibility for implementing the Bill’s requirements will always remain with a responsible person. Nevertheless, for reasons that have been outlined by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, there may be areas where they require permission, support or co-operative steps from other parties to have some level of control of the premises or the event, in order to comply with the requirements of the Bill.
The noble Baroness gave an example which I can repeat back to her, in essence, where the person is a leaseholder who might identify that in order to put in place public protection measures, some changes are required to the building, such as replacing glass or providing alternative exit routes. In order to do that, the lease agreement may specify that permission must be obtained from the freeholder before any alterations are made. The purpose of this would be that if the freeholder were to refuse, or fail to respond to, such a request, this would compromise the responsible person’s ability to take forward reasonably practicable measures and frustrate the potential protection afforded to the premises. Clause 8(5) and (6) have been designed to require in such circumstances the freeholder
“so far as is reasonably practicable”—
the key phrase in the legislation—to co-operate with the leaseholder for the purposes of allowing the Bill’s requirements to be met.
I re-emphasise
“so far as is reasonably practicable”.
The clause does not require those subject to Clause 8(5) and (6) to habitually co-operate; they must co-operate so far as is reasonably practicable. What is reasonably practicable are the very issues that the Committee has already referred to, such as costs, benefits and the difficulties in making the respective relevant change, including considering the longer-term use of the premises.
I should also emphasise that Clause 8 does not automatically override commercial contracts or agreements. There is the co-operative principle that where there are parties with control of premises or events, there will be parties who will work readily with those responsible to take forward appropriate requirements. However, where that is not the case and where there is a dispute, Clause 11—which we will come to in a moment—gives the persons the right to apply for determination at a tribunal. The tribunal may be asked to determine
“whether a person is required to co-operate with the person responsible”
for the duty. I hope the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, will recognise that there is a reasonable test in the clause as determined, and that the safeguard of the tribunal is there for where there are disagreements in due course.
I am grateful to the Minister, and for his assurance. Of course, I was aware of the substantial sum of money that is being given to the SIA to enable it to carry out these activities. However, if it is well in hand, surely we have reached the point at which at least an outline plan could be given by the SIA as to what it is proposing to do with that money? This relates to a number of amendments that we are going to be considering later, and I thought I would get my blow in on this early. I suspect that there are going to be real concerns about a regulatory authority that has never regulated anything like this. Surely it would be right for us to be given at least a two- or three-page outline of what its proposals are, because it must have at least reached that point.
I am in danger of straying into a future set of amendments, or indeed a general Second Reading debate on the Security Industry Authority. I say to the noble Lord that the SIA currently has a very good record of processing licensing applications—93% within 25 days—and has an 86% satisfaction rating by individuals in terms of their interaction with the authority. Ministers are going to be accountable for the performance in the event of this Bill becoming an Act. We have said, particularly my honourable friend Dan Jarvis, the Security Minister in the House of Commons, that there will be key ministerial engagement with the SIA in helping to develop and shape that plan over the two-year period between the Bill potentially receiving Royal Assent, and its implementation by the SIA and this scheme becoming live.
We may have that Second Reading debate in later groups of amendments. I hope I will be able to reassure the noble Lord then that Ministers have taken decisions to put the SIA in the prime spot of the regulator. Ministers want that to succeed, and they will be making sure that the plans are put in place to make sure that it succeeds, because this legislation is meaningless without the regulation, delivery, oversight, guidance and training that we believe the SIA can put into place. We will revisit that downstream.
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, for his contribution; I think he stole some of the lines that I was going to use. He made the very clear point that the tribunal has a responsibility for setting its timescales and its deadlines, and that it is not for ministerial direction to do that. The tribunal system is well established, with statutory rules and experienced judges and officials who understand the need to make timely decisions in a variety of contexts. It is these rules and processes that should determine how that tribunal operates: with appropriate parliamentary and ministerial oversight—certainly—through amendments to legislation relating to courts and tribunals.
I note the potentially positive objectives of the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst. He wants to see a definitive timescale set, but if we included that provision in the Bill, it would set an unhelpful precedent and cut across the roles of the Tribunal Procedure Committee and the tribunal procedure rules. I do not anticipate a large number of cases coming before a tribunal anyway, because I hope that—again, as with most of the issues in the proposed legislation—we can resolve these matters well downstream. In the event of an issue coming to a tribunal, it is right and proper—and I am grateful that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, mentioned this—that the tribunal itself is able to operate effectively, with its own well-established framework to deliver its own fair decision, and not be hampered by timescales set by legislation which may not anticipate what will happen two, three, four or five years down the line. Therefore, I will take support where I can get it and thank the noble Lord for his contribution.
The tribunal has an overarching duty to deal with cases fairly and justly. If an arbitrary time limit is imposed, the proposal by the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, may undermine that existing duty.
I hope that, in my response, I have given some comfort to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and that I have explained to the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, why I wish them both not to press their amendments.
My Lords, I can see force in what the Minister has said, so I will not press my amendment.
I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, will not pursue his amendment. As noble, and noble and learned, Lords will have understood, my question to him was a coded form of opposition. He said “It doesn’t matter that there’s no precedent”, but I think that it matters very much.
On my Amendment 24, I hope it is appropriate to summarise the Minister’s response as saying that there are two conditions for subsection (6) to apply: practicality and reasonableness. He is nodding—I say that so that we will get it into Hansard, because it answers the question raised by the independent reviewer. If we need to come back for any clarity, or if I am misconstruing him, perhaps there will be an opportunity.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness for allowing me to intervene. I gave the words “reasonable” and “practical”; they are the tenors on which the legislation would be interpreted.
I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Faulkner for tabling the first of this group of amendments and to the noble Lords, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay and Lord Udny-Lister, the noble Baronesses, Lady Fox of Buckley and Lady Suttie, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester and my noble friend Lord Mann for their contributions.
I would like to just stand back for a moment. All the amendments and comments are about making sure that somebody in a responsible position understands what the provisions of the Bill are so they can make sure that the people who are with them, on a voluntary or professional basis, are seen to understand and are able to implement the legislation in the event, which we hope will never happen, of a further terrorist attack.
The specific question of training is an important one, but I remind noble Lords that there is no requirement in the Bill currently. In fact, as the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, mentioned, that was a step back that the Government took to ensure that we carry out specific training on any particular issue. It is essential that we have those public protection measures in place and that people understand them, but is it essential for all the issues that have been raised today to be fully put down and for those “burdens” to be put on to voluntary organisations and organisations in the higher tier?
In Clause 5(3) we are asking for public protection measures, which include invacuation, assessing windows and a whole range of issues about a particular site; and in Clause 6 there are some more detailed observations for the larger premises. What my honourable friend Dan Jarvis in the House of Commons and I are trying to do with the Bill is establish good practice. Accordingly, as has been mentioned in the Chamber tonight, training and instruction will vary according to the types of premises and workers—whether it is a professional building or a small village hall with amateur individuals being trustees and responsible for those areas. The Government consider that the focus should be on how to ensure that people can carry out their roles effectively, rather than requiring the completion of generic or, indeed, one-size-fits-all modules or courses. If no one working at a qualified premises has been informed how to carry out an evacuation procedure, the procedure is, self-evidently, not properly in place and the requirements under this legislation have not been met.
The Government recognise the vital importance of proper instruction, and, as such, the Bill will require some form of guidance and strategy, but I would suggest it does not require prescriptive training along the lines that have been discussed in the range of amendments brought before the Committee today.
Under this legislation, the Secretary of State, the right honourable Yvette Cooper, and any future Secretary of State, must provide guidance under Clause 27 and lay it before this House and the House of Commons so that there is public scrutiny of what that guidance will be in the event of this Bill becoming an Act and Clause 27 passing into law. That guidance will be produced with the specific purpose of helping those in scope in the standard or enhanced tiers to understand the requirements that are required of them and to understand how to comply with them.
Moreover, in Clause 12, one of the functions of the Security Industry Association will be to provide the appropriate advice to those in scope of the requirements. Where provided, such advice cannot replace, but may be complementary to, the statutory guidance produced by the Secretary of State. It is intended that the Security Industry Association will support and guide those who are responsible for the premises and events and will seek to educate rather than enforce in the first instance. Through the process of implementation, the Home Office is intending—I hope I have given reassurance previously on this—to support the SIA, to ensure that the advice it provides and the guidance it produces assists those who fall within scope, drawing appropriately on relevant stakeholders. The Home Office is committed to ensuring that the SIA brings in the right people with suitable qualifications and expertise to ensure effective performance.
I hope that that reassures the Committee. It does not set down a template for training because training is not required, but it will set down guidance for organisations in the standard or enhanced tiers to ensure that they know what is required of them, and the legislation is clear in Clauses 5 and 6 as to what that is.
I thank the Minister for giving way. Has he given more thought to the sector-specific guidance, as we have touched on previously in Committee? He relies on the guidance that the Secretary of State for the Home Department will have to bring forward but, as this debate has shown, the application for a heritage railway association or a small football club varies hugely. If he and his department were willing to look at sector-specific guidance that would take in all the specific situations that volunteers and staff in those organisations face, that would go some way to helping.
The noble Lord makes a valuable point. But consider, for example, that the provisions were for a standard-tier building. The standard-tier building under Clause 5(3) requires “public protection procedures”: evacuating individuals; moving individuals; preventing individuals from entering or leaving; and providing information to individuals on the premises. Those requirements in Clause 5(3)(a) to (d) apply to a heritage railway, a village hall, a small football club, or a small church—they apply to any particular premises. What that clause and therefore what the training/understanding is about is making sure that, be it a railway, church, village hall or football club, those provisions are understood by the people who, in the event of an attack, would be in the building and would be directed by the responsible person, or their delegated named person, to understand—if this building were a village hall—which entrances they need to lock or open, which windows to shut or not, and what the evacuation procedure for the building is.
There is a training element in that, but it is really in the understanding. The guidance that the SIA and the Home Office will produce downstream—it is downstream because this is not yet an Act and there is a two-year implementation period—will be designed to make sure that whatever the circumstances, individuals who are responsible people under the legislation understand what their responsibilities are. I am acutely aware that there are, as there are now, a number of individuals offering types of training before this Bill is even legislation and has Royal Assent.
Do we, as the noble Baroness says, produce a Home Office list of “supported individuals”? Our aim is to try to simplify and de-bureaucratise this, as far as possible, so that it is easily understood by those who are “responsible individuals”, and the costs are not excessive. The requirements in the legislative amendments being discussed today would add potential layers of bureaucracy and would not achieve the fundamental objective, which is, “What do I have to do in the event of a terrorist attack in the premises that I am responsible for, whatever size those premises are?”
The Minister is giving a good explanation on bureaucracy and cost, which I think is rational, but I fear I am hearing too much of the Home Office mentality of an “authorised person”. When it comes to dealing with major risk, including dealing with terrorism, the message on the railways, on the London Underground and in airports is that everyone should be vigilant. A huge amount of resource has gone into that messaging.
With the example of parish councils, I do not think anyone is suggesting that parish councils should be required by law to have carried out a training session. Not that long ago, however, I represented about 60 parish councils, and I would expect somebody to be organising a training session for all 60 of those councils to make sure they are all clear about what they should and should not be doing in relation to this. That is a small but crucial event. Is there not a danger that the Home Office thought process of the “responsible person” leaves out the responsibilities of the rest of us and the key role for us to be playing in this?
The purpose of this legislation is to provide guidance for the responsible person where buildings and premises are impacted at the time of a terrorist attack to ensure that the responsible person knows what to do. It is not designed to be worrying about the downstream elements of potential terrorism—although we all worry about these things. We all need to be vigilant on trains and in the street; we all need to understand what is happening; we all need to support the police and the security services. As professional forces, they are doing what they can to prevent an attack occurring in the first place—but, in the event of terrorists choosing to attack a village hall in my noble friend’s former parliamentary constituency, or another railway heritage site, what happens when that attack takes place? That is the nub of what this Bill is about.
The provisions under Clause 5, for smaller premises, and Clause 6, for larger premises, and the provisions on having a nominated person are linked to an understanding of what we do in that circumstance. The amendments today are about whether we need to ramp up training to do that. What I am saying to the House is that the Security Industry Authority and the Home Office will provide guidance on how to understand and implement that legislation, but the specific training and vetting and supporting specific training providers is not one of those obligations. Certainly, however, there will be guidance from the Secretary of State and the Security Industry Authority.
Indeed, as I was saying before my noble friend asked to intervene, there are government fact sheets currently. There is social media promotion of the leaflets and there is stakeholder engagement. We have had a massive consultation, in several incarnations, through different Governments and through various rounds of scrutiny by the public and parliamentarians. What we are trying to get to is an understanding of certain responsibilities that individuals have to have to make sure that there are protective measures in place in the event of an attack, which remains unlikely but could happen anywhere, at any time. When it happens, how do people understand their responsibilities and responses?
The two-year implementation period that we are likely to have before the Bill becomes implemented law, as opposed to Royal Assent law, will allow for wider discussion of the issues that the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, mentioned around whether we need to tailor specific advice or not and will include widespread dissemination of the type of information that the proposals of the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, have brought forward today. This is a valuable discussion to have, but the aim of the Government is to try to make this as simple as possible; to give guidance to ensure that it is as simple as possible; and not to overcomplicate things by making everyone think, “I have to have training to do this”. It is not about training, it is about responsibilities. Those responsibilities are set down in the Act and guidance will be given in due course.
My Lords, I am most grateful to the Minister for his reply at the end of the debate. If I may, I will come back to that in a second. I first want to thank all noble Lords who have spoken, many of them on the other side of the Chamber from me, and one on my side, on the Back Bench here, because there is clearly great public support for the Bill. We are determined that it should pass and that it should work, but we believe that, for it to work effectively, there must be a commitment by the Home Office, the Security Industry Authority and other interested bodies to make certain that there are people in place in the organisations affected who are properly informed and trained in what their duties and responsibilities are going to be.
The noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, spotted the fact that I had the word “may” in my amendment, and not “must”, which does, I hope, leave the Government with some discretion as to how it wants to implement the two-year consultation and implementation period. I hope that there was enough in my noble friend’s speech to indicate that, if it is going to be necessary for some form of structure to be established, it will be necessary not only for guidance to be available; the implementation of that guidance will need to be properly organised, either with public funds or through some other means of providing trainers who are able to do that. I hope that that opportunity is not ruled out and that there is going to be determination to ensure that the Bill, when it becomes an Act, will be implemented effectively and that the organisations that are required to implement it feel comfortable and are not affected financially by having to take on these responsibilities.
For the moment, I will of course ask the Committee to allow me to withdraw the amendment, but I hope that my noble friend is clear: there is a lot of support for the propositions that all of us have been making in this debate and I hope that we can come back to this at a later stage to see how we can implement them. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I start by re-emphasising the purpose of this legislation, as the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, said that she is unconvinced of the need for it. This legislation will save lives. There are people who died because people did not know what to do when a terrorist attack occurred, and there are people whose lives were saved and who are walking the streets today because people took action when a terrorist attack occurred. The purpose of this legislation is to put in place a framework so that individuals know, if a terrorist attack occurs, what their responsibilities are in that moment; it is not to stop terrorism per se, or to worry about what happens afterwards to the perpetrators, but to stop terrorist activity damaging individuals’ lives in that moment. That is the purpose of this legislation.
I know that the noble Lord, Lord Murray of Blidworth, has brought this amendment forward constructively, but I agree with the noble Lords, Lord Carlile and Lord Elliott, that it will dilute responsibility, because there is a named person and that named person is a named person whether or not they subcontract to a security consultant. It will increase the very cost that the noble Lord has been seeking to reduce during the passage of the Bill to date. It will add potential burdens, on small organisations in particular. It will create a market for the very snake-oil salesmen that this Committee is trying to avoid engaging with. It will set standards which are unrealistic when compared to the standards being set by the Home Office and/or the Security Industry Association. It will sow confusion, and it will put burdens on the very people who the noble Lord, deep down, wants to make sure do not have such burdens.
The Home Office’s whole approach is to try to make sure that the provisions in Clause 5 for the smaller tier, and the provisions in Clause 6 for the enhanced tier, are in place and can be simply understood and embedded in good practice. That is certainly true for the enhanced tier, because, by and large, it is made up of professional organisations that will embed the requirements in their day-to-day activity. For smaller organisations, it is about a simple level of guidance and support, which has a legislative component in that someone is responsible. Someone needs to make sure that measures are in place, such as simple evacuation, invacuation, shutting windows or hiding under a desk—whatever is appropriate for that local provision—without the need to have expensive tailored security provision on top. The cost estimate we have put in the Bill is around £330 for the standard tier, and that is in time, not necessarily in cash.
The noble Lord’s proposal would create confusion. Someone would undoubtedly say, “I have to have a consultant”, and someone would undoubtedly pay a consultant, and then the next village would say, “They’ve paid a consultant. We have to do the same”. The next village would say the same, and the costs and the burden would rise on those businesses, when the requirements of the Bill are actually simple and straightforward.
Does the Minister not think that, for example, a village hall that has developed a terrorism action plan along the lines of that required by Clause 5 will want to test that to ascertain whether it meets the requirement before the Security Industry Authority comes to inspect it? In the event that it is inspected and its plan is found wanting, it becomes liable for the heavy penalties that we see later in the Bill. It is surely a natural human reaction to want to test that, and they will do it by going to the private market. Is it not sensible to build into the Bill a measure that allows them to do that? It is simply going to happen. People are going to want to test their plans. Surely he must understand that.
I would argue that the way to test those plans is to test them against the Home Office guidance and the security industry guidance. It is not potentially to go out and say to Mr or Mrs security consultant, “Please come in at an exorbitant cost to check that the five exits that we’ve got in this village hall and the plan I’ve put down to work on them meet the requirements of the Act”. The Bill has been determined in such a way that the Home Office does not believe that the requirements are onerous for the standard tier organisations, and even for the enhanced tier the anticipated cost is around £5,000. That will be standard practice for a large arena or large organisation, without the requirement to have those further security consultants test it accordingly. In my view, though the House will determine this in due course, the amendment would dilute the responsibility on the responsible person for bringing forward those plans in the first place.
I say to the noble Lord that I know why he has done this. All the way through the Bill, he has argued to reduce the burdens on small organisations, but this amendment would simply increase those burdens. It would create uncertainty, jealousy and cost, and it would not achieve the objectives that he said. I hope that he will not at any stage, either now or on Report, bring this amendment back for this House to determine.
I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this short debate on the amendment, particularly the Minister. I might just address one or two of the points raised. In answer to the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, yes, the accreditation referred to in my amendment is the same as the certification.
I turn to the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. Of course, I do not seek to replace the contingent liability on a contractor in contract law for faulty advice or workmanship in the floor example that he provided. I am suggesting more that the contractor would share the liability under the statute—the daily penalties and the financial penalties that can be imposed by the SIA and the criminal liability under the Act, which I think is separate from ordinary contractual liability, which would be recoverable under a civil action in the courts.
However, I am grateful to the noble Lord for pointing out and reminding me of the passage in the Saunders report saying that the advice provided needs to be clear and to assist the parties that receive that advice. That is exactly what my amendment seeks to achieve. The reality, as I sought to argue to the Minister a moment ago, is that bodies subject to duties under the Bill will look for advice because of the penalty regime, particularly the contingent criminal offence, which would fall upon the responsible person. One therefore expects that there will be a market for advice, and it is important that it is regulated to prevent the snake-oil salesmen that noble Lords across the Committee have expressed an intention to avoid.
I am particularly grateful to my noble friend Lord Davies for his support for my amendment, and to all other noble Lords for contributing to the debate. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I support the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, and that in the name of my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower.
In the Manchester Arena Inquiry report by Sir John Saunders, the Security Industry Authority came in for considerable criticism. I refer particularly to paragraphs 3.25 to 3.38 of volume 1 of his report. In particular, the inquiry found that there was a lack of effective enforcement measures by the SIA, and this gives rise to considerable concerns about the readiness of the SIA to undertake this task. In previous groups, the Minister has said that one of the purposes of the two-year implementation period is to get the SIA ready for this much greater task. One of the points raised by the amendments in this group is that the SIA is compelled to consider other aspects of information which may be provided by local authorities. I suggest to the Committee that that is a useful and beneficial thing for the Bill to consider.
I am grateful to noble Lords for their amendments and contributions to the Committee. I think I have said already that guidance will be produced by the Home Office and by the Security Industry Authority. I do not need to go into the detail of that, as I have already covered it.
In relation to that, importantly, on Amendment 30, from the noble Baronesses, Lady Suttie and Lady Hamwee, besides investigations and enforcement, a primary function of the Security Industry Authority will be to advise, educate and support those who fall within scope of the legislation. That is part of its role. As well as the general overarching role, the SIA’s guidance will look at how it can exercise those new functions. It already plays a significant role in safeguarding the public, through the regulation of the private security industry. We believe that it has a wealth of experience in inspecting and enforcing legislation which better protects the public.
I accept that the regulator implementation programme, which is the nub of the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, is in the early stages of development. However, the Government are clear that we expect the SIA to engage in work with existing public safety bodies—this goes to the very point that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, endorsed—before this new regime comes into effect.
It is important that the provisions under Clauses 5 and 6 are set down, but they have a crossover of responsibility in certain areas, as the noble Lord and the noble Baroness indicated. Ultimately, the SIA has a responsibility to regulate the functions of this Bill. The guidance will ensure that that aligns with existing requirements, so far as is relevant to the SIA carrying out its regulatory functions. Therefore, while the amendment highlights this area, I hope it is one that is not developed further, because existing proposals in the Bill, and in the intention I have given, mean that the SIA has responsibilities which I hope are clear.
Amendment 31 would place a statutory duty on the SIA to consult with stakeholders in different sectors. The amendment would require the SIA to consult in relation to requirements at contiguous premises, premises within other premises, and areas within the vicinity of buildings. I hope I have already set out that we recognise the importance of communication and that understanding the impact on affected sectors is pivotal to ensuring effective implementation. This includes the operational guidance to be issued under Clause 12 by the SIA and the statutory guidance I have referred to several times issued by the Home Office under Clause 27. The Government do not expect that the SIA’s operational guidance will address matters specifically set out in the amendment, such as premises within premises, as it will relate to its functions.
Furthermore, it is already the Government’s clear expectation that the SIA should engage with relevant stakeholders on its guidance, where appropriate. “Relevant stakeholders” means a whole range of bodies, potentially including local authorities. Again, I hope that we do not need to place a statutory duty on the SIA, because that will be part of its core business, as directed by the Government under this legislation, in the event of it becoming law downstream.
Amendment 32 has been tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower. I hope I have given sufficient reassurance that the Home Office and the SIA recognise the value of engagement on the implementation of the important legislation before us. The department has already worked with local authorities as key stakeholders, and we expect that to continue. I know what the noble Lord’s intention is with this, but the question is whether we place a statutory duty on the SIA to notify local authorities of the guidance, as opposed to the SIA doing it as part of the general consultation.
The guidance will be published and will be publicly available. I am hoping that the SIA will give appropriate communications to accompany publication. This publication should be no surprise to local authorities, because, two years downstream, when it is potentially implemented, there will be plenty of opportunity to have that discussion.
Amendment 36A is in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. I understand that the intention is to clarify the purpose of Clause 27(4). As I have already set out, the Government are acutely aware of the need to provide help and support in complying with the requirements of the legislation through guidance under Clause 27.
Clause 27(4) applies where it is alleged in proceedings that a person has contravened a requirement imposed by Part 1 of the Bill. In such a case, the clause provides that the person may rely on proof they acted in accordance with this guidance as tending to establish that there was no such contravention. The intention of the clause is to provide comfort and reassurance to those responsible for qualifying premises and events, as it allows the person to rely on proof that they acted in accordance with the guidelines as showing them to have likely met the relevant requirements. It will not provide absolute proof but will be given the appropriate weight in proceedings, as the circumstances and other evidence must be. All of those things will be taken into consideration.
The noble Baroness’s Amendment 36A would put beyond doubt only that a person may adduce evidence to that end. The effect of this would be to provide a lesser level of protection to someone faced by allegations than is provided for by the current drafting. I do not believe that is the intention she had in tabling this amendment. Furthermore, the clause has precedent in other regulatory regimes, namely, the Building Safety Act 2022. Its inclusion recognises concern about the implementation of what would be a novel regime.
I hope that, with those explanations, noble Lords will not press their amendments at this stage and accept the comments I have made from this Front Bench.
I thank the Minister for that reply. As I said at the outset, these are primarily probing amendments from the live events sector, which wanted clarity on the coherence and the crossover between various regulatory bodies.
I will read Hansard and check what the Minister has said. What is clear is that there needs to be effective communication between the various bodies. There needs to be very clear guidelines and guidance for the organisations, so that they understand what is required of them. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment at this stage.
(10 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I have a sad sense of déjà vu, as this is a very real echo of the earlier Question from the noble Lord, Lord Balfe. I respect the insightful comments from noble Lords on that similar issue.
The whole country was unified last summer over the horror of events in Southport. It was indeed a brutal and senseless act of violence. We owe it to the memories of Alice, Bebe and Elsie to do everything we can as a society to ensure that such acts of brutality are not allowed to be repeated. Sadly, they appear to be repeating. We want communities to feel safe and individuals to go about their daily business, like Taylor Swift dance classes in the summer holidays, without fearing that there are dangerous people out there intent on hurting them.
It is deeply troubling that the Prevent learning review makes it clear that warning signs were missed in the lead up to that attack in Southport. These Benches have long raised concerns about the failures of Prevent. Indeed, as, the elected mayor of Watford when Prevent was first introduced, I remember the trouble that we had with our Muslim community in trying to get it to accept what Prevent was trying to do. It has had a very troubled journey through its many incarnations. For that reason, we welcome the decision to publish the learning review.
We also welcome the creation of the new Prevent commissioner. We are very pleased that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, will serve as interim commissioner. He is highly skilled and experienced in the complex issues that he will need to navigate that tricky road. I would welcome some details from the Minister on what powers the commissioner will have to enforce any recommendations and to ensure that they will be enacted. Recommendations must lead to actions and actions to swift, successful resolution with full transparency and accountability. Often, we do not have a very good track record in that regard.
Looking more widely, we have to ensure that our national security strategy is fit for purpose, given the wide range of threats we now face as a country. We clearly need to tackle extremist ideology, but not to forget those who are motivated not by any particular ideology, but rather by an obsession with violence or a hatred of society. Will the Minister say what the Government can do? What are they going to do to prevent people slipping through the net?
A point that often is not made is that we also have a duty of care to those individuals whom we ask to decide, for the safety of society, whether an individual is a threat to life. What is being done to support those people in that role? What training are they given to ensure that they can make the best possible decision on behalf of us all?
Finally, after the tragic murders in Southport last summer and the disorder on the streets afterwards, we saw communities coming together in far greater numbers to clean up the streets and affirm belief in something bigger than themselves. Protecting communities must be at the centre of everything that the Home Office does. What is being done to reassure the public that they remain safe from threats? What is being done to ensure that incidents such as this are not exploited by groups or individuals who would wish harm upon our communities?
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, and to the noble Baroness, Lady Thornhill, for their contributions. Like them, I want to start with the victims of this crime. They should be for ever in our thoughts when we deal with how we respond to these issues. Bebe, Elsie and Alice need to be remembered at all times. I remind the House that the perpetrator, whom I shall not name today, is now serving 52 years, a sentence passed by Mr Justice Goose in the Crown Court. That perpetrator will have a significant sentence as the result of the crimes he committed.
I am grateful for the welcome for the inquiry from the noble Lord, Lord Davies, and the noble Baroness, Lady Thornhill. The noble Lord asked me particularly about the timeline for the public inquiry. As the Home Office has already said, the inquiry will be non-statutory. We reserve the right to change it to a statutory inquiry if circumstances require. I hope that the noble Lord will know, because I have said this before, that the choice of chair, the terms of reference and the timeline for the inquiry are important matters that I will report back to this House on in due course.
Our first priority is to consult the families and the coroner who is undertaking a statutory duty in relation to this incident. We will therefore, at some point, be able to answer the noble Lord’s questions in a way that I cannot at the moment, but I commit to bringing this back to the House in due course.
The Home Secretary swiftly commissioned a review shortly after the murders which has brought forward 14 recommendations. The noble Lord, Lord Davies, mentioned two particular issues: data sharing and training. Recommendation 1 addresses data sharing and putting in place some measures to help with that. Recommendation 3 is about improving training. Having discussed the implementation of the 14 recommendations with officials, I can give a commitment that this House will have a report back by—I hope—this summer on the finalisation of those recommendations and the resulting practical action. The Government accept all 14 recommendations to be implemented in due course.
The noble Baroness and the noble Lord mentioned the appointment of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, who I am pleased to see in his place. I know he has a busy schedule looking at the issues we are discussing at the moment. The noble Baroness asked about the powers of the recommendations that the noble Lord may make. He is the interim commissioner. We have asked him to look at what happened in this case, and also to do a quick sprint on Prevent more generally. He, and whoever is appointed as the permanent commissioner, will have powers to make recommendations. I am still of the view that recommendations are to Ministers who will decide on those recommendations and be held accountable for them. I suspect that, in due course, there will be agreement on the outcome of any recommendations made. That will help to review independently, and to decide politically the way forward.
The noble Baroness also mentioned widening Prevent’s essentially terrorism role to look at other issues where people may have mental health challenges, be obsessed with violence or general hatred or have a whole range of other issues driving them that are not related to Islamist or far-right terrorism as we know them. We are looking at this and how it can be adopted. This is another issue that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, will look at in order to give what I hope will be a considered response to difficult and challenging issues.
Finally, the noble Baroness, Lady Thornhill, made a point about the community. What really impressed me about Southport after the attack was that the religious, civic and ordinary communities came together to reject the violence that had occurred in their town. They showed that the violence emanating from the violence in their town was also not acceptable or applicable and was rejected by the community. That was a valuable lesson. As political leaders, we need collectively to reject those who would exploit difficult issues for political ends. I am acutely aware that we have our political differences, but we should be standing together against terrorism, violence and the type of actions that led to the deaths of these three young girls.
I take some comfort from the response of the Southport community, while having to recognise that there are lessons to be learned because of mistakes that were made. As ever, those mistakes need to be rectified to ensure that we make positive change for the future. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, can assist the Government bringing his expertise to this area.
My Lords, this case, terrible as it is, shows the fine line that can exist at times between mental illness and terrorist offences, particularly where a single person is involved.
Prevent has struggled at times when police officers are trying to make decisions, based on intelligence or factual evidence, when mental illness is involved. I wonder whether the Minister might look at the unit in the Metropolitan Police called the Fixated Threat Assessment Centre. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, may consider it. It was created in 2006 and has about 20 people in it. It was designed to protect royalty against people who become fixated on them. It is led by psychologists and psychiatrists. It makes a medical assessment of the threat, rather than just a criminal assessment as a police officer might do. It has police officers and mental health nurses who are able to access data from the health service as well as from the police. That balanced approach can be quite helpful. Sometimes, the way forward might be treatment, sometimes it should be criminal investigation with the consequences that might follow. This process has been quite well established for about 20 years, but it has never extended beyond royalty-fixated threat assessment. I wonder whether we all might learn from it.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe; he brings immeasurable expertise in his contribution to this debate. I will say two things in response. First, the Prevent programme still has to focus primarily on people who are being radicalised through a range of means and pose threats on both Islamist and extreme right-wing fronts—that is the main focus. But, secondly, this case shows that there are potential areas where we need to look at other issues, including misogyny, concerns around violence and its worship generally, and people just wishing to inflict hate on society for a range of reasons that are not politically or culturally motivated. I take what the noble Lord said, as there may be lessons that we could learn from it. I would be very grateful to discuss—with both the Metropolitan Police and the noble Lord, if he wishes—how we can widen the debate on looking at potential areas. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, will look at how we can draw a wider circumference around the support mechanisms to help with cases that fall outside the broad areas of Prevent but which still lead to the types of actions that Prevent is designed to prevent.
I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister and others for understanding that not everything can be squeezed into the rubric of “terrorism”, with its ideological motive and so on. I will make a small point on a previous point my noble friend made in reference to the sentence of 52 years. It is quite important to remember, and for the public to understand, that this was, rightly, a life sentence with a minimum of 52 years before any consideration of release; one would not always get that information from reading the newspapers. I hope that my noble friend will forgive me for making that clear.
My noble friend is absolutely right. The 52 years is a minimum; it is a life sentence. Indeed, in his sentencing remarks, Justice Goose indicated that he felt that it was highly unlikely that the individual convicted would be released. That is a matter for well downstream. The concerns that we have around Prevent are things that we can resolve to stop that type of activity taking place in the future. As my noble friend knows, the reason a whole-life tariff was not imposed was because of the age of the perpetrator at the time of the event. I suspect that, if he had been older, a whole-life tariff may well have been given by the judge. My noble friend was right to add further definition to my comment, which was not meant to undermine in any way the sentence given.
My Lords, I declare my interests as set out in the register. My thoughts are with all those affected by this tragedy in Southport. I am sure that the Minister will accept that there is a big difference between the decision-makers involved in Prevent—who are referred over 19 cases a day, and therefore 7,000 cases a year—and a reviewing officer who is looking at one particular case with the benefit of hindsight. I share the concerns that the noble Baroness, Lady Thornhill, has about the decision-makers in such cases. Indeed, I do not think that it came out clearly in the review’s executive summary on the government website that, in this case, all the procedures and policies were followed by those involved in the decision-making. Therefore,
“it is the subjective decisions that have come into focus”.
Can the Minister explain how the Government will address the issues around subjective decision-making in such cases? Also, what does he think the impact will be on the considerable number of cases that these officers have to deal with now? Prevent is apparently expanding its definition to include a fascination with mass violence, in addition to concentrating on the areas of, say, Islamist and right-wing terrorism, which the Minister said the Government want Prevent officers to concentrate on.
I am grateful to the noble Lord and for the experience that he brings to this issue. He raised two points; I will first answer the latter one about the potential widening of the definition. We are dependent ultimately on further advice from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, downstream. As I mentioned to the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, it will still mean that the focus is on Islamist and extreme right-wing terrorism, because those two issues are the most extreme areas that we need to resolve and deal with; they are where most cases come from. In the light of that, there may be—as in the first part of his question—additional pressures on case officers to look at how they work with different types of activity, which they may not be used to working with to date and on which they may need further training and support.
I hope that the noble Lord will have a chance to look at the 14 recommendations in the executive summary. The second states:
“Further training should be considered regarding the circumstances where visits to individuals during the initial assessment can be conducted”.
That further training aspect, alongside the other 13 recommendations that we have now accepted and will implement by this summer, will look at the range of issues that the noble Lord mentioned in the first part of his question.
(10 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I listened carefully to the speeches which have been made. The noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, talked about sledgehammers cracking nuts; I slightly wonder whether that is what the amendments in this group would have the effect of doing. It is clear that for the qualifying premises—let us separate out the enhanced duty ones for a moment—what is being talked about is taking reasonably practical measures, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said, and that there should be appropriate public protection.
When I listened to the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley, I thought that it sounded as if, as an event organiser, he is already exemplary because he has thought about these things. I am sure that he has briefed the volunteers and the people around him about this. I slightly wonder why people have got so worked up about what the consequences and implications of all of this are.
If people want to know why there is this question of whether you invacuate or evacuate—whether you lock the doors or whatever—I am very taken by the accounts I heard of the Borough Market incidents. There were decisions which had to be made instantly as to whether to shut and barricade the doors or bring people in from outside. That assessment is going to be made on the spot, in an instant, but it is much better if the event organisers or the premises organisers have spent a bit of time thinking about it in advance, as clearly the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley, has done, briefing each other and considering the various “What ifs?”. There is no right or wrong answer in those cases; you have to make the best assessment, but you will always make a better one if you have thought about it in advance, worked out what the choices are and what drives them.
My other point is about Amendment 22 and the waiving of public protection procedures. This sounds like the sledgehammer to crack a nut, as referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron. A bureaucratic process will be set up whereby an events organiser or a premises organiser will make an application for a waiver to a public body, no doubt filling in lots of forms. Frankly, would it not be quicker just to do what the Bill asks: to make appropriate, reasonable arrangements? That is surely what is there and, if they are appropriate and reasonable, then the organisers will not have problems as a result of this Bill.
I am grateful to the noble Lords who have tabled these amendments because, self-evidently, they have generated a discussion on some important points. That is extremely valuable, not just as clarification today but for those who ultimately, should this Bill become an Act, have to implement it downstream, so I am grateful to noble Lords for them. If I may, I will try to deal with the amendments in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Sandhurst, first and then return to that of the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley, as a separate series in due course.
Amendment 20A from the noble Lords, Lord Davies and Lord Sandhurst, concerns the procedure under Clause 5 for preventing individuals entering or leaving premises or events. Clause 5 sets out some types of procedure, four in total, of which lockdown procedures may be used to reduce the risk of harm by moving people away from danger. I think the proposals in the legislation are dependent on the premises or event. They would potentially include locking doors, closing shutters or, in some cases, moving people to a safer part of the premise.
The noble Lord highlighted some examples in his contribution. If an armed attacker were outside a theatre, leaving doors open or unlocked would risk the attacker entering the premises. There could be a plan whereby, at certain events, a lockdown procedure would have to be activated to secure the auditorium against entry, such as locking the doors until the police arrive or securing the scene, which may reduce harm to staff and the audience. It might be a procedure relating to particular circumstance. It will vary according to the type of situation or attack.
In some cases—as my noble friend Lord Harris of Haringey mentioned, this happened in the event at Borough Market—a lockdown might help to save lives. In other cases, it might be more appropriate for people to flee. Statutory guidance will be published by the Home Office/SIA in due course to illustrate the Bill’s provisions, including on public protection measures. During the London Bridge attack—the noble Lord said that he wanted the Minister to give examples—some premises successfully executed a lockdown procedure and, in doing so, saved lives. That is really important to remember.
We are not being prescriptive. Going back to what my noble friend Lord Harris said, the public protection procedures in Clause 5(3)(a), (b), (c) and (d) set down the type of things that organisations and the responsible person need to think about and prepare for as part of a plan. With all due respect to the noble Lord, the changes he is proposing are not necessary because the Government consider that the requirements of the clause are appropriate as drafted. Again—we will come on to this issue in a moment, with other amendments in the name of the noble Lord—we are trying to be proportionate and reasonable.
On Amendment 21A, I suggest to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that proportionality is at the heart of the Bill as a whole. It is important to remind the Committee that this Bill has been through several iterations. It has been through consultation, drafting, a Home Affairs Select Committee, previous Government engagement and the engagement of this Government. Out of that, we want to get proportionate measures that ensure that in-scope premises and events take proportionate and appropriate steps.
It is about being reasonably prepared and prepared for risk—straying into what the Lord, Lord De Mauley, said—whatever the size or location of a premises. He is right that the majority of these attacks have taken place in urban areas at large venues, or in urban tarmacked areas. That is not to say that it will not happen elsewhere, that a terrorist group will not pick a farm event, a small village hall or another similar event.
That is why not just this Government, but the Government he supported, put in place the measures before us today. It is why the Bill went through a public inquiry, emerging from the recommendations of Sir John Saunders. It is why it went through the draft legislation process, and why the Commons Home Affairs Committee supported it on a cross-party basis, even though the majority of its members were from His Majesty’s Opposition. We are trying to be proportionate and reasonable, and the public protection procedures in Clause 5 are an important element of the Bill’s effectiveness and power.
I hope that assuages the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel. Again, we are trying to do something that is proportionate, achievable and relatively cost-effective. I have mentioned elsewhere the cost of the potential measures. We have estimated it at around £330 per year for the lower tier. That is not in terms of cash being paid out to anybody; that is our assessment of the potential costs that can be incurred. It is about good practice, good training, good support, making sure that we have evacuation and invacuation procedures, looking at the exits and entrances and what would happen, and making those assessments, while making sure that the responsible person knows what they are.
The Secretary of State could add further procedures if they consider that necessary, but I am straying into later amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich. I have some sympathy with those, and I hope that when we reach them—probably now on Monday—I will be able to give some comfort to the noble Lords, Lord Cameron and Lord Anderson, about the use of Henry VIII powers. However, we will deliver that at a slightly later date in the consideration of the Bill. Whatever happens, if there were any changes under the current proposals, they would be subject to the affirmative procedure, so this House and the House of Commons would have an opportunity to support or reject any changes brought forward by the Government as a whole.
On Amendment 23A, from the noble Lords, Lord Davies and Lord Sandhurst, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, again gave a reasonable level of support to the idea of a timeframe for any duty and consideration being put in place. Clause 7 places the legislative requirement on those responsible for enhanced duty premises and events to prepare and maintain a document that records important elements of their compliance. That is a valuable document that will help the regulator consider compliance. It should be provided to the Secretary of State via the Security Industry Authority as soon as is reasonably practical. This will enable the SIA to make an initial evaluation of the premises’ or event’s security approach and engage in meaningful discussion or engagement about any potential inspection.
There is no single standard type of premises or event. Some will have long-established premises with little change needed and some will have to make changes accordingly. To ensure that regulatory provisions work as effectively as possible for all, the document should be sent to the SIA at an early stage. However, at the moment, by providing a maximum timeframe of six months, the amendment may result in either inaccurate documents or material that is out of date being sent. It could hinder regulatory activity and it could hinder the provision of advice and help to strengthen the venues’ practices. But I have noted what the noble Lord said and what the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said in support. Although I do not wish to accept the amendment today, those points have been put on the record and we will obviously examine them in due course.
I turn to the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley. I genuinely understand his motivation to ensure that the Bill does not render it difficult to put on many events that are valuable for cultural, social, tourist and business purposes. I accept and understand that objective. The Bill as drafted has caused concerns that he has put on the record—which, again, I will examine because of his timeframe, and if he writes to me I will examine those concerns as well—that are founded on his belief that this will be damaging. But, in my view, the Bill sets down the issue that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and my noble friend Lord Harris of Haringey mentioned: procedures for public protection in place so far as is reasonably practical. In determining what is reasonably practicable, the responsible person—which may in this case indeed be him—will take into account their operating context and the particular circumstances of the premises or event. They will consider the appropriate procedures in the light of the cost and resources. That is the assurance I give him.
What we are asking for in the Bill, under the various clauses before us, is that he thinks, as I think he has tonight, about the consequences and about whether there is a threat; that he makes that assessment; that he makes the provisions; that he—or she—looks at whether those areas need to have that plan; that he makes sure that the volunteers in an organisation know about that plan; and that he makes sure, potentially, that the paid professionals he or she is dealing with look at and understand that plan. Accordingly, no procedure is required to be put in place at unreasonable cost to the responsible person, and in the measures in the clauses that he mentioned and expressed concern about, such as public protection measures, he will note that there is no mandating of those public protection measures or mention of scanners or other material. There is simply an assessment for the responsible person to organise accordingly.
The first condition in the noble Lord’s amendment for the grant of a waiver is therefore unnecessary. Furthermore, it is anticipated that developing and implementing these procedures should be simple, for cost and staff time. Some of the actions required as part of the procedure could be as simple as locking doors, closing shutters and identifying a safe route to cover. Some of the areas that he has mentioned, such as open-air events, will qualify under the Bill only if they have the requirements in earlier clauses—a building, or a paid entry or exit or ticketing system. Again, I accept that some of the events that he referred to in his contribution may have that, but the whole purpose of the Government’s proposals—which I remind him was shared by the previous Government in broad terms—is to provide good practice, a framework and a consideration for somebody responsible to think of a plan in the event of a terrorist attack.
I assure the noble Lord that this is not about preventing a terrorist attack. That is the job of the police, to whom I pay tribute, the Security Service, to which I pay tribute, and the myriad organisations trying to make sure that we stop bad people doing bad things before they ever get to the stage of doing them. But, sadly, he will know that the risk is always there. The security services try to do this every day of the week, but there may be occasions when something difficult and challenging happens, and this Bill is about what happens when that begins. It is about mitigating the risk, having that plan and proposals in place, and having those public protection measures to stop an attack and reduce the vulnerability in that place.
I genuinely understand the noble Lord’s intention and I look forward to receiving his letter and giving him a full response to it. I hope that I can assure him that the Government’s objective is to put good practice in place at minimal cost and ensure that those people who have a responsibility for an event transmit the evacuation protection plans to those who can impact those plans in the event of that split-second moment, as my noble friend Lord Harris of Haringey said, when a daily event of enjoyment, pleasure and fun suddenly sees, in its immediate effect, a terrorist attack under way. We are trying to ensure that the split-second decisions that saved lives in Borough Market are thought about beforehand to save lives in the event of an attack.
I would love to assure the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley, that no attack would ever take place at the Caerwys Agricultural Show in my former constituency, for example, or at a scout gathering somewhere else, but I cannot. We will stop it upstream when we can but, in the event of an attack happening, we are asking whether the people on the ground know what to do. That is what the Bill is about, and that is why I urge him to write to me and not to press his amendments this evening, as, indeed, I urge the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Sandhurst. Their points are well made and they will continue to be considered, not just during the passage of the Bill but, crucially, when Royal Assent is achieved. The two-year period that we have to implement the Bill is the time when the guidance and discussion that the noble Lord seeks will be part of the consideration of this, I hope, successful and productive legislation.
(10 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberI am grateful to my noble friend Lord Faulkner of Worcester, the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, and His Majesty’s Opposition’s Front-Bench spokesman, the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for their contributions to this debate. My noble friend first drew my attention to his concerns during the pre-discussion of the Bill, as well as at Second Reading. I wrote to him on his concerns prior to Christmas. I hope that I can again assuage his concerns expressed in the discussions we have had this evening.
Amendment 10 seeks to ensure that railway vehicles, such as trains, that are temporarily stopped at a station are excluded from the assessment of the number of individuals that it is reasonable to expect from time to time at railway stations. I hope I can give my noble friend some assurance that a train that stops at a station as part of its journey does not form part of the station premises. Clause 2(2), which sets out what a qualifying premises is, states that the site must consist of
“a building or a building and other land”.
If I can put it this way, the train has a temporary interaction with the station as it passes through—rather like it does when I travel through Crewe on a regular basis—but the passengers on the train are not “present on the premises” for the purposes of the definition of qualifying premises. The train and the building are completely separate. A train in use as a train is a vehicle, which is not a building, so the train will not form qualifying premises in its own right either. I therefore hope that Clause 2 is sufficiently clear on what constitutes a premises.
Amendment 12 looks at the definition of a railway station in Schedule 1, which has been drawn from Section 83 of the Railways Act 1993—on which I served at the time; that takes me back 32 years, which is a long time ago—which in turn stems from Section 67 of the Transport and Works Act 1992. A station may include some or all parts of the premises that this amendment appears designed to remove. Furthermore, the words that the amendment would remove are a non-exhaustive list. These areas are already capable of falling within the definition if they are used in connection with the station.
I hope my noble friend will understand why I do not think it appropriate to change the definition for the purposes of this legislation, as it may remove some parts of a station which may form part of its premises. Where there is not already a legislative requirement comparable to the Bill, it is the Government’s intention to include such of those parts within scope where they properly form part of the premises for the purpose of the Bill’s objectives. Again, the building and the rail are separate entities.
For station premises which fall under Clause 2, the parts that the amendment seeks to exclude may form part of the premises and therefore may be relevant to taking forward public protection procedures or public protection measures, as far as is reasonably practicable. I know from previous exchanges I have had with my noble friend that this amendment seeks to exclude the specified parts of a station premises in order to provide greater clarity that these would not feature in an assessment of the numbers of persons it is reasonable to expect at a station premises. Locations such as a forecourt or a car park are usually transient locations. It would be difficult to envisage a scenario whereby a car park would have great significance to an assessment of the number of individuals present on the premises.
Therefore, I recognise the intention behind my noble friend’s amendment, but I do not consider it an appropriate approach. I therefore hope that I have assuaged his concerns.
It may be helpful if I put Amendments 16, 17 and 18 in context by setting out the Government’s approach to the application of the Bill to transport premises. Where a transport premise satisfies the Clause 2 premises criteria, it is considered that it is comparable to other publicly accessible premises that the Bill captures, and it is appropriate and necessary, therefore, to include it within the Bill’s scope. Paragraphs 11 and 12 of Schedule 1, therefore, include definitions of relevant transport premises for this purpose.
It is expected that, for example, some airports, railway stations and bus stations will, under the definition in the Bill, be qualifying premises required to take forward the Bill’s requirements. This is considered appropriate, given that the security of the public at those premises is of equal importance to that of the public at, for example, an entertainment centre or a large retail premise. However, paragraph 4 of Schedule 2 excludes those transport premises that are already subject to existing requirements to consider and mitigate terrorist threats. To do otherwise would confuse and duplicate burdens on operators and give no additional public protection benefits. Excluded premises therefore include airports, national rail and underground premises, international rail premises and port facilities, as described in the schedule.
I turn to Amendment 16 specifically, which I know is of concern to my noble friend. Where there are premises that are shared—for example, where a national rail and a heritage railway station are concurrent or form part of the premises—there may be parts of those premises that are subject to legislative requirements related to mitigating terrorist threats, and parts that are not. If there are premises, or parts of premises, that meet the Clause 2 criteria and are not subject to existing legislative requirements, it is considered that they should meet the requirements of the Bill.
I want to pay tribute to the volunteers and those who run heritage railways. The Llangollen heritage railway is not too far from where I live. The Government consider heritage railways, as described by my noble friend, as primarily visitor attractions that help support tourism and the local economy rather than necessarily means of transportation in themselves. They are, by their definition, very different from the rest of the rail network, which is already required to have appropriate security procedures and measures in place.
As such, it is not considered appropriate that parts of the heritage railway premises at shared or joint stations should automatically be excluded from the scope of the Bill where equivalent safety provisions are not already in place. To do so would mean there would be no requirement for parts of these premises to consider appropriate security procedures and measures, and the security of the public at heritage railway centres is just as important as at any other premise within scope of the Bill.
In previous discussions and exchanges with noble Lords, I have emphasised very strongly that the measures required for the above-200 premise in Clause 5 are important but not onerous measures, and ones that volunteers at railway stations or elsewhere would wish to adopt as good practice, as well as being a legal requirement under the Bill. Evacuating individuals, moving them to a place of safety, preventing them from entering or leaving premises and giving them information, is all good practice, but with the legislative back-up of the Bill.
So I hope that the distinction between trains as trains on the move, and buildings as buildings, is one where my noble friend can understand where the Government are coming from and accept. I hope that is sufficient to persuade him and the triumvirate of noble Lords who raised these concerns not to press the amendment. I can see that the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, wishes to contribute, so I will certainly let him.
I am grateful to the Minister. Is he able to say anything on the points I raised about the secondary powers that the Bill brings about and grants to the Secretary of State to vary some of the conditions, and particularly how that would relate to organisations such as those in the heritage rail sector that are reliant on a large number of volunteers? Would he accept that there is a difference between a business that has an employee who has an ongoing responsibility for following changes in the law that the Secretary of State makes through secondary powers and the burden that is imposed on organisations where volunteers have to keep abreast of changing laws? They may be following closely the deliberations on the primary Act, but the Act provides for a number of secondary powers that would be more difficult for them to follow than an organisation with full-time employees.
I accept that there will be requirements for guidance. Again, the purpose of the Government is to ensure that we have that guidance in place, and that will be circulated via the Security Industry Association in due course. I hope that will help. The Secretary of State’s powers will be subject to further amendments and discussion later on. Hopefully, I will be able to give some assurances on that.
I thought my time was over, which is why I was sitting down, but instead I shall turn to Amendment 17. By virtue of Section 119 of the Railways Act 1993, such requirements as requested in Amendment 17 apply to railway stations in Great Britain. However, as my noble friend said, Section 119 of the Railways Act does not extend to Northern Ireland. Therefore, where there are stations within the Northern Ireland Railways network that meet the Clause 2 criteria, I consider it appropriate that the Bill is applied to those stations accordingly.
On Amendment 18, I understand from my noble friend’s explanatory statement that the intention behind it is to exclude stations or parts of stations that are not buildings. There are some important factors to consider regarding that intention. First, to be a qualifying premise within the scope of the Bill, the premises must consist of a building or buildings or the land, and if there are stations or indeed premises that do not meet this condition, they would not be qualifying premises. The formulation of the Bill at Clauses 2 and 3 is to capture premises where there is control and ownership of that venue, not to capture freely accessible open spaces. However, there are obviously many premises that are constituted of a building or of the land that fall under premises defined in Clauses 2 and 3. Where that is the case, it is our intention that those parts of premises that constitute land with a building should be in scope. To exclude those premises at stations or other premises would have a detrimental effect on the aims of the Bill.
Again, I draw all noble Lords back to the basic premise of the Bill, which is to provide a basic floor for conditions for premises over 200 and over 800 where we have the appropriate requirement to ensure that we put in protections in the event of an attack on those premises. I hope my noble friends Lord Faulkner and Lady Ritchie, if she is here, will see the consequences of what I have said. As such, I cannot support the amendment, but I hope I have explained the reasons why.
My Lords, I start by expressing my deep appreciation to the noble Lords, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay and Lord Davies of Gower, on the Benches opposite. I think their speeches will be read with great enthusiasm by the members of the Heritage Railway Association, and I am sure that both of them will be welcome at any heritage railway for the next year at least, for understanding so clearly the contribution the heritage railways make to the tourist economy and in terms of increasing general well-being and satisfaction. I thank them very much.
I also thank my noble friend the Minister. I think we are edging towards an understanding where it may be possible to achieve what the Government want to do, while at the same time not jeopardising the financial circumstances of a sector that is finding life very tough, as the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, pointed out.
Some of the answers that my noble friend gave right at the end of his speech are quite technical—I hope he does not mind my saying that—and I am going to read those with great care and take some advice on them. Again, I welcome his support for the principle behind my amendments. Whether or not we come back on Report is a matter for further discussion, but for the moment I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
I am grateful for the efforts of noble Lords in tabling the amendments we are considering and the points they have raised. The intention of the Bill is to provide a framework for security in the event of a terrorist attack: that is its prime focus. I recognise that there will be pressures on volunteers to come to the table on these provisions, but it is part of the scope of the Bill to ensure that happens and there is good practice.
I can assure the Committee that as part of the development of the Bill, both the current Government and the previous Government have carefully considered where it is appropriate to exclude premises and events from its scope. In particular, we have taken into account the potential impact on smaller community and grass-roots premises. For the reasons the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, mentioned, we have to draw that line in relation to the Bill as a whole.
On Amendments 13 and 15 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, the Government are conscious that there are many types of premises used for sports activities with different operating models. That is why we have made revisions to the previous draft version of the Bill to distinguish between sports premises which are open to the public to access freely and those where there is some form of control of entry, whether a ticket check, swipe card access or other.
Schedule 2 to the Bill excludes open-air premises which might otherwise be captured. This includes parks, sports grounds and open-air premises used for recreation or leisure where there are no measures to control access. The noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, gave me a number of examples, including the boat race, as it involves buildings and tow paths. I will reflect on his examples. My gut feeling is that buildings are covered, but tow paths and other associated provisions are not, except if—as mentioned in the Bill—payment is made, invitations or passes to access are issued, or individuals must be members or guests of a club or association to gain access. I will reflect on his points, however, and prior to Report—which will not be too far hence—I will make sure the noble Lord has a letter in his hand. He can then decide whether to take action on Report or be satisfied; I hope, of course, it will be the latter.
I have the concern that under the noble Lord’s proposals to remove paragraph 3(2)(d) of the schedule, a non-league football match, such as at Flint Town United in the town I live in, with 8,000 people attending, would be out of scope and its security not considered. That is unacceptable, because the amendments could leave only a few hundred premises across the United Kingdom within scope. Again, the purpose of this legislation is to ensure that we put in a basic minimum, which is to provide protection in the event of an attack and steps that can be taken by the associated individual. That is the bottom line, and sometimes it causes reflections that the noble Lord has made.
The costs were touched on by a number of noble Lords. We have estimated that for a standard duty premises the costs will be around £330 per year. That is not cash up front being paid externally; it might just be an assessment of the time involved by volunteers to undertake the training and be the responsible person. Again, there is a judgment to be made, and we have made the judgment that that is a right level of approach. Noble Lords have expressed concerns about that, but I do not think it will reduce the level of volunteers. Nor, having looked at the impact assessment from the Home Office, do I share the concerns that the penalties set out in paragraph 68, for example—which I agree are heavy—will put people off, because we are trying to instil into the system a level of good practice. Downstream, undoubtedly, that will not be administered as a day one fine—there will be discussion between the authority and the regulated premise in due course. I hope that will not put individuals off, but the noble Lord has made his point.
The noble Lord mentioned that officials have drawn up the impact assessment. I pay tribute to the officials for doing that, as they have worked hard, but he will note that the signature on the bottom is of the Security Minister, Dan Jarvis. Political leadership takes responsibility for this document and will continue to do so with the support of officials downstream.
On Amendments 14 and 19 from the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley, the noble Lord himself mentioned that he thinks they need to be reflected on. I will take his word for that and give him the encouragement to reflect on them still further. The Bill sets out that open-air premises which might otherwise be caught are excluded, but he can reflect on his amendments and, if he feels that he wishes to bring them back on Report, a recrafted amendment could be tabled, should he wish to do so. That is his decision and his call in due course.
If I may, I will reflect on all the comments made by noble Lords. There were some detailed questions about the pavilion and reflections on that. I hope that noble Lords will understand that we are trying to achieve a baseline, and we want clarity on that, because clarity means that it serves a purpose so volunteers and others will take the right approach, the SIA will know what it is monitoring, and Ministers and this House will be accountable for the performance. I will reflect on all the points that have been made and, if clarity is required, then we will try and ensure that it happens. I will write to Members and, if noble Lords feel that that clarity is not present in my correspondence, then there will be opportunities later in the day to take action accordingly. With that, I hope noble Lords will not press their amendments.
I thank the Minister for that comprehensive reply. We both share the overall objectives; of that there is no doubt, and I think that applies to everybody in the Committee. I hope that, in addition to the letter, the Minister will give consideration with his colleagues to sector-specific guidance. That would be very helpful in the context of the sport and recreation world.
I should mention that, if this Bill receives Royal Assent, as I hope it will, then there is that potential two-year implementation period, and we will be looking clearly at guidance to make sure that the wishes of the legislation are reflected in how it can be implemented by a range of organisations.
I appreciate that. By “sector-specific”, I was talking about the sport and recreation world, so I hope that that is also taken into consideration by the Minister. My biggest concern by far is the community amateur sports clubs—the CASCs—the volunteers, and the grass-roots sportsmen and sports-women in this country who give so much of their time voluntarily.
We will go away and consider the response that the Minister has kindly given the Committee. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment standing in my name.
(10 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this has been a short debate on Amendment 1. If the Committee will indulge me, I am keen to very briefly set out an overall approach from these Benches to Committee stage. I reiterate that we support the Bill. We recognise that families and survivors have already had to wait a very long time to get this important legislation on the statute book, but we believe it is also important to get clarity on certain areas of the Bill and to probe the thinking behind some of the drafting, so that it can be the best Bill possible. I also pay tribute to Figen Murray and the campaign team. They have done an amazing job, but there remain areas in the Bill that are very much a framework. Greater clarity, as well as reassurances from the Minister, would be helpful.
I totally agree with the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, regarding Amendment 1. In fact, I was sitting in my office this afternoon thinking, “Isn’t that exactly what the Long Title of the Bill says, so what is the added purpose?”. I listened carefully to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, but I am afraid that I too did not really hear the additional purpose of his amendment. As I see it, the purpose of the Bill is about public confidence and public protection, as well as the protection of premises. In other words, it should be about people as well as just premises.
As the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said, it is about people taking responsibility for themselves. It is about making sure that people feel safer when they go to a venue or an event. On Saturday, I happened to go to a theatre in central London where I was asked to open up my rucksack. I also went to a very small private museum on Sunday, staffed by volunteers, where I was not only asked to show my rucksack but had it confiscated and put in a locker. These things do not necessarily cost money, since at that museum they were volunteers.
The Bill should be about introducing measures that minimise the risks, making sure that venues and events have a plan in place and a person responsible for implementing that plan
“to reduce the vulnerability of the premises”
as it says in the Long Title of the Bill. The Bill is also about making sure that there is a plan in place in the tragic event that an attack happens. One of the main problems that I see with this amendment is that it sets out only part of what the Bill aims to do. Yes, the Bill is about protection of premises from terrorism, but it is also about having plans in place to minimise the number of casualties in the extremely unfortunate case that an attack occurs. We should remember that people who are involved in an attack have injuries for life—and not just physical injuries. They can also have emotional and mental health injuries. For that reason, from these Benches, I am afraid that we cannot support this amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful for this short debate on Amendment 1 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower. He was right, at the start, to remind us of the reason why this Bill has been put in place, as did the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst. That is because of attacks on Borough Market, on Manchester Arena and on London Bridge. The noble Lord, Lord Davies, mentioned a death today in Sheffield, about which I pass on my sympathies to the family. I cannot comment in any more detail at this time, but ongoing investigations will take place.
I understand the intention of the amendment, but, if I may, the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, and my noble friend Lord Harris of Haringey have endorsed what I would have said from this Front Bench about the Bill. The Bill has a Long Title, which I which will not read for the convenience of the House, but it is on the face of the Bill, and that is relatively clear as to what the purpose of the Bill is. The Bill is designed, as has been mentioned by a number of noble Lords, to ensure that premises and events in scope are better prepared for an act of terrorism, should one occur. We have taken some expert advice on what that should be, and the consideration is that there are certain measures that could be put in place which, if they were in place prior to a terrorist attack occurring, could potentially save lives.
For ease of Members, although we are jumping ahead slightly, I refer them to Clause 5, which sets down a number of public protection measures that are required. This goes to the heart of what of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, mentioned about what we should do in the event of an attack. In Clause 5, the Bill sets down a range of measures, including
“evacuating individuals from the premises … moving individuals to a place on the premises or at the event where there is less risk of physical harm … preventing individuals entering or leaving the premises or event … providing information to individuals on the premises or at the event”.
They are specifically in Clause 5 and, later on, in Clause 6, setting out clear objectives for both public protection procedures and measures. Those procedures are designed to reduce the risk of physical harm being caused to individuals if an act of terrorism were to occur.
I am straying into the sort of Second Reading debate area that we have had, which I do not want to do, but the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, and others mentioned the issues around the scope of the Bill, the cost of the Bill and other issues there. We have taken a measured approach and have made some changes, based on consultation, raising the level of the threshold in the Bill from 100 to 200, with a later second tier of 800. That will reduce the number of venues taken into the scope of the Bill from 278,900 down to 154,600, with 24,000 in the higher tier; so we are cognisant of the fact that there were, potentially, a number of areas where that would have brought a lot more premises into scope and created much more difficulty for people.
What we are trying to do with this legislation is to establish the principle that we have requirements in place which are there for low-level training and support for individuals to be able to understand what happens in the event of a terrorist attack. Again, I said at Second Reading that, downstream, we have to undertake a lot more work to prevent any attacks in the first place; but, in the event that one happens at a premise in scope, we have to ensure that measures, as in Clauses 5 and 6, are in place. I think that the Explanatory Notes, the Long Title and the clauses that I have mentioned meet those objectives, but that is for the Committee to determine.
I will add one more point, if I may. The noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, talked about the two-year period for implementation. By all means, let us have a debate about that downstream, but, again, what this Committee is trying to do—and what the Government are trying to do in supporting this House and supporting the objectives of Figen Murray and the campaign—is to make sure that the measures in place are effective; are implemented in an effective way; have proper oversight and regulation from, as we will discuss later, the Security Industry Authority; and that we give consideration to all other bodies impacted by the Bill to allow time for them to undertake the training, undertake and understand the legislation and put preparations in place.
My Lords, I have three brief points to make in response to this rather interesting short debate. My first point relates to Amendment 20, in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. As my noble friend said, it is very much a probing amendment that resulted from organisations that organise events and have premises but are unclear as to the definition. They are people who want to do the right thing but want a greater explanation on the record from the Government as to what it actually means in practice.
My second point continues the flattery of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. If the noble and learned Lord is asking a question, I feel it is one that has to be answered. He is asking the right question although, as he acknowledges, perhaps he has not come up with the right answer yet in terms of the wording. I hope the Government will return to this before Report with some of the suggested wording, taking on board the various points that have been raised.
My third and final point relates to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. In many ways, the noble Baroness hits the nail on the head; we should not let the terrorists win. But that is what the Bill is about: it is about getting the balance right between not letting terrorists win and yet letting the public feel safe to go to events and public buildings and not worry, because they know that somebody, somewhere has thought about what to do in the case of an attack.
That was an interesting group. I thank noble Lords for tabling the amendments; they are worthy of discussion and I hope I can answer each point in turn.
Essentially, there are two issues: the definition of “building” and the definition of “immediate vicinity”. I will try to answer the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Suttie, in their amendments.
Amendment 2, in the name of the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord De Mauley, seeks to amend the definition of “premises” in Clause 2(2) so that the term “building” refers to the definition at Section 121 of the Building Act 1984. The Bill has carefully defined qualifying premises and qualifying events to ensure that it is able to appropriately catch the wide range of premises and events that there are, and the definition in the Building Act sadly does not align with this.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, sort of stole my notes on this, because she commented that the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, includes a number of moveable objects, such as transport items and transport purposes. I confess I did not know that before the amendment was tabled, but research helps on these matters. Having looked at what the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, has said, there are parts of the definition in the Bill that are not replicated in the Building Act. The term “building” is commonly used and the Bill relies on this ordinary meaning. We do not want to over-define terms that are already well understood, particularly where doing so may create confusion or indeed loopholes.
For those reasons, as mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, the extension to transport objects—including hovercraft—means that the definition of “building” in Section 121 of the Building Act 1984 is not really appropriate for this definition today. I hope the noble Lord can accept that and I hope my comment reflects what has been said in Committee today.
I turn now to Amendment 3, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead. It was interesting, and I understand the intention of his amendment. I have not been in this House long, but I sense that the noble and learned Lord’s contributions are ones the House listens to; so I understand and accept the point he has brought forward today.
Clause 2(2)(b) specifies that “qualifying premises” must be wholly or mainly used for one or more of the uses specified in Schedule 1. These uses cover activities where the premises are accessible to or used by the public. I hope I can reassure the noble and learned Lord that temporary buildings can form part of such premises. I hope that will give him the reassurance he seeks in relation to his amendment.
The amendment would extend the scope of Clause 2 to include temporary buildings or structures even if they are not a feature of the usual activities undertaken at the premises. For example, where a field is not in scope, erecting a very temporary structure for the purposes of an event, such as an annual village fete, could draw the field into scope of Clause 2 under this amendment. It may not normally meet the conditions elsewhere, by the very nature of the building being put up, but it would then be drawn into scope by his amendment.
The Government are mindful of the many temporary and one-off events that occur across the UK, many of which will draw large crowds and consist of temporary structures such as tents and staging areas. It is the Government’s intention to capture these events under Clause 3. We have carefully designed the criteria to do so, in a way that strikes a balance between achieving public protection and avoiding undue burden on businesses, organisations and local communities, as we have heard from a number of noble Lords, again including the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst.
To that end, we are not looking to legislate for all events and Clause 3 carefully clarifies this. As such, open access events that do not have such checks in place will not be in scope of the Bill. The Government do not consider it appropriate or practical for events that do not have these types of controls and boundaries in place to be in scope. Again, I understand why the noble and learned Lord tabled his amendment, but I hope that on reflection he can accept the points I have made and will not take his amendment further.
Amendment 20 is important, because it asks for genuine clarification. I hope I can give clarification to both noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Suttie, on this amendment, which seeks to examine the meaning of “immediate vicinity”. I want to first reassure that the duties under the Bill do not require responsible persons to implement procedures or measures that are beyond their control. Self-evidently, there are some things in the immediate vicinity that will be beyond their control: for example, erecting safety equipment on pavements or other land for which they are not responsible outside the premises.
As I have already set out, the purpose of the Bill is to require people in control of qualifying premises and events to take steps aimed at reducing the risk of physical harm to people in the event of a terrorist attack that might directly impact their venue. An act of terrorism close to a building may also result in physical harm to people inside that building, as well as to people queuing, entering, exiting or even just passing by. Therefore, when considering appropriate procedures and measures to reduce physical harm from, and vulnerability to, terrorism, it is right that duty holders also think about what they should do for their premises in the event of an attack taking place just outside.
We have not deliberately chosen not to define “immediate vicinity” for the purposes of this Bill. The Bill relies on what we term the ordinary meaning of those words. What constitutes the immediate vicinity of a premises or event will depend on its specific circumstances. If the Bill were prescriptive and, for example, to stipulate a certain distance from the premises, it would undermine the flexibility with which requirements can apply to a range of venues in an array of different places. For example, the procedures appropriate for an inner-city pub are likely to be quite different from those for a sprawling visitor attraction in the countryside.
I am grateful. Will the Minister undertake to think again on the point I made about certainty when you meet resistance from people with a temporary facility wondering whether they have to go through all the trouble and expense of complying with the measures in the Bill. The problem is that it is quite easy for a lawyer to construct an argument to point to the Building Safety Act, which says that “building” means any “permanent or temporary” building. It does not say that here, so it raises a question as to whether temporary things are covered at all. The way to cut out that argument completely is to include those few words, which I am not sure would do any harm at all to the Bill.
I am not asking for an answer now, but I would be grateful if the Minister would consider very carefully whether there is an advantage in certainty, given that it is important that these measures are capable of being enforced, to avoid arguments going round in circles as to what “building” really means.
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord. I have tried to impress on the Committee that we think that the type of circumstance that the noble and learned Lord has suggested is covered by the Bill. I will obviously examine Hansard and the contributions again in the light of the discussion, but I remain convinced that the Bill meets the needs that the noble and learned Lord is concerned about. However, reflection is always a good thing and I will certainly examine his comments in detail.
I had a sense of a looming intervention from the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, before I sit down, but I am obviously just generally nervous of his potential interventions coming my way.
I hope I have satisfied noble Lords and the noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Suttie. With that, I hope that the amendments are not pressed. I will look at Hansard and at the comments made.
My Lords, I will not try to answer any points about Amendment 20. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, mentioned it but did not really emphasise whether his amendment, or a similar amendment referring to temporary structures, would do any harm in this context. I do not think it would, but it is a discussion that we should have.
The Minister is quite right to be wary of any body language demonstrated by the noble Lord sitting immediately opposite me—you never know what is coming.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, has made his case and I have made mine. His words are always worthy of examination, and that I will do.
My Lords, Section 30 of the Building Safety Act 2022 or Section 121 of the Building Act 1984, that is the question.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, makes some strong points, particularly in regard to whether it is capable of enforcement. That is an extremely important point. A number of other important points have been made by noble Lords. The point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, about people attending events without having to worry and having a relaxed time is very important. The noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, makes an extremely helpful point about wanting a good definition, which includes collapsible buildings, and he talked about circuses with up to 500 people. All in all, this is a definition that requires some further discussion. The noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, is right that it is for the Government to come forward with a definition that satisfies us all. On that basis, perhaps we can go away, have a discussion, and come back at Report with something that satisfies all of us. For the time being, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 11, standing in my name, as well as Amendments 4 and 9 in the name of my noble friend Lord Sandhurst.
Amendment 11 seeks to establish an exemption for premises which have been assessed to be in a low-risk category by an independent assessor. As the Minister knows, we have concerns about which premises will be required to implement security measures under the Bill, and we feel that there should be some flexibility for the premises that are affected by it.
It may be that the correct flexibility would be delivered by Amendment 22, in the name of my noble friend Lord De Mauley, which will be debated later in Committee, or by Amendment 8, in the name of my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth. However, the overriding point here is that there must be some flexibility in approach.
Not all premises that are currently caught by the Bill are in need of these additional measures, and it equally may be the case that the Bill as drafted will miss a number of premises that are in need of them. We hope the Government will listen to these concerns and engage positively so that we can ensure that the right premises are required to put in place the appropriate measures to protect the public from the risks of terrorism. This amendment would make this judgment an independent one, taking the discretion out of the responsibility of the department and giving premises that are at low risk access to a route to exemption. I will listen carefully to the Minister’s remarks in response to this debate, and I hope he will engage with me as we seek to deliver the flexibility I have spoken about today.
I will now speak to Amendments 4 and 9 in the name of my noble friend Lord Sandhurst, which seek to clarify the Bill’s language around the frequency of a premises breaching the capacity threshold. As drafted, the Bill says that the measures will apply when a premises reaches the threshold in the Bill “from time to time”. This is far too vague, and the organisations affected by the Bill need clarity now. My noble friend Lord Sandhurst has rightly seized on this point and argued forcefully for the need for clarity today. While I expect that the Minister will tell us that this can be addressed through guidance, it is important we get clarity in the Bill.
To establish a way forward, I ask the Minister to set out what timeframe the Government expect to appear in the guidance. If the Government can answer that question today, can he explain why that timeframe cannot appear in the legislation itself? It is our view that setting the timeframe in law would give businesses and other organisations which will be regulated under the Bill certainty that this definition will not be altered through guidance. I hope the Minister can see how the lack of clarity on this point in legislation could leave space for the timeframe to be changed over time, which could see more venues caught by the rules than is appropriate, and Parliament would have no input in that process.
As I said in the opening debate in Committee, the seriousness of the issues involved in this Bill means we must get the legislation right. We will listen carefully to the Minister’s response to this probing amendment and look to table constructive amendments to Clause 2 where necessary at Report.
I am again grateful to noble Lords for the constructive way in which they have approached the amendments before us. If I may, I shall start with Amendment 11, which is in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, and which was spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley. The first and foremost point I want to make on Amendment 11 is the one that is made to me as Minister by the security services. The threat to the United Kingdom from terrorism is currently substantial. Terrorists may choose to carry out attacks at a broad range of locations of different sizes and types, as attacks across the UK and around the world have shown. As I have explained during the passage of the Bill, the Bill is not about preventing terrorist attacks—that is the job of our security services and the police. The objective of the Bill is to ensure that public protection procedures and measures are put in place to reduce the risk of physical harm if an attack occurs and the vulnerability of premises and events to attacks.
The key point for the noble Lord is that this is not related to the particular premise or a particular time, be it rural or not and inside or outside the scope of the Bill. It is about ensuring that the threat, which is substantial, is recognised, and that can happen at any premise and at any time. That is why we believe the amendment to be well-intended but not in keeping with the objectives of the legislation, so the Government cannot support Amendment 11 for those reasons. If the Government took a position on setting a size threshold in the Bill and considered the noble Lord’s amendment the right approach, we would end up discarding a large number of premises that could, due to the threat being substantial, be subject to attack. That point was made very clearly by the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, in her contribution.
Amendments 4 and 9 have been tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst. They would change the provision of Clauses 2(2)(c) and 2(3)(a), which provide that, to be in scope as qualifying premises, 200 or more individuals must be reasonably expected to be present on the premises at the same time in connection with uses under Schedule 1 “from time to time”, as we have stated. The amendments proposed by the noble Lord would change “from time to time” to refer to the number of individuals expected “not less than once a month”. This would change both the number and range of premises caught by the Bill either at all or at enhanced duty premises.
The Government’s intention in bringing forward the Bill is to ensure that we examine that, where significant numbers of people gather at premises, steps have been taken to protect them against terrorism. This should be the case whether the relevant thresholds are met on a daily or monthly basis or less frequently. An assessment based on the number of people expected at least once a month would not take into account the myriad ways in which different premises are used and attendances fluctuate over the course of a year. For example, there is the seasonal nature of sports grounds and visitor attractions, and a monthly assessment would take those premises out of the equation.
Therefore, I hope the noble Lord is again offering me a probing amendment to examine, but I cannot support its current phraseology.
We are trying not to define what “from time to time” is because, for example, if a premise on one day of the year met the threshold, that would be from time to time, or it might be monthly or daily. The amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, would mean a prescriptive assessment on a monthly basis, and that in my view would not be sufficient, given the substantial level of the threat.
I understand the difficulty that the Minister is in, but the point I am trying to make is that it is important that those operating the premises know what they are required to do. Unless they know what “from time to time” means, it is very difficult for them to do that.
Without straying into other parts of the Bill, I would hope that people and premises that fall within scope of the Bill, be it a 200 or an 800 threshold, would have clarity over their responsibility areas. If they look at Clause 5, “Public protection procedures”, they will know exactly what is required of them for those public protection matters that fall within the scope of the Bill. So, whether it is “from time to time” as in one day a year or as in every week or every month, if we are more prescriptive, as would be the case under the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, we would take out a number of premises that—even if it was only one day a year, as the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley, mentioned—would still meet the criteria of the scope of the Bill. My judgment is that the measures in Clause 5 are important but not onerous. They are about training, support and examination of a number of areas. Therefore, if from time to time, one day a year, a premise falls within scope to meet the objectives, the responsible person needs to examine the premise and look at the measures needed in place. That is the reason.
I say that not because I want to impose burdens on a range of bodies but because the terrorist threat is substantial. While the terrorist incidents have occurred in large cities, there is no likelihood that they may not occur in other parts of the country. Therefore, those measures are required within the scope of the Bill. From my perspective as the Minister responsible for taking the Bill through this House, it is important that they are required on a “from time to time” basis, not on a very prescriptive monthly basis. That is why I urge the noble Lord not to press his amendments.
In the case of an enhanced premises, where there is an event of 1,000 people once a year but for the rest of the year there are never more 200 or 300 people going through, does that bring it into that category? You are normally just “qualifying” premises and so must have the facilities and systems in place to deal with a terrorism event if, heaven forbid, such happens, but if, now and again, you get to 800 people, does it mean that you have to search everyone coming and going throughout the year or is it only when there is the event? That is where I have concerns.
I hope that I can help the noble Lord. There are two categories. There is a 200 threshold and an 800 threshold. If a premise crosses the 200 and/or the 800 threshold, it will be responsible for undertaking certain activity as prescribed by the Bill, common to which are the items in Clause 5. From time to time, if an event is over 800, it will have to go to the levels of the Bill for those thresholds of businesses and premises over 800. That is the nature of the proposal before the House in this Bill.
My Lords, regarding Amendment 4 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, we need to define exactly what we mean by “from time to time”. Is it a decade? It must be defined if organisations are to understand their responsibilities. At the moment, it is unclear. In my Amendment 11, I seek merely to establish an exemption for premises that are assessed to be in a low-risk category by an independent assessor. We have genuine concerns about which premises will be required to implement security measures under the Bill.
I have heard what the Minister has said, but I am not entirely convinced. This is an issue that we will take away and consider before Report. For the time being, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, I support the amendments to Clause 2 tabled by my noble friends Lord Frost, Lord Udny-Lister and Lord Murray of Blidworth. I am sorry that the Government have declined to give this group a proper title and referred to it as the “degroup”. For the benefit of the Committee, it would have been better for this group to have been given a proper title, such as “capacity of premises”. I hope the Minister will take this back to officials, so that we can have proper titles for groups of amendments going forward.
These amendments collectively seek to adjust the minimum threshold for qualifying premises under the Bill and to ensure that the legislation strikes a careful balance between security and proportional regulation. Amendments 5, 6 and 7 propose raising the threshold from the current 200 person capacity to 300, 400 and 500 respectively. These are important proposals that merit some serious consideration. The current threshold of 200 people is relatively low and risks imposing unnecessary and disproportionate burdens on small venues, community spaces and independent businesses.
I particularly have in mind when communities come together to protest at public meetings called at short notice in community halls, often with more than 200 and perhaps more than 300 people—I see the Minister smiling; we have all been there.
Small and medium-sized enterprises, including restaurants, cafes, independent theatres and community halls, are vital to the social fabric and economic vitality of our communities. Many of these premises operate on razor-thin margins and simply do not have the financial capacity or staffing resources to implement the comprehensive security measures that may be required under this legislation. Compliance with the regulations could entail significant investment in security equipment, personnel, training and operational changes—costs that could be ruinous for smaller businesses.
It is also worth considering the administrative burden that a low threshold may impose on both the businesses themselves and the enforcement authorities tasked with overseeing compliance. By setting the bar at 200 people, the current provision potentially captures a vast number of venues that pose a relatively low security risk. This dilutes resources that could be better focused on higher-risk premises where security efforts would be more impactful. Moreover, we must take a proportionate and risk-based approach to security policy. If we overburden smaller venues with costly and complex requirements, the unintended consequences may be that many of them are forced to reduce their operations or even close altogether. That would deprive communities of essential spaces for social, cultural and economic activities, particularly in rural and underserved areas where small venues play an outsized role.
Raising the thresholds to 300, 400 or 500 people, as proposed by these amendments, would ensure that security requirements are applied where they are most necessary—namely, at larger venues with higher footfall and greater potential risk. It would also signal that this legislation is responsive to the concerns of business owners and recognises the practical realities of running a small venue in today’s challenging economic climate.
It is crucial that we approach this matter with pragmatism and proportionality. A higher threshold would help protect businesses, community spaces and cultural venues from unnecessary regulatory burdens while maintaining a clear focus on enhancing public safety where it truly matters. We must recognise that many smaller establishments operate on tight margins and have limited resources. Mandating extensive security measures may be feasible for larger venues but could place an unsustainable financial and administrative strain on smaller premises. Raising the threshold would help to ensure that security requirements are applied where they are most necessary: namely, at larger venues with higher footfall where the risks are more significant.
That said, I appreciate the wisdom in Amendment 8, tabled by my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth, which he spoke to with some passion and which takes a nuanced approach. This amendment proposes a dual system where the default threshold is raised to 300 people but the Secretary of State retains the discretion to designate smaller premises as qualifying if they are at
“heightened risk of a terrorist threat”.
That flexibility is crucial. Although larger premises are generally more attractive targets, we must acknowledge that smaller venues can also be vulnerable under specific circumstances, whether due to their location, the nature of the events they host, or intelligence indicating a credible threat. Granting the Secretary of State this discretionary power ensures that the legislation remains responsive to evolving security challenges without imposing blanket requirements on small businesses.
Furthermore, Amendment 8 reflects a thoughtful understanding of the need for a risk-based approach to security. Security should be proportionate to the threat, and, by incorporating an element of ministerial discretion, we can achieve a more targeted and effective framework.
In conclusion, these amendments collectively represent a pragmatic and balanced approach to enhancing public safety while safeguarding the viability of small businesses and community spaces. I urge the Government to give serious consideration to adopting a higher default threshold alongside a discretionary mechanism to ensure that security measures are applied where they are most needed.
Again, I am grateful to noble Lords. A range of amendments have been brought before the House and the nub of the arguments is about the threshold for qualifying premises. That issue was quite rightly debated in this House at Second Reading and was also debated in the House of Commons.
Sorry, I left north Wales at 7 am, so it has been a long day already. The noble Lord, Lord De Mauley, mentioned the figure of 800. Why have we come to our figure? I can make all sorts of justifications. Two hundred takes into account the greatest number of large premises, so it is a figure that we have determined accordingly. We have to set the figure at a certain level and we have done so following the wide range of consultation that has taken place.
To what extent has the department made an evaluation of the impact on volunteering of the measures as they are currently proposed, with a threshold of 200? Does the Home Office have a threshold for the number of trustees that they think will go unfilled, or the lack of volunteering in community ventures and village halls, as a consequence of the threats and burden imposed by these measures?
The measures that we have accepted are part of the consultation that we have undertaken. The noble Lord was a Minister standing at this Dispatch Box in this department during the genesis of this Bill, so he will know that there has been wide consultation on these matters. Again, I point him to Clause 5 on public protection measures. Clause 5(3) refers to
“evacuating individuals from the premises … moving individuals to a place on the premises … preventing individuals entering or leaving the premises … providing information to individuals on the premises or at the event”.
Are those onerous issues? Or are they things that, even in our own assessment, are relatively low cost in terms of training? That relatively low cost is, essentially, in person hours when determining what those requirements are.
Again, we could fix a number. If I fixed the number at 300, 400 or 500, we would take even more premises out, but that would dilute the purpose of this legislation, which is to set good practice for the prevention of an attack when an attack is occurring and the steps that can be taken to save lives. People’s experiences—not mine, but those in the consultations of the public inquiry—mean that the 200 figure we have now settled on is the right one. I commend that figure to the House and hope that noble Lords will support it in due course when it comes to the final decision by this House before Third Reading.
I thank everyone who contributed to this section of Committee. I thank the Minister for his thoughtful comments. I appreciate that there is a degree of arbitrariness in this number, but, equally, it is our task to try to make it as non-arbitrary as possible and make sure that the number we eventually choose is as well grounded in reality as it possibly can be.
Perhaps I might be permitted just one remark before sitting down. I say that because there is pressure for risk aversion, and we have heard some of that in your Lordships’ House today. It is important to be careful what we are doing here. We need to keep in mind what the threshold number means. If we set it at 200, for example, we are not saying that we are prepared to tolerate the risk of 199 people being killed in a terrorist attack. That is not what the threshold is about. The risk that we want to tolerate of that is the number zero.
What we are saying is that there is a trade-off. The costs to businesses and society of complying with these measures are justifiable above a certain number when we take the broader risk of terrorism into account. As the Minister said, the risk of a terrorist attack is unlikely in any individual case. We have to be able to debate this number prudentially while understanding exactly what the threshold means. We have debated it and I suspect we will so again. Meanwhile, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(10 months, 3 weeks ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I am grateful for this debate today, which has been full of emotion and concern. It has raised issues that deserve to be respected, and I hope to be able to answer them in part.
I am particularly aware that this week, as the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, mentioned, sees the commencement of the Omagh bombing inquiry. I had the privilege of attending the Memorial Garden in Omagh some 15 years ago. I met victims there and learned of their continued pain, anger and desire for answers. The noble Baroness has herself been a victim of terrorist activity, and I understand the pain, anger and wish for answers that she brings to this debate. I have met with victims of Omagh. I have sat in a room with the widows of police officers who were murdered. I have met those who were killed by the IRA—and, indeed, those who were shot dead by loyalist paramilitaries as well. I have sat with, and looked into the eyes of, people who have undertaken those killings, both from the IRA and from the loyalist community. I did so to try to understand and resolve some of the issues that underpin this debate today.
I am grateful for the comments from a number of noble Lords and Baronesses. The noble Baroness, Lady Foster, and the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, mentioned my service in Northern Ireland. I had a fleeting period in Northern Ireland, but it left a deep impression on me and on my examination of the issues that still affect us today. Even in this Home Office job, just before Christmas, I attended the 50th anniversary of the Birmingham pub bombing. People still wanted answers and still did not understand; they were still the victims of violence that took place in the context of our discussions today. So I understand that.
The noble Baroness, Lady Foster, and the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, asked what has changed since I was there. I would be interested to see what has happened since I left. The noble Lord, Lord Bew, mentioned this as well. One thing has happened since I left. When I was in Northern Ireland, I was the First Minister; I was the Deputy First Minister; I was the Treasury Minister, for a while; and I was the Culture Minister and the Housing Minister. Now, Michelle O’Neill and Emma Little-Pengelly hold those posts in a devolved Administration salvaged from the trauma of that not occurring. They have got local decision-making back in place, as envisaged by the Good Friday/Belfast agreement—call it what you will—of 1998. So, there has been progress in many ways, but pain—it has been visible in the Room today—still exists as a result of that activity.
In a sense, I would like to look to the future as well. We have the legacy of the Troubles, which, again, is self-evidently visible in this Room today—the trauma experienced by individuals and communities, and by some noble Lords and Baronesses in this Room, some of whom have represented such individuals in Parliament or the Northern Ireland Assembly, as was referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Goodman of Wycombe.
Addressing the legacy of the Troubles is one of the aims of the Good Friday agreement. Noble Lords will be aware that the Government, through my right honourable friend Hilary Benn, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, are looking at how we can build on that legacy in order to ensure that we understand and find a way through those difficult issues.
The noble Baroness, Lady Foster, has given a view on the First Minister, as have other noble Lords here today; that is in the Room and on the record today. I hope that we can look at some of the issues as we go forward, while recognising that there is still a very deep scar in Northern Ireland as a whole.
That brings me to two points in relation to this debate. First, there is a Section 1 Terrorism Act 2006 offence of encouraging terrorism, including unlawful glorification. The noble Lord, Lord Goodman, mentioned it. I will come to the other points he raised in a moment. For individuals who glorify acts of terrorism, whether online or offline, whether with reference to proscribed organisations or individual acts of terrorism, such behaviour has no place in our society. There is a legal definition of that act of glorification currently on the statute book. Police forces in Northern Ireland or elsewhere can seek to examine it and can bring prosecutions accordingly. It may not be satisfactory to the noble Baroness, and she may worry about the number of prosecutions made—I understand that—but that framework is there in law.
In that sense, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Austin, who I still call my noble friend, that the incidents at a football match this week, which I was not party to—I have read about them, I have not seen them personally, but I take his word for what happened—can be referred by the police if they feel a criminal act was committed under that offence. I urge him to draw it to the attention of the West Midlands Police because that is where the appropriate response lies. It is not for Ministers to determine whether criminal action has taken place, it is for Ministers to put legislation in place.
The second important area is Section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which makes it an offence to support a proscribed organisation. Again, this was referred to by a number of Members. There is a whole list of proscribed organisations which the Government have determined are beyond the pale, owing to their activities. Hamas is included in that. I was not in Parliament at the time, but in 2019 the offence was widened to ensure that it captured such statements even where the speaker is reckless as to their impact. The penalty for that proscription offence is a maximum of 14 years in prison and/or an unlimited fine. Again, there is legislation on the statute book now, and it is not for Ministers to determine whether that legislation has been broken. It is for the police to make an arrest, prepare a case and put it to the Crown Prosecution Service; and it is for the CPS to determine whether charges should be made. Those charges are either made or not. If they are made, they go to court. If they go to court, they are in front of a jury and the jury determines whether the law has been broken.
So, currently, there is a mechanism in place for any of the instances noble Lords have raised concerns about today. Are those two mechanisms currently satisfactory, given the nature of the changes in the threat and the activities? Well, the Government have done two things since 4 July. We organised what we called a sprint to review counter-terrorism legislation. There was a leak of some discussion this week. That is not government policy—I put that on the record—but we have asked Jonathan Hall KC to look at current legislation and I think it is important that this debate can form part of assessment for the Government. He will make that assessment and produce a report on current terrorism legislation, by which I mean Section 12 of the Terrorism Act, Section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006 or indeed some potential new legislation to cover any issues raised today and elsewhere. He will present that report to Ministers at a date to be determined, we will make an assessment and either accept or reject any recommendations, and we may or may not bring forward new legislation during the many opportunities we have this year.
I am pleased, again, to see the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, in his place because I am grateful to him as he has accepted a commission from the Government to review the current operation of Prevent. It largely does not deal with the Northern Ireland situation, I accept that, but it deals with some of the issues that the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, and other noble Lords in this Committee have mentioned. So, without wanting to influence the determination of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, he has a mandate independently to review this and make recommendations, which, again, the Government can reject or accept, that will be brought to this House in due course.
I say to all noble Lords here today that I understand the pain seen by the noble Lords, Lord Morrow, Lord McCrea and Lord Bew, and referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Goodman of Wycombe, and my noble friend Lord Austin. I particularly understand the sentiments of the contribution from the noble Baroness, Lady Foster. However, those issues are, in a sense, up for review. If the legislation is not sufficient or appropriate, then that will be reviewed, and recommendations will be made. We will respond to that in due course.
I will refer to a couple of other points that have been made. The noble Lord, Lord Goodman, raised a series of questions effectively about marching, parades and determinations. There is legislation on the statute book, and I have referred to it in the Chamber of this House recently. Legislation about marches is there. It gives powers to police officers and Gold Command to determine marching routes and whether they are suitable or if they cause difficulties. It is not the Parades Commission, but it a determination.
As a Government, we are currently looking at number of issues relating to the position of legislation. We have already publicly announced that there is legislation coming this year in a police and crime Bill that will look at the issue of war memorials and people who abuse them or stand on them. That is an issue. There are a number of other challenges that are on the radar. I am not in a position to announce policy today, but I assure the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, that we are working on a number of policy options that will address some issues to do with the management of parades and marches in due course. When we are in position to announce them, we will do so in the police and crime Bill.
The Government are committed to ensuring that police have appropriate powers to maintain order. There are a range of powers already on the statute book for the police to do that. We are keeping all that public order legislation under constant review. Where there are gaps, we will identify them. I will look at the points that the noble Lord mentioned, and I will write to him in detail in response to them.
My time is up. I could add a few more points, but I want to touch on the contribution from His Majesty’s Opposition’s Front Bench. It is important that we look at the internet. It is important that we look at radicalisation on the internet. Again, that forms part of reviews that are taking place currently. Also, the Government are committed to reviewing that with the platform companies to make sure that we remove content that is encouraging terrorism or, indeed, encouraging the abuse of children or sexual abuse in other ways. That is all on the agenda as well.
Given that I am one minute over, I thank the noble Baroness for raising this issue. I may not have answered all her points, but she has a right to raise those issues. She has done in that in an effective way that has left a legacy on this Committee in terms of its discussion. If I have not picked up points made by noble Lords today, I will do so and respond according. I look forward to continuing to work with colleagues from Northern Ireland and beyond to ensure that the next generation of children has a peaceful and productive future in a society that respects differences and rejects violence.
(10 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, we must, of course, remain resolute in protecting our democratic values and the security of our nation. As the horrific attack in Southport has shown, the evolving nature of threats requires us to remain vigilant. However, I urge caution against diluting the focus of counterterrorism efforts. Islamists and far-right extremism remain the most pressing dangers; shifting attention to behaviours devoid of clear ideological intent risks overstretching our already pressured security services. Will the Minister commit to retaining the changes to non-crime hate incidents made by the last Government? Does he agree that the police should not be looking into matters or recording personal data where there is no imminent risk of criminality? To do so would waste police time and infringe freedom of speech.
This Answer arises because of the leak of a document. I just want to place on record what was said in the Answer by my right honourable friend the Home Secretary and my honourable friend the Minister of State for Security. The leaked documents were not current or new government policy.
With regard to the incidents of hate crime that the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, mentioned, I say to him again that if he thinks back, I am sure he will remember that this Government have said, on a number of occasions to date, that there was a review of non-recordable hate crime incidents where we have now asked the National Police Chiefs’ Council to look at those incidents to try to ensure that we reduce the use of non-crime hate incidents and focus on what should be the case in relation to the original intention of non-crime hate incidents.
The noble Lord also mentioned the focus of the Answer and policy as being extremism in relation to Islamist extremism and extreme right-wing neo-Nazi extremism. I can assure him that that is the case. That is the Government’s main focus. However, we have asked the interim Prevent commissioner, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, to review where we are with Prevent legislation in the light of the incident—terrible that it was—in Southport. There is also a request on the table for the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation to look at whether terrorism legislation needs to be reviewed in the light of not just the recent incident but others as a whole.
I reassure the noble Lord that any changes in policy brought forward by the Government will be presented in this House in a way in which they can be understood, debated and accepted by both Houses of Parliament.
I reiterate that this was a leaked document. We do not normally comment on leaks, except in this case to say that it is not government policy.
My Lords, it is very pleasing to hear the Minister’s answers. Clearly, the review, even though it was a leak, was not coming up with the right answers; the Home Secretary has made a similar point. One of the key issues to getting this right is proper, early and deep engagement of the communities which will be affected across the length of the country. What will the Government do to ensure that communities are deeply engaged right from the outset of any review or strategies that are required, and that they feel ownership of these, rather than that they were forced upon them?
The noble Lord, Lord Scriven, makes a very important point. Rather like policing generally, it is important that any aspect of legislation or policy relating to prevention of terrorism, or understanding and taking action on extremism, has the support of the community for which it is designed and which it serves. Embedded in what we do will be discussion and consultation on the way forward.
My right honourable friend the Home Secretary determined that we needed to have a quick sprint on terrorism legislation. The leaked document was part of that sprint but was not government policy. The examinations of both Prevent and terrorism legislation are ongoing. At the moment, the Government’s commitment is that the two main focuses of our policy have to be extreme Islamist action and extreme neo-Nazi right-wing action.
My Lords, I declare an interest as director of Policy Exchange, and I had the pleasure of publishing this document which cast an important light on government policy. I welcome the Minister’s reaffirmation of Islamism and far-right extremism as the highest priorities.
In respect of the definition of extremism, both the Minister’s colleagues, Mr Norris at the MHCLG and Mr Jarvis at the Home Office, have given apparently contradictory statements—first on 21 January and, secondly, Mr Jarvis on 28 January—on the disapplication of the previous Government’s definition of extremism, which Mr Norris said would be disapplied. Mr Jarvis, in an Answer to a Written Question yesterday, stated that there were no plans to change the previous Government’s definition of extremism policy. Can the Minister please shed some light on the matter?
Of course I can. Might I suggest to the noble Lord that the next time a leak finds its way to him, he puts it in an envelope and posts it back to the Home Office? That would be extremely helpful. I put that on the record for any noble Lord who receives in the post a document marked “Private: not yet government policy”; it is good to send it back to us.
There are no plans to change the definition of extremism, which was set out by the previous Government in March 2024. It sets down three points, which are: negating or destroying the fundamental rights and freedoms of others; undermining, overturning or replacing UK systems of liberal parliamentary democracy; or intentionally creating a permissive environment for others to achieve the results in either of the first two points. That is the definition of extremism. It has not changed, and was not going to be changed. The leaked document did not include a change and it is not government policy. I will buy the noble Lord some envelopes for the future.
Does the Minister agree that Ministers have a perfect right to reject documents that are placed before them, wherever they come from, and that this is not a matter for journalistic surprise? Does he agree that we should do nothing to dilute the considerable effectiveness of counterterrorism policing, which involves a number of authorities and public bodies? Does he also agree that Parliament and even the media should await patiently the two reports by experts in the field, to which he referred earlier, and confirm that we will then enjoy informed debate rather than wild comment?
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and I agree with all three points that he has mentioned. The key point is that Governments consider a range of advice. I give a commitment from this Dispatch Box, as my right honourable friend the Home Secretary would from the House of Commons, that when any change or development of policy is made it will be reported to this House and to the House of Commons. That is the right and proper thing to do. As for speculation on leaked documents and advice given to Ministers: Ministers decide. They receive advice, commission potential papers and deliberate on them. The two reviews we have established are designed to create debate and bring forward suggestions that Ministers will ultimately decide on. I thank the noble Lord for his comments, with which I agree, and welcome his support.
My Lords, I declare my interest as co-chair of the national police ethics committee. In your Lordships’ House next week, we will begin Committee on the very important Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill. Would the Minister agree that this is a time when we have to be absolutely clear what we mean by terrorism, so that we in this House can give that Bill the clear, in-depth scrutiny it requires?
I agree, and I look forward to spending potentially several days debating that Bill with noble Lords. It is important that we have a definition of terrorism. It is currently set down in legislation. The Government have asked again for a review of that as part of the review the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, referred to, but there are no outcomes to it yet. Until it brings any outcomes, that is the definition of terrorism in place for this legislation.
Baroness Hazarika (Lab)
My Lords, as part of the work that the department is doing, could the Minister look at the intersection of extremist ideology, whether that is Islamist or far right, with other important issues, such as misogyny and examples of mental health issues? Will they also look at what technology companies are doing? If you have a fragile mind and are being fed a diet of awful, grotesque violence and extreme pornography, that will contribute to these problems as well.
My noble friend mentions other sources of issues that may lead people to extremist or terrorist behaviour. The Government are cognisant of that and will not ignore that approach. However, the two main threats are from Islamist terrorism or extreme right-wing neo-Nazi terrorism, so that is where the focus of government action is. We will still examine incidents on a case-by-case basis when they arise.
On the reviews that are being undertaken, we have to learn lessons from issues such as Southport. If there are issues that need to be updated when Prevent and the terrorist legislation are reviewed then so be it. How we deal with materials placed on the net and the responsibility of tech companies for that material is one of the issues that may need to be updated in due course. Self-evidently, individuals are being radicalised in a range of ways, including in the ways my noble friend has mentioned, from Islamist, neo-Nazi and other material they have seen on the net. There is a need to ensure that we examine that new framework, which was not in existence the last time I was in the Home Office 14 years ago, but which is in place now. Therefore, the Government’s response needs to be cognisant of that. We will take all of those points into account and report to this House in due course, when appropriate.
(10 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberTo ask His Majesty’s Government what plans they have to process the outstanding asylum applications of Syrians in the UK.
Following the fall of the Assad regime, the Home Office has withdrawn the country policy and information notes guidance for Syria and temporarily paused interviews and decisions on Syrian asylum claims. This was and remains a necessary step which several other European countries have also taken. The pause is under constant review. When there is a clear basis on which to make decisions, we will resume.
My Lords, the Minister will understand that, for asylum seekers and refugees, uncertainty exacerbates the problems that they have in any event. Will the Home Office consider processing claims that are not based on persecution from the Assad regime? Can the Minister give the House any information on whether the pause applies to Syrians applying for settlement, having been here for five years, and with their initial leave expiring?
On the latter question, everything is paused at the moment for the simple reason that we do not yet understand what has happened in Syria on a permanent basis or know how stable Syria is as a whole. For those who have applied and for those who have had their leave to remain agreed, those issues are paused. As for the first part of the noble Baroness’s question, although there is a strong case to say that those who came here prior to the fall of the Assad regime were fleeing the Assad regime, we still have to examine all the circumstances pending the resolution of what happened in Syria prior to Christmas.
My Lords, the Minister will recall that, on the collapse of the Soviet Union, we, in concert with others, introduced a Know-How Fund to try to improve governance and the economy within the former Soviet Union. Is there not a case, in concert with the European Union and other interested countries, most notably in the Middle East, to contemplate introducing a Know-How Fund for Syria? That might reduce the flow of migrants in the future.
The noble Viscount tempts me into areas which are not my direct responsibility, but I take his point that stability in Syria and its reconstruction are extremely important international global objectives to ensure that the region remains safe and stable, stemming the flow of refugees and asylum seekers to the United Kingdom. I will refer his comments to the appropriate Minister, but I share his objective for stability in the region, and whatever the UK Government can do to achieve that is something that we should consider.
My Lords, I was somewhat surprised to read that one in five of the children who entered care in this country in 2023-24 were unaccompanied asylum-seeking children. Will the Minister tell the House what special arrangements are made for these children who are particularly vulnerable?
I am grateful to the noble Lord for that question. He makes a valid point. Unaccompanied asylum-seeking children, including those from Syria, will continue to be supported by local authorities in England, Scotland and Wales and by health and social care trusts in Northern Ireland, where appropriate, in line with the statutory duties of those authorities. We are trying to ensure that, if unaccompanied children are here now, that level of safeguarding is in place, for the reasons that I know the noble Lord is committed to and which previous safeguarding measures have somewhat failed.
My Lords, granting asylum is a very precious thing, and this country’s reputation with regard to that is something about which we ought to be very proud. Will the Minister comment on the basis of granting asylum? Are the Government still committed, as I believe is right, to the two main principles of the 1951 refugee convention, and are they implementing them strictly and properly in the granting of asylum applications?
I say to the noble Lord yes, and I hope so. I can only be as open and fair to him as that. For the simple reason that we know what has happened in Syria, there is an assessment to be made of whether individuals wish to return to Syria or to seek asylum, and for those individuals who may seek asylum, what their status is. It is a very complex, moving situation. Therefore, in the Syrian context, the Government, along with their European partners and others, have to have a pause. I will take the points that he has made, and I hope I have answered them to his satisfaction.
How are the Government ensuring that those granted asylum are effectively integrated into British society? In respect of applicants, what steps are the Government taking to ensure that thorough security checks are conducted before asylum applications are approved, particularly given concerns about individuals potentially exploiting the system?
In the context of Syria, there is a pause, as I have already said to the House. In the event of individuals applying from Syria after any lifting of the pause, rigorous checks will be undertaken. One of the areas of refusal could well be if there are criminal tendencies among individuals who are applying for asylum. Those rigorous tests are in place. The noble Lord raises integration. It is important that we have integration and that people respect our cultural differences, because a lack of integration leads to potential conflict, and neither he nor I wish to see that. At the moment, in relation to this Question, for the 5,500 or so Syrian refugees who have currently applied for asylum, that decision will have to wait; no further applications will be processed, although they can be accepted, until we review that pause.
My Lords, Syria has a turbulent past, and no one can see but darkly the future of Syria. If the promises of the new regime are honoured over a period of time, surely it will be very difficult for many to find a plausible case for asylum.
It is not for me to determine or judge whether an individual wishes to apply for asylum from their country of origin to the United Kingdom or any other country. Our job is to assess such claims against the criteria that we have about persecution and the need for refugee status to be granted. There may be individuals who, in a future Syria, feel that they need to seek asylum from that regime— I do not know. That would be for those individuals to determine and apply, and for this Government to adjudicate accordingly.
My Lords, the Government of Syria are a proscribed terrorist organisation under British law. The Minister suggested, if I heard him correctly, that the pause will be in place until there is clarity about a permanent, stable Government of Syria, which may not be for a considerable time. Given that we have already seen instances of the persecution of women in Syria in certain geographical regions, I hope that the Home Office is not making a decision now that Syria is a permanently safe country.
I assure the noble Lord that people can still apply for asylum from Syria; what they cannot do is have a decision. There is nothing to stop people applying, but they cannot have a decision. That is because we need to review the situation in Syria, partly for the reasons the noble Lord has mentioned and partly because we need to look at the long-term situation in Syria. There may be individuals who currently have applications and who wish to return, and there is a mechanism for them to apply for support from the UK Government to cease their applications and return. There may be other individuals who wish to leave Syria for a range of reasons. This is not a unilateral action by the UK Government; it is one that is supported by Austria, Belgium, France and other European countries, and the pause has the support of the United Nations Refugee Agency. It is a serious assessment of the situation, and I hope the noble Lord will bear with us until we can resolve that.
My Lords, if I may, I will build on the question asked by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, regarding asylum-seeking children. Of course there is protection, but I really want to better understand the number of children who have gone missing from our institutions and what the Government are putting in place to safeguard them.
I do not wish to, and am not trying to, make a political point, but when we came in on 4 July last year we discovered that there were approximately 90 unaccompanied children still missing. One of the first priorities of the Government is to try to find out what has happened to those 90 children who we were told, on 4 July, had gone missing. We are trying to track down those unaccompanied children. To go back to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Laming, we are trying to beef up the arrangements to ensure that local authorities and health trusts, and indeed the Government, know about unaccompanied children, be they from Syria, in the context of this Question, or not, so that the safeguarding process can be put in place.
(10 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank the Minister for this opportunity to discuss the Statement on the Southport attacks that was made in the House of Commons last week.
It is hard to find the words to describe the truly awful brutality that resulted in the violent and shocking deaths of Alice, Bebe and Elsie last summer in Southport: three little girls who set off to enjoy the innocent pleasure of dancing—something which so many children enjoy—only never to return. My heart goes out to their families and friends left behind, as well as to the many left physically, emotionally and mentally scarred after the barbaric events of that day.
From these Benches, we welcome the announcement of the inquiry. A public inquiry is necessary because the Government have a duty to the families to learn the lessons from what happened. An extremely violent young man was identified, by many different people and organisations, yet he was still able to carry out these abhorrent attacks.
Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements exist to enable the police and other relevant agencies such as youth offending teams and social services to manage the risk presented by violent offenders, but many are underresourced and lack experienced or qualified participants. Can the Minister say whether the inquiry will aim to establish whether the risks presented by such cases are best managed through MAPPA teams? What are the Government doing to ensure that MAPPA teams are properly staffed and resourced?
Last September, the Committee on Statutory Inquiries of your Lordships’ House published its findings. Paragraph 46 of that report says:
“Ministers should keep in mind the option of holding a non-statutory inquiry (given its relative agility) and then converting it if witnesses fail to cooperate. Ministers should also consider selecting non-judge chairs or appointing a panel. Ministers should meet and consult victims and survivors’ groups before publishing the terms of reference”.
I would be grateful if the Minister could confirm that this is in line with the approach that the Government intend to take on the public inquiry.
The announcement last week of the introduction of greater checks on age before buying knives online is to be welcomed. As the Home Secretary said last week, it is truly shocking that Axel Rudakubana was easily able to buy knives on Amazon when he was only 17. However, can the Minister clarify what is the current situation for buying knives online from an outlet based outside of the UK? Can he confirm whether it is the intention to introduce age verification for the import of knives to this country?
A great deal has been written and said about the effectiveness of Prevent and the definition of terrorism since the Prime Minister’s and Home Secretary’s Statements last week. It is welcome that there is to be another review of Prevent. I believe the Prime Minister’s Statement raised some important questions. Is a lone attacker—unfortunately, usually a young man—who is obsessed with terrorism and previous terrorist attacks but who is not ideologically driven or working within a recognised terrorist organisation, a terrorist? It is important to consider what would be the consequences of changing Prevent’s engagement in such cases.
Does the Minister agree with Neil Basu, the Met’s former head of counterterror policing, when he said last week that a “Prevent for non-terrorists” is now necessary and will require a “big bill” if we want to be safe? Will the Home Office carry out an assessment of the risks of diverting counterterrorism officers from their core task if the definition is expanded to include extremely violent, physiologically disturbed people who are clearly a danger to society but not necessarily a threat to the state?
The brutal murders in Southport raise questions about dangerous individuals and the internet, as Rachel Reeves acknowledged yesterday and as is made clear by the Home Secretary’s letter to the many tech companies appealing for a change in their attitudes. There have always been dangerous and violent individuals who pose a risk to society, but society now faces an additional threat from individuals who have easy access to radical, violent and extremist views on the internet, which can provide an incentive for attacks and sometimes an utterly misguided sense of identity and justification. Do the Government intend to take further measures to remove such dangerous content and to work with search engines such as Google to divert searches to more positive content, with signposting to organisations that can help such individuals?
The misinformation spread on social media after the attacks last summer in Southport, including from Elon Musk, was truly sickening and shocking. It did absolutely nothing to help the victims and survivors, and had much more to do with identity politics and a right-wing agenda. These are not simple matters with quick-fix solutions. We should be wary of knee-jerk reactions which result in bad legislation. However, the victims’ families deserve to know that we will ask the difficult questions and try to find workable solutions, and, most importantly, learn from the mistakes.
My Lords, in addressing the Statement made by my right honourable friend the Home Secretary in the House of Commons, our first thoughts have to be with the victims of this horrendous incident: Elsie, Bebe and Alice. Our thoughts are also with the people who were attacked, their parents and the brave people who ran to the defence of those young children, both those at the playgroup event and, later, the security forces, the police, the fire services and others. All of them showed that this horrendous crime will remain with us for years to come.
I will try to answer in detail the points from His Majesty’s loyal Opposition’s Front Bench and the Liberal Democrat Front Bench. So the House is aware, the Home Secretary’s announcement last week ensured that we will have an independent public inquiry which will look not just at what happened in Southport but at the issue of rising youth violence and extremism. It will look at the issues raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, in relation to the Online Safety Act and the importance of taking action to remove content. Members will wish to know that, on 17 March, illegal content removal comes into effect. We have written to online providers to ask them to speed up their response, as is their statutory responsibility, prior to that date.
We will undertake a learning review of the organisation of Prevent generally, which has now been in operation for well over 20 years. The situation within the terrorist community and the areas that Prevent relates to have changed in that time and we need to make sure that it is up to speed. We have appointed the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, as independent commissioner of Prevent and to review this case on a temporary basis.
We will look at knife sales in the police and crime Bill which will come before this House shortly. I will reflect on the points that the noble Baroness raised in relation to overseas sales, as well as the verification of sales that have been brought to the door.
We must remember that the individual who committed these crimes faces a life sentence, given down last week, with a 52-year minimum sentence. The issues that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, mentioned about the whole-life sentence are tempered by the fact that the UK Government have signed up to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which means that we cannot currently give a whole-life sentence to somebody under the age of 18.
The House should not be confused by this regarding our commitment to the victims of this crime, which the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, spoke of. We will give them full support. That is why, taking on board the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, we will take some time to appoint the chair of the inquiry and to consult with the coroner and the victims’ families, and to look at the terms of reference for the inquiry. All the points made from both Front Benches are important to be considered by the public inquiry.
The noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, mentioned integration. That is key to the assessment of Prevent and to how we tackle those issues generally. I remind him that the perpetrator of this crime was a British-born, British citizen. There are multilayered complexities in the issues that led to the appalling incident in Southport.
The noble Lord and the noble Baroness made points about the review of legislation generally. We have asked the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation to see whether we are up to speed at the moment. That again will be a considered process, but one which I hope will add value to the work that we need to do.
The noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, mentioned a range of issues regarding multi-agency teams and their determinations. These are all extremely important. I assure her that we will be examining all this in relation to the response as a whole.
I hope noble Lords will recognise that, for those of us who were Ministers in the first few weeks of office, this was a tremendous challenge. We have to look in slow time at how we best respond to this challenge. We have looked at the incidents that have been referred to and at the sentencing that has now happened in relation to Southport, but we have also had a review of the consequences, post-Southport, of the disorder that took place in the light of that event. As Ministers, it is important for us to get to the stage of looking at what we can do to help prevent incidents like the one that happened in Southport occurring in the future.
I hope that, as a start, the points that my right honourable friend mentioned in the Statement last week and in this updated Statement, post-sentencing, give this House the assurance that this Government will be looking at how Prevent is operating, the incidents surrounding this crime and why the multi-agency support mechanisms did not identify interventions earlier, the Online Safety Act and how we can improve those issues, and at all this as a whole, to ensure that if there are things that we can do in the future to prevent this type of atrocity, we will do them.
I am grateful to my noble friend for his question and for the work that he has done in this field. He will know that 33 of the 34 recommendations from the Shawcross report have already been fully implemented. We have one outstanding recommendation. We have already launched new statutory guidance and new training for front-line professionals, including on Islamist extremism. We are overhauling our decision to take in non-Prevent referrals that enter the system. We have launched pilots to tackle online radicalisation, to support those that do not meet the Prevent thresholds. We have recruited, as I mentioned in my initial comments, the first independent Prevent commissioner.
Everything will be kept under review, but I hope that the Shawcross recommendations that are implemented will make a difference. Self-evidently, failings have happened and, therefore, we need to review those failings independently of ministerial action and, in doing that, bring forward—sadly—further recommendations to tighten and improve the system.
My Lords, the Intelligence and Security Committee showed in its 2022 report, Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism, the toxic nature of how online extremism is affecting young minds. I accept what the Minister said, that there rightly has to be a threshold for something to be deemed terrorism, but does he agree that the real gap is that, for those individuals who are affected by these images and propaganda online, there is nothing currently in the mental health services that they are referred to for dealing with that?
My noble friend raises an important issue. This is an important part of the process that we need to review now: if individuals are being radicalised in their bedrooms in whatever way—right-wing, Islamist or just for the purposes of enjoying killing—we need to try to find a mechanism to remove the content that is leading to that radicalisation. Equally, if people come into contact with social services, the police or other agencies—as indeed the perpetrator did in this case—that needs to be sensitively picked up and support, whether mental health, directional or another form, needs to be given to help change that behaviour. That is the purpose of Prevent and of the regime that both Governments have had in place over a long period of time. Self-evidently, in this case, it failed. The purpose of our public inquiry is to look at why it failed and at the interventions that happened, why they did not work and why they were not picked up and developed further. We need to ensure that, from whatever background violent behaviour is being directed, we take action to mitigate against it.
My Lords, I accept what the Minister is saying but, on this Holocaust Memorial Day, the Times reports the findings of a Channel 4 survey which found that 52% of young people aged 13-27 said that they thought
“the UK would be a better place if a strong leader was in charge who does not have to bother with parliament and elections”,
while 47% agreed that,
“the entire way our society is organised must be radically changed through revolution”.
Not only did the internet apparently incentivise or motivate the Stockport murderer, it is producing wider, very worrying, attitudes. What will the Government do to counter these dangerous ideas; for example, by supporting the production of positive content?
We have to do two things. First, we have to look at where there is material online that breaches criminal thresholds and then work with the hosts of that material to take it down. That is what the Government are trying to do with the Online Safety Act. My right honourable friend the Home Secretary and the DSIT Secretary, Peter Kyle, will be looking in the longer term at that type of illegal material which fosters, for example, ideas of using ricin, promoting potential attacks or encouraging violent behaviour. That has to cross a criminal threshold.
There is also a wider point about promoting a decent society and the values of tolerance, understanding, respecting differences and allowing people to live their lives with tolerance. My parents’ generation saw great loss fighting fascism in the Second World War—members of my family died. I grew up in the knowledge that my family and their generation had fought fascism in the Second World War. The Holocaust memorial services today remind us of where fascist ideology leads. We need, in my view, to gain an open, tolerant society. That is the second half of what I hope all of us can do to make sure that we respect and celebrate our differences.
Does the Minister agree with me that, leaving aside our obligations under the Convention on the Rights of the Child, it would be unwise of us to use an incident as extreme and horrifying as this as a ground for changing the law to enable a judge to impose a whole-life sentence on an individual aged under 18? The problem is that if the law is changed, it is changed generally, applying over a wide range of cases. It would not capture, without a very difficult definition, a case as extreme as this. It would be wiser to leave the matter as it is and of course go along with what the convention tells us.
The noble and learned Lord speaks wise words. He will also note that Justice Goose indicated in his sentencing that it was likely to be a whole-life term, even though he could give only a 52-year sentence. The perpetrator will not be considered for any form of parole, at any stage, until he is 70; he is currently 18. That is a severe sentence, for which I am grateful for the work of Justice Goose and the judiciary in dealing with this difficult case in a sensitive way.
My Lords, on the Statement’s points on contempt of court, will the Minister comment on the CPS’s refusal to release full background details about Rudakubana, even after his guilty plea? This led the Crime Reporters Association to note
“a worrying pattern whereby forces wanting to provide information to the press have been instructed to stay silent”.
I raise this because I want to know what the Minister thinks about the information vacuum that followed the incident. Yes, some bad-faith players stirred the pot, but most of the people who were speculating and asking questions about, say, terrorism were parents who were just sickened by the carnage of those little girls, and I think felt resentful, frankly, at being called out as either far-right or somehow the problem themselves. Can we have more openness and information, not less?
The Government have tried to be as open as possible at every stage of this process, which is why we made Statements to the House of Commons when the incident occurred, on sentencing and now. I hope the noble Baroness will recognise that the Government have a duty also to make sure that information does not prejudice a trial and/or a sentencing result, even after a guilty plea.
If information that the Government held, or were party to, or had already prepared to begin to promote ideas that we are acting on now, had been put into the public domain at a time when the Government either became aware of that information or acted upon it, we may have had a situation whereby a trial would not have been a fair and open trial; a conviction may not have happened in the way it has happened; and, even after the guilty plea, which the Government were not expecting on that day, we may have had the sentence subject to potential appeals because of anything the Government had said.
Certainly, the Government’s role is to now have an inquiry, for all the reasons I have mentioned, and to look at all the issues that noble Lords and noble Baronesses have raised today. But the Government also have a responsibility to make sure that members of the judiciary fulfil their job appropriately.
Lord Goodman of Wycombe (Con)
Further to the answer that the Minister has just given, Jonathan Hall, the Government’s independent reviewer of counterterror legislation, said, in the aftermath of these heartbreaking killings, that
“if there is any information you can give, put it in the public domain, and be really careful that you don’t fall into the trap of saying ‘we can only say zilch, because there are criminal proceedings’”.
He continued:
“Quite often, there’s a fair amount … that can be put into the public domain”,
and that
“just saying ‘there’s a charge, we can’t say any more’, is not going to cut it these days”.
I appreciate, as the Minister says, that the position is very difficult, and one does not want to prejudice a trial. But will he reflect on what the independent adviser said, and did he agree with it?
I am grateful for the way in which the noble Lord has put his question. We have now charged the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation to examine the lessons from this case. He is responsible for the comments he has made. But he will present a report, which this Government will publish and present to both Houses in due course, on the issues that he thinks are relevant; we will respond, and that is the right and proper way to do it. I am not about to make policy now at the Dispatch Box, nor is my right honourable friend, on issues which demand and need reflection, and I hope the noble Lord understands the reasons I have responded in that way.
My Lords, I beg the indulgence of the House, as I missed the opening statement from the Minister. I recognise the difficulties that he faced. Although, obviously, as the previous speaker said, a fair amount can be put into the public domain and, equally obviously, everyone wants as much as possible, nothing would have been more disastrous than if Ministers had put information into the public domain that put the trial in jeopardy and this man got off completely. May I say to the Minister in solace that whatever criticism he and the Government have had for the actions they have taken or not taken, it is as nothing to the criticism that he and his colleagues would have received if they had put that trial in jeopardy and this murderer had gone scot free?
My noble friend has faced decisions such as those that we have faced in these past few months, and he knows the difficulty of dealing with incidents such as the one that happened in Southport in the summer of last year. I understand and take his point, and I am grateful for his support. I hope the House will understand that the Government not commenting on certain issues is not about them trying to cover up or be secretive or not divulge information; it is about ensuring that that information is divulged at a time when it is most effective to secure convictions of individuals such as the one responsible for an atrocious act that took three lives.
My Lords, I have two quick questions for the Minister. First, obviously, the state has failed with horrific consequences here. The Minister mentioned a review. Can he set out what the timeline is? How fast can it be done? How thorough will it be? Will the Government undertake to accept any recommendations or changes that are suggested? Secondly, there have been a few comments about the rights of a child, which are obviously important, but there are also the rights of the victims to consider. If there are, sadly, future incidents such as this, and if the Government go ahead and lower the voting age to 16, does that then mean—and this is not a political point—that a 16 year-old is considered to be an adult, or is a 16 year-old who is able to vote still a child?
On that latter point, the Government’s legal binding for this potential area of policy is signing up to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. We are determined by the convention that is signed, so that any change in the voting age would not impact on the convention unilaterally by the United Kingdom as a whole.
The noble Lord mentioned the inquiry. I hope he understands that this relates partly to the speed of the events of last week, with a guilty plea and the sentencing on Thursday. With the sentencing having taken place, we want to establish the inquiry that my right honourable friend has mentioned, but we want to take time for three reasons and in three areas. We want to take time to consult the families to ensure that they understand what is happening and that they are brought onboard, because the victims are not just the children who died but their relatives. We have a coroner’s inquest, which is ongoing, and we need to consult the coroner on these matters. We have to ensure that the chair has the right skills for this inquiry, and that is not going to be a quick, easy fix. Therefore, much as I would like to give the noble Lord an easy answer on the timescale, I say to him that I will bring back to this House at some point, in a Written Statement or on the Floor of the House, the details of that inquiry, but as yet we are working through those things. We want to make sure that we get it right. We want the families not only to feel ownership of the inquiry but to understand its objectives and terms of reference, to have contributed to them and to have confidence in the chair that we ultimately select.