Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill [Lords]

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 19th February 2024 Commons Chamber

[Stuart C. McDonald]

My hon. and learned Friend will not be surprised to hear that I completely agree with her.

In fact, that brings me to the next point I want to raise in relation to clause 2. As well as putting in place what I struggle to see as being a reasonably operated assessment, the clause raises concerns in relation to consistency with data protection legislation and with human rights obligations. The factors to be taken into account when undertaking that really difficult assessment do not even expressly include the sensitivity of the data in question, which surely should be central to any question of processing. That is an inconsistency with existing data protection principles and laws, and I agree that the compatibility of such provisions with our human rights obligations is also surely highly dubious. Just because someone has shared personal data does not mean that they automatically lose their right to further protection around how that data is shared and processed, especially when it is sensitive personal data, as my hon. and learned Friend has just said.

The role of judicial commissioners in this area is even further diluted, reduced to reviewing by judicial review standards whether datasets do indeed relate to data where there can be low or no expectation of privacy. Frankly, that is not a safeguard at all. At the very least, their role needs to be strengthened when the Bill is considered in Committee. We also need to seek assurances around how the Bill will impact on the reporting of the retention and use of bulk personal datasets. If large numbers are retained under category authorisations, we may not know how many datasets are actually being gathered.

Let me turn to various aspects of part 4, on notices. Again there are some controversial provisions, particularly in clause 21 and the requirement on selected telecommunications operators to inform the Secretary of State if they propose to make changes to their products or services that would negatively affect existing lawful access capabilities. That seems like an extraordinarily broad power, without anything remotely appropriate in terms of oversight and limitations. These powers are going to make the UK a real outlier. Essentially, the Secretary of State will be empowered to say to tech companies, “You are not allowed to improve your products without consulting us, so that we can still break in to access the data that we need and when we want it”. Despite what the Secretary of State says, taken together with other changes to review processes, such powers could easily be used to significantly delay, or de facto veto, updates to security, rendering everybody’s data more vulnerable to hacking by third-party actors.

[The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)]

That is simply incorrect, and I know that the hon. Gentleman would not wish to continue down a road that he knows to be incorrect. Let me just be very clear: this is a continuation of a power that was granted in 2016. The notice does not extend that power; it merely enables a conversation to begin with companies before any action is taken, to maintain an existing standard and not in fact to change it.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am grateful for that clarification from the Minister, and we will of course engage further in this debate in Committee.

These concerns have been raised not just by me but by significant tech companies; this is not something that has come to me simply through perusing the Bill. The key question remains: why is there to be no proper oversight of these notices and notice powers by independent advance authorisation? Why is there not even the double lock that applies to other notices that can be served on communications providers under that Act? Surely that scrutiny should be carried out in advance. There are also lots of question marks around the expanded claims of international jurisdiction. How will potential conflicts of law be resolved, especially if a company subject to one of these notices that is contrary to its domestic laws cannot even say anything about it because it is bound to secrecy by this legislation? What are the prospects of other Governments copying what our Government are doing and seeking to replicate such provisions, and what would the impact of that be on UK companies?

Turning to internet connection records, the starting point is that we should remember that no other European Union or Five Eyes country permits the requiring of ICR generation or retention in relation to its own residents, so this was a hugely controversial development in the 2016 Act. As we have heard, ICRs can reveal huge amounts of deeply sensitive information about a person. For now, secret services can seek ICRs only when certain facts that are already known, such as the identity of a person connecting or the time and use of the connection, so that the retention is at least targeted in some way.

The risk in this Bill is that reasonable suspicion will no longer precede targeted surveillance. Instead, the Bill would seek to use ICRs for the discovery of new targets, which is a really significant jump and development. I can genuinely understand some of the reasons being offered for this change, and I am not unsympathetic to the case being made, but if these powers are not carefully circumscribed, they risk creating a big step towards mass surveillance and fishing exercises. We need to ask whether there are less invasive alternatives and whether these powers are therefore really necessary. Alternatively, we need to look again at the oversight mechanisms for the use of these powers.

We also have concerns about the Bill’s proposals in relation to the offence created by the 2016 Act, where relevant persons in a relevant public body knowingly or recklessly obtain communications data from a telecoms or postal operator without lawful authority. This Bill seeks to set out examples of what would amount to lawful authority, which is a laudable aim. However, there are real questions about whether some of the examples in clause 12 are not in fact redefining the concept of lawful authority. In particular, the assertion that there would be lawful authority simply because

“the communications data had been published before the relevant person obtained it”

is controversial. That is particularly so when

“‘published’ means make available to the public or a section of the public (whether or not on a commercial basis).”

As I said in relation to bulk personal datasets, limited publication is not authority for intrusive surveillance. Could a simple private message not amount to publication of comms data? The implications of this definition of lawful authority need very careful scrutiny indeed.

Finally, on the interception and hacking of parliamentarians, making provision for circumstances where the Prime Minister is unavailable to play his part in a triple lock seems sensible, but the fact that the issue of snooping on MPs and others is being revisited should trigger us all to rethink the whole scheme. Our role of representing our constituents, interrogating legislation and holding the Government to account should not be interfered with lightly. We should take the chance to consider post-surveillance notification of MPs who have been spied upon, by judicial commissioners, once investigations are completed. As matters stand at the moment, redress is almost impossible to obtain. We should also require that the investigatory power commissioners be informed every time these powers are used, so that there is transparency about how often this is happening. All other options should be on the table as well.

I started by thanking intelligence and law enforcement authorities and I am happy to do so again in closing, but our respect for them does not mean we should ever consider writing blank cheques or handing them whatever powers they ask for. They are not perfect. From time to time they exceed their powers and certain individuals abuse their lawful capabilities. The powers that they seek through this Bill are extremely invasive and broad in scope. There is a real danger that key provisions of the Bill will go beyond what is necessary and get the balance with privacy and human rights wrong. These provisions will need serious scrutiny and revision in Committee, and that is what we in the SNP will seek to secure.

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[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

Let me start by thanking our security services. I think I am now the longest-serving member of the ISC, and it is a privilege to work with them and scrutinise their work, as our Committee does. They do not get a great deal of publicity—for the right reasons—but when they do, it is sometimes not factual by any stretch of the imagination. They do an invaluable job, and in protecting our democracy, the threat that they face—that we all face—is changing, so the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 needs revising.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Wallasey (Dame Angela Eagle) said, the important point is that any new powers that we give the security services to act on our behalf should come with an equally balanced level of scrutiny and oversight. I see the scrutiny of our security as like a three-legged stool, with the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, and the ISC. Well, actually, I would say that it is more like a two-and-a-half-legged stool, because the Home Secretary has done what most Ministers do; they say how wonderful the ISC is, how much they value our work, and that they want us fully involved—in passing this legislation, for example—but since 2017, when I first sat on the ISC, there has been a marked increase in lip service paid to it, as I think we see again in the Bill. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) said, we have not met the Prime Minister for 10 years—any of them; I think we had one who offered to come in the dying days of her Administration. We have taken evidence from the security services on the Bill, and I have to say that they are not the problem: it is the Government who are the problem all the time. That was the case with the National Security and Investment Act 2021. Frankly, it is an uphill struggle to get things changed in this Bill—changes that would not only improve the Bill, but make sense. One has just been highlighted by the Chairman of the ISC, the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis).

On occasions, it is a bit like going round in circles. I will give an example. We have actually made one little advance in the other place, in terms of acceptance of the changes to do with the triple lock. Now, though, the sensible thing we are asking for—that it should be in the Bill that the Prime Minister should actually see those warrants—is being resisted as though it would somehow stop the world. I am sorry, but I do not think it would. I think the Government believe that they have to be seen to be resisting any changes. I like the Minister, but the passage of the National Security and Investment Act was a pretty dark day for the Government’s relationship with the ISC, because we had to fight tooth and nail to try to get anything changed in that Bill.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I was not in the Government then.

[Mr Jones]

I think the Minister was, actually. I think he picked up the tail end of that Bill.

The ISC has looked at this issue in detail. We have taken evidence from the heads of the security services, and we want to be supportive of change, but we also want that important role of scrutiny and ensuring the public are protected from the occasions when things might go wrong. The other thing that struck me today is that, although the Home Secretary can read a good speech, I am not sure he had a great grasp of some of the detail of the Bill. All I ask of the Minister is to please take on board some of the things we are saying, so that we can make progress in Committee. They are not radical things that are going to upturn the Bill; they are things that will improve it. I suspect that in certain parts of the Government there is a hatred of the ISC, and the belief that we have to be resisted at all costs. That will lead to a poorer Bill, because the amendments we will be tabling would actually improve the Bill. Lord West also did a great job in the other place.

I now turn to clause 2 of the Bill, which introduces the bulk personal data regime. There is a worrying gap: oversight of what are deemed low or no privacy datasets added to category authorisations. At the moment, the system does not work, because things like the electoral register have to get special permission. That is silly, frankly, but we need to ensure that these provisions are scrutinised.

New part 7A of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, introduced by clause 2, provides for a light-touch regime for the retention and examination of bulk personal datasets by the intelligence services where the subject of that data is deemed to have low or no reasonable expectation of privacy. As the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East (Stuart C. McDonald) said, people are increasingly giving their personal data with little thought to how it is going to be used—not just by the intelligence services, but for commercial purposes. That needs looking at.

Approval of such a dataset will be sought either under a category authorisation, which encompasses a number of individual datasets that have a similar content and may be used for a similar purpose, or by individual authorisation, which covers a single dataset that does not fall neatly into a category authorisation or is subject to a complicating factor. For a category authorisation, a judicial commissioner will approve the overall description of the category authorisation before it can be used. A judicial commissioner will approve renewal of the authorisation after 12 months, and the relevant Secretary of State will receive retrospective annual reports on the use of category and individual authorisations.

However, as the Bill is currently drafted, this oversight is all retrospective. The problem is that what is missing is real-time or even near real-time oversight of changes. Under the present regime, once a category authorisation has been approved, the intelligence services have the ability to add individual datasets to that authorisation through internal processes alone. They examine the dataset without being subject to any political or judicial oversight, and they would be able to use those datasets for potentially a year without anybody being any the wiser.

We do not question why the security services need these powers, but there is potential for mission creep without any oversight of what is being authorised. We are not saying that these powers are not required; they are required. What we are really being asked to do is rely on the good faith of the intelligence services to use the powers in a certain way. I do not think that is strong enough, and no legislation should be solely dependent on good will. We also have to guard against—there are such occasions—situations when mistakes happen or people use powers for purposes that are not in the public interest.

It is important that we fill this 12-month gap, and the ISC thinks that the easiest and simplest way to change this process would be for the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to be notified when an individual bulk personal dataset is added by an agency to an existing authorisation. I understand that Lord Anderson of Ipswich, in his review of 2023, recommended a similar proposal. The argument from the Government—it is similar to what they have used throughout this Bill, as the Committee Chairman has remarked—is that that will be onerous in adding to the work of the intelligence services. Well, it would not, because it would simply mean sending a one-line email to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner containing the name and description of the bulk personal dataset as soon as reasonably practicable.

The decision would be approved internally and then sent to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, so it is not actually asking for approval. It is just making sure that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner is aware of what is being added, and that the individuals taking such a decision realise that they must inform the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. That would obviously allow the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to look at trends in what is happening. Clearly, after the 12 months, they could look back, but they could also intervene if they thought something was not in touch.

An argument the Government use quite often about this Bill is that it is to have a light-touch approach, and I think this suggestion is for a light-touch approach. I do not know what is onerous about the security services sending an email to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. I think it would ensure the oversight that is needed. Real-time oversight is what we are suggesting, and I do not think it would add to the administration of the security services, but it would lead to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner at least having some visibility on another layer at which decisions are taken.

The proposal would be a very simple thing to do, and I do not understand why the Government are resisting it. I suggest they are resisting it for the many reasons they have resisted some of the other sensible things we have put forward: just because they want to do that. I do not know how we go forward with the relationship between this present Government and the ISC. Dragging information out of them screaming and kicking is taking a long time, even though we have a legal duty to get information, and the critical point now is the starvation of resources from the Committee which is creating real problems in the way that it can operate.

I hope that things change and that when we table amendments we will not get the usual response that amendments to this type of legislation should only be done in the Lords. Are we here to cause trouble for the security services? No, we are not; we want to ensure we do our job, which is set out in statute, to supervise the security services and improve the powers, but to ensure that the public have the recognised safeguards we should expect in a democracy such as ours.

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[The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)]

I thank hon. and right hon. Members from across the House for their contributions not just today, but throughout the many different stages of the Bill. I pay huge tribute to the Members of the other place who have contributed enormously, in particular Lord Anderson, who has been an exceptional asset to the passage of the Bill and the condition it is in, and Lord West who, as a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee, not only shepherded some extremely important amendments into the Bill, but was kind enough to say that it was the first time in 14 years that he had ever had an amendment accepted by the Government. I am delighted to say that it was to this Bill. It was because we are so committed to working with all parts of both Houses and with the ISC that we got so much through in the other place. [Interruption.] That said, many comments will no doubt be raised in this House. I can assure hon. Members, especially the right hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones), that I will approach all suggestions in the way that I have done to date. Where we may not agree—it may not be that he is right, or that I am right—it will be for good reason and I will set out my reasons in the appropriate way.

The Bill is about one fundamental thing: the security of the British people. We rightly heard from my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne (Sir Charles Walker) about the nature of freedom, but the truth is that freedom without security is impossible. It is a chimera. The Bill is about ensuring that the British people have the security to enable that freedom. That is an absolutely vital responsibility not just of this Government, but of this House and the other place. I am grateful for the work that the hon. Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis) and the shadow Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) have put in to ensure the co-operative, bipartisan and open approach to the Bill, as is merited by the work of our fantastic intelligence services to provide security for our whole country.

As the British public would expect, we keep our approach to national security under constant review. Where we identify the need for change or improvement, we will not hesitate to act. That is why we have brought forward the Bill, which acts on the findings of the Home Secretary’s report and Lord Anderson’s independent review into the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. Hon. and right hon. Members will not need me to rehearse the arguments, but we have seen an extraordinary, rapid evolution in the nature of the threats since the 2016 Act: Russia’s threat to the whole of Europe and not just to Ukraine; the violence that Iran is trying to bring not just in the middle east but even on to our own shores; and the way technology has enabled hostile states not only to steal our technology but to introduce intelligence-gathering platforms into our country through the guise of car sales.

We have seen a change in the way technology works and a change in the nature of the threats, and we must keep up to date with those changes. That is why this work is so important. It is essential that the United Kingdom’s investigatory powers framework remains fit for purpose to help our intelligence agencies detect and stop some of the most serious threats posed to the UK and its citizens, including threats from terrorism, state threats, and child sexual abuse and exploitation.

Because these are exceptional powers, Members have rightly pointed out that they require appropriate, robust and, in this case, world-leading safeguards, and that is what we have sought to set out. The changes in the Bill are relatively narrow in scope, but unless we make them now, the ability of our agencies to tackle evolving threats will be increasingly constrained in the face of global instability, technological advances and state hostility, so now is the time to act.

Let me now deal with some of the points that have been raised. The hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East (Stuart C. McDonald) raised a rather interesting point about the changes to “lawful authority” in clause 12 in respect of published data. The purpose of new subsection (3A) is for material that has already been published not to require additional authority for its disclosure by a telecommunications operator to a relevant public authority. The definition of “publish” and reference to “a section of the public” would not include private messages unless they had been made public in some other way—just as our sitting room could not be considered a public place unless we opened it up to the public. It would be our choice, and nothing to do with the nature of the building.

The hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry), who has made important contributions through her chairmanship of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, raised questions about the transparency safeguards in the 2016 Act. Those extremely robust safeguards are centred on considerations relating to intrusion into privacy, and that will remain the case in the Bill. They include a requirement for investigatory powers to be used in a “necessary and proportionate” way, with independent oversight by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and redress through the Investigatory Powers Tribunal.

My right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes) contributed in his usual robust fashion to the debate—and, I should add, to the session that I was fortunate enough to have with the Intelligence and Security Committee, in which he was enormously helpful in assisting me with some changes to the Bill. He spoke about the five individuals who could be designated by the Prime Minister, and asked why we had not referred specifically to “those with warranting powers”. It is possible that a Minister with warranting powers who had that experience would then be moved to another Department, or indeed that the machinery of government change would alter the nature of the oversight. While we felt that it was right to limit the number to as few as possible, we also felt that it was right to have a relevant selection, which is why we left the number at five—after some very good consultation with the ISC, for which I am extremely grateful to my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis) .

[Sir John Hayes]

My right hon. Friend has been immensely generous both in giving way and in his earlier comments about my role. Will he briefly deal with the issue of the other bodies with the regulatory function who can compel the release of communications data? As he will remember, the point I made was that the existing law obliges them to take further procedural steps before they do so. Why is that no longer deemed appropriate?

[Tom Tugendhat]

As my right hon. Friend will know, several powers in the earlier Bill—the one that he took through the House—were indeed overseen in various different ways. The Bill does not seek to undermine any of that oversight; what it seeks to do is clarify, in certain areas, where it is necessary. My right hon. Friend has highlighted individual agencies or bodies, and I should be happy to write to him to ensure he is aware of exactly where that is being covered.

The right hon. Member for North Durham spoke about prior judicial authorisation for ICRs. The purpose of the Bill is to try to streamline operations for the intelligence services in areas where the risk is of, as we are calling it, low or no expectation of privacy. He will have seen in the Bill what the expectation means, including areas where information has already been readily made public. I accept his commentary and I would be happy to enter into further conversations with him, but the reason we are not currently going down that route is simply that the existing law, the IPA 2016, allows the collection of bulk data with prior authorisation. This is intended to speed the process up. If we put in the measures he is referring to, we would effectively remain in the same place that we are now. That would make it harder for the volume of data that is now coming to be considered by the intelligence agencies. That is why we have made the provision for a subsequent approval rather than a prior approval. He is right to say that it involves a maximum of a year, although I think it unlikely that it would go to that maximum. That will be in cases where this is low or no expectation of privacy—after it has already been agreed by a judge to be in the correct category. I think the right hon. Gentleman might be looking at this through the other end of the telescope.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

What the Minister has to realise is that the big concern from the public—although let’s be honest, the public are not looking at the detail of this—is that somehow the security services will be getting access to huge amounts of bulk data and just having a free run at it. All that I and the Committee are suggesting is that an email should be sent when there are changes to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. That would be a simple thing. It would not be onerous, and it would reinforce the point that there was at least some potential oversight of the process.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I think we may be conflating different aspects of the Bill. I do believe that this already has oversight.

Let me answer the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne, which touches on a similar area. Where people have the right to and expectation of privacy and freedom, this provision does not remove that right. What it does is allow the intelligence agencies to use bulk data to target an individual at a particular point, and the excess collected information will not be able to be used for targeting an individual without the warrant process that would be expected for any initial search. In that sense, this is not undermining anybody’s privacy; it is allowing for the fact that information is now largely in bulk format. The hon. Member for Barnsley Central was talking about steaming open envelopes. It is impossible to steam open a single envelope today; one has to steam open thousands because that is how data comes. Without an amendment such as that set out in the Bill, we would simply be interrupting the work of the intelligence services to the degree that it would hold them back and make the process harder, but I would be happy to take this up with my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne later if he wishes.

I thank the hon. Member for Halifax (Holly Lynch), who was here earlier and made an interesting point about the various ways in which the memorandum of understanding should be looked at through the National Security Act 2023. Friends of mine will know my thoughts on that and know that I gave the Conservative party the chance to allow me to change that 10-year absence, but the Conservative party chose somebody else to make that decision so I have sadly lost the ability to have that influence.

My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright) made a typically insightful speech and typically sensible comments on the ways in which we must consider how the authorisation must not be used to mount general surveillance. Condition D will be used only when an applicant makes a clear and compelling case, based on tangible, reliable intelligence leads, information and analysis, that the resulting data will identify parties involved in a relevant serious crime or national security-related specified operation or investigation. The applicant must explain any anticipated collateral intrusion, and how this will be managed to ensure that the application is necessary and proportionate to the outcomes of the investigation.

[Sir Jeremy Wright]

I accept what my right hon. Friend says but, in the context I described, the case is being made to someone else within the intelligence agency. There are, of course, two types of authorisation—D1 and D2—and we are worried about D2, under which the application is made from inside the intelligence agency to inside the intelligence agency. That does not present the sort of external scrutiny that we suggest is necessary.

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[Tom Tugendhat]

My right hon. and learned Friend is right, but he also knows that IPCO has retrospective oversight of these areas. Where it comes under a category allocation through “low or no”, there is an automatic review period within a year. Although he is correct that the application is made within the service, it is within the service subject to a pre-agreed condition and with follow-up oversight, so as to enable that speedy response.

[Sir Julian Lewis]

On a different but not unrelated point, the Minister will recall that I referred to the annual report given to the Secretary of State detailing the individual bulk personal datasets that had been retained and examined. There is no extra work involved in letting the ISC and IPCO see that report. The only possible justifiable exclusion would be something that, at the time of the report, was still current. Is there any reason at all why IPCO and the ISC should not be sent that report, rather than a severely watered-down version?

[Tom Tugendhat]

My right hon. Friend answers his own question. The reason for the difference is the currency element.

[Sir Julian Lewis]

In that case, we can reach agreement if the Minister would like to give us an assurance that the only difference between the two reports will be the exclusion of matters that are current at the time of drawing up the report, but I suspect that there will be many other differences between the two reports.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I will be very happy to talk to my right hon. Friend about that to make sure that he is satisfied. It is important that we make sure that the reports that go to the House—through the ISC, because of the nature of the reports—are relevant and allow appropriate scrutiny. I think we can all agree with that.

I have covered the points raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne, so I will turn to the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon), who made an extremely important point: that his constituents, like any other citizens of the United Kingdom, should expect the right to privacy. He also made a compelling point about the need for security, and I think the Bill strikes that balance extremely carefully. He is right to say that people will be concerned, and he is not alone. I am also concerned that we maintain the right to privacy within our legislative framework, which is why we checked very carefully that the Bill is fully compliant with the ECHR right to a private life. It is also why we looked at the various exceptions.

The hon. Member for Barnsley Central mentioned the notices regime, and he is right that we will keep it under review. We maintain a regular conversation with companies that have an interest in this area, and he is right to say that there is an overseas element. I merely point out that it is the role of this House to legislate for the security of the British people and, in particular, for the safety of our children and families. Such security is not something we can outsource to tech firms on the west coast. We sometimes have a responsibility to pass extraterritorial laws—as he knows very well, we have done that in the past—so although this measure adds to that ability, it is not detrimental because it asks people to maintain their current position before making any changes and to talk to us during that period. There is no requirement to break any policies, change products or introduce new products; it is merely to maintain the status quo, so that we have the same ability to keep the British people safe until we have had a conversation about how that status quo should change.

Finally, the hon. Member for Barnsley Central raised a question about trades unions. He is right that there are many different professions where protected characteristics could come into play, including lawyers, doctors and psychiatrists, and where any such intrusive power should be used with exceptional caution. I would just say that, due to the nature of this place and Parliaments around the United Kingdom, the position of parliamentarian is particular, which is why it is set out specifically and separately in the Bill. That does not mean that any attitude against any other individual should be used cavalierly. It is not a question of the role or the post the person holds, but their rights as a British citizen. Those rights should be absolutely guarded from intrusion or aggression by the state without exceptionally good reason. This amendment, which the hon. Gentleman is kindly supporting, sets out that balance between British citizens’ right to privacy and their right to security. With that, I commend the Bill to the House.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read a Second time.

Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill [Lords] (Programme)

Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 83A(7)),That the following provisions shall apply to the Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill [Lords]:

Committal

(1) The Bill shall be committed to a Public Bill Committee. Proceedings in Public Bill Committee

(2) Proceedings in the Public Bill Committee shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion on Tuesday 12 March 2024.

(3) The Public Bill Committee shall have leave to sit twice on the first day on which it meets.

Consideration and Third Reading

(4) Proceedings on Consideration shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion one hour before the moment of interruption on the day on which those proceedings are commenced.

(5) Proceedings on Third Reading shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the moment of interruption on that day.

(6) Standing Order No. 83B (Programming committees) shall not apply to proceedings on Consideration and Third Reading.

Other proceedings

(7)Any other proceedings on the Bill may be programmed.—(Mark Fletcher.)

Question agreed to.

Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill [Lords] (Money)

King’s recommendation signified.

Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 52(1)(a)),

That, for the purposes of any Act resulting from the Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill [Lords], it is expedient to authorise the payment out of money provided by Parliament of:

(a) any expenditure incurred under or by virtue of the Act by the Secretary of State or a government department, and

(b) any increase attributable to the Act in the sums payable under or by virtue of any other Act out of money so provided.—(Mark Fletcher.)

Question agreed to.

Protest Measures

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Thursday 8th February 2024 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)]

With permission, Mr Deputy Speaker, I shall make a statement on new Government measures to tackle unacceptable behaviour at protests.

In the aftermath of the horrific attacks on 7 October, many people took to the streets to make their views heard. Many did so peacefully and respectfully. I had the great privilege of marching alongside many people, including some in this House, against antisemitism on the streets of both Manchester and London. Sadly, those protests do not tell the whole story.

Over the past few months, we have all seen disturbing and distressing examples of hateful abuse, of serious damage, and of law-abiding citizens being intimidated and prevented from going about their daily life. The right to protest is fundamental to our democracy, but when we see people hurling racist abuse, desecrating national memorials of great significance to our country, or taking flares to marches to cause disruption and fear, the only reasonable response is outrage and disgust. Tolerating these actions would be radicalising in itself. This Government will not stand by and allow a small minority to incite hatred and commit crimes, undermining our proud tradition of peaceful protest.

Today, the Government have announced a package of measures to put a stop to this criminality for good. Protesters have for too long been able to claim in law that protest is a “reasonable excuse” for criminal behaviour. Blocking roads, preventing ambulances from getting through and stopping people from getting to work or visiting loved ones are breathtakingly selfish acts. The British public certainly do not see an acceptable justification for that level of disruption to their life. That is why we are removing that defence for relevant crimes. Protesters will no longer be able to cite the right to protest as a reasonable excuse to get away with disruptive offences, such as blocking roads.

Through the package that we are announcing today, we will crack down on those who climb on war memorials. In recent months, we have seen cases where individuals have broken away from large protests and scaled national monuments. War memorials belong to all of us. They are the altars of our national grief, and it is clearly not acceptable to disrespect them in that way; it is an assault on the memory of so many who gave their life for our freedom and to defend our nation. Attacking our national memorials goes beyond the legitimate exercise of free speech. We must not give those who commit criminal acts at protests the ability to get away with it by simply hiding their identity.

Once the legislation comes into force, the police will have new powers to arrest protesters at certain protests who wear face coverings to conceal their identity. Those who shout racist abuse and extremist rhetoric will no longer be able to hide from justice. We are also protecting the public by putting an end to people bringing flares on marches. Flares have been used during large-scale protests, and have been fired at police officers, posing significant risk of injury. A new offence will ban the possession of flares, fireworks and any other pyrotechnics at protests. Anyone who flouts the new rules will face serious consequences, including up to three months in jail and a £1,000 fine for those who climb on war memorials.

The changes that we have announced today build on the legislation that we introduced last year to help the police tackle disruption from protests. We criminalised interfering with key national infrastructure through section 7 of the Public Order Act 2023. Since we passed the Act last year, the Metropolitan police have made more than 600 arrests to minimise the disruption caused by Just Stop Oil. On Tuesday, the Home Secretary met policing leaders to thank them for their work, and to encourage the use of all existing powers at their disposal, as well as these new measures, to maintain order at protests. I am very grateful to frontline officers across the country for their efforts and successes in keeping the British people safe during an immensely challenging period. I know that policing these events on a regular basis is both complex and demanding. It takes officers away from crucial work preventing crime and protecting vulnerable people in our communities.

As I have made clear, freedom of expression is vital to our democracy, and this House champions it every day. People must be able to speak without fear, and have their right to peaceful protest protected, but those freedoms and rights are not absolute, for very good reason. There is no freedom to commit violence or intimidation, or to harass others. This country has laws against vocally supporting terror organisations for a very good reason, and last month, the Government proscribed Hizb ut-Tahrir as a terrorist organisation. That group actively celebrated the 7 October terrorist attacks in Israel that led to the rape and murder of many, many people. It is an organisation that has poisoned minds for far too long.

We must, and we will, continue to stand with communities who feel threatened, and ensure their safety wherever they live and work. The Government are sticking to the plan to give police the powers that they need to crack down on crime and keep our streets safe. We will never tolerate hateful, dangerous or intimidating behaviour. We will always put the decent, law-abiding majority first. We will do what is right and fair. I commend this statement to the House.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Sir Roger Gale)]

I call the Opposition spokesman.

[Dan Jarvis (Barnsley Central) (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for his statement, and for advance sight of it. The Labour party absolutely respects the fundamental freedom to make legitimate, peaceful protest, but when that freedom is abused to intimidate, harass and harm others, safeguards must be put in place to protect the public. It is essential that the police be able to maintain public order while safeguarding the right to legitimate, peaceful protest. We will therefore scrutinise the details of the proposals to ensure that any new measures are applied appropriately and proportionately.

I will respond to the measures that the Minister has outlined. First, there are the new powers for the police to arrest protesters using face coverings to conceal their identity. While we understand the genuine concern about protesters committing public order offences while wearing face coverings, we are also concerned that there might be, at times, legitimate reasons why some protesters would want to wear face coverings. Let me give an example. When dissidents protest outside foreign embassies—the Minister will know which ones I have in mind—they may well want to conceal their identity to protect their family back home. The UK is, and should always be, a safe haven for dissidents opposing oppressive regimes. Can the Minister provide more detail about how that new power will be applied appropriately?

Secondly, the Opposition welcome a ban on flares and fireworks, which have been used to fuel public disorder and intimidate police officers in recent months. However, the policing of large protests could pose a challenge to enforcing the ban effectively, so I would be grateful if the Minister outlined what guidance will be issued to police forces on enforcing that at large protests with thousands of people in attendance.

Thirdly, on measures to protect the sanctity of war memorials, I know that the Minister will agree—as will, I am sure, every right hon. and hon. Member in the House—that they are extremely important places. They are places to remember those who have made the ultimate sacrifice in the service of our country, and they must always be respected. During protest activity last year, a very small minority of protesters desecrated the sanctity of war memorials, which understandably sparked outrage right around the country.

Protest activity also raised the issue of what is defined as hateful extremism. Despite promises, the Government have not so far been forthcoming with their definition of hateful extremism, which would help the police forces to police protests better. Can the Minister say when that will be brought forward, and outline when the Government will bring forward an updated counter-extremism strategy? The current one is eight years out of date.

The right to peacefully protest is a fundamental freedom in our country. It must not be abused, but it must not be curbed unnecessarily, either. The Opposition will scrutinise these measures further to ensure that they strike the right balance between safeguarding the right to protest and the important duty to safeguard the public.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I thank my hon. Friend—and he is my hon. Friend—for his support and comments. He is quite right that protecting peaceful protest and the right of free citizens to express their views on our streets is essential to the Government’s mission, and it is one of our priorities. The points that he raises are fair; in some cases, I will have to write to him with more detail, but I will cover some of the areas that I think matter greatly.

On face coverings, my hon. Friend raises important questions about when there might be a legitimate reason for somebody to cover their face. The guidelines and the legislation that we are setting out will cover that, because police officers will have discretion to give an order requiring a face covering to be removed. Those commanding the policing of protests will therefore have discretion over when they ask for that instruction to be carried out.

Secondly, on pyrotechnics, the instruction is quite clear: the measure relates to those participating in the protest. If, particularly around Diwali or Guy Fawkes’s day—not a day that I think anybody in this House would ever celebrate—people who have bought fireworks happen to pass a protest, they will not be caught by the offence. It refers to participation in the protest.

On my hon. Friend’s point about war memorials, he and I know far too many names that have been etched on to those stones. We also know that protests on war memorials can tear open extremely painful wounds that have long been closed. That is why I think the British people, quite rightly, saw the protests on war memorials as so offensive. That is why it is right that the Government act against the small minority desecrating such an important place in our hearts.

On my hon. Friend’s question about counter-extremism, the work being done by Robin Simcox is hugely important, and we are doing an awful lot to tighten up various elements of our counter-extremism policy. Indeed, I hope very much that I will be leaving the Chamber very shortly to have a meeting on that subject. The reality is, however, that it is a very complex subject; the Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities is currently working on a definition of extremism alongside the Attorney General. There is an awful lot that we must do to ensure that groups that pose the danger of extremism are addressed in other ways. That is where cross-Government working has been so important in ensuring that groups are transparent in what they are doing, in who is funding them and in where they are targeting their attention.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Sir Roger Gale)]

I call the Father of the House.

[Sir Peter Bottomley (Worthing West) (Con)]

It is an honour to follow the hon. and gallant Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis), who has just put a question to my right hon. and gallant Friend the Minister for Security.

Some demonstrations are perfectly acceptable. For example, in my early years as an MP, in order to get a relief road, I escorted mothers and their prams down a major road. We went at three and a half miles an hour, which was faster than the traffic would have gone had we not been there on a demo. It was a Friday evening and people were trying to leave London. We got the relief road.

I also led a march from Speakers’ Corner to Trafalgar Square for the Cambridge Two—two social workers who were wrongly convicted and jailed for helping the homeless.

That is different from the kind of disaster that happens when there are crowd surges, especially if they are created by explosions, be they from firecrackers or other things. I was present at Óscar Romero’s funeral, when 14 people died around me from crushing because explosives or fireworks went off.

I was present at the Heysel stadium in 1985 when 39 Italians were crushed to death. Being able to control demonstrations, which should be held by agreement and understanding with the authorities, is vital for them to be safe.

On a more minor scale, there was a flash protest outside my constituency office yesterday by good-natured people who care about the people in Gaza. Had there been one young worker in that place when suddenly a flashmob appeared around them, it would have been discomfiting. I am sure that that would not be caught by these measures, and nor should it be, but I say to those doing such protests: “Think of others.”

I ask my right hon. Friend to remember a last point about disruption. When there was one of the Just Stop Oil or Extinction Rebellion demonstrations, in which people were allowed to sit around in the streets here—for far too long in my view—I said to one person who had flown in from Vancouver to join the protest that flying halfway across a continent and an ocean to help Extinction Rebellion was odd. I said, “What about the ambulances?” They said, “We’ll let them through.” I replied, “The ambulances are stuck 2 miles away. You can’t let them through. You must let people go about their ordinary business to save lives and for the prosperity of the country.”

I back the Government’s measures, and I hope my right hon. Friend knows that he will have support from across the House and the country for what he has proposed.

[Tom Tugendhat]

First, I thank the Father of the House for his support for these important measures, and indeed for his entirely correct observation that protest is not only necessary but important across the country. Every day, many protests happen politely, courteously and in ways that make their point without causing the kind of societal harms that, sadly, some cause. His longevity in this place, and indeed outside it, is a blessing to the House. He remembers the funeral of the late St Óscar Romero, whose extraordinary work was an inspiration to millions around the world. My hon. Friend reminds us not only that crying “Fire!” in a crowded theatre is not an expression of freedom of speech, but that, in this context, making an explosion in a crowded area can lead to human tragedy beyond expectation. The co-operation between protesters and the police is incredibly important for the protection of the public.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Sir Roger Gale)]

I call the SNP spokesperson.

[Amy Callaghan (East Dunbartonshire) (SNP)]

We in the SNP oppose these measures to clamp down on people’s right to protest, just as we opposed the Public Order Act 2023 and the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. On issues such as the Women Against State Pension Inequality campaign, Iraq, and Israel and Gaza, people from Scotland travel to London, to Westminster, to make their voices heard. People feel helpless in the wake of the Gaza situation, which is unfolding 24/7 on our social media feeds. They donate what they can during a cost of living crisis, and they boycott and protest. How does Westminster respond? It responds by cutting cost of living support, banning public bodies from investing ethically, and clamping down on the right to protest through measures that will impact certain people in society, particularly those living with disabilities.

Human rights lawyer Baroness Shami Chakrabarti has called out today’s announcement as “more culture war nonsense”. She highlighted that individuals may have reasons other than criminality for covering their faces:

“Should rape victims or refugees peacefully protesting really be punished for covering their faces to protect their identities?”

Is this not just another example of the Government pandering to their far-right wing, rather than protecting the legitimate right to protest? This Government are punishing the majority for a tiny minority’s actions, further fuelling their culture war. As for the detail the Minister outlined, a £1,000 fine is significant and unaffordable to people across these isles, but it is nothing to a Prime Minister who is willing to bet that exact amount on people’s lives.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I can honestly say that I am sorry, but not entirely surprised, that the SNP is choosing to make divisive politics out of what has been a moment of national unity. At many of these protests, we have seen extremely dignified individuals raising a point, whether about Gaza or antisemitism. We have heard courageous voices speaking out on all sides of these debates—individuals who have made their voices heard extremely clearly and in a dignified way—but sadly, some extremists have chosen this as the moment to spread hatred and fear and to stoke nationalism or division. I realise that that is something that the hon. Lady and I take different positions on, as after all, she represents a nationalist wing in our country. It is a great shame that she is choosing this moment to spread that hatred. I do wish that the Scottish nationalists would—[Interruption.] You are a nationalist party; therefore, you are Scottish nationalists.

[Amy Callaghan]

It is the Scottish National party.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Sir Roger Gale)]

Order.

[Tom Tugendhat]

As the Scottish nationalists who are represented in Parliament today have chosen to make a point out of this issue, I will just say that many people have protested across the whole of the United Kingdom in many dignified ways. We are seeking to make sure that those across our country who quite rightly wish to exercise their right to protest can do so in a safe and dignified way.

[Greg Smith (Buckingham) (Con)]

This is an important set of measures, and I welcome everything that my right hon. Friend has announced. Without seeking to interfere with the operational independence of the police, there should be a presumption of instant and immediate application of these new measures where offences occur. Too often in the protests we have seen since 7 October vile antisemitic posters have been displayed and banners have been carried unchallenged, only for the police—particularly the Metropolitan police—to put out appeals later asking, “Do you know this person?” That emboldens those who have these foul views to carry on, and it sends a much deeper and disturbing message, particularly to Jewish communities across the country, that the police are just letting those offences go by.

[Tom Tugendhat]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. That is exactly why the Home Secretary has already been speaking with police chiefs in the United Kingdom about the powers that will be provided. The police chiefs themselves have asked for the powers. He is also absolutely right that the level of antisemitism we have seen on our streets is simply vile and completely unacceptable, and it is also true that some of the symbols that are being carried and some of the flags that are being displayed are themselves radicalising, so action against them is so important. It is quite noticeable how many of the symbols that people claim should be culturally normalised in the UK are absolutely not tolerated in Muslim countries across the world, for the very clear reason that they do not speak for Muslim people—either in the UK or around the world—but are trying to speak for a narrow Islamist fringe that is utterly hateful and has no place in our society.

[Dame Diana Johnson (Kingston upon Hull North) (Lab)]

I am sure the Minister knows that the Home Affairs Select Committee has been carrying out an inquiry into the policing of protests after the horrific attacks of 7 October. I join both Front Benchers, the Minister and my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis) in thanking the police for the work they have done, keeping people safe on demonstrations and also upholding the law.

We on the Home Affairs Committee have taken evidence from the police, and although people should of course have the right to protest, we were very concerned about the effect that the number of protests is having on the number of rest days that are being cancelled for police officers in the Met, for example. More than 4,000 rest days have been cancelled, and the cost to the Met of policing those protests up to the end of December has been £18.9 million.

Will the Minister explain how these new laws will be supported with any additional resourcing that the police need? What more can be done to support the wellbeing of officers who are either deployed or abstracted to ensure that these protests can go ahead? In the light of Home Secretary’s comments this week about neighbourhood policing and how important that is, can the Minister reassure the House that resources will not be taken away from neighbourhood policing to deal with the policing of protests?

[Tom Tugendhat]

I pay tribute to the right hon. Lady’s work on the policing of protests. Her Committee has already had some important evidence sessions, which I have listened to in part, not in whole—forgive me. We will no doubt be seeing the work she pulls together at the end of that inquiry, and I shall read it with great interest.

It is worth saying that the pressure on policing across the United Kingdom from these protests has been significant. We recognise that, and we have been looking to support police forces, where appropriate, in whatever way is appropriate. It is certainly true that many police forces have been able to manage only because of the uplift in police numbers they have seen in recent years. Sadly, London, as the right hon. Lady knows, has not managed to use that uplift, which is a great shame. Frankly, I am sure that that is something the people of London will consider in the polls in May. Sadly, in Scotland as well, police numbers have fallen, whereas in the rest of the United Kingdom they have by and large risen. These are areas in which I know she will encourage people to make decisions according to how they have been governed, not just policed.

[Bob Blackman (Harrow East) (Con)]

Since the atrocities on 7 October, the regular hate marches that have taken place in London have forced Jewish Londoners to remove their kippahs, remove their Star of David necklaces and, in some cases, even vacate their homes because they are scared—and they are certainly scared to travel to central London when one of these hate marches is taking place. Only 16% of British Jews believe that the police treat antisemitism as equivalent to other forms of hate crime, and two thirds of British Jews believe that the police have double standards on these crimes. When these measures are introduced, will my right hon. Friend make sure that they are actually targeted at the people expressing hatred towards British Jews, and that those people are arrested and taken to court to answer for the charges that are made?

[Tom Tugendhat]

I thank my hon. Friend for his question, and he is absolutely right that the level of antisemitism we have seen has been utterly unacceptable and the fear that has been spread, sadly, among the Jewish community in the United Kingdom has been utterly vile. It is simply intolerable to have parts of our community feeling unsafe to walk, shop or do whatever they choose on the streets of our capital. It is completely wrong.

The powers in this instruction or ruling will be for the police to deploy as operationally appropriate. However, I am sure that police officers and police chiefs around the United Kingdom will have heard my hon. Friend’s point and will have recognised it. I should point out that, since the 7 October protests began, more than 600 arrests have been made in relation to those protests. The police take this extremely seriously, and about 30 of those arrests have been related to TACT—Terrorism Act 2000—offences. That should, I hope, reassure all communities across this country that this Government and these police officers take these offences extremely seriously, and they will be using all the powers at their disposal to protect everyone in the United Kingdom.

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

I am someone who knows the politics and lifestyle of Northern Ireland and who lived through the troubles, and we protested on many occasions, but the one thing we never did was wear a mask. I therefore very much welcome the legislation coming forward today. The right to protest is an important right in a democratic society and country, but I firmly believe that things should be done decently and in order, which means people having the courage of their convictions and having their face uncovered. People wearing a mask at a protest, whether they be pro-Hamas protesters or hunt saboteurs, are breaking the law, and I would be very pleased to see them jailed and fined for the activity of wearing a mask. Will the Minister outline how soon changes can be put in place, and whether discussions are ongoing with the Northern Ireland Assembly—it is back on its feet again, and Ministers are in place—to ensure that the legislation initiated here can apply across all of this great United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland?

[Tom Tugendhat]

I greatly welcome the hon. Member’s comments, but he will know that, perhaps not so often in Strangford, but some people did wear balaclavas in the protests that I saw in Northern Ireland.

[Jim Shannon]

I didn’t.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I am sure the hon. Member was not one of them; there is absolutely no suggestion that he could ever be one of them. I think that would surprise quite literally everyone in this House. I am grateful for his support. This measure will clearly need to be worked on, and we have already begun conversations with the Northern Ireland Office, but areas of work will be required across the United Kingdom. Police chiefs are already aware of this and have been asking for these powers, and that is why they are coming into place.

[Martin Vickers (Cleethorpes) (Con)]

The Minister’s statement will be welcome to the vast majority of decent, law-abiding citizens up and down the country, particularly in respect of the protection of war memorials. Although the proposed three months’ imprisonment or £1,000 fine might be suitable for some who are caught up in demonstrations, three months seems incredibly lenient for those who we can probably describe as “professional protesters”. Of course the final decision rests with the courts, but could a heavier period of imprisonment be available to them?

[Tom Tugendhat]

My hon. Friend raises an interesting point. Sadly, as is quite frequently the case, on the more serious occasions it would not be just one offence that was brought. I think this level of punishment represents, rightly, the offence that such actions cause, and the penalty is, I think, appropriate to that. It is of course possible that other charges will be brought alongside that.

[Clive Efford (Eltham) (Lab)]

I welcome the Minister’s statement, and I support the reference to protecting war memorials. As the son of someone who served in the second world war and as someone who grew up knowing people who lost comrades in the war, those memorials are often the only place where those people are commemorated, because they have no grave of their own, and such memorials should be protected in the way the Minister suggests. None the less, the detail of the proposals will require a great deal of scrutiny, so could he say a little more about where we will get that opportunity? The Criminal Justice Bill is now on Report. Are the measures an amendment to that? Will they be statutory instruments? When will we get the opportunity to scrutinise the Government’s proposals?

[Tom Tugendhat]

There will be amendments to the Criminal Justice Bill, which can be scrutinised on Report. I understand the hon. Member’s comments. These are limited and minor amendments, as he knows. They are measures that the police have been asking for, and they enjoy the support of the House for exactly the reason he gave.

[Robin Millar (Aberconwy) (Con)]

It is expected—and even reasonable—that those who lose the democratic debate in this place will take their protest on to the streets. However, we have seen a recent disturbing trend that the tactics of a minority now undermine and jeopardise the tradition of effective peaceful protest that we enjoy in this democracy. Does my right hon. Friend agree that the measures the Government have taken, and the measures he proposes today, are a reasonable response to such tactics, and that the tactics of the minority that have been employed, and that these measures address, are distorting and abusing the hard-won freedoms of this country to gather, to speak, and to protest peacefully?

[Tom Tugendhat]

My hon. Friend makes an extremely important point and if I may, I will build on it in combination with an earlier point. There are many people who served our country in various different ways over two world wars and in conflicts since then, whose memorials are either lost and known only unto God or are many thousands of miles away from their families. Families who have come to share our lives in the United Kingdom may have left behind them the graves of family members who served in those conflicts. I am thinking in particular of the 140,000 or so Muslim servicemen who served and lost their lives in the last two wars, of the many Jewish ex-servicemen who march as well, and of many others from around the world—from Africa, South America and Asia—who served in the pursuit of liberty and the defence of freedom in our country. This is their home now; those memorials remember their relatives and loved ones, and it is absolutely right that, for all communities in this country, we defend those moments of national memorial and the altars to liberty that they represent.

[Deidre Brock (Edinburgh North and Leith) (SNP)]

These measures may impact on those of my constituents who wish to protest outside this place or elsewhere over the border. The Minister says that enforcement actions will be taken by police officers at their discretion. How will the Government ensure that these measures will be applied uniformly, proportionately and appropriately across all of England’s police forces?

[Tom Tugendhat]

These are police powers, so the enforcement or application of them is operationally independent and down to the discretion of officers and chief constables as appropriate. That is how policing traditionally works. We do not have a national police force through which we can order police officers to arrest or not arrest individuals. We allow individual police officers to apply the law according to the guidelines that chief constables set out, and that is exactly what will happen in this circumstance.

Uddin Inquiry: Terms of Reference

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Tuesday 6th February 2024 Written Statements

[The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)]

On 9 November 2023, the Government announced the establishment of a statutory inquiry, to investigate the death of Mr Jalal Uddin in Rochdale, greater Manchester.

A copy of the terms of reference for the inquiry was placed in the Libraries of both Houses.

An inaccuracy has since been identified in the terms of reference and, in line with the Inquiries Act 2005, the chair of the inquiry, His Honour Edward Thomas Henry Teague KC, Chief Coroner of England and Wales, has been consulted about amending the terms of reference to correct the inaccuracy.

The amendment does not materially affect the operation or the remit of the inquiry.

In order to comply with section 6(3) of the Inquiries Act 2005, I will place a copy of the amended terms of reference in the Libraries of both Houses.

[HCWS245]

Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill: Public Consultation

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Monday 5th February 2024 Written Statements

[The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)]

Today the Government have launched a public consultation on the Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill. The Bill is also known as ‘Martyn’s Law’ in tribute to Martyn Hett, who was tragically killed alongside 21 others in the Manchester Arena terrorist attack in 2017.

The Government reaffirmed their commitment to introduce this important piece of legislation in the King’s Speech on 7 November 2023. Extensive engagement and support from security partners, business and victims’ groups, including Figen Murray and the Martyn’s Law Campaign Team, has enabled significant progress on the development of Martyn’s Law to date. The Government would like, once again, to pay particular thanks to Figen Murray for her tireless campaigning and the significant personal contribution she has made to progressing this Bill.

Overview

The threat picture is complex, evolving, and enduring, with terrorists choosing to attack a broad range of locations. Since the start of 2017 there have been 14 terror attacks in the UK. Too many have sadly lost their lives.

The Bill will ensure premises in the UK are better prepared for terrorist attacks by requiring them to take necessary but proportionate steps according to their capacity to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack and reduce harm. Our expert security partners strongly consider that even basic knowledge will help to protect the public in the event of an attack. Through the Bill, those responsible for premises will be better prepared and ready to respond in the event of a terrorist attack, thereby enhancing public safety.

Following an 18-week public consultation on proposals in 2021, the Government confirmed their intention to bring forward the Bill in December 2022. To ensure the measures can meaningfully enhance public safety while remaining proportionate, we requested that the Home Affairs Select Committee (HASC) conduct pre-legislative scrutiny of the draft Bill, which was published in May 2023.

Pre-legislative scrutiny, as well as our extensive engagement programme, provided important feedback from parliamentarians, businesses and other key stake-holders. This feedback particularly focused on the application of the proposals in relation to standard duty premises. These premises—the Standard Tier—are smaller, being largely those with a capacity of 100 to 799 individuals, e.g. many retail stores, bars, restaurants, theatres and village halls.

Next steps

On the strength of that feedback, we have revised the Standard Tier requirements to make them clearer and more proportionate, while ensuring they deliver on their primary objective: to implement simple procedures which could reduce harm and save lives in the event of a suspected attack. The consultation is focused specifically on this revised approach to the Standard Tier.

Consultation

This new approach is considered to be more proportionate, meaningful, effective and transparent than that previously agreed for the following reasons:



The purpose of the primary duty is now outcome-focused, aligns with comparable regimes—i.e. Health and Safety—and removes any previous assumptions around the Standard Tier requirements being too instructive and rigid, i.e. a “tick box” exercise.

It brings greater clarity to costs and expectations, i.e. the Standard Tier holds no legal requirement for premises to consider physical security measures, but focuses on procedures and the actions people working at the premises should take in response to an attack.

It measures all premises in scope against the same standard of “reasonably practicable”. This approach is better suited to the wide range of organisations that will be within scope of the Standard Tier because they will assess and implement procedures that are suitable for their individual circumstances. The “reasonably practicable” test includes what is financially feasible for premises.

We have moved away from a prescribed training requirement—i.e. a one size fits all package for all relevant staff. Instead, those responsible will be required to ensure that their procedures are adequately communicated and practised by relevant staff. Again, in implementing relevant procedures, those responsible will be held to a “reasonably practicable” standard.

The consultation seeks specific feedback on these measures to ensure the updated requirements proposed for Standard Tier premises are appropriate.

It also seeks respondents’ views on how any costs incurred by the Standard Tier requirements should be met and how premises currently meet similar obligations under Health and Safety and Fire Safety legislation.

The consultation will run until 18 March 2024 and is available on www.gov.uk. It is open to the public, and is targeted at organisations, businesses, and local and public authorities, and/or individuals who own or operate premises that the proposed Bill would affect. We particularly welcome views from those responsible for the smaller premises which would fall within the Standard Tier, especially those in the community and voluntary sector.

I am looking forward to concluding the consultation process, which will support the Government in finalising the legislation and ensuring it is robust and delivers on its core aims ahead of a formal introduction to Parliament.

A copy of the consultation will be placed in the Libraries of both Houses.

[HCWS240]

Draft Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (Remedial) Order 2023

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Tuesday 23rd January 2024 General Committees

[The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)]

I beg to move,

That the Committee has considered the draft Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (Remedial) Order 2023.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Hosie. The order was laid before the House on 18 October 2023. Maintaining our national security and keeping the public safe is a priority for the Government. The Investigatory Powers Act 2016, or the IPA, provides extensive and robust privacy safeguards in relation to investigatory powers. We rightly have world-leading standards in place on transparency, privacy, redress and oversight to accompany the exercise of these important powers.

The order will make necessary amendments to the IPA following the judgment of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in May 2021 in the case of Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom, which I will refer to as BBW. The Grand Chamber ruling related to the bulk interception regime under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, known as RIPA, which was was the predecessor to the IPA. The Grand Chamber found that there were violations of articles 8 and 10 of the European convention on human rights, which I will refer to as “the convention”.

Although most of the incompatibilities were addressed through the introduction of the IPA, one further change required primary legislation to implement. To be compliant with article 10 of the convention, the IPA’s bulk interception regime needed to include a requirement for prior independent authorisation for the use of criteria to select intercepted material for examination. Such a requirement applied where a purpose of the search was to find confidential journalistic material or information that could identify a source of journalistic material. The requirement also applied to searches carrying a high likelihood of confidential journalistic material or sources of journalistic material being selected for examination.

Finally, prior independent authorisation is also required for the retention of items containing confidential journalistic material or sources of journalistic material. Bulk interception warrants authorised the interception in bulk of communications. That material is then retained for the minimum amount of time necessary for the authorised purposes. Criteria are used to search through that material to find material useful for operational purposes. Useful material is then retained for the minimum amount of time necessary for the authorised purposes. It is the use of these criteria that will require judicial authorisation if a purpose of using them is to identify confidential journalistic material, or to identify or confirm a source of journalistic material, or if the use of them is highly likely to lead to such outcomes. Currently, section 154 of the IPA, which covers the journalistic safeguards for bulk interception, requires only that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner be informed if material thought to contain confidential journalistic material or sources of journalistic material is retained following examination for a purpose other than its own destruction.

There are additional safeguards in the interception code of practice that require the relevant intelligence agency to seek the agreement of a senior official within a warrant-granting department before the agency may select material for examination in order to identify or confirm a source of journalistic information. This remedial order therefore strengthens the existing safeguards. It does this by requiring that approval from the Investigatory Powers Commissioner be obtained before any criteria are used, with the purpose of that being to select material for examination that is confidential journalistic material or a source of journalistic material or where it will be highly likely to do so. The retention of confidential journalistic material or sources of journalistic material must also be authorised by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. There is also an urgency provision, which I will come to later. [Interruption.] It is an honour to see my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucester.

It is necessary that the Government make this change to the IPA, so that our intelligence agencies can maintain their ability to carry out bulk interception. It is an important operational tool, used to identify threats to national security—it was recognised by the Grand Chamber as such—tackle serious crimes and maintain the United Kingdom’s economic wellbeing.

The Investigatory Powers Commissioner already provides oversight of confidential journalistic material and sources of journalistic material obtained under bulk interception, but legislative change is needed to mandate those safeguards within the IPA. Failure to amend the IPA could result in applications for bulk interception warrants being refused.

The draft remedial order will reform three different areas of the IPA, by amending section 154, inserting proposed new section 154A, and making a minor amendment to section 229(8). The amendment to section 154 will introduce enhanced safeguards relating to the criteria used to select material for examination that will identify confidential journalistic material, or identify or confirm sources of journalistic material derived from material acquired through bulk interception. The permission of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner will be required before such material can be purposefully selected for examination, or knowingly retained for a purpose other than destruction.

Proposed new section 154A introduces an urgency process for dealing with requests that need to be approved out of hours for authorisations to use criteria to select material for examination. Such authorisations will be subject to subsequent judicial authorisation if the relevant condition is met. Activity must cease if that is not the case, so urgent applications will still be subject to rigorous judicial scrutiny.

The amendment to section 229(8) is a consequential amendment that includes references to the new functions of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner in section 154 and proposed new section 154A, so that they are treated consistently within the IPA. Section 229(6) and (7) require judicial commissioners not to act in a way that is contrary to the public interest, national security, the prevention or detection of serious crime, or the economic wellbeing of the United Kingdom. Subsection (8) then disapplies that requirement when the judicial commissioner is exercising various functions, such as considering whether to approve the authorisation of a bulk interception warrant.

Section 229(8) is amended by this draft statutory instrument to include decisions by the judicial commissioner under section 154, as amended, and proposed new section 154A. That is consistent with similar judicial commissioner functions in other parts of the IPA, and ensures that judicial commissioners can exercise their functions properly.

In summary, the changes will ensure that the United Kingdom is meeting its obligations under the convention and that the bulk interception regime is compliant with article 10 of the convention. The changes will also further strengthen the privacy safeguards contained in the IPA, in line with the BBW judgment, while continuing to give our intelligence agencies the powers and flexibility to keep our country safe. I commend the draft order to the Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

I am grateful to the Labour and SNP spokesmen for their comments, especially my friend the hon. Member for Barnsley Central, who correctly set out the reason why oversight is so important. It is right to place on the record my extreme gratitude to journalists in this country who, correctly, see their role as one of the guardians of our unwritten constitution. It is essential that we maintain the integrity of our political process, and journalism—good journalism—is part of doing that.

The hon. Gentleman tempts me to take various other lines, and of course it would be wrong of me not to praise the Scottish Conservatives, who have made such a fantastic impact on our national life, and who I look forward to seeing returned in much greater number after the coming election.

[The Chair]

Order. I think the Minister is out of scope.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I pay huge tribute in particular to Viscount and later Earl of Kilmuir, David Maxwell Fyfe, who was not only the first Home Secretary to have MI5 reporting to him rather than the Prime Minister, but one of the principal drafters of the European convention on human rights and a key individual in building the post-war order, in which British justice was used as the template for a new European convention.

[Richard Graham (Gloucester) (Con)]

Does this remedial order and its compliance with the ECHR worry or reassure allies with whom we share intelligence?

[Tom Tugendhat]

When we make it clear that the work we do, necessarily in secret, is supervised and checked against a legal basis, it hugely reassures our friends and partners. It assures them as well that we are not just a partner to be trusted, but a partner with which intelligence can be shared very freely, because of the clear legal oversight. This is a strong element in building the security and building up the trust that we need to keep our people safe. I commend the order to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Thursday 18th January 2024 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)]

I beg to move,

That the draft Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order 2024, which was laid before this House on 15 January, be approved.

I am grateful to the House for considering this draft order, which will finally see Hizb ut-Tahrir proscribed. The events of 7 October will be permanently ingrained on our minds. What Hamas did that day was barbaric. It was evil. Who can erase the images that we saw of mothers crying over their blood-soaked beds with their children missing, of teenagers gunned down at a festival of peace, or of women abducted, raped and slaughtered? Who among us could fail to be appalled by such depravity or to still feel the pain of those whose loved ones are hostages? Who could stay silent in the face of the worst pogrom against Jews on any day since the holocaust?

In the aftermath of 7 October, communities across the United Kingdom came together to condemn these vile acts and to stand with British Jews in their hour of grief. Not everyone, however, reacted with sorrow. Instead of horror, Hizb ut-Tahrir responded to the murder of civilians with elation. Instead of condemnation, it lavished Hamas with praise.

I want to make something very clear: I am a champion of freedom of speech, and I have no issue with people saying things that I regard as insensitive, uninformed or wrong, but this is different. Free speech includes neither the promotion of terrorism nor the celebration of terrorist acts. It is not acceptable to describe Hamas as the “heroes” of Palestine or the events of 7 October as a “long-awaited victory”. It is not acceptable to refer to the killing of Jewish tourists by an Egyptian police officer as

“a simple example of what should be done towards the Jews”.

It is not acceptable to call for so-called Muslim armies to rise up and carry out similar acts.

Hizb ut-Tahrir has antisemitism at its very core. It rejects democracy and engages in vile homophobia. As an organisation, it does not just reject British values; it seeks to undermine them. We will not let groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir abuse our freedoms. We will never tolerate the promotion or encouragement of terrorism. We have zero tolerance for antisemitism. Hizb ut-Tahrir must be proscribed.

Before I come to discuss the specifics of the order, I will set out some background on the proscription power. Currently, 79 terrorist organisations are proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000. For an organisation to be proscribed, the Government must believe that it is concerned in terrorism as set out in section 3 of the Act. If the statutory test is met, the Home Secretary must consider the proportionality of proscription and decide whether to exercise their discretion.

Proscription is a powerful tool with severe penalties, criminalising membership and invitations of support for organisations. It also supports other disruptive activity including immigration disruptions and terrorist financing orders. In short, the resources of a proscribed organisation are terrorist property and therefore liable to be seized.

A decision to proscribe is taken only after great care and consideration, given its wide-ranging impact. It must be approved by both Houses. Part 2 of the 2000 Act contains the proscription offences in sections 11 to 13. An organisation is proscribed if it is listed in schedule 2 to the Act. Article 2 of the order will add Hizb ut-Tahrir to the list in schedule 2 as a new entry.

We have carefully considered all the evidence. Hizb ut-Tahrir is concerned in terrorism. With the House’s consent, it will be proscribed, including all regional branches such as Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain.

Although I am unable to comment on specific intelligence, I can provide the House with a summary of the group’s activities. Hizb ut-Tahrir is an international political organisation with a footprint in at least 32 countries, including the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and Australia. Its long-term goal is to establish an expansionist caliphate ruled under Islamic law, with no fixed borders, seeking new territories to occupy in the name of jihad. That is its stated aim. Hizb ut-Tahrir’s headquarters and central media office are in Beirut, and its ideology and strategy are co-ordinated centrally.

The British branch, Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain, was established in 1986. It is afforded autonomy to operate in its local environment, but it is important to emphasise that it is part of a coherent international movement, and recognises the leadership of Hizb ut-Tahrir. The decision to proscribe therefore relates to Hizb ut-Tahrir, including all its regional branches. Any distinction between them is artificial.

There is evidence that Hizb ut-Tahrir is concerned in terrorism. Its central media office and several of its middle eastern branches have celebrated and praised the barbaric terrorist attacks on Israel and other nations’ citizens carried out by Hamas, which, as Members will be aware, are already a proscribed organisation.

[Mr Alistair Carmichael (Orkney and Shetland) (LD)]

Is the Minister aware that Zeyno Baran of the Hudson Institute has observed that the British chapter of Hizb ut-Tahrir is the “nerve centre” of the international movement? As is so often the case when dealing with terror organisations, the responsibility to protect our own citizens extends to citizens in other countries as well.

[Tom Tugendhat]

The right hon. Member is absolutely right that the unity of this organisation means that one branch cannot be separated from another. The UK branch is important when taking down the network around the world. That is why, as I will come to, this action is supported not just here but around the world.

As I mentioned earlier, recent activity includes an article attributed to Hizb ut-Tahrir’s Egyptian branch, which referred to the killing of Jewish tourists by an Egyptian police officer as

“a simple example of what should be done towards the Jews”.

The British branch is supportive of—and indeed, subservient to—its global leadership and policy positions. It demonstrates a hatred not just of Israel but of all Jews. Its promotion and encouragement of terrorism is inspired by an abhorrent antisemitic ideology.

Hizb ut-Tahrir has frequently referred to Hamas as the heroes of Palestine. Hamas are not heroes. Those who perpetrated the attacks on 7 October are monsters. Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain published an article on its website that described the 7 October attacks as a long-awaited victory that

“ignited a wave of joy and elation amongst Muslims globally”.

It is the Government’s view that the content included in that article and others like it betrays Hizb ut-Tahrir and Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain’s true ideology and beliefs. Hizb ut-Tahrir has regularly engaged in homophobic and antisemitic discourse. It rejects democracy, and its aims bear similarities to those of terrorist groups, including Daesh, which is already proscribed. Internationally, Hizb ut-Tahrir plays the mood music to which other terrorists dance.

This proscription will serve as a reminder that the United Kingdom does not and will never tolerate the promotion or encouragement of terrorism. It will send the message that promoting or encouraging Hamas’s sickening attack on 7 October is utterly unacceptable and at odds with the values of this country. By proscribing, we will reassert our unwavering commitment to fighting antisemitism, which has increased unacceptably in the United Kingdom and globally in recent months.

To the Jewish community in the United Kingdom, I say this: “We will always protect British citizens. We will do whatever it takes to protect you.” To British Muslim parents and to many mosques across the country, I say this: “We will remove this menace that claims to act in your name. Hizb ut-Tahrir does not represent Islam or Muslims. You are a crucial part of our nation and your Government is on your side.”

Before I conclude, I will make a couple of further points. First, the decision to proscribe is supported by our international partners. Hizb ut-Tahrir is banned in many countries around the world, including in Germany, and restrictions are placed on its activities in Austria. This is an organisation that does not believe in borders or the nation state, and that calls for the overthrow of every Government in the Islamic world. It has declared the custodian of the two holy places in Saudi Arabia, the Khadim al-Haramayn, an apostate, and has been banned in Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Following coup attempts in Jordan and Egypt, it has been banned in those countries as well. Its call for the caliphate is a colonial imperialist ambition from another age and gives legitimacy to others, including ISIS and al-Qaeda. When al-Nabhani split from the Muslim Brotherhood to found this organisation in 1953, it was to a great extent because he did not believe in its incrementalist policy of using democracy, but instead turned to violence and radicalising Muslim militaries to establish a single expansionist Islamist empire. This is an organisation calling for the conquest of India, Greece, Spain and France—anywhere, in fact, where Muslim armies once trod, even if that was over 1,000 years ago.

Let us not forget the impact of Hizb ut-Tahrir in the United Kingdom. One of its original leaders subsequently went on to set up al-Muhajiroun, a pernicious organisation, now also proscribed, with links to many of the perpetrators of Islamist-inspired attacks in recent years. We are taking this action to stop the pain and loss caused to countless families across our country who have lost loved ones to this cult. This proscription is important to protecting all communities across our country, and to standing with our allies and partners in nations from Indonesia to Morocco.

Proscription is a powerful tool. It will significantly hamper Hizb ut-Tahrir’s operations in the United Kingdom, and damage its activities and support for branches in other parts of the world. The United Kingdom must not be a hub for global terrorism: not today, not tomorrow, not ever. It will now be a criminal offence for a person to: belong to Hizb ut-Tahrir; invite or express support for Hizb ut-Tahrir; arrange a meeting in support of Hizb ut-Tahrir; and wear clothing, carry or display articles in public in such a way as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the individual is a member of, or a supporter of, Hizb ut-Tahrir. The penalties for conviction of proscription offences can be a maximum of 14 years in prison and/or an unlimited fine.

The first duty of Government is to keep our people safe, to guard the homes of our friends and fellow citizens, and to discourage any from going down the path of radicalisation that destroys lives. Nothing matters more. It is a tremendous responsibility and one that we approach with the utmost seriousness. The fight against terrorism demands constant vigilance. When there is a clear need for action to support that vital mission, we will not hesitate. I therefore urge the House to support this proscription order. It is a proportionate response to the promotion and encouragement of terrorism. It is a justified response to calls for violence and disorder, and it is necessary to defend our values and to protect all the communities of our great country.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

I pay tribute to Members for the tone in which the debate has been conducted. I place on record my thanks to the hon. Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis); it is a pleasure to stand with him again in protecting our country’s interest, this time a little closer to home. I also pay tribute to the hon. Member for Halifax (Holly Lynch), who was with him on the Opposition Front Bench earlier. She was an extremely able predecessor in his role and a great help.

I repeat the hon. Gentleman’s thanks to the intelligence services, who have done so much to prepare the evidence in various different ways which has enabled us to support these various actions, although much of the information has been public, so it has been able to prepare it in the usual way. I thank him for his comments about the way in which this work has been done. As he recognises, it has been a little quicker than we would normally go, but I am grateful that the Scottish National party and the Labour party recognise that there is an urgency to this matter and have supported it.

I will briefly answer the hon. Gentleman’s questions about the timing of the proscription. This is, quite rightly, detailed legal work. The judgment has to be made extremely carefully. It must be not only lawful but proportionate, and we must get that balance right. As others have mentioned, proscription is an extremely powerful tool. It is not a political tool or to be used at the whim of a Government or Minister to silence critics or debate. This tool should be used only to protect the British people from terrorism—that is its purpose. We need to make absolutely clear that we are using it appropriately and only when necessary. All of us in this House, I hope, support freedom of views and freedom of expression. We have all heard things we may not like, but we would defend the right of people to say them, and we must ensure we are extremely careful about that.

The hon. Gentleman raised a question about the definition of extremism. As he knows, we are working on that. I pay a huge tribute to those working on that and to the Government’s countering extremism adviser, Robin Simcox, who has been an extremely important voice in much of the debate. I thank Members on the Opposition Front Bench for their support.

I turn to my hon. Friend the Member for Brigg and Goole (Andrew Percy), who has been a good friend of mine, but more importantly a good friend to his community for a very long time. He is tireless in the campaign against antisemitism. He rightly identifies what we are seeing today as being in the mould of the fascist movements of the 1930s. We could easily mistake some of the words on the works of Hizb ut-Tahrir as coming from the voices of some of the fascist leaders of the 1920s. They bear a stark resemblance to them. He is absolutely right that the online activities must be banned, and he will be pleased to hear that they are: all activities by this group are banned.

My hon. Friend is also right to say that Jews should not be afraid to be in London at any time, and certainly not on a Saturday or a Sunday, when many people want to go out shopping or just to be with friends and family. These protests, sadly, have not only been vile demonstrations of some of the worst parts of our community, but radicalising moments in themselves. I know the police are aware of that; the Home Secretary and I have both spoken to them about that.

[Christian Wakeford]

I thank the right hon. and gallant Member for giving way. He joined me on the march against antisemitism several weeks ago when tens of thousands of people were saying no to Jew hatred. May I use this moment to say that there is a similar march in Manchester this weekend? If any Member wants to join us to say no to antisemitism, they would be more than welcome.

[Tom Tugendhat]

The hon. Gentleman will see me again on Sunday, as I will be there with him.

[Sir Desmond Swayne (New Forest West) (Con)]

May I suggest to my right hon. Friend that his Department look into the possibility of confining marches to a static location? The fact is that all people are currently being inhibited from attending central London at weekends and that is having a significant impact on commerce and shopping in the west end. I would not want to see demonstrations inhibited by having costs imposed on them, but it seems a perfectly reasonable compromise after so many marches to have static locations.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I thank my right hon. Friend for his suggestion. I shall certainly take that away and I am sure that my colleagues in the Department will come back to him.

May I just turn to the remarks of the hon. Member for Aberdeen North (Kirsty Blackman)? She rightly praised the Union of Jewish Students in Aberdeen and the work that it has done. The union has done some incredibly important work around the United Kingdom in our universities, which have seen a rise in antisemitism on their campuses. I have already spoken to Universities UK and the Russell Group about that. We simply cannot tolerate this. It is simply unacceptable to see students excluded from education because of the vile hatred of others. It is wrong. It is unBritish and it will not be tolerated.

The hon. Lady will understand—I hope that she forgives me—why for very obvious reasons I will not go into the actions that the police and other organisations may be taking, but she can be assured that conversations have been had that will lead to actions as soon as possible to ensure that this proscription, once authorised by both Houses, will not be sitting idly on the books and will be enforced as she would rightly expect.

[Kirsty Blackman]

Just before the Minister finishes on that point, will he commit to updating us, even if it is some time down the line, about the impact that those actions have had, to assure us that they have worked?

[Tom Tugendhat]

Absolutely, I will do that. I hope the House forgives me if I sound slightly coy in the way that I put this, but I will update the hon. Lady as soon as I can in the most appropriate way possible.

I now turn to the comments of my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith), who noted that we were both sanctioned by the Chinese state. I can add both the Iranian and Russian Governments, and after today, I think he will be joining me in at least one of those. What we are seeing is a pattern of violence, as he rightly identifies. It has spread out of Tehran over many decades and has had an influence on many different groups, including, as he correctly identifies, in the Red sea in this latest episode of Houthi piracy. We are incredibly aware of that, which is why the Government have rightly taken action. The Prime Minister was absolutely clear immediately that we should stand not just with our American allies, but with many others around the world in making sure that we defend freedom of navigation and that we protect those people working on ships, who are from very diverse backgrounds and have been targeted by this violence in recent months. Sadly, we have seen the murder of crews and ship workers by Houthi rebels in the Red sea, and it is right that we take action. I am grateful to the Prime Minister for his clear and determined response.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green also raised the question of dealing with state actors in this matter. This is something that he and I have discussed in the past. I draw the House’s attention to the recent introduction of the National Security Act 2023, which gives extraordinary and extra powers to our intelligence and police services to make sure that they may take action not just against intelligence services but against any who are supporting them and working with them. It is not, I admit, the same as proscription, but it does give a huge range of authority to our community to make sure that it is properly defended against the threats that we see.

It would be wrong of me to comment further on proscription options that we may be holding in reserve. As Members will know, for very clear reasons these are matters that we do not discuss until we are ready to announce them. None the less, it is absolutely right to say that we are taking the state abuse of our citizens, or the intervention of states in our Government or economic processes, extremely seriously. That sits alongside the National Security and Investment Act 2021 and hopefully demonstrates clearly to the whole House that we will not tolerate foreign interference or foreign aggression on our soil, or illegitimate uses by foreign intelligence services of organisations within the United Kingdom that are designed to do us harm.

The hon. Member for Bury South, who I will be seeing on Sunday, also spoke about front groups, and he was absolutely right to do so. If there are aliases or name changes, provisions can be changed quickly. That is covered under the Terrorism Act 2000. Should it be necessary, we will update the House, but Members can be assured that simply changing a name does not avoid proscription.

The right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael) spoke about advocating violence and the challenge of radicalisation in what we are seeing. I draw the House’s attention to the fact that the independent reviewer of Prevent, Sir William Shawcross, has just published his report. He has done what I think is a magisterial piece of work, which highlights areas where we need to update and change policies. We have accepted his recommendations and are in the process of making sure that the Prevent duty, as it applies to this country, is there to help and protect families across this country not just from the effects of violence, but from the effects of radicalisation. The pain that many families must feel when their children are torn away into these cult-like organisations is horrific, and it is quite right that we protect families from every community across this country.

That is where the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) is right as well. Of course this action applies across the whole of the United Kingdom and of course we will be having conversations with police forces across the whole of the United Kingdom. I regularly communicate with the PSNI, which is a very important part of our national police presence and a very effective police force. I am grateful to the hon. Member for his comments and support. This action is about protecting the whole of the United Kingdom against terror. Sadly, his part of the United Kingdom has experienced far too much of that, although I remember very clearly, as a child here in London, the effects of Northern Irish terror being felt on the underground and on the buses, where, sadly, too many people were also killed and maimed.

On that, I thank the House for this debate. I hope that this motion will go through as intended to ensure that this country is better protected.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That the draft Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order 2024, which was laid before this House on 15 January, be approved.

Oral Answers to Questions

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Monday 15th January 2024 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)]

Apologies for my hesitation, Mr Speaker. I was so busy listening to the heckling opposite that it was difficult to focus on what was going on.

This question is about something of which we should be very proud. The fact is that fraud ruins lives, but this Government have managed to get it down by 13% year on year, online and offline. It is extremely important that we continue with that ambitious agenda and ensure that we continue to cut fraud so that we can bring it down completely by the end of the Parliament.

[Nigel Mills]

Would my right hon. Friend agree that the key to reducing levels of fraud is to help people to understand what might be a fraud so that they are not taken in by it? Is there more that we can do to help people to spot the signs and not become a victim in the first place?

[Tom Tugendhat]

The question about what is a fraud is becoming all too prevalent. We have heard of many different kinds of fraud coming up in many different areas, which is why in a few weeks’ time we will, I hope, launch a new comms campaign about it. The truth is that fraud affects so many people in so many ways, and we are trying to make sure that people know what is going on so they can claim the help and support that they need, to make sure that we defeat this pernicious evil.

[Grahame Morris (Easington) (Lab)]

We simply do not have the resources or expertise to tackle fraud. I have a constituent who is still waiting for a charging decision five years after being the victim of fraud. Her retirement has been ruined waiting for the police and the Crown Prosecution Service to make the charging decision. Durham constabulary has a single forensic account. Does the Minister believe, as I do, that a lack of specialist resources is leading to unacceptable delays in justice?

[Tom Tugendhat]

I completely understand the hon. Gentleman’s point, and that is exactly why this Government have introduced a new national fraud squad—which is now almost fully recruited, at 400—and increased the funding available to forces to fight fraud. Some forces are doing exceptionally well at this already. Avon is doing extremely well and the City of London police is doing exceptionally well in leading on fraud nationally.

[Steven Bonnar (Coatbridge, Chryston and Bellshill) (SNP)]

3. What discussions he has had with the Scottish Government on recent changes to legal migration rules.

--- Later in debate ---

[Nigel Mills (Amber Valley) (Con)]

T3. I am sure the Home Secretary would agree that anti-extremism training in Departments is extremely important. What more can the Government do to ensure that it is training to tackle extremism, rather than anti-Government and party bias training?

[The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)]

My hon. Friend will have seen recently a pretty extraordinary report on allegations about extremism and the failure to train properly, and what is going on in universities around the United Kingdom. In one recent problematic case, it was said that it is very hard to define what a terrorist is. We know what a terrorist is, the law knows what a terrorist is and this Government know what a terrorist is, and that is exactly why we have just proscribed Hizb ut-Tahrir.

[Mr Speaker]

I call the shadow Home Secretary.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jack Lopresti (Filton and Bradley Stoke) (Con)]

What steps is my right hon. Friend taking to provide advice to police forces across the country to help them support communities during the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas?

[Tom Tugendhat]

My hon. Friend is right to ask that question, because sadly, we have seen an absolutely vile upsurge in antisemitism on our streets. We have seen people who claim to be speaking out for equality and justice actually defending people who take slaves, who violate women’s and girls’ rights, and who here in our own country make the Jewish community feel uncomfortable. That is exactly why this Government have committed £18 million to the Community Security Trust. Very sadly, we have also had to commit £7 million to academic security, because there has also been a massive increase in antisemitism in universities. We are combating all of that.

[Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

How many times must a demonstration in the same cause be repeated, week in and week out, before the well-funded organisers become liable to pay for at least part of the policing costs?

Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Wednesday 10th January 2024 Written Statements

[The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)]

Section 19(1) of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 requires the Secretary of State to report to Parliament as soon as reasonably practicable after the end of every relevant three-month period on the exercise of their TPIM powers under the Act during that period. The level of information provided will always be subject to slight variations based on operational advice.

UK-US Data Access Agreement: First Year of Use

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Tuesday 19th December 2023 Written Statements

[The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)]

The first duty of any Government is to keep the United Kingdom and its people safe. As the Department responsible for public safety and national security, one of our key priorities is ensuring our law enforcement and intelligence agencies have access to the tools, capabilities and data they need to ensure public safety. The groundbreaking UK-US data access agreement (“the agreement”) is one of these tools.

The agreement allows UK agencies to submit requests for content of communications directly to communications service providers, including social media platforms and messaging services, located in the United States. This must be for the purpose of investigating, preventing, detecting, and prosecuting serious crime. This has allowed our agencies access to more data, more quickly than ever before.

Since the agreement entered into force in October 2022, the UK has made more than 10,000 requests to these US companies. All of these requests have provided UK law enforcement and intelligence agencies with critical data to tackle the most serious crimes facing UK citizens including terrorism; child sexual exploitation; drug trafficking; and organised crime.

The direct benefits derived from data provided under the agreement to UK agencies have been across the full spectrum of serious crime. This has included:

identifying the location of illegal firearms suppliers and their locations for storing weapons. This led to arrests and also the seizure of cash and heroin found at the same site;

supporting high-priority child sexual exploitation investigations, which has resulted in the safeguarding of vulnerable children from harm and the arrest of those suspected of committing offences against children;

providing UK law enforcement with the information to locate and arrest an individual suspected of murder who had been attempting to abscond from the UK;

identifying a boat being used to traffic class A drugs, leading to the seizure of over 1.5 tonnes of class A drugs;

enabling the investigation of an organised crime group engaged in the laundering of cash obtained through the sale of non duty-paid alcohol in the UK; and

advancing broader law enforcement operations linked to preventing gang violence and the purchase and supply of illegal firearms.

These outcomes would not have been possible without the critical data provided under the agreement.

It is clear that the access to data the agreement provides is crucial in protecting our children and the wider public from harm. My officials will continue to work closely with operational partners over the coming years to maximise the benefits the agreement provides and ensure His Majesty’s Government are able to continue to protect the public and keep the country safe. I also welcome continued engagement and support from the communications service providers on this important issue.

[HCWS152]

Crown Dependencies: Beneficial Ownership Transparency

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Tuesday 19th December 2023 Written Statements

[The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)]

Illicit finance is an active and growing threat to the national security of the UK family. As set out earlier this year in the UK’s second economic crime plan, illicit finance fuels serious and organised crime, threatens our institutions, and enables kleptocrats to establish a financial foothold. That is why in 2016, the UK set up our own publicly accessible register of beneficial ownership, the people with significant control (PSCs) register, which was the first of its kind in the world. Seven years later, many other countries and jurisdictions around the world have joined us.

We are still working with others to achieve this aim. The UK and Crown dependencies (CDs) have a history of working together as partners to strengthen our economic defences against illicit finance. Publicly accessible registers of beneficial ownership are an essential tool in this fight.

In 2019, the Bailiwick of Jersey, Bailiwick of Guernsey and Isle of Man (the Crown dependencies) committed to implement publicly accessible registers of beneficial ownership in line with the principles adopted by the European Union.

In December 2022, following the ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the CDs issued a statement announcing that they were pausing work on their public commitments while they sought legal advice.

According to Transparency International, 14 EU member states have maintained public access to their beneficial ownership registers. Gibraltar has also maintained a publicly accessible beneficial ownership register since 2020 and has not noted any negative economic impacts resulting from the implementation of its public register. The UK is satisfied with the lawfulness of our own publicly accessible registers and continues to believe that the CDs could legally implement public registers of their own.

The Home Office has been actively engaging the CDs to understand their position. As the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for Macclesfield (David Rutley) set out in the Backbench Business debate on 7 December, there have been discussions with the CDs on providing access to beneficial ownership information to those with a legitimate interest, such as media and civil society organisations who are involved in the fight against illicit finance and money laundering.

Legitimate interest access would bring the CDs into line with the EU, where the CJEU judgment notes that EU member states must continue to enable access to those with “legitimate interest”. For the CDs to implement legitimate interest access would be a very significant step forward in beneficial ownership transparency and improve the security of the UK and the wider British family. Nevertheless, the UK Government are still committed to publicly accessible registers becoming the global norm.

The Home Office has made our expectations clear that the CDs should implement registers with legitimate interest access in the coming year. On 13 December, the CDs published their commitments on beneficial ownership transparency.

The CDs state that they will deliver obliged entity access—such as financial services businesses and certain other businesses in their jurisdictions who are required to conduct due diligence—during 2024. I consider that delivering obliged entity access across the CDs has been slower than it should be, given the need to protect our financial institutions from use by hostile states, terrorists and criminals. This recognition of commitment is still welcome.

I welcome the CDs’ press release, stating their commitment to developing and delivering legitimate interest access to their beneficial ownership registers, confirming that access to the information on their registers

“will be extended to include those media and civil society organisations who can demonstrate a legitimate interest in accessing relevant information in order to combat financial crime”.

I look forward to seeing this commitment being adopted by the appropriate CD Parliaments.

The CDs have said that their definition of legitimate interest access will be developed having due regard to international good practice, including finalisation of the EU’s sixth anti-money laundering directive (6AMLD) which is anticipated in early 2024, as well as in line with relevant European judgments such as the 2022 CJEU ruling. The CDs also note that the EU negotiating text for 6AMLD recognises groups who may have a legitimate interest as being those

“conducting business transactions, civil society, journalists, law enforcement and higher education”.

The CDs state that they will present proposals to their Parliaments for agreement on the definition and implementation of legitimate interest by Q4 2024 at the latest. Given that the original commitments were made in 2019 and the increasing use of finance to co-ordinate action against the interests of the British people and the wider British family, this is not the pace that I expect, and I urge the CDs to work as quickly as possible next year to implement these commitments. Parliament will wish to consider these commitments and closely monitor the situation.

[HCWS151]