Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 9th March 2026 Lords Chamber

Clause 140 is an oppressive clause. It would provide the police with the powers to restrict the very protests that are most likely to be justified and effective. There is no way of curing it and we should have none of it.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

The noble Lord has already accepted that the right to protest has to be balanced against the rights of others. Surely the virtue of the cumulative disruption provision, Clause 140, is that it is totally unacceptable that the rights of others who wish to pray in their synagogue, who wish to get to their synagogue, who wish to get away from their synagogue, should be repeatedly disrupted in the same place every week. The cumulative nature of the disruption pushes the balance in favour of asking the protesters not to cease protesting but to do it somewhere else.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

The answer to that is that the cumulative nature of the disruption is not what causes the oppression to worshippers at synagogues or mosques or anywhere else. We have accepted, for the purpose of Report, restrictions on the right to protest near places of worship on condition that it is relevant and that we are talking about the place of worship and worshippers being disrupted. The fact that a legitimate protest is repeated is not a reason for restricting the protests. If the rights and freedoms of others are restricted, that in itself is, under our Amendment 369, a reason for restricting protest, because there is a right to protest. It is not helped by the fact that repeated protests are seen as more difficult. I see the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, about repeated protests at synagogues and mosques, but they are covered by our condition on restriction at a place of worship. I beg to move.

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[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, before I speak to my amendments in this group, I would like to say that I learned to read a long time ago—more than 70 years ago, before I went to school. This alphabet soup of a Bill is quite confusing, partly because so many people disagree with it. The noble Lord, Lord Hanson, should perhaps be aware that it is moderately unusual to have this many amendments; perhaps it would help if he accepted one or two. Obviously, all of my amendments are incredibly reasonable, so I urge him to pick them up. My first amendment in this group would solve the problem outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, so I expect his strong support on that.

The noble Lord, Lord Marks, moved Amendment 369 on the right to protest. In Committee, we were all reassured that this was not necessary, because the right to peaceful protest is already protected under the Human Rights Act. We were correctly reminded that Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights protect the freedoms of expression and assembly, and that public authorities are already bound by those duties, but that reassurance is based on the assumption that those protections will remain intact. As the noble Lord, Lord Marks, pointed out, we cannot be sure of that; we cannot speak for future Governments, who might cause our right to protest to deteriorate.

Over recent years, under this Government and the previous one, we have seen a steady erosion of our right to protest and an expansion of police powers to restrict those protests. Each time, we are told, “The powers are modest—you will hardly notice them”. Of course, that is not true, because the effect is cumulative, damaging and leads to much greater constraint on people who are campaigning and protesting. The balance is shifting and Parliament continues to widen state power without at the same time reaffirming the underlying right.

I have also cosigned Amendment 369A, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger. There are many legitimate reasons why people might want to cover their faces at protests. Some noble Lords on this side of the Chamber might benefit from wearing masks sometimes, just to hide their look of derision at other noble Lords who are speaking coherently, cogently and sensibly. People might fear losing their job if their political views were known. They might fear backlash from family or their local community. They might be worried about racial profiling, particularly given the increased use of facial recognition technology. They might be protesting against a foreign regime and be genuinely concerned about repercussions for loved ones overseas. It is not unreasonable to wear masks.

I turn now to my Amendment 372ZA. Clause 139 is very problematic. It gives the police significant new powers to restrict protests near places of worship. I am an atheist, but I absolutely protect the right of people to worship freely, as they want to, and without fear. At a time of rising antisemitism, Islamophobia and racism, that duty is paramount for us here in Parliament. All our diverse communities must be supported and defended, and every faith group must have the ability to worship freely. As drafted, Clause 139 risks undermining that balance between rights. If the Government are not prepared to remove it, it must at the very least be clarified and narrowed. My amendments are offered as a compromise and an attempt to introduce clarity where the drafting is currently vague and overly broad.

My amendments, which address the phrases “in the vicinity”, “within 50 metres” and “the purpose of intimidating”, seek to establish clarity on these broad definitions in Clause 139. The clause seeks to restrict the right to protest by giving the police new powers to ban or restrict protest “in the vicinity” of places of religious worship, based on the false premise that these powers are required to protect freedom of religion. “In the vicinity” is a vague definition that could mean 10 metres or 10 miles. At the very least, the clause must be amended to make it more specific and contained, with an eye towards protecting Article 11—the right to freedom of assembly. “In the vicinity” needs to be clarified in terms of a specific distance. Many cities and towns have a large concentration of places of worship. The clause as it stands could make it virtually impossible to protest, as other noble Lords have said, including taking protests to Parliament or other such places on which protesters might wish to focus in order to make their point to people in positions of influence—for example, in government.

The Green Party feels that 50 metres is a sensible compromise that would provide clarity for police on the threshold for imposing conditions on protests while protecting the Article 11 right. Amendment 372ZA would help the police because it is so specific that they could take a tape measure to protests to make sure that protesters were at the designated distance. It would also help protesters, because they would know whether they were legally allowed to protest at that point or not. I urge the Minister to think about this and to clarify what “in the vicinity” means. It is far too vague to bring in in legislation. Surely the Government must see that.

The phrase “may intimidate” again is terribly vague, and I do not understand why anybody would put that in a Bill. This is bad writing—which is why we have so many amendments labelled ZA, ZZ and BZ and so on Report. All our diverse communities have to be supported and defended, but Clause 139, as it stands, will not do that because it is too vague. There are existing powers to address racial and religious hatred and violence. Under the Public Order Act 1986, the police can impose conditions on protests that may compel people not to worship, disrupt the activities of an organisation or intimidate or harass people in the vicinity. My amendment tries to make things clearer. As always, I am just trying to help the Government get things right.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Before she sits down, I put to the noble Baroness that her amendments would not achieve the purpose that I understand the Government to have with Clause 139. If you confer the power in relation only to a protest that takes place within 50 metres then you are not going to achieve the purpose, which is to ensure that people are able to get to and away from their synagogue every Saturday. If there is a march of hundreds or thousands of people that impedes their access, 50 metres is not going to work. As I have already put to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, protest is a balance between the rights of protesters and the rights of other people. The noble Baroness is ignoring the rights of others.

[Noble Lords]

Hear, hear!

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[Lord Hacking (Lab)]

My Lords, this is indeed Report and I have a great deal of sympathy with the amendments that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, spoke to. I also take the point of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones: this is a large group, with a large number of amendments. But I will restrict my comments to Amendment 369A.

As the noble Baronesses, Lady Fox and Lady Chakrabarti, said, it is much simpler to apply the test of “reasonable excuse”, rather than the complicated language used in Clause 133(2), where there is a test of whether the wearing of the clothes of concealment had

“a purpose relating to the health of the person or others”.

That is just asking for a complicated interpretation, and the “reasonable excuse” test is, in my view, sounder.

I will make one comment relating to the entirety of Report on this Bill. I, and I am sure other Members of this House, have extreme concern that we are having to sit every night beyond 11 pm to midnight. I am glad to see a nod from the Liberal Democrat Benches. That places great strain, not only on Ministers—I hasten not to ask the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, how many midnights he has been sitting up in this House for. He would find it difficult to count on his fingers: there are only 10 fingers to count on, so I am afraid he does not have enough fingers to count the number of times. So it imposes a strain on him, and it also imposes a great strain on all of us who need or want to participate in this Bill throughout every debate. There is another problem: with the House sitting so late, some important amendments are not considered. This happened to me on Monday last week. I had a very important amendment down, together with others, which was not reached. Indeed, it was not even spoken to. This goes for the whole of Report.

I am blaming nobody: I am certainly not blaming Ministers or the Government Chief Whip, all of whom I greatly respect. But there is a problem, and I cannot help recalling that, on Wednesday last week, when again the House sat to midnight, I was sitting in a committee room in Portcullis House and the annunciator said that the House of Commons rose at 7 pm. There is a disproportionate burden being placed on this House and I protest about it.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, in my experience, the later the sitting, the more persuasive the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, gets—but that is just a personal view.

I shall make one general comment and then make my observations on Amendments 369 and 369A. The modest changes—and they are modest—introduced in the Bill by the Government to public order legislation do not justify some of the alarmist comments that we have heard today about the death of the right to protest in this country. Protest is alive and well, as we see constantly, and will continue to be alive and well—and there is nothing in this Bill or in the Government’s proposals that will stop the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and others protesting against matters they disapprove of—so let us keep this in perspective, please.

[Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer (LD)]

I thank the noble Lord for giving way, but perhaps I could give him a very small example of something that is completely relevant to what he says. On 5 March this year, the Metropolitan Police raided a Quaker meeting house and arrested a number of young, non-violent activists who were being trained in non-violent protest. How can that happen? They were not even protesting: they were just planning how to be non-violent at protests. The noble Lord must concede that that would have a chilling effect on people.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, who makes a forceful point, but my understanding is that that led to no charges. I certainly would not defend what the police did in those circumstances. Perhaps more relevantly, it has nothing whatever to do with the contents of the Bill or the proposals that the Government are putting forward in this proposed legislation.

Amendment 369 is an important amendment, from the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and others, proposing that we should insert into the statute book a right to protest. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, that it would be most inappropriate. It cannot be right to introduce a statutory right to protest when we are not introducing into the statute book, and rightly so, any other provision in the European Convention on Human Rights, such as the right to freedom of speech or to religious freedom. The reason for that, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, is that we already have the protection of the Human Rights Act, which is applied by our judges.

With respect, I do not accept the criticisms made by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, when he focused on the European concept, in the European Court of Human Rights, of the “margin of discretion”. But that is an international concept, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said. There is something similar here—a discretionary area of judgment—but the European concept is an international concept that is not applied by the domestic courts. Then the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said, “Well, we need to put a marker down in case future Parliaments interfere with the right to protest”. But nothing that we do today will prevent a future Parliament, should it wish to do so, legislating in a way we may think is inappropriate. That is a matter for the future Parliament, and a matter for debate at the time.

The third point the noble Lord, Lord Marks, made was that the convention allowed for a restriction for the protection of morals. He said that was surely inappropriate. Well, yes, but I cannot think of any case where protest has been limited because of a moral view imposed by the police or any other authority. I would not go quite as far as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, who said—I wrote it down—that morals were a “dead letter” nowadays, which is perhaps a wider proposition than she intended to suggest. But Amendment 369 would be most unfortunate. It would cause confusion and achieve no sensible purpose, if I may respectfully say so.

I take a different view of Amendment 369A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, and I have signed it. It deals with Clause 133, which introduces this new offence of concealing your identity at a protest. No defence of reasonable excuse is included, despite the fact that the Joint Committee on Human Rights, in its fifth report of the Session, proposed that there should be such a defence. The absence of such a defence is very puzzling, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, because in Clause 133(2) there are defences

“relating to the health of the person … religious observance, or … a purpose relating to the person’s work”.

In Committee I gave an example of why a defence of reasonable excuse is required. The example—and it is a very topical example—was of a man or a woman who wishes to protest outside the Iranian embassy or at some other demonstration against the conduct of the Iranian regime. They may well have a very strong reason for concealing their identity, which is that they have relatives in Iran. Are we really to say that they are committing a criminal offence, despite the obvious need for them to conceal their identity in those circumstances?

With great respect to the Minister, I heard no convincing answer to that point in Committee. That is why I have joined the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, in suggesting that a defence of reasonable excuse should be added to this new criminal offence. If the noble Lord wishes to test the opinion of the House—and I hope he does, if the Minister cannot give any comfort on this—I will certainly support him.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I rise mainly to support the Government. It seems to me that they are broadly taking steps to stop intimidation of the public, not to stop intimidation of the Government, which is what those who support the right to protest seem to be suggesting. The amendments, on the whole, seem to try to restrict that right. For the reasons that many people have already said, I do not think it is necessary.

The job of the police is to ensure that peaceful protesters are able to protest and that they are not intimidated. It is not their job to maximise the impact of the protest, which is what the implications of facilitation seem to suggest. Other people’s rights have to be respected; in the heat of a protest it is very difficult for the police to get that right. It can be a little easier in preparation for the protest, if you are able to plan, but many of these decisions often have to be made during the protest. When there are thousands of people who are emotional and shouting, perhaps outside the Israeli embassy, it can have an intimidating effect on everybody. We have to think seriously about how the police are able to implement these amendments.

I accept that proportionality is a very important part of the ECHR—I would not argue against that—but it is quite hard for the cops to measure this on the ground. In Northern Ireland it became such an issue that we ended up with a Parades Commission, which took the issues away from the police. The way that legislation is going, I suspect it might be wiser to leave someone independent to make these decisions rather than the police. But while it is with the police, it has to be as simple as possible, not because the police are simple—I speak personally—but because it is not easy to get that balance right. This is an acute judgment, not one that is measured in a court.

I want to speak about two other issues. If Parliament decides that it wants face coverings, we have to think carefully about the reasonable excuse. I do not disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, but I suspect that everybody will have a reasonable excuse. Imagine, as a police officer, confronting somebody about wearing a mask and trying to determine whether they have a reasonable excuse, together with four or five other people in a crowd. It would be almost impossible. Do they have a cold? That is one of the defences in the Act already. I think it would be almost unenforceable. I am not saying that it is wrong to have a reasonable excuse, but it is difficult to determine it during a protest.

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We heard discussion about the fear of reprisals when it comes to transnational repression. I say particularly to my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti that introducing a statutory defence relating to transnational repression would introduce operational complexities for the police, as it is of course the role of the courts, not law enforcement, to assess reasonable doubt and evaluate any defences raised by the defendant. In the context of transnational repression cases, which are often internationally complex, such a defence would place an unnecessary burden on police to disprove claims relating to potential threats to an individual’s safety from a particular state, for example. I stress as well that clear—

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

So is the Minister saying to the protestor at the Iranian embassy that he or she has only two choices: not to protest, or to protest not wearing a face mask and thereby run the risk that their relatives in Iran may be killed or tortured?

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

In that example, I revert to what I said about the locality being designated only if the police suspect that criminality is likely to occur or has occurred on previous occasions. I put it to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that a largely peaceful protest outside an embassy and at an appropriate distance would not fall into that category of protest.

As I was going to say, clear operational guidance from the NPCC—

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[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I do not disagree with the noble Lord. What I am saying is that the police designation of a locality where this offence would apply would be made only in cases where they thought that criminality and an offence would occur. It is not related to the fact that, in this case, there are Iranians protesting. I reflect the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, who, to paraphrase, said that the reasonable defences we list in the clause are common-sense and easily explicable.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

May I test the patience of the Minister? I am very grateful to him. The defence he is offering—that this applies only if there is criminality—does not explain why Clause 133 recognises the defences of health, religious observance or a person’s work. If the Government recognise those defences, even though they are in the context of criminality, surely the clause should also cover the type of example I have given.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

The noble Lord can never test my patience too far. I simply say that, in terms of the police’s operational use, there are three clear, easy-to-understand, easy-to-interpret defences one could use in this situation. Fear of dissident reprisal does not necessarily fit into that category so easily. Notwithstanding his inability to test my patience, I am going to make some progress, as we have more to discuss.

Under Amendments 372A, 372B and 372C in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, Clause 139 would apply only where a protest is directed at or connected with the place of worship, before conditions could be imposed. Additionally, Amendments 372ZA, 372AA, 372AB, 372BA, 372BB and 372D in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, would raise the threshold for police intervention by requiring proof that a protest has the explicit purpose of intimidating individuals accessing a place of worship and that it would, in fact, intimidate them. The amendments also propose limiting police powers to protests occurring

“within 50 metres from the outer perimeter”

of a place of worship.

As seen with recent demonstrations, protests can have an unintended impact on the lives of a community and those seeking to exercise their freedom of religion without intimidation or fear. I want to be clear that Clause 139 seeks to address a clear legislative gap arising from such protests. Police currently have powers to intervene where there is a serious disruption to the life of the community or intentional intimidation. However, we have already heard consistently from both the police and religious communities that these thresholds are too high to protect worshippers who feel too intimidated to attend their place of worship, even though the protesters do not intend to have such an effect. Requiring officers to demonstrate both the purpose and effect of intimidation would restrict their ability to act at an earlier stage, reducing operational flexibility.

Clause 139 responds directly to that problem. It does not ban protests; it simply gives the police the ability to impose proportionate conditions where a procession, assembly or one-person protest may create an intimidating atmosphere in the vicinity of a place of worship. This will protect the freedom to worship without undermining the fundamental right to protest. Both rights are essential, and the clause is carefully designed to balance them. As the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, herself said, the duty to protect minority communities and their right to go about their lives—whether it is their freedom of worship or any other aspect—is indeed paramount. The clause seeks to do that.

The noble Baroness’s proposal to introduce a rigid 50-metre boundary would further constrain the police, as we heard from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. The noble Baroness calls the proposal in the Bill vague, but I put it to her that the rigidity of a 50-metre boundary goes too far. For example, let us consider the practical example of the proximity of St Margaret’s Church to both this House and Parliament Square. Having this rule in place, notwithstanding any particular provisions on protests in Parliament Square, would make that sort of protest impossible. To use one of the examples promoted by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, any protest outside churches or cathedrals would presumably also be limited in that way.

Activity occurring outside that distance may still create an environment that discourages worshippers from entry, yet the police would be unable to impose conditions unless the protest moved closer. This would undermine the clause’s purpose of enabling proportionate intervention where there is a risk of an intimidatory atmosphere near a place of worship. As noble Lord, Lord Pannick said, that includes the comings and goings—going to and from a place of worship, as well as actually being within the building.

I take this opportunity to thank the noble Lord, Lord Leigh of Hurley, who, I am afraid, is not in his place, for meeting me and members of Jewish community organisations, including the Board of Deputies of British Jews, CST and the Jewish Leadership Council, to discuss the clause. As I reiterated at that meeting, I want to make it clear that the Government will write to police forces and local authorities following Royal Assent to remind them of their existing powers to protect community centres, schools and places of worship. This will ensure that all agencies are fully aware of the tools they already have to respond to intimidatory behaviour in these settings.

Amendment 373, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, seeks to remove the cumulative disruption clause from the Bill. I have been clear that the right to peaceful protest is a fundamental democratic right in this country. However, it should be balanced with the need for individuals and communities to feel safe in their own neighbourhoods. Over the past few years, we have seen the impact of protests on the lives of communities and, of course, the tragic antisemitic terror incident that took place at the Heaton Park Hebrew Congregation’s synagogue on 2 October, which led to the unfortunate murders of Adrian Daulby and Melvin Cravitz. Protests subsequently continued, which highlighted concerns around the protection of specific communities, including Jewish communities, which are affected by the cumulative impact of protests.

There are other examples where communities face serious disruption from protests taking place in the same area week after week. On this, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. On the streets of London over the past couple of years, we have seen protests almost weekly. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, is right that the cumulative impact has the effect of forcing home a particular message that those protesters want to make. However, that should not come at the price of other citizens not being allowed to enjoy their regular rights.

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[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Walney, for bringing forward Amendment 371A and all noble Lords who have added their name to it. I thank the Members of your Lordships’ House who, I hope, will be speaking to it. This amendment is eminently sensible. We have heard several examples already of groups which engage in criminal and intimidating behaviour to further their ideological ends, but which do not necessarily pass the terrorism threshold. There is no justification for their continued lawful existence, but to proscribe them as terrorists obfuscates the meaning of the category and incorporates inactive supporters within the definition. The pertinent example of this is Palestine Action. I will not speculate on whether the behaviour actually amounts to terrorism, but the actions of its supporters following its proscription highlight the necessity for action.

An organisation that damages defence infrastructure and attacks members of the public should cease to exist, but for the police to then have to spend precious time arresting hundreds of protesters with placards is clearly not ideal. It may seem morally dubious on behalf of those protesters, but I think we can all agree that they are a far cry from the archetypal terrorist supporters of, say, ISIS or the Taliban. Most importantly, it is a waste of police time to have to deal with sanctimonious protesters who otherwise peacefully support a general ideological cause. That is why we entirely support the noble Lord’s amendment. Our Amendment 371B introduces a minor change to the drafting that reflects our belief that the proscription of groups in this category should not be contingent on whether they fulfil the criteria of both subsections (1A) and (1B). Individually, the actions in both subsections should merit a protest group being proscribed and prohibited from taking further action.

If a listed crime is committed that creates a serious risk to the safety of the public, then the line is crossed from dissent to danger. I think noble Lords can agree that whether a group is for an ideological end or not, this should merit proscription. The very act of a group entering an arms factory with sledgehammers should preclude its existence, regardless of motive. That said, ideological motive is also a factor that should be considered in its own right: if a group shuns peaceful protest and becomes willing to commit criminal offences to further a political end, that should be grounds to ban it. Take, for example, BASH BACK, the activist group which has consistently engaged in criminal damage, vandalism and intimidation in the name of so-called transgender rights. To take one example—as I am sure my noble friend Lady Cash will highlight—it recently spray-painted the office building of the Equality and Human Rights Commission for simply declaring that biological sex is biological sex.

This vandalism is an offence under Section 1 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 and should result in a group being proscribed. I am, however, wary that spray painting and other forms of vandalism may not be seen to create a risk of serious harm to public safety, and I am not confident that, with the right lawyers, the actions of these groups would result in them being proscribed, because of a technicality. Criminality alone introduces the possibility of restricting the practice of a protest group. Whether this is augmented by either a risk to public safety or by an intention to influence political decision-making should confirm that decision.

That being said, I reaffirm my support for the noble Lord’s original amendment. It is a pertinent time for this debate, and I believe that Amendment 371A finds the right balance between prohibiting criminal activity and permitting peaceful support. I hope all Members of your Lordships’ House can recognise the rationale for moving away from a rigid binary between terrorism and protest and acknowledge that it is a spectrum that will benefit from more nuance. His Majesty’s loyal Opposition will support this amendment, and I look forward to hearing the closing remarks of the Minister and of the noble Lord, Lord Walney.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 371A from the noble Lord, Lord Walney. As the noble Lord mentioned, the House will be very familiar with the problems that have arisen from the use of the power that the Secretary of State has to proscribe a terrorist group. The virtue of Amendment 371A is that it avoids any such description. It focuses on the severe mischief that we know certain groups are causing in our society.

Who could object to the Secretary of State having a power, by regulation, to designate a group as an extreme criminal protest group if there is a reasonable belief that its purpose and practice is the deliberate commission of the serious offences set out in this amendment: riot, violent disorder, destroying or damaging property, and interference with the use or operation of key national infrastructure? Surely the Secretary of State should have power to take action, particularly when, as the amendment requires, those offences are carried out with the intention of influencing public policy, parliamentary debate, ministerial decision-making or the exercise of democratic functions, and they create a risk of serious harm to public safety, democratic institutions or the rights of others.

We all support the right to protest, but there are limits, and these clearly are breached by deliberate conduct the purpose of which is to act in the way set out in the tightly drawn amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Walney. As he has pointed out, he has avoided in his drafting the real problem that has arisen in the Palestine Action case: that people are criminalised by reason of support for that body. That has caused problems. The Court of Appeal case is pending, but this amendment avoids those difficulties.

So I support this. I hope the Minister will not tell the House that this is not the time and that we should wait in particular for the report of the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven. I too have the highest regard for him, but we should bear in mind that, with this Bill, the Government have not waited for his report in a number of provisions relating to public order, particularly and rightly on cumulative disruption. So I say to the House: let us deal with this. This is a legislative opportunity; it is a pressing problem, and we should deal with it now.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, for the reasons given by the noble Lords, Lord Walney and Lord Pannick, I strongly support this amendment.

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[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 371A from the noble Lord, Lord Walney, because it addresses a difficult area—something that falls short of terrorism and which causes problems for legislators, policing and the courts. Terrorism is fairly well understood. It is the application or the threat of violence for a political purpose; it is easily stated. In this case, it seems to me that there are some indications that there might be a gap. It is not the first time we have been confronted by this problem. Before terrorism was defined—probably by the terrorism which started in Northern Ireland—in the 1930s, we saw that people were parading on the streets for political motives, so legislation had to be introduced on uniforms and various other things that indicated that people were trying to use violence or political aspirations to influence the Government.

It seems that the gap that has evolved is around Palestine Action. There are probably three indicators of a need for a solution to a gap that has developed. First, we have had a criminal case in which a police officer was hit by someone with a hammer, and the people who appeared to have been involved have been found not guilty. That case has been appealed, but that one issue has obviously caused some concern for everybody affected—the police, in part, but mainly the businesses being attacked by this group. The second case is a civil case, which is already—

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

May I just correct the noble Lord? In that case, what happened was that the jury could not agree and there is a retrial of those serious criminal allegations.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

That is quite right, and thank you for that correction, although, clearly, they were not found guilty.

Secondly, the civil case is about prohibition. The High Court has decided that it does not prefer the Government’s judgment that Palestine Action should be a proscribed group. I find that constitutionally quite odd. I understand that sometimes, the court will come to a different opinion on legislation, but it seems to me that the Government, faced with the best information possible, have concluded that it should be proscribed, and the court has decided that that is not proportionate. Whatever the outcome on appeal—which the noble Lord, Lord Walney, has alluded to and we will hear eventually—this needs to be resolved quickly because it is hard to understand.

Both cases might indicate that there were some doubts about the proscription of this group. Most of the time, terrorist groups are obvious. Terrorism is mass and indiscriminate violence that murders tens of people. We see it and it is very obvious. In this case I did wonder, but sometimes governments have information that the rest of us do not. One of the other signs, which has already been mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Walney, was that, when support began to be expressed for a proscribed group, people then said, “This is quite odd; why are we arresting them?” They did not have the same qualms about Irish terrorism or about ISIS when they were beheading citizens of this country. It indicates that, perhaps, there is something different about this group. The amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Walney, has identified a reasonable solution to that gap. Conspiracy alone is not a sufficient answer. It is possible to charge someone with conspiracy to commit a violent act or conspiracy to riot, but you cannot prosecute people who might fund that conspiracy. This amendment would start to address the protest group and the way it is funded and supported.

My final point—quite narrowly defined in this sense—is that this is about the intent to cause serious harm to public safety or to affect public policy and democracy. Both are substantial bars to pass before somebody could be convicted of this offence. The Government ought seriously to consider filling the gap with this amendment, or, if they do not, with something very much like it.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Report stage & 3rd reading
Wednesday 4th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord. Can he give a practical example of when there has ever been a relevant criminal offence committed against a person because they are not deaf?

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

I cannot—not as a lawyer; I cannot refer to case law on this—but I would not rely on past example alone. If we are passing laws that seek to apply equality, we should seek to apply it on the basis of somebody’s disability status, whether they are disabled or not. It is not implausible—though I accept it is far less likely and far less numerous in past occurrence—for that to be the case. In some of the other areas in the heated debates that we see, it is not as implausible as many of us would like to assume. If it is possible to tighten this up in the drafting, I think it would do the job the Government are seeking to do in a complete way.

That would not prevent the Government fulfilling their manifesto commitment for delivering protections to trans people and disabled people; it would simply ensure that everybody was treated in this area of the law on the basis of protected characteristics in the same way. At the moment, there are greater protections for everybody of every conceivable sexual orientation and people of either sex, but there are not on each of the areas set out in the Equality Act. More pertinently, it would avoid fuelling what is already a very unhelpful public discourse about two-tier policing and laws, or some of the more charged debates that we have in the darker corners of the internet or from the more far-fetched foreign critics who have been mentioned previously.

On Amendment 336 from my noble friends Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Cameron of Lochiel, while it is understandable that they are probing this area, I do not think that their amendment is warranted. It probes the question of whether protections for transgender people should apply to people who are “proposing to undergo” a process of gender reassignment. In fact, Section 2 of the Gender Recognition Act 2004, which has been the law of the land for 22 years, requires somebody applying for a gender recognition certificate to undergo that process to have

“lived in the acquired gender throughout the period of two years”

preceding their application. Signalling an intention to propose to go through that process is an important part of the law as it stands, and therefore Amendment 336 is not needed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)]

I thank the noble Baroness for her intervention. I was just about to get on to that in my second point, which is that the whole idea of an aggravated crime increasingly weaponises and politicises the concept of hate.

In the previous debate, the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, made some very affecting comments. I was able to talk with her about the incident that she also mentioned this evening outside the Chamber. Over the years, my very long-standing and noble friend Lord Shinkwin has told me some very harrowing things that have happened to him. The disabled protected characteristic having an aggravated crime is possibly the most difficult of these to speak against.

But whatever that protected class is, it is exactly the point that the noble Baroness was making. This is an aggravator to a crime that exists. If the crime is committed, it does not matter why it was committed; it can still be prosecuted. If it cannot be prosecuted, you cannot prosecute the aggravated aspect of it either. Weaponising hate and making it into a thing ignores the fact that these are merely aggravator laws. They are not laws that in and of themselves create a crime; they merely aggravate an existing crime. That has received very little attention in the debate this evening.

Thirdly, it further creates and promotes the concept of society as identity groups. I have the view that we are all human beings and the way to have a coherent and well working society is for us all to work together, whereas with aggravated crimes, people with one or another protected characteristic are encouraged to say, “I’ve been discriminated against. They are the things against me. These people are hateful”, instead of saying, “Let’s all join together and just stop crime”.

I would like to lean on two actors who I very much respect and think of as very thoughtful people: Denzel Washington and Morgan Freeman. They have both been quoted on numerous occasions as saying, “How do you stop hate crime? How do you stop racial hatred? The answer is you stop talking about it”. If they believe that, and I happen to agree with them, what is it about what they say that noble Lords disagree with?

My final point is on this idea of looking into people’s minds. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, talked about a case where the difference between committing a bad crime and committing it because you dislike the gender or whatever it was of the individual was a wrap on the knuckles or going to jail for six weeks. How do you know exactly what was in that person’s mind? Was it just an off-the-cuff remark, or was it some deep hatred that deserved society’s censure? You do not know. Queen Elizabeth I said, “I do not want to look into men’s souls”. It has been a fundamental part of British jurisprudence since the 17th century—I do not know why the noble Baroness thinks that is funny; it is fundamental to the way we conduct our society.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord. Will he accept that there is no question of a court looking into someone’s soul? The aggravation has to be proved. It has to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and it is proved beyond a reasonable doubt by what the person has said, or what they have done, and the circumstances of the case. That is a matter for the judge.

[Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)]

The noble Lord evinces the certainty that comes from a lifetime in the courts. Those of us who sit outside those courts are maybe a little less certain of the courts’ ability to reach such a fine state of discernment.

I will wrap up; it is getting late.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Sugg (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Government for tabling their Amendments 339 and 340, and thank all noble Lords who supported this call in Committee.

These amendments respond to a campaign from Karma Nirvana and 60 other specialist violence against women and girls organisations, along with survivors and their families, calling on the Government to introduce the statutory definition of honour-based abuse. That campaign was established in memory of Fawziyah Javed, whose case demonstrates the tragic consequences of failing to identify honour-based abuse. Despite multiple calls for help, including two police visits just days before her murder, the abuse she endured was never recognised as honour-based abuse. Crucially, professionals failed to identify the multi-perpetrator nature of the abuse, which involved not only her partner but members of his family. Sadly, Fawziyah’s case is not isolated. Again and again, inquiries and serious case reviews show that, when honour-based abuse is not recognised early, victims are left unprotected, escalation is missed, and all those involved in abuse are not held to account.

The hope is that this definition, supported by clear guidance, will enable front-line professionals to identify, understand and respond to honour-based abuse before tragedies occur, and, crucially, to recognise all perpetrators involved. While this progress in the Bill is welcome, the Government’s chosen approach does not explicitly recognise the specific multi-perpetrator nature of honour-based abuse—an omission with real safeguarding consequences. The current wording risks being read as referring to only one additional perpetrator. Honour-based abuse, however, commonly involves multiple family or community members acting collectively, often across households and generations. Failing to reflect this reality in the Bill risks embedding the very misunderstanding that the definition seeks to correct.

My Amendment 340A would address this by making a simple and proportionate change to subsection (2) of the Government’s amendment. It would clarify that honour-based abuse can involve a person or persons, ensuring that statutory language reflects operational reality. It would align the law with the lived experience of victims, the expertise of specialist services and existing safeguarding practice. It is a modest change with major consequences for victim safety.

I am grateful for the engagement of Ministers and officials on this issue. I anticipate that the Minister may argue in response that this amendment is unnecessary because Section 6 of the Interpretation Act 1978 provides that

“words in the singular include the plural”—

I acknowledge that. However, this principle does not translate effectively in safeguarding practice. I appreciate that this issue will be made explicit in the guidance, and I am grateful for the Minister’s reassurances on that point, but we are concerned that legislation may be read literally, and that the harm of relying on “person” is therefore not theoretical. Focusing on a single actor risks professionals misunderstanding the collective nature of the threat and failing to safeguard against a wider group. That is precisely the gap that has led to missed risks and preventable deaths.

I very much hope that the Minister can accept my amendment or perhaps commit to coming back at Third Reading with the Government’s own version. If he cannot, please can he explain two things? First, what is the legal risk or harm of including the words “or persons”? The safeguarding risks of not including them are clear and substantial. Secondly, why have other areas of the criminal law, such as legislation on harassment, organised crime, gangs, affray and riot, been able to use explicit plural language, yet this Bill has not? In each of those contexts, Parliament has recognised the need for clarity where multiple actors are inherent to the offence. Honour-based abuse is no different; indeed, it is a textbook example of collective harm.

In closing, I am very grateful to the Government for taking this significant step forward. I pay tribute to the many survivors of honour-based abuse, and to the families of those who have been killed. Despite unimaginable trauma, they have fought for this definition so that others may be protected. They are following this debate closely, and their message is clear: honour-based abuse is collective abuse; if the law does not say this plainly, professionals may not act on it. I very much hope that the Minister recognises the strength of feeling, the weight of evidence and the safeguarding imperative, and accepts this small but vital amendment that will materially improve professional understanding and, most importantly, save lives.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, that it is not merely that, under the Interpretation Act, “person” includes “persons” unless the context requires otherwise—which I do not think it does here. I hope that the Minister will make it clear that the object of his amendment is indeed to cover cases where there is more than one person. If the Minister can say that that is the Government’s objective, the courts will have regard to that if there is any ambiguity at all, which I do not think there is.

[Lord Lucas (Con)]

My Lords, I congratulate the Government on bringing forward these amendments. However, reading Amendment 340 as it is written, in the context of our treatment of Lord Mandelson in this House, I cannot see how we are not guilty of honour-based abuse. We are a community that considers that a person has dishonoured us; we have subjected them to economic abuse and greatly restricted their access to money and income. How does it not apply? How would it not apply to a part of a community deciding to ostracise people who have been involved with a grooming gang? There is nothing in this definition that exempts “abuse” directed at people who have done serious wrong.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to support this amendment, which would have been avoided if we had been able to have proper regulation of psychotherapy professionals. The problem is that the voluntary registration through the British Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy, the UK Council for Psychotherapy or the National Counselling & Psychotherapy Society requires people to be appropriately trained and have ethical standards. But if there is a serious complaint against them and they are removed from there, they can still carry on seeing clients and practising in a completely unethical way. There is absolutely no recourse for people who are seriously harmed by whatever activities are undertaken.

There are times in people’s lives when they are particularly vulnerable. One of those is when they are bereaved. Some older people, when they are bereaved, may be in what you could call that pre-dementia phase of being particularly emotionally vulnerable. They may have people who recommend in good faith that they go to see somebody who has some counselling label up, but who then goes on to exploit them tremendously to create dependency, charge huge fees and make the person emotionally dependent on them, which results in coercive behaviour to carry on seeing this person and carry on handing over money. They may also, in the process, implant the idea that their family are being unsupportive and that the best thing they could do would be to cut off contact with their family.

I have seen this first hand, when a family, who were well-meaning and wanting to provide support, had the most awful acrimonious correspondence sent to them by the person who was being advised for their own good in their counselling to have no contact whatever with these family members, and the counselling service that this person was accessing drained many thousands of pounds from their personal account. The problem is that, at the moment, there is no recourse for the public. They can complain and try to take a legal process against the person, but they are very vulnerable people. This amendment would provide a route to having some control, if you like, over some of these quack practitioners who should not be out there, putting up nameplates and calling themselves counsellors.

It is worth remembering that, particularly in primary care, we have talking therapies that have very good outcomes, such as cognitive behavioural therapy, delivered by people who are properly trained, subject to ethical standards and have appropriate diplomas. They provide non-judgmental, confidential, professional assistance and guidance to help people find a solution to their problems. It has become popular in primary care and in the community, but the backlash against it is that an unsuspecting person and their friends may not realise, or have any way of knowing, that somebody who claims to be a counsellor is completely bogus.

In 2024, Alastair Campbell campaigned hard against this, and there was a very good article in the i newspaper about it—I do not think it is advertising for me to name the paper. I recall the discussions we had about trying to get the registration of professionals, so that those who are providing a valuable service can carry on doing so and are not tainted in the minds of the public by those who are completely bogus. This amendment seems to be essential to protect the public.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Marks, mentioned the reservations which I expressed in Committee. I have thought further about this matter since Committee. Indeed, the purpose of the gap between Committee and Report is precisely so that all noble Lords—not only noble Lords on the Cross Benches and Back Benches but Ministers—can reflect on what was said in Committee.

I have looked in particular at the provision which the noble Lord, Lord Marks, mentioned, Section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015, which creates an offence of:

“Controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship”.


It uses, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, rightly said, the same concepts that the amendment tabled by the noble Lord and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, seeks to implement in the law in the present context. It seems to me that there is a very close analogy between that existing criminal offence and the present context, which is not in the same intimate or family relationship but in the relationship between the psychotherapist or counsellor and the patient.

For my part, I cannot see why the mischief—and it is a mischief—which the amendment seeks to identify should not be a criminal offence. Why should it be that persons who carry out conduct that is defined in this provision should not be subject to the criminal law? Regulation is important, but it is not the answer. The mischief defined in Amendment 358 should be a criminal offence. I have changed my mind.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, for bringing his amendment back on Report, and commend him for his continued championing of this issue. Regrettably, these Benches cannot endorse his amendment. We acknowledge that there is plainly a gap in the current law that is causing an issue within the counselling and psychotherapy sector, but are less sure that the amendment as drafted would best serve victims and help them get redress.

As has just been said, the amendment would introduce an offence modelled on Section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015, which itself introduced the offence of controlling and coercive behaviour by intimate relations or family members. Like the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, I understand the parallel with this, but I believe that they are fundamentally different in nature, with counselling and psychotherapy being a relationship with a client and a provider in a different setting.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 4th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Cash (Con)]

My Lords, I support the amendments of my noble friend Lord Young of Acton and oppose the Government’s amendments in their entirety, on principle.

I did not expect to be beginning in the way I am about to begin, but I want to say this because the quality of debates around hate crime have become increasingly polarising. In my first year in this House, which has been a great privilege, I have grown to deeply admire the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Hanson of Flint, in particular for the way he has conducted the passage of this Bill and the many late nights and long hours he has put in. Indeed, I have grown slightly fond—if that is okay to say—of him and our exchanges in the corridors. Therefore, it is with some trepidation and fear that I get to my feet to say that I hope we can engage in a respectful debate. I do not agree that this is the right vehicle for the objectives but I do agree with the objectives.

The Minister used these words—I hope I have taken them down correctly; I think it is verbatim. He happens to believe that trans and disabled people “should be able to live without hostility”. I 100% agree with that, but I do not believe that this is the right vehicle. My noble friend Lord Young of Acton has already covered the existence, introduced in 2020, of the aggravating factors in sentencing which allow all those characteristics and categories to have increased sentencing as a result of hostility acted out on those people. I want to clarify that, because I do not believe there is a single person here, whether Peer or guest in the Gallery, who would disagree with anything that the Minister said. I hope we can have a debate on what the right vehicle is, which does not denigrate anything when it comes to what the principles should be.

Seeking to amend the Bill to add “aggravated factors”, alongside race and religion, introduced a quarter of a century ago, is a significant departure. It is an extension and expansion of the structure of our criminal law. The traditional structure is that conduct constitutes the offence: for example, he hit him and he meant to. The motive may aggravate the sentence; the law does not need to prove why. But once we subdivide offences by protected characteristic or identity, we depart from that principle. We know—because the Home Office itself says that only 7% of recorded hate crimes result in charging—that this becomes a complicated way of proceeding against this kind of conduct, particularly when we already have a vehicle for punishing it. The same conduct becomes a different offence depending on the identity of the victim and the alleged beliefs of the defendant. The motive for the crime moves from sentencing into the definition of the crime itself. It is, of course, more complex to establish, and harder to charge and then to prove. What better way to approach it than by the sentencing mechanism, where a judge has heard the evidence, and it has become quite clear and apparent during the course of the trial that this was an underlying motivation. He or she—I note, with deference, the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, sitting opposite—can then increase the sentence accordingly.

This is not something I have just come up with today. Many respected academics and lawyers have questioned the aggravated defence regime. Professor Richard Taylor has argued that racially or religiously aggravated offences created by the 1998 Act are conceptually confused and duplicate what could be, and is now, more adequately addressed through sentencing law. The Law Commission of England and Wales has recognised this structural tension. In fact, the Law Commission goes so far as to comment on sex not becoming a characteristic at all. There have also been a number of reports by Policy Exchange, and I declare my interest as a senior fellow. These reports warn against the steady multiplication of identity-based criminal categories, and emphasise that the criminal law should focus on the conduct, rather than proliferating protected characteristic variants of an offence.

Others, including Lord Sumption, have cautioned that we should not push the criminal law from punishing harmful conduct towards adjudicating belief and motive. We do not need any reminder of the risks, because we are currently dealing with the failure of the non-crime hate incident reporting regime. Why, at the very moment that Parliament is moving to curtail the recording of non-crime hate incidents—recognising the problems created when policing becomes entangled in the recording of perceived hostility—are the Government proposing to expand hostility-based criminal offences themselves? I noted that the Minister said that this was a manifesto pledge, but it makes me very uneasy that we are coming to it only on Report. It is such a significant structural change in the criminal law and an expansion of the regime that I would have appreciated the opportunity to speak to it at Second Reading and to challenge and scrutinise it in detail in Committee.

We need to have an honest and evidence-led debate. It is too easy to reflexively say that this is the kind thing and the right thing. It will not produce change or the results that we want it to. The aggravated offence model has been operating for more than a quarter of a century as a large-scale behavioural and sociological experiment in using identity-based categories to address prejudice. It is taboo to question it and to question whether it has worked, but we must. If it had reduced hostility or strengthened social cohesion then there might be a case for expansion, but it has not, and no evidence of that has been produced.

Hate-crime legislation is not a demonstrably effective enforcement tool. It is wholly wrong to divert resources in this way, in an already overstretched criminal justice system, where we are challenging the very existence of the jury trial without a solid evidential base for doing so. I oppose the amendment.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I support the Government’s amendments. As I understand them, they do not create any new criminal offences; they are concerned only with sentencing for criminal offences that are proved and on the statute book. It is elementary that the sentence the court imposes for any criminal offence must depend on the circumstances of that particular offence. I cannot see the objection to the court being told that one of the things it should take into account is whether the defendant, who has been convicted of a particular offence, has acted by reason of hostility based on the victim being, or being presumed to be, transgender.

[Lord Young of Acton (Con)]

The court can already take all the aggravating factors into account, save for hostility to sex. If a crime is aggravated by one of three of the four aggravators that the Bill would introduce into the charging regime, the CPS can flag those as aggravating factors and they can be taken into account at the sentencing stage, so what material difference would the government amendments make?

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, but he is running two inconsistent arguments. He is saying first that the law already allows this, and secondly that this amendment to make the position clear is fundamentally objectionable on grounds of principle. He cannot run both arguments, nor say that it is objectionable for one of the factors that the court should take into account to be whether the hostility is based on sex. Why should we exclude sex? Why does the law currently allow the victim’s membership, or presumed membership, of a racial or religious group to be a factor that the court can take into account, but not sex or transgender status? That makes no sense whatever when the Equality Act deals with all these protected characteristics.

I emphasise that whether it is right or appropriate for the judge to take these factors into account in the circumstances of a particular case, and to what extent, will depend on the discretion of the sentencing judge, which will inevitably depend on the circumstances of the crime. Therefore, to exclude entirely the factor of the victim being, or being presumed to be, transgender, as the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, seeks to do, seems arbitrary.

Of course, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, that we must be very careful indeed to ensure that people are not punished for the exercise of free speech, but the law protects that exercise. It protects it by reference to Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which the sentencing judge must take into account in all cases. I do not know the circumstances of the case that the noble Lord referred to, where there was an acquittal at the appeal stage, but I strongly suspect that Article 10 had something to do with it. I support the Government’s amendment.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I have serious reservations about the Government’s amendments on aggravated offences. I appreciate that this puts me at odds with the Minister, but I knew that long before today, because in Committee he made a passionate speech, as he has today, telling us how proud he would be to move these amendments and claiming that they show a Government prepared to protect LGBT and disabled people.

If this is such an important change in the law for the Government, and a principled flagship for progressive Labour that appeared in its manifesto, we have to ask why the Government waited until Report in the Lords—so late in the Bill’s passage—to table the amendments. They must have thought that they were principled and important before, so why are we seeing them only now? I am afraid that, as the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, explained, this denies this House the constitutional right to properly scrutinise and mull over the complex details of the amendments—let alone the fact that that was denied to the elected Chamber.

In the limited space that we have here, I will start by raising some general concerns I have with aggravated offences. Some people might say that this is a Second Reading speech; if it is, it is because the Government did not bring the amendments forward until now, so I will say it anyway. In my view, the state’s job, via criminal justice, is to prosecute material, clearly defined offences. When the authorities attempt to either infer or impute motivation for a crime, seemingly to signal its particular gravity, that is a dangerous move towards punishing ideas, beliefs or attitudes. Some of those ideas, of course, might be bigoted or abhorrent, but they are none the less ideas and opinions. We need to be wary of inadvertently stepping towards thought-crime solutions just to signal our moral virtue, and I am worried about expanding that regime.

This has consequences. Offences such as these carry higher maximum penalties when offenders demonstrate hostility, and this can mean prison. But hostility can be interpreted broadly in the law as ill will, antagonism or prejudice. Let me be clear: violence, harassment, assault or whatever against a disabled person, a trans person, a woman or anyone should be punished appropriately—severely, if that is your take—and certainly uniformly, regardless of motive. But aggravated sentencing can lead to some perverse outcomes.

On hate crime aggravators, in Committee I used an example from the CPS report Our Recent Hate Crime Prosecutions. A man was put in jail for 20 weeks for

“assaulting his father, sister and a police officer, and using racist slurs against his sister’s partner”.

But the CPS notes that, without the racist slurs, he would have only received a community order. So for the assault he would have retained his freedom but, with the racist words, he got 20 weeks in jail. What is more problematic is that many of the offences we are talking about are not actually those kinds of aggressions but often speech that is promiscuously criminalised.

This sentencing anomaly really hits home when it comes to the much boasted-of addition of sex into the aggregation. “At last”, people will say; “misogyny taken seriously”. But, during the Sentencing Bill, the Government refused to accept a perfectly reasonable amendment exempting sexual assault offences and domestic violence offences from the early release scheme. Surely, a real, material commitment to women would be to have accepted that amendment, not increased sentences for offences deemed driven by hostility to women.

Instead, my view is that we should prosecute actual offences committed against any woman. When those offences involve, for example, sexual violence or domestic abuse, we should give appropriate sentences to perpetrators and then not let the offenders out early to free up prison places. That would help women far more than this amendment, the wording of which says that the aggravators must be announced in “open court” to declare an offence aggravated—if ever there were an indication of the performative nature of this, that is it.

One worry is that many of the offences to which “aggravated” will be attached will be the tangled plethora of hate speech crimes, already leading to the scandal of Britain’s declining free speech reputation internationally, with so many arrested for speech crimes, as we have heard about. So many of these offences are wholly subjective, because hostility can be defined by the victim. We have seen the recent weaponisation of speech against those who do not share the same views, the whole cancel culture and toxicity that has proliferated, and identity groups and those with protective characteristics pitched against each other in grievance complaints.

Although it was not in the criminal law, we saw a gross example of this when John Davidson, a man with Tourette’s and the subject of an award-winning sympathetic film, involuntarily ticked and shouted out the N-word. Subsequent commentary refused to accept that there was no intent to offend. Race and disability were put at odds, rather than empathetically understanding the issues, and that is one of the problems with playing the identity politics issue. Increasing aggravated offences will just add to this toxic mix, and that, combined with public order and communications arrests—if not prosecutions for speech crimes, as described by the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton—will make this issue really difficult.

The issue of hostility to transgender identity is likely to stir up further tensions. I want to ask: what is transgender identity? At best, it is a subjective category. It is a self-defined description. That is not a criticism; it is just an observation. Transgender identity does not require a gender recognition certificate or surgery. By the way, the wording in the amendment is confusing here: it gives credence to the fact that surgery might be a key, but then it says “proposing to undergo” gender reassignment, which is a very odd phrase. That is why the amendments of the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Cameron of Lochiel, are right to query and probe it, which is what we should be doing, even though it is so late in the day. How transgender people are defined will matter to how these amendments will be understood.

The clarification of the noble Lords from the Official Opposition, in Amendments 337, 350, 351 and 352, establishing what sex means in the Bill, is also helpful. Emphasising biological sex—sex at birth—is necessary to ensure that the cultural clash between gender identity and sex is not muddled up in this Bill or in these amendments. The noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, in his Amendment 334A, also hopes to ensure that the proposed changes do not criminalise misgendering.

I just note that I hate the word “misgendering”. If a male identifies as a female, even if he has a certificate or has had surgery, he is still a man. Saying that is not misgendering; it is factually accurate. Asking me to call him a woman is compelled speech, asking me to repeat misinformation. But would that statement, which I am very nervous about making, be seen as evidence of hostility to someone based on their gender identity? Guess what: too often, those accused of, and punished for, so-called misgendering offences are women. Police criminalised Sex Matters’ Helen Joyce for some tweets referring to Freda Wallace by his former name Fred and using he/him pronouns, and the police recorded that as “criminal harassment” with “transgender aggravators”.

What about the young lesbian who says that she is not attracted to a male—a man who thinks that, by wearing stilettos and a dress, he is a woman and should be allowed into a lesbian-only group at a workplace—

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 25th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, I apologise to the House; I was not ready, but it is worth waiting for. This amendment would change the legal test for imposing a respect order, requiring the court to consider this step “necessary and proportionate”, and not merely “just and convenient”, in preventing a person engaging in anti-social behaviour. This small, targeted change would ensure that the test is more proportionately aligned with the potentially serious consequences of these quasi-criminal orders, since a breach can result in up to two years’ imprisonment. It would also better reflect the Government’s stated intention that these orders should be used to tackle the most persistent cases of anti-social behaviour.

As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, noted in Committee, these cases would be adequately covered by a “necessary and proportionate” framework. The Minister says that judges must already take necessity and proportionality into account under the Human Rights Act. If that is so, I struggle to see why that very safeguard cannot be placed transparently in the Bill. This is a critical point, given the well-documented failures of previous anti-social behaviour powers. The evidence shows that, in practice, vague legal tests not only lead to inconsistent decisions: they sometimes deter the courts from using orders.

A more rigorous test would also address concerns about systemic bias. Existing anti-social behaviour powers continue to fall more heavily on minority-ethnic and other disadvantaged groups. Without stronger safeguards, this will almost inevitably be repeated by respect orders. Tightening the test is a modest way to reduce that risk, and will provide greater clarity for all concerned—judges, counsel and victims—as well as those made subject to these orders. It also better aligns the order with the risk assessment duty already outlined in new Section J1 inserted by Clause 1.

In Committee a number of Peers expressed concern about judicial overreach, particularly with tools so sweeping that they can order somebody to do anything described. But the current broad and vague test will do nothing to solve this. In fact, it will make matters worse. The quasi-criminal nature of these orders will invite legal challenge, causing delay in already backlogged courts, potentially clogging the system with marginal cases while doing little for victims of persistent and ongoing anti-social behaviour. A clear necessity and proportionality requirement would sharpen the law, focus efforts on the worst cases and help ensure that respect orders become the tool of choice for serious or repeat anti-social behaviour, rather than just another broad but inconsistently used power added to an already confusing landscape.

I have one final point. In Committee we welcomed the Home Office’s plan to pilot these orders, only to be told that the Government had decided that this was no longer necessary. On that occasion, the Minister informed me that things change. However, since then things appear to have changed again: the latest policy paper says that respect orders will now be piloted before being rolled out nationally. That is obviously very welcome, but I hope that today the Minister can reassure the House that—in this matter, at least—there will be no further changes. One change I strongly advocate is that outlined in Amendment 1. If it sharpens the law, improves enforcement and offers greater protection against injustice for the price of a modest drafting alteration, why resist it? I beg to move.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I agree with everything said by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. As I understand the Government’s position, they accept that it would not be appropriate to impose such an order unless it is necessary and proportionate, and indeed that is the test applied by the European Convention on Human Rights, so the only question is whether the language of the Bill, and the Act that it will become, should reflect the true test. It seems to me, as it seems to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, highly appropriate that what is in the legislation should set out the true test. This has to be applied not just by judges but by police officers, local authorities, communities and everyone who is responsible for considering and enforcing this legislation. Let us put the true and proper test on the face of the Bill.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, there is a lot in this group. The Government are undoubtedly sincere in wanting to use the Bill to further tackle anti-social behaviour, and such moves to take on this blight on communities will certainly be popular. However, we have to pause a moment and say that there is already a plethora of tools on the statute book designed to tackle anti-social behaviour, and yet it does not seem to be improving. This is the group in which we need to ask why. Perhaps anti-social behaviour orders and injunctions in all their various guises, from community penalty notices to public spaces protection orders, are just not fit for purpose.

I fear that, instead of tackling this, the Government are taking an easy and performative route and affording the state even more of the same—with more draconian powers—under a different label, that of respect orders. They are doing all this with little clarity or evidence of efficacy. That is what the amendments in this group are designed to tackle. By and large, I support them all.

I tabled Amendment 6, which calls for an independent —I stress the word “independent”—review of existing powers under the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, which should be published prior to the commencement of Sections 1 and 2 of the Act. As legislators, we have an obligation to take responsibility for assessing the impact of, and the evidence about, laws that we made in the past before we duplicate their weaknesses. We need to understand the pros and cons.

This review would look at solving the evidence gap. It is extraordinary that there is significant variation in data captured across relative authorities. Because ASBIs are locally administered in a patchwork of varied use, there is a worrying variation in the types and quality of data collected, the location of that data and the ability of that data to be extrapolated and shared internally or with relevant agencies where appropriate. This is surely a slap across the face of evidence-based policy-making, because without data it is not possible to adequately assess the effectiveness of behaviour orders and to fully understand any trends arising out of their imposition, enforcement or breach, including disproportionate impacts.

That is why Amendment 24 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, who is not in her place, which would require the Home Office to publish quarterly data, is so important, as well as Amendment 12 from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, which calls for an annual report. Both amendments positively try to tackle the limits of the availability of the evidence base, without which I do not know how we can make informed policy decisions.

At present, all the critiques of present behaviour orders are invaluably brought to us from sporadic academic research, FoI-based research led by the likes of Josie Appleton and her team at the Campaign for Freedom in Everyday Life, and the excellent campaign group Justice. They want their work to be made redundant by the Government; they want the Government and officialdom to do their work instead. If the Home Office does not understand its own legislative tools because it does not have the data, the misery of anti-social behaviour will remain untouched while the statute book grows.

I hope the Minister will listen to the front-line workers who have to implement and use these orders and who, reasonably, bemoan the lack of proper consultation with those who understand the ASBI regime in real life. I note the government amendment on consultation, which is welcome.

The majority of practitioners who Justice consulted believe that the new respect orders are unnecessary and replicate flawed laws already available. Only 6% conclude that they will improve outcomes for victims; 82% of respondents to the practitioners survey have called for the review of the existing 2014 Act and of existing powers prior to respect orders being introduced. There was unanimous agreement that the Government should address problems inherent in existing injunctions and orders before creating more, and that failure to properly consult has meant that opportunities to resolve problems with the way orders operate in practice, not on paper, and to increase their effectiveness have been missed. Surely the Minister will want and feel the need to understand why research shows that a significant proportion of CPNs and PSPOs are, for example, being overused for trivial activities, such as feeding the birds, honking horns, gathering in groups or idling in your car, or imposed in inappropriate circumstances against, too often, the homeless and the mentally ill, where the behaviour complained of falls far below the threshold of antisocial behaviour that the public are concerned about and that the 2014 Act was envisaged to tackle.

All that we are asking in these amendments is for the Minister to look at what has gone wrong so that we can improve it. Surely the Government are worried about the vastly varied use of existing orders, which creates a postcode lottery for victims and means that British citizens do not know what is allowed from one town to another. Conduct that is totally lawful in Lincoln might be subject to state sanction in Leeds. Surely such a differential variation in the volume of orders imposed, the type of orders imposed, the conditions imposed, and so on, undermines the rule of law that I know this Government strongly support. It makes enforcement dependent on the victim’s location, rather than circumstances, or on the perpetrator’s location, rather than precisely how they are behaving badly. This makes a mockery of the notion of all of us being equal under the law. A review would look at these problems and recommend practical solutions.

Amendments 1 and 3, especially, are important in relation to ensuring that respect orders are used only when necessary and in a proportionate way. We have already heard about that. I think this is very helpful, particularly in creating a right to appeal. I am worried that the statutory test and the language used for imposing these new respect orders are so broad that, rather than capturing behaviour that is serious and persistent in nature, they will criminalise more trivial behaviour. That these orders can be imposed on individuals without their knowledge and, most egregiously, for an indefinite duration—for example, until further notice—is why we need this appeals process. How is it fair or proportionate that an individual who has never been found guilty of an offence is required to comply with serious restrictions on their liberty and personal life indefinitely, yet someone convicted of an offence by the criminal justice system is at liberty and free of prohibitions once they reach the end of their defined term of sentence, or even sometimes before that these days? This is reminiscent of that stain on our justice system, the abolished and abominable IPP indefinite sentence, which caused such a scandal. Why would the Government now create these new, oppressive orders that flout the important principle that if individual lives are subject to state interference, they need to know how long the interference will last and when it will end?

Finally, I have added my name to Amendment 7, an excellent contribution from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, on fixed-term penalty notices, based on the work of the Campaign for Freedom in Everyday Life. This, I hope, will ring true with any Labour Government, because ensuring that private companies dishing out on-the-spot fines for antisocial behaviour, and doing so to profit financially, is surely something that offends the Government’s values. There are concerns that antisocial behaviour orders have been corrupted for income generation and commercial purposes. With fines increasing so much under this Bill, surely that tendency will be turbocharged. I think it is something that the Government will want to tackle, because all the orders in Clause 4 being issued at such a low benchmark are likely to result in fines going up. I am worried that this will encourage councils to become trigger-happy with orders and so on.

I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Hanson of Flint, will remember, as I do, the scandal of Kingdom Security in north Wales in, I think, 2019, when councils including Conwy, Denbighshire, Flintshire, Gwynedd and Anglesey outsourced the collection of their on-the-spot fines to a private security group, Kingdom, which illustrated that the behaviour of the enforcers could well be seen as being far more anti-social than any of the behaviour of local residents for which they were supposed to be fining them. A grass-roots campaign attracted 8,000-plus members to its Facebook page and led to numerous protests all over north Wales, with the security group’s wardens accused of threatening, bullying and even stalking north Walians, following dog walkers and smokers at a distance just so they could catch them out and fine them. They expressly targeted the elderly and women and children; the tissue of one 95 year-old lady blew from her wheelchair to the ground, and she was fined.

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There is a point to be made, and if the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, wish to make it, that is fine, but this is consistent with Acts of Parliament that are currently in place on similar orders. Courts will take the necessity and proportionality of an order into account as a result of the duties that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, raised under the Human Rights Act. Therefore, it is an unnecessary procedure to amend the legal test, particularly as the effect would be to increase the threshold for the use of these orders, making the job of the police, local authorities and others in protecting communities that much harder.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Would the Minister accept that it is very difficult ever to think of circumstances in which it would be appropriate for a court to impose a respect order, with all the implications that has for an individual, unless the court is satisfied that it is necessary and proportionate?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord has made his point. I am trying to give the defence from the Government’s perspective. That is our view. He has made a reasonable point, but that is our view and I hope he accepts our comments on those issues in good faith.

On Amendment 2, I hope the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, will understand when I say that I agree with the points that he made. Amendment 2, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, is rather bureaucratic, in that the council must carry out a full public consultation prior to any application to the court for a respect order to be made.

I was leader of a council for some years. We had six or seven meetings per year. Does the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, really expect, in the event of this legislation becoming law, that the council would consider respect orders and agree them on a six or eight week basis, six times per year, before the police could go? I am with the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, on this one. Some areas undertake this as a matter of course as part of local practice, but there is no requirement for a public consultation prior to a public spaces protection order being implemented. It is certainly my and the Government’s view that such requirements would add an inappropriate and disproportionate barrier to respect order applications and delay important relief for ASB victims. I hope that, on reflection, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, will agree with His Majesty’s Opposition and me. He may not, but I put that point to him for his consideration.

Amendment 3, again tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, would add a provision for a respondent to appeal the making or variation of a respect order. I hope I can assure noble Lords that there are express provisions in the Bill that provide for an application to be made to vary or discharge a respect order. The ordinary rules of appeal will apply to decisions to grant a respect order or a refusal to vary or discharge an order. To be absolutely clear on this issue, decisions to grant or vary respect orders, as well as decisions not to grant or vary one, will be appealable through the usual avenues under Civil Procedure Rules. I hope that assists.

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington, for his Amendment 5. I know that he wished to speak to that in Committee. He seeks to add for-profit registered social housing providers to the list of relevant agencies that can apply for a respect order. I recognise the importance of relevant agencies having the tools to tackle anti-social behaviour, but we should exercise caution before extending these powers without more consideration. I say that in the spirit of friendship and co-operation with the noble Lord. The Home Secretary has a power to amend the list of relevant authorities that can apply for a respect order. If it is considered appropriate to add a for-profit registered social housing provider to the list then we can do that via secondary legislation after the Bill has achieved Royal Assent, but I would like to give more consideration to this point. This is not a “no”; it could be added later with more consideration. I hope that will at least help him in the discussions that he has had today.

Amendment 6 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, would require the Home Secretary, within six months of the Bill becoming law, to commission an independent review of the existing powers under the 2014 Act prior to introducing respect orders, housing injunctions or youth injunctions as a whole. Again, I go back to what I said to the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel. It is a manifesto commitment that we fought the election on to improve anti-social behaviour responses, and one such response that we specifically put in the manifesto at the general election was respect orders. So, the idea that we wish to—

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[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, we support the principle underlying this amendment. Serious and organised waste crime both is an environmental nuisance and has real consequences for communities and the taxpayer. As we heard from the noble Earl, Lord Russell, the Government’s own estimates say that around 20% of waste in England may be illegally managed at some stage in the supply chain, and that over a third of waste crime is linked to organised crime groups. These figures underline that waste crime is not simply limited to opportunistic fly-tipping; in many cases it is co-ordinated criminal activity driven by profit. It is therefore entirely understandable that noble Lords wish to see it recognised as a national strategic priority.

However, we have some reservations about placing such a requirement in statute. Under Section 3 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013, the Secretary of State already determines the NCA’s strategic priorities following consultation. At present there is no fixed statutory list of priorities, and to single out one specific crime type in primary legislation would be unusual. The question, therefore, is not whether waste crime is serious but whether this is the right legislative mechanism. I look forward to hearing from the Minister how the Government intend to ensure that serious and organised waste crime receives a sustained and meaningful focus.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I too have concerns about this amendment. Nobody could dispute that waste crime is a very serious problem that needs to be addressed. But as I understand it, the NCA’s strategic priorities at the moment—whether they are required by the Secretary of State or otherwise—focus on degrading the highest-harm organised crime groups, with a particular emphasis on tackling drugs, online fraud and organised immigration crime. There may be others. The NCA surely cannot treat all serious matters as a priority. The whole point of a priority is that it focuses on the most serious criminal offences that our society faces. I am not persuaded that identifying this very real problem as a strategic priority is going to assist.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Earl, Lord Russell, for his amendment. As he explained, it would allow the Secretary of State to include serious and organised waste crime as a strategic priority for the National Crime Agency. We have all agreed that waste crime blights local communities, that it damages the environment and that serious organised crime—which is on the rise—is a factor in that. The Environment Agency is now regularly alerted to new illegal waste sites.

As evidence for the noble Earl that the Government take this matter seriously, the Environment Agency’s additional waste crime enforcement budget for 2025-26 has been increased by more than 50% to £15.6 million, a £5.6 million increase on the previous year. That is because we recognise that there is a potential area of concern here. It has allowed the Environment Agency to increase its front-line criminal enforcement resource by 43 full-time staff in the Joint Unit for Waste Crime and area environmental crime teams, as well as bringing additional staff for enforcement duties under our major waste reforms.

The Environment Agency works closely, as the noble Earl mentioned, with the National Crime Agency and the Joint Unit on Waste Crime. There are multi-agency prevention and disruption tactics taking place, as well as investigatory activities to impact successfully on criminals. Between the organisations, they have developed enhanced intelligence-sharing and an enhanced approach to targeting organised criminal gangs. We are looking, with other law enforcement bodies, at recommending and introducing new technical capabilities to look at how we can, through an agreed strategy, target waste crime.

Therefore, there is a role for the National Crime Agency but, as the noble Lords, Lord Cameron of Lochiel and Lord Pannick, alluded to, the National Crime Agency is not the lead agency for tackling waste crime. That is the Environment Agency. Under the Crime and Courts Act 2013, the strategic priorities for the National Crime Agency need to reflect changing threat levels in respect of different crime types. I am pleased to see the noble Baroness, Lady May of Maidenhead, here, who would have been lead Minister on the 2013 Act that established the National Crime Agency. I served as a shadow Minister at the time, when dealing with that Bill. Section 3 of that Act is deliberately silent on types of organised crime because it does not want to fetter the National Crime Agency—the very point the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, made in relation to the Home Secretary’s discretion to skew the National Crime Agency’s priorities. Therefore, to insert a crime type, however well-meaning or needed, would be to undermine the principles of Section 3 of the 2013 Act.

In short, the Government fully agree with the sentiment underpinning the amendment. We take waste crime extremely seriously; the increase in the budget is evidence of that, as is the co-operation between the NCA and the Environment Agency. I hope that with those comments, the noble Earl will agree that his approach of tying the National Crime Agency to specific targets would not be as helpful as he had hoped and that he can withdraw his amendment.

Government Website: Registering a Death

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Tuesday 10th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful for that, and I will certainly pass it on to the appropriate authorities. For information, my own mother died a long time ago, on Christmas Day, and we had a very difficult time dealing with that, given the holiday period. The service that was provided, in that case in the Liverpool region, was exemplary, and it is important that we recognise good service when it happens. We are trying to improve the situation, as I have said to the noble Baroness. I will reflect on the points that the noble Lord has made.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, will the Minister reflect on the fact that there are serious delays not just in the registration of deaths but in the operation of coroner’s inquests? The outgoing chair of the Justice Committee at the time of the last election, Sir Bob Neill, said the committee had been told that the coroner service was “chronically under-resourced and underfunded” and that this was leading to totally unacceptable delays. Could the Minister or the noble Baroness, Lady Merron, add this to the shopping list of matters they will look at?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I feel as if I am answering for three departments today: the Department of Health, the Home Office, and now the Ministry of Justice has been thrown in. I will reflect on and share with my noble friend Lord Timpson the points that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has made. I cannot answer him today but I will certainly make sure it is looked at.

Shamima Begum

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

On the first part of my noble friend’s question, the Government are obviously deeply concerned about developments in north-east Syria. However, we welcome the agreement between the Syrian Government and the Syrian Democratic Forces to integrate military and civilian institutions, and we will continue to monitor what happens in northern Syria. Regarding Shamima Begum, my noble friend knows that I try to be helpful on these matters. However, I cannot be any more helpful than I was last time, which is to say that a process has been followed and there is further discussion in the European courts. I cannot anticipate or comment upon that matter until such time as those issues are resolved.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords—

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords—

[Captain of the Honourable Corps of Gentlemen-at-Arms and Chief Whip (Lord Kennedy of Southwark) (Lab Co-op)]

We have plenty of time. We will hear from the Cross Benches first and then from the noble Viscount.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I declare an interest as a former legal counsel of Shamima Begum—there are many of us in that position. The Minister has repeatedly stated that the existence of legal proceedings in the European Court of Human Rights prevents him answering detailed questions. I am aware of no doctrine of the European court that imposes such a restriction. Why are the Government hiding behind the European court’s proceedings to avoid answering the Question from the noble Lord, Lord Dubs?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

With due respect to the noble Lord, I am not hiding behind that. We have taken a judgment that we are in discussion on that matter in the European court with legal teams. I am not able to give a running commentary on those matters in this House. The noble Lord may not like that, but that is the position I have to give the House today.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, as one of the vice-chairs of the APPG on Counter Extremism, I support the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, in these amendments. He has already referenced the Time to Act publication, which was published late last year and deals with a number of statistics that are quite startling and deserve to go on the record today. It was found that one in five voters— 21%, actually—

“say that political violence in the UK is acceptable in some conditions, and 18% would consider participating in violent protests as the state of Britain declines”.

That is a very concerning thing to read. We know that there has been a nearly 600% rise in antisemitic incidents in the UK following 7 October 2023. We also know that anti-Muslim hate has doubled over this last decade. Those are statistics that cannot be ignored. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, outlined why she finds some difficulty with these amendments, but there is recognition in the report that extremism

“is one of the primary domestic security and societal threats facing the UK”.

When the noble Baroness was detailing some examples of extremism, the noble and right reverend Lord asked why people were not prosecuted. I would argue—and I know that the noble and right reverend Lord will recognise that I have an amendment later in the day—that the glorification of terrorism needs to be much more clearly defined in law. We will come to that later in the amendments. Defeating terrorism is not just about dealing with it from a military point of view but about dealing with the narrative around those terrorist organisations—“draining the swamp”, as the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, would put it. We are allowing glorification to continue on the streets of our country and then not recognising that extremism will grow as a result. I hope that when we come to debate that issue, there will be a good airing of the issues around the glorification of terrorism.

The first thing we need to do in this area is to recognise that there is a problem, and then to define the problem and move on to understand it and deal with it. I very much welcome these amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Goodman.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I share the concerns expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, and indeed by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, but I am very doubtful that further legislation is required. There is, as previous speakers have said, a very worrying degree of antisemitic extremist speech, particularly, I am sorry to say, in the Muslim community and not just in speeches in mosques. Opposition to the policies of the Israeli Government—opposition shared by many Jews—cannot begin to justify such speech.

The sort of people who murdered Jews in Heaton Park synagogue come from a community. They have been to school in this country. They are members of mosques. The real question is how the whole community, not only the Muslim community, is going to address this problem. I know, and the Minister will no doubt confirm, that the Government do a great deal to ensure that civic values and the lessons to be learned from the Holocaust are taught in schools, but I fear that much more needs to be done and there really is a responsibility on the leaders of the Muslim community to take further steps to ensure that those lessons are understood.

It is, as the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, said, particularly poignant that this issue is raised on Holocaust Memorial Day, and sad that these matters need to be readdressed. It is a problem in our society; it needs to be dealt with, but, as I say, I am very doubtful that legislation is the answer.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I stand to oppose the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and to suggest that it is vital that these clauses stand part of the Bill, because protest is strongest when it is open, accountable and proud. A movement that hides its face borrows the language of secrecy; a movement that stands unmasked invites public judgment and moral authority.

History teaches us that the most effective and morally persuasive movements were led openly. Emmeline Pankhurst marched into the public square and faced arrest and imprisonment without concealment, because the suffragette cause depended on moral clarity and public witness. Arthur Scargill led the miners in mass action, visible and unhidden, because solidarity is built on faces and names, not anonymity. Martin Luther King Jr stood on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial and in the streets of Birmingham with nothing to hide, because non-violence and moral authority require openness. Mahatma Gandhi led millions in acts of civil resistance with a visible, symbolic presence that made the movement impossible to ignore.

The Government’s own summary of the Bill is clear about the purpose of these measures. It refers to:

“A new criminal offence which prohibits the wearing or otherwise using of an item that conceals identity when in an area designated by police under the new provisions”.


That designation is constrained by a statutory trigger:

“A designation can only be made … when the police reasonably believe that a protest may or is taking place in that area, the protest is likely to involve or has involved the commission of offences and that a designation would prevent or control the commission of offences”.


These are targeted powers, aimed at preventing criminality while protecting lawful assembly. It is not about silencing dissent; it is about responsibility and transparency. The fact sheet also notes a practical enforcement tool:

“The bill also creates a new power for the police to require someone to remove a face covering during a protest”.


That power underlines the expectation that those who lead and speak for causes should be prepared to be seen and held to account.

I mentioned older historical protest leaders, but I can bring the Committee more up to date. Contemporary political figures continue to lead visibly. We all have tremendous respect for the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, who has led a few protests in the past. I have looked at about 50 absolutely magnificent photos of the noble Baroness protesting in Westminster and other areas. She has been at the forefront of various Green Party protests. She said that she had been protesting all her life, but I could not find any of her as a schoolgirl at the anti-Vietnam War or Aldermaston protests.

She has a varied repertoire: stop the police Bill; stop pension financing; outside the Royal Court of Justice with a banner saying “Neither Confirm Nor Deny”; stop fracking in Lancashire; stop dumping sewage, South West Water; renters’ rights; and many more—all with her trusty loudhailer. She also said that part of protest was to cause inconvenience and disruption. I suggest that the three of them on the green holding up a banner against Guantanamo Bay did not cause much inconvenience.

The serious point, as I tease the noble Baroness, is this: in every single photo, after her last 50 years of protest, she and her colleagues had their faces uncovered, demonstrating modern political leadership in public demonstrations. To all other organisations I say that, if the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, whom I admire as a conviction politician, can protest so frequently with her face uncovered, so can and should everyone else. So I say, “Go on, organisers: encourage openness, train you marshals and make sure your aims are clear”. To the police I say, “Use these powers proportionately and protect lawful assembly”. To the public I say, “Support the right to protest and expect those who lead to do so with courage and transparency”.

I conclude by saying that, when protest is unmasked, it persuades rather than intimidates; it invites debate rather than hiding behind anonymity. That is how movements achieve lasting change.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, that was a powerful speech, but it really is not the case that all protesters are in the position of Martin Luther King, Emmeline Pankhurst, Mahatma Gandhi and the noble Baroness herself. There are protesters who have good reason for wishing to conceal their identity. If I am a protester against the current regime in Tehran and join a protest in London in order to express my views, I will be genuinely and properly concerned that my identity being revealed may well lead to action being taken against my family and associates in Tehran, and I have a very good reason for not wanting to have my identity disclosed.

I am concerned that Clause 118(2) is too narrow. It provides a defence for a person who has concealed their identity: showing that the reason they are wearing a mask is for

“a purpose relating to the health of the person or others, the purposes of religious observance, or … a purpose relating to the person’s work”.

Those are the only defences. That does not cover the example I gave—I could give many other examples—of the protester concerned about what is going on in Tehran. So I suggest to the Minister that, although I do not support the wish of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, to remove these clauses, I do think she has a point about the narrow scope of the defences in the clause.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, made her point so ably that I was not tempted to speak, until I heard the counter-speech from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. It is simply ahistoric to suggest that the suffragettes—those protesters who everybody loves now but who were once incarcerated and tortured by the British state—

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

There are designations that we have set down in law and there are designations that are not set down in law, but the measure is a proportionate one that the police can undertake, and in the event of an individual knowing that that is happening, they can accordingly take their own measures and decide to either protest or not protest. That does not curtail the right to protest.

The measure does not ban face coverings at every protest. An individual can go to a protest; they can wear a face covering for the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, has outlined, and only if the police believe that criminal actions could be taken is that area designated. Then it is a matter for the individual, and I believe a majority of peaceful, legitimate protests will not be captured by this legislation, and the police must take great—

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

The Minister is making a very powerful case but I ask him to focus on the defences which he has recognised. I do not understand why it is a defence for me to show that I wore a face mask because of my religion, but it is not a defence for me to prove, the onus being on me, that I wore a face mask because I was protesting against the Iranian regime and I have family in Iran.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I hear the point that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, makes. We have drawn a line in the defences. I come back to the principle that the power to be used by the police officer, not the Government, is to determine this in the event of suspected criminality occurring.

There may not be, in the case that the noble Lord has mentioned, the need for that designation, because the police may make a judgment, which is their judgment to make, that a protest outside the Iranian embassy, for example, would not lead to potential criminal activity. That is the judgment that we are making. That is the line that we have drawn. I see the point that he has made, but that is the defence that I can put to him today. Because—

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[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I cannot tell you how much energy and self-control it has taken to stay seated, with all these interventions and comments. First, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for his very kind comments and the photographs, which have obviously brought back a lot of very nice, happy memories. I thank him for that. The other aspect to my having to exercise loads of self- control in staying sitting down is that I get very agitated —very irritated, in fact—and I scribble all over the papers I have in front of me, which sometimes makes it difficult to reply fully. I am going to do my best, and I beg the patience of the House in allowing me to go through all my scribbles.

I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Chakrabarti and Lady Fox, and the noble Lords, Lord Strasburger and Lord Marks, for their support. I am very grateful. Obviously, this is a day that will go in my diary: the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, actually agreed with something I said. That is quite rare.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I did not necessarily agree that the Baroness, Lady Jones, should be mentioned in the same sentence as Martin Luther King and Emmeline Pankhurst—I just wanted to make that clear.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

I thank the noble Lord. I would like to say, by the way, that I did go to Aldermaston, but my first real protest was in 1968 when I was 18. I went on a CND rally, and it was peaceful—at least, I think it was; I cannot remember.

It is not difficult to counter the arguments from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. He talked about my being brave enough—perhaps he did not use the word “brave”—to go to protests without a mask, but, of course, I am a highly privileged white female and he is a highly privileged white male. It is not for us to say who might be vulnerable and who might not, and who might fear reprisals and who might not. Let us remember that there are people who live in fear of other people, and those people could easily be deterred from going to protests.

On the points from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and the Minister, the fact is that the police have enough powers already. If they really are requesting this, surely the Government should have a little bit more pragmatism about what they are passing. The fact that the Minister is so happy that two Tories are supporting him is something I honestly find quite shocking. If they are the only people he can rouse to support him in your Lordships’ House, that really says something—and I do not mean for any of you to stand up and support him: it is not necessary.

On the issue of the police getting confused, because the legislation at the moment is very confused—there is so much of it—

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[Lord Pannick (CB)]

The amendments in this group are motivated by understandable concern about the decision of the Supreme Court in the Ziegler case, which is [2021] UKSC 23. The noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Faulks, made powerful submissions relating to that case.

The Committee may wish to be reminded that the Supreme Court reconsidered the statements made in Ziegler in the abortion services case, which was [2022] UKSC 32. Further guidance on the issues in Ziegler was given by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett of Maldon, as the Lord Chief Justice in the Cuciurean case, which is [2022] 3 WLR 446. The Supreme Court said, in the abortion services case, that it is not for the jury or the magistrates in each individual case to assess whether the conduct of the defendant is protected by human rights law. That was the concern, as I understand it, of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester suggested that that is highly desirable, but that is not the law.

In the abortion services case, in paragraphs 63 to 66, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reed, who is the President of the Supreme Court, spoke for a seven person Supreme Court. It was an enlarged court because of the importance of the issue. He addressed the principles. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Reed, said at paragraph 63:

“The first question was whether, in a case where the exercise of rights under articles 9 to 11 of the Convention is raised by the defendant to a criminal prosecution, there must always be an assessment of the proportionality of any interference with those rights on the facts of the individual case. The answer is no”.


In paragraph 64, he said:

“The second question was whether, where an offence is liable to give rise to an interference with the exercise of rights under articles 9, 10 or 11 of the Convention, it is necessary for the ingredients of the offence to include (or be interpreted as including) the absence of reasonable or lawful excuse in order for a conviction to be compatible with the Convention rights. The answer is no”.


Paragraph 65, says:

“The third question was whether it is possible for the ingredients of an offence in themselves to ensure the compatibility of a conviction with the Convention rights under articles 9, 10 and 11. The answer is yes”.


The position under the law is that the prosecution will say that Parliament has enacted a specific offence; that is the law of the land, and it is simply not open to the defendant to say that they are entitled to seek to overturn the ingredients of the offence by reference to convention rights. The law of the land is set out in the criminal offence. Therefore, respectfully, much of the criticism of Ziegler fails to recognise that the courts themselves have understood that Ziegler went too far, and that what Parliament has determined in relation to the law is the governing law—notwithstanding Articles 9 to 11 of the convention.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I have a couple of amendments in this group. First, I say to the right reverend Prelate that the peaceful religious processions that he had in mind, such as those at Easter, were not the sort of processions that the chief constable of Greater Manchester Police had in mind when he recently said something to the effect of him having seen an appalling increase in aggro and violence in demonstrations, and that:

“The intolerable has become normalised”.


That is quite different from the peaceful processions that the right reverend Prelate had in mind.

Before I turn to my amendments, I want to say how much I enjoyed the Minister’s winding-up speech in the previous debate. He was in absolutely top form, especially in his demolition of the noble Lord, Lord Marks. I suspect that most of the best bits in his speech were not written by his officials; I shall treasure them. I hope that I do not become a victim of such a wonderful oration against me.

I have two amendments in this group. The first is quite small, simple and titchy, and the second is slightly more complicated.

Clause 122(2) says:

“It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that they—


(a) had a good reason for climbing on the specified memorial,


(b) were the owner or occupier of the specified memorial, or


(c) had the consent of the owner or occupier”


to do so. My first amendment would delete the general excuse of having a “good reason”. The only defences left for a person charged with an offence under Clause 122 would be that they were the owner or occupier of the memorial or had the consent of the owner or occupier to climb on it. I wonder about “occupier”; I presume that that is to cover memorials that are not just statues but buildings, such as the Hall of Memory in Birmingham. I would be grateful for a slight elucidation on what is meant by the occupier of a memorial.

I turn to the proposed new clause in my Amendment 378B. It is simple in principle but looks a bit complicated. It simply reproduces the operative test, as well as the definition of “community”, in the Public Order Act 1986 (Serious Disruption to the Life of the Community) Regulations 2023 and would put them in the Bill, giving them primary law status. This would improve legal certainty and parliamentary scrutiny.

Many clauses in the Bill, and many of the amendments, speak of

“serious disruption to the life of the community”.

We may conclude from this that the disruption must be pretty serious indeed to qualify as “serious”. However, that is not the case since the previous Government passed the 2023 regulations, which defined and, some commentators would say, diluted the concept of serious disruption.

In plain terms, my proposed new clause would place in the Bill all the illustrative examples and interpretive tests introduced in the Public Order Act 1986 (Serious Disruption to the Life of the Community) Regulations. As I suggested, those regulations make amendments to provisions in the Public Order Act 1986 concerning the meaning of the expression

“serious disruption to the life of the community”.

Section 12 of the Act gives the police the power to impose conditions on people organising and taking part in public processions. A senior police officer can exercise this power if they reasonably believe that a procession may result in

“serious disruption to the life of the community”.

Serious disruption to the life of the community is not defined in the Act itself, but Section 12(2A) sets out a non-exhaustive list of examples that may constitute serious disruption.

The 2023 regulations refine that list. The amendments to Section 12(2A) and (2B) of the Act also provide that, when considering whether a public procession in England and Wales may result in serious disruption, a senior police officer must take into account the disruption that may occur regardless of whether the procession is held, as well as the disruption that may result from the procession, and may take into account the cumulative disruption that may be caused by more than one public procession or public assembly in the same area. The amendments also provide that the term “community” extends to anyone who may be affected by the public procession regardless of whether they live or work in the vicinity of the procession. They state that “disruption” is anything

“that is more than minor”,

in particular to

“the making of a journey”

or access to goods and services. The regulations define this as

“access to any essential goods or any essential service”,

including access to

“the supply of money, food, water, energy or fuel … a system of communication … a place of worship … a transport facility … an educational institution, or … a service relating to health”.

That is what the regulations say in redefining

“serious disruption to the life of the community”

in the Act. Although my amendment looks complicated, it simply suggests that those regulations should be incorporated into the Bill as primary legislation. Transferring the regulations into the Bill would bring legal clarity—the police, courts and organisers would read the statutory test directly from the Act rather than a separate statutory instrument, reducing uncertainty about where the operative tests are located. It would mirror the stated purposes of the 2023 regulations to provide greater clarity. It would bring consistency of application—putting the tests in primary legislation would reduce the risk of interpretive divergence between different SIs or guidance and make the threshold for imposing conditions more visible to Parliament and the public. The cumulative effects would be preserved—the clause could, and should, reproduce the regulations’ treatment of cumulative effects so that multiple impacts are properly captured, as the regulations already contemplate cumulative assessment.

Of course, the Minister will say that embedding illustrative examples in primary law makes future policy adjustments harder and might require primary legislation and time to respond to unforeseen operational guidance. However, I suggest that retaining my proposed new clause, to secure clarity and parliamentary oversight but add a short delegated powers safeguard—a power to change it in future by regulations—would be perfectly okay.

I support Amendment 369A on pyrotechnics at protests tabled by my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower on the Front Bench, but it does not go far enough. I cannot think of any lawful excuse for possessing pyrotechnic articles while taking part in a protest. Protests are a vital part of our democratic life. They are a place for voices to be heard, grievances to be aired and change to be sought. But they are not a place for devices that can cause panic, injury or irreversible escalation. Pyrotechnics are designed to startle, burn, explode and smoke; they are not tools of peaceful persuasion. To allow a defence based on an honestly held political belief risks turning lawful protest into a dangerous theatre of risk and fear. Public safety must be paramount.

There are a few other things I could say about pyrotechnics at protests, but I will cut short my remarks in the interests of time. I see no justification whatever for anyone to have pyrotechnics at any protest or for there to be a lawful defence for it.

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I hope that the review by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, may well assess further whether the powers existing in the 1986 Act are still fit for purpose. As I said, if there are any recommendations from the review by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, the Government will consider them, and there will be further opportunities potentially if we agree to legislate at a later date, but not within the Bill. On that basis, I invite the noble Lord, Lord Davies, in what has been an interesting, complex—

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

The Minister responded to the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, and the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, and their understandable concerns about the protests outside the Israeli-owned restaurant in Notting Hill by saying that this is a matter for the police. Have the Government no position on whether it is acceptable for people who are dining in an Israeli-owned restaurant to be subject to abuse and intimidation of the sort that we have seen on London streets?

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I am concerned a little about cumulative impact. I see that we cannot necessarily have counter demonstrations too close to each other, but I am not sure that saying “This area has had enough demonstrations for a while, they need to move somewhere else” finds the mark. I would advise being a little bit more precise, as the noble Baroness, Lady Blower, suggested, and in particular looking back at how we solved the issue around abortion clinics as a way of solving the issue of protests close to religious centres.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I join the noble Lord, Lord Polak, in thanking my noble friend Lord Walney for all his hard work and leadership in seeking to secure a fairer balance in this context. Unlike the noble Lord, Lord Hain, I positively welcome government Amendment 372, because it will ensure that the police must take account of cumulative disruption when exercising their power to impose conditions on public processions and assemblies.

The amendment will be, and is, particularly welcomed by synagogues and their members, whose access to and from Saturday prayers has been regularly disrupted by hostile, abusive and intimidating crowds of protesters. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester suggested that we should look at intention here, but whether that is the intention of the protestors, it is the effect, and it is very damaging to the right—and it is a right—of worship.

With great respect, the noble Lord, Lord Hain, should recognise that there are competing rights here. There is not just the right to protest but the right to go to a synagogue, to have access to a synagogue, to be able to leave a synagogue, and not to be deterred by hundreds of abusive protesters protesting in favour of a particular cause. The noble Lord made the point that cumulative protests may be very effective, and I am sure he is right about that in many contexts. However, the point of government Amendment 372 is not to stop protests or people expressing their view about matters of public policy. The question concerns where the protest takes place, and why it is necessary to go past the same synagogue with hundreds of people every Saturday, preventing those who wish to exercise their right of religious observance—and their right to get there and to leave—doing so peacefully and securely. Yes, protest, but you do not have to do it in the same place, along the same street, every week. The street has no significance for the protester, but it has a real significance for those who want to go to the synagogue.

The noble Lord, Lord Hain, says that the right to protest is not in conflict with the right to religious observance, and he is right. The problem arises, as here, where the protesters go along the same road each week. As I say, they do not have to go along that road; they can protest somewhere else, and that is what this amendment is concerned to achieve.

The amendment would reintroduce, with an improvement, the secondary legislation introduced by the previous Government which was held to be unlawful by the Court of Appeal in a case brought by Liberty. Contrary to what the noble Lord, Lord Hain, suggested, the secondary legislation was held unlawful by reason of matters other than cumulative disruption. The Court of Appeal did not say that the cumulative disruption provisions in the statutory instrument were unlawful. It said that other parts of the statutory instrument that sought to define the circumstances in which protest was unacceptable were unlawful, not those on cumulative disruption. Amendment 372 is an improvement on what the previous Government introduced because it imposes a duty on the police to have regard to cumulative disruption. The statutory instrument introduced by the previous Government merely conferred a discretion.

I turn to Amendments 373 to 378 from the Opposition Front Bench. I am grateful to the Opposition Front Bench for producing these amendments, which would vary the criteria in government Amendment 372 by focusing attention, for the purposes of cumulative disruption, not on the geographical area in which the public procession or assembly is repeatedly held but on whether the repeated procession or assembly concerns “the same subject matter”.

I recognise that these amendments are well motivated, but I do not support them. The vice of cumulative disruption is that it occurs repeatedly in the same geographical area—for example, in the same street near the synagogue—and causes disruption every Saturday. To focus on whether the repeated protests concern “the same subject matter” misses the point. I am also concerned that legislating with reference to the same subject matter will inevitably provoke disputes over how the police should apply such a criterion. Protesters would inevitably say that last week’s march was in support of Gaza, this week’s is against the Netanyahu Government and next week’s is against the policy of the Trump Administration. I am very doubtful that a specific reference to 50 metres, as proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Blower, and the noble Lord, Lord Hain, would suffice. It all depends on the size of the protest and the nature of the premises, does it not? This is a context where police discretion is desirable.

Finally, I have added my name to Amendment 380, tabled by my noble friend Lord Walney, which would apply the duty to take account of cumulative disruption to the power to prohibit public processions. The same reasoning that justifies the Government’s wish to require cumulative disruption to be considered in relation to the power to impose conditions also justifies a duty to take account of cumulative disruption in relation to the power to ban a public procession.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 7th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, the right to protest, like most of the rights under the European Convention on Human Rights, requires a balance. A balance is required here between the rights of protesters and the rights of others.

The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, is absolutely right. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, may not wish to recognise that, but there are other rights that need to be balanced against the rights of protesters. For her to dismiss as “nonsense” the noble Lord’s concerns will trouble many people here in this Committee, because the protester has to accept that there are other rights and interests that need to be taken into account. So, I am with the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, on this issue.

I am also unpersuaded that we need Amendment 369, which the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has eloquently advanced today. I doubt it because, as he rightly says, it echoes almost word for word what is in Article 11, read with Article 10, of the European Convention on Human Rights, which is already part of our law under the Human Rights Act. I am very doubtful that we need an express statutory provision that repeats what is already part of the law of this land.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, I draw the Committee’s attention to my interest as chair of Big Brother Watch. I will speak about Amendments 369 and 371 in the name of my colleague and noble friend Lord Marks.

Protest is the lifeblood of any vibrant democracy, and in the United Kingdom it is one of the most powerful ways for ordinary citizens to make their voices heard. Our democratic system depends not only on elections but on the active participation of the people between elections. Protest is essential because it allows us to challenge decisions, hold leaders accountable and demand change when systems seem slow or unresponsive.

Throughout our history, protest has driven meaningful progress. Universal male suffrage in Britain was pushed forward by mass movements such as the Chartists and later reform campaigns which used strikes, mass meetings and demonstrations to pressure Parliament into extending the franchise and paying MPs so that working-class men could serve. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, that I imagine those were quite inconvenient to a few people. Women’s suffrage in the UK was won by the suffragettes only after decades of marches, processions, civil disobedience and hunger strikes, culminating in the Representation of the People Act.

Peaceful protest educates the public, sparks debate and creates the pressure necessary for reform. In a healthy democracy, disagreement is not a threat but a sign that citizens care deeply about their society. However, our right to protest is, as has already been said, under relentless attack. Through the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 and the Public Order Act 2023, the previous Government introduced multiple restrictions on our precious right to protest. Then last year, the current Government found a way to further suppress peaceful demonstrations by misusing terrorism legislation to stop protests. This led to 2,700 arrests of mostly elderly people who were protesting about what was happening in Gaza. We had the bizarre sight, week after week, of police arresting vicars and old ladies in Parliament Square when they posed no threat whatever to anyone.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Can I just point out to the noble Lord, if he will allow me to, that these people were not arrested for expressing a view about Gaza? They were arrested for supporting Palestine Action, which is a violent terrorist group.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 17th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I am sorry again to rather disagree with my noble friend, although I have some sympathy with the underlying problem. I declare an interest in that I have three electric bikes, all of them, I hope, with fully approved batteries. One is the Brompton, on which I go from King’s Cross to this place—very good it is too, and, I hope, wholly safe.

There is a problem with batteries—my noble friend has addressed it—and particularly with regard to fires. Personally, I try never to charge a battery in a house, even with my bikes, which were both expensive and, I hope, very good. There is a problem with them that needs to be addressed, but the real problem with the amendment is that, other than providing the occasion for inspecting the battery, there is no obvious relationship between the criminal offences specified in the proposed new clause and looking at the battery. There is no necessary or, indeed, probable connection between the battery and the offence, so I am very much against linking those criminal offences with the inspection of the battery. Moreover, as my noble friend has said, the enforcement problems are very great here, because most or many of these batteries are bought online, and trying to identify the contract of supply would be next to impossible.

However, my noble friend is right to draw attention to the danger of batteries which are inherently unsafe, and right too to draw attention to the fact that people are disconnecting the controls on their bicycles so that they can go very much faster than the law allows. Those are matters which should be addressed by the Government, but not, I think, via this particular amendment.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, it is of course a criminal offence to ride your e-bike at more than a specified rate. I am sure that the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, when he rides any of his e-bikes, complies with those requirements at all times. But if it is already an offence to ride a bike at more than a specified speed, it must surely already be an offence to provide a battery for the specific purpose of enabling the rider to break the law. I do not understand why that is not already a criminal offence.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

I am afraid I disagree. On the roads, it is certainly an offence to use an e-bike beyond a certain speed—I think it is 15 miles an hour—but, of course, e-bikes are also used for off-road purposes, and at that point, the speed regulations are not in play.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Then the answer to the problem is to ensure that the speed limits apply whenever the e-bike is used. I fail to understand why it is a criminal offence to use your e-bike above a specified speed on the road, but not on the pavement. It seems ridiculous.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

I use one of my e-bikes to go around my fields. In fact, I do not go at more than 15 mph because, first, I would fall off; secondly, it is not necessary; and thirdly, the bike cannot do so. However, I cannot see why, as a matter of principle, I should be restrained from going at more than 15 mph on my own land.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I do not want to prolong this, but the purpose of this amendment is not to regulate the speed of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, on his field. The concern is e-bike riders on pavements, and I suggest that the answer is to ensure that people cannot ride more than a specified speed on the pavements, if at all. Of course, they are not allowed to ride on the pavement at all, so they should not be doing so. The point, surely, is that if there is a specified speed limit, it is already a criminal offence to conspire to provide a battery for the specific purpose of enabling e-bike riders to break the speed limit.

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

My Lords, we have heard some jolly clever speeches. It seems to me that the general point of this group of amendments, and indeed the previous one, is to bring this matter of great public concern to the attention of the Government during this debate. We are not now, this afternoon, looking for statutory perfection; we are looking for the Government to pay attention, and every one of us, be it my noble friend Lord Goschen walking here, or my noble friend Lord Hailsham riding at a reasonable speed from King’s Cross to this place, has our own experiences and anecdotal stories to inform the House and this debate.

I really do not think we need to get stuck in the weeds; we just need to get the Government to be a little braver. Yes, they should read out the departmental notes they have in front of them, but they should also realise that this is a matter of real and pressing public concern. The use of e-cycles by drug dealers and others, who wear the stolen uniforms of respectable companies to deliver drugs here, there and everywhere, with no lights on their bikes, wearing balaclavas and dark clothing, at night, placing themselves and other road users in danger, is a matter of deep concern. That is what we need to get across to the Government, and I hope they will take the general point on board, even if they disapprove of the niceties of the amendments tabled by my noble friends Lord Shinkwin and Lord Blencathra.

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[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his response and all noble Lords who have spoken in this short debate. I think that noble Lords and Ministers are getting the message from nearly all sides of the Committee—apart from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—that there is a real problem here that the Government are not addressing.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I entirely accept that there is mischief here. My comments were addressed at the specifics of the amendment—but I accept that there is a problem that needs to be addressed.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The Government are keen to discourage racial abuse against individuals who are doing their job, and that is what Clauses 107 to 109 do. The clauses set out in legislation a broad thrust of definitions. Ultimately, in these cases, police and health workers usually have body-worn cameras on and the police will judge evidential material to determine whether they wish to refer it to the CPS. The CPS will review the incident that has led to the potential referral and determine whether it meets the evidential threshold and is worthy of prosecution. Then, if it comes before a court, it will be for that court to determine whether that criminal threshold has been crossed.

With all that, it is not a simple matter of us passing the legislation; it is also a matter of the judgment of police officers, CPS officials and ultimately a judge or jury in determining the outcome of those cases. As with most legislation, I want none of this to go to court. I want it to change the behaviour of people who are looking at a charge of using racially abusive language not on the street but in their home. I hope it sets a minimum standard, which is what this Parliament should be about, in saying that we will not tolerate this. That is why I support the inclusion of the clauses.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

The Minister is making a very strong case as to the principle behind these clauses, as did the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. But will he address the specific concern of the Constitution Committee that the language used in these provisions—the concepts of “insulting” and “distress”—is too broad?

As he knows, the Constitution Committee concluded:

“These clauses should be drawn more narrowly and the Government should more clearly define the terminology within the Bill”.


Will the Government reflect on that before Report and come back with a more precise definition in these provisions?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. As ever, we will reflect on what has been said. The judgment we have made is as in the clauses before this House, as introduced and supported by the House of Commons. There will be opportunity, if the noble Lord so wishes, to table amendments on Report to reflect any view that he has, but this is the judgment we have made.

The principle of today’s discussion is that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, believes we should strike out these clauses. That is not a principle I can accept—I am grateful for the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, on that. Whatever reflection takes place on this, our principle is that we have included these clauses for a purpose, which I hope I have articulated, and I wish for the Committee to support that principle.

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[Lord Deben (Con)]

My Lords, I have not taken part in this Bill before, but I do so now because I have been closely connected with someone who was treated by a so-called psychotherapist and removed from her family as a result. These people do something almost inconceivable. They get inside people’s minds and teach them totally false memories, so they begin to imagine that their parents have abused them and behaved in appalling ways which are entirely untrue. They believe it and as long as they go on with the so-called therapy, they are imprisoned by these wicked people.

This is done for two reasons: money and control. I very much agree with what has just been said, but I do not wish that to be yet another excuse for not accepting this amendment. There are far too many people in this country being destroyed for money and power by wicked people, and our law does not protect them. We have now discussed this so often, so long and so convincingly that frankly, I want to beg the Minister: please do not be another Minister who finds a reason for not doing this. Because if so, he allows yet more young people to have their lives destroyed by some of the most evil people I have ever come across.

I think my contribution was worth while, not just because I have personal and direct connection with someone who was in this condition, but because I want to assure the House that there is no need to worry on a religious ground. I think I am known to have very strong religious views, and I do not think this is going to cause problems for any legitimate religious organisation. There may be some problems from some pretty illegitimate religious organisations such as the Moonies and the Scientologists, but the truth is these people work on their own. They are individuals and they do this for money. I beg the Minister not to let this chance go to protect the most vulnerable young people.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

The noble Lord, Lord Marks, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and the other speakers have established that there is a very real mischief here. My concern is about the width of this amendment. If it is going to be brought back on Report, either by the Minister or by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, it really needs to be more specific. It is very broad in the concepts it uses, such as the concept of “psychological harm” and whether

“the behaviour was in all the circumstances reasonable”.

It seems to me that the mischief here is people who provide psychotherapy or counselling services in bad faith or dishonestly, and we need to have an amendment which more specifically addresses that mischief. The French legislation to which the noble Lord, Lord Marks, referred was much more specific and tailored than what we have here.

[Baroness Gohir (CB)]

My Lords, I was not going to speak on this amendment, but the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, have inspired me to speak. I support the amendment and would add another set of people who do exactly the same: spiritual faith healers. They do coercive and controlling behaviour and target the most vulnerable. They do all the things mentioned. In certain minority ethnic communities, they will target vulnerable women, for example, and take large amounts of cash from them. I do not expect noble Lords to amend this proposed new clause to add those sets of people, because they obviously want to maximise their chances of getting their clause through, but they have inspired me to think about replicating their amendment and perhaps proposing it for future legislation. So the Minister can expect a letter from me to discuss this further—which also amounts to spiritual abuse.

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[Baroness O’Grady of Upper Holloway (Lab)]

My Lords, I add my support for these probing amendments and I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, for her work on this issue. I strongly welcome the Government’s promise to launch the largest crackdown in history to reduce violence against women and girls. While of course the misery of experiencing violence and harassment is not exclusive to women, surveys from the TUC and others have shown that it is overwhelmingly women who suffer this abuse. I also welcome the Government’s recognition that we need a whole-system approach that places prevention and survivors at its heart. As we have heard already, every part of society has to step up if we are to achieve the goal of every woman feeling safe everywhere, and that must include action to make the workplace a place of safety for women, too.

I had hoped that we had moved on from the notion that violence against women is somehow a private or domestic matter, but let us take the practical example of the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations. This is the UK’s health and safety law that requires employers to report specific serious work-related incidents, such as fatalities and major injuries, to the Health and Safety Executive. These reports help the HSE track risks and prevent future harm, making it a vital legal duty to maintain workplace safety and accountability. But, if you look at it today, you see that the HSE website explicitly states that, while acts of violence to a person at work that result in death or a major injury are reportable, a physical injury inflicted on one employee by another during a dispute about a so-called “personal matter”, or an employee at work

“being injured by a relative or a friend who visits them at work about a domestic matter”

is not reportable. So, the HSE has no responsibility to track violence against women that happens in the workplace which is deemed to be a personal or domestic matter. I find that pretty shocking. You have to question why women’s experience of violence at work is disregarded in this way.

As we have also heard, the Equality and Human Rights Commission has responsibility for the duty on employers to prevent sexual harassment, but it is open and public that it will investigate only what it describes as “strategic cases”, as it simply does not have adequate resources to deliver comprehensive enforcement. Surely, health and safety inspectors who have the powers and ability to go into workplaces have a role to play in enforcing prevention of sexual harassment.

The UK has fallen far behind the ILO’s recommended standard for the ratio of labour inspectors to the size of workforce. In effect, the safety and welfare of British workers has been deprioritised over the last decade and more compared with other countries. But it seems that the safety and welfare of women workers have been deprioritised even more. There is an opportunity for an update and a reset. The new fair work agency and boosting the number of labour inspectors will be vital, but we must get the health and safety framework right, too. For the sake of women workers, I hope the Minister will talk to other colleagues, for sure, but also give careful consideration to the amendments before us.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I too support the objective of Amendment 348—who would not support the objective of preventing illegal violence and harassment in the workplace? I suspect that the main argument against Amendment 348 will be the burden that it would impose on employers, particularly small ones, and the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, made that point very eloquently.

I will briefly identify one reason why it is very much in the interests of the employer to have these duties. It is because if there is illegal violence and harassment in the workplace which causes, as it will, damage to the victim, she—and it normally will be she—will be looking for remedies, and the person against whom she is most likely to be advised to sue is not the rogue other employee but the employer. The employer is particularly vulnerable to such a civil claim if they have not, as required by Amendment 348—which no doubt can be improved in its drafting—conducted any sort of assessment to identify potential risks, have not implemented policies and procedures to eliminate those risks, and, in particular, have not provided at least basic training to all employees on the importance of these matters. So, yes, this will impose a burden on employers, particularly small ones, but it is very much in their interests to protect themselves against legal liability and to deter such action taking place.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, these amendments ask employers not only to react when something goes wrong but to look ahead, identify the risks and take sensible steps to prevent harm before it happens. That is especially important for women and those in insecure or public-facing roles, who we know are more likely to be targeted and less likely to feel safe reporting what has happened to them.

The statistics are damning. There were nearly 700,000 incidents last year alone, with attacks on lone workers surging by 132% over three years. We strongly support the aim of these amendments; however, as we did previously, we have questions around how a duty to eliminate risks, so far as reasonably practicable, would work in small businesses on tight margins. Layering new mandates on top of existing duties under the Equality Act and employment law risks confusion, which could dilute accountability. This is not an argument against doing more, but a practical issue which needs to be addressed.

There is also a wider cultural point. Legislation can set clear expectations, but workers will be safer only if staff feel confident to report incidents and these reports lead to action, not to victims being sidelined or blamed. Training, confidential reporting routes and proper follow-up, all mentioned in the amendments, are not extras; they are essential if any new duty is to change what has sadly become everyday reality for many people just trying to do their jobs.