National Security Bill

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 11th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I start by saying that if the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, is a pupil barrister, I do not know what on earth that makes me. We shall see.

I start with a comment that I know will be supported by all members of the Committee: if the story on the front page of the Sun is accurate, it reminds us of the debt of gratitude that we owe to the security services. They seem to have foiled a plot to import uranium at Heathrow this morning. If that is accurate, it is something that we in this Committee should note, because I know that the security services and those who work on our behalf in all these areas read our proceedings, and they should not mistake or confuse the very real debate that is going on here about the best way for us to go forward, and the best legislative context for us to have for our Armed Forces and our intelligence services, with any sense in which we underestimate or do not respect them fully for the work they do across the world in our interests.

I have objected to Clause 28 standing part of the Bill, and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, for his support, because, as it stands, the clause is unacceptable. The Government themselves have said in the other place and in previous debates that they are considering whether the clause needs amending and, if so, how. We all wait with bated breath to see where that has got to. The ISC has said it needs to change, and we know that even with the further closed briefings from the intelligence services to the ISC, it still believes that the clause needs amendment.

Amendment 63A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, and Amendment 64 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Carlile, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, are welcome and important statements of how the Government may deal with the many concerns raised in both Houses. The excellent contributions we had in support of them challenged the Government to say, if they are not the way forward, what is. The Minister’s response to these amendments will be very important and it will be interesting for all of us to know whether the Government are actually listening. Are these amendments to be accepted by the Government and, if not, why not? If they are not, can we expect a government amendment in good time for us to consider it before Report?

Questions that arise for the Minister if the Government do not accept these amendments are clear. The amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, as he explained,

“would ensure that the immunity provided to Ministers and officials who assist or encourage crimes under the Serious Crime Act 2007 does not cover torture, murder or sexual offences.”

Indeed, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, mentioned the issue of torture. If this is not to be accepted by the Government, can the Minister clearly and without any qualification say that none of this behaviour would ever be allowed if the clause were to be passed unamended? Remember, we are referring to murder, unlawful killing, torture or sexual offences. A clear and categoric ministerial statement, on the record, with no qualification or prevarication, would help the Committee enormously with respect to that amendment.

Amendment 64 would ensure—as I read it, and the explanatory statement confirms this—that high-level ministerial authority is fundamentally important. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, made the excellent point that high-level ministerial authority must be maintained for the authorisation of the doing of such acts, rather than the weakening or even, as most of us believe, the exclusion of such authority, as Clause 28, as drafted, allows. Is that not the case? Why would the Government object to the maintenance of such ministerial authority, ensuring, in a democracy proud of its traditions, the importance of proper political accountability for decisions that are made? Again, this is a point that the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and, I think, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, made. Just as important, if not even more so, is that such ministerial authorisations would be under the supervision of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office—IPCO. This, under Clause 28, now seems not to be the case, whereas independent oversight and accountability seem to me, and I am sure to most of us in the Committee, to be an essential part of such a process.

We know the phrase in the clause as it stands,

“the proper exercise of any function”,

has also caused concern. What does it mean? Who decides whether it is proper or the breadth and potential scope of the phrase? If there is no independent oversight, as required by Amendment 64, who provides it and how? Something as sensitive and crucial as this cannot be left to a few individuals in a closed meeting in an office away from any public gaze or scrutiny. That is unacceptable in a democracy. As it stands, the clause is not acceptable and these amendments seek to improve it. As I and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, have said, we will have to come back to this on Report, either to push an amendment or to agree or disagree a government amendment.

Very serious concerns have been raised about Clause 28 that cannot and should not be ignored by the Government. The ISC has said that the clause needs amending because it is unacceptably broad. Will the Government listen to it, if no one else? Even with the additional briefings, as I have said, it does not believe that Clause 28 is the way forward, even if it accepts that there is a problem that needs fixing.

In justifying Clause 28 as it stands, can the Minister answer some of the following questions? There are currently safeguards, such as ministerial authorisation, the reasonableness test so eloquently outlined for us by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, under Section 50 of the Serious Crime Act and the fact that the DPP must be satisfied that a prosecution is in the public interest, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, properly reminds us time after time. I am grateful that he does so, because that point is lost; it is about not only whether a conviction can be secured but whether it is in the national or public interest for such a prosecution to be pursued. I have faith in the system. I believe that in most cases, if it is not in the public interest, it will not be pursued. That is an open decision that we can question to see whether we agree with it. Why have these safeguards been swept away with respect to such behaviour conducted abroad?

Can the Minister clarify what it means in Clause 28 for something to be necessary for the proper function of the UKIC or the Armed Forces, with no proportionality required? Why have the Government diminished the role and accountability of Ministers in the decision-making structure? As the noble Lords, Lord Purvis and Lord Beith, asked, why does Clause 28 extend this immunity to the Armed Forces? If I have read it right, the Armed Forces have protection under Section 7 of the Intelligence Services Act. Have I got that wrong? Can the Minister clarify why Clause 28, as drafted, appears to extend these immunities to the Armed Forces? As the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, asked, will he give an example of conduct that is the proper exercise of any function of the services but is currently subject to the chilling effect of the 2007 Act and would therefore now be allowed under this Bill? Why can it not be authorised under Section 7 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994 as it stands?

This is an incredibly serious debate, as we have heard from the many contributions from noble Lords. We also know that a huge cross-section of Members of Parliament in the other place expressed their concerns, many with great personal experience. Dan Jarvis MP, Kevan Jones MP, Maria Eagle MP and David Davis MP made excellent speeches asking why the change is necessary and, if it is, why we cannot have something that deals with the perceived problem and commands support, including from our parliamentary oversight committee, the ISC. The ISC was set up specifically to be allowed closed briefings, so that it could advise us on what was appropriate for these difficult matters. How on earth can the Government command the respect and support of this Chamber if the ISC, the committee we set up to have oversight on these matters, does not agree with Clause 28? Why do the Government set themselves against what the ISC is saying and then wonder why we have doubts?

The excellent House of Lords briefing highlights the many comments expressing doubts, particularly the belief that immunity from prosecution for serious crimes committed abroad would be made much more likely and possible under this clause. As Jeremy Wright MP asked, can the Minister explain the difference between acting reasonably under Section 50—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, made this point—and acting in the proper exercise of a function, as this clause requires?

We are rightly proud of the work of our intelligence services and Armed Forces, but we also have a responsibility as a democracy to set a legislative framework that sets, and is seen to set, high standards. Openness, transparency and accountability are part of the price of our democracy. As drafted, Clause 28 undermines these principles and needs at the very least to be seriously amended.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to a fascinating and wide-ranging debate. If the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, is not sure where it leaves him if the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, is a pupil, I am under absolutely no illusions where I am left.

I turn to Clause 28, the Serious Crime Act 2007 amendment. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for his advance notice of interest in this measure and the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, for our discussions to date on this Bill. I also very much thank the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Carlile, who provided advance notice of their intention to table this amendment and have generously shared their time and expertise with me and the team on this measure, as the critical friends to the national security world that the Committee knows them to be.

I will speak to the purpose of the SCA amendment and the amendments tabled by noble Lords. Respectively, they seek to remove the SCA amendment in Clause 28 from the Bill and replace it with an amendment to Section 7 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994, or ISA, and to add to Clause 28 to ensure that exemption from liability for individual Ministers and officials who assist or encourage crimes under the SCA would not cover torture, murder or sexual offences. However, before I come to that, it is right to express our thanks to those who work tirelessly to keep us safe, as the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Coaker, did, while recognising that we should carefully examine any changes to the law which might regulate or enable their activities.

I will briefly tell noble Lords why Clause 28 is in the Bill and why the amendment to the SCA is necessary. In essence, it is vital that we solve an unintended consequence of the SCA which currently exposes those acting for our intelligence and security agencies—MI6, MI5, GCHQ: the UK intelligence community, which I will henceforth call UKIC—and our Armed Forces to potential legal jeopardy and limits their operational agility. This can limit their ability to keep the UK safe, including through our international collaboration with trusted partners, which is vital in the modern world.

The SCA creates offences when an act is done which is capable of “encouraging or assisting” an offence and the person intends or believes their act may encourage or assist an offence. These offences are complex and were predominantly introduced to ensure the police could tackle those directing serious organised crime—for example, capturing those who knowingly directed violence or the importation of drugs but distanced themselves from criminal conduct. There is no minimum level of contribution to the offence which may be encouraged or assisted; the contribution can be small and indirect and there is no need for an offence to be ultimately committed. I will come back to the noble Lords’ amendment, but say here that these are obviously not circumstances that always lend themselves well to pre-authorisation.

Clause 28 focuses on this very specific area of criminal law which is having an operational impact to the detriment of the UK’s security. It is not a general immunity and it would not change the application of all other criminal law offences. It does not make it legal to encourage or enable torture or rendition or solicit murder and does not limit the offence of misconduct in public office. In addition, Clause 28 does not remove civil liability or change either the UK’s international law obligations or UKIC’s or the Armed Forces’ rigid adherence to these obligations. I will come back to that in a moment.

At present, UKIC and the Armed Forces are required to carefully apply the provisions of the offences, sometimes at fast pace and in critical scenarios, as has been noted, and some of which may have life or death consequences—all while they work with our international partners to help protect the UK. We are talking, for example, about sharing intelligence to combat terrorist attack plots. Delays and limits on activity arise solely due to SCA risks when otherwise seniors are clear that there is no wrongdoing and that the activity represents a proper function of the organisation. The offences in the SCA are therefore creating a “chilling effect”, as the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, referred to, across UKIC and the Armed Forces in the delivery of their mission, and impacting on their ability to keep our country safe.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

The Minister has repeated several times his reference to the Armed Forces, but, up to now, always in the context of support for intelligence organisations’ activities. It would be helpful if he could clarify—he is nodding; I think he is indicating that he might do so—whether the inclusion of the Armed Forces is intended to confer the immunity on their general range of activity or is intended to be confined to their support for the intelligence agencies.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord has pre-empted me by about a second. A number of noble Lords have asked why the Armed Forces are included, including the noble Lords, Lord Purvis, Lord Anderson, Lord Beith, Lord Carlile and Lord Coaker. The Ministry of Defence collaborates with a diverse array of allies and partners, with intelligence sharing often forming a key part of such efforts. The Armed Forces also work closely with the UK intelligence and security community, helping to protect the UK from myriad threats overseas. The protection provided for in Clause 28 seeks to ensure that where our Armed Forces collaborate and provide authorised operational support with international partners, as with UKIC, support can continue without exposing individual staff or officers to personal risk of criminal liability. I hope that answers the question to the noble Lord’s satisfaction.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

It would answer the question if the clause was so defined as to limit the extent of the immunity to acting in support of the intelligence agencies. However, as I read it, it does not do that.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I will continue, but I will come back to that, if I may.

I want to return to the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, seeing as we are talking about the application of this, and also to the point on torture. There will be no change to the UK’s other domestic and international legal obligations, including those under the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and international obligations on assisting an unlawful act, which is Article 16 of the International Law Commission’s articles on state responsibility for internationally wrongful acts. I hope that is unequivocal enough.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

I apologise for interrupting the noble Lord. Before he moves on, could he give us two figures which I am sure he must know or could be given very quickly? First, in relation to the security services, how many cases have there been in the past 10 years of the kind we are discussing in which the Director of Public Prosecutions has had to make a decision as to whether a prosecution should take place? Secondly, how many events have been affected adversely over that period by the existing state of the law?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am afraid that I do not have those figures to hand. I am not sure that I will be able to get them, but I will do my very best to find out and come back to the noble Lord on that question.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way, and I look forward to that reply when it comes in writing. If I have this right, the Minister said that it makes no difference—there is no change—to the approach on unlawful killing, torture or cruel or inhuman treatment. Is he saying that this clause does not provide immunity in offering assistance to others who would be committing unlawful killing, torture or cruel or inhuman treatment?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

As I said earlier, I think this is confined very much to the intelligence support by the Armed Forces—is that what the noble Lord is referring to?

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am grateful. No, it is not. The Minister said that there was no change to the approach on unlawful killing and torture. My reading of this clause is that there would now be immunity for offering assistance to others to carry out unlawful killing or torture.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I do not believe that there is immunity for that, but I will clarify that if I am incorrect.

Moving on, caution when considering the legality of support to our partners is of course correct and will continue. However, the current impact of the SCA offences means that vital intelligence-sharing opportunities have been delayed or missed, even when UKIC and the Armed Forces are fully compliant with other legal and policy requirements, such as the Fulford principles and the overseas security and justice assistance guidance, which ensure, for example, that support to international partners is in line with our human rights obligations. I have the principles and guidance to hand. If anybody would like me to go through them in detail, I will, but they are long so it will delay proceedings. I will await an intervention, if any noble Lord wishes me to do that.

UKIC’s and the Armed Forces’ adherence to and compliance with the principles are monitored by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office—IPCO—via regular inspections, and they are also routinely scrutinised by the Intelligence and Security Committee. Ministers are directly accountable for the work of the agencies and the legality of their operations. When things go wrong, it is entirely right that there is scrutiny of and accountability for the organisations’ activities, and I commend the important work that the ISC and IPCO undertake in this space. Meanwhile, any individual found to be working beyond the proper functions of the security and intelligence agencies or the Armed Forces will remain personally liable for those actions. This is right and fair.

However, I have heard the views of the House about this clause. The Government are in close consultation with the Intelligence and Security Committee, UKIC and the Armed Forces, and we are carefully reflecting on the views expressed and considering whether a change in approach is appropriate. It is important to note that those who have seen the very sensitive information which is relevant to this issue have agreed that there is a problem to solve—including the ISC, which has seen specific examples—and I am committed to us reaching a consensus on this matter.

Turning directly to the amendment in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Carlile, Section 7 of the Intelligence Services Act allows the Secretary of State to give authorisations for acts outside the British Isles, provided that the acts are done as necessary for the proper function of SIS or GCHQ—though not MI5 or the Armed Forces—and that the nature and consequence of the acts will be reasonable. These authorisations are clearly not currently available in all the circumstances in which SCA risks arise. I understand that this amendment seeks to address that gap and provide a solution to the application of the SCA offences. It also seeks to utilise an existing power for ministerial authorisation which is overseen by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. These are obviously legitimate and valuable objectives. Section 7 authorisations provide a carefully used route by which the agencies can seek ministerial approval in advance of planned activities. They require Ministers to consider, in relation to specific acts, whether they are necessary and whether the consequences are reasonable. Once authorised, they can remove criminal and civil liability for those acts.

There will invariably be instances where the SCA risk does not manifest itself initially and becomes apparent only much later. Where a risk is not identified in advance, a Section 7 authorisation would not be sought to cover it. In these cases, those acting for UKIC or the Armed Forces would not be adequately protected should concerns about SCA offences arise later. Further, this scenario could lead to an unintended consequence of seeking to use Section 7 authorisations for hypothetical risks, creating an unhealthy reality in which more conduct is approved than would be otherwise without providing meaningful consideration of those risks. I am sure the House shares our desire to find a targeted solution to that problem. It would be a perverse outcome indeed if this well-intended amendment were to lead to less consideration of the SCA risks rather than more. Whether it is a class authorisation or a targeted one, as referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, the reasons why Section 7 authorisations are inappropriate remain the same.

In short, the Government do not believe that Section 7 authorisation is the best solution to the specific operational issue and do not believe it would improve the clarity of the application of the SCA offences to all the complex operational scenarios that arise in ongoing, carefully considered but agile international collaboration. It is more desirable to remove this risk in a targeted way as per Clause 28, avoiding the burden of potentially missing, and/or the overuse of, Section 7 authorisations for SCA risks.

The noble Lords, Lord Purvis and Lord Beith, talked about criminal conduct and authorisation of this for covert human intelligence sources. I think they may have conflated this with the issue at hand. No amendment is being proposed to the criminal conduct authorisation regime which governs the action of agents. We are concerned here with support for our international partners’ activities, so I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Evans, and the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, who articulated this point very well.

I now turn to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, which aims to table provisions which explicitly state that Clause 28 does not cover torture, murder or sexual offences. Again, it is a legitimate attempt to clarify Clause 28. However, it is one which the Government deem unnecessary for reasons that I have partly outlined already but will continue to set out.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

Coming back to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, gives me the opportunity to return to an earlier comment from the Minister. Did he say in answer to the question from the noble Lord that he did not think we could assist others if they were conducting operations which involved torture, et cetera—that we could not support that activity? Was he going to clarify that and write to us, or clarify it later on the Floor of this Chamber?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am going to do it right now: there is no immunity for inciting or assisting others to kill or torture.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

Could the Minister give a little more information as to why there is no immunity?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord does not want there to be immunity.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

No. Why, under this clause, would there continue to be no immunity?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Perhaps I could get to the end and then clarify this. As I said earlier in relation to the SCA, I can confirm that the examples that the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, asked about have been provided to the ISC. As the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, pointed out, it has agreed that this is a problem that requires a solution.

It is vital to acknowledge that Clause 28 will not create blanket criminal law immunity or change the application of all other criminal law offences, including those criminalising torture anywhere in the world, as I have said a number of times. The UK remains committed and subject to international legal obligations, including under the UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and international obligations on assisting an unlawful act under Article 16 of the International Law Commission’s articles on state responsibility for internationally wrongful acts. The amendment to the SCA offences applies only when persons acting for UKIC or the Armed Forces are acting within the proper exercise of their functions. We do not consider that the activities that are of concern and the focus of this amendment would amount to the proper exercise of those functions. I hope that is clear.

I want to be clear that any individual found to be working outside the proper functions of the intelligence agencies or Armed Forces will remain personally liable for those actions under the SCA offences, as well as other applicable laws. Meanwhile, it will still be possible for legal challenges to be brought against the intelligence agencies and Armed Forces in relation to allegations of unlawful behaviour, whether in the form of judicial review, civil damages claims or through a referral to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. That is exactly as it should be.

In response to the point from the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, I say that the Government’s position is that this amendment is not intended to, nor would it have the effect of, removing the role of the relevant Secretary of State from the oversight of the intelligence and security services.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, spoke about the current reasonableness defence and effectively why it is not enough. There is an existing reasonableness defence in Section 50 of the SCA, as has been noted, which was included in recognition that there may be occasions when it could be shown that an individual’s actions were justified in the circumstances.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

I am very sorry to interrupt the noble Lord again. He said that this would not remove the oversight of the Secretary of State and I absolutely accept that. Of course the Secretary of State will have oversight, but does the noble Lord accept that authorisation by the Secretary of State, at least in some cases, will no longer be a requirement?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I see where the noble Lord is coming from and, yes, I accept that.

I return to the reasonableness defence in Section 50. While we consider that properly authorised activity to protect national security should be interpreted as being reasonable, the application of the reasonableness defence to UKIC’s activity is untested.

I come back to one of the earlier points from the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. I am not aware of any prosecutions, but he will know that I cannot comment on operational matters.

I also come back to the questions about the CPS. The fact that the CPS would not be obliged to prosecute offers little comfort to those carrying out legitimate work on behalf of His Majesty’s Government, who may still be subject to criminal investigation for carrying out authorised activities in the interests of national security. The Government consider that we should be able to offer legal reassurance to individuals carrying out vital work to support those interests.

I finish by reiterating that I am committed to continuing to work with the experts in this House, particularly the noble Lords who have tabled the amendments we have debated, and those in the other place to reach consensus on Clause 28. I thank all noble Lords for their patience as we move towards that shared objective.

I have noted the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, on timeliness but, at the moment, the Government cannot support these amendments and I therefore respectfully ask noble Lords not to press them.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Before the noble Lord sits down, could I see whether I have understood him correctly? Is he saying that an act of torture or sexual offences committed in support of another country’s services could not be a proper exercise of the functions of the Security Service—the SIS—or GCHQ? If he is, would it not be better to have that on the face of the Bill rather than simply as a statement from the Minister?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

That is what I am saying. I will come back to whether it should be on the face of the Bill in due course.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am very grateful for that last interaction between the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the Minister. I am also grateful for the Minister continuing to have a degree of open-mindedness. I do not know where I sit on the cascade of legal hierarchy, but I think it is lower order. I do not know if it is just me, but a frisson of nervousness went through my spine when the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, asked for a quick word outside. If I could avoid that, it would be better.

I am well aware of the distinction between SIS officers working under a CHIS authorisation and what is covered under the ISA. I am also well aware of MI5 officers running agents who carry out criminal activity. The point I was trying to make is that there are clear distinctions and that we have procedures with regard to MI5 officers running agents who carry out criminal activity, but there is no immunity for them to do so. The point I made in my opening remarks is that the processes that MI5 has are effectively the defence. The concern with the breadth of this immunity is that those processes will no longer be the case.

I am also well aware of our international obligations, but it is under domestic law that we would realise what those natures are. Because of the extraterritorial nature of the schedule in the SCA, I am still not convinced in the reading of it that our intelligence services and Armed Forces would be able to operate under domestic law in offering assistance to others carrying out criminal acts. Those criminal acts may well also be breaches of international law. I am grateful for what the Minister said, but I am also grateful for his willingness to engage further on that.

I hope the Minister took on board the consensus with regard to concerns about the Armed Forces. The point I made at the start of this debate is that, unique among the SIS and GCHQ included within this, the Armed Forces have powers of detention. Therefore, the processes under way under the MoD doctrine for risk assessments on torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, extraordinary rendition or rendition, and unacceptable standards of arrest and detention are all areas of considerable concern, if there is immunity for our Armed Forces when working with others.

Of course, the guidance that exists also includes the receiving of unsolicited information or providing or sharing information on collaboration. These risk assessment processes are in place—they are in published principles and guidelines—and the considerable concern is that they will be washed away by the extent of the immunity.

I am grateful to the Minister for being open. I still think that he has not sufficiently addressed all the areas of concern, not least that there would be a considerable diminution of independent oversight in the operation of this. I will withdraw my amendment at this stage. I accept the Minister’s word that he will engage fully before Report, and I hope he will be able to put in writing responses to all the issues that have been raised on this so that we can study it carefully before Report. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

No; I cannot respond to that gallantly, can I? I will plough on.

Interestingly, my son recently completed a master’s in journalism at City, University of London. He told me that the public interest part of the journalism course was the least attended, partly because there are fewer jobs in it, which I thought was interesting and worth reflecting on. It is a very important part of any journalist’s work, but it is not where the majority of students choose to study. I thought that was an interesting observation.

The amendments in this group relate to defining a foreign power for the purposes of its activity in the UK. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, moved her Amendment 66A, which would ensure that journalists and civil society are not wrongly included. This debate could have spread over to the group we will discuss on Monday on the foreign influence registration scheme and how that affects businesses, universities and political parties. In a sense, we will revisit a lot of these issues. Nevertheless, noble Lords have made points that will bear repeating, because they can be repeated in that context.

The noble Lord, Lord Marks, tabled similar amendments to create exclusions in certain instances. Amendments 67 and 69 would expand the definition to include corporations working on the behalf of foreign Governments. It is worth reflecting on the Government’s previous inconsistent approach to Huawei in 5G networks, and their lack of understanding of the risks. I believe that this underlines a need for a more coherent strategy. Serious questions remain following the 2020 announcement that Huawei would be removed from UK 5G networks, which we believe was long overdue, about why it was given the go-ahead in the first place. The Huawei case was sadly illustrative of how, in the past decade, the Government have allowed our national security to become an afterthought, creating risks to it. We on this side of the House believe that the Government need to invest in homegrown alternatives to end our national dependence on high-risk vendors.

My noble friend Lady Hayter made a number of very interesting points about political parties, which were picked up by other noble Lords in the debate. I would be interested to hear the Minister’s answer to the points she raised.

The noble Lord, Lord Black, referred to the letter in the Times today to which he was a co-signatory. The noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, also spoke about the potential chilling effect of the Bill’s provisions as they are currently drafted. They both spoke about the importance of a public interest journalism.

The noble Lord, Lord Wallace, made a point that I think will be repeated on Monday but is well worth repeating. It is the problem of overreporting. That is a theme that has run through all the briefings which I have received and that I am sure all noble Lord have received. It a fear in the university sector, the business sector and political parties, and literally hundreds of NGOs are also concerned about this matter—but that is something that can be talked about on Monday, as I have just mentioned.

When the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, summed up, he put his finger on the main problem with this section of the Bill, which is defining the anomalies of political parties, whether they are in government or not, or are part of coalitions or are opposition parties, and the many sorts of relationships which all political parties have internationally and how that works with the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Black, about the importance of public interest journalism, and how that is a very international approach, often dealing with leaked information and illegal information, and how journalists are to be protected in pursuing that valuable work. So this is a complex area. I am sure the Minister will, as usual, be very careful in his answer, but I hope he retains an open mind, as he did on the previous group when we were considering issues raised in this Committee.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I again thank all noble Lords who have participated in this debate. Amendment 66A seeks to exclude journalism and civil society activity from the foreign power condition unless the conduct is instigated by or is under the direction or control of a foreign power. I acknowledge the intention of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, to protect legitimate activity from being criminalised under the Bill with this amendment. However, the Government do not believe that the Bill criminalises legitimate activity and, as such, it is our view that this amendment is unnecessary.

The Committee will be aware that the foreign power condition provides a single and consistent means by which a link between a person’s activities and a foreign state can be drawn. Meeting the foreign power condition is not in itself wrong. It becomes relevant when the other elements of the offences to which it applies are met. As such, the Government do not believe there is a risk to those who engage in legitimate acts, such as journalism or forms of civil society activity.

Turning to the specifics of the amendment, we know that those with hostile intent seek to hide their activities under the appearance of legitimacy, and this amendment could therefore create a gap in our ability to prosecute such individuals. This amendment would mean that an activity carried out with the financial or other assistance of, in collaboration with, or with the agreement of a foreign power would not meet the requirements of the foreign power condition. As a consequence, where a state threat actor posing as a journalist has been engaged in harmful activity which is an offence under the Bill, they would not commit an offence even if we could show that they were receiving specific funding in relation to that activity from a foreign power. This would produce an unwelcome effect whereby those seeking to cause harm to the UK could pose as journalists or members of civil society groups or operate through proxies in order to make it more difficult to be prosecuted.

The Government understand that journalists and those conducting civil society activity can be acting wholly legitimately when receiving funding from a foreign power or working in collaboration with it. However, the other requirements for offences to be committed mean that those legitimate acts would not be captured. In answer to my noble friend Lord Black, I can be clear that this Bill targets wrongful activity from states, not whistleblowing —but we will be coming back to whistleblowing later in today’s session. I also hope that those comments reassure my noble friends Lord Black and Lady Stowell and, of course, the noble Lord, Lord Faulks.

I now turn to Amendments 67 to 71 on the meaning of foreign power, which were tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Marks of Henley on Thames and Lord Purvis of Tweed. The noble Lords have tabled an amendment to remove from the definition a political party which is the governing political party of foreign Government. The inclusion of governing political parties addresses situations where there is a dominant political party or parties within a country to such an extent that it may be difficult to disentangle whether harmful activities are being carried out on the direction of the ruling party or the Government. We know all too well that states seeking to exert their influence or cause harm to the United Kingdom will do so through a number of different vectors, and we do not wish to create a gap in our legislation which state actors could exploit.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

How then, if you seek to attack political parties that are effectively Governments, do you correspondingly exclude political parties that are not in any sense responsible for the activities of the Government, even though they may form a small part of such a Government? The point we made about coalitions is in point and illustrates one of the points we are concerned with, which is that, in a desire to encompass everything that ought to be encompassed, you pull into the net all kinds of fish that ought never to have been caught.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I of course understand where the noble Lord is coming from, but the point is that this relates to the activities of these political parties and those who are working for them. Therefore, I am not entirely convinced that it would be appropriate to exclude the smaller parties in, say, a coalition.

I was going to go on to explain why certain governing political parties in the Republic of Ireland have been carved out, in answer to the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. A political party that is both the governing political party in the Republic of Ireland and a political party registered in Great Britain or Northern Ireland is excluded from the definition of a foreign power, as noted. This exclusion is included in recognition of the fact that there are political parties that contest elections in the Republic of Ireland and in the United Kingdom to ensure that the provisions in the Bill do not inadvertently impact cross-border politics.

A further amendment has been tabled seeking to add corporate or other entities.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

Is the Minister moving off political parties? If so, he has not answered any of the questions that I posed, and I hope he is going to do so before he moves off political parties. The idea is that we are going to call in political parties—and only governing parties, although under Schedule 4 they are the ones that are excluded, not opposition ones—but other countries do not necessarily have a definition of political parties in the way that we do. In fact, until PPERA, in 1998 or whenever it was, I cannot remember, we did not have a definition of political parties or a register of them. So, in other countries that do not have them, how on earth are you going to know who is a political party?

Apart from that, there is the question I put about whether they are in opposition or in government, and what the answer is on America. If one is trying to get at agents acting on behalf of a Government, all you have to do—I used to be general-secretary of the Fabian Society—is call yourself a think tank rather than a political party, and then presumably you can do the activity. So, if this is a way of try to get at organisations that work on behalf of Governments, only calling them political parties, of which in many countries there are no definitions anyway, is, I have to say, somewhat the wrong approach. Will the Minister give me answers to the questions I posed in my contribution?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank the noble Baroness for that. She will forgive me if I do not get involved in what is the correct, or legitimate, Government of the United States. I do not think that is for me to opine.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

It will be for the noble Lord or his successor to opine, because it is in the Bill. There is no secondary legislation attached to it about what the definition will be. This is Pepper v Hart. What is going to be taken is the Minister’s words at the Dispatch Box. If the Minister is saying that he cannot define which is the governing party in America, how do we know who we can meet and who we have to register?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

As regards the registering point, the noble Baroness is—as the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, suggested—perhaps straying into the FIRS situation, which we will discuss at considerable length on Monday. I think that will deal with a number of the questions the noble Baroness has posed with regard to registration and so on. Can we come back to that on Monday, please?

As regards opining as to the Government of the United States, I choose not to do so purely because it would potentially be a political can of worms, but I acknowledge the fact that obviously there is a President who comes from a different party from the majority party in one of the two Houses.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

So there will be meetings that we can have now, and if—God forbid—Mr Trump wins, suddenly the parties with which we are allowed to talk will change because it is Mr Trump rather than Mr Biden. Is that really what the Minister is saying?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

No, I do not believe that is particularly what I am saying. I suspect we will have to come back to this for precise definition purposes, and I am happy to commit to do so.

A further amendment has been tabled, seeking to add corporate or other entities to the foreign power definition. We believe this is unnecessary as it is already covered in the foreign power condition provision, which covers indirect links, under Clause 29(3). This explicitly provides that a person’s conduct could meet the foreign power condition if there is

“an indirect relationship through one or more companies”.

The legislation therefore covers cases where a person is receiving tasking through a company that is under the ownership, control or direction of a foreign power. It is vital that states are not able to circumvent the measures in the Bill by working through proxies to deliver harmful effects.

The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, asked specifically about state-owned companies and Huawei in particular. We have not included state-owned companies in the definition of a foreign power as these companies often have their own non-state objectives. Instead, the legislation captures circumstances where a person acts directly or indirectly

“for or on behalf of a foreign power”.

That includes cases where a person knows, or ought reasonably to know, that the activity they are conducting for a state-linked company is being carried out for or on behalf of the foreign power, or where they intend to benefit a foreign power. Offences may be committed by bodies corporate, including those established in other jurisdictions. In addition, the legislation provides that where an offence is committed by a company

“with the consent or connivance … or … due to any neglect”

of an officer of the company, that officer of the company may be guilty of the offence.

In answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, I have just mentioned that a number of the questions she raised and subjects she covered are more appropriately dealt with under the FIRS discussion we will have on Monday. That also applies to a number of the things raised by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace. As noble Lords know, that part of the Bill—Clauses 65 and 66 —was introduced late into the House of Commons, to which the noble Lord referred. I am sorry if the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, thinks I was frivolous as to the potential for right-wing threats to our national security. Just for the record, I am completely agnostic about from which end of the political spectrum threats are made to our national security.

Finally, noble Lords have tabled an amendment to exclude members of NATO and other nations, via regulations, from the definition of a foreign power. It is important to note that the National Security Bill focuses on harmful conduct undertaken by a person, not the foreign power they seek to benefit. Actively excluding certain states could create an unwelcome gap in the legislation, particularly given that we know that states sometimes look to act through proxies. These amendments, therefore, could lead to us being unable to take necessary and appropriate action against harmful activities. Noble Lords will wish to note the case of Daniel Houghton, the dual British-Dutch national who attempted to sell sensitive information to the Dutch intelligence services in 2010. Were NATO states to be excluded from the definition of a foreign power, cases like Daniel Houghton’s would not be captured by the offences and measures in the Bill.

For those reasons, the Government cannot accept these amendments and I ask noble Lords not to press them.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I am afraid I do not accept the Minister’s idea that these things cannot be criminalised, so I will bring my amendment back on Report. I thank noble Lords for contributing to my amendment, particularly the noble Lord, Lord Black, with his expertise—which goes way beyond mine. I ask the Minister for a meeting to discuss this, because it is quite a fundamental point and bears further discussion. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw.

National Security Bill

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 11th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, this is another JCHR-recommended amendment, ably spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Marks. Its effect is to narrow the definition of foreign power threat activity by removing giving support and assistance to a person involved in offences under the Bill. The reason for the amendment is that the support and assistance become illegal if unrelated to espionage activity. As the noble Lord explained, its effect does not alter the lines which include facilitating such offending under subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b) of the relevant clause. His objection to paragraph (c) was that it does not make sense and is too vague. I take on board the legal points and his examination of the English in that paragraph, but the real point of this is to provoke a debate and discussion, to narrow the definition and encourage the Minister to explain more fully what is meant by the definitions set down in the Bill.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 72 seeks to narrow the definition of foreign power threat activity by removing the conduct of those who give support or assistance to individuals, as has been noted.

The definition of foreign power threat activity is a vital part of the Bill, ensuring that the police have the powers they need in support of investigations into state threats offences. It is important that foreign power threat activity has sufficient breadth to allow our law enforcement and intelligence agencies to act where a threat is posed to the safety of the United Kingdom.

There will inevitably be overlap between facilitating on the one hand and assisting or supporting individuals on the other to carry out certain harmful activity under the Bill. However, it is important to retain both elements as they serve distinct purposes. We do not wish to create a gap in the legislation that prevents us being able to act against persons who assist individuals involved in harmful activity, and therefore we cannot accept this amendment.

Both noble Lords implied that it is casting the net too broadly to say that it is not necessary to identify a specific offence or act. However, given the harm that can arise from state threats activity, it is right that the Government can act to disrupt individuals during the early stages of their conduct. Therefore, it will not always be possible to determine the end goal of their conduct. Indeed, in some cases an individual may not have even decided the precise outcome they seek to bring about but, none the less, they have an intention to engage in state threats activity. We therefore want to ensure that the provisions are robust enough to catch criminals in these cases. Waiting until we have a full picture of the act they wish to commit could mean that we have to wait until the act itself is committed.

Additionally, I reassure the House that the reference to

“conduct which gives support or assistance”

under Clause 31(1)(c) relates specifically to conduct falling under Clause 31(1)(a), as is made explicit through the reference to paragraph (a). The Government’s view is that it is implicit that the conduct in question must be support in relation to acts or threats under Clause 31(1)(a), rather than support in relation to any unrelated activity. Thus, the provision does not risk bringing activity wholly unrelated to state threats activity into scope.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

Can the Minister explain that? That is the only thing I can see that is covered by paragraph (c) which is not covered by paragraph (b)—the provision of support or assistance in matters which are nothing to do with the likelihood of the individual being involved in conduct falling within paragraph (a). The Minister has stated that paragraph (c) does not have the effect of proscribing conduct which has nothing to do with the provisions in paragraphs (a) and (b), but I do not know on what he bases that confidence.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I base that confidence on the explicit reference to Clause 31(1)(a) in Clause 31(1)(c). With that, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

I will withdraw it, but only on the basis that the Minister will consider this a little more carefully. As I have said, at the moment the clause seems to me unsatisfactory, and paragraph (c) ought to go. That would not damage the overall meaning of the clause at all, and I hope that the Minister will reconsider that before Report. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

73: Clause 34, page 25, line 20, leave out from “(1)” to end of line 21 and insert “is subject to sections 3(6) and 15(6) (commission of offences under sections 3 and 15 by conduct outside the United Kingdom).”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment provides that Clause 34(1) is subject to specific provisions in Clauses 3 and 15 about when conduct taking place outside the UK can constitute an offence under those Clauses.

Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (Codes of Practice) (Revision of Code A) Order 2022

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Tuesday 10th January 2023 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

That the draft Order laid before the House on 13 October 2022 be approved.

Relevant document: 15th Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, this order was laid in draft before Parliament on 13 October 2022. It will bring into effect a revised code of practice issued under Section 66 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, which I shall call “PACE” from now on. This is PACE Code A, which governs the exercise by police officers of powers to stop and search a person without first arresting them. For England and Wales, PACE sets out the core powers of the police to prevent, detect and investigate crime. The exercise of these powers is subject to codes of practice, or PACE codes, which the Secretary of State is required to issue. The PACE codes put in place important procedural safeguards for the public and detainees when the police exercise their powers.

The proposed amendments to PACE Code A, which we are discussing today, relate to police powers to stop and search individuals subject to a serious violence reduction order, which I will refer to henceforth as “SVROs”. Inserted into the sentencing code by the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, SVROs are civil orders which give the police powers to stop and search individuals convicted of an offence where a bladed article or offensive weapon was used or was present. Cracking down on knife crime is a priority for the Government, and SVROs are an important part of that crucial endeavour. By increasing the risk of detection, these orders are designed to deter habitual knife carriers from reoffending, as well as to help prevent exploitation into continued criminality, including further weapons carrying.

We must build an understanding of the impact of the new orders, so the issuing of the orders will be piloted in West Midlands, Merseyside, Sussex and Thames Valley police force areas. The pilot will be independently evaluated before a decision is made on rollout of the orders across England and Wales. We have proposed these revisions to PACE Code A to ensure that proper guidance and safeguards on the use of the new stop and search power are in place for the pilot.

The proposed revisions were subject to a statutory consultation, which ran for six weeks; they introduce a new temporary annexe, G, which deals with searches in relation to SVROs. In particular, the code highlights that the power does not require officers to have prior reasonable grounds, but its use must not be based on prejudice; it highlights that searches can be conducted only on those subject to an SVRO, and that officers should seek to confirm the identity of the individual; it outlines that the use of the power, like all other stop and search powers, is discretionary, and that officers will be expected to use their judgment when choosing to conduct searches; it outlines that the new annexe will apply for 24 months, plus an additional six-month transitional period; and it outlines the territorial extent of the use of the powers. While SVROs will be issued only in the pilot police force areas, the stop and search powers will be available across England and Wales.

On concerns around disproportionality and the impact of stop and search on particular communities, our aim is for these orders to enable police to take a more targeted approach, specifically in relation to known weapons carriers. The code of practice is just one of many safeguards in place to ensure the fair and proportionate use of SVROs. The revised code was laid before Parliament together with the draft order and Explanatory Memorandum. Subject to the order being approved, the revised code will come into force on 17 January 2023. I must highlight that this date is not a fixed date for the commencement of the SVRO pilot: we are ensuring that all the appropriate secondary legislation is in place before commencing in early 2023.

Fighting crime and protecting the public are central to the Government’s agenda. I therefore commend the draft order to the House and I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I start by thanking the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, who made some important and interesting points. I agree with many of them and I look forward to the Minister’s response.

The Chamber will wish to know that we did not oppose the Motion for this pilot in the other place, but there are also important points that I wish to pose to the Minister to add to those made by the noble Lords, Lord Paddick, Lord Moylan and Lord Hogan-Howe, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, in another sense, in that this also gives us in this Chamber the opportunity to discuss knife crime, which is clearly an important matter.

We are all horrified by knife crime and the horrific murders, sometimes of young people by other young people, in the most shocking of circumstances—in full public view. Can the Minister start by telling us what the latest figures actually tell us with respect to knife crime? I looked for them before this debate, and some are impacted by the pandemic or use different years as a baseline. What are the actual official figures for knife crime and knife-related murder, and not just in London but across the country? Clearly, whatever the figures are, they are too high, and the fundamental question for this debate is how serious violence reduction orders are expected to help. The noble Lord, Lord Moylan, made the point that knife crime prevention orders were backed as the answer to tackle knife crime back in 2019. They have not even started yet. Why is that, and when will they start?

On the issue of disproportionality, the pilot is for two years. However, supposing that problems emerge around disproportionality before the two years—a point the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, made—is there a mechanism for an earlier review within that two-year period to look at data as it emerges? The Minister in the other place says he is open to this. What does that mean: an interim review after, say, six months, or a year? What does the Government being “open to looking at this” mean?

Can the Minister explain the transition period of six months and how that will work in practice? In particular, how will it impact on an individual given such an order as regards its length? Are all orders for only a six-month duration or just those issued on the last day of the two-year pilot, hence the six-month transition period? It is not clear to me at all, because if you are given an SVRO on the last day of the two years, it can last only for a maximum of six months. If you are given it on the first day of the two-year period, can you be given it for two years, or two years and six months, or can you be given it for six months, then another six months and another six months? Some clarity about who can and cannot be given SVROs is needed.

On the issue of territorial extent, the SVROs will be able to be used only in the four areas—the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, made a good point about how the areas were chosen, why certain other areas were not and why the number four was alighted on, and I think the Chamber could do with some explanation of that from the Government. These four areas are the areas where the orders can be given but, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, mentioned, the concern is that the police power will be applied across England and Wales. How will the data be shared by these four areas with forces across the country? What about Scotland? If somebody who is subject to such an order went to Scotland, what happens with respect to that? How will a police officer be able to know that the individual is subject to an order? Again, the noble Lord, Lord Hogan- Howe, made that point, although I understand that his point was that you would expect it to be on the police database and shared in that way. However, it would be interesting to see how that will work and what the Government’s response would be.

In other debates, we have talked about stop and search, including whether only a uniformed officer can use this power; again, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has made this point forcefully before. With respect to this order, can only a uniformed officer use this stop and search power—particularly given that, as noble Lords will appreciate, it is stop and search that can be done without suspicion? How many officers have now received the College of Policing training on stop and search, and will they be updated with respect to this order?

On the question of pilots, can the Minister look at ensuring that, if, for whatever reason, a future pilot contains one part that is focused on a small number of areas and another part that is to be applied nationally, this is clearly explained—particularly in this case where, as the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, have pointed out, this pilot came about as a result of a concession made by the Government because of the concerns about serious violence reduction orders raised by many noble Lords?

Can the Minister say something to inform us how this pilot will be evaluated by Ecorys? How is it going to do that? What criteria is it going to use to determine whether this pilot has been successful? Will it be fully independent of government? Also, are the Government open to the fact that these pilots may fail and not work? In those circumstances, would the Government be prepared to say that they will not carry on with them? The evaluation is particularly important given the concerns around disproportionality with respect to gender and ethnicity. If the evaluation shows that there are problems, the Government should consider other measures.

We all want to tackle knife crime, whatever its level; there is no difference between us on that. There are real issues for us as a society to deal with, as the Minister in the other place said. I want to point out one statistic that the Minister in the other place used so that noble Lords can see how difficult this is, whatever the level of knife crime. He said that

“young black people are 24 times more likely to be murdered using a knife than those from other communities.”—[Official Report, Commons, Ninth Delegated Legislation Committee, 13/12/22; col. 8.]

We all want something to be done about that. We all accept that that figure is too high. The issue for the Government is how on earth knife crime prevention orders are going to tackle that and other issues related to knife crime across the country. Can the Minister say what else the Government are doing to tackle this problem?

We have this new order alongside other orders designed to tackle knife crime and serious violence. We all hope that they work. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and others pointed out, targeting hot spots, having police on the streets in neighbourhoods, prevention, community engagement and support are also crucial. Many lives, often very young ones, are still being lost. Many families are still affected. Many communities are still affected. Orders such as this one may help, but they must be part of a wider ongoing effort by the police and communities if they are to have the impact that we all want.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have made valuable contributions to this debate.

First, I will address the concerns expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, in relation to the territorial extent of the SVRO pilot. I want to clarify that, as I said earlier, SVROs are being introduced on the basis of a pilot in Merseyside, West Midlands, Sussex and Thames Valley police forces. They will be issued only in these four pilot police force areas. However, as the revised PACE Code A sets out, the stop and search powers are enforceable by all constables across England and Wales; the “all constables” point answers the question of whether they will be in uniform, I think, but obviously they would have to identify themselves as such. This is aimed at supporting an operational response across police force areas, allowing constables from non-pilot forces to stop and search individuals subject to SVROs if they travel outside of the pilot area.

The noble Lords, Lord Hogan-Howe and Lord Coaker, asked why we are piloting in those force areas and not with larger forces, where the prevalence of serious violence—

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I am sorry to interrupt; I apologise to the Minister for being rude. I am not clear what he means about whether or not an officer using this stop and search power must be in uniform. This is an extremely important point. I am sorry if it is just me and I did not understand, but I wonder whether the Minister can clarify that point.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

That is no problem at all. I will do my best to clarify that by the end of this speech, but as I understand it, it is all constables, which I assume includes those who do not necessarily wear a uniform.

Regarding the territorial extent of the pilot and why we are piloting in these force areas and not larger ones, where the prevalence of serious violence is higher, all four forces that will pilot SVROs are in the 20 areas most affected by serious violence across England and Wales. They accounted for 80% of all hospital admissions for injury with a sharp object, with each individually accounting for 2% or more of admissions, rounded to the nearest percentage point. The West Midlands has the third-highest rate of knife crime in England and Wales, and Merseyside the sixth-highest. The pilot will allow us to build an understanding of the impact and effectiveness of the new orders before deciding whether they should be rolled out nationally to other force areas. I hope that answers the question.

I have heard what the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, had to say on this topic; however, stop and search powers are not enforceable across England and Wales. As the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, noted, individuals subject to SVROs could simply operate outside the pilot areas. The Government held a statutory consultation on the revised code. This issue was discussed at length with key stakeholders, who strongly supported allowing the use of stop and search powers by police constables both within and outside the police force areas. In answer to the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, about the Police Federation, it is a member of the PACE board and as such was invited to provide a response. Whether it did, I do not know. Like the proposed approach to SVROs, knife crime prevention orders, which have been referred to, are being piloted in the Metropolitan Police area and can only be issued in that force area. However, the orders are also enforceable across England and Wales.

I stress that this is only a pilot, but we are revising the PACE codes because they outline the fundamental principles of fair and responsible stop and search. We want to ensure that officers have clear guidance on the use of the new powers in the SVRO pilot, including through PACE codes of practice. The search power can only be used against persons who are subject to an SVRO. An individual can be issued with an SVRO only if they are over 18 and have been convicted of an offence involving a bladed article or an offensive weapon, and if the court considers it necessary to make the SVRO to protect the public from the risk of harm involving an offensive weapon or bladed article, or to prevent the offender from further offending involving an offensive weapon or bladed article. Therefore, while the police do not require reasonable grounds for suspicion, it is not an unrestricted stop and search power. The code of practice is clear that the use of the power must not be based on prejudice. The use of the power is discretionary, and officers will be expected to use their judgment when choosing to conduct searches.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked how, if individuals are not legally required to give their identity when stopped by the police, officers will identify those subject to an SVRO. The police will have obtained the offender’s details at the notification stage of an SVRO—there is the requirement for an individual subject of an SVRO to notify the police of their name and address—and they should ensure that any stop and search under the power is targeted at offenders that have a SVRO only. In most cases, it is expected that offenders subject to an SVRO will be known to the police and officers will be able to identify the offender before conducting a search. Where an officer is unsure of an offender’s identity, they should seek to confirm that offender’s identity and whether they have an SVRO before using the stop and search power. It is an offence for an offender to tell a police constable that they are not subject to an SVRO if they are.

The Government fully support the police in the fair use of stop and search to crack down on violent crime and protect communities. The code of practice is one of many safeguards in place to ensure the fair and proportionate use of SVROs. Others include statutory guidance for the police on the use of the power, which we have laid in draft before Parliament, body-worn video, and extensive data collection. Stop and searches carried out using the SVRO power will be subject to the usual internal and external scrutiny panels to ensure that forces are continually reviewing and learning from officer stop and searches.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and my noble friend Lord Moylan asked about the evaluation of the pilot. We of course recognise the need for transparency in how the orders are used, and clear and robust monitoring to reassure communities that the orders are being used appropriately and effectively. The Government are piloting SVROs to build an understanding of their impact before deciding whether they should be rolled out nationally. By definition, that implies that if they do not work and we do not get sufficient data, they will not be continued with.

We have appointed an independent evaluator, Ecorys, to carefully gather the data necessary to assess the impact of these orders. We will lay a report on the outcome of the pilot in Parliament. It is expected in late 2025 and will include an initial assessment of the impact of SVROs on the reoffending rates of offenders in respect of whom such orders have been made; include information about the exercise by constables of the powers; provide an assessment of the impact on offenders of being subject to an SVRO; and assess the impact of SVROs on people with protected characteristics within the meaning of the Equality Act 2010. We are also working with the SVRO working group and the National Police Chiefs’ Council to ensure that all forces are aware of the draft statutory guidance on SVROs and the revised PACE Code A.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked me about training. I do not think it is for me to discuss operational matters particularly, but the training is being worked on by the College of Policing. It will be interactive e-learning training and will ensure that officers in pilot areas understand the new civil orders, their responsibilities and the stop and search powers being provided. This learning platform will test officer knowledge, including when it would or would not be appropriate to use the powers.

To sum up, we do not accept that the availability of the stop and search powers across England and Wales for individuals subject to an SVRO warrants the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. The rationale behind the approach we are taking is clear and sensible, and there are strong safeguards in place. Ultimately, we have a responsibility to tackle crime and keep people safe, and that is and will continue to be a key priority for the Government.

I welcome the fact that the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, mentioned victims; I will go into some detail on the statistics. The latest police-recorded crime figures published by the ONS for the year ending June 2022 show that knife-enabled crime remained 9% lower—that is, 49,991 offences—than pre-coronavirus pandemic levels; in the year ending March 2020, the figure was 55,076. Police-recorded offences of possession of an article with a blade or point were 9% higher in the year ending June 2022, at 25,287 offences, than the year ending March 2020, when there were 23,242 offences. That is a 13% increase. The police recorded 679 homicide offences in the year ending June 2022, which is a 5% decrease compared with the year ending March 2020. Levels have increased by 13% since the year ending June 2021, during which social restrictions were still in place.

I understand the concerns around disproportionality and the impact of stop and search, particularly on black individuals. But, as the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, has just mentioned, we should not forget that, according to the most recent studies, young black people are 24 times more likely to be victims of homicide than young white people. That is a tragedy. Young people are dying, their families are suffering and their communities are being disproportionately impacted. I totally agree with the noble Lord, Lord Coaker: we absolutely have to do better. I go back to the point I made earlier: to be absolutely clear, an individual must have been convicted of an offence where a bladed article or offensive weapon was used or was present to receive an SVRO, and the stop and search power applies only where an individual has an SVRO.

I will read out a supportive quote from Patrick Green, CEO of the Ben Kinsella Trust. As a reminder, Ben was knifed to death at the age of 16 in 2008; he would now have been entering his 31st year. Patrick said:

“We are pleased that the Government is setting out to do more to take knives and those who choose to persistently carry them off our streets. Reoffending rates have been one of the scourges of knife crime. SVROs give us a chance to look again at stop and search and what more can be done in the courts to reduce offending.”


That very powerful statement speaks for itself.

The policy detail of SVROs was discussed at length during passage of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. As mentioned, they will be piloted and we will conduct a full evaluation before any further rollout.

My noble friend Lord Moylan went slightly off topic when he asked me about non-crime hate incidents. I will endeavour to answer. The Home Secretary has asked officials to consider the issue of NCHI recording to ensure that the police are using their time most effectively. This work is currently under way and includes consideration of whether the Home Secretary will publish a code of practice on non-crime hate incident recording, as provided for in Sections 60 and 61 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act.

In closing, I offer again my thanks to all noble Lords who contributed to this short debate. I hope that I have covered the points raised during it. There is one that I have not: I will write to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, on the subject of uniforms; I cannot clarify that at this precise moment. I hope the House will feel sufficiently reassured that the changes we are making to PACE Code A are a necessary safeguard to have in place before commencement of the pilot scheme for SVROs. I have made it clear that public safety is our foremost concern. I therefore commend the order to the House.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, before the Minister sits down, I did not hear an answer to my two questions. I do not expect one as to whether the Government respect democracy because I know the answer to that, but my other question was about the pilot scheme. Why promise a pilot and then do the whole rollout?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am not entirely sure that I understand the noble Baroness’s question. If you are going to have a pilot you have to roll it out, surely.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

Why not wait for the pilot to finish before you decide to roll out the whole thing more widely?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

We have not actually started the pilot and we are not rolling it out. It is stuck to four pilot areas. We are talking about the territorial extent of the stop and search powers.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I am very grateful to all noble Lords for their contributions to the debate, particularly those who supported my amendment.

The Minister has completely glossed over the whole point of the regret amendment, which is that a concession was made by a government Minister at the Dispatch Box to limit SVROs to specific police areas. There was no mention of restricting only the issuing of SVROs, rather than their enforcement, at that time. It was never even considered, let alone agreed to. What has happened is this. The Home Office has consulted the police—what the Government called “key stakeholders”; I think the Minister means the police, as that is who they consulted—and the police said, “Hang on a minute, we need the power across all of England and Wales because these criminals travel”. That may or may not be a valid argument, but it was not what the Minister promised from the Dispatch Box. That is the point and that is why there is a regret amendment, but I do not intend to delay the House further because there is a big debate to come. I therefore wish to withdraw the amendment.

Police: Employment and Discipline

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Monday 9th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what plans they have to revise the (1) employment contracts, and (2) disciplinary regulations, for police officers.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, police officers hold a unique position in society and are therefore protected by a unique set of terms and conditions, which are enshrined in legislation. Regulations are updated regularly following consultation with policing stakeholders, and the Government have no current plans to revise that approach. In October, the Government announced a review into police officer dismissals, ensuring that the system is fair and effective at removing those who are not fit to serve.

[The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Fookes) (Con)]

My Lords, we have a virtual contribution from the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours.

[Lord Campbell-Savours (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, following Metropolitan Police Commissioner Sir Mark Rowley’s powerful expression of concerns over the handling of police misconduct allegations and the need to sack the worst offenders—as well as similar comments from the formidable noble Baroness, Lady Casey, on the need for early dismissals, and, more recently, the shocking revelations from the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, about the six-stage, year-long police officer dismissal process—can the Minister explain why the whole police disciplinary procedure cannot be reviewed in line with those of other professions? With the worst cases, dismissal should come first. More widely, there should be a speedier appeal procedure.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, as I have just said, we announced a review into that in October. The terms of reference are under active discussion and will be published in the near future. I will just correct the noble Lord: there are not six stages to the dismissals process; there are actually only three in the performance regulations, but officers can appeal against the outcome of those stages. Accelerated hearings are often missed, but if there is sufficient evidence of gross misconduct and it is in the public interest for the individual to cease to be an officer without delay, the chief constable can hold or chair accelerated misconduct proceedings.

[Lord Lexden (Con)]

My Lords, is it not imperative to enable the Metropolitan Police Commissioner to sort out the terrible problems, about which he has spoken so fully, as soon as possible? No review—action, please.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

As I have said, we will be publishing the terms of reference in that review very shortly. The current system provides routes for chief constables to dismiss officers through accelerated hearings, as I have just outlined.

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary’s report, published last November, said that

“it is too easy for the wrong people both to join and to stay in the police.”

One of the recommendations was that any candidate for the police should have a face-to-face interview with existing police officers. When that was put to the Minister in the other House, it was said that there was an expectation that that would happen. Does the Minister agree that the inspectorate has put forward a requirement, not a recommendation, for some action to take place?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

From memory, there is a face-to-face aspect to the vetting and interviewing process—if I am wrong on that, I will come back and correct myself. On the report to which the noble Lord referred, he will be aware that there is a requirement for policing bodies to provide a response to the recommendations in that report within 56 days of its publication. Those responses will be imminent, in that case.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, the Met’s own figures show that the number of officers suspended from duties on full pay has risen by almost 600% over the last three years. This excludes a growing number of others subject to management or restricted duties owing to concerns about their performance or conduct. This is not a statistical quirk but a consequence of systemic issues with the disciplinary procedures. This needs to be addressed urgently, because it affects forces across the country and compromises the safety of the people whom these police officers serve. We do not have time to wait for a review; it needs to be dealt with now.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I respectfully disagree. I think that the appropriate process is to review this and, as I say, the review was announced in October. The terms of reference are under active discussion and will be published very soon.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, in view of all the legislation that we keep passing here, giving the police greater and greater powers, I would have assumed that there would be some urgency to this sort of revision. We need higher standards of discipline, self-control and integrity within our police forces if we are going to give them all these extra powers.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I completely agree with the noble Baroness; we absolutely need all those things.

[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for outlining that there is an expedited procedure in certain circumstances. However, can he please outline whether or not an officer is suspended, as is common in most professional situations, while that expedited procedure is undertaken?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am afraid that I do not know the answer to that; I will have to write to my noble friend.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, the Minister will know that the majority of our police officers do a great job, often in the most difficult circumstances. However, we have seen a number of high-profile cases that have undermined the public’s trust and confidence in our police—cases such as that of Sarah Everard or even of the head of the police watchdog himself having to resign over historic allegations. Is not the question for the Government: what are they going to do to work with the police to restore the necessary public trust and confidence in our police?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I join the noble Lord in agreeing that we owe our police officers—the vast majority of whom do an excellent job—our thanks and praise. He will also be aware that there have been a number of reports published on these subjects. The police forces will be coming back imminently with their responses to the HMICFRS report, to which I referred earlier. As I said, I think the report specified that it will be within 56 days. It is absolutely incumbent on the Government to work with all police forces to ensure that they deliver the highest possible standards.

[Lord Watts (Lab)]

My Lords, is it not the case that there are three stages, but there are three appeals, so there are six stages, which is why the process takes so long? Can the Minister confirm that the terms of reference will include the time it takes to go through the procedures, so that they are speeded up, and that that will be an important part of the review?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I said earlier that this is under active discussion. I am not part of those active discussions, but I cannot imagine a set of circumstances where they would not be considering the speed of the process.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, why has it taken from October to January just to come up with basic terms of reference? How long will it be before this review, whenever it actually begins, concludes, given the concern throughout the country and certainly across your Lordships’ House?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am afraid I do not know why it has taken a couple of months to get to this stage, and I do not know how long the review will take, but I imagine that will be dealt with in the terms of reference.

[Baroness Blower (Lab)]

My Lords, significant concerns have been expressed in your Lordships’ House today about the fact that this has taken since October, so will the Minister undertake to write, and place a copy of the letter in the Library, to tell us how long he imagines this will now take?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I will go back to the Policing Minister, have a discussion with him and then write, based on that discussion.

Police: Appointments in PCC Offices

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Wednesday 21st December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lexden]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what plans they have to introduce legislation to prevent police officers facing serious misconduct proceedings being appointed to senior posts in the offices of Police and Crime Commissioners.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, police and crime commissioners are required by legislation to seek the views of their police and crime panel when appointing to senior positions in their office. The ultimate decision on appointment lies with the PCC as the directly elected local representative for policing. Former police officers or police staff members who have been dismissed and placed on the barred list are prevented from being employed or appointed by a PCC.

[Lord Lexden (Con)]

My Lords, what kind of system is it that permits a disgraced policeman awaiting a serious misconduct hearing to oversee the work of a police chief constable with an unspotted record? What kind of system is it that permits a police and crime commissioner to announce a serious misconduct hearing and then delay it indefinitely, even though the law requires it to start within 100 days, saying recently, and utterly bizarrely:

“It is complicated, it is interwoven with other things and there is order of things I cannot supersede”?


Is not a system that permits all this a gravely defective system? Is it not scandalous that the Government have done nothing to fix the defects, despite repeated calls from across the House, with the Home Secretary even refusing to discuss these matters with a small cross-party group?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, no, I do not believe that is the case. I will defend the system. On the second part of my noble friend’s question, arrangements concerning the establishment of a misconduct hearing are a matter for PCCs, and the management of the hearing itself is the responsibility of the independent legally qualified chairs. Legally qualified chairs must commence a hearing within 100 days of an officer being provided a notice referring them to proceedings, but may extend this period where they consider it in the interests of justice to do so. Decisions made within a hearing are done independently of PCCs as well as government. I think that answers the second part of my noble friend’s question.

[Lord Morris of Aberavon (Lab)]

My Lords, while I sympathise with the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, would not the best course be to revisit the Nolan principles—which I, with others, was charged by Prime Minister John Major with drawing up proposals to implement—so that anyone who falls below those more comprehensive standards would be barred from any public office?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I take the noble and learned Lord’s point, and I agree: the Nolan principles should always be observed.

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, this Chamber has already decided that policemen facing charges should not escape those charges by resignation. Yet here we have a case of a new PCC appointing someone who is under investigation, and that investigation, as we have heard, has been delayed, in order to hold to account the chief constable. This just cannot stand. If you are appointed as a person to hold a chief constable to account and you yourself are under a sanction of gross misconduct to be heard, surely the Minister must agree that there should be regulations to avoid that circumstance. So, can he tell us what regulations are now going to be put in place in order to make sure this circumstance does not arise?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, the regulations already exist. In line with the provisions set out in Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, PCCs must follow the process set out: namely, they must notify the Police and Crime Panel of their proposed senior appointment. The panel must then hold a confirmation hearing and produce a report and recommendation regarding whether it supports the proposed senior appointment. The PCP must do so within three weeks of receiving notification from the PCC of the proposed appointment. This is all set out in statute, so the regulations already exist.

[The Lord Speaker (Lord McFall of Alcluith)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, is participating remotely.

[Lord Campbell-Savours (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, in light of the recent speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, when she revealed the six-stage process governing disciplinary actions against police officers—I was shocked—should not the process be revisited in the way she and others are now suggesting? How can there be confidence in systems that protect rogue police officers, and their pensions, delay justice with prolonged processes, offer extended leave and rewards—[Inaudible]—Mike Veale, with further appointments? The Daily Mail should be thanked for its excellent reporting of these matters.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, it might help if I go into detail on the barred and advisory lists. Since December 2017, any officer, special constable or member of police staff dismissed is placed on the police barred list, preventing them rejoining policing in the future, and that includes PCC offices. Any officer who retires or resigns during a gross misconduct investigation, or before an allegation comes to light, is placed on the police advisory list. PCCs must consult the advisory list before appointing an individual, although inclusion on the list does not necessarily preclude employment. It will be for the PCC to assess.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, does the Minister agree that the issues raised by the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, illustrate starkly the dysfunctionality of a police service that still consists of 43 territorial police forces, and that it is high time the service be restructured—for example, along the lines of the much more limited number of counterterrorism police services, which work very well across the existing boundaries?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord makes some very good points, but they are slightly above my pay grade, as I am sure he will appreciate. There are 39 PCCs across England and Wales, with three mayors exercising similar functions; the City of London Police has separate set of rules and regs. In the main and for the most part, most of those people are doing a superb job and are held accountable by the public who elect them.

[Baroness Browning (Con)]

I advise my noble friend that I was the Minister who put police and crime commissioners on to the statute book in this House, opposed by all the Benches opposite at the time. I ask a question that has been asked previously in courts around the country: is this what Parliament intended? I do not think that Parliament ever did intend the current problem, clearly identified by my noble friend Lord Lexden, to occur, and I advise my noble friend the Minister to do all he can to ensure that a cross-party meeting takes place as soon as possible.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank my noble friend for her perspective. Of course, I will take those points back, but I will again robustly defend the process that she put in place: I think it is working.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, the Government cannot continue to sit on the sidelines on this issue. The noble Lord, Lord Lexden, has repeatedly raised his concerns and the Government have chosen to sit on their hands. The Minister said that the regulations exist and are being followed, but is he satisfied with them? The current situation undermines the police in Leicestershire and the position of PCCs in general. Does he think the regulations need to be changed?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I certainly agree with the noble Lord that the current set of circumstances surrounding this individual case are absolutely disturbing. However, the regulations are still being followed and it would be entirely inappropriate of me to comment on an individual case.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, if the regulations are in place, how on earth has this individual been appointed?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, that is a very good question indeed. As I have said, confirmation hearings must be held in public and then, as the directly elected local representative for policing, it is for the PCCs to make decisions about senior appointments to their offices. As I have said many times at this Dispatch Box, ultimately PCCs are directly elected by the communities they serve and it is the public who will ultimately hold them to account for the decisions they take.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, I refer to my interests in the register regarding policing. This is one of the very rare situations where we have created someone who has a singular series of powers—on their own—and there is no mechanism, apart from one election every four years, to hold them to account during their term of office. Are the Government going to address that?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I imagine that the intent behind the noble Lord’s question is to ask whether we have any plans for a recall mechanism, for example. The honest answer to that is no. However, part two of the PCC review assessed the benefits and disbenefits of introducing such a mechanism, and the estimated average cost of a recall for PCCs was very significant and would require the creation of a bespoke national body. It remains for the electors to make their decisions.

[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friend made mention of misconduct and the barred list. The Home Office holds a number of barred lists, so can he reassure your Lordships’ House that the people on the list in question are compared with those who are barred, for instance, from working with vulnerable people or with children, so that they are not going to slip into other professions? There should be a cross-referencing look at people who are barred from certain professions due to their misconduct.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am afraid I do not have that information to hand, but I will happily write to my noble friend.

National Security Bill

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 21st December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I found this a fascinating short debate. It caused me to reflect on my time in this House, which has been a few decades now. Over 20 years ago, I remember sitting in on debates on treason in the Council of Europe, covering the way it would be addressed and the appropriateness of the death penalty within council member states. There were similar debates, although the debates regarding treason have evolved over those decades.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Bethell, for raising this issue. He referenced the Policy Exchange paper; obviously, thinking is developing in this area, so it is appropriate to have this debate here in Committee. I want to pick up the last point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, about the impact of the word “treason” and whether that actually deflects from the purpose of trying to fill the gap in the legislation identified by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson.

I listened to all noble Lords who spoke so interestingly in this debate. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, made a point about the labels put on particular words and how that may influence juries, as in the example he gave. It caused me to reflect on when, as a magistrate, I was asked to convict somebody of a terrorism offence, which does not happen very often in magistrates’ courts. This particular terrorism offence charge was for graffiti on the Tube. The words used caused me and my colleagues to reflect on the appropriateness of that charge. I think the defendant pleaded guilty to that offence, so all we were doing was sentencing, but we had exactly that discussion about the appropriateness of words in particular contexts. I can see the argument that “treason” is so emotive that it could indeed affect juries’ likelihood of getting convictions.

As I said, this has been a very interesting debate. I have to say to the noble Lord, Lord Bethell, that some very serious points have been made against his amendment. Nevertheless, there is sympathy that there is a gap in the legislation, which may be filled in other ways.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, that this has been a fascinating debate on a fascinating subject. I thank my noble friend Lord Bethell for introducing Amendment 37A on treason in his name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. I will now explain why the Government cannot accept the inclusion of this new clause in the Bill.

As noble Lords who are interested in this subject will have noted, the Government are looking closely at the issue of treason, as stated by the Secretary of State at Second Reading in the other place. The Government have been reviewing the case for and against reform of the UK’s treason laws and that review has not yet concluded. What we can say is that the UK has extensive terrorism laws—the “bristling arsenal” mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson—which protect the safety of the UK and its citizens from forms of terrorism which might be considered treasonous. However, it would be correct to assert that treason law is outdated and in need of reform in light of the growing threats from foreign state actors. To answer the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, the Bill provides a suite of measures for where somebody assists an enemy; it just would not be called treason.

I understand the significant history regarding the evolution of treason in the UK. Because of this, arguments have been made in this House and outside that an offence of treason goes further than criminal offences in relation to terrorism and state threats. Treason acknowledges the duty that a citizen has not to betray their state and many consider that a reformed, modernised treason offence would stress the importance of this through a specific criminal offence, reaffirming the bonds of citizenship that we have to the UK and to each other.

This amendment and others relating to treason have been proposed in previous Bills, but considering the role of treason in modern society is a substantial undertaking and one that we are looking at very closely. I acknowledge that this amendment and others seek to address concerns regarding the lack of a usable modern treason offence in the UK, so we welcome debate on this important topic.

Obviously, I reassure the noble Lords, Lord Bethell and Lord Faulks, and others that the Government do take this issue seriously and will listen carefully to the views offered by all noble Lords. However, as noble Lords may know, the Government are currently considering options for a formal review of this issue, including the possibility of the Law Commission conducting a review in this area. This area is complex, as the noble Lords, Lord Carlile and Lord Purvis, so eloquently explained.

I therefore thank my noble friend once again for his amendment but ask him to withdraw Amendment 37A while the Government’s review is ongoing.

[Lord Bethell (Con)]

My Lords, I am enormously grateful for the thoughtful and detailed debate we have had on this amendment. I will address a few of the points—I cannot address all of them—and I will seek to be brief.

This amendment is not about the past—it is not about Clive Ponting or Lord Haw-Haw and what happened a long time ago—but about the future. The future has states that use as a strategy the suborning of our citizens as an important part of hybrid warfare, at a scale and with a sophistication that we just have not seen for more than a generation—for two generations—and which, given the way in which they do it, we have probably never seen before. That is why this amendment is important: it is to combat a strategic threat from our enemies.

It fills a gap. The suborning of our citizens is not wholly covered by everything in the Bill at the moment, but I take on board the points made by the noble Lords, Lord Carlile and Lord Anderson, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and others on this. Duplication is not a sin in drafting laws. I have seen it happen before and I think that there is a gap that could be occupied by an amendment such as this.

A number of noble Lords asked what kind of attack this might cover. It would absolutely cover the contribution to a cyberattack. That is exactly the kind of modern warfare that our enemies are seeking to suborn our citizens to join in on, and therefore we should be thinking very much indeed about all the contributions our citizens could make to hybrid war when we are thinking about this.

As regards the impact on ISIS or a terrorist group, I completely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, that ISIS is not going to be intimidated. I am more worried about Kimberley—the person who does not know that they are doing something wrong by helping one of our enemies.

Lastly—I will try to keep my comments brief; I appreciate that I have not tackled all of the points—I confess for a moment here to a massive cognitive dissonance. Noble Lords and noble and learned Lords have spoken about their anxieties about the word “treason” as if it was a super-hot piece of vocabulary that was too hot to handle. I simply do not have that sentiment at all; it does not touch me in the same way that it clearly touches others. I thought the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, spoke very well about that. Words such as theft, rape and terrorism are important parts of our legal vocabulary. I regard treason as simply akin to any one of those, and the arguments made—

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

38: Clause 13, page 11, line 18, leave out subsections (1) to (11) and insert—
“(1) A person commits an offence if—(a) the person engages in prohibited conduct,(b) the foreign power condition is met in relation to the prohibited conduct, and(c) the person intends the prohibited conduct, or a course of conduct of which it forms part, to have an interference effect.(2) A person commits an offence if—(a) the person engages in prohibited conduct,(b) the foreign power condition is met in relation to the prohibited conduct, and(c) the person is reckless as to whether the prohibited conduct, or a course of conduct of which it forms part, will have an interference effect.(3) A person (“P”) commits an offence if—(a) P engages in a course of conduct with one or more other persons,(b) the foreign power condition is met in relation to conduct of P which forms part of the course of conduct,(c) P intends the course of conduct to have an interference effect,(d) as part of the course of conduct, a person other than P engages in prohibited conduct, and(e) P intends or believes that as part of the course of conduct, a person other than P will engage in prohibited conduct.(4) For the purposes of subsections (1)(c) and (2)(c) a course of conduct includes a course of conduct engaged in by the person alone, or by the person and one or more other persons.(5) Subsections (1) and (2) apply whether the person’s conduct takes place in the United Kingdom or elsewhere.(6) Subsection (3) applies whether P’s conduct or the prohibited conduct takes place in the United Kingdom or elsewhere.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment adds two new ways of committing an offence under Clause 13. Under subsection (2) the offence may be committed recklessly. Under subsection (3) it may be committed by a person where another person engages in prohibited conduct, if both are engaged in the same course of conduct.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I turn to government Amendments 38, 40, 41 and 42, and Amendments 43, 44, 45 and 45A in this group, tabled by other noble Lords.

The government amendments to Clause 13 are vital to the utility of the offence of foreign interference and will strengthen our response to hostile attacks against our democracy and society. We must stand up to aggression against diaspora communities in the UK, as well as provide further safeguards to help promote a healthy democracy. The aim of the offence of foreign interference is to create a more challenging operating environment for, and to deter and disrupt the activities of, foreign states that seek to undermine UK interests, our institutions, our political system or our rights, and ultimately prejudice our national security.

We know that states around the world, including the UK, conduct open and transparent influence activities, such as using diplomacy to shape and align policy to benefit shared interests. This is a welcome part of transparent international engagement and it is vital to the UK achieving its interests. However, some states seek to further their strategic interests by going further than overt political influence, such as through cultivating and manipulating relationships with individuals and entities in the UK where power and influence lies and using deception to shape public policy-making.

I will now provide further detail on the government amendments in this group. Government Amendments 38, 40, 41 and 42 deal with three key areas. They clarify the original policy intent in making provision for activity that forms a “course of conduct”, provide for the offence to capture reckless conduct, and, finally, provide definitions for the term “political process”. In addition, there are some minor and technical changes to give effect to the above. As regards the effect on the drafting, the original Clause 13 has now become three clauses. That is to make the provisions simpler with the changes that we have made.

On the amendments dealing with a course of conduct, noble Lords will note that the volume of changes appears substantial, but this is not a change of policy. Amendment 38 has given better effect to our policy intent in respect of third-party conduct. We must ensure that we capture scenarios where foreign interference is achieved through the actions of two or more people acting in concert, but where it cannot be proven that all individuals intended their actions alone to have an undesirable effect. A scenario could be where a person, P, works for a foreign power and intends to interfere with a person’s rights in the UK: for example, pressuring members of a diaspora community to stay silent on certain issues. If P subcontracts the prohibited conduct to another person—for instance, coercion of individuals—these amendments would allow us to charge P with an offence of foreign interference.

In respect of amendments to capture reckless conduct, we have carefully considered the comments made in the other place in respect of recklessness, as well as concerns from stakeholders, and consider it appropriate to add this offence. Not having recklessness leaves a gap where someone who is clearly aware they are involved in foreign interference activity but cannot be shown to have intended the relevant effects escapes a potential prosecution, for example because a person is motivated principally by money or a desire to get ahead.

Recklessness is a well-established and well-understood legal principle in the criminal law. A person is reckless when they foresee a risk that their conduct could, under this offence, cause one of the interference effects. A person must also proceed unreasonably in the circumstances with that conduct even when they are aware of the risks of continuing to do so. To be clear, this will not capture a person who has no appreciation of the risks at the time the conduct takes place.

Amendment 41 makes provision for a new clause which now includes the “interference effects”—previously in Clause 13—and adds a definition of “political process”, which will bring greater clarity to the scope of the offence. The interference effects have had to be amended to take account of the addition of reckless conduct. “Manipulate” has been replaced with “interfere” to recognise that a person cannot recklessly manipulate something. We have maintained the high bar to meet an interference effect.

The Government’s position is that the references to

“proceedings of either House of Parliament”

in the government amendment on “Foreign interference: meaning of interference effect” and in Clause 68 on the meaning of political influence does not, and could not, displace the prohibition on impeaching or questioning proceedings in Parliament contained in Article 9 of the Bill of Rights, and is not intended to do this.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, we very much welcome Clauses 13 and 14—or however they are now numbered, given the Government’s amendments—as they introduce new offences of foreign interference, given the potential impact on our democratic processes at every level. That is a further reflection of the way that the Bill takes account of the new national security environment and the changing and emerging threats that we face.

As the Minister helpfully outlined, the main effect of the Government’s amendments will be to broaden the offences to include when a person acts recklessly. It appears that that has been brought in to reflect references to “recklessness” in other offences in the Bill and following debate in the Commons. That is very welcome. Can the Minister explain why it was not part of the original Bill, and what has caused the change of thinking in the department for it to bring forward these amendments?

I will also reflect on some of the discussion from the noble Lords, Lord Carlile and Lord Purvis, and others, on what is meant by proposed new subsection (2)(e), which refers to

“causing spiritual injury to, or placing undue spiritual pressure on, a person”.

For the benefit of the Committee, it would be helpful if the Government could say more about what they intend, what that encompasses and the thinking that lies behind it. That would be helpful to the Committee in the light of the various comments made.

We also support Amendment 43 from the noble Lords, Lord Purvis and Lord Wallace. We very much support the concept of an annual report on how these clauses protect the integrity of the UK’s democratic processes. I also understand and appreciate, as I think the Committee does, the Minister’s comment about how this is about protecting the country’s democratic processes from foreign interference, not from the normal democratic and political discourse that one would expect. I am particularly grateful for that, having been accused of being a communist and a member of the Revolutionary Socialist Party—I do not know whether anyone ever came across that in my file. More recently, for the new heads of various bodies, I have been called a traitor for my views on the EU referendum. So I stand here accused of being a communist on the one hand—in my younger days, it has to be said—and then having moved to being a traitor for my views.

The serious point I am trying to make, in a humorous way, is that political discourse takes place, as do debate and argument. It is really important for us to understand the difference in the Bill’s intention that the Minister pointed out. For that to be read into the record is really important so that it is not misunderstood; it is clearly not what the Government intend.

Amendment 44, in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Carlile and Lord Wallace, and of my noble friend Lord Ponsonby, is really important. It was very well articulated by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and the noble Lord, Lord Evans, said that he supports it. There are a lot of arguments for this amendment, but my view is the same as the point the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, made—a really important point, particularly at the current time when there is some disillusionment. Accepting Amendment 44 as part of the Bill would help enormously to instil public confidence, to ensure that people understand that our political parties not only are free from foreign interference through political donation but are seen to be free of it from their statements. Instilling public confidence on that is really important.

I move on to my Amendment 45, which is a probing amendment. I say to the Government that it is not necessarily intended to be added to the Bill, but it deals with an important aspect of this discussion. It is how to deal with the issue of informing the public about what we seek to do and the new threats that they face, and how we raise their awareness of them. There is also the crucial question of how this could be done in real time.

I use the example of Canada to cause us as a Committee to think. Canada has a Critical Election Incident Public Protocol, which lays out a clear and impartial process by which Canadians can be notified of a foreign threat to the integrity of an election. That includes provisions for informing candidates, organisations or election officials whether they have been the known target of an attack. It has processes which state how decisions are made, and by whom, and as to whether a public announcement should be made to alert people to the threat.

As I said, this is a probing amendment, and I am not an expert on the protocol. I am trying to understand the Government’s view. If we were to believe that foreign interference was taking place, at what point would they think it appropriate, relevant or consistent with the security of our nation for the public to be informed of that? I think the public have a right to be involved, potentially in live time.

I think this raises real difficulties. Let me create a scenario: a general election takes place—let us not use the next year or two; let us say in 10 years’ time—and the Government find that that election is being compromised by foreign interference. What happens? How does the Bill deal with that scenario? We are in Committee, which is when we look at detail. I think there is an important question for the Government about public involvement with respect to their knowledge and awareness of the potential for interference that may take place and what they have a right to know if the Government or the services come to a conclusion that there is foreign interference and that it may be compromising an election, whether it be a general election, a local election or some other part of the democratic process. I think that is an important part of this discussion. I think that, far from it being a weakness for the Government of the day, with the security services and others, to say that they are protecting the integrity of the democratic processes such is their importance, alongside that, should it be necessary for them to alert the public, they should have a system, or protocol to which they can refer, dealing with what the consequences of that would be.

This has been an interesting debate at the heart of another important series of amendments because they seek to protect our democratic processes from the foreign interference the Minister pointed out in his introduction. I look forward to his reply to not only my remarks but to the remarks of other noble Lords.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the notably unrevolutionary noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for his support for these amendments. I will address his precise question on whether the amendments on recklessness represent a change in government policy and why they are being introduced now. It was always our intention to capture malign foreign interference activity in all its forms with this offence. After the completion of the Bill’s passage in the other place and in light of the comments made in the Public Bill Committee on the lack of an offence that could be committed recklessly, we retested the offence against the operational and policy requirements and we saw that there were examples of conduct, such as where a person’s intention was not to cause an effect but rather to improve their status within relevant organisations of a foreign power, that were at risk of not being in scope for the offence. I hope that answers the question on why it is being done now.

The noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, asked three specific questions about why recklessness is present in only one of these offences. The fact is that there are three different ways to commit the offence. New subsections (1) and (2)—inserted by Amendment 38—relate to a person’s intention, and only subsection (2) deals with recklessness.

Amendment 43 seeks to introduce a requirement for the Secretary of State to lay a yearly report, from the date of the National Security Bill gaining Royal Assent, assessing the impact which Clauses 13 and 14 have had on protecting the integrity of the UK’s democratic processes. This amendment duplicates one tabled in the other place. We do not consider it to be appropriate to introduce reporting requirements on the subject in isolation from the existing work on democratic integrity or in isolation from wider consideration of oversight and review mechanisms for the Bill.

Amendment 45 seeks to introduce a mechanism to alert the public to threats to the integrity of elections. We do not consider this to be necessary. Clauses 13 and 14 ensure that there are appropriate criminal sanctions for foreign interference. These provisions sit alongside other non-legislative activity. In advance of democratic events, His Majesty’s Government stand up an election cell to monitor and respond to any emerging issues during the election period. The election cell is led by the Cabinet Office and brings together government departments, the intelligence agencies, the devolved Administrations and external partners to ensure a holistic understanding of risks and to drive any necessary mitigations. The National Cyber Security Centre also meets regularly with the UK’s parliamentary parties and works closely with those responsible for core parts of the UK’s electoral infrastructure. Finally, formally established in 2019, the defending democracy programme is a cross-government programme with the overarching objective to safeguard elections and referendums and related democratic processes in the United Kingdom.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

Several speeches have stressed the importance of informing and educating the public about the dangers of foreign interference in British elections. One of the reasons why people like me go on so much about releasing the additional information in the ISC Russia report is precisely to alert and inform the public. The amendment that the Minister has just been discussing is about alerting the public, in the course of an election campaign, if that should be a problem. He mentioned the defending democracy task force. I have found a small number of references to it, but it is not exactly a public body and what it does is so far extremely unclear. What about the public information and public education dimension of what we are discussing?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am dredging my memory a little bit here, but I remember the Security Minister about a month ago outlining much more about defending democracy. I will have to refer back to the comments he made in the other place, but I am pretty sure they deal with the questions that have just been raised by the noble Lord.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I think this is a really important point about informing and alerting the public in live time. I would be grateful if the Minister could come back having reflected on that for us.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I will certainly have to read all the various information that I can find on the defending democracy programme, which I am pretty sure deals with most of the issues that have just been raised. If I am wrong on that, of course I will make that clear.

Amendment 44 was spoken to by the noble Lords, Lord Coaker, Lord Carlile, Lord Purvis, Lord Evans and others. The amendment seeks to enhance checks on the source of political donations in two ways. First, it seeks to introduce a requirement for political parties to release a policy statement to ensure the identification of donations from foreign powers. Secondly, it requires political parties to include in their annual statement of accounts a statement detailing their risk management approach to donations and the measures in place to prevent the acceptance of impermissible donations. While I understand the intent behind this amendment, let me be clear that UK electoral law already sets out a stringent regime of controls on political donations to ensure that only those with a legitimate interest in UK elections can make political donations and that political donations are transparent. Given that it has been spoken to by most speakers, I am going to go into a bit more detail on this, with the indulgence of the Committee.

Only those with a genuine interest in UK electoral events can make political donations. That includes registered UK electors, including registered overseas electors, UK-registered companies, trade unions and other UK-based entities or otherwise eligible donors, such as Irish citizens meeting prescribed conditions who can donate to parties in Northern Ireland. Parties and other campaigners are prohibited from accepting donations which are not from a permissible or identifiable donor. Failure to return such a donation, either to the donor or the Electoral Commission within 30 days of receipt is an offence and any such donations must be reported to the Electoral Commission. Furthermore, the Elections Act 2022 introduced a restriction on ineligible foreign third-party campaigning above a £700 de minimis threshold.

It is an offence to attempt to evade the rules on donations by concealing information, giving false information or knowingly being involved in an arrangement to facilitate the making of an impermissible donation. This provides a safeguard against impermissible donations via the back door. Political parties must already register donations over a certain value to the Electoral Commission; they are then published online for public scrutiny.

By requiring political parties to detail publicly their approach to mitigating the risk of impermissible donations, proposed new subsection (3) of the noble Lord’s amendment has the effect of providing such donors with the details of mitigations they need to overcome to make an impermissible donation. I am sure that is an unintended consequence, but it is important to oppose this amendment on the grounds that not only do the existing rules mitigate these risks but the amendment itself risks undermining the already strong rules.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, I apologise for intervening again. The Minister has not addressed the ease with which someone who has not lived in this country for three or more decades can now register, and the difficulty of verifying that they are who they say they are. If he will not address it now, can he write in detail to some of us, or perhaps invite us to a briefing, and make sure that that area will be tightened by the Bill?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, that is more properly a DLUHC area, in the light of the Act passed recently, but I will certainly have the conversation with my counterpart there and see what that Act says. I am not an expert on that Act, as the noble Lord will probably appreciate.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

We obviously have a difference of opinion as to whether the current system is stringent. I am curious why, if the trading arm of a political party was operating with a business that had any interest in one of the 26 countries in the money laundering and terrorist financing regulations, it would have to do due diligence, but if it received money that originated from such a country, it would not. Why does the Minister think that is acceptable?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

As I outlined in my answer earlier, I believe this is a stringent regime. I am afraid there is a significant difference of opinion. It specifies that only those with a genuine interest in UK electoral events can make political donations. Any donations that are not permissible and not reported will constitute an offence.

I am afraid I will not address the comments by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, about support for Mr Orbán over the Dutch and French; that certainly does not apply here. His Amendment 45A seeks to add requirements relating to proxy voting. It would be odd and somewhat undemocratic to seek to apply such measures solely to overseas electors, when the same issue could arise for domestic electors. In any event, proxy voters and those seeking to use a proxy are not in a position to determine whether someone is seeking to support a foreign power. It is an impossible ask of them. Adding such requirements risks disfranchising individuals by blocking their ability to find a proxy and undermining the very point of a proxy voting system.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, I apologise for intervening yet again. My point was simply that the level of controls and identity verification we have now introduced for domestic voters under the Elections Act is noticeably tougher than those for overseas electors. Given that overseas electors are also potential donors, this seems to be a hole that needs to be filled. The Minister says it does not need to be filled. That does not satisfy us.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am sorry to disagree with the noble Lord, but on this one I do. However, I commit to discussing this further with my counterpart at DLUHC. I will come back to the subject.

Spiritual injury was raised by the noble Lords, Lord Wallace, Lord Anderson and Lord Purvis. I will commit to write on FCDO engagement on this subject; I do not have the answers to those questions. What is spiritual injury and why is it part of this offence? Basically, it mirrors the Elections Act 2022. The term “spiritual injury” covers the potential harmful impact on an individual’s spiritual or religious well-being that could be directly caused by another individual—for example, excluding a person from the membership of an organised belief system or banning them from attending a place of worship. The term “undue spiritual pressure” could include, for example, pressuring a person to commit an act by suggesting that doing so is a duty arising from the spiritual or religious beliefs that a person holds or purports to hold. In addition, “undue spiritual pressure” could refer to conduct by a person that alters, or has the potential to alter, a person’s spiritual standing or well-being.

Reference to “spiritual injury” already exists in the definition of “undue influence” as set out in Section 114A of the Representation of the People Act 1983. Undue spiritual pressure is a new element of undue spiritual influence in the clarified offence in Section 8(4)(e) of the Elections Act, as part of efforts to clarify what types of conduct amount to an undue influence. I hope I have answered that question.

For these reasons, the Government cannot accept this set of amendments. I ask the Committee to accept the Government’s amendments to improve the foreign interference offence.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

I am sorry to interrupt the Minister and am very grateful to him for giving way. On this question of spiritual injury, has the Lord Chief Justice been consulted as to whether he and the judiciary regard this definition as something that judges can sum up to juries in a clear way? Although the phrase exists elsewhere, it has not been litigated to any great extent and, without a consultation of the judges, may cause great difficulty.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The simple answer is that I do not know, but I will find out and commit to write.

[Viscount Stansgate (Lab)]

The question I asked related to the bit in brackets. What effect would there be if you omitted that part in brackets?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I think I have already answered in significant detail why that clause has gone into the Bill. I have also answered the specific points that the noble Viscount raised at the start of the debate.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

This is really important. As the noble Viscount pointed out, this is not about coercion of an individual but about putting into law “causing spiritual injury” to any person, ill-defined as that is, and not just the person to whom the effect of the interference relates. It is of significance that we would be putting in a very considerable offence of causing an undefined spiritual injury to any person. Can the Minister reflect on that and maybe come back to us in writing?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I have heard the feelings about this around the Committee, so of course I commit to do that.

Amendment 38 agreed.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

40: Clause 13, page 12, line 38, leave out from beginning to end of line 7 on page 13 and insert—
““interference effect” has the meaning given by section (Foreign interference: meaning of “interference effect”);“prohibited conduct” has the meaning given by section (Foreign interference: meaning of “prohibited conduct”).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment updates the definitions in Clause 13.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

41: After Clause 13, insert the following new Clause—
“Foreign interference: meaning of “interference effect”(1) For the purposes of section 13 an “interference effect” means any of the following effects— (a) interfering with the exercise by a particular person of a Convention right, as it has effect under the law of the United Kingdom,(b) affecting the exercise by any person of their public functions,(c) interfering with whether, or how, any person makes use of services provided in the exercise of public functions,(d) interfering with whether, or how, any person participates in political processes or makes political decisions,(e) interfering with whether, or how, any person participates in legal processes under the law of the United Kingdom, or(f) prejudicing the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.(2) An effect may be an interference effect whether it relates to a specific instance of a matter mentioned in subsection (1), or to the matter in general.(3) In subsection (1)(d) “political processes” means—(a) an election or referendum in the United Kingdom;(b) the proceedings of either House of Parliament, the Northern Ireland Assembly, the Scottish Parliament or Senedd Cymru;(c) the proceedings of a local authority;(d) the proceedings of a UK registered political party.(4) In subsection (1)(d) “political decisions” means a decision of—(a) the government of the United Kingdom, a Northern Ireland Minister, a Northern Ireland department, the Scottish Ministers or the Welsh Ministers;(b) a local authority.(5) In this section—“Convention rights” has the meaning given by section 1 of the Human Rights Act 1998;the“law of the United Kingdom” includes the law of any part of the United Kingdom;“local authority” means—(a) in England—(i) a county council,(ii) a district council,(iii) a London borough council,(iv) a combined authority established under section 103 of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009,(v) a parish council,(vi) the Council of the Isles of Scilly,(vii) the Common Council of the City of London,(viii) the Sub-Treasurer of the Inner Temple,(ix) the Under Treasurer of the Middle Temple;(b) in Wales, a county council, county borough council or community council;(c) in Scotland, a council constituted under section 2 of the Local Government etc. (Scotland) Act 1994;(d) in Northern Ireland, a district council;“Northern Ireland Minister” includes the First Minister, the deputy First Minister and a junior Minister;“public functions” means functions of a public nature—(a) exercisable in the United Kingdom, or (b) exercisable in a country or territory outside the United Kingdom by a person acting for or on behalf of, or holding office under, the Crown;“UK registered political party” means a political party registered under Part 2 of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000;“Welsh Minister” includes the First Minister, the Counsel General to the Welsh Government and a Deputy Welsh Minister.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new Clause defining “interference effect” replaces Clause 13(2) and (3). Subsection (1)(c) to (e) now use “interfering” not “manipulating” because of the introduction of recklessness in Clause 13, and political processes and decisions are defined. There are drafting changes consequential on Lord Sharpe’s amendments to Clause 13.

National Security Bill

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 21st December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, this group of amendments simply raises two questions, which is why we put down two probing amendments. Clause 16 criminalises preparatory conduct for any offences under Clauses 1, 2, 4 or 12, but it does not cover preparatory conduct for offences under Clauses 3 or 5.

Clause 3, as noble Lords will know, is the offence of assisting a foreign intelligence service. It is not covered by the preparatory conduct offence, and we are simply at a loss to know why the Government deem it necessary to have an offence of preparatory conduct in relation to the protected information offence, the trade secret offence, the more serious of the two prohibited places offences and sabotage, but not in relation to assisting a foreign intelligence service. Can the Minister explain the Government’s thinking?

I do not believe that there is a need for a similar explanation for not criminalising preparatory conduct in relation to offences under Clauses 13 and 14, on foreign interference, or Clause 15, on obtaining benefits from a foreign intelligence service. That is because Clause 13 already covers preparatory conduct, because it refers to conduct or a course of conduct of which it, the conduct, forms part. Clauses 14 and 15 define the new offences in a way that states the criminal acts so tightly that they do not need a reference to preparatory conduct. Indeed, that would be inappropriate.

As for Clause 5, it may be that the reason for not making a separate offence of preparatory conduct for unauthorised entry to a prohibited place is that the Clause 5 offence is summary only and carries a maximum sentence of six months’ imprisonment. It may have been thought that preparatory conduct for such an offence was likely to be fairly nonspecific anyway. If the Government have other reasons for excluding Clause 5 from the ambit of the preparatory conduct clause, please may we know what they are? These are probing amendments, but I beg to move.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, Amendments 50 and 51 seek to expand the preparatory conduct offence by adding the assisting a foreign intelligence service or FIS offence, Clause 3, and the unauthorised entry to a prohibited place offence, Clause 5, to the scope of the preparatory conduct offence.

The Committee will be aware that, under Clause 3, the first offence, in subsection (1), applies where a person engages in conduct that they intend will materially assist an FIS in carrying out UK-related activities. The second offence, under subsection (2), applies where a person engages in conduct that it is reasonably possible may materially assist an FIS in carrying out UK-related activities. The person engaging in this conduct has to know, or ought reasonably to know, that the conduct is of this kind. The type of activity that could be considered to be preparatory acts relating to assisting an FIS are already sufficiently covered by the second offence under subsection (2) and also by the offence of obtaining material benefits from a foreign intelligence service under Clause 15.

Clause 5 targets conduct in a prohibited place which is unauthorised. The offence targets lower-level activity, such as knowingly entering a prohibited place without authorisation. This offence does not therefore require a purpose prejudicial to the UK to be demonstrated. I remind noble Lords that the purpose of Clause 16 is to allow the most serious state threats activity to be disrupted at an early stage. It would be disproportionate to include the Clause 5 offence under the scope of the preparatory conduct offence, given that the offence does not require any proof of intent against the United Kingdom and accordingly carries a lower penalty. As such, we do not consider that the inclusion of these additional offences to the preparatory conduct offence is necessary or proportionate to achieve the aims of the offence.

I hope that that answers the questions put by the noble Lord, Lord Marks. The Government therefore do not find the amendment to be necessary, so I invite him to withdraw.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, the Minister’s response on Clause 5 was precisely in line with the possibility that I adumbrated, and he has confirmed that, so I shall withdraw that amendment without hesitation. Of course, I shall also not move the other amendment, because it needs further discussion. However, at the moment I do not understand how preparatory conduct is covered by Clause 3 at all. Perhaps we can discuss that behind the scenes between now and Report. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

62: Schedule 6, page 114, line 14, leave out “sheriff principal” and insert “Sheriff Appeal Court”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment corrects the definition of “relevant appeal court” in relation to appeals in Scotland.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 62 is a minor amendment to Schedule 6 which covers detention following an arrest for foreign power threat activity. Included in the schedule are powers for the police to take fingerprints and samples—biometric data—from an individual in detention. Biometric data can be retained for three years, with the police able to apply to the court for that period to be extended. The police and the individual can appeal the decision on extension to a relevant appeal court. This amendment corrects a reference to the relevant appeal court in Scotland, which is currently defined as the sheriff principal. Sections 109 and 110 of the Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 abolished appeals to the sheriff principal in civil proceedings, with appeals now made to the Sheriff Appeal Court. This amendment corrects this.

Amendment 73 is a consequential change to take account of the new offence at Clause 15: obtaining a material benefit from a foreign intelligence service. This was introduced in Committee in the other place, at which point the Committee had surpassed Clause 15. Clause 15(6) makes its own provision about when offences are committed outside the UK. I beg to move, thank you very much and wish you a happy Christmas.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I wish the Minister and all other members of the Committee a merry Christmas and, in keeping with this Bill, a safe new year.

Investigatory Powers (Communications Data) (Relevant Public Authorities and Designated Senior Officers) Regulations 2022

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Tuesday 20th December 2022 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

That the draft Regulations laid before the House on 17 November be approved.

Relevant documents: 19th Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, keeping the public safe and protecting our national security is a key priority for this Government. It is vital that our intelligence agencies, law enforcement bodies and public authorities are able to exercise the important powers contained in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, which I will refer to as the IPA. We rightly have in place world-leading standards on transparency, privacy, redress and oversight to accompany the exercise of these powers.

The regulations to be debated today will make two necessary amendments to Schedule 4 to the IPA. The first will implement changes to the communications data authorisation process for the UK intelligence community in order to implement the findings of a High Court judgment. This judgment was handed down in June this year in the case of Liberty v Secretary of State for the Home Department and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. I will refer to communications data as CD and the UK intelligence community as UKIC.

This amendment will remove the power for UKIC to internally authorise the acquisition of CD for purposes which relate solely to serious crime, other than in urgent circumstances. In line with the court’s judgment, from 1 January 2023, it will be necessary for UKIC to seek authorisation for acquisitions of this type through the Office for Communications Data Authorisations, which I will refer to as the OCDA. The OCDA is part of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office, and its involvement in the authorisation process will ensure that an independent body has considered all non-urgent applications for CD.

For urgent applications, UKIC needs the ability to continue to self-authorise the acquisition of CD in such circumstances, because the OCDA is open only during normal office hours and our intelligence services need to be able to acquire CD at any time of day or night in urgent situations. This statutory instrument makes the necessary change to Schedule 4 to permit such urgent acquisition. Law enforcement bodies such as police forces are able to self-authorise urgent CD requests in the same way.

If this power is not in place, there is a risk of causing delays to UKIC’s operations, potentially putting the public at increased risk of serious crime. Additionally, these regulations will amend the Schedule 4 entry for the UK National Authority for Counter-Eavesdropping, which I will refer to as UK NACE. UK NACE was added to Schedule 4 in 2020, and these regulations do not change the powers afforded to it but make its designation more consistent with the approach taken for other similar bodies which form part of relevant public authorities for the purposes of Schedule 4 to the IPA.

It is opportune to make this small change alongside the other amendments to Schedule 4 to implement the High Court judgment. Per the obligations set out in Section 72 of the IPA, appropriate consultation has taken place with UK NACE, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office in advance of making this change. UK NACE plays a critical role in protecting our national security from state threats and other malign actors, and it is vital that it is equipped with the appropriate powers to carry out this activity effectively.

In summary, these regulations will enable UKIC and UK NACE to continue carrying out their statutory duties effectively, while ensuring that there is appropriate oversight in place to protect privacy. I hope noble Lords will support these measures and their objectives. I commend the draft regulations to the House and beg to move.

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, we support these regulations, but I have a number of questions to ask the Minister and would like the whole House to reflect on the way regulations of this sort are dealt with by the House.

Early in January, there will be a debate on two reports from this House on the way in which secondary legislation is dealt with by Parliament, particularly the House of Lords. This particular set of regulations—what I am about to say has no effect on them—come under the enhanced affirmative procedure, which provides for regulations being placed in a draft form so that Parliament can assess them and then request the Government to make changes in summary. They would then bring forward amendments to it. In this set of regulations such a requirement was not in place, because the committee that looked at them, of which I am a member, did not make any recommendations about changes that might be required.

However, there are two points in respect of the way that Parliament deals with these matters. The first is that when the enhanced affirmative procedure is required, there is no specification as to which committee of this House will look at them. I will raise that matter in January, but we perhaps need to consider it. At the moment, the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee looks at them, but not necessarily so: it is simply because there was nobody else. In the other place, it is “other committees” that look at this procedure, which is quite strange.

There is no question that, because there is no recommendation from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, this procedure would have to form the amendment. It is very important that we have that opportunity to make changes to the secondary legislation; it is otherwise a take-it-or-leave-it procedure. A detailed discussion has been going on in this House about this, as we find it very strange for a Parliament to give such power to the Executive without having the opportunity to properly scrutinise and make appropriate changes.

I would like to ask the Minister some questions. First, which bit of the EU law, which resulted in the High Court’s decision, was problematic? This was a compendium case taken to the High Court, in which the Government defended themselves. This was one of several elements, and the Government were defeated on this element on the basis that they were breaching that EU law. Is the Minister satisfied that the EU law itself is appropriate and will therefore not necessarily need to be changed? It provides some fundamental rights, particularly against what people call the snoopers’ charter.

My second question concerns the operation of the OCDA. It is rather strange that the Minister and his counterpart in the other place talked about the OCDA being able to deal with these matters only during opening hours. It strikes me as being rather like a pub: you have opening hours, you have to place your order, and you cannot put anything in if the doors are closed. The question therefore arises: if you are applying to the OCDA during opening hours, how long would it take to give an answer? Clearly, the issue of understanding and defining what is urgent is very important. Having a definition that says that it is urgent only if it is closing time or they are gone would not be wholly appropriate. I understand the urgent nature of the legislation, but perhaps the Minister could describe how long the OCDA would take to provide an answer in ordinary circumstances where there is not such urgency. With those two questions, I am pleased to support these regulations. I hope that we can delve more into the process in January.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his opening comments. He has outlined what the statutory instrument does. These changes come as a result of the High Court ruling in June this year in the case of Liberty v the Secretary of State for the Home Department and the Secretary of State for the FCDO.

This SI will allow for the internal authorisation of the acquisition of communications data solely for serious crime purposes in urgent situations, as prescribed by Section 61A of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. I understand that parts of the wider case were dismissed. However, the High Court ruled in favour of Liberty on one key point—namely, deeming it to be unlawful for the security services to obtain individuals’ communications data from telecom providers without having prior independent authorisation in certain circumstances.

In preparing for this debate, I read the blog of Neil Brown, who says he is an internet, telecoms and tech lawyer. He commented:

“I suspect, absent an appeal, there will be a tweak to the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, to provide for independent authorisation of requests by security or intelligence agencies before obtaining communications data, retained under Part 4 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, for the applicable crime purpose.”


This SI is indeed the tweak he refers to. He goes on:

“While important, this decision is unlikely to have a material impact on telecommunications operators, whether it applies to all communications data or only communications data retained by a telecommunications operator under Part 4. This is because it relates to what happens ‘behind the scenes’ before a Part 3 authorisation or notice is served on a telecommunications operator. The impact of a Part 3 authorisation or notice has not changed, nor has the obligation to provide data in response to a notice. I suppose that it might have an impact in the short term on the volume of requests, if OCDA”—


the Office for Communications Data Authorisations—

“is to have an increased workload—presumably, if that is the case, there would be a plan to increase OCDA’s staffing.”

My questions for the Minister arising from those comments are, first, does he believe that Neil Brown is accurate in his assessment that there is likely to be a lack of impact on the telecommunication operators through this SI? Secondly, is there a plan to increase the OCDA’s staffing if necessary?

We welcome the Government’s corrective action through this SI. We recognise that there needs to be an appropriate balance between our civil liberties and the fast-changing threats posed by serious and organised crime.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords who participated in this short debate for their considered views on the regulations. To go back to where I started, it is vital that the public have confidence in the discharge of the important powers contained in the investigatory powers regime and that these organisations can carry out their statutory duties to keep us all safe.

The noble Lord, Lord German, asked me about the relevant pieces of retained EU legislation or case law that pertain to the High Court decision. These particular pieces of law are: the Parliament and Council directives—I shall not go into the numbers as there are a lot of them—as implemented in the UK by Parliament in the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003; Privacy International v the Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Secretary of State for the Home Department —again, a load of numbers which I will not bother repeating; and a third one which is in French, and I am afraid my pronunciation powers prevent me having a go.

National Security Bill

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 19th December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group, tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Purvis, intend to tighten the scope of offences in Clauses 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 12, 15 and 29. This is achieved in these amendments by leaving out

“or ought reasonably to know”

from the relevant clauses, meaning that an offence is committed under these clauses only if the person

“knows … that to be the case.”

The practical effect of these amendments is therefore that offences are committed only when a person knows that their actions are damaging. Given that the offences in the Bill could carry significant sentences, as we heard from the noble Lord, Lord Marks, the Committee is right to probe to what extent a person must know that they are committing such an offence, especially as it will otherwise be up to the courts to determine whether a person ought reasonably to have known that they were committing the offence.

However, it is not unusual for offences to be committed when a person ought reasonably to know. There is a recent example of this, which includes the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015. I was recently googling it, and it seems that the Act was passed by the coalition Government.

Further to this, if an offence is committed only when a person knows it to be the case that their actions are damaging, it could be difficult to get a successful prosecution. None the less, it is right and helpful that the Committee should ask the Minister to expand on the points we have heard in this short debate.

As the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said, juries often decide on the state of somebody’s mind when an action is committed, and the decision as to whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty can easily turn on their perception of the state of the person’s mind. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, spoke about the difference between knowledge and imputed knowledge. As he said, it would indeed be helpful if the Minister could expand on the level of imputed knowledge that may be expected to secure a conviction.

The noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, reminded us of the complexity of dealing with “grey space”, as he referred to it. This is an opportunity for the Minister to try to clarify the situation so that prosecutions can be appropriately brought and reasonably thought to have secured an appropriate conviction.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their broad support for the Bill and the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, for introducing these amendments.

The test that a person

“knows, or ought reasonably to know”

the effect of their conduct recurs throughout the offences and measures in Part 1 of the Bill. Failing to include an element of objectivity in this test would risk seriously undermining the offences and not criminalising behaviour for which we consider individuals should be culpable. Those conducting state threats activity are likely to be skilled at their tradecraft and will be adept at hiding their activities from our intelligence and law enforcement agencies. It is important that we do not hinder our ability to prosecute in these cases.

We consider that knowledge is an appropriate threshold for these offences and the foreign power condition. However, we believe it is also right to include constructive knowledge in these provisions. Given the seriousness of the offences to which this test applies, it is essential that an element of objectivity is included to ensure that offences can still be prosecuted where individuals are unjustly claiming not to have known the relevant consequences or circumstances. It is, of course, right that those who could not have seen those consequences or circumstances should not be criminally liable under these offences.

I think it is helpful at this point to draw noble Lords’ attention back to the 1911 Official Secrets Act, which we are replacing with this Bill. The offences under that legislation cover certain actions, such as obtaining information, by a person

“for any purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests”

of the United Kingdom. Those offences require a no-fault element to be proved in relation to the prejudice to the safety or interests of the state. The proposed amendments to Clauses 1, 4 and 12 contain the same requirement for prejudice to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom, but, importantly, and as recommended by the Law Commission, introduce a subjective fault element. We agree with the Law Commission that these offences should contain a subjective fault element. Crucially, the offences would not capture a person who genuinely could not reasonably have known the effect or nature of their conduct.

Perhaps I might provide a hypothetical scenario of how the proposed amendment could affect the foreign power condition in Clause 29. It is possible that an individual is unaware that they are working for an undercover foreign agent. The noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, made a very good point about the grey area in which much of this activity takes place. Let us imagine that the security services tell that individual that the person they are working for is, in fact, a foreign agent but the individual refuses to believe it despite clear warnings. At this point, it would be reasonable to make that individual culpable should they continue activities at the behest of the foreign agent, whereas it might prove difficult to successfully prosecute the individual if knowledge had to be proved.

To be clear, the individual in this example would still need to meet all the other tests in any given offence to be charged with that offence. Meeting the foreign power condition is not in itself wrongdoing.

The same logic applies to other amendments tabled. In Clauses 3 and 15, I am sure the whole House would agree that it is not right that an individual should escape liability when they reasonably should have known that their conduct could assist a foreign intelligence service or that they were receiving a benefit from a foreign intelligence service. A purely subjective test would make these offences very difficult to successfully prosecute.

Constructive knowledge is applied by the courts in other circumstances and the Government are confident that this test is appropriate. There will be a range of culpability between those who have actual knowledge and those who should have known, but that is something that is appropriate for sentencing rather than conviction. I hope that goes some way to answering the question put by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope—ah, apparently not.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I want to make it quite clear that, for the reason that was expressed earlier, I do not object to the idea of objectivity here, because it is sometimes extremely difficult to prove that someone knew something. The phraseology being used is pointing in the right direction, but there are two different levels of knowledge. The first is the knowledge of the background facts, and then there is the knowledge that flows from the conclusion based on those facts. Both of those are built into the rather short phraseology of this clause.

Taking those as two separate things, I can agree that the conclusion to be drawn from those facts can be looked at objectively. My question is: how much is the prosecutor going to be dependent on imputed knowledge of the background facts? It would be consistent with some other contexts in which reasonable knowledge is used to say that you look to see what information is possessed by the individual. Taking that as a given, you look at what facts the individual knew, and then you look at the conclusion that ought to be drawn from those facts. I hope I have made it clear that there are two stages here and my concern is about the first stage—whether the clause is imputing knowledge to the individual which that individual does not have. If it is going that far, it is taking a very serious step.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank the noble and learned Lord for that clarification. I do not think the clause is imputing that but I will read Hansard very carefully and, if I may, I will come back to him in writing on this point.

The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, will pick me up if I do not address the Official Secrets Act 1989, but that is due to be discussed in group 33 on a subsequent Committee day, so I ask if we can come back to that detail then, if that is acceptable.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

Of course, as long as it is on the basis of the point that my noble friend raised—that we will have two pieces of legislation. The 1989 Act will cover serving or former members of the intelligence services, but this Bill means that there will now be two competing pieces of legislation. I do not know which the Government intend will trump the other.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I understand where the noble Lord is coming from. I commit to making sure that we explain that in considerable detail at the appropriate time, if that is acceptable.

For the reasons I have given, the Government cannot accept the tabled amendments and I ask the noble Lord to withdraw.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I shall certainly withdraw the amendment at this stage at the end of what I have to say, and will then consider it and my other amendments with the Minister and others between now and Report.

I am grateful for the incisive consideration of imputed knowledge by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, supported, as I understood it, by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, who clearly articulated the difference between the basic knowledge that you must have and the conditions for imputing knowledge. That is what the Government’s drafting of all these clauses in the Bill simply does not address.

My noble friend Lord Purvis of Tweed pointed out the very difficult coexistence of the Bill with the Official Secrets Act 1989, which I think the Minister accepted and said that we are going to come back to. It is difficult precisely because it is not simply a competition between offences that involve serving or former intelligence officers and those involving any person; it is also that there is a carefully defined defence under the Official Secrets Act that does not apply here, and the offences can be made out on the basis of imputed knowledge.

The point made by the Minister, that the requirement for actual knowledge might hinder prosecutions, would be a good one were it not for the fact that juries are very good at determining whether or not people who deny knowledge actually have it, as the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, pointed out. With the exception of the Clause 5 offence, these are all indictable-only offences, as you would expect, carrying very serious penalties. A defendant who denies knowledge will have that denial very carefully considered, and the underlying facts that he knew, or can be shown to have known, will be considered to enable a jury to decide whether he actually knew.

On that basis, I suspect that, at the end of the deliberations on the Bill, the House may well want to ensure that, for a conviction to stand, it is a question not of hindering prosecutions but of whether a conviction on reasonable evidence is a likely outcome. When that is considered, I believe that actual knowledge should be required, although I of course wish to consider this over the intervening stages of the Bill. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

That is quite right. As I said, the problem with the Bill is that there is no indication of what else may be covered by the “safety or interests” of the state, or what the limits of those terms might be. As I have been arguing, and as others have said, as well as the prevention of terrorism and espionage, they could extend to policies on energy, national infrastructure, the protection of water, power, food, health services, transport, law and order, organised crime and immigration controls. The extent of the powers that may be taken in the Bill could be used in relation to a wide range of state interests, not just state interests related to national security or to the defence of the realm. The interests of the state clearly are ensuring that we have enough energy, but should that be covered by a National Security Bill? These are questions that the Minister needs to answer, and it will be interesting to hear his answer.

I will make a couple of final remarks. Like many, I am somebody who has never read the Official Secrets Act 1911, but in preparation for Committee—and knowing the depth of knowledge, experience and wisdom that we have around—I thought it was necessary to make sure I was quoting. The Official Secrets Act 1911 says under “Penalties for spying”:

“If any person for any purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State—”.


The Official Secrets Act 1911 says that it has to be for a purpose “prejudicial” to the interests of the state. Logically, should not defendants or people have the right also to argue that their act was not prejudicial to the state? The Act says that your act has to be prejudicial, so surely you have a right and a responsibility to prove that it was not prejudicial. That argument could take place within the courts or wherever. This argument about someone’s actions in relation to the safety or interests of the state, and whether they were prejudicial, needs some sort of definition. Without it, how on earth do we know whether somebody is going to commit an offence under this Act? It would be for somebody to interpret.

Can the Minister clarify what the Government mean by “safety or interests” of the state? Who determines what they are? How can anybody act against that in a way which does not break the law, whether it be through protests or actions? If I take action outside of an RAF base, protesting against it and trying to disrupt things going in or out, or if I am at the peace camp at Faslane, will that be classed as a protest? Where does it become something that falls foul of the Bill? In other words, where do you draw the line? That is an important question for the Government to answer.

My amendment and those put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and others say to the Government that it is not good enough just to say the “safety and interests” of the state. What does that mean? People have challenged that over the decades. They have stood up and said that the safety and interests of the state are something that they challenge or do not agree with. Through history, that is how progress and reform have taken place. At the time, those protesting, taking action or conducting various activities have sometimes been accused of undermining national security or acting against the interests of the state.

We do not want to pass a law which leads to more confusion or a greater inability for Parliament to say that these are the sorts of actions we mean. That is the whole point of the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Marks, which I support. It says that if it does not relate just to defence and national security, where is the grey zone that the noble Lord, Lord Evans, mentioned? Where do we draw the line? As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, keeps reminding us, we should not abrogate our responsibility on that. It is our fundamental responsibility to try to answer that question.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, once again, this was a helpful debate, as noted by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. I thank all those who participated. These amendments seek to limit the “interests” element of the “safety or interests of the United Kingdom” test which applies to many of the clauses in Part 1. As noted by many noble Lords, this concept was explored extensively in the other place.

The majority of these amendments change the “interests” element to cover only security or defence interests. This moves away from the safety or interests of the UK test that already exists and is understood in current espionage legislation. Indeed, the Law Commission noted its support of the Government’s decision to retain this term. At the oral evidence session to the Public Bill Committee, it noted that

“safety or interest of the state is consistent with a lot of the wording that already exists within the Official Secrets Act”—

those of 1911 and 1920—and

“avoids what might risk being an unduly narrow focus on national security”,—[Official Report, Commons, National Security Bill Committee, 7/7/22; col. 52.]

as the noble Lord, Lord Evans, noted.

The experience of the Government and the Governments of allied states is that espionage is frequently targeted at and can result in significant damage to all sorts of national interests, some of which may fall outside the scope of security or defence interests. Indeed, any attempt to narrow or define the interests to the UK risks creating a test that is quickly outdated, as the UK’s interests naturally and properly evolve.

A number of noble Lords referred to the Chandler v Director of Public Prosecutions case that was heard in this House in 1964. It concluded that the interests of the state meant the objects of state policy, determined by the Crown on the advice of Ministers. That is noticeably distinct from protecting the particular interests of those in office. I heard what the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, and others said in relation to the 2001 case. However, in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, the Government do not think it can be defined in legislation. It needs to retain flexibility for future threats as they evolve.

For this reason, it would also not be appropriate for the Secretary of State to attempt to define the UK’s interests in a Statement to Parliament, as in the proposed amendment to Clause 1. Notably, these amendments do not include economic interests, interests related to public health, as the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, noted, or interests related to preserving our democracy—to name just a few areas that would be overlooked by them. We know that these areas are targeted by hostile actors, and they should rightly be protected.

I was asked what safeguards are in place to prevent the Government using this legislation inappropriately—

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. I want to test the issue with regard to economic activity. If the Minister is saying that the Bill will be broad and go beyond national security economic activity, then presumably that brings into its remit all significant areas of major trade disputes where we have mechanisms for reciprocal action for penalising, having punitive tariff responses, et cetera, when effectively there is economic warfare. If the noble Lord, Lord Evans, and the Minister are correct, anyone involved in any trade competitor which is engaged in dumping or activity that may lead to reciprocal trade actions will now be under the remit of the Bill. It is criminalising an offence with potentially 14 years’ or life imprisonment, rather than going through the approach of what other economic trade activity is concerned. Part of the concern is that the Government will be able to decide that all these different areas would now come under the remit of the Bill.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

If noble Lords will bear with me, I am going to address that point.

I was saying what safeguards are in place to prevent the Government using the legislation inappropriately—for example, by deciding that someone is acting against government policy but where there is no national security impact. Each offence under this legislation includes tests that must be met in order for the offences to be committed. For example, for a person to commit the Clause 1 offence, they must obtain or disclose information that is “protected” for a purpose that they know, or ought reasonably to know, is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom, and the activity must be conducted for, or on behalf of, or with the intention to benefit, a foreign power. The limits to the type of conduct that is capable of being caught under this offence, in particular the foreign power condition, ensure that there is a state link. Designing the offence in this way clearly focuses the offence on harmful state threats activity.

Additionally, Attorney-General consent must also be obtained before prosecution can be pursued for the majority of offences under Part 1—in the case of Northern Ireland that is the Advocate-General for Northern Ireland—and the Crown Prosecution Service must apply the public interest test.

I understand the intention of these amendments. I would say to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, that obviously individuals and groups might not agree with government policies, and the noble Baroness makes it very clear that she falls into that category on a regular basis, but they nevertheless represent the policy of the Government who have been elected to act for the country, and disclosing information to a foreign power can never be the right response to that.

As I say, I understand the intention of these amendments, but the Government cannot support them and respectfully ask for them not to be pressed.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I entirely understand the position taken by the noble Lord, Lord Evans of Weardale, but, with respect, the fallacy that he falls into, and the fallacy into which the Government fall—the Minister has articulated it—is that, in the interests of being able to prosecute a wide range of activities, they threaten to lower the threshold for such prosecutions to a point where the responsibility for the decision on guilt lies not with a jury considering guilt or innocence but with those who decide to prosecute because they perceive a threat to the interests of the United Kingdom, and the interests of the United Kingdom are very wide.

I agreed with almost everything that the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, said; the one thing he did which I did not agree with was that he misquoted the Bill. The Bill is not about prejudice to the safety “and” interests of the United Kingdom. Everywhere that the phrase occurs, it says the safety “or” interests of the United Kingdom”.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group relate to the new offences of obtaining or disclosing trade secrets. We support these new offences and agree that the Government should safeguard against threats to the UK’s trade policy. We see them as important amendments. None the less, we have had an interesting and important debate today. As the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has outlined, Amendments 8, 9 and 10 are about trying to understand why the Government believe that the offences need to have such a wide scope and whether narrowing them down would really have the unintended or bad consequences that the Government believe they would.

I have a couple of specific questions for the Government. The Bill says that there has to be a direct link to a foreign power, but suppose somebody obtains information such as a trade secret and sells it not to a foreign power but to a competitor business. Is that covered under the legislation? Is it the case that, under the Bill, to prosecute there would need to be a link from the individual to a foreign power and not just to a competitor within the UK?

The measures in Clause 2(4) to (7)—I think the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, referred to this in his Amendment 11—are really quite important. Why can the offence take place only outside the UK if it is in respect to possession by a UK national, as opposed to a UK national and/or a UK resident, or any other description of persons? Having talked about a narrow definition, I wonder why the Government have restricted the measures in subsections (4) to (7) to a UK national. I would be interested to hear the Government’s answer to that.

An interesting discussion and debate has taken place within the Committee about the JCHR recommendation. It is an interesting point that we will all want the Government to clarify. What is the Minister actually saying to the points from the noble Lords, Lord Carlile and Lord Marks, and the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford? The JCHR quite clearly states that:

“The theft of trade secrets that pose no risk to national security is more properly governed by the offence of theft (and other breach of confidence and intellectual property rules) than through new espionage offences.”


It would be interesting to understand whether the Government think the JCHR is wrong or whether it has a point. If the JCHR is wrong, why do the Government believe it is wrong? Maybe the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, have greater relevance with respect to this Bill. With those few remarks, I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have participated in another lively and entertaining debate. Amendment 8 seeks to add a “safety or interests of the UK” test to Clause 2. Amendments 9 and 10 seek to narrow the definition of a “trade secret” so that it captures only information which is actually subject to measures to protect it. Amendment 11 seeks to expand the scope of a “UK person”. The Government reject these amendments and I will try to explain why.

The offence of obtaining or disclosing trade secrets targets threats designed to undermine our economic prosperity, tackling the whole-state approach to national security adopted by state actors. The Government believe that economic prosperity and national security are inherently linked. You cannot have one without securing the other, and Clause 2 seeks to protect both.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I am not going to disagree with the Minister, but on the question of the letter—and I am pleased that he is writing to me—could he put it in the Library, and do that with respect to all the letters, so that every noble Lord can see his answers to the various questions?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Yes, I am happy to give that reassurance. This is just me flying somewhat solo, so I shall clarify that, but I can think of a number of circumstances where it would very much depend on the corporate. But I shall seek official clearance on that. In light of all those answers, I respectfully ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, that was another interesting debate. I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for defending the honour of the JCHR against a charge of naivety from the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, which I reject. I am sure that the JCHR is capable of understanding the noble Lord’s points.

As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, there is a mischief here. As the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, said, economic espionage can be against national security—and it can be, but I think that the Minister went further than that. He said that economic prosperity and national security were synonymous. That is a very broad assertion. For instance, the shareholders in Tesla apparently believe, because the share price of Tesla has dropped rather fast, that Elon Musk has neglected the economic prosperity of Tesla by his concentration on Twitter. I do not think that any of us would regard the share price of Tesla as affecting the national security of the United States. I believe that the Minister is wrong in saying that economic prosperity and national security are synonymous, but of course I accept that economic espionage can certainly damage national security.

As my noble friend Lord Marks said, my Amendment 8 intends precisely to put in a test or condition that the theft of a trade secret is prejudicial to the “safety or interests of the United Kingdom”, preferably with that term redefined by amendments from these Benches. Without that condition, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, Clause 2 does not belong in this Bill. I conclude that I am really not persuaded by the arguments against Amendment 8. When damage to economic prosperity is also harmful to national security, that would be satisfied, if a test of that was added—and I have not heard an argument as to why that test is missing from Clause 2. If the Minister is correct that economic espionage and damage to national security are synonymous, what is the harm of putting in a definition, as the amendment suggests? But I have not yet persuaded the Minister, or indeed some other Members of the House, so for the time being I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, mentioned, there should be a second amendment to go with Amendment 13. There is only one amendment in this group.

Clause 3 means that for the first time it will be a criminal offence to be a covert foreign agent and engage in activity that assists a foreign intelligence service. While the clause currently states that an offence is committed when a person engages in conduct that

“it is reasonably possible … may materially assist a foreign intelligence service”,

this amendment would mean instead that an offence is committed only if it is likely materially to assist a foreign intelligence service. The impact of the amendment is that it increases the threshold for the likelihood of whether an action assists a foreign intelligence service, reflecting concerns raised by the JCHR. As the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said, this would be punishable by up to 14 years’ imprisonment, so we look forward to the Minister clarifying why the offence is not more tightly drawn.

The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, raised a very interesting question about the large group of consultants with experience of the security services and forces who provide training to any number of actors across the world, and how they may be caught by this provision. I look forward to the Minister’s answer.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 13 seeks to narrow the scope of the offence provided for in Clause 3(2). For brevity, I will refer to a foreign intelligence service as a FIS.

The Government reject this amendment because we do not consider it to be necessary. Clause 3(2) provides for an offence where a person engages in conduct which it is reasonably possible may materially assist a FIS in carrying out UK-related activities. Amendment 13 seeks to change this to “likely materially to” assist a FIS. We do not consider there to be a difference between the two terms. I recognise the spirit in which this amendment has been made, to raise the bar for this offence being conducted, but I assure noble Lords that for this offence to apply, a person not only needs to engage in the conduct that it is reasonably possible may assist a FIS but must know, or ought reasonably to know, that it will assist a FIS in carrying out UK-related activities.

To ensure that we do not capture legitimate activity, there are defences in Clause 3(7). Not only will we not criminalise activity conducted in accordance with an agreement to which we are a party—such as agreements with our Five Eyes partners based in the UK—but we will exclude law enforcement and others who are legally obliged under UK law to assist a FIS. That goes some way to answering the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis. Additionally, where someone with public functions—

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My reading of it is that, taking the defence in Clause 3(7)(b) as an example, if I was providing Special Forces training—unlikely though that might seem—because I have functions of a public nature, I would be fine, although I do not think anyone would wish to receive Special Forces training from me. I was asking specifically about UK private sector bodies—consultancies and those that carry out those functions. I am happy for the Minister to write to me if he does not have an answer now, but I do not think that private sector enterprises are covered by any of the defences in Clause 3(7).

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, my reading of it is not the same as the noble Lord’s, but I will seek clarification and happily write to him on that.

The noble Lord, Lord Marks, raised a hypothetical about assisting foreign intelligence services. I am happy to provide a few more which may clarify the scope of this clause. Hypothetical examples of a person assisting a foreign intelligence service in carrying out its activities could include aiding intelligence-gathering operations or providing a financial benefit to a foreign intelligence service, or someone working for a foreign intelligence service to entice an individual into working for them. I hope that clarifies it to some extent.

It is important to note that the threat posed by espionage, as we have said in previous groupings, is constantly evolving. It is important that our legislative provisions withstand the test of time. We must safeguard against a rapidly changing and complex threat landscape in which foreign powers and their intelligence services use a whole-of-society approach to conduct hostile activity against the UK. That is why Clause 3 is such an important part of the Bill. We therefore reject this amendment and respectfully ask that it be withdrawn.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

I was going to ask the Minister something before he sat down, but he sat down so fast.

My concern with the Government’s approach, and the Minister’s approach in his response, is that it describes activities without reference to the legal definition of the activities concerned. Clause 3(1) involves the person committing the offence if the person

“engages in contact of any kind”.

Under Clause 3(4):

“‘UK-related activities’ means … activities taking place in the United Kingdom”.

It is not necessary to identify the service. As my noble friend pointed out, Clause 3(7) does not cover the private sector.

My amendments are very simple and very short, but even that raising of the threshold the Government resist. We are at a loss to understand why the Government are not prepared to bring a more forensic approach to the definitions in our criminal law. I quite appreciate and agree that the offence, in principle, of assisting a foreign intelligence service to the prejudice of the interests of the United Kingdom—which we say should be clearly defined—is a very important part of the Bill. But it is wrong to draft the law in such a way as to catch any conduct that attracts the displeasure of our intelligence services, our prosecuting authorities or government policy. It is important to define criminal conduct in such a way that it criminalises only conduct that ought properly to be a criminal offence when committed not only by United Kingdom citizens but by others who have absolutely no intention of assisting a foreign intelligence service to the detriment or prejudice of the United Kingdom. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Public Order Bill

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I will respond to the noble Lord. If I, in any way, gave the impression that I underestimated the significance or seriousness of what happened to Charlotte Lynch, that was certainly not my intention. I hope that most noble Lords can see the vehemence with which I support doing something about what happened to Charlotte Lynch and using that—if that is the right way of putting it—as a way of ensuring that the Government respond in a way that protects journalistic freedom across our country, whatever the circumstances.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, before I begin responding to the debate, I start by thanking the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for his most gracious apology, which I am obviously very happy to accept. I also acknowledge that the debate in question was long, free-ranging and somewhat tortuous.

I thank all noble Lords for their contributions on Amendments 117 and 127A. I completely agree with much of the sentiment that has been expressed when speaking to the amendments, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and to which the noble Baronesses, Lady Boycott and Lady Jones, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, have added their names. As I made clear during the debate on the first day in Committee, I share the concerns about the recent arrest of journalists reporting on the Just Stop Oil protests on the M25. The Government are absolutely clear that the role of members of the press must be respected. It is vital that journalists can do their job freely and without restriction, so I agree completely with the noble Baroness, Lady Boycott, and my noble friend Lord Deben, that it is a vital part of our democracy that journalists must be able to report without fear or favour.

On the specific case of the arrest and detention of the journalists at Just Stop Oil’s M25 protest, I was pleased to see the independent review into the arrest and detention of the journalists that concluded on 23 November. The statement issued by Hertfordshire Constabulary confirmed that the arrests were not justified and that, going forward, changes in training and command would be made. It acknowledged that it was the wake-up call to which the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, referred. The review has proposed a series of recommendations which Hertfordshire Police has confirmed it is acting on. They include:

“A further review to ensure that any Public Order Public Safety officers and commanders who have not yet carried out the College of Policing National Union of Journalists awareness training are identified and do so within 30 days; Directions to ensure that all commanders have immediate access to co-located mentors”,


to the policemen who are logging activity,

“and public order public safety tactical advisors throughout operations”

and:

“An immediate operational assessment of the number and experience of the Constabulary’s cadre of Public Order Public Safety commanders.”


I hope that the noble Baroness was somewhat reassured by that statement and the confirmation from the constabulary that it clearly got it wrong in that case, as well as the mitigations in place to ensure that it does not happen again.

In answer to the noble Lords, Lord Faulks and Lord Coaker, the police make mistakes. We agree that it was wrong, but we do not legislate for instances where it was clearly a false arrest and, therefore, unlawful.

More widely, I seek to assure noble Lords that the police cannot exercise their powers in any circumstance unless they have reasonable grounds to do so. It is highly unlikely that simply recording a protest creates sufficient grounds for the use of powers. The College of Policing’s initial learning curriculum includes a package of content on dealing effectively with the media in a policing context. In addition, the authorised professional practice for public order contains asection on the interaction of the police with members of the media, including the recognition of press identification.

Both the noble Baronesses, Lady Fox and Lady Boycott, referenced SDPOs, to which we will return later. The noble Baroness, Lady Boycott, specifically asked whether attending two or more events might give cause to one. The answer is no, because they would not be causing or contributing to serious disruption. However, as I said, that is a debate to which we will return.

Therefore, I support the sentiment behind the noble Baroness’s amendment, but I do not think that it is necessary and respectfully ask her to withdraw it.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

Before the Minister sits down, and with my real thanks for the sentiment that he expressed, does he concede that public order powers in general are cast in broad terms? Charlotte Lynch was arrested for the offence of conspiracy to cause a public nuisance—a fairly broad concept—and a number of broad police powers and offences in the Bill are triggered by an undefined concept of serious disruption.

Does the Minister also concede that senior voices in policing have said that journalists who give the oxygen of publicity to protests are part of the problem? By giving publicity, they are feeding the fuel of serious disruption. I know that the Minister disagrees with that proposition but, given that there has been so much performative legislation, and that there is apparently disagreement in the policing world about what is and is not feeding a serious disruption, why would the Government not take this modest step to ensure that no one should be arrested for the primary purpose of preventing their reporting of protest?

As a point of clarification, the difference between Amendments 117 and 127A is not the class of people they cover; it is the class of activity that is being reported on. Amendment 127A is an improvement on my poorer drafting of Amendment 117 because it refers to reporting protests themselves and not just the policing.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I agree with the noble Baroness that I do not agree with the proposition she just outlined from senior police officers. Having said that, I have not read those particular comments and cannot comment on the specifics. I go back to what I was saying earlier: it is not lawful to detain journalists simply there monitoring protests; it is against the law. The police made mistakes in these cases. As I said earlier, we agree it was completely wrong.

[Lord Deben (Con)]

Before my noble friend sits down, the fact is that what he says is true, but something has happened and therefore we have to react to it. For the Government to say that it is not necessary to do this does not mean that they need not to do it, if noble Lords see what I mean. It does not help for the Government to say that it is all okay because it was illegal. It happened and we know that it has happened on several occasions. It is also true that there appears to be among sections of the police a feeling that journalists make things worse rather than do their job. In those circumstances it is no skin off the Government’s nose just to say, “Right, we will put this in and that will make people feel happier and it will make us able to say to foreigners, ‘Look, we actually got this in the law. Not generally, but particularly, because it happened. Why don’t you do the same thing?’”

I do not understand this Government not taking easy steps that do not harm anybody. Just do it and do not constantly say, “Oh well, it’s all right.” It is not and we should do it.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I have to say to my noble friend: I hope I was not giving the impression that I was saying that it was all right, because it was not. I have acknowledged that it was wrong and the police made mistakes in this particular case. But, to go back to the point I made in response to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, we do not legislate for instances where it was clearly a false arrest and therefore unlawful.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

Will the Minister confirm that neither in his remarks nor apparently from what he said was the response of Hertfordshire police, was there any reference to the unauthorised detention of the journalist at the police station? The first thing that would have happened at the police station is that the journalist would have been asked to turn out their pockets, including their press pass, and yet they were still detained for five hours. What do Hertfordshire police and the Government say about a sergeant not at the scene of the protest authorising the detention?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Obviously, I defer to the noble Lord’s expertise on matters custodial, but—I am flying solo a little bit here—I imagine that, whatever the erroneous reasons given for the arrest, the custodial sergeant or whoever was in that position felt that some investigation was required.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

Does the noble Lord not realise how disappointing his response is in many ways? As the noble Lord, Lord Deben, just said, what happened in Hertfordshire was a real challenge to us to respond to something which seems to threaten journalistic freedom to report on protests. All of us are saying that, for the Government to turn round and say, “Don’t worry: it was a rare occurrence and it won’t happen again—no need to worry” with a shrug of the shoulders is just not the sort of response that one would hope to get from the Government. As I said, I do not believe we live in a totalitarian state, but every now and again a challenge emerges which threatens to undermine aspects of our democracy, and in this case it is journalistic and broadcasting freedom.

I think that we, certainly I, would expect the Government to reflect on what the movers of the amendment said and on some of the many moving speeches, including from my noble friend Lady Symons, and whether there is a need for the Government to act in order to protect one of the cherished freedoms that we have. I think that is what people in this Chamber—if I read again what the noble Lord, Lord Deben, said; the noble Baroness, Lady Boycott, made the point through her amendment; and I have tried to do it through the words that I have said—are expecting from the Minister, rather than simply, “Well, it was just one of those things that happened and it won’t happen again.”

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

Very briefly, what concerns me about this—well, lots of things concern me—is that the police, including the custody sergeant, should have known it was an illegal arrest, but they must have thought they could get away with it. That really irks me. It is the thought that the police were so high-handed, and that is why it has to be explicit so that they cannot in any sense claim ignorance of the law.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, I am getting a strong sense of how disappointing I am being, but it is also very fair to say that I have been completely unequivocal in sharing completely his concerns about the protection of our democracy and institutions. As I said earlier, it is a vital part of democracy, and I would expect and also demand, that protests are reported on fairly and freely. Of course I am sorry that the noble Baroness is irked, but I cannot second-guess what the police were thinking and I will not stray into that territory.

[Baroness Boycott (CB)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his reply to all the wonderful speeches, and I thank many noble Lords for speaking tonight in support of the amendment that the noble Baronesses, Lady Chakrabarti and Lady Jones, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and I put forward.

What I want to say very much reflects what the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, was saying. I would call this the Government’s “bad apple” defence, which at the moment gets deployed all over the shop, whether we are talking about a single police officer who accosts a young woman at night with bad consequences or about a single police station in Hertfordshire. This is not about a bad apple; as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said, this is about a systemic situation, and as the noble Lord, Lord Deben, said, this has happened and it is now happening a lot more.

I suspect, although I am quite happy for your Lordships to disagree with me, that this is a lot to do with the climate and the feeling of people in a desperate situation who do not know what else to do. They end up gluing themselves to the road and they are seen as something extreme. That does not matter: it is still a protest, however annoying and nuisance making it is, and we can all debate that—but it is another debate. This is about the right to protest and the right of journalists to go to that protest and report on it. Journalists report on what human beings do. They report on people, what motivates them and what they care about, and what people are prepared to glue themselves to a road for or to padlock themselves to, or to climb Nelson’s column or whatever it happens to be.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, made the point about monitoring things across the world. We send journalists to monitor whether African countries are having free elections. How can we stand here and say that that is a good idea if, at the same time, someone reporting on a climate protest is chucked in jail? She was in a cell with a tin bucket as a lavatory for five hours. We are not talking about a quick slap on the wrist and “I’ll write you a letter later and send you a 30 quid fine”. This was a serious thing and it happened. We are therefore obliged to do something about it.

I come back to the “bad apple” defence. It is used by this Government over and over. They cannot use it in this instance and hope to hold their heads up high, or for people in this House to let them get away with it—we will not. I, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and others will bring this back on Report. We will work on the amendment, but it will fundamentally be the same. I am very grateful to all noble Lords who supported it. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, has said, there are better ways of approaching this—established ways of dealing with it—such as the example he gave of search warrants to ensure that we maintain the political independence of both the police and the Crown Prosecution Service, which will be the two main agencies involved in deciding whether unconvicted people should be made the subject of SDPOs, as we will get on to in the next group.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for the amendments in this group. I turn first to Amendment 126, which would require the College of Policing to publish guidance consolidating the public order authorised professional practice and NPCC and college operational advice for public order policing. The Government would be required to lay the consolidated guidance before Parliament and the guidance would need to be reviewed annually and updated when appropriate.

The noble Lord’s explanatory statement clarifies that this builds on a recommendation from His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services to the College of Policing. For the benefit of the House, when giving oral evidence to the Public Bill Committee, His Majesty’s Inspector Matt Parr has said of policing’s response to the report that it was

“the most professional and thorough response”—[Official Report, Commons, Public Order Bill Committee, 9/6/22; col. 55.]

he had seen to a report that he had done.

The college has drafted a new public order public safety authorised professional practice that is in the final stages prior to consultation, which precedes publication. A draft version will be published for consultation by public order practitioners by the end of December and the college plans to publish the final version in early 2023.

To provide further reassurances to all those present who have shown interest in public order guidance, noble Lords will perhaps allow me to detail some of the work that the college has undertaken beyond the authorised professional practice to improve public order training.

On guidance, the college publishes regular bulletins, including on changes to processes, legislation and new training products. Its summary guide to the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act has been circulated to all forces and widely shared with officers involved in policing public order and protest. This guidance reiterates the need for a balanced approach with a reminder of the recent HMICFRS conclusion that

“the police do not strike the right balance on every occasion. The balance may tip too readily in favour of protesters when – as is often the case – the police do not accurately assess the level of disruption caused, or likely to be caused, by a protest.”

In April, the college drafted the National Police Chiefs’ Council’s Protest Operational Advice Document, which reiterated the need for a rapid response to disruptive disorder. The document aims: first, to support consistency of decision-making and engagement with stakeholders; secondly, to signpost guidance, legislation, key legal decisions, policies and practice which may assist in the policing of protest, thereby promoting public safety, preventing or reducing crime, disorder and/or terrorism to support overall public safety; and, thirdly, to assist decision-makers in achieving outcomes which support the exercise by peaceful protestors of their rights under Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11, while striking the appropriate balance between those rights and the rights of others affected by protest. This is being reviewed by the college, which aims to publish the revised version in February 2023.

On training, over the last six months the college has rolled out significant changes to protestor removal training. This used to be a very niche skill with very few people trained to a high level, but this meant the response was slow. The college has since developed new, quicker training for simpler lock-ons, which has meant a substantial improvement in the speed of the police response to these. I could go on, but I think I have made the point. The college is a professional organisation that is proactive in response to protests to ensure that officers are trained to the highest possible standards. It does not need a legislative stick to make them do so. That is why the Government do not support this amendment.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for specifying that Amendment 144 is a probing amendment to query the demand for, and the capacity of, specialist protest officers across police forces. I presume by “specialist protest officers” the noble Lord is referring to both public order trained officers and officers trained in the removal of protesters who lock on. For the benefit of the House, it is worth clarifying that, for the most part, protests are non-violent and are managed effectively by general patrol officers. When there is a risk of violence, officers with additional specialist public order training are deployed.

On specialist public order trained officers, the NPCC has set a national requirement of 297 police support units across England and Wales, alongside 75 in London. A police support unit consists of one inspector, three sergeants and 18 constables as well as three drivers. On level 3, which is basic public order training, the NPCC has set a requirement for 234 basic deployment units.

On the question from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, on specialist officers, the NPCC has identified a national requirement for 108 officers trained in debonding protestors, 189 officers trained to remove protestors and another 189 who are trained to remove protestors from complex environments such as height. The noble Lord also asked about non-specialist officers. They are deployed to respond to peaceful protests and all have level 3 public order training.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked me about specials. Peaceful protests would seem to me to be well within the abilities of volunteer police officers—indeed, I have seen it in my own service overseas. He also mentioned cuts. I am afraid I am going to disappoint him by saying that we are well on the way to the 20,000 police uplift that was promised. I will also of course say that the nature of protests has changed and, therefore, so has the nature of policing, as reflected in much of this Bill.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I am sorry to interrupt the Minister and am grateful to him for giving way. I have seen evidence that special constables are being trained to level 2 and being issued with specialist equipment, so I am not talking about special constables trained to level 3, as the noble Lord suggested.

The noble Lord gave a whole series of numbers. The National Police Chiefs’ Council has decided that there should be specified numbers of level 3 and level 2-trained units of one, three and 18—one inspector, three sergeants and 18 constables—as the requirement nationally. To what extent have police services fulfilled those requirements? The indication that the Minister gave was that that is the target that the National Police Chiefs’ Council has given, but to what extent have police forces been able to fulfil that target?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am afraid that I do not know the answer. I will write to the noble Lord with the detail. Regarding the specials, as long as they are trained, surely that is the point.

Chief officers are responsible for demonstrating that they can appropriately mobilise to a variety of public order policing operations at a force, regional and national level in accordance with the national mobilisation plan. The College of Policing sets consistent standards across England and Wales to ensure consistency across forces, allowing officers from different forces to operate in tandem when deployed to other force areas.

The required capacity for public order capabilities is informed by the assessment of threats, harm and risk from the National Police Coordination Centre, as agreed by the National Police Chiefs’ Council. Officials and Ministers in the Home Office regularly probe the National Police Coordination Centre on its confidence that forces can respond to disorder. At present, it assesses that forces are able to meet current protest demands. Forces have been able to use public order resources to respond to incidents including the awful disorder in Leicester in August and September, as well as Just Stop Oil’s recent disruptive campaign on the M25.

Amendment 142A seeks to ensure that statutory guidance issued under Clause 30 is subject to the affirmative scrutiny procedure, rather than the negative procedure, as the Bill currently allows. This follows a recommendation from the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, as explained by the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, and the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher. I thank the committee for its consideration of the Bill. I hope, but am afraid I doubt, that noble Lords will forgive me for echoing the arguments made in the Government’s response here. SDPOs do not represent a new concept. Successive Governments, dating back at least to 1998 and the creation of anti-social behaviour orders in the Crime and Disorder Act, have legislated for civil preventive orders of this kind, which can impose restrictions on liberty, backed by criminal sanctions. Many of these preventive order regimes include similar provision to that in Clause 30 for the Secretary of State to issue guidance which was not subject to the draft affirmative scrutiny procedure. Guidance issued for serious violence reduction orders is subject to the negative scrutiny procedure. Having said that, I listened very carefully to the speech by the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, and I will write to him with an attempt to unravel some of the discrepancies that he mentioned.

We therefore see it as entirely appropriate that the guidance is subject to the negative scrutiny procedure and respectfully encourage noble Lords not to press their amendments.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, the last remark the Minister made, about writing to my noble friend Lord Rooker, was useful. Reflecting in the letter on the comments by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, might be helpful as well.

I will focus on my own amendment. I thank all noble Lords who contributed on it. The reason for it was the need for co-ordinated and updated guidance. I am grateful to the Minister for saying that the updated guidance will come at the beginning of 2023.

You can see why there is a need for clarification. An article in the Daily Telegraph just yesterday, quoting the chief constable of Greater Manchester, Stephen Watson, said:

“criticism of officers by the public for being too slow to clear the protesters was ‘not an unreasonable judgment’.”

He went on to say:

“The public has seen us reacting too slowly, less assertively than they would have liked.”


That is the second-most senior police officer in the country saying that the police should have acted more quickly with respect to the protesters. He goes on—and I am not a trained police officer, just reflecting on what the chief constable said in a national paper:

“I think fundamentally, if people obstruct the highway they should be moved from the highway very quickly. The so-called five stage process of resolution can be worked through”


quickly. He goes on, and here is the point that the guidance needs to clarify. Is the chief constable of Greater Manchester right, or are the other officers? The article says that his argument is that

“officers spent too much time building a ‘copper-bottomed’ case for prosecuting people for offences such as public nuisance rather than arresting them for the lesser crime of obstruction.”

I do not know whether that is right or wrong, but somewhere along the line there needs to be clarification through the guidance package, which we hope will come at the beginning of 2023. It should say that, to deal with protests quickly and robustly but according to the law, these are the options available in coming to any decision. The chief constable of Greater Manchester is clearly saying that the police could have done better by using the lesser offence of obstruction. Is he right or wrong? The guidance may be able to sort that out for us. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I open by echoing what the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said: all the arguments in all the amendments could become redundant if we support not putting Clauses 19 and 20 in the Bill. The strength of feeling demonstrated through this short debate leads me to believe that that may well be what we vote on when we come to Report.

I forget whether it was my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti or the noble Lord, Lord Skidelsky, who referred to this as copy-and-paste legislation. I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Skidelsky, who gave the analogy of chicken coops being moved around to replicate these civil injunctions. But perhaps the most powerful speech we have heard was from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, who gave six examples of SDPOs being tougher than TPIMs, which really caused me to sit back and reflect on the meat of what we are dealing with here today.

My noble friend Lady Chakrabarti said she has always been against what she called quasi-injunctive orders—civil orders—going all the way back to ASBOs. This caused me to reflect, as a magistrate, on which of those orders I deal with when I sit in courts. I deal with some of them: football banning orders, knife crime prevention orders and domestic violence protection orders—I think most noble Lords who have taken part in this debate think DVPOs are an appropriate use of civil orders. But, of course, the list goes on. That is really the point my noble friend makes: there are a growing number of these civil orders that, if breached, result in criminal convictions.

To repeat what I said, here we are meeting a very extreme situation in which people planning to get involved in protest or to help people do so can potentially be criminalised for that activity. The nature of the potential offence being committed is different.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, went through in detail, for which I thank him, the nature of the injunctions in Clauses 19 and 20, so I will not go through all that again, but I will make one point that he did not make. We are concerned that there does not seem to be any requirement for the person involved to have knowledge that the protest activities were going to cause serious disruption. That lack of a requirement of knowledge is a source of concern for us.

In the debate on the previous group, my noble friend Lord Rooker and the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, spoke about the comments of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, and my noble friend quoted from them. The noble Lord, Lord Beith, spoke about the Secretary of State issuing guidance to chief police officers and how that could go down a road whose potential political implications, in a sense, I prefer not to think about.

I will quote briefly from other committees which have reflected on this legislation. First, the Joint Committee on Human Rights has said:

“Serious Disruption Prevention Orders represent a disproportionate response to the disruption caused by protest. They are likely to result in interference with legitimate peaceful exercise of Article 10 and 11 rights. The police already have powers to impose conditions on protests and to arrest those who breach them. Other provisions of this Bill, if passed, will provide the police with even greater powers to restrict or prevent disruptive protest.”


Another committee, the Constitution Committee, said:

“The purposes for which a Serious Disruption Prevention Order can be issued are broad. They can be issued not only to prevent a person committing a protest-related offence but also to prevent a person from carrying out activities related to a protest. Such a protest need cause, or be likely to cause, serious disruption to only two people. This gives the orders a pre-emptive or preventative role. Furthermore, ‘protest-related’ offence is not adequately defined in this part of the Bill nor … is ‘serious disruption’. This undermines legal certainty. We recommend that the meaning of ‘protest-related offence’ is clarified more precisely.”


The Minister has a big job on his hands to try to convince any Member of this Committee that he is on the right track. The amendments in my name—the clause stand part amendments—are the quickest way to put this part of the Bill out of its misery.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, there are notices to oppose within this group, so it may help if I start by addressing serious disruption prevention orders as a whole, before turning to amendments to the clause. SDPOs will target protestors who are determined to repeatedly inflict disruption on the public or those who simply wish to go about their daily lives. Our experience at recent protests has shown that many police are encountering the same individuals, who are determined repeatedly to inflict disruption on the public.

It cannot be right that a small group of individuals repeatedly trample on the rights of the public without let or hindrance. Yes, many are arrested, but after paying small fines or serving short or suspended sentences, they are free to reoffend. This measure would, following the consideration and permission of the courts, allow for proportionate and necessary restriction or requirements to be placed on individuals to prevent them causing harm.

Additionally, in some cases, individuals choose to not get their hands dirty. They go around the country speaking to young people who are determined to make the world a better place—not to encourage them to study and seek out a career to better the planet, or even to enter politics to enact change; instead, they encourage them to commit criminal offences, alienate the public from their cause and jeopardise their opportunity for a career that will actually make a difference. Why should these individuals, who contribute to serious disruption, be permitted to behave as they do without consequence?

This is why SDPOs are needed, as drafted. They will provide an alternative, non-custodial route to prevent those who have a track record of trampling on the rights of others from doing so. The threshold for the imposition of these orders is appropriately high and I trust our courts to impose them only where necessary.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked about the HMICFRS conclusion. The report from the policing inspectorate considered only orders which would always ban an individual from protesting. SDPOs grant the courts discretion to impose any prohibitions and requirements necessary to protect the public from protest-related crimes and serious disruption. Depending on the individual circumstances, this may mean that the court will not consider it necessary to stop individuals attending protests.

Amendments 128, 129 and 130 would raise the evidential threshold for SDPOs to the criminal standard. I am sure that many who support these amendments also support the civil courts approving injunctions against protesters. These are made on the civil burden of proof against large numbers of people, including “persons unknown”. SDPOs are made against single known individuals.

A number of noble Lords asked why SDPOs can be granted using a civil standard of proof, including the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Skidelsky, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chelmsford, among others. The use of the civil standard of proof is not a novel concept for preventive orders. Football banning orders, for example, use the same standard of proof to help prevent violence or disorder at or in connection with any regulated football matches. By using a civil standard of proof, courts will be allowed, following due consideration, to place prohibitions or requirements they consider necessary to prevent an individual causing disruption.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. I will make a couple of brief comments in support of the amendments. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, forcefully made the arguments for Amendment 150, and I will not repeat them. I also support my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti’s amendments —she also made the arguments.

I will add one thing to the amendments of my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester—obviously spoken to by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chelmsford. Amendment 147 talks about the “vetting, recruitment and discipline” of specialist officers. It is especially important that these amendments have been tabled. I know that the Government will be as worried, concerned and appalled as the rest of us in the week where we have seen the resignation of Michael Lockwood as the director-general of the Independent Office for Police Conduct due to a criminal inquiry. My noble friend Lady Chakrabarti made a point about vetting. I have no idea what the process or procedure was when Mr Lockwood got the post, but one wonders about the vetting that took place, and this raises the question yet again. We will not have a big debate about all this, but I think that what my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti’s amendments get at is that, if we are to restore public confidence, we have to address some of these issues. Unfortunately, at the moment, we seem to have one thing after another which undermines the valuable work that so many of our officers do.

I will raise one other point about commencement. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, raised the issue of Section 78 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. Talking about the commencement of the Bill, he was worried about Section 78’s definition of

“Intentionally or recklessly causing public nuisance”


and how it related to the provisions in Bill. Before the commencement of the Act, as it will be, some clarification of how it relates to Section 78 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 would be helpful for our police forces as they interpret the law.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for tabling their amendments; I absolutely understand the sentiment behind them. It is obviously important that the measures passed in the Bill are continually subject to inspection, reporting and scrutiny by the relevant bodies, such as HMICFRS. However, I remind noble Lords that the use of police powers is already carefully scrutinised by public bodies such as HMICFRS and the Independent Office for Police Conduct. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, will forgive me for not referring to the ongoing case against the departing chief.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

What I hope I said is that our expectation is that the provisions in the Bill will improve the ability of the police to “remove and deter protesters”, thereby alleviating some pressure on the police.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

That is very helpful. I agree with the Minister that police officers—we have a fine one in this Committee—and police forces should not be treated with a broad brush, but, and noble Lords will perhaps forgive me if I say it, nor should peaceful protesters. Hence, the question raised by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and hence the bulk of criticism of this entire draft legislation in this Committee. It is an unhappy privilege to be perhaps the last speaker in this Committee; I think I was the first. I am grateful to the Minister for his fortitude and courtesy. He wants to rise again.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I just want to clarify that I mean criminal protesters.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to the Minister but, of course, if the Government are able to keep expanding the definition of criminality, that does not give much cause for comfort about protecting peaceful dissent. I am none the less grateful to the Minister for his fortitude and courtesy throughout this three-session Committee. I hope that he and his colleagues will understand that what he has heard over these days and hours is very serious cross-party concern about these measures, reflected in vast sections of the country. I have no doubt that, after a good break and, I hope, a happy Christmas of reflection, colleagues will be back and some of these matters will definitely be put to the vote. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.