Chinese "Overseas Police Service Stations"
Tom Tugendhat Excerpts(1 year, 6 months ago)
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The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)
Last November, I committed to update the House on the response to media reporting of unofficial Chinese “police service stations.” The Minister for Crime, Policing and Fire reiterated this commitment in April.
Reports by the non-governmental organisation Safeguard Defenders claimed that there were three Chinese “police service stations” in the UK—in Croydon, Glasgow and Hendon. Further allegations have been made about an additional site in Belfast.
These reports alleged that, while these “police service stations” are officially set up in countries across the world to conduct administrative tasks to support Chinese nationals residing abroad, they are also used to monitor and harass diaspora communities and, in some cases, to coerce people to return to China outside of legitimate channels.
The police have visited each of the locations identified by Safeguard Defenders, and carefully looked into these allegations to consider whether any laws have been broken and whether any further action should be taken. I can confirm that they have not, to date, identified any evidence of illegal activity on behalf of the Chinese state across these sites. We assess that police and public scrutiny have had a suppressive impact on any administrative functions that these sites may have had.
However, these “police service stations” were established without our permission and their presence, regardless of whatever low-level administrative activity they were performing, will have worried and intimidated those who have left China and sought safety and freedom here in the UK. This is unacceptable.
The Chinese authorities regularly criticise others for what they see as interference in their internal affairs, yet they felt able to open unattributed sites without consulting the UK Government. It is alleged that this was a pattern repeated around the world.
The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office has told the Chinese embassy that any functions related to such “police service stations” in the UK are unacceptable and that they must not operate in any form. The Chinese embassy has subsequently responded that all such stations have closed permanently. Any further allegations will be swiftly investigated, in line with UK law.
I hope that this clarifies what we know about these alleged “police service stations” and the action that we have taken. The 2023 Integrated Review Refresh makes it clear that we want to engage and partner with China on key issues where it is in our national interest to do so. However, the UK will always put national security first.
Let me be clear: any attempt by any foreign power to intimidate, harass or harm individuals or communities in the UK will not be tolerated. This is an insidious threat to our democracy and fundamental human rights. That is why I asked the Defending Democracy Taskforce to review the UK’s approach to trans-national repression to ensure that we have a robust and joined-up response across Government and law enforcement. Understanding and combating this kind of interference is a key pillar of our taskforce’s efforts.
The National Security Bill, now in its final stages, represents the biggest overhaul of state threats legislation in a generation, and will drastically improve our tools to deal with the full range of state threat activity, regardless of where it originates. The Bill contains provisions that will leave those seeking to coerce, including through threats of violence, for, or with the intention to benefit, a foreign state liable to prosecution in a way that they currently are not. Those convicted could face up to 14 years in prison. I urge Parliament to quickly pass the Bill so that its powers can be used to clamp down on foreign interference and trans-national repression.
I look forward to working closely with this House to further protect our democracy.
[HCWS822]
Interpol General Assembly 2024
Tom Tugendhat Excerpts(1 year, 7 months ago)
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The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)
I am pleased to inform the House of the date and location for the UK hosted Interpol General Assembly in 2024.
Interpol and the UK have agreed that the General Assembly will take place between 4 and 7 November 2024 in Glasgow. The city brings experience of hosting COP26 in November 2021, the largest event of its kind that the UK has ever hosted. The agreement followed consultation with the NCA, Scottish Government, Police Scotland and other delivery partners and stakeholders.
The Government are committed to global safety, protecting our citizens, and working with the rest of the world to combat criminal threats. Hosting the Interpol General Assembly highlights this steadfast commitment to make the world a safer place. It is a key opportunity to drive innovation and leadership in international police co-operation and tackle major crime trends and security threats facing the world, including serious and organised crime, counter-terrorism and fraud.
The event at Glasgow’s Scottish Event Campus (SEC) next year will be Interpol’s 92nd conference, bringing together over 1,000 senior delegates from across Interpol’s 195 member countries. The General Assembly is Interpol’s highest governing body and the largest global gathering of senior law enforcement officials and heads of ministries. The General Assembly meets annually and is responsible for major decisions affecting general policy and resources. This event will include elections for 10 key leadership posts, including the new Secretary General.
In the run-up to November 2024, the UK Government will continue to work with key stakeholders to make the event a success for the whole of the United Kingdom, for Glasgow and for Interpol.
[HCWS785]
Oral Answers to Questions
Tom Tugendhat Excerpts(1 year, 7 months ago)
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Martin Vickers (Cleethorpes) (Con)
The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)
We recently launched our strategy to tackle fraud, alongside measures in the Online Safety Bill that will require companies to prevent fraud and measures in the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill to hold companies to account for fraud committed by their employees. We are also working with tech companies to agree other measures and improving the support we give to victims.
Nigel Mills
We know that 80% of fraud starts online, and 18% comes from the tech companies that the Minister talked about, yet they do not contribute anything to reimbursing the victims of fraud, despite effectively profiting from causing it. Is it not time that we considered asking them to contribute towards reimbursing some of the losses that they are introducing into the system?
Tom Tugendhat
My hon. Friend is raising questions that we have looked at closely in the fraud strategy, and he is absolutely right to highlight the disparity between those who are causing and those who are paying. This is a conversation that we have been having, and I look forward to identifying some areas soon for further discussion. Action Fraud has not always helped as well as it might, which is why we are looking at making the system more efficient.
Mr Mohindra
At my surgery in Sarratt last month I met Catherine, whose father was defrauded out of thousands after taking a call from a man who he thought worked for Virgin Media. Catherine only found out after her father unfortunately passed away and she found all the emails he had sent attempting to get his money back—a battle that Catherine has now taken on. Can the Minister tell the House what he is doing to stop vulnerable people being targeted by fraudsters?
Tom Tugendhat
May I offer absolute sympathy to Catherine? Sadly, although my hon. Friend is citing the case of an older man who was the target of crime, this is a crime that affects many people of all ages across our society. It is not specifically connected to the most vulnerable; rather, it predominantly affects people who are online more often, which, as one can imagine, includes many people across society. We are rolling out the nationwide economic crime victim care unit across England and Wales, for victims whose cases are not investigated by the police. This group will help victims to recover from fraud and cyber-crime, and will significantly reduce the likelihood of repeat victimisation.
Martin Vickers
I welcome Minister’s proposal that Action Fraud should have greater capacity. I have experienced a number of constituency cases where elderly people were robbed of their life savings and there was a feeling that insufficient priority was being given to this issue. Will the Minister give an assurance that there will be a renewed focus on dealing with these scams, which destroy people’s lives?
Tom Tugendhat
I can absolutely give that commitment. These scams, which to some people appear victimless, are sadly anything but. The connection to serious mental health issues that follow is sadly all too clear, and many of us in our constituency work have come across individuals for whom these events have resulted in extreme suffering and sometimes even worse.
Seema Malhotra (Feltham and Heston) (Lab/Co-op)
It is staggering that fraud now accounts for almost half of crime, yet barely any of those crimes are investigated, and less than 0.1% of them make it to court. Hardly anything seems to be being done to upgrade police technology and practice to help deal with that. Seriously, what are the Government doing that will make any sort of difference?
Tom Tugendhat
The hon. Lady will have heard only a few weeks ago that we launched our new fraud strategy, which includes 400 officers in the national fraud squad and increased resources of some £400 million to help police forces across the country. A lot of that work has already started, and a lot of it still has to be done. We are making sure that that focus is there because, as she correctly says, 40% of crime is fraud. The UK, sadly, has received too many attempts to defraud our people, for several reasons. One reason is the way our banking system works and the speed of banking in the UK, and another is the English language, which I am afraid makes it significantly easier for fraudsters overseas to act against our people. It is true that a significant amount of that crime is not here in the UK but abroad, so working with partners around the world is important.
Clive Efford (Eltham) (Lab)
There were 3.7 million instances of fraud last year. Will the Minister say why only 0.1% of cases make it to court?
Tom Tugendhat
We are working on that challenge with the Ministry of Justice, and the hon. Gentleman is right to highlight it. Often, the reason is that many of those crimes are committed abroad or are not followed up. Sometimes, that is because people are embarrassed to report them, which is a great shame because they should not be embarrassed—they are crimes like any other. Often, it is because it is very difficult to collect evidence. That is exactly why we have launched the new national fraud squad to help police forces across the country, working with the regional and organised crime units to bring not just the evidence but eventually the prosecution through the Crown Prosecution Service, to make sure that we have not just reports of fraud but prosecutions and convictions.
Emma Hardy (Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle) (Lab)
Just over a year ago, the anti-fraud Minister Lord Agnew resigned in anger at the billions being lost and written off in covid fraud payments. He said to the Treasury Committee on which I sit:
“There is not anybody who would condone a weak system that allows money to fall into the laps of crooks, and that is what I saw happening.”
Lord Agnew was a Conservative Minister. Can the Minister tell us what has changed, if anything, such as the amount of money in covid fraud payments recovered or the attitude of the Treasury?
Tom Tugendhat
As the hon. Lady knows well, this Government take fraud very seriously in these matters. I say that with absolute confidence because we have just worked up a national fraud strategy for the first time in many years. We have the money and the commitment, and now we have the officers behind it. This is an extremely important area of crime that we have been taking seriously in order to ensure that it reduces alongside other areas of crime. That is exactly what this Government will do.
Naz Shah (Bradford West) (Lab)
According to the Government, fraud is now the most common crime in the UK, costing almost £7 billion a year, with one in 15 people falling victim. The number of victims has skyrocketed amid the cost of living crisis, and victims are left without hope. Police forces up and down the country are crying out for resources to tackle the ever growing and advancing ways in which criminals exploit people to commit fraud. If the Government care and are serious about fraud and its victims, why do Ministers persistently exclude fraud from crime statistics?
Tom Tugendhat
That is a slightly strange question, because fraud is in the Crime Survey of England and Wales, so I simply do not understand which surveys the hon. Lady is looking at. She may be thinking of the crime surveys before 2010, which are hard to compare because Labour did not count fraud—but we do.
Information Orders Code of Practice: Consultation
Tom Tugendhat Excerpts(1 year, 7 months ago)
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The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)
The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA) contains a comprehensive package of measures designed to make the recovery of unlawfully held assets more effective. The operation of certain powers within POCA are subject to guidance in various codes of practice issued by the Home Secretary, the Attorney General and the Advocate General for Northern Ireland, the Department of Justice Northern Ireland and Scottish Ministers.
A new code of practice needs to be made to reflect possible changes made to POCA by the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill (ECCT Bill) [1]. Subject to its commencement, the ECCT Bill will make amendments to part 7 of POCA to create additional Information Order powers that will assist the National Crime Agency (NCA) with operational analysis of information that is relevant to money laundering or suspected money laundering and/or terrorist financing or suspected terrorist financing. It will also assist the NCA with strategic analysis identifying trends or patterns in the conduct of money laundering or terrorist financing, or systemic deficiencies or vulnerabilities which have been or are being likely to be, exploited for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing. For clarity, the title of ‘Further Information Orders’ in this part of POCA, will be replaced with ‘Information Orders’.
It is also intended that the additional Information Order powers will be replicated in part III of the Terrorism Act 2000 (TACT).
POCA and TACT provide that before a code of practice is issued, I must consider any representations made, modify the code as appropriate, and subsequently lay the code before Parliament for approval.
I am today launching a consultation on the following code of practice:
Code of practice issued under section 339ZL to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and section 22F to the Terrorism Act 2000 about certain Information Orders.
A copy of the consultation document and the draft code of practice will be placed in the Libraries of both Houses and published on www.gov.uk.
Following this consultation, I intend to lay a statutory instrument to issue this code of practice under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA) and the Terrorism Act 2000 (TACT) to reflect changes as a result of the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill.
[1] This is subject to powers being inserted into POCA by the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill being passed by Parliament and receiving Royal Assent.
[HCWS772]
Public Order Act 2023
Tom Tugendhat Excerpts(1 year, 7 months ago)
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The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)
It feels slightly churlish for a Conservative to get in the way of a family dispute between the SNP and Labour, but if I may answer on behalf of His Majesty’s Government, I will begin by giving a little praise and thanks to the hon. Member for North East Fife (Wendy Chamberlain). As a serving police officer, she did a huge amount for her community and our country. It is wonderful to have her voice in this Chamber. I must, however, disagree with the points she made.
A lot of the aspects of these debates have been focused on the nature of protest. The reality is that this is not a debate about the nature of protest. It is not a debate about the right of free citizens to associate on the streets to call for or against Government policies. It is not a debate about the ability of individuals, from anywhere across these islands, to protest about whether their fellow citizens should or should not be allowed to do things. It is not even a debate about whether we in this House should or should not encourage, or dissuade fellow citizens from certain actions. No, this is a debate about whether or not a small minority of people should be allowed to use disruption as protest: to use disruption as a way of stopping others from conducting their lives—
Tom Tugendhat
I won’t, thank you. As the hon. Gentleman spoke for as much time as my hon. Friend the Member for Bury North (James Daly), I am sure he will give me the few moments I have to close.
This is about whether a few people can use disruption, instead of allowing many to associate, to express their views and to just go about their business as they have every right to do. It is absolutely essential that we stick to that point because that is exactly why the then Scottish Justice Secretary Keith Brown—I am still rather a fan of his, actually, but I know I am probably unique in that in this Chamber—supported it. He welcomed it and agreed it. As a former royal marine, he knows about order and discipline, so I am delighted that he did so. He welcomed it because he knows that protest is absolutely legitimate, but disruption and the use of disruption to silence others, to stop people going about their business and to dissuade others from expressing their views is not.
That is really quite something, but I suppose the main point of the debate is not really about protest at all, is it? Here, I am slightly drawn to the hon. Member for Croydon—the one opposite me, the hon. Member for Croydon Central (Sarah Jones), rather than the one who sits next to me, the Minister for Crime, Policing and Fire, my right hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp). She pointed out correctly that this is really—
Tom Tugendhat
Three of you. Well, there we go, aren’t I lucky?
The hon. Lady pointed out correctly that this debate is not about protest at all; it is actually about distraction. It is about distracting people in Scotland and across these islands from what we are really seeing here, which is a Scottish Nationalist party that has lost its way. It is talking about protest because it does not want to talk about policing. When I go to Gartcosh, I see the extraordinary efforts of the British security services in all their different ways, whether Police Scotland, MI5, the different elements of His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs or the National Crime Agency working together. I see an extraordinary panoply of officers who are doing their best for the country in ways that inspire huge respect for anybody who has the pride and security of our nation at heart.
However, every time I go, one thing comes up from the Police Scotland officers—fine individuals led by a very impressive chief constable. Every time, they point out that, despite Barnett formulas and equal availability of cash—in fact, despite higher taxes—the number of police officers in Scotland is going down. In England and Wales, it is going up. Crime in England and Wales is going down but, sadly, in Scotland crime is going up. It is not just about criminal justice or the ability of our fellow citizens across these islands to live and enjoy their lives freely without fear of persecution or being attacked by fellow citizens or others—it is across the board.
Despite well over a decade of absolute rule in Holyrood, the SNP has let down people in Scotland time and again. Education results are down, avoidable deaths are up, poorest student numbers are down and taxes are up. Again and again, a catalogue of failure and a pattern of wasted opportunity, wasted money and wasted lives are ruining opportunities for people across our islands.
I have been told several times today that this debate is relevant to the SNP because there is a small element of possibility, through the British Transport police, that connects it to Scotland. I have also been told that it is relevant because Scottish people can come down and protest in Westminster. It is also true that people across the whole of the United Kingdom have had the great benefit over hundreds of years of Scotland’s huge successes: the Scottish enlightenment, the great universities of Edinburgh and Glasgow, and the huge opportunities of the industrial and economic revolution that came out of Scotland. They have enriched and empowered us all.
It is right that we as British citizens hold the SNP to account for its failure in letting down all the British people across these islands, because it is not just in Scotland that the failure is felt. As a Unionist, I can say passionately that I feel that failure across the whole of the United Kingdom. It is absolutely unacceptable to be silent when we see Scottish people being so ill served by such a failed Administration.
Let me come back to the Public Order Act—[Interruption.] To great cheers from the SNP Benches. The Act was passed and then saw one of the greatest moments of assembly in London that we have seen in many years. Many people protested peacefully. Many people said “Not my King”, although constitutionally that is an odd statement in a monarchy. Many people were able to express their views peacefully and freely. That does not really parallel to any of the countries that the hon. Member for Edinburgh East (Tommy Sheppard) cited, but it points to the extraordinary liberty that our officers of the law have managed to secure our great nation. It points to the absurdity of this debate.
Brendan O'Hara (Argyll and Bute) (SNP)
claimed to move the closure (Standing Order No. 36).
Question put forthwith, That the Question be now put.
A Division was called, but no Members being appointed Tellers for the Noes, the
Speaker declared that the Ayes had it.
Main Question accordingly put.
National Security Bill
Tom Tugendhat ExcerptsWednesday 3rd May 2023
(1 year, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate National Security Act 2023 View all National Security Act 2023 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Commons Consideration of Lords Amendments as at 3 May 2023 - (3 May 2023)
The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)
I beg to move amendment (a) to Lords amendment 26.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Lords amendment 26, and amendment (c) and Government amendment (b).
Lords amendment 153, and Government amendment (a).
Lords amendment 22, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 122, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendments 1 to 21, 23 to 25, 27 to 121, 123 to 152 and 154 to 174.
Tom Tugendhat
Let me start on a personal note by thanking the Clerk who is sitting in his place and congratulating him on becoming Clerk of the House. It is the first time that he has been in his place when I have spoken from the Despatch Box. He has been a friend for many years, so I am glad to have the opportunity to put on record that the Clerks keep us all on the straight and narrow, and in some cases get us out of rather a lot of trouble. I thank them very much indeed.
It is a pleasure to bring the National Security Bill back to this House. A number of changes have been made in the other place to improve it. The House will know the importance of the Bill: it gives our intelligence and security services, as well as law enforcement, a new toolkit to tackle state actors who threaten the safety and security of the United Kingdom. It also takes steps to prevent public funds from being given to those who could use them to support terror. As always, this Government have listened. I pay tribute to Lord Anderson and Lord Carlile for their work to improve the Bill—[Interruption.] I am glad to hear the acknowledgement from the Opposition Benches. That has improved the Bill for all sides.
We have heard the views of the other place, of industry and of many others, and we have focused the foreign influence registration scheme into a more targeted weapon against those who would do us harm. Arrangements to carry out political influence activity will now be registerable only when directed by a foreign power. Receiving funding from a foreign power, absent a direction, will not trigger a requirement to register under the scheme. For example, cultural institutes that make an important contribution to life in the United Kingdom will not be required to register simply because they receive funding from a foreign power. That is in line with the original intention of the scheme.
Only where organisations or individuals are directed by a foreign power to carry out political activities will that arrangement need to be routinely registered. We will publish guidance to support understanding of the scheme and circumstances in which arrangements will need to be registered. It remains the case that criminal offences will be attached to failures to register.
The Government made a number of changes in the other place following concerns expressed about the Bill’s potential impact on journalistic freedoms and other legitimate activity. I pay enormous tribute to Lord Black for his contribution to the debate. The Government are clear that the Bill’s focus is on protecting the United Kingdom from threats from those acting against the UK’s interests, not interfering with press freedom. The Lords amendments clarify the scope of offences and requirements in part 1. That includes amending the language in the phrase
“knows, or ought reasonably to know”
to put beyond doubt that it would need to be proved what an individual knew rather than capturing individuals acting unwittingly. That applies in every instance when the phrase appears in the Bill, including in the foreign power condition.
Further drafting changes have been made, including to clarify the scope of the offence of assisting a foreign intelligence service and the meaning of foreign power threat activity.
Martin Docherty-Hughes (West Dunbartonshire) (SNP)
Does the Minister agree that we must exclude assistance in torture from the scope of defence, to protect people such as my constituent Jagtar Singh Johal, who was repeatedly electrocuted and threatened with being set alight by the Government of India?
Tom Tugendhat
The hon. Member will know that that is a matter for the Foreign Office in its dealings with other states. The Bill does not in any way erode any of the protections under the European convention on human rights, including the right not to be tortured.
We are pleased that the chief executive officer of the News Media Association Owen Meredith said in response to the Government’s changes that he welcomed
“the government’s reassurances that journalism will not be criminalised under this new national security regime.”
That is absolutely correct. It will not be, and it is not the Government’s intention that it should be. The media sector recognises the balance that the Government have struck between protecting press freedoms and safeguarding national security.
We have also taken on board the concerns of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, which I thank for the incredibly constructive and supportive manner in which it has engaged on the Bill. In response, the Government have changed the Serious Crime Act 2007 amendment from non-application of the offences to a defence. We believe that the amendment strikes the right balance. It ensures that the dedicated individuals in the intelligence and security services can carry out activities to support our foreign partners, but that there can be proper legal consideration of any potential wrongdoing.
The Bill is now in a strong position. We have effective tools and powers to tackle hostile activity on British soil or that is against the UK’s interest, done for or on behalf of, or with the intention to benefit, foreign states. We have a thorough transparency scheme designed to ensure that we know who is influencing our politics. Under the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme, we have the ability to specify states and entities and thereby require the registration of activities to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. We also have the means to prevent the exploitation of the UK’s civil legal aid and civil damage systems by convicted terrorists.
Stephen Doughty (Cardiff South and Penarth) (Lab/Co-op)
I have raised on a number of occasions in debates and Committees the use of cryptocurrencies, and cryptocurrency mixers in particular, to facilitate the activities of hostile state-sponsored activities in a number of countries. The US Treasury acted against a number of the so-called mixers back in August last year. Despite raising that on a number of occasions, I am yet to receive clarification on what we are doing to ensure that cryptocurrency is not used to facilitate hostile state activities, as has been done in sums of billions.
Tom Tugendhat
The hon. Gentleman, who is a friend, is right to highlight this issue as it is true that cryptocurrency can be used in such ways. I urge him to look at the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill, which we are taking through the House. Naturally, the National Security Bill does not cover every element that we are using to ensure the protection of the United Kingdom; there are many other Bills, which work together as a woven fabric of defence. Cryptocurrency is one aspect of the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill, which my hon. Friend the Member for Thirsk and Malton (Kevin Hollinrake) is leading on. That Bill is making its way through the House and will address some of the hon. Gentleman’s concerns.
Turning to amendments 22 and 122, the Government have set out clear reasons why we will not accept either amendment. I know that my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis) will be making an intervention about this later in the debate. We have set out the reasons why we will not accept the amendments, which were made clear in the other place.
Amendment 22 would introduce a requirement for political parties to
“publish a policy statement to ensure the identification of donations from a foreign power”.
Upon receipt of a donation, political parties are already required by law to verify whether they are or are not from a political source. Donations that do not meet the permissibility tests or are unidentifiable must be returned and reported to the Electoral Commission. If political parties fail to do that, their treasurers face being sent to jail. They risk the reputations of their staff and their elected representatives being shredded. There is already a strong incentive for parties to ensure that donations come only from permissible donors.
Sir Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)
But earlier the Minister was praying in aid Lord Carlile, saying what a wonderful job he had done in helping the Government to bring forward wonderful amendments. This is one of his amendments, so it seems a bit odd to turn against this one.
On the point the Minister just made about permissible donors, all that has to be checked is whether the person is on the electoral register. The Elections Act 2022 has added to the register 3.5 million people who do not even live in this country. All that political parties presently have to do is check whether somebody is on the electoral register. I do not think that safeguards our elections from interference from those who would wish us ill.
Tom Tugendhat
The hon. Member has formerly been very kind about the work that we have done together, such as on the Foreign Affairs Committee and on other appointments. He has agreed with me on some areas and disagreed on others. It cannot be an enormous surprise to him that I agree with Lord Carlile on some areas and disagree with him on others. Frankly, that is the nature of parliamentary work, as the hon. Gentleman knows better than anyone.
As for the hon. Gentleman’s point about foreign registrations, those are of British citizens living abroad. Those are the only terms on which people are registered to vote on our electoral register. It is not right to say that those are a random 3.5 million people; that is certainly not true. They are British citizens and therefore their donations are as valid as their votes.
The Government recognise that there are risks. That is why it is already an offence to attempt to make a donation by concealing information, giving false information or knowingly facilitating the making of an impermissible donation. Where the foreign power condition is met in relation to a relevant electoral offence, as set out in schedule 1 to the Bill, clause 16 provides for a substantially increased maximum penalty: where a one-year sentence previously applied, that has been increased to four years; and two-year sentences have been increased to seven years. These relevant electoral offences include offences of undue influence, for which the maximum sentence has been increased to seven years, and making a false declaration about the source of a donation, for which the maximum sentence has been increased to four years.
Indeed, the Government have already taken action. The Elections Act 2022 tightened the law to close loopholes on foreign spending. The Electoral Commission is also being given more powers to access Companies House information, through measures under the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill. That will allow the Electoral Commission to undertake the proper targeted and proportionate checks.
For absolute clarity, donations to political parties from foreign powers, made directly or indirectly, are not permissible. The amendment places new requirements on minor parties, who are not subject to any other financial reporting requirements at this time, as they can contest only local and parish elections. The amendment would therefore place huge administrative burdens on small, grassroots political campaigning and would punish grassroots democracy.
It is not clear how the proposals would work in practice. Political parties are not banks; rightly, they do not have access to individuals’ financial records. They are not His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs; they do not have access to tax records. They do have access to the electoral roll and to Companies House, which they are already obliged to check. The Electoral Commission already publishes guidance on these legal duties. Indeed, political parties must already report all larger donations to the Electoral Commission, which are then published online for public scrutiny.
Martin Docherty-Hughes
Is the Minister saying that small grassroots organisations, many of them associational organisations that may be registered charities in England and Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland, are not capable of filling out an extra form to make sure that they are not being utilised by foreign states?
Tom Tugendhat
The hon. Member underplays what the amendment would do. It would be much more than simply filling in a form and would place a greater burden of a need to check, which would be a major requirement for small political parties and grassroots organisations. I am surprised that he, as a champion of local democracy, would require smaller parties to do that.
As I have said, Lords amendment 22 is not needed. The law already makes robust provision in relation to donations to political parties. Foreign donations are banned. It is an offence to accept them and there are strong rules safeguarding against impermissible donations via the backdoor. Parties can accept donations only from permissible donors. As such, the Government will not accept the amendment.
Amendment 122 imposes a duty on the Prime Minister to amend the memorandum of understanding between the Prime Minister and the Intelligence and Security Committee to account for changes to intelligence or security activities
“as a result of this Act”.
It also requires engagement on these revisions to begin within six months of the Act coming into force.
The power to make revisions to the MOU between the Prime Minister and the ISC is not limited to changes resulting from a specific piece of legislation. Adding the amendment risks creating the erroneous impression that explicit legislative provision is required in order for the ISC to propose amendments to the MOU. Further, the power to amend the MOU is already included in the Justice and Security Act 2013. I would be happy to meet with the chair of the ISC, my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East, on this matter. Indeed, we have spoken about that in the past.
Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend—and he is a friend—who I know is saying what he has to say. We know that the memorandum of understanding can be amended as developments in the organisation of Government require it to be amended, but the trouble is that the Prime Minister has been reluctant to amend it and it is not being amended. The reason this amendment was introduced in the other place is to force the Government to do what they should be doing voluntarily.
Tom Tugendhat
As usual, my right hon. Friend makes his point cogently. In reality, the MOU requires amendment because the nature of the Government has changed. He is absolutely right that we need to ensure that the House is able to scrutinise the Government on areas where intelligence and security information is required. I agree that that update needs to be made, but I disagree that this is the place to do it or that it should be done in legislation, for the reasons of flexibility that we have already discussed. I know that he will be making his case powerfully to the Prime Minister, and no doubt to other Ministers, to make sure that the updates required to make sure scrutiny is observed are followed through.
Finally, I turn to the amendment to the Serious Crime Act 2007 tabled today, which largely speaks for itself. It clarifies the application of the new defence, which will apply to
“the proper exercise of a function of the armed forces”
only when relating to intelligence. This addresses concerns raised in the other place about the scope of armed forces activities that may have been covered by the defence. It builds upon the amendment tabled by Lord Anderson on Report in the Lords and the commitment made in the other place to bring forward a similar amendment. I am glad that we can bring it forward today.
The ISC has heard and accepted the operational problems caused by the application of the SCA offences. I believe the new SCA defence, and today’s amendment to it, satisfy the concerns of the United Kingdom intelligence community, the armed forces, the other place and this House. I therefore ask the House to support the Government amendment. Let me again thank the Intelligence and Security Committee for its co-operation and help in improving the Bill.
As the House will know, the Government have also tabled a minor amendment to the foreign influence registration scheme, designed to ensure parity across the devolved Administrations in respect of the public officials covered within the meaning of political influence activity.
This Bill is a groundbreaking piece of legislation that will revolutionise the tools and powers available to the police and our intelligence agencies, so that they are equipped to keep us safe.
Stephen Doughty
The Minister will be aware of Lords amendment 130, which relates to the sovereign base areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia. He will also be aware of the concern that has been expressed about the possible unintended consequences of the Bill. Those bases are critical to UK national security, as is our relationship with the Republic of Cyprus, which a close friend of many in the House. Will he say a little about where the discussions have got to, and whether there will be a good conclusion?
Tom Tugendhat
The hon. Gentleman has tempted me to approach the issue a little early in my speech, but let me put this firmly on the record. I have met the high commissioner of Cyprus, and my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary has spoken to its Foreign Secretary. I want to make it clear that any references in the Bill to the sovereign base areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia shall be in accordance with the 1960 treaty concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, shall not affect the status of the sovereign base areas as defined in the treaty, and will not in any way undermine its provisions. References to the sovereign base areas in the Bill in no way indicate a change in UK policy towards their governance. I hope that is extremely clear.
If we had these powers now, I would already be encouraging the police to use them against those who side with our enemies. As always, I want to share my admiration and appreciation for the services, their work and all their efforts that so often go unseen, although the impact does not go unnoticed. I hope that right hon. and hon. Members will support the Government’s changes, and our opposition to the amendments relating to the ISC and political party donations.
Sir Julian Lewis
I am very grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s support and I take this opportunity to pay tribute to both him and his predecessor for making an extremely valuable and valued contribution to the Committee. We draw such authority as we have from the fact that party politics does not enter into our work. I think I heard the Security Minister say that he accepted that the MOU needs to be updated—
Sir Julian Lewis
I see that he is nodding. Should he wish to elaborate on that a little more, that would be even more welcome.
Sir Chris Bryant
I start where my right hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) finished. I am completely perplexed about why the Minister is holding out against Lords amendment 22, not least because he told Insider last year that it was “perfectly legitimate” to criticise political parties for accepting donations “that are not clear”. He made it absolutely clear at the time that he supported the idea of legislation to require political parties to be clear about where their funding was coming from. To be fair to him, that was obviously not when he was a Government Minister, and he has now fallen among thieves. I preferred the old version of the Minister, and I hope that, in our discussions over the next few minutes, we can manage to persuade him to return to proper form.
The pedigree for Lords amendment 22 is phenomenally strong, as has been said. Not only have Lord Carlile and Lord Evans—the chair of the Committee on Standards in Public Life and a former head of MI5—called directly for such provisions, but as I understand from her comments, Baroness Manningham-Buller also supported Lords amendment 22, as did Lord West, all the members of the ISC, Spotlight on Corruption, the Committee on Standards in Public Life, and, of course, the Electoral Commission.
The Electoral Commission wrote directly to the Minister last year to say that it would surely be wrong not to change the law so that political parties can accept donations from companies that have made enough money in the UK to fund the amount of their donation. One would think that that stands to reason. One would also think that it stands to reason, as the commission also argued, that political parties should be required to check not just whether someone is a permissible donor in the sense of being on the electoral register, but whether they have enough money of their own to be able to fund the political party to the extent proposed. That is just due diligence, but there are phenomenal loopholes in the law.
The Minister is normally a very polite and generous man, but I understand that he has still not replied to the Electoral Commission on this matter, and the commission has complained about this. In this area, as he knows perfectly well from our work on the Foreign Affairs Committee, complacency serves us ill. One need only look at the sad trajectory of the tier 1 visa system—the golden visa. When the report was finally produced it showed that we had given visas to live in the UK and make their permanent residence here to people we ended up sanctioning because they were so closely related to the Putin regime. The 2020 Russia report from the ISC—it should have been the 2019 Russia report, but the then Prime Minister did not allow it to be published before the general election—made it very clear that Russia and perhaps other state actors had been intent on affecting elections and referendums in this country, and urged us not to be complacent.
There are authoritarian state actors who wish us ill. They rely on the openness of our political system, on our open system of governance in the City, on the fact that contracts can be enforced, and on our open judicial system. They rely on all of that and, I would argue, on our complacency to be able to do their nefarious work in the UK. There is a flaw in the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000: the concept of “permissible donor” is too tightly drawn. Surely any political party and any person trying to secure donations from a third party would want to ensure that the money they received was not tainted by human rights abuses in another country, by authoritarian acts from another country or, frankly, by malign influence by a third party state actor.
The position is made worse by the Elections Act 2022 adding to the registers 3.5 million overseas voters who pay, or who may pay, no tax in the UK, and who may have next to no relationship with the authorities in this country—it is necessarily very difficult to track that information down. What should a party do if it is offered a donation of, let us say, £50,000 by somebody who lives and works in Moscow today? The law says the party need not do anything, as long as the individual is on the electoral register. Surely, though, we do not think that that is right or appropriate. I want further checks to be in place. The provisions in the amendment are so minimal—absolutely the minimum that we have to do to make sure that political parties in this country do the basics.
I said there is a flaw—perhaps a fissure—in PPERA, but I am starting to worry that the Government want that loophole to exist. If they do not, I simply do not understand why the Minister is holding out on this point. I hope the Minister will change his mind on this minimal requirement and support Lords amendment 22. If we end up voting it down, I hope their lordships will throw it back to us. For more than a decade now, we have left the door wide open to political interference in our system in this country. It is time we slammed it shut.
Tom Tugendhat
First, I thank the hon. Member for Halifax (Holly Lynch) for the contribution she made and the spirit in which she has approached these debates. She is absolutely right to talk about Caoilfhionn Gallagher and Jimmy Lai and to highlight the many issues that she did. Such matters unite us; another is the fact that this Government, like every Member of this House, I am sure, remain absolutely committed to the UN convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. There is absolutely nothing in this Bill, or in any other Bill that this Government are bringing forward, that would in any way undermine our obligations or the seriousness with which we treat torture as it is practised, sadly too frequently, around the world. Although I hear what the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael), my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) and the hon. and gallant Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis) say, there is quite literally nothing in the Bill that would give rise to the need for amendment (c) to Lords amendment.
The point made by the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland about Lord Pannick, however, was entirely fair. A letter should have gone back to him. In fact, the point was made and the answer given in the form of amendments to clause 3 that address his concern about the carve-out for lawyers. Although I agree that I should have written, the reality is that I addressed the points Lord Pannick raised in the Bill itself.
The matter of foreign donations has been raised again. The reality is that we have to treat British citizens like British citizens. The idea that we can treat British citizens differently depending on how we feel about them seems to me to be rather a bad way of making law, but that does not mean that political parties have to treat British citizens exactly alike. Surely the rule here is: just because you can does not mean you should. There are many donations, and perhaps many individuals making them, that many of us would not wish to accept. The point about politics is that it is about decisions, judgment and choices, and while the law has to apply to everyone equally, we as politicians and as political parties are not so obliged. We have to make judgments and decisions, and we have to carry our reputations and the reputations of our organisations with us when we make those calls.
On the changes to the MOU that the ISC suggested, my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis) had the opportunity to give me the power to make those changes, but I am not the Prime Minister, so I cannot do so. The Prime Minister will have to make that decision, but I will raise the matter again with his office, because my right hon. Friend’s points were well made.
I have heard many comments about the Official Secrets Act 1989. The nature of this reform is complex and there are many and various arguments because this piece of legislation ties into so many others. I will not give my right hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart) a commitment to act in this Parliament—he will understand that more work is required. As for my ability to make commitments into the next Session, he tempts me too far.
I am glad to hear that the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East (Stuart C. McDonald) has achieved the great honour of being treasurer of the Scottish National party. I hope it comes with a caravan and that he is enjoying the touring that that affords him.
My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright) raises many good points. The reality is that these challenges must be addressed as a whole and require further discussion, so I am very grateful for his time.
Bob Stewart
I accept the Minister’s points on the Official Secrets Act 1989 and the fact that it is complicated, but do the Government recognise that, complicated though it is, it must be addressed?
Tom Tugendhat
My right hon. Friend tempts me in a direction I would love to go in, but in the minutes I have left, I shall not be lured. An awful lot of legislation would require work if we were to amend the Act, so a huge amount of drafting work would be required before I could express an opinion. I see other right hon. and hon. Members nodding in agreement.
The hon. Member for Rhondda (Sir Chris Bryant) made a fair point on the Electoral Commission. I shall follow up with the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, which is responsible for electoral law and which will be responding to the commission on that issue.
If I may, I will finish by simply saying that tomorrow is polling day, and while this Bill addresses many different aspects of our national security, the single best thing that all of us as citizens can do to defend our country and our future is to vote. As such, I urge everybody who has the opportunity to do so—in England and Wales, in our local government areas—to please get out and vote, and of course, to vote Conservative.
Amendment (a) made to Lords amendment 26.
Amendment (c) proposed to Lords amendment 26.—(Mr Carmichael.)
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Points of Order
Tom Tugendhat Excerpts(1 year, 7 months ago)
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Mr Speaker
I think that I have already answered that, but actually we have got a Minister who is itching to respond.
The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)
Further to that point of order, Mr Speaker. Thank you very much for allowing me to correct the record. The fact is, we were not counting fraud in 2010 when we took over the Government, so it is difficult to draw comparisons from before. What we have seen since, though, is a record number of police officers who are solving crimes. We have seen car crime down 22% since 2019, and neighbourhood crime and community crime down 50%. This is a success for the Government.
Mr Speaker
What I would say is, if research is going to take place, we ought to try to get the figures out correctly in the first place. Let us come to a more sedate moment and the ten-minute rule Bill.
Draft Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill
Tom Tugendhat Excerpts(1 year, 7 months ago)
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The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)
Today, I am pleased to announce the publication of the draft Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill, also known as Martyn’s law, for pre-legislative scrutiny by the Home Affairs Committee. The draft Bill (CP 840) has been laid before the House and is also available on www.gov.uk.
The Government confirmed their intention to bring forward Martyn’s law in December 2022. Since this announcement, officials have been working at pace to finalise the proposals.
The plans have been developed following extensive engagement with security partners, business and victims’ groups, including Figen Murray and the Martyn’s Law Campaign Team. The Government would particularly like to thank Figen Murray, whose son Martyn Hett was killed in the Manchester Arena attack, for the significant contribution she has made through her tireless campaign to introduce the Bill.
The threat from terrorism is evolving and enduring. One of the most significant long-term trends, irrespective of ideology, is individuals—or small groups—who plan or carry out terrorist attacks without being part of an organised terrorist group. This type of terrorism is not new, but it is now the most prevalent, and it presents unique challenges for our counter-terrorism response.
Attacks have tended to be “low-complexity” involving “low-sophistication” attack methodologies. For example, we have seen attacks that utilised knives and vehicles. Individuals may not have any relationship with or direction from established terrorist groups—but just because an attack is low-sophistication, it does not mean it is less deadly.
This trend is not exclusive, as such individuals are capable of higher-complexity attacks involving more sophisticated attack methodologies, such as the 2017 Manchester Arena bombing. This trend of radicalised self-initiated actors makes identification and disruption difficult, and it becomes increasingly challenging to predict threat at specific locations.
This is why it is right that Martyn’s law should seek to improve protective security and organisational preparedness at a wide range of public premises across the UK. Those responsible for certain public premises will be required to consider the threat from terrorism and implement reasonably practicable and proportionate mitigating measures. It will also establish an associated inspection and enforcement regime, which will seek to educate, advise, and ensure compliance with the requirements of the Bill.
The requirements within the Bill will only apply to qualifying premises—in short, qualifying premises have specific uses and a large capacity. Qualifying premises are split into two tiers, the “standard duty” and the “enhanced duty”. Standard duty premises are those with a capacity of 100 to 799 people. Enhanced duty premises are those with a capacity of 800 people or more. The Bill allows for provision to be made for some qualifying premises to be treated as standard duty premises when they would otherwise be enhanced duty premises, and vice versa.
Standard duty requirements have been developed to ensure there is a baseline level of protection and preparedness throughout the UK. These requirements will help keep the public safe, while at the same time not unduly burdening business. The enhanced tier requirements are more extensive because those premises have a responsibility to keep larger numbers of people safe.
The regulator will apply a “reasonably practicable” test to carefully consider what it is reasonable to expect of a specific premise; there will not be a one size fits all approach. In all instances, the Government and the regulator will provide guidance and support to ensure we do everything possible to alleviate the burden on business.
The requirements that apply to enhanced duty premises will also apply to large events held at non-qualifying premises, known as qualifying events. These are public events with a capacity of 800 or over that require express permission for entry—with or without payment.
We recognise that it would not be appropriate for all locations to consider and put in place security measures. Striking the right balance between protecting the public and proportionality has been at the heart of policy development and the Bill.
I am looking forward to working with the Home Affairs Committee to ensure that the legislation is robust and delivers on its core aims ahead of a formal introduction into Parliament.
[HCWS751]
Crypto-assets: Codes of Practice Consultation
Tom Tugendhat Excerpts(1 year, 8 months ago)
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The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)
The Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) 2002 contains a comprehensive package of measures designed to make the recovery of unlawfully held assets more effective. The operation of certain powers within POCA are subject to guidance in various codes of practice issued by the Home Secretary, the Attorney General and the Advocate General for Northern Ireland, the Department of Justice Northern Ireland and Scottish Ministers.
Three existing codes of practice need to be updated and one new code of practice made, to reflect possible changes made to POCA by the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency (ECCT) Bill, which subject to being passed by Parliament and receiving Royal Assent will amend and insert new civil forfeiture powers into POCA, to increase the recovery of crypto-assets.
It is intended that the new civil forfeiture crypto-asset powers will be replicated in schedule 1 to the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA) and Schedule 6 to the Terrorism Act 2000 (TACT). The equivalent code of practice also needs to be updated.
POCA and TACT provide that before a code of practice is issued, I must consider any representations made, modify the codes as appropriate, and subsequently lay the codes before Parliament for approval.
I intend to consult on changes to the following codes of practice:
Code of practice issued under section 47S of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002—Search, Seizure and Detention of Property (England and Wales).
Code of practice issued under section 195S of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002—Search, Seizure and Detention of Property (Northern Ireland).
Code of practice issued under the proposed section 303Z25 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (as inserted by schedule 7 to the ECCT Bill) - Recovery of Crypto-assets and Related Items: Search Powers (NEW CODE).
Code of practice issued under section 377 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002—Investigations.
Code of practice for officers acting under schedule 1 to the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and
Security Act 2001—amended through powers under Schedule 14 to TACT.
In tandem the Attorney General’s Office will also launch a consultation on its equivalent code of practice.
I will arrange for a copy of the consultation document and the five draft codes to be placed in the Libraries of both Houses.
Following this consultation, I intend to lay a statutory instrument to issue these updated codes of practice under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA) to reflect changes as a result of both the Economic Crime, Transparency and Enforcement Act, and the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill.
[HCWS682]
Pro-Innovation Regulation of Technologies Review and the Computer Misuse Act 1990
Tom Tugendhat Excerpts(1 year, 8 months ago)
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The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)
I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Bridgend (Dr Wallis) for securing this debate and for his continued interest in this issue. This is not the first time he has raised it with me—in fact, the first time he raised it with me was many years ago—but it is perhaps the first time that I may be able to assist.
In my role as Security Minister, I see evidence every day of the scale of the threat from cyber-crime that affects our citizens, businesses and Government services. There were an estimated 690,000 incidents of computer misuse in England and Wales in the year to September 2022, of which 577,000 were related to unauthorised access to personal information. I have seen the effects of criminals targeting businesses and individuals online—the businesses that suffer financial losses because of ransomware attack and their inability to carry on their businesses, and the individuals who lose personal information, including highly personal information, and can suffer harassment and blackmail because of it.
It is because of such criminal activity that protecting the country in cyber-space is such a key priority for the Government. It is essential that we ensure the UK has the powers and legislation to allow our law enforcement agencies to take action to tackle this threat. The Computer Misuse Act dates from 1990, before almost anybody had an email address—certainly before I did. Today, we could not only research the law online, but one of the large language model artificial intelligences we now see frequently used online could actually draft large parts of it too.
That is why this Government have launched a call for information, asking for different views on whether the 1990 Act and the powers used by law enforcement agencies to investigate the offences in that Act need to be enhanced.
In February, we launched a consultation in which we set out proposals for new powers for law enforcement agencies to improve their ability to take action to tackle crime online. Those proposals include a power to allow law enforcement agencies to take control of domains and internet protocol addresses to help tackle a wide range of offences, including fraud; a power to require the preservation of computer data; and a power to take action against a person possessing or using data obtained by another person through a CMA offence. In the consultation, we committed to further considering the question raised by my hon. Friend of whether the Act needs to be amended to provide defences to CMA offences.
As the Government set out in our response to the pro-innovation regulation of technologies review by Sir Patrick Vallance, the Home Office is taking forward work to consider the merits and risks of introducing changes to the Act in relation to the defences. That is a complex issue that requires significant further discussion with a wide range of stakeholders. The Computer Misuse Act is based fundamentally on the principle that the owner of the system is responsible for the operation of the system and its data, and bears the cost in securing it. It is right that they have the protection of the law from those who obtain or attempt to obtain unauthorised access to computers and their data.
It is important that we consult those who actually own the systems for their views on that. In particular, we need to ensure that any changes that we make to the Act support the continued improvement to the UK’s cyber-security while ensuring that system owners continue to have the right to determine who may access their systems and data. That in itself feeds into the growth agenda. System owners need to know that the Government take unauthorised access to their systems seriously and will support them in tackling those who attempt to commit such offences.
Let me clear about some of the issues that we need to address in relation to introducing defences. The proposals would potentially allow a defence for the unauthorised access by a person to another person’s property—in this case, their computer systems and data—without their knowledge or consent. We will therefore need to define what constitutes legitimate cyber-security activity, where a defence might be applicable and under what circumstances, and how such unauthorised access can be kept to a minimum.
We will also need to consider who should be allowed to undertake such activity, what professional standards they will need to comply with, and what reporting or oversight will be needed. Of course, we must make no changes that would prevent law enforcement agencies from investigating, prosecuting and pursuing those who commit cyber-crimes. I am sure Members would agree that, in the light of those issues, any changes must be considered very carefully indeed.
As we set out in the consultation, we have committed to working with law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, the cyber-security industry and system owners to consider proposals and reach a consensus on the best way forward. That work is under way, and the Government would welcome any contributions from those with an interest in this area.
Question put and agreed to.