(9 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the Government have tabled this amendment to provide that civil legal aid may be made available at hearings of applications to extend the 14-day time period in which an individual’s travel documents may be retained in England and Wales. This issue was raised by my right honourable friend Dominic Grieve in Committee on 15 December and it is a matter in which the Joint Committee on Human Rights has expressed an interest.
Legal aid for judicial review is already available in England and Wales, subject to the statutory means and merits test, including for legal challenge by those subject to the temporary passport seizure power. However, this amendment is necessary to ensure that, subject to the means and merits test, civil legal aid may be made available in relation to applications to extend a temporary passport seizure to a district judge—magistrates’ courts— in England and Wales, as set out in paragraph 8 of Schedule 1 to the Bill.
The Scottish Government have confirmed that civil legal aid is already available in Scotland under the Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 1986. The secondary legislation which sits under that may require some amendment and that will, of course, be taken forward through the Scottish Parliament. We are speaking to the devolved Administration in Northern Ireland about whether civil legal aid is already available there, subject to the statutory means and merits test, for individuals subject to the power in that jurisdiction. If an amendment is necessary to cover the availability of legal aid in Northern Ireland, we will bring one forward in due course.
Amendment 1 will amend Schedule 1 to the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, or LASPO for short. It will add the provision of legal aid in the proceedings set out in paragraph 8 of Schedule 1 to the Bill as a form of civil legal services for which legal aid may be made available in England and Wales. The matters covered are subject to all the exclusions set out in part 2 of Schedule 1 to LASPO. The amendment also ensures that advocacy before a district judge—magistrates’ courts—may be included in the civil legal aid that may be made available for these proceedings by amending Part 3 of Schedule 1 to LASPO.
The amendment does not alter the statutory means and merits test, nor does it make civil legal aid available for any other civil legal services in England and Wales. The Government consider that an amendment to the scope of the civil legal aid scheme in England and Wales is appropriate in these circumstances due to the important nature of the proceedings set out in paragraph 8 of Schedule 1 to the Bill, the limitations on an individual’s ability to present their own case in these circumstances and the absence of an alternative route to resolution. I beg to move.
My Lords, as the Minister has said, the amendment provides for legal aid for proceedings before a district judge in the light of an application for an extension of the 14-day period. We fully support the Government’s change of heart on this point about legal aid. As the Minister mentioned, the amendment states that its provisions are subject to the exclusions in Parts 2 and 3 of Schedule 1 to the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. So that we are clear on exactly what those exclusions mean, it would be helpful if the Minister could clarify what their impact would be in reality, in respect of legal aid being provided, or not, in applications for an extension of time for retention of travel documents, which is the issue covered by the amendment.
My Lords, I shall try to deal with the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, although I acknowledge that I do not have a specific heading relating to it and I may have to write to him to expand on it. Currently, the availability of legal aid depends mainly on where the proceedings or legal processes are taking place, which is related to the point made by my noble friend Lady Hamwee. In general, if the proceedings or processes are taking place in England and Wales, the individuals involved can apply for civil legal aid so long as the matter is within the scope of the LASPO merits and means tests. The noble Lord asked about that precise issue and how that will be applied. If notes are not able to reach me by the time I sit down, I will put that in writing.
We will come to the other point made by my noble friend Lady Hamwee in more detail in later groupings. What we are talking about here is the first period where the issue of the temporary seizure of a passport comes before the courts, what representation is made, how it is funded and how it is made available. There is not a legal process before that, which is a matter that can be debated later on and we will have responses to it later on. We are talking here about the 14-day point at which it comes before the court for approval to extend the period of seizure up to 30 days. With those explanations and the assurance that I will come back to this matter, I hope that the amendment will be agreed.
Can the Minister also tell us now, or at a later stage, whether sunset clauses were imposed by the then Labour Government in the anti-terrorism Acts of 2000 and 2001 and, if so, what the terms were?
My Lords, we have had a very good, short debate on this, with a lot of contributions that in many ways highlight the difficulties that there are in this area when it comes to reaching any common ground as to what the position should be. I am grateful for the two amendments which have been introduced calling for a sunset clause on Chapters 1 and 2, and will outline the Government’s position on this. As was touched on before, it cannot of course be about whether this is a matter of principle, because clearly it is something that the Government have looked at in respect of other chapters of the Bill.
I will give the Committee the reasons why we have come to the position that we have on these particular amendments. The problem that we are seeking to address with these powers is not of a short-term nature—a point very well made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. We do not know how long it is going to be there for or how the threat that we are facing might mutate into different fields and theatres. From that point of view, we felt that having a set date and time on which those powers fall would send the wrong signal. I will come back to the reasons for that. Terrorism-related travel is a serious and ongoing issue, and we can expect the threat posed by British citizens returning from fighting alongside terrorist groups abroad to be present for many years to come. It is important that our law enforcement agencies are equipped to protect the British public from individuals who pose a risk.
Amendment 2 seeks to introduce a sunset clause to the temporary passport provisions. It would ensure that the power would be repealed in two years’ time, unless both Houses pass a resolution that it should continue. The precautions we have established should ensure that the temporary passport seizure power will be used in a fair, reasonable and lawful manner. They are aimed at striking the right balance between our civil liberties—which the right reverend Prelate was absolutely right to focus on—and our right to safety and security, which a number of noble Lords, including my noble friend Lady Buscombe, referred to. The House of Commons considered these factors very carefully, as your Lordships have, and it came to an overwhelming view that it did not feel that a sunset clause was necessary in relation to Chapter 1.
Amendment 55 would introduce a sunset provision to the temporary exclusion power in Chapter 2 of Part 1. Your Lordships will be aware that the Government have tabled amendments to introduce strong judicial oversight of the use of this power. The courts will have a number of opportunities to review whether each temporary exclusion order is imposed appropriately and to ensure that the power is used proportionately against individuals suspected of terrorism. In the light of these strong safeguards on the use of both the temporary passport seizure power and the temporary exclusion power, the Government do not think that it is necessary to bring the power to an end after two years. Indeed, introducing sunset clauses to these powers in two years might, as my noble friend Lord Carlile said, inadvertently send the wrong message to would-be jihadist travellers by suggesting that we lack the intent to deal with the threat that they pose to us.
There are two points here. I reflect on the views and the great experience that my noble friend Lady Warsi has in this area through her excellent work in office. She led for the Government on this, and therefore I listened very carefully to what she said about civil liberties, but there are two sides to this. There is of course the side that deals with the ability of people to travel, and the disruption of travel, which effectively is what we are talking about here. Measures are available under the royal prerogative, under which a passport is not seized but can actually be cancelled, and there is no sunset clause and no basis of appeal for these measures. Under the Terrorism Act 2000, too, there are powers to disrupt and deal with passports. Again, they are not subject to a sunset clause.
Does the Minister not accept that there is a difference between the judicial oversight, on which he laid some emphasis, and the political oversight that comes from having a sunset clause? Her Majesty’s justices can take only certain legal considerations into their protection of legislation. They cannot consider the wider political considerations that bear upon the matter in hand. Does he see the distinction?
I see the distinction between the issues—as did the other place and the Constitution Committee. But in this area, we believe that a sunset clause is not necessary in relation to this chapter of the Bill. In other parts, such as Part 2, when we will come to TPIMs, the sunset clause is there. It is not a general principle written through the Bill; we are looking at this area by area, and we remain open to advice from your Lordships’ House, Parliament and the independent reviewer as to what their thoughts are on the necessity of that.
People have not happened upon the sunset clause up to now because they have found it too difficult to arrive at a precise point for where the amendment should be. Should it be at two, three or four years? We have heard a range of different discussions. It remains there, open to review, and the procedures will be subject to regulations, which will give rise to further debate and scrutiny, but it is not appropriate to offer a fixed and arbitrary time limit for this chapter of the Bill.
I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. I have not been sitting here counting up the numbers but I have a feeling that there was rather more support for the general thrust of my amendment than opposition to it. Obviously, I am grateful to the Minister for saying that he will take away what has been said today and reflect further on it—without, I accept, making any commitment to come back with a change—and I am grateful to him for saying that he will look at the matter in the light of the comments that have been made today.
I have to say that I find a little odd the Minister’s comment at the end that the problem was—at least this is how it came over to me—how long should it be before the powers cease unless they are continued by affirmative resolution of both Houses? I have been asked the question; I am not wedded to two years. If it is possible to have discussions and come to an agreement on another period that might gain wider support, the issue at stake is that there should be, after a certain period, a look at whether we still need these powers in force, in view of the fact that they are quite significant new powers. If the issue that the Government have is determining the appropriate length of time—because, after all, not to put anything in the Bill in a sense determines a period of time; that is, there is no review at all—I hope that the Minister will be willing to have discussions on that point.
We have already had different views expressed about the message that the powers ceasing to continue after a certain period, unless renewed, sends. I am afraid I rather subscribe to the view that the message that it sends if you do not have it in is that these powers could continue, metaphorically speaking, for ever and a day, although I appreciate that another view has been expressed that they might be seen as a sign of weakness on our part. As I say, that is not a view to which I subscribe. I do not think that reviewing the need for the continuation of these powers is a sign of weakness at all because obviously there is a distinct possibility that in looking at the situation one might decide that the powers should be renewed.
We have also had a discussion about the role of the independent reviewer, which presumably will be discussed in the next group of amendments. Of course, the issue of the sunset clause covers the question of the current worsening of the security situation, with people from this country going abroad, apparently to engage in acts of terrorism, and subsequently returning. That involves the two issues we are talking about: passports and temporary exclusion orders. I say only to the Minister that within not too long a period of time—although I am flexible about what that should be—the problem arising from people going from this country to engage in terrorism and seeking to return may be a lesser problem than it is now, as opposed to other issues related to terrorism still being fairly high up the list.
That is what the proposed sunset clause deals with: specifically, people going from this country to engage in terrorism and subsequently coming back. It is because we consider it a problem at present that we are talking about and supporting the powers in the Bill. But it is conceivable that, over not too long a period, that specific point may not be the problem it is at the moment, and we ought to have some powers in the Bill to be able to reflect on whether the case is still there for continuing the powers that we are talking about today.
As I say, I am grateful to the Minister for agreeing to reflect further and to all noble Lords who have taken part in the discussion. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, we have Amendment 16 in this group. Paragraph 4 of Schedule 1 deals with authorisation by a senior police officer for retention of a travel document. The travel document could, of course, be a non-UK passport. The purpose of our amendment, which provides for the relevant embassy to be informed immediately if a travel document is being retained, is to ascertain how the Government intend to manage the seizure of non-UK travel documents and the individual concerned, including where there is dual nationality.
Bearing in mind that the individual in question, who will presumably be a foreign national, will be unable to leave this country for a period of time, who or what will be informed of this who would not have been so informed if the individual in question was a British national with a British passport? If the country of which the individual concerned was a national became aware, or was made aware, that the passport had been retained and travel denied, would we, if that country so requested, prevent the individual travelling until it had carried out and implemented the kind of measures and procedures which we are providing for under the temporary exclusion orders?
If we were satisfied that the foreign national in question whose passport had been retained was seeking to go to another country, which was not their own, for purposes associated with terrorism, what action might we take? Would we consider legal proceedings against them in this country; would we deport them back to their own country; or would we allow them subsequently to continue on their way to wherever it was they were going?
This is very much a probing amendment to find out how the Government would manage the situation, or what actions they would take in relation to the seizure of non-UK travel documents and the individual concerned. I hope that the Minister will clarify some of the issues that I have raised, as well as those raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friends Lady Hamwee, Lord Thomas and Lady Ludford for tabling Amendment 5 and for providing advance notice of their amendments. The debate on this group has also concerned Amendment 16, tabled by the Opposition, and to which the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has spoken. I will seek to address the issues that both amendments raise.
Amendment 5 would amend the definition of a passport to exclude,
“a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom”.
It would prevent police officers and designated Border Force officers exercising the power against individuals travelling on a foreign passport. This would mean that the police could not use this power to disrupt the travel of foreign nationals they reasonably suspected to be travelling overseas for terrorist-related activity. In the case of British citizens with dual nationality, the amendment would have the effect that the person’s British passport could be seized but their foreign passport could not. I accept the probing nature of the amendment, and I am sure that my noble friend is aware of that point but is seeking to elicit further information and reassurances.
The increasing number of people leaving the UK and Europe for the purpose of engaging in terrorism-related activity overseas—and returning with enhanced terrorist-related capabilities—means that we need proportionate powers to counter the real threat that we face from terrorism at home and abroad. This power will send out a robust message to anyone considering travelling to and from the UK for the purpose of involvement in terrorist activities.
It would not be appropriate—indeed, it may unlawfully discriminate against British citizens—if the police were able to use this power against British citizens suspected to be travelling overseas for terrorist-related activity but unable to use this power to disrupt the travel of foreign nationals. The power therefore applies to British citizens and foreign nationals, including European Economic Area nationals. Databases at a port would be updated to disrupt any further attempts at travel for the period in which the travel documents have been retained.
Passports are the property of the issuing authority—my noble friend sought clarification on this—and it is an International Civil Aviation Organisation, ICAO, standard for the issuing authority to be shown on the passport. There is no legal requirement to inform other issuing authorities when passports are seized or surrendered in other circumstances, such as to meet bail conditions. That would be the same for a British national in another country subject to similar actions.
Amendment 16 would require the police to inform the relevant embassy or high commission if the police exercised the power at Schedule 1 against their country’s citizens. If a foreign travel document is seized under this power, we will consider whether to notify the Government concerned on a case-by-case basis. In some cases, there could be concerns about the consequences for an individual if information like that is made available. Individuals affected can, of course, if they choose, seek consular assistance from their Government’s representatives here.
Foreign Governments are not routinely notified when their passports are seized or surrendered in other circumstances, such as under Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000, when a passport can be held for up to seven days for examination purposes, or when an individual subject to a terrorism prevention and investigation measure is prohibited from possessing a travel document.
My noble friend Lady Hamwee asked about the definition of travel documents. Our definition is anything that is or appears to be a passport, ticket or another document that permits a person to make a journey by any means from within the UK to outside the UK. It would include, for example, a boarding pass. A passport means a UK passport or a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom or by or on behalf of an international organisation or a document that can be used in some or all circumstances instead of a passport.
I was asked whether the power applied to diplomatic passports. Under international law and treaty diplomats may enjoy certain immunities. This power cannot be used to breach one of those. I think that is fairly clear.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked whether we would return a foreign national’s passport to their country, if it was requested. Passports are the property of the issuing authority, as I have already mentioned. There is no legal requirement to inform issuing authorities when passports are seized or surrendered. If the issuing authority requested it to be returned, we would consider whether it was appropriate to do so. In most circumstances we would expect to return it unless it was required, for example, as evidence in connection with a prosecution.
I have tried to answer the points of what I know were probing amendments. I hope with those bits of explanation and justification my noble friend will feel free to withdraw her amendment.
I wonder whether the Minister can help me. It just occurred to me, as I was listening to him, about a foreign national who is in transit through this country. Is this power exercisable to remove the passport of a foreign national who is simply passing through this country with a view to going to a further destination?
I will check this, because it is a very important matter, but intuitively my belief would be that the answer is yes, because they would be in the United Kingdom and they would be reasonably suspected by the authorities or the police of intending to travel overseas from this country for terrorist-related activities. I will check on that and if it is not the case I will write to the noble Lord.
My Lords, I think there may be different types of transit. There are certainly some instances in an airport where you pass through and do not actually go through immigration control. You are simply passing from one airline service to another and you bypass the place where the police officer would be to seize your passport. Other people in transit may have to remain for a while, possibly because they want to see somebody or collect luggage. It may well be that the noble Lord is entirely right that in that situation, because you are confronted by a constable with the power, the power would be exercisable —so it may depend very much on the circumstances of the individual traveller.
I agree and I shall seek clarification on that. It may also be the case that the power is triggered when someone on a no-fly list comes in, even though effectively they are not entering UK territory. However, when they arrive in the UK, they have to present their passport and travel documents—and, as I argued in my answer, at that point I would expect any action to be taken. Again, these are very important points and I will check with the authorities on how this will work in practice. It is probably covered in the draft code of practice on the seizure of passports, which is currently out for review. If so, I will certainly make sure that those views are noted as part of the consultation process.
The answer may be that the powers apply in the case of a person at a port in Great Britain. That is at paragraph 2 of Schedule 1, and “port” is defined in paragraph (1)(8) as including “an airport”. From that, my understanding is that if you are at the airport, whether on the land side or the air side, the power will exist. However, I should be very grateful if the noble Lord could write with the answer to all noble Lords who are interested in this matter.
That seems to be excellent legal advice and I am sure that it is absolutely correct. Certainly we will review it and, if that is not the case, we will write.
My Lords, the point about not passing through immigration control occurred to me as well as noble Lords were speaking. Then my mind turned to the question of what would happen if someone was travelling on one passport but carrying the passport of another country and switched half way through the journey. All this goes to the workability of these provisions, which is really the overarching question that noble Lords are asking. I do not think that I am alone in finding it a little difficult to imagine quite how the powers will operate in some circumstances.
It is not always easy to probe something without suggesting the opposite of what one intends. There is another example of that coming up shortly. So the noble Lord is right: I was not trying to take the words out but merely probing.
I am not sure—I may have missed it—whether the Minister referred to international organisations other than quoting what is in the schedule. Perhaps I may look at that after today and, if necessary, have another word with him. It looks as though I may not need to withdraw the amendment quite yet.
I am just looking for help in order to answer my noble friend Lady Hamwee. The answer that I gave on diplomatic immunity was that, under international law and treaties, diplomats may enjoy certain immunities, and this power could not be used in breach of those. Therefore, that is clear. In relation to the point that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, raised on transit passengers, my briefing note says, reassuringly, “Yes, your answer was accurate”. That is helpful. There may be cases where it is appropriate to use this power against transit passengers and, in practice, these will mostly occur following prior information provided to the police about an individual’s intention to travel. The power can be exercised both air side and land side, including against passengers who do not present at immigration control. I hope that that is helpful to noble Lords.
My Lords, this has been a substantial debate, which is not surprising because there are 24 amendments in the group. I will run through a full response and then address in particular the key concerns and comments which were made. They have been particularly helpful because they provide an opportunity to flesh out the workability of the options before us.
This debate is about judicial oversight of the temporary passport seizure power. I am grateful to noble Lords whose amendments we are considering and all those who contributed their expertise—very deep expertise in the case of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, who has experience of the judgments in which he has taken part and has written.
These amendments cover a number of areas including: requiring the police to inform a person of the reasons his or her travel documents are being seized; allowing an individual to make representations at the point of seizure; creating a statutory right for the person whose travel documents have been seized to appeal the police officer’s decision to a court; and reducing the initial period of retention from 14 days to seven days. I reassure noble Lords that the power is already subject to considerable safeguards proportionate to the level of interference. Safeguards already in place will ensure that, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, sought, this power will be exercised in a fair, reasonable and lawful manner and in a responsible and proportionate way. Crucially, individuals can already challenge the exercise of this power, if they choose to do so, by seeking a judicial review. Given the safeguards and constraints on the use of the power, we believe it is the appropriate form of court scrutiny to which the exercise of the power should be subject.
Let me briefly summarise for the Committee the safeguards that we already envisage. The decision to exercise this power will be made by a trained police officer and subject to authorisation by a senior police officer of at least the rank of superintendent who must be satisfied that the test for exercise of the power was met. If the travel documents are still being retained 72 hours after they were seized, a police officer of at least the rank of chief superintendent must carry out a review of that decision and communicate his findings to the relevant chief constable, who must consider and take appropriate action.
Unless a court agrees to extend the retention period, the police may retain the travel documents for a maximum of 14 days from the day after the documents were seized. This timescale has been set deliberately. The investigation should have progressed to the extent that a court can meaningfully consider whether the investigation into whether there are grounds for further action to be taken is being conducted diligently and expeditiously, and the evidence heard should be tailored to the case being considered. A statutory code of practice for police and Border Force officers, which is currently open for consultation, will make provision for how officers are to exercise the powers and guard against any risk of improper use.
I have listened to today’s debate and noted the implication that taking a passport for up to a maximum of 30 days is an infringement of liberty equivalent to detaining an individual in a police cell. Indeed, the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, to name an extension of the seizure period a “warrant of further retention” seeks to draw that exact analogy. Even if we were not facing the threat that we are from foreign fighters, I hope that noble Lords will agree that this is not an appropriate analogy. Individuals subject to this power will remain at liberty. During the period that the police hold that person’s passport, the police and others would work diligently to investigate the situation further.
As the Bill stands, there is a clear threshold that must be met to justify the exercise of the power, and it can be used only at a port or border. The police are not empowered to detain the individual or remove his or her passport privileges permanently under this power. The legislation places a statutory duty on the police to return the travel documents as soon as possible if their investigations do not substantiate grounds to support further action being taken in respect of the person. In the light of the extensive nature of those safeguards, the Government believe that the changes proposed in these amendments are not necessary given the relatively limited impact of the power, and the amendments could have the unintended consequence of inhibiting its use. In other circumstances where a police officer forms a reasonable suspicion about an individual’s activities, there is no automatic court hearing to challenge his or her decision.
I hope that noble Lords will see that while a number of these amendments are helpful on the face of things, they could be damaging to national security if the police are required to justify their reasons for reasonable suspicion. To consider what information can be disclosed without prejudicing national security can take time and cannot be rushed. The use of reasonable suspicion as an evidential standard is used in relation to many other police powers, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, said. What constitutes reasonable suspicion will depend on the circumstances in each individual case. There must be an objective basis for the constable’s state of mind based on the facts, and it must be specific to the personal conduct of the person.
Although we cannot deal with hypothetical cases such as the one I was invited to comment on by my noble friends Lord Thomas and Lady Warsi, I can say that evidence will come to the police officer from many different sources. The point is that he must have reasonable suspicion and reasonable grounds for his suspicion that something is wrong. I know that in many cases the people most concerned to ensure that the individual does not travel abroad are the individual’s family and friends, who care for them, so information may come from that source. In some circumstances it may come from other sources, which we would want to take great care to protect. That is why we have this test in place at present; I will come to some of the specifics in a minute.
Under Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000, to which my noble friend Lady Ludford referred, people may be questioned by the authorities for the purpose of determining whether they appear to be persons who are or have been concerned in terrorism without any prior suspicion, and anything found on them, including their passports, can be retained for up to seven days for examination purposes. Under Schedule 7 there is neither a statutory right of appeal nor an automatic court review of passports permanently cancelled under the royal prerogative. If the police apply to the court to extend the retention period of the passport, they will issue a notice to the individual informing him or her of the reasons for the seizure and retention of the travel documents, provided that that information did not prejudice national security. The information provided will enable a person to understand why they are under investigation and will help the court—if the police apply to extend the retention period—to consider whether the case is being considered diligently and expeditiously. Your Lordships should also be aware that a person subject to this power is not prevented from making representations at any time, including at the point of seizure.
Due to the nature of the appeal or review envisaged in a number of these amendments, the court would need to provide for closed material proceedings with the appointment of special advocates. As the House will know, closed material proceedings are resource intensive and it would be challenging for such a hearing to take place within that initial seizure period. Indeed, by the time it is heard the travel documents might already have been returned or alternative disruption action have been taken.
A number of the amendments sought to reduce the initial seizure period to seven days. The 14-day period was set following consultation with the police; by that point the investigation should have progressed to the extent that a court can meaningfully consider whether the investigation into whether there are grounds for further action to be taken is being conducted diligently and expeditiously, and the evidence heard should be tailored to the case being considered.
As I previously outlined, the Government have established rigorous and stringent measures to ensure that this power will be used in a fair, reasonable and lawful manner, that the 14-day retention period is proportionate to the level of interference, and that safeguards are already in place to ensure that travel documents are not retained any longer than absolutely necessary.
Let me just deal with some specific points raised in the debate. First of all, the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, raised the issue of judicial oversight and review. In a judicial review, the court will consider whether the police officer’s decision was reasonable and in compliance with the public law and human rights principles. It will not substitute its own view on whether the test was met. However, the level of scrutiny is a high one and appropriate to this power. When we are dealing with closed material procedures, special advocates and gisting, on the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, raised, the Justice and Security Act provides the basis by which closed material procedures could be used in such a judicial review challenge. The police may apply to the judge for an order to exclude an individual or representatives from the court hearing. The Bill sets out the circumstances in which this may happen—for example, if evidence of an offence under the Terrorism Act would be interfered with or harmed. The court is not examining the police officer’s decision to seize the travel documents; there is no explicit provision for special advocates to be appointed. However, case law suggests that magistrates would have jurisdiction to appoint special advocates if considered appropriate or necessary.
The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, raised a couple of questions at Second Reading, and I am sorry that I did not get around to responding to them then, but I shall try to do so now. She asked, quite reasonably, why we could not use Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000. That schedule and this power have different tests and focus on different things. Schedule 7 is a no-suspicion test that focuses on the commission, preparation and instigation of terrorist offences. Any documents can be retained for seven days for the purposes of examination only. This new power has a reasonable suspicion test, and only travel documents can be retained for up to 14 days in the first instance. That is because the purpose, as we have set out, is that this is disruptive; it seeks to disrupt the travel plans of somebody who is reasonably suspected of travelling abroad for the purposes of terrorism-related activity.
The noble Baroness also asked about the rolling renewal of an extension. The power is exercised for 14 days initially and can be extended—so documents may be retained for up to 30 days with the permission of a court. The power cannot be renewed beyond 30 days because, at the end of that time, some alternative course of action might be taken. It might be a TPIM or a prosecution of some type, but the travel documents cannot be retained for longer than 30 days.
I have tried to address most of the issues raised. I shall deal with the particular, formal response about reasonable grounds, on the point raised by my noble friends Lord Thomas and Lady Warsi. It is for the police officer to decide whether he or she has a reasonable suspicion on which to exercise the power. Police officers are familiar with making decisions to this threshold. A request from another state would not be sufficient for a police officer to form a reasonable suspicion for him or herself—but, of course, we have intelligence-sharing arrangements with other states, and they may provide information to a level that would be sufficient for a UK police officer to form a reasonable suspicion about the individual’s travel intentions. In the consultation document that has been referred to, on page 8, there is a very detailed setting out, as noble Lords would expect, of what constitutes reasonable suspicion. Of course, extensive training would be given to those who would exercise that very serious power—I accept that is the point being made—before it is actually used.
With those assurances and explanations, I ask the noble Lord to consider withdrawing his amendment.
My Lords, I realise that there is plenty of material in the Minister’s response for us to read and think about. However, at the start of his response, he said that an officer should not have to justify his suspicion. I wondered whether he was equating that with gisting, which was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and others, because I do not think that they are the same thing. If he does not want to commit to answering that point now, perhaps I may have a word with him about that between now and the next stage.
I am happy to expand further on that but, effectively, the justification I referred to was that the police officer would have had to have arrived at a position where he believed that there was a reasonable suspicion, and that the reasonable grounds test had been met. He would then have to justify that to a senior officer of the rank of superintendent or above and then, after 72 hours, that would have to be a chief superintendent and it would have to go to the chief constable, so it was in that setting that I was referring particularly to the justification rather than gisting.
I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate and thank the Minister for his very full reply which, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has already commented, will probably need to be read through fairly carefully in Hansard to make sure that the different points that he made are fully digested. As I understand it, based on the Minister’s reply, the Government do not have any intention of going down the road of either my Amendments 14 and 15 on judicial oversight or, indeed, of the proposition made by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which was of a different nature but clearly addressed the same issue. I think I am right in saying that the Government are not making any movement at all in the direction of either my amendments, or, indeed, the views of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. Have I understood that correctly?
My Lords, the noble Lord seeks to draw me on this. This is the Committee stage of a very important Bill and we are very much listening and reviewing your Lordships’ comments. I am inviting the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment and therefore, obviously, signalling that we are not comfortable with it as it stands.
I give the assurance now that I intend to withdraw the amendment, so there is no need for the Minister to think that I am about to test the opinion of the Committee, if that is what is running through his mind. I was seeking to ensure that I had correctly understood the thrust of his reply on behalf of the Government, which I think I have interpreted correctly. I suppose that we can all wait in hope that the Government may change their mind, but the Minister did not say that he intended to reflect on the points that were made in the debate today, as he did in relation to other groups of amendments, so I think, for that reason alone, one puts a rather different interpretation on what he said on this group from the interpretation that one might justifiably put on what he said in response to previous groups.
I do not think that we have moved any further on the issue of people being given some indication of the reasons for the powers that be having suspicions that they intended to leave the country for the purpose of involvement in terrorism-related activity. I will need to read Hansard, but I thought that the Minister said that it was open to an individual to make representations at any time, including on seizure, but perhaps I misunderstood what he said. If he did say anything along those lines, I was going to ask him exactly what representations and to whom, but perhaps I misunderstood the reply.
I think that we have different views about what can and cannot emerge as a result of judicial review, since I think the Minister was of the view that somehow that contained a power to review the grounds on which a decision had been made as opposed to not being able to look at that issue, which is my understanding of what judicial review would involve. It would not encompass that question. However, once again, I will read carefully what the Minister said.
We then had the comments in relation to the application to court to extend the period from 14 days up to a maximum of 30 days. Once again, as I understand it, that court is considering only whether the authorities are acting diligently and expeditiously and is not considering the reasons behind the decision—that is, the reasons behind the suspicion. So, in that sense, we do not seem to have moved any further forward in the light of the Minister’s reply. Likewise, I do not think that he responded to another point I made, although I did not specifically ask him to do so. I simply made the statement that, under the authorisation process, there is no provision for the senior officers involved to consider representations from the person from whom the travel documents have been taken or from a representative of that person. As I say, I do not think that the Minister commented on that, so I assume that my version is correct and that there is no provision for them to consider representations. So I think the point of view of those who have tabled the amendments must be that they have not made any progress so far. However, as I said, I will want to read carefully the Minister’s response, as I am sure will all other noble Lords who have taken part in this debate, in order to ensure that we have fully understood it. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My noble friend is aware of this point—at least I hope that he is, because I sent an e-mail on it. Schedule 1 provides for the usual 40-day period in paragraph 19 and I had intended to ask the Minister to confirm that that period is suspended during the Dissolution of Parliament. However, the question now has a second limb, because the Government have tabled Amendment 45, which refers to a similar 40-day period but actually spells that out. I wonder why there is a distinction between these two. I am not objecting to this. The Statutory Instruments Act 1946 covers the point, but dealing with it in detail in the new schedule raises a question that needs to be sat upon with regard to the first schedule.
I am happy to respond to my noble friend and to thank her for giving advance notice that she intended to speak on this. She asked whether the 40-day period described in paragraph 19 is suspended during Dissolution. I can confirm that the period would be suspended. However, in reality, our intention is for the code of practice to come into force the day after Royal Assent, using the affirmative procedure, as these powers are urgently needed by law enforcement. My noble friend noted that the new schedule in Amendment 45 suspends the 40-day period. It may not be possible to timetable the debate on the court rules necessary to implement the temporary exclusion order provisions by Dissolution. However, we are confident that the House will debate the code of practice on the exercise of the passport seizure provision before Dissolution.
I am grateful for that answer, but I am not sure that I entirely understand the procedure that the Minister referred to at the start of it. I wonder if he might write to noble Lords about how this would operate.
My Lords, in moving Amendment 44, I shall speak also to the other amendments in the group.
As I have made clear to your Lordships, the Government are absolutely committed to the appropriate and proportionate use of the temporary exclusion power. As we indicated that we would, we have looked very carefully at the constructive suggestions from David Anderson, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, on the matter of judicial oversight. Following this consideration, we have tabled amendments which seek to introduce oversight of the power in line with his recommendations. Specifically, the amendments propose the creation of a permission stage before imposition of the temporary exclusion order—also very much in line with the amendments tabled by the Opposition. In addition, they propose a statutory judicial review mechanism to consider both the imposition of the order and any specific in-country requirements. I will address each of the elements in turn.
For the permission stage, the court would be asked to consider whether the decision to impose the temporary exclusion order “is obviously flawed” using principles applicable under judicial review, and whether to grant permission for it to be imposed. There would also be a provision for retrospective reviews in urgent cases, where the Secretary of State has deemed the situation of such urgency that the order must be imposed without prior permission of the court. I must point out that this provision for a retrospective review is an additional safeguard which is absent in other amendments which have been tabled. The court would have the power to refuse permission for the order, where prior permission was being sought. In retrospective review cases, it would have the power to quash the order. I hope noble Lords will agree that this gives the courts a significant role in the imposition of a temporary exclusion order.
The second element of judicial oversight which the Government are seeking to introduce is a statutory judicial review mechanism. The in-country elements of a temporary exclusion order will not be imposed until the individual has returned back to the United Kingdom, allowing law enforcement partners to assess the most appropriate measures to manage the risk posed by the individual at that time. The statutory judicial review will ensure that the individual, if he or she applies for it on return to the UK, can challenge any in-country requirements placed on them. Of course, ordinary judicial review would always have been open to the individual, but putting it on a statutory footing in this way provides some additional structure which I hope will be reassuring to the House. Most importantly, the individual will not have to seek permission from the court for there to be a review.
The government amendment provides that the court would not only have the power to consider in detail—and quash—the specific in-country requirements placed on an individual, but it would also have the power to consider again whether the relevant conditions for imposing the temporary exclusion order were and, in respect of the ongoing necessity of the in-country measures, continue to be met, and again have the power to quash the whole order or direct the Secretary of State to revoke it. This is in line with David Anderson’s recommendations and means that there is a further opportunity for judicial scrutiny of the imposition of the order as well as the in-country requirements.
The government amendments place considerable power with the courts in the temporary exclusion process, allowing effective judicial scrutiny of that power both before and after its use. I hope that this provides the reassurance the House seeks in respect of court oversight of this measure, and also in respect of the importance the Government place on an appropriate and proportionate use of this power. I beg to move.
My Lords, I welcome the government amendments and I thank the Minister for his explanation of them. I also welcome the Government’s conversion to the principle of judicial oversight in regard to temporary exclusion orders. That is because it has to be said that any measure which seeks to restrict the movements of an individual and restrict their right to return to the country of which they are a citizen is a hugely significant power. I will not go into the other points that have been raised because we have yet to discuss the detail of how the exclusion orders will work, but the noble Baroness said that they would remain in force for two days. My information suggests that they can remain in force for two years from the date they are first imposed.
The Government previously insisted that this was a power for the Home Secretary alone, but that was not a view we could share. Both the Home Secretary and the noble Lord have referred in their comments to judicial review. That was already in place, but judicial oversight is, as we have heard, something that the Constitution Committee referred to and the Joint Committee on Human Rights said would be a necessity. Indeed, from the beginning we have been convinced of the need for parliamentary scrutiny of this aspect of the Bill. At Second Reading in the other place on 2 December, the shadow Home Secretary, my colleague the right honourable Yvette Cooper, rightly pointed out that there is such a judicial process for TPIMs and stated that we would be tabling amendments on judicial oversight. The Home Secretary responded in Committee on 15 December saying that such oversight was not necessary because it was the operation of a royal prerogative in terms of cancelling a passport, and that it was less restrictive than the conditions under TPIMs. The debate continued through to the Report stage, where again we tabled amendments which both the government parties voted against on the explanation from the Minister that there had not been,
“the chance properly to consider the Opposition amendments”.—[Official Report, Commons, 6/1/15; col. 208.]
Three weeks has been long enough for noble Lords to consider the Bill, but it was not long enough for Home Office Ministers to consider our amendments. That is why I am particularly grateful to the noble Lord. In the 10 days since it was voted down in the House of Commons, the Government have found time to consider the issues and table amendments. It is a minor point, but I received an e-mail about this last Friday evening, which was a little late. Also, it would have been nice to have had the amendments with that e-mail. Perhaps that could be considered for the future when letters about new amendments are sent out at a late stage.
However, those are minor matters as compared with the fact that the Government have come around, and we greatly welcome that. The case for judicial oversight of this has been clear from the beginning. We understand and appreciate that there are times when a swift application and decision have to be made, but the Government have rightly recognised in their amendments that that should be subject to judicial processes.
Perhaps I may raise a couple of points for clarification. There are some differences between the amendments we tabled at the start of the process and government Amendment 52. First, the new amendment does not require the Secretary of State to set out a draft of the proposed notice in the temporary exclusion order application, unlike subsection (2) of the proposed new clause in our Amendment 54. Why do the Government not think it necessary to set out the draft of the proposed TEO notice, as we propose? Secondly, proposed new subsection (2) provides that the court may, in addition to giving the Secretary of State permission to impose a TEO,
“give directions to the Secretary of State in relation to the measures to be imposed on the individual”,
who is subject to such an order. That is not in the government amendment. There may be good reasons for that, but it would be helpful to know from the noble Lord the reasons for those changes.
We are committed to judicial oversight along with the other measures we have proposed. We have not had total success, although the Minister has agreed to reconsider some of them. These measures should be subject to a sunset clause; that is, a renewal requirement for Parliament to look at them again. We also think that Parliament should be assisted in that consideration. There should be further scrutiny in the form of a report from the independent reviewer and a report on their use from the Home Secretary. All these measures are important, but we are pleased that the Government have accepted the need for judicial oversight. It will not threaten the ability of the Home Secretary to impose a TEO where there is intelligence and evidence to support that measure, as the noble Lord has clarified. However, what judicial oversight does provide is legitimacy and validity to the order. That, I think, will provide the public with greater reassurance when they see these orders being imposed.
We support these amendments, but it would be helpful if the noble Lord could give us an explanation of the differences between our proposals and those set out in the government amendments.
I am grateful to all noble Lords for their broad welcome for the amendments which have been put forward. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, we have listened in the other place, which is why my honourable friend the Minister for Security and Immigration, James Brokenshire, said that he would seek to bring forward measures in this House. We have listened to the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation and what we have proposed has been moulded by and fits in with what he sought to set out. We have also been significantly influenced by the persuasive report of the Constitution Committee, to which I referred earlier. Again, I thank my noble friend Lord Lang for his thoughtful work, which has been extremely helpful. That has all come together and we have made our recommendations and presented the amendments.
Let me deal with some of the points raised, in no particular order. However, certainly on the human rights side, I stand by the declaration that I made in the Bill. It is a very important statement in terms of giving assurance to people about the proportionality of what is being proposed regarding temporary exclusion orders and how they will operate.
The Minister said that the in-country application of a TEO—if I understood correctly—would be two years. Am I incorrect, then, in my understanding that if a temporary exclusion order were served either at the address or in person, the person’s return would be subject to that for two years, so that if at any time in that two-year period they sought to return to the UK they would be subject to the conditions of the TEO? Is he saying that that is incorrect and it is only the in-country provisions of the TEO that last for two years?
I will clarify that point to make sure I have got it absolutely right. My belief, however, is very much that we are talking here about two elements. On the in-country element, technically—of course, we are dealing here with legal processes and they would have to be reviewed—if the person were to refuse the conditions of their return they would not be able to return and therefore the order would effectively remain in place while they are not in the country. The intention, however, would be that there would be reasonable requirements about being accompanied, the time and place, their mode of travel, the fact that they would be met, and the in-country element would expire at that point. However, I will look again carefully at the words that I used and clarify them if need be.
The noble Baroness also asked why we would not provide the court with the conditions to impose on an individual at the application stage. Temporary exclusion orders differ from TPIMs in that the imposition of a TEO is likely to be put in place many months before the individual returns to the UK and is subject to in-country measures, as I have mentioned. The nature of the individuals who will be subject to TEOs means that the specifics of their cases will vary, and it would be inappropriate for the security services and police to decide on the conditions so far in advance. The individual will be served with the conditions of their return to the UK and will be able to challenge these conditions as part of the statutory review.
The temporary exclusion order remains in force for two years. This includes both the out-of-country provision and the in-country element. In practice, how long the in-country obligation lasts will depend on how quickly the person returns, which is what we were discussing there.
I think that I have covered the point of my noble friend Lady Warsi about the briefing session. I am grateful that she found that helpful.
I hesitate to rise but the discussion that took place was about the purpose of the temporary exclusion order. The clear sense that I got from the briefing and subsequent discussion with the Minister was that the whole purpose was to facilitate a controlled entry back into the United Kingdom, and a controlled entry back into a programme of potential deradicalisation and whatever that would involve, a move by the Government which I hugely support and welcome. I felt that if the whole purpose of this temporary exclusion order was not to keep people out of the country—as has been suggested in the press—but was about managing somebody’s return, to make sure that we protected the security of our citizens, then we are talking about an incredibly short period for which the person would find themselves outside the United Kingdom but a much longer period subject to conditions within the United Kingdom. If that is the case, I would be grateful if it was clarified at the Dispatch Box.
Before the Minister replies to that, can he include in his reply whether the Government have studied the experience of countries such as Denmark and Germany, which have working knowledge of how returns of such people can be satisfactorily dealt with?
On the point just raised by the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, we have been very mindful of the fact that we need to work, not in isolation but in partnership with other countries. The level of co-operation and working across Europe in particular with our European colleagues, not least because of the events in Paris, has increased dramatically. We want to learn what works best. To answer my noble friend’s point, these orders will not exclude somebody from the UK per se. Through them we are saying that if you have been abroad and we believe that there is evidence that you have been engaged in terrorist activities we are not simply going to allow you to drift in and out of this country with impunity. That would need to be managed and supervised. We want that to happen—it is the purpose of the temporary exclusion orders.
My noble friend Lady Ludford—it now seems like a little while ago—was the first to speak about this. She raised a point about the tests and the phrase “obviously flawed”. Here, we are seeking to introduce a permission-stage model and a statutory judicial review mechanism similar to those already in place for the TPIM and asset-freezing regimes, which will consider both the decision to impose the TEO in general terms and for the in-country elements. Having considered these suggestions, we tabled these amendments in line with the recommendation. It is, as was said, simply consistent with those other elements to which we are referring. I hope that that has been helpful.
I apologise for prolonging this, but I forgot to ask my noble friend something earlier. I am trying to understand the architecture of all this. Under the new clause relating to prior permission of the court, in Amendment 52, proposed new subsection (9) says:
“Only the Secretary of State may appeal against a determination of the court under … this section”,
and the urgency provision. I wonder whether that is a bit unfair on the person. Why would the individual not have a comparable right of appeal? Is there a clear reason why that is the case?
Again, I will write if necessary, but I think the answer is simply that in that example, it is the Secretary of State who has made her decision and then subjected that decision to scrutiny by the courts. The courts will obviously make their judgment, and therefore the appeal is in connection with that particular part of the process. The individual concerned with that has access, through different routes, to judicial review of the temporary exclusion order. On the point about the Secretary of State, the individual is not involved in that stage, but will have the chance to challenge the substance. We are basically talking about two not quite parallel but different parts of the process. Therefore, the rights of appeal apply to different entities or individuals, as appropriate to those elements.
With those comments, I commend the amendments standing in my name in this group and invite noble Lords to consider not pressing theirs.
My Lords, I appreciate that this is the last group of amendments before we seek the permission of the House to break. I am grateful to my noble friend for raising this point, which relates to the information provided to the subject of a temporary exclusion order.
It is, of course, important that the individual is informed that they are subject to a temporary exclusion order—after all, that is the point of it—and that they are given some indication of why this is the case. However, I trust your Lordships will understand that it is not appropriate for the individual to be provided with detailed reasoning behind the Secretary of State’s decision, which is likely to include sensitive information, the disclosure of which could damage national security and put lives at risk.
Any notice given to the individual would state that the Secretary of State has reasonable suspicion that they have been involved in terrorism-related activity abroad. We believe that this is sufficient disclosure, which informs the individual of the basis for the decision while protecting sensitive information.
My noble friend was brief in moving her amendment. I have been fairly brief in responding to it but I hope I have answered the point she was making. I therefore ask her to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I am conscious of the time. I think that was one of those answers that may raise further questions, which perhaps I will keep for another day. As there is another debate about to happen, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(9 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 62, 63 and 64. The Committee will be pleased to know that I am aiming to be extremely brief on all the amendments left in my name for today.
Amendment 57 is an amendment to Clause 3(6), which provides:
“If a temporary exclusion order is revoked, it ceases to be in force when notice of its revocation is given”.
I am intrigued to know why the effect of the order continues until notice is given. By definition, there is a delay between the decision to revoke and the notice of revocation. Although this is not the whole of the point I am making, I am not sure whether notice being given means a notice received or a notice, as it were, sent out. In any event, there is a time difference between the decision and the notice, and I should have thought that the revocation should take effect immediately.
Amendment 62 is an amendment to Clause 8, which provides for the obligations on an individual who returns under an order. Here, the notice imposes the obligations on an individual who is subject to the order and who has returned to the UK. Are there no obligations in a period before the return to the UK or is this something to do with the proceedings which have taken place in the UK? The status of somebody who is subject to an order but has not returned intrigues me. Are there no obligations which may apply to an individual before he returns to the UK? The obligations are backed up by Clause 9, which is about offences if restrictions are contravened. My question here is about status.
Amendment 63, also an amendment to Clause 8, is similar to Amendment 57. I note that the notice of the obligations comes into force when it is given and is in force until the order ends. Is there a point at which the notice is deemed to be given? My amendment will provide for it actually to be given. My noble friend will understand that I am seeking to understand when it comes into force.
Amendment 64, also to Clause 8, is similar to Amendment 57 in that the variation or revocation should come into effect immediately, not take effect when notice is given, and the same questions are raised as for the earlier amendment. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for bringing forward these amendments, which provide an opportunity to put further information on the record as to how temporary exclusion orders will work in practice. Amendment 57 seeks to provide that a temporary exclusion order ceases to be in force immediately when revoked, not when notice of revocation is given. We believe it is important that notice of revocation is given and that this is the point at which the order ceases to be in force. It is right that the individual concerned is made aware that the restrictions and obligations imposed on them will no longer be in place.
Similarly, Amendment 64 seeks to ensure that any variation or revocation of the in-country obligations placed on an individual come into effect immediately rather than once notice has been given to that individual. In the same way, we believe that it is right that notice of revocation is given and that this is the point at which the obligations cease to be in force. It is important that the individual concerned is made aware that the obligations imposed on them will no longer be in place. More importantly, it is vital that the individual is informed of any variation to the obligations before these variations take effect to avoid an unintentional breach, which could lead to prosecution.
Amendment 63 seeks to provide that notice of any in-country obligations comes into force when an individual is actually given the notice. As the individual will have returned to the UK under the terms of the temporary exclusion order, we will usually know the whereabouts of the individual and, in practice, should always be able to serve the notice on them in person. But it may be expedient for an individual as well as for the authorities for notice of a variation, for example, to be posted to the individual rather than served in person. In addition, there may be circumstances in which an individual absconds and is therefore no longer at the contact address. In all those circumstances, it is right that notice can be deemed to have been given, provided proper procedures are followed. Parliament will be able to review those procedures, but I can assure your Lordships that they will be based on well established practice in relation to immigration decisions.
Finally, Amendment 62 seeks to allow the Secretary of State to impose the in-country obligations of a temporary exclusion order on an individual who is about to return to the UK, as well as on those who have already returned to the UK. The in-country elements of a temporary exclusion order cannot be imposed until the individual has returned to the United Kingdom, a point on which my noble friend sought clarification. This will allow law enforcement partners to assess the most appropriate measures to manage the risk posed by the individual at that time, which may be a matter of years after the decision to impose the order was originally taken. It may even be appropriate to arrest and prosecute the individual, rather than impose any in-country measures on them. Therefore, it would not be appropriate to apply the in-country measures to someone who is about to return. It is better to wait until the individual is in the UK and form an assessment about the in-country measures at that stage.
In terms of the obligations and when they come into effect before return to the UK, the obligations made against the individual will apply only when the individual returns to the UK. Before that point, the individual will be subject to the temporary exclusion order in that their return will be disrupted and controlled, and they may be subject to conditions under the permit to return. But they will not be subject to in-country measures until they return for the reasons that I have outlined. I trust that that is a helpful reply to my noble friend and I invite her to withdraw her amendment.
I apologise that I did not come in before my noble friend spoke but something he said has prompted me. In resisting Amendment 63 in the name of my noble friend Lady Hamwee to require an actual giving of notice, he referred to cases where it could be deemed to have been given. I think that that would refer to Clause 10, under which the Secretary of State may make regulations about the giving of notice under Clause 3. The Clause 10 states:
“The regulations may, in particular, make provision about cases in which notice is to be deemed to have been given”.
My noble friend referred to immigration case law. First, will he give us an idea of what circumstances qualify as “deemed”? Secondly, how much would be included in those regulations under Clause 10 about the criteria or circumstances, or what would qualify in substance as deeming to give notice?
I am grateful to my noble friend for seeking clarification on this issue. The clause follows the same procedures as apply to other measures that might be introduced, such as those concerning immigration. Clearly, we would like to serve the notice in person but, given that the person might be overseas and engaged in terrorist activities, that might not be possible. However, that cannot be a reason why the order cannot be deemed to have been served. Therefore, we have followed the same routes as in immigration cases and the notice would go to their last known address.
I am grateful to my noble friend for giving me the opportunity to expand on this point. The key issue is that we want the individual to get the message that they are subject to a temporary exclusion order because we want them to make contact with the authorities so that they can have a properly managed return to the UK. We do not want the risks which might occur of somebody turning up and seeking to board a flight and only at that point discovering that their travel documents have been invalidated. It would serve everyone’s purpose that the procedures are followed and that people are made aware. I hope that is helpful to my noble friend.
My Lords, I thank my noble friend for his reply. At the same time as he was saying that it is important that the individual knows—I absolutely go along with that—he also said that it is possible for there to be deemed notice. I need to read how those two fit together. I take the point that there is a distinction between variation of obligations and the revocation of an order. Of course, one is accustomed to a notice sometimes having to be served by post or whatever—there are many instances where a notice is deemed to have been given—because if that were not the case the prospective recipient of the notice could always avoid being given it by slipping around.
I was a little alarmed by my noble friend’s comment, if I heard him aright, on Amendment 62 that it could be years before an individual came back, which takes us back to earlier discussions. However, the Minister has covered the ground and I will do my best to cover his answer properly when I read it. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I recall a point I made at Second Reading. The human rights memo notes at paragraph 13 that the Secretary of State proposed to adopt a practice on TEOs equivalent to her,
“practice of not depriving individuals of British citizenship”,
if that would expose them to a real risk of treatment that would be contrary to Articles 2 or 3 of the human rights convention. The Government do not believe that the convention applies if those persons are not within the UK’s jurisdiction, so it is adopted as a practice. However, I asked at Second Reading whether it would be possible to incorporate in the Bill—it is a point worth focusing on even if it said only in a code or regulations—that it is the practice of the Secretary of State not to impose a TEO if that would expose an individual to a real risk of treatment under Article 2 of the convention on risk to life or Article 3 on risk of torture or inhuman treatment. Perhaps there is some way to incorporate that as rather more than a practice.
My Lords, it has been helpful to go through the Bill as the result of the amendments, trying to tease out as much as possible about the workings of the system. Certainly a good many questions have been raised; I will try to respond to as many of them as possible. As regards those that I do not get round to responding to, I will read the Official Report and write in the correct way and then we can return to it on Report should the noble Baroness wish to do that.
It is worth making a few contextual comments. Upwards of 600 people from this country have travelled to the Middle East. Everybody knows that; there is a certain flinching and the reaction is, “Don’t say that again”. However, if that was not the nature of the threat, we would not be bringing forward this measure. About half of those people have returned to the UK. Some might say that that poses quite a risk. We know—it is not an unreasonable thought—that a number of terrorist organisations would seek to advance their warped and perverted cause by seeking to bring down an airliner or blow it up; that is not manufactured but is a real threat to us. Therefore, when the authorities have produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable belief that someone has been involved in terrorist activities, and that that has been tested through a court, if we simply said that they should be able to board a flight on the way home back to the UK, some might say that we were failing in our duty of care to the people in the country and to those on the airliner. As my noble friend Lady Warsi rightly said, none of us would like to think about our children, let alone us, travelling on a flight that may contain people who have been engaged in that activity.
I thank the Minister for picking up my point; he says that he is trying to put some context around the reality—and he is. It would help me if he put some context in terms of time. All this sounds very neat on paper but, in reality, how long will it all take for the individual who is out there?
I shall come to that point in the pile of papers that have found their way to me. But I can anticipate a theme that will come through these notes—we want it to be as quick as is possible, bearing in mind the safety of the return. That is what we want it to be, and I am sure that that will be the message. The second part of the message will be to say that each case will be slightly different. The difficulty with being too prescriptive is that you tie people’s hands in responding in slightly different ways to slightly different levels of intelligence or knowledge about a particular individual. Effectively, the purpose of the order is that we want that person to return to the UK in a managed and safe way.
I am grateful to the noble Lord for that. I understand why he introduced his response in the way that he did. However, does he accept that the questions asked by most noble Lords, and certainly my questions, did not challenge the process or the principle of managed return? What we are seeking is that the return should be as efficient, effective and speedy as possible to ensure that somebody is returned home. I am sure that he was not trying to suggest that we would in any way want to put British citizens at risk or in danger. However, for a managed return to have credibility and to be effective, it has to be efficient. I appreciate that circumstances differ but there are certain scenarios that have to be addressed so that we can have confidence that the process will not be like the one for addressing Ebola, which did not work out in practice. It has to be efficient and effective. Those are the very points on which we are seeking responses.
The noble Baroness is absolutely right. I very much appreciate the constructive and thoughtful way in which she has engaged with the Bill on behalf of the Opposition. Not one of the questions posed by the noble Baroness or by any other noble Lord on this amendment was anything other than fair and reasonable and seeking elucidation on the serious power that we are introducing here. Equally, when I introduce the problem as the precursor to the power, I am not trying to make a point. I simply want to put it in context so that people reading this part of our proceedings can see how we are approaching this issue.
As regards the specific points that were made, the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, asked whether all TEO subjects would be escorted back to the UK by police officers and whether we would pay for their flights. Whether a temporary exclusion order subject is escorted back to the UK by UK police officers will be decided on a case-by-case basis. Similarly, whether the UK Government would meet the costs of the return flight would depend on the facts of the individual case. In some cases, the individual may be deported by the other country involved, which may provide escorts and meet the costs. In some cases, no security may be needed for the escorts and the individual may easily be able to bear the costs or, as my noble friend Lord Ashton said in a previous example, it may be possible to rearrange the flight departure.
The noble Baroness expressed concern that these people might just melt away. Obviously, we cannot create a power for detention extraterritorially, but we will liaise with the other country in advance. In most circumstances we would expect the other country to take steps to manage the person involved. We would deal with the issue through the diplomatic network and our embassies in most countries around the world. Our staff would be in contact with their opposite numbers. Certainly, the hope and the anticipation is that where a TEO has been put in place, the issue would be addressed before the person ever turned up at the airport. As soon as is practicably possible after the person comes on to the radar, they would be contacted, informed about the temporary exclusion order and the process of managing the return would be initiated.
Will these people have consular access? They are British citizens, as I said to the noble Lord, Lord Harris, and they have the same right to seek help as any other British citizen. My noble friend Lady Warsi asked whether they could be returned as detainees. I realise that that has a particular meaning in international law. As set out in the Bill, the individual may return to the UK under the terms of a permit to return. But they may also return if they are deported by another country. In practice, the difference between the two methods of return would not affect the treatment of the individual on their return to the UK, as their return would not have breached the temporary exclusion order. They would then both be subject to the in-country obligations.
The noble Lord, Lord Harris, referred to rendering a person stateless but the person will retain the right to return to the UK and to seek consular help. However, the individual may choose not to return or not to engage with their order, but that would be a matter of their own choosing. My noble friend Lady Warsi referred to the risk of torture. The Home Secretary will not seek to impose a temporary exclusion order where she considers that doing so would create substantial grounds to believe that the individual would face a real risk of torture or inhuman treatment, in keeping with the human rights obligations in the Bill. The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, asked about international discussions. We are engaged in discussions with our international partners. Other countries have been interested in this measure and sought to discuss with us the details. These discussions have so far been positive. Our partners recognise that this is a shared threat and are keen to engage in a shared response.
As to the requirement to attend a deradicalisation programme on their return, the requirements placed on the individual once they are back in the UK will be decided on a case-by-case basis. These may include a requirement to engage with a programme potentially comprising reporting, notification of change of address and deradicalisation activities. I do not have a note on the specific point raised by my noble friend Lady Warsi on whether other programmes might be considered. There are deradicalisation programmes such as Channel and Prevent but, at this stage, I am not aware of any other efforts to create new programmes. We are very much focused on making the ones that we have work and making them as effective as possible.
The case studies put to us by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, were helpful. She gave the example of Mr A being detained in another country. This will depend on the laws of the other country. When a person is notified of a temporary exclusion order, they will be told how to get a permit to return. If they arrive at the airport in another country, that country may well seek to detain the person. The person would then be able to liaise with the British authorities through the authorities of the other country to agree the terms of their permit and the process of managed return. I am grateful to the noble Baroness for raising this point but I can assure her that the Government have existing successful processes in place to prevent individuals travelling to the UK and for managing the arrival of certain individuals into the country. For example, we operate a no-fly list as well as a procedure to arrest certain individuals for terrorist-related offences when they arrive in the UK. Unlike the case she raised on Ebola, we are talking about named individuals who have been informed about the order prior to returning. These systems will therefore ensure a controlled return and the authorities on this side are aware of what is expected of them.
In terms of a reasonable timeframe, the Bill makes it clear that there is a duty on the Secretary of State to issue a permit to travel to a subject of a temporary exclusion order within a reasonable period. The next question is: what is a reasonable period? That will be determined on a case-by-case basis. It will need to take account of factors such as frequency of flights to and from the country and, of course, the level of co-operation from the individual who is the subject of the temporary exclusion order.
I have given a reasonable number of replies. I think that my noble friend Lady Hamwee raised some other points on which I do not have notes. She can either remind me of them—I am happy to give way—or I am happy just to stand by the undertaking that this is a complex matter with areas of detail on which I am happy to reflect and write ahead of Report stage.
The Minister as usual has given a very full reply. There is one basic issue which troubles me in terms of hard-headed security. If you have got somebody so potentially dangerous that you are taking this action why is it safer to have them outside your jurisdiction rather than at home under your immediate jurisdiction?
On the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Judd, we are seeking to bring them back but in a safe way. We recognise that they are our responsibility. At the moment it is not quite—I have to be careful about saying this—a revolving door with people being able to come and go as they will but there needs to be structure, security and some action to seek to prevent people going and, where that has failed, a managed return. The situation is very dynamic, which the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, I am sure appreciates and the terms of the permit of return will change over time. We are in the process of beginning to engage with countries to work with them on these problems and to say how the process should work. If we become too prescriptive in putting down in primary or secondary legislation what that process should be, it does not allow us to be more flexible in the case of the individual or the country concerned. That is why we are asking for a bit of flexibility but we are mindful that that requires judicial oversight. People are not stranded out there. They are given a permit to return. They are able to have a judicial review of the process and the actual permit or order has gone through an element of judicial scrutiny before it is made, so elements are there.
I was asked about the independent reviewer’s criteria and I have just got a note on that. His discretion is not constrained in the other areas and we believe that he would not want it to be constrained in this area. That is, I suppose, the point made about the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation overseeing this aspect of the order.
This follows on from the point that my noble friend Lord Judd has just made. This is a very serious step that is being taken. The Minister says, “We are simply managing the return and it is intended to be temporary”. What, then, is the purpose of Clause 3(8), which says:
“The imposition of a temporary exclusion order does not prevent a further temporary exclusion order from being imposed … (including in a case where an order ceases to be in force at the expiry of its two year duration)”?
What are the circumstances that require a provision for going beyond two years? Are we really saying that the managed return is going to take longer than two years? It seems to open up the possibility that this is in effect about permanent exclusion.
The circumstances are not that the managed return is going to take more than two years; they are that the individual may be out there for longer than two years. The original order might lapse before he or she seeks to return to the UK and, in those circumstances, we would seek to renew it. We have talked about two separate elements. One is when the person arrives, and that relates to safe return. There are then the in-country elements of the temporary exclusion order, which would come into effect only once the person arrived back in the UK. That is the argument for it. We are seeking a degree of flexibility with a review process—
I am sorry; I am trying to follow the Minister’s argument. He is saying that two years might elapse before the individual comes back to one’s attention. Perhaps I am misreading it but Clause 3 states that the Secretary of State must give notice of the imposition of the order and that:
“A temporary exclusion order … comes into force when notice of its imposition is given”.
How can you give it if you cannot find the person? Therefore, what is the argument? Is it that the individual will disappear for two years, as you will not have been able to impose the order because you do not know where they are?
I hope that I can help the noble Lord here. Perhaps the problem is my poor explanation of this issue. We are saying that of course notice is deemed to have been given but the person may well not present at a port seeking return to the UK until after a period of two years. At that point the order could be renewed so that their travel documents would be invalidated and they would have to seek a permit. That is the intention. I am aware that there will be other issues and I will look at this matter very carefully. I think that it has been helpful to hear the Committee’s views on this and to hear the questions that have been raised.
Following on from the issue just raised by the noble Lord, Lord Harris, I completely understand that there could be a situation in which an order could effectively be issued—perhaps upon the family, who might have some contact with the individual; I do not know how this would work—and then the person would effectively say, “I don’t care. I’m going to stay in Syria and carry on fighting”. He stays out there for two years and two days and therefore you have to impose a second order. I understand the logic behind that. The concern is probably not so much about those people who do not want to come back but about those who may want to come back but are excluded under the temporary exclusion order.
This does not have to be done today but it might be helpful to the Committee if the Government could give an indication of their understanding of or thinking on the potential time periods that we expect somebody to be outside the country. This was the question that I raised at the briefing session. If, for example, you serve a temporary exclusion order on X and X turns up at Istanbul Airport and says, “I understand that I have a temporary exclusion order. I want to come back. I want to take part in whatever scheme you want me to take part in”, or, “I want to come back and defend myself because the allegations you have made against me are untrue and I want to clear my name”, how long do we anticipate that person being outside the country?
I go back to the way in which this order was briefed. It was briefed by the Government as, “Those crazies who want to do us harm and go out there to take part in terrorist activity will be thrown out of our country and kept out of our country”. That is not what the Government are saying now. They are saying that these orders are about bringing somebody back in and managing the process for our sake, for their sake and for the security of this country. If that is the case, and this is all about bringing people in, not throwing them out, why are the Government so reluctant about giving timescales for bringing them in but quite liberal in giving them for how long they can stay out?
We are not talking about throwing people out here. The context is that we are talking about people who went out to be involved in terrorist activity, potentially with an organisation that is seeking to plot and motivate those individuals to commit terrorist acts back in the UK. In the very helpful example given by the noble Baroness, somebody—let us call them Mr or Miss R, R standing for “Reasonable” —recognises that there is a temporary exclusion order. Their family has alerted them to that and they are concerned about it. They do not particularly want to initiate the judicial review when they are out there, although they would be entitled to. They just want to get back as quickly as possible and sort the whole thing out because they think a terrible mistake has been made. They arrive in Istanbul; flights are not an issue as there are several each day from there to London. There is also a consulate there so they would have access to consular services. For the reasonable person, their return could be managed in a matter of days. I do not need to carry on with Mr U —Mr Unreasonable—who seeks to challenge through judicial review, which he is entitled to do from outside the process, and seeks to dispute having any restrictions on his return. Clearly, that may take longer but our desire is that it should happen as quickly, smoothly and safely as possible.
This will be my last hypothetical. As a nation, we take the position that there are certain countries to which we will not deport people, particularly if they have a label around their neck, because it is assumed that they will be tortured. If an individual on whom a temporary exclusion order sits is in one of those countries and we have labelled them as somebody whom the Secretary of State reasonably suspects of being involved in terrorism-related activity and reasonably considers a danger to the people of this country, is it not likely that that country—one to which we would not deport people—will arrest them and potentially, because on our say-so this person is extremely dangerous, torture them? Where does that stand in terms of our normal position on human rights?
It stands in the same position I gave in my earlier answer. If the Secretary of State had a reasonable expectation that imposing a temporary exclusion order on an individual in a particular country might give rise to torture, then that order would not be issued in those circumstances because of the impact it would have on their human rights. I hope that offers reassurance on that element.
I am grateful for that. All the Bill says is:
“It is for the Secretary of State to decide the terms of a permit to return”.
There is no framework. I fully understand, and I think we all appreciate, that the terms of every permit will not be exactly the same. It is entirely reasonable for the Government to have flexibility in dealing with that. But there should be a framework, which is what we are talking about in terms of my purely probing amendment. The more I think about it, the more sense it makes. The framework should be something that the Home Secretary can consult on before implementing. I am not referring to the individual terms of every permit but the framework in which it would operate.
The noble Lord said that this is entirely different from the Ebola situation because they are named individuals whose return would be expected. The return of the nurses who returned in January was expected. They were all on the same flight and they expected to be met at the airport. Having been met at the airport, their experience was described by them as an absolute shambles. I say that there are similarities not to be difficult but to indicate that there is experience of why these things have to be managed very carefully.
There are a few questions that the noble Lord did not answer. I asked whether consulate authorities would be notified if there was someone who was subject to a TEO in their area and if it was thought that they were about to travel. He answered part of that to say what the consulate’s role would be, but would they be notified of a TEO?
The consulate would be an integral part of the TEO process in communicating to the country that that order was in place.
That is helpful and I am grateful. I am still uncertain as to the progress made in discussions with other countries. Other noble Lords picked up on that point as well. There are still a number of questions to be answered. The only reason for asking these questions is to ensure that we get it right. The worst-case scenario will be to have people subject to TEOs who, for some reason, cannot return or their return is managed badly, and that there are some problems. They may return under a false name. We want to ensure that people who want to return are able to do so in a managed way, and that when they return they are interviewed and may be subject to TPIMs if that is appropriate. That is the safest way to treat those who may cause risk to British citizens, and the safest and the best way to protect British citizens. I am grateful to the Minister for his effort. He has reassured me on some points but there are still some outstanding points. I hope he will look through Hansard, and perhaps offer the opportunity to talk to him and officials to iron out any further concerns that we have. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, Clause 10(3) provides:
“The Secretary of State may make regulations providing for legislation relating to passports … to apply … to permits to return”.
The amendment, which would rather inelegantly extend this by adding “and generally with regard to the passport of an excluded individual”, is designed to probe how a passport becomes valid again. If a passport is invalidated under Clause 3(9), what provisions will there be about the return of a passport on revocation or in the event of an unfavourable outcome of proceedings? In other words, there are more issues around passports than are dealt with in the relatively narrow provisions of Clause 10(3) and I hope that my noble friend will be able to add something to our understanding of how this will operate. I beg to move.
My Lords, we have had a long day of debates which has benefited from the great insight, experience and expertise in your Lordships’ House. I am grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed.
Amendment 67 seeks to provide that regulations are made by the Secretary of State relating to passports of individuals who are subject to temporary exclusion orders. Under a temporary exclusion order, an individual’s British passport will be cancelled and invalid for travel. In the event that the order was quashed, revoked or otherwise came to an end, it would be open to the individual in question to apply for a further passport. There will be no need for the Secretary of State to make further regulations for circumstances in which the individual no longer had a valid passport as there is a well established process already in place for obtaining passports.
I hope this helps and reassures my noble friend and that she will feel able to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I confess that, stupidly, that had not occurred to me. If the individual applies for a passport, it will not be available instantly—they rarely are. However, most importantly, he should be informed that that is what he has to do. This takes us back to the points that have been made on clarity. I am glad now to understand how this will operate. However, as ever, it raises extra points—probably far more than I have mentioned—but the Minister will be pleased to know that I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(9 years, 7 months ago)
Lords Chamber
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the impact on students, universities and international relations of requiring overseas students to leave the United Kingdom immediately upon graduating.
My Lords, our reforms have clamped down on the student migration abuse allowed under the last Government, while ensuring that our excellent universities continue to attract the brightest and best students. Ensuring that immigrants leave at the end of their visa is just as important as controlling who comes here to study in the first place.
My Lords, I am sorry that the Minister used the term “abuse” in this context. There has been much criticism, including by eminent businesspeople and economists, about,
“shutting the door on some of the very individuals who help the UK’s unique global service economy to thrive”,
to use the words of the British Chambers of Commerce. I tabled the Question in the Recess, when the proposal referred to appeared from the Home Office—I am glad that it seems not to be making progress—but can the Minister tell us what current Conservative thinking is on visas for new graduates?
I can certainly inform my noble friend what government thinking is on the position. In the same spirit, I reflect that it seemed to be the position of her party that we ought to count people in and count them out. Last year we counted 121,000 students in and 51,000 out. That leaves 70,000 people who were here without an appropriate visa, and we think that that is wrong. If you are here on a study visa, you should be studying. You should not be working. If you want to come here to work, you are very welcome but you ought to apply for the right visa to uphold that.
My Lords, it is of course entirely appropriate to ensure that the administration of student visas is being carried out effectively, but that should not diminish the contribution that overseas students make to this country culturally, academically and financially. There are examples all over the world of economies that benefit from overseas students not just when they are studying but from the contribution that they can make following graduation. Will the Government drop this plan to limit the access of overseas students to the United Kingdom after they complete their studies, and will they look at proper examples elsewhere in the world where people stay on, contribute to entrepreneurial activity and eventually return home to help to develop the economies of the countries they came from in the first place?
Let me underscore that absolute commitment. When people are coming here to study, they are coming to invest in the UK and they will be welcome. There is no cap on students coming to the UK, provided that they are bona fide students in bona fide universities and they have the funds necessary to complete their studies. We are talking about tier 4, which is the student visa, and whether people ought to be able to stay on. There are some examples of abuse of that system under the previous Government, and we are trying to tighten up on that by simply saying that they ought to have an appropriate visa. We have opened up new routes through tier 2 and tier 1 particularly to entrepreneurs and those in high-skilled occupations. They will continue to be welcome in this country, as in others around the world.
My Lords, as a member of the UCL Council, may I say how delighted I am that the Chancellor scotched the rumours before Christmas about further curtailment of the post-study work route? At London First, we have again issued a report showing how important the relationship with emerging economies is. Is the Minister aware of a study by Loughborough University which showed that nearly half of international students thought that the post-study work route was an important or the most important factor in deciding whether to study in the UK? Will he consider reinstating the two-year post-study work route for postgraduates and STEM graduates?
STEM graduates—graduates in science, technology, engineering and mathematics—are certainly in demand. They will have no problem, if they have a bona fide employer, in meeting the criteria for tier 2, so there is no problem in ensuring that that opportunity will remain open. We want to welcome them. The question is whether 100,000 people ought to be able to stay on, as was the case before, without any limitations, doing jobs as baristas or making pizza deliveries. That is in no way to diminish the value of those jobs, but simply to say that that is not making best use of their degree and that they are jobs which could be provided to people who are here legally in the domestic market.
Does the Minister agree that there are two areas where the ability to stay on for two years after completing one’s graduation is of great significance? One is adding to scientific teams, where the addition of a graduate who stays on for the time being to work on a team in an area such as cancer research is vital. The other vital area is that in the past students studying medicine have stayed on and worked in A&E before they returned to their own countries. That does them well because they gain experience; it does us well because it makes it easier to get a quick response in A&E.
I totally agree with my noble friend. Those are exactly the types of profession where we want to see more places occupied by highly skilled and qualified graduates in this country. They would have no problem securing employment and meeting the criteria under the tier 2 provisions in either of those examples. Information released last week on the number of students in the past academic year showed that the number of postgraduate students staying on for research had risen by 9%, which we should all welcome.
My Lords, the noble Lord has tried hard to reassure your Lordships’ House on the Government’s policy here. Obviously, no one wants there to be abuse of the system, but the noble Lord must understand that there is a great deal of doubt whether the Home Secretary even tries to understand the benefit and the value of overseas students to the UK for both universities and the economy. The plan to require all students to return immediately would, as the noble Lord has heard, lose the talents of doctors, engineers and entrepreneurs to the UK economy and UK society. If the Home Secretary cannot even convince her Conservative colleagues in the Cabinet of that policy, surely it is time to think again. I ask the noble Lord to take a message back to the Home Secretary: can we have less rhetoric and more practical common sense?
My right honourable friend the Home Secretary is absolutely committed to opening the doors to genuine students, but not to the bogus students that we were talking about before. When she spoke, it was about a policy that was in the Conservative Party manifesto on page 21, which is that the best way to ensure that we keep a grip on the fact that people are here on the appropriate visas is through them returning to their country once they have completed their study visa and then reapplying for a work visa. That is not the position now. The position now is that they can do that in country. We encourage people to do so where they have high-skill jobs or they want to stay here to set up a business.
My Lords, will the Minister explain how he can be so sure how many students return when we have no proper border controls on people leaving this country? Does he not agree that forcing students who have completed their studies to go back to their home—at very considerable expense to themselves—before reapplying to come here is an astonishing way to try to fill that lacuna?
The noble Lord is sharp, as ever, in spotting the issue. We will have exit checks in place by the end of this Parliament, as was promised. Of the figure which I gave—about 70,000 people going missing—some of those will have reapplied to go onto the tier 4 system. Some of them will be here and working illegally. The point is that at the moment we do not know. If we counted them in and counted them out and made sure they were on the appropriate visa, we would be able to know.
In his first Answer the Minister spoke of a policy to attract “the brightest and best” to study in our higher education institutions. Does that mean that the policy is to attract academic high fliers and people of outstanding personal virtue? I do not think that is the limit of the policy, is it? What does he mean by the phrase “the brightest and best”, which Home Office Ministers invariably use when talking about this subject?
It simply reflects that such is the quality of education institutions in this country that they attract some of “the brightest and best” academic and skilled people from around the world. We want to continue to ensure that they do that and, in so doing, contribute to the success of the growing British economy.
Given the Government’s ambition to make this country the best place in which to practise science, will the Minister tell us whether they have heeded the warning from Sir Paul Nurse, the president of the Royal Society, that the present anti-immigration rhetoric coming from some Members is damaging the ability of this country to recruit leading scientists?
That is all the more reason why we need to ensure that we give a warm welcome and send out a very clear message to those people that we want to come to this country to study and to contribute to the economy that we will not stand by and see our system abused by people who do not want to come here and study but instead want to come here to work.
My Lords, is it possible to distinguish among non-scientists—people like me—who come to this country to study and then stay on? Non-scientists may not find immediate access to jobs but very often, in areas like post-war reconstruction, they have a great deal to contribute. I would have been very sorry if I had been sent home and not allowed to sit in your Lordships’ House.
Exactly, and that is another fine example of how the system works. We want to encourage people. The system is far wider than students of science and technology. We simply give an example of those as people who we particularly want to stay on and contribute to the workforce and the economy, but of course there is a wider cultural benefit and value in having that interchange between people of different nationalities more widely in the arts and other subjects across our universities.
(9 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, with permission, I shall repeat a Statement made by my right honourable friend the Home Secretary in another place earlier this afternoon.
“Mr Speaker, I want to make a statement about the terrorist attacks in Paris, and the threat we face from terrorism in the United Kingdom.
It will take some time for us to learn the full details of the attacks last week, but the basic facts are now clear. Seventeen innocent people were murdered in cold blood, and a number of others were injured. Amedy Coulibaly, the terrorist who attacked the Jewish supermarket, claimed his actions were carried out in the name of ISIL. Unconfirmed reports suggest that Cherif and Said Kouachi—the two brothers who attacked the office of Charlie Hebdo—were associated with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen, the same al-Qaeda affiliate that had been in contact with the men who murdered Fusilier Lee Rigby in 2013.
As the appalling events in Paris were unfolding, this House was debating the Government’s Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill, and the threat level in the United Kingdom—which is set by the independent Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre—remains at severe. This means that a terrorist attack in our country is highly likely and could occur without warning.
Three serious terrorist plots have been disrupted in recent months alone. Nearly 600 people from this country have travelled to Syria and Iraq to fight, around half of them have returned and there are thousands of people from across Europe who have done the same. As I said during the passage of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill and on many, repeated occasions, the Government will do everything they can to keep the public safe.
As soon as the attacks in France took place, the Government increased security at the UK border. Officers from Border Force, the police and other organisations intensified checks on passengers, vehicles and goods entering the UK. We offered the French Government all assistance necessary, including the full co-operation of our police and Security and Intelligence Agencies.
On Sunday, before I attended the peace rally in Paris, I held talks with my counterparts from Europe, the United States and Canada to discuss what action we can take together. There was firm support from all countries present for new action to share intelligence, track the movement of terrorists and defeat the ideology which lies beneath the threat. It is important that we now deliver on those talks, and my officials, the Security Minister and I will keep up the pace—in particular when it comes to passenger name records—with other European member states.
On Monday, the Prime Minister, the Defence Secretary and I held a security meeting with senior officials to review the Paris attacks and the risks to the UK of a similar attack. Of course, we have long had detailed plans for dealing with these kinds of attacks. The House will recall the attacks in Mumbai in 2008 when terrorists armed with assault weapons and explosives took the lives of more than 150 people. Since 2010, and learning the lessons of that attack, we have improved our police firearms capability and the speed of our military response, and we have enhanced protective security where possible through a range of other measures. We have improved joint working between the emergency services to deal specifically with marauding gun attacks. Specialist joint police, ambulance and fire teams are now in place in key areas across England, with equivalents in Scotland and Wales, and they are trained and equipped to manage casualties in the event of that kind of an attack.
The police and other agencies regularly carry out exercises to test the response to a terrorist attack, and these exercises include scenarios that are similar to the events in Paris. We will ensure that future exercises reflect specific elements of the Paris attacks, so we can learn from them and be ready for them should they ever occur in the United Kingdom. In addition, I should tell the House that the police can call on appropriate military assistance when required across the country.
The attacks in Paris were enabled by the availability of assault weapons. Although there are obviously a number of illegal weapons in the UK, we have some of the toughest gun laws in the world, and as a result firearms offences make up only a small proportion of overall recorded crime. The types of firearms used in the attacks in Paris are not unknown in the UK, but they are extremely uncommon. However, as the Prime Minister has said, we must step up our efforts with other countries to crack down on the illegal smuggling of weapons across borders. In particular, the member states of the European Union need to work together to put beyond use the vast number of weapons in the countries of the former Yugoslavia and disrupt the supply of weapons from other parts of the world, especially north Africa.
The measures we have taken following events in Paris are in addition to the substantial work that the Government have undertaken, and continue to undertake, to counter the threat from terrorism. Last summer, Parliament approved emergency legislation to prevent the sudden and rapid loss of access to communications data and the ability to intercept communications where it is thought necessary and proportionate to do so. Parliament is of course scrutinising the proposals in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill as we speak. This important legislation will strengthen our powers to disrupt the ability of people to travel abroad to fight, and control their ability to return here. It will also enhance our ability to deal with those in the UK who pose a risk. In particular, it will allow the relocation of people subject to terrorism prevention and investigation measures to other parts of the country. In addition, the Prime Minister has announced £130 million over the next two years for the agencies, police and others in addition to the more than £500 million spent on counterterrorism policing each year.
This Government have done more to confront the ideology that lies behind the threat we face. I have excluded more foreign hate preachers than any Home Secretary before me; we have deported Abu Qatada and extradited Abu Hamza; we have reformed the Prevent strategy so that it tackles non-violent extremism as well as violent extremism; and we have invested more time, resources and money in counter-narrative operations.
We have always been clear that the police and the security agencies must have the capabilities and powers they need to do their job, and following the attacks in Paris the Prime Minister has reiterated that commitment. Unfortunately, when it comes to communications data and the intercept of communications, there is no cross-party consensus and therefore no parliamentary majority to pass the legislation to give the police and security services the capabilities they need. Let me be absolutely clear: every day that passes without the proposals in the communications data Bill, the capabilities of the people who keep us safe diminish; and as those capabilities diminish, more people find themselves in danger and—yes—crimes will go unpunished and innocent lives will be put at risk.
This is not, as I have heard it said, “letting the Government snoop on your e-mails”. It is allowing the police and the security services, under a tightly regulated and controlled regime, to find out the who, where, when and how of a communication but not its content, so that they can prove and disprove alibis, identify associations between suspects, and tie suspects and victims to specific locations. It is too soon to say for certain, but it is highly probable that communications data were used in the Paris attacks to locate the suspects and establish the links between the two attacks. Quite simply, if we want the police and the security services to protect the public and save lives, they need this capability.
Last weekend people of all nationalities, faith and backgrounds came together out on to the streets of France and other countries to demonstrate their opposition to terror, and to stand for democracy and for freedom. We must stand in solidarity with them, and do all that we can to confront extremism and terrorism in all its forms.”
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her characteristically thoughtful and measured response. I, too, pay tribute to noble Lords who were here into the late hours last night in what was, I thought, an incredible debate demonstrating the House at its best, with its deep expertise and concern in this area.
The noble Baroness asked about the 300 people who are thought to have returned. Of course, we do not know the whereabouts of everyone, and that is part of the purpose behind the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill—to improve the ability of the security services to identify and track people coming in and to seek to prevent them from going out. We can say that last year, in 2014, more than 120 people were arrested for alleged offences relating to Syria, including terrorist financing, preparing acts of terrorism and attending terrorist training camps. There were seven prosecutions. In the previous year, 27 people were arrested in the UK for Syria-related terrorist offences. Some of those people will also go into the Channel programme; 2,000 individuals are taking part in the Channel programme. I do not have a particular breakdown as to those who were part of the 300 who came back, but that gives an idea as to what the security services are doing with those people, and we need to give them what strength we can.
On the concerns about the situation at the borders, there was a particular operation, as we would all expect, in the wake of the attack, which was as much in solidarity and co-operation and as part of the tracking procedure with the Home Secretary’s opposite number in France, Monsieur Cazeneuve. I entirely understand the point that the noble Baroness made about capacity at border points. That is why we need to rely more on intelligence and data gathering about who is travelling and why, where the threat is, and communicating and working with our partners in Europe through the opt-ins to the joint home affairs measures which we announced before Christmas to enable us to work more effectively.
On the communications data Bill and the Joint Committee on Human Rights, when that review took place, my right honourable friend the Home Secretary responded to the Joint Committee that it had made a very thorough review of the Bill and that, broadly, all the committee’s recommendations were acceptable, with some modifications. That was communicated to the committee. It now looks as if it is not possible to pass the Bill in this Parliament, but, if the Conservative Party were to form a Government after the election, it would of course be brought forward immediately in any Queen’s Speech.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement. Does he agree that since the attacks the solidarity shown by the French people of all faiths in defence of the values that we all share is the surest way to show the world that the terrorists will not prevail? Does he further agree that the sharing of information about potential terrorist attacks among EU countries, the United States, Turkey and other countries is an essential way to prevent future terrorist attacks from taking place in our country and in other countries?
Taking the last point first, I certainly agree that information sharing needs to improve. That is why we signed up for the ECRIS security system data checks and the Schengen information sharing system and why dialogues are happening at this very time in the US—the Prime Minister departs soon for Washington to engage in conversations with our partners there—and elsewhere in Europe.
On the noble Lord’s first point about image, when people resort to violence and intimidation the result, as is so often the case, is exactly the opposite of what they try to do. They tried to divide and spread terror but instead they brought confidence onto the streets of Paris which was shared across Europe. That was a welcome sight and a very bold message to send to those who would challenge our liberties.
My Lords, the view was widely expressed in yesterday’s debate that Prevent, and the Channel programme within it, is the most difficult and most important strand of the counter- terrorism strategy. I welcome the reference in the Statement to the investment of time, resources and money in the counternarrative. Money, time and energy are not unlimited. Do the Government agree that it may be more productive to apply these to quiet, informal, non-traditional and imaginative support and advice and will they remain open to not using up those resources on putting Prevent on a statutory basis?
Some 45,000 people have had contact through the Prevent programmes but their provision across England and Wales is, one might say, patchy. The idea behind putting it on a statutory footing—something which the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, David Anderson, supported—was to try to raise standards to ensure that we get better value for money from it. In doing that, it is important to work with those in the Muslim community. They are our partners and they want to work with Government and the wider community to identify people who pose a potential risk and to challenge the notion that these acts of terror are anything other than brutality and have absolutely nothing to do with their faith.
My Lords, will the noble Lord accept that the events in Paris—the public reaction to them throughout Europe has been very moving—have persuaded a very large number of people in this country, including me, to reconsider our previous position and take the view that we ought to go further than the provisions in the Bill and withdraw or cancel the passports held by British subjects who have gone to the Middle East or elsewhere to enlist with al-Qaeda, Islamic State or other jihadist or terrorist organisations? It is often said that withdrawing their passports would be against international law. I think I am right—the Minister will correct me if I am not—that there is no actual convention or explicit treaty which constricts us in this area. What is said to be international law is really just an opinion on the subject. As the Minister has already said, the prime and overriding necessity and priority must be to save British lives. Is there not a real danger that, if hundreds more people in this category come back to this country, the additional strain placed on our security services of monitoring them may be such as to create a significantly enhanced risk of an oversight at some point which could cost a lot of lives?
The noble Lord’s point about passports is absolutely right. Eight people have had their British citizenship revoked since August 2013. The power already exists, under royal prerogative, to cancel someone’s passport. Those decisions are not taken lightly but the power is there. Whether it needs to be extended is something we will have to keep under continuous review. The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation will be a key asset in giving us advice on that.
Is my noble friend aware of a surprising recent change which has taken place at London City Airport whereby you can get through immigration simply by putting your passport in a machine, with no direct contact with an individual immigration officer at all? Is this likely to improve security?
Counterintuitively, it probably does because the only people who are able to go down that channel are those who have biometrics in their passport. Although it might not be apparent, the access channels for those who have biometric passports are overseen and visually checked by a Border Force officer.
My Lords, much has been said since the attacks in Paris about the right to offend. If there is a right to offend, there is a right to be offended. People react to offence in different ways. Some will turn the other cheek, some will come out with expletives and some will resort to violence. Does the Minister believe that there is any merit in deliberately antagonising people?
This goes to the heart. We need to separate the issues. There can never be any excuse under any terms whatever for people using violence to raise a point. In fact, in many ways the spirit of Paris on that dreadful day was best represented by the Muslim police officer, a personal protection officer, who was murdered defending one of the journalists at Charlie Hebdo who had been under attack. It is that spirit of service that we ought to highlight. We may disagree with people, but we defend absolutely their right to speak. That is the spirit we should carry forward.
Does my noble friend recognise that while there were criticisms of the Government for bringing in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill, which they did well before the events in Paris, I do not think there is much criticism now of the need for steps to be taken in recognising the importance of introducing those measures? Those of us who are the survivors of last night’s marathon will recall the words of the impressive maiden speech of the noble Lord, Lord Evans of Weardale, a former director-general of MI5, who said that the threat level now is greater but our capacity to meet it is less. I challenge my noble friend on what he said at the end in reply to the question about the communications data Bill. We still have three months left of this Parliament. This should not be a party-political issue. These issues are our vital to our intelligence services. It does not matter how many boots we have on the ground; intelligence is our safeguard and our defence in those issues. We must ensure that in the present very dangerous situation the intelligence services have the resources they need. In the three months we have left, I hope the Government will consider that we could still do that and make sensible progress in this area.
The noble Lord brings immense experience to this, not least from his chairmanship of the Intelligence and Security Committee, the oversight committee. He makes an interesting point. I repeated the Home Secretary’s Statement in which she that there is no cross-party agreement. Should that cross-party agreement emerge—of course, in your Lordships’ House party affiliation is only part of the picture as there is a distinguished coterie of expertise on the Cross Benches—then all things are possible.
My Lords, I am sure the noble Lord is aware that the Jewish community in France feels extremely threatened at the moment. I think it is also the case that the Jewish community in the UK does not feel terribly comfortable at the moment. What efforts are the Government making to help to support and reassure the Jewish community? Is any support being given to organisations such as the Maimonides Foundation, which was set up to bring together the Jewish and Muslim communities? That is a very useful measure. I express an interest as a previous member of the Maimonides Foundation.
I shall have to write on the latter point. On the former point, the Community Security Trust, which has responsibility for security at Jewish schools and synagogues, has been working closely with the Metropolitan Police and other forces to continue to take appropriate operational response measures to protect the Jewish community from terrorism, hate crime and the impact of public order protests. Police forces continue to work closely with the CST and other Jewish community organisations. I am deeply conscious of the sense of unease and fear which is felt within the Jewish community at this time. My honourable friend the Security Minister is meeting the CST today. I hope that in future I will be able to report back more. If not, I will write on it at the same time as I write on the other matter.
My Lords, in the short time that I have been back in this House, I have learnt to have the highest regard for my noble friend. However, I was slightly surprised that, speaking on behalf of the Government, he stressed the importance of trying to press forward with the communications data Bill because, as it is acknowledged, there is not agreement within the Government on this matter. Is it not the case that—as came out in the debate yesterday on the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill—that we really need to wait to review and possibly strengthen the legal framework before collecting more data? This also applies at the European level because the Government are pressing for the passenger name record EU directive but are resisting the strengthening of the EU data protection laws, on both consumer data and data that are used for law enforcement purposes. Do not the two need to go together so that people can be reassured that their data are secured before more are collected?
Again, the thoughts are mutual in terms of respect but also in terms of disagreement. This is just part of the disagreement and people can express their views. The Home Secretary has been very clear that we think that this Bill is absolutely necessary and the security services are very clear that they think this is necessary. The current head of MI5 thinks that this power is absolutely necessary. We want to give it to him. We might disagree with our coalition colleagues about that. I am perfectly able, as a Minister and part of the Government, to say that, as the Deputy Prime Minister was able to offer a different view in the media this morning.
My Lords, in the Statement the Government say that they will do everything they can to keep the public safe. While we would all agree with that sentiment, the fact is there has been a scandal developing over the past two and a half years where the National Crime Agency is not operational in all parts of the United Kingdom. It does not fully operate in Northern Ireland because Sinn Fein has decided to veto it. When will the Government do something about this instead of pussyfooting around it? It is not going to fix itself and yet it is opening the back door to terrorism and criminal gangs. I do not believe that that elementary step should be left untaken.
Of course I recognise that. The National Crime Agency is responsible primarily for organised crime and child sexual exploitation; it is looking and working in those areas. The Home Secretary has made it clear that we would like to see the National Crime Agency extended to Northern Ireland but because of the devolved agreement that we have, we need to seek approval from Northern Ireland to welcome it into the role. We would like to see it but really it is for Northern Ireland to decide.
My Lords, the Minister will be aware of the work of the Community Security Trust with the Jewish community. He will also be aware that the trust also works with some Muslim communities, and no doubt he would be prepared to encourage working between the two communities on an interfaith basis. The CST has a high reputation, I believe, with the police and security forces and it would be welcome for the Government to explicitly back that interfaith approach.
I am very happy to do that. That is absolutely right. We saw images of Jews and Muslims coming together in Paris—there was reference made to them last night. I think they were actually from Albania and came together to show solidarity that this is not happening in their name and that all faith communities are going to stand together against this attack on their freedoms. The more we see of that, the better.
Does my noble friend agree that there is nothing remotely disrespectful in the cartoon in this week’s Charlie Hebdo which depicts the Prophet Muhammad identifying with the victims of the murderous attack by fascist terrorists and weeping at the thought that it could be claimed to have been done in his name?
I think that all those who believe in a divine force in this world will recognise that any divine element who is love will be weeping at what is happening now, not just in France but across the whole world, in many corners where people’s lives are blighted and violence is used.
Do I understand the Minister correctly—perhaps I misunderstood it, although I did not miss a single speech last night—that the Home Secretary is sitting on some legislative proposals that she has not been allowed to bring forward, which would fit in the Bill we are discussing? We will have that Bill in this House for four weeks, so it would not be that rushed. If that is the case, and if there is a problem because there is a veto on allowing her to give it to the Minister, frankly it is Parliament’s decision, so why does he not ask the Home Secretary to offer the amendments to a Cross-Bench Peer so that this House can decide whether or not to further amend the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill before we send it back to the other place?
The communications data Bill is there; the Joint Committee on Human Rights carried out an excellent review of it, making a few recommendations. My right honourable friend the Home Secretary has made her position clear on those points. Of course, people are entirely at liberty to pick up amendments and bring forward any that they wish.
My Lords, my noble friend referred earlier to the fact that Muslims are partners and we very much need them to work and co-operate in order to root out these extremists in our society after the terrible events in Paris. However, does he agree with me that comments such as those made by Rupert Murdoch, who lays the blame firmly on the world’s Muslims and says that they “must be held responsible”, and Nigel Farage, who said only the other day that the authorities had turned a blind eye to,
“the growth of ghettos where the police and all the normal agents of the law have withdrawn and that is where sharia law has come in”,
are unhelpful as regards promoting good race, community and interfaith relations? Will they help in what we are trying to achieve?
I am grateful to my noble friend for raising that point, which perfectly illustrates the tensions. I disagree fundamentally with what has been said, both by Rupert Murdoch and by the UKIP member in the other example that she gave. Again, however, we defend the free press and its right to say that.
My Lords, I can well understand that Members on the Lib Dem Benches wish to wait, as many of us would like to in an ideal world, for the outcome of David Anderson’s review of terrorism legislation, and they welcome the ISC on the subject of data and the work of the independent group at RUSI. However, does the Minister accept that in waiting for those recommendations and in taking a slow and considered look at legislation in this difficult area, we heighten the risk to our citizens?
The noble Baroness, who of course has immense experience in this area, will recall that the Home Secretary said that,
“every day that passes without the proposals in the draft Communications Data Bill, the capabilities of the people who keep us safe diminish; and as those capabilities diminish, more people find themselves in danger and—yes—crimes will go unpunished and innocent lives will be put at risk”.
That is a very sober message for all Members of this House to reflect upon.
My Lords, just for complete clarity on the government position, will the Minister agree that the Snowden revelations have made us all much less safe and have enabled terrorists now to use methods of communication that we cannot penetrate, and that there will therefore be deaths as a result of what he has done?
That is absolutely right. I also pay tribute to the interventions and remarks that the noble Lord made last night on people trying to present the communications data Bill as some kind of snoopers’ charter. That is absolutely ridiculous and offensive to people who are trying to do a serious job of trying to keep us safe in this country. They deserve our support and do not deserve to be trivialised in that way.
(9 years, 7 months ago)
Lords Chamber
That the Bill be read a second time.
Relevant documents: 5th Report from the Joint Committee on Human Rights, 8th Report from the Constitution Committee
My Lords, the emergence of ISIL and its territorial gains in Syria and Iraq present a clear and present threat to our national security. Noble Lords will be aware that nearly 600 people from the UK who are of interest to the security services are thought to have travelled to the region since the start of the conflict. It is estimated that almost half of them have since returned to the UK. On 29 August 2014, the independent Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre raised the terrorism threat level from substantial to severe, meaning that an attack is highly likely. On 1 September, my right honourable friend the Prime Minister announced that legislation would be brought forward.
The horrific events in Paris last week were the latest in a long line of shocking terrorist attacks, following the brutal beheading of Fusilier Lee Rigby, the murder of four civilians at the Jewish Museum in Brussels last May, the shootings at the Canadian Parliament in Ottawa and the Sydney hostage crisis. They all demonstrate the threat posed by ISIL and other terrorist organisations, such as al-Qaeda, across the democratic world.
I know that the whole House will join me in paying tribute to the incredible and courageous work of the men and women in our law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies. Their tireless efforts to keep us safe have thwarted around 40 attacks since 7 July 2005. Since April 2010, 210 people have been charged and more than 140 have been successfully prosecuted for terrorism-related offences. It is those security services that tell us that the nature of the threat has changed and so must our response. It is against that backdrop that we bring the Bill before your Lordships’ House.
The Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill will help us to disrupt people who intend to travel abroad to fight, as well as their ability to return here without ensuring adequate protection for our citizens. It will enhance our ability to monitor and control the actions of those in the UK who pose a threat, and it will help to challenge the pernicious underlying ideology that feeds, supports and sanctions terrorism. Part 1 of the Bill contains two powers that will enhance our ability to restrict the plans of those suspected of travelling overseas to engage in terrorism-related activity. The first is the power for the police, or a Border Force officer acting under their direction, to seize a passport and, in so doing, temporarily to disrupt the ability of an individual to travel. This will allow the agencies to investigate and decide whether further disruptive action is necessary—for instance, criminal prosecution or cancelling their passport under the existing royal prerogative.
Chapter 2 creates the power for the Home Secretary to issue temporary exclusion orders. This will allow us temporarily to disrupt the return of a British citizen suspected of involvement in terrorism-related activity abroad, ensuring that when individuals return it is on our terms. In the light of the comments of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, David Anderson QC, and following the debates in the House of Commons, the Government have committed to considering judicial oversight for this power. We will return to this issue in Committee should the Bill be successful at Second Reading.
Part 2 of the Bill enhances the existing terrorism prevention and investigation measures—or TPIMs—regime. Here, we are again acting on the recommendations of David Anderson QC in his most recent report on the operation of TPIMs. This includes allowing us to relocate an individual subject to a TPIM order up to 200 miles from his or her current residence, to help disrupt terrorist networks. It also involves raising the legal test for imposing a TPIM, providing further reassurance that they are used only where absolutely necessary.
Part 3 relates to data retention, specifically the problem of internet protocol address resolution. This is a technical issue and we will get into the details in Committee. However, these provisions will deliver vital additional capability to the police and intelligence agencies, helping to address the ongoing degradation in the availability of communications data.
Part 4 covers aviation, shipping and rail security. It includes measures in three broad areas: our authority-to-carry or no-fly arrangements; systems for providing advance passenger information to the UK authorities; and enhanced security and screening measures. Carriers will have to comply with our requirements if they are to operate to the UK.
Chapter 1 of Part 5 creates a duty on a range of authorities—listed in Schedule 3 to the Bill—to have due regard to preventing people being drawn into terrorism. The detail of what this duty will mean in practice for the schools, universities, police forces and prisons that will be subject to it will be set out in statutory guidance. We have published that guidance in draft for consultation alongside this Bill.
Chapter 2 of Part 5 also provides a statutory basis for the existing programmes for those at risk of being drawn into terrorism. As many noble Lords will be aware, in England and Wales this is known as the Channel programme. These provisions will ensure that such programmes are consistently available to all local areas.
Part 6 amends two provisions in the Terrorism Act 2000. The first ensures that UK insurance companies cannot reimburse the payment of a ransom to a terrorist organisation, putting the existing law beyond doubt. The second relates to the examination of goods at ports under Schedule 7 to the 2000 Act. It will clarify the law relating to where goods can be examined and the examination of goods comprising postal items.
Along with other miscellaneous provisions, Part 7 allows for the creation of a Privacy and Civil Liberties Board to support the work of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. We are at present conducting a further consultation on this proposal, prior to bringing forward regulations for Parliament to consider.
I welcome the cross-party support for this legislation in this House. I know that the Home Secretary has appreciated it in the House of Commons. I particularly want to thank the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, and my noble friend Lady Hamwee for their constructive approach in negotiations about this legislation.
I am also aware that there is a very long and distinguished list of Peers seeking to speak in this debate. I am sure that noble Lords are particularly keen to hear the maiden speeches of the noble Lords, Lord Evans of Weardale and Lord Green of Deddington, who bring considerable knowledge and expertise to these matters. I do not, therefore, intend to detain the House any longer, but will of course respond in greater detail to the points which—
I am grateful to my noble friend for giving way. I am intervening because I cannot stay for the rest of the debate. I welcome his statement that he will consider introducing judicial authority over control orders. Does he accept the general constitutional principle that, where such control orders are to be introduced, they should be under judicial control rather than under the control of politicians?
I referred to that earlier. In another place, the Minister, James Brokenshire, said that we would look at it and seek to bring forward amendments, should the Bill go into Committee. We will do that.
I was saying, in conclusion, that I will address the points made in the course of this debate, perhaps at greater length, in my closing remarks.
We are in the middle of a generational struggle against a ruthless terrorist ideology that challenges the core values of our society. Those charged with our security must be properly equipped to do the job that we ask of them to maintain a free, open and tolerant nation. That is what the Bill is designed to do and I commend it to the House. I beg to move.
My Lords, I echo the words of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, in viewing this debate as calm and measured. In the words of my noble friend Lord Phillips of Sudbury, it has been the House at its best, as it is on many occasions of this nature. A lot of issues have been raised and I shall do my very best to get through them. Essentially, they have grouped around nine main thematic areas: the nature of the threat; the procedure and legislative process; passports, and their seizure; temporary exclusion orders; funding and resources; international co-operation; IT and data retention; Prevent powers, particularly in relation to universities; and the Privacy and Civil Liberties Board.
I turn to the first of those—the nature of the threat. I thought that the debate was aided immensely by the contributions in our two new maiden speeches, which were both focused on the particular expertise that the noble Lords, Lord Evans and Lord Green, have in their respective roles. The noble Lord, Lord Evans, referred to a jolt of energy that has gone through the terrorist networks; they are enlivened, bold and audacious in how they undertake their attacks. The noble Lord, Lord Green, from his immense experience in the Middle East, spoke of what he regarded as that region descending into a chaotic situation. He chillingly viewed the situation as being the worst that he could recall in 50 years. That is of course because of what is happening through ISIL in Iraq and Syria. I pay tribute to the work of my noble friend Lady Neville-Jones, who pointed out that it is not a static threat but an expanding one, and that ISIL is now very much on the borders of NATO in Turkey. It is growing and dynamic.
The noble Lord, Lord King, has immense expertise, which I was grateful that he could draw on while speaking in the gap. He reminded us that ISIL is different and distinctive from anything that we have seen before. The noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, talked about its international nature in referring to Boko Haram and attacks elsewhere, including Pakistan. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, referred to the horrific attack on the school in Peshawar, which led to the death of 132 schoolchildren. It is of course not just happening far away; it is happening with the active and determined support of British citizens—a small and determined band. That is what makes it different.
My noble friend Lady Neville-Jones and the noble Lord, Lord Butler, referred to the fact that in the case of the horrific attacks in Paris, the attackers were using skills and training that they had experienced in training camps and active service elsewhere. The noble Baroness referred to Yemen, where they had learnt those deadly skills that we need to counter. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, talked from his immense experience about the actions of a determined minority that were jeopardising free speech. When we have a debate about the Prevent duties for universities—which I will come to in a minute—it is important that we also remember this enemy’s absolutely determined war on free speech.
The noble Lord, Lord Rooker, offered me some professional sympathy, having been a distinguished predecessor in this role, and talked about a group of people who were intent on destroying our very way of life. For these reasons, and others, the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, adjudged fairly that the Government had entirely and convincingly made the case for the necessity of legislation. On the nature of the legislation and its process, a couple of noble Lords, to whom I will not refer directly, questioned whether it was a knee-jerk reaction. They used terms such as “window-dressing” and questioned whether it was meaningful and would have a real effect in tackling a real problem. At my very junior level in the Government, I have an overwhelming sense of the need to consider such matters as: are you overlooking something; are you upholding safety; are you correctly balancing security, civil rights and freedom; are you doing all that you can? I can only imagine what the weight and pressure must have been for the Prime Minister when he was informed, on 29 August, of the view of the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre—not of his committee, not in his judgment—that the threat level should be raised from substantial to severe. It therefore determined that an attack was highly likely. I guess he responded as most of us would do on 1 September, when he said that he wanted to be absolutely sure he had done everything in his power to try to keep our citizens safe. That is the genesis of the legislation.
As to the legislative process before us, the Government are committed to ensuring the effective parliamentary scrutiny of the legislation. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, talked about the use of fast-track in a very thoughtful speech, which showed an incredible understanding of the wrestling and agonising which is going on across government about how to strike the balance and frame the legislative approach. The noble Lord, Lord Rooker, said that he did not feel that the term “fast-track” was appropriate. In some senses it is not, because we are talking here about a limitation of the intervals, not limitation of the debate. The signal of intent came at the beginning of September; the Bill was introduced at the end of November; we have had hearings by the Joint Committee on Human Rights; it has been scrutinised in another place; it will have three days in Committee, then go on to Report and Third Reading. There are also five or six parallel consultations on different aspects of the Bill. We can make the case. I know that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, brings immense expertise to this area. He made a very thoughtful speech in which he raised concerns on this point and I listened carefully to them. However, I feel that in this case of necessity we have got the balance about right in terms of the legislative process.
The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, to whom I express my gratitude for her support as we work through the Bill, asked about the sunset clause. There are certain provisions within TPIMs and the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act which are subject to sunset clauses. However, the view is that it would be inappropriate to add a sunset clause for some of the other provisions—for instance, where they simply clarify existing legislation or where an industry, such as the aviation sector, needs certainty if it is to implement new technical systems. Noble Lords will wish to note that the Constitution Committee, which took a great interest in such issues, did not recommend a sunset provision in this regard.
My noble friend Lord Jopling and the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, talked about preparedness. My noble friend Lord Jopling also spoke about the chemical, biological and nuclear attacks which could arise—and about the chilling side-effects of Botox, which, if they were made known in the market, would lead to a dramatic fall in sales. However, it is right that preparedness is a key part of what the Government are seeking to do here. In 2014, more than 120 people were arrested for alleged offences relating to Syria while seven individuals were convicted for Syria-related terrorist activities, which shows that the Government are prepared in this regard.
Many literary allusions were made in the debate. The noble Lord, Lord Hennessy, referred to Karl Popper, and I was grateful that he struggled with the relevant text as that made me feel less guilty. We have also had references to Joseph Conrad, Voltaire, Henry James and others. Noble Lords have struggled with the texts of philosophers in trying to get the right balance between privacy and security. That issue was helpfully touched on by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham, who said that it is not how we live but how we live together that matters, and that we need to be careful about taking away security and civil liberties. The noble Lord, Lord Armstrong of Ilminster, talked about the need to restrike the balance between the two concepts in the face of the new threat. That balance is constantly under review. My noble friend Lord Carlile, in a very powerful and eloquent speech, which was full of insight, said that the Home Office was far from caricatures portraying a cadre of people seeking every opportunity to restrict the freedoms of others. In his experience and in mine, the Home Office is full of incredibly professional people who agonise, along with everybody else, about whether they have struck that balance correctly.
My noble friend Lady Shields and a number of others spoke about the international discussions that are going on. I can inform the House that active discussions are taking place bilaterally with Turkey and France, as one would expect, but also with EU partners. This underscores the fact that we are facing these threats having taken the decision at the end of November to opt into certain justice and home affairs issues. One can only imagine what people might be thinking, and how insecure they might feel if, in the face of the terrorist attacks in Paris, we did not have any legislation currently in train. We are debating it and that is part of our preparedness.
The noble Lord, Lord Condon, referred to lessons from Denmark. My noble friend Lord Carlile painted a picture of a phalanx of international leaders arm in arm on the march on Sunday. The international community needs to move forward and to ensure that we send a collective message, but we also need to work with each other to counter this very serious threat. My noble friend Lord Roberts and I are attracted to the suggestion of my noble friend Lord Carlile that religious communities can be part of the solution, not part of the problem. My noble friend Lord Marlesford talked about political Islam but religions are very much part of the solution. The picture of the Albanian Christians and Muslims marching together in Paris certainly showed that the terrorists have not won.
Several noble Lords, including my noble friends Lady Berridge and Lady Buscombe, referred to passport seizure for longer than 14 days. They talked about the Joint Committee on Human Rights report. There is an important point here. My noble friend Lady Buscombe said that to characterise this as a universally critical statement on the Bill, as perhaps some of the press releases that have surrounded this debate did, was absolutely wrong. The report took a fair and balanced approach. Again, it reflected the fact that everybody is wrestling with this. The difference in views between the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, and my noble friend Lady Buscombe reflects the scale of debate that is happening not just in the Joint Committee on Human Rights but across the Floor of the House. In fact, it is happening across the country.
At 14 days, the police’s investigation should have progressed to the extent that a court can meaningfully consider whether the investigation has been conducted diligently and expeditiously. Any evidence provided at a court hearing should not differ too greatly from that which caused the decision to seize a passport in the first place. This is done on a case-by-case basis. The noble Viscount, Lord Hanworth, reminded us that each individual has a different route to ISIL or wherever they are going. We need to treat them as individuals, case by case.
In terms of reasonable suspicion, I am sure that my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford did not mean that officials would seize a passport on a hunch. We are in consultation over a substantial document—a code of practice. It goes into exhaustive detail about the circumstances, assurances and processes that must be gone through before such a serious step as temporarily taking away someone’s travel documents is taken. I can assure the House that that power would be used only on a case-by-case basis, where the police reasonably suspect that a person is travelling overseas for terrorist purposes. It would probably be circumscribed by a number of stringent safeguards, with a check by a senior officer above superintendent level and an additional check by a more senior officer independent of the investigation for up to 72 hours; an initial retention period of only 14 days; and a court review of the ongoing need to retain a passport, allowing a judge to extend that period up to a maximum of 30 days if the police needed more time for their investigation.
My noble friend Lady Hamwee asked whether we could seize foreign as well as UK passports. The answer is yes and it feeds into the point that my noble friend Lord Marlesford raised about notifying people when they have more than one nationality. The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, asked about the JCHR’s proposal for notification of the turnovers, and I feel that my noble friend Lady Buscombe dealt with that effectively. We are all searching for the right approach.
The noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, asked whether the temporary exclusion orders will be retained indefinitely. The clause makes it clear that there is a duty for the Secretary of State to issue to the subject of a temporary exclusion a permit to travel within a reasonable period if the subject applies for one. This is a key provision for a temporary exclusion power. It is about managing the return, to which a number of noble Lords have referred.
I was asked specifically about what is meant by “considering further action” and the judicial oversight of that process. The only language that I am able to use at present, which may not be satisfactory—noble Lords will have to read between the lines—is that we will visit this in Committee. Noble Lords understand how legislation works. I hope they will understand that that is more than a general statement; it is something of a statement of intent.
On temporary exclusion orders, if people want to return we will decide whether to impose a temporary exclusion order on a case-by-case basis. A temporary exclusion order does not prevent individuals from returning to the UK. It ensures that they return in a controlled manner and subjects them to additional measures on their return. It can be in operation for up to two years because of those additional measures; it is not that the process of their return will take two years.
I now move on to funding. I hope the House will bear with me just a little bit longer, given that I was chastised by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, for being a little bit brief at the beginning. She is perhaps beginning to regret that statement now, as I am sure the House is. I will try to get through this, but I will certainly finish within the next few minutes. I give that undertaking. Not a great many questions were raised on finance, but the noble Lord, Lord Harris, asked me about it. I have that finance available. I am happy to write to the noble Lord about that. I absolutely underscore the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Swynnerton, the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and my noble friend Lady Berridge that finance is critical to the way that this terrorist organisation is growing. It is a rich organisation, as the noble Lord said. We need to attack its finances as well as its ideology and its human resources.
I think the point on control orders is now accepted. We have seen the remarks of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, David Anderson. He has made his position very clear on this and we are listening very carefully to him.
I was asked by the noble Lords, Lord Carlile and Lord Butler, about the oversight board and whether it was the case that we had somehow changed our position. I think that was the suggestion. We are currently consulting on the powers. The document is out there and that consultation is live until 30 January for people to offer their views on the shape of the board. We do not want to pre-empt the end of that process at this stage. We are determined to go forward in the light of the consultation. If it goes forward, the establishment of the board will be by means of the affirmative procedure, as the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, asked. The timing of this will be subject to the availability of parliamentary time. I cannot say a great deal more on that, but I assure noble Lords that we will have more to say on that in Committee.
A number of points were made on Prevent. I will use this as an opportunity to plug the fact that we have a meeting at 2.30 pm on Thursday 15 January to deal with this matter, particularly relating to universities, in Committee Room 4A. Most noble Lords have been written to about this. The only point I would make on universities is that a copy of the Official Report of this debate should be required reading in all universities. That is not a regulation; it is just a suggestion. I do not want to stir things up too much further.
On the Data Retention Act, I want to thank my noble friend Lady Shields in particular for her work and for her helpful comments. During the scrutiny of the draft Communications Data Bill, both the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament and the Joint Committee on the Bill concluded that legislation is required to address the ongoing capability gaps that this narrow provision will not fill. We talked about the gaps in current capability. The noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, referred to that as well.
I have covered as many points as I can. The first duty of any Government is to ensure that their citizens are safe. That means not only the wider elements of how we talk about and tackle the culture that is giving rise to this problem but also effective policing, as my noble friend Lord Wasserman pointed out. I agree with noble Lords that we must protect our civil liberties alongside our rights to safety and security. The range of safeguards in this Bill and those we propose to add in Committee will do that, ensuring that these new powers are used in a necessary and proportionate way. The varied and detailed contributions from noble Lords have enabled us to cover a full range of issues during the course of today’s debate and I and my noble friend Lord Ashton of Hyde look forward to returning to these issues in detail in Committee. I commend the Bill to the House.
(9 years, 7 months ago)
Lords Chamber
That the Bill be committed to a Committee of the Whole House, and that it be an instruction to the Committee that they consider the Bill in the following order:
Clause 1, Schedule 1, Clauses 2 to 20, Schedule 2, Clause 21, Schedule 3, Clauses 22 to 30, Schedule 4, Clauses 31 to 35, Schedule 5, Clauses 36 to 43.
(9 years, 7 months ago)
Lords Chamber
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the effects on children of the publication of photographs of them without agreement or permission; and what consideration they have given to the aims of Protect: the Campaign for Children’s Privacy.
My Lords, I understand the importance of ensuring that children’s privacy is respected and that safeguards are in place to protect it. The Government have introduced the new system of independent press self-regulation and there are remedies available under civil law. The Government are committed to tackling the production and distribution of indecent images of children and criminal offences are available in such cases.
My Lords, we have to be clear about what Protect: the Campaign for Children’s Privacy is asking the Government to consider. Surely it is entirely reasonable and responsible that when identifying an individual child in a published photograph, there should either be consent or good reason. If not, the image should be pixilated or blurred. The Minister referred to self-regulation. If that is working, why did Hannah Weller have to go to court and why did the judge say that the law needs clarification? Will the Minister agree to meet Protect in order to understand parents’ concerns and consider how children’s privacy can be protected?
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for her question. I should say first that my right honourable friend the Deputy Prime Minister has met campaigners and I would be very happy to facilitate further meetings if that would be helpful. In respect of the particular case to which she referred, this is an ongoing legal matter and I am sure that she will understand if I do not comment on the specifics. But when it comes to the matter at hand, which is that of self-regulation, it is important to note that the Editors’ Code of Practice actually stipulates that where a child is under the age of 16, consent should be sought. That is something which should happen under the code and under self-regulation. Where that does not happen, there is then redress through the civil courts.
My Lords, society’s clear moral duty is to protect all children. Section 8 of the Ofcom Broadcasting Code does so and is very specific about the privacy and protection of children. All broadcasters apply these rules responsibly. What can be done to ensure that similar rules which refer more specifically to this type of photography are included in the print media code of practice and adhered to in order to protect children from unwanted exposure and potential harm?
I am grateful to my noble friend for that question. Section 1.8 of the Ofcom code refers to the protection of children and that is mirrored by the code of ethics under the self-regulatory system. What we need to do is ensure that that is working and that people are protected. At the same time, there is a need for a balance on the one hand between large crowd scenes in which children might be involved, or the premiere of a movie where a child star might be putting themselves in the public domain, and situations where privacy is involved. A fine balance needs to be achieved.
My Lords, does the noble Lord accept that those who have disabilities are still having huge difficulties in coming forward and reporting child sexual abuse or the need for protection? Will he assure the House that in all aspects of dealing with this matter—whether with regard to the media, the social justice arena or the law—he will take on board the specific needs of those with disabilities, in particular those with autism?
This applies to everybody equally, and those with disabilities should come forward. Those guilty of abuse should be prosecuted. There is a straight line between what we are talking about, which may be general intrusion such as the publication of a photograph, and, of course, the publication of sexualised images of children, on which the full weight of the criminal law needs rightly to come down.
My Lords, surely the examples that the Minister gave are very different. If there is a general crowd scene, and an individual child is not identified by name, that is distinct from circumstances where a child is identifiable and where consent has not been given. Under what circumstances does the public interest require that a child’s face should not be pixilated? Is there any case at all, in terms of journalistic integrity or the freedom of investigative journalism, that requires an identifiable child’s face to be published without consent?
The noble Lord puts his finger absolutely on the point, which is the difference between images—which is the context of the campaign, as I understand it—and the identification attached to an image of a child, which requires consent. That is the area of balance and the area of debate that we are seeking to square in this.
My Lords, does self-regulation apply to internet service providers?
The We Protect campaign, which the Prime Minister launched and which is chaired very effectively by my noble friend Lady Shields, is about self-regulation. It announced a major breakthrough just before Christmas about internet service providers seeking to remove child abuse images from the internet, identify abusers and ensure that they are brought to justice.
My Lords, given that three-quarters of the public believe that the media should protect children by pixilating or blurring their faces, does the Minister agree that more can and should be done to protect children’s privacy?
I acknowledge the work which the noble Baroness has done and her personal experience in this area, which I am aware of and which, obviously, we all understand. In the case of the protection of privacy, everybody—certainly every parent—understands the lengths to which we are all prepared to go to protect our children and our children’s safety. The question is about weighing the balance between that right to privacy and the right and privilege of free speech and freedom of the press, which is an underscored part of our democracy.
My Lords, the Minister has said that free speech is somehow undermined by publishing an identifiable child’s image. How is it undermined?
I did not say that it was undermined. With respect to the noble Lord, what I actually said was that there is a balance, in a free society, between being able to produce and publish images and identifying those images—in other words between the human rights aspects of Article 6, which deal with protection and privacy, and of Article 8, which deals with free speech. The courts deal with that and the self-regulators deal with that. We can deal with it in a common-sense way without the need to criminalise everyone who produces an image of a child.
(9 years, 8 months ago)
Lords Chamber
To ask Her Majesty’s Government, in the light of the comments by the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, what plans they have for the funding of policing over the next five years.
My Lords, the provisional police grant report to be published shortly sets out the Government’s decisions on police funding for 2015-16. No decisions have yet been taken on police funding beyond March 2016. However, as the police have shown categorically under this Government, it is possible to deliver lower crime while reducing budgets.
My Lords, I thank my noble friend for that Answer and congratulate him on his Dispatch Box manner, which has been exemplary since he became a Minister. However, does he not realise that there is very real concern in the country—not least in Lincolnshire, where the chief constable made a similar statement to Sir Bernard’s just a week before him? Is my noble friend confident that, apart from anything else, we will be able to continue to recruit candidates in the right number and of the right quality, because public confidence in the police service is being somewhat damaged by these statements?
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for his kind remarks, which are of course reciprocated. On the budgets that we are talking about, it is important to say that we inherited a very difficult set of financial circumstances, and the police had to take their share of the pressure. The reality is that although absolute police budgets have fallen by 16% in cash terms, crime has fallen by 20%. That is welcome. Indeed, in Lincolnshire, where Neil Rhodes is, there has been a 20% reduction in overall crime levels against a 10% change in overall officer numbers. That gives some encouragement that it can be done.
My Lords, I declare my registered interest in policing. Does the Minister accept that it will be prudent for the next Government, of whatever complexion, to consider further police reform, including potential amalgamations, if such reform is shown to provide better value for money, improve public confidence and, most importantly, safeguard neighbourhood policing, which seems to be under threat? Does he agree that the current Government’s support for police and crime commissioners should not get in the way of, or inhibit, further discussion of sensible reform?
I acknowledge the noble Lord’s great expertise in this area. The current Commissioner of the Met, while warning about cuts, also said that cuts without reform would not work. I think that everyone is signed up to the fact that there needs to be reform. What that reform should be is where the debate lies. Our argument is that perhaps there is greater room for the reform of policing—for example, doing away with targets and making just one target of cutting crime, and being better co-ordinated in terms of procurement between forces. Those are arguments that can be had. I also recognise the importance of local policing, which the noble Lord referred to as well.
My Lords, the Minister is aware that cuts upon cuts to police budgets mean that more functions are now being carried out by the private security industry—even custody suites in police stations. The role of private security is increasing dramatically and it is interacting with the public daily, so why have the Government failed to regulate private security firms? The consultation on this issue had one of the largest responses ever and it was almost unanimous in its support for regulation. The industry itself—that is, the organisations representing those businesses—is calling for regulation urgently, so why will the Government not act in the interests of the public and of the industry?
Of course the private security industry is the subject of regulation, and I will come to that. The reality is that in the past, in 2010, there were 5,000 police officers who were dealing with back-office and administrative functions. We said that, given the need to reduce overall budgets, the essential thing was to protect front-line policing, and therefore that we needed to move those people out of administrative tasks and on to the front line to actually fight against crime. That is what they have done, heroically, and that has led to a reduction in overall crime.
My Lords, are there any plans to extend the powers of the police and crime commissioners to investigate serious complaints against police officers? If so, what discussions have taken place with the Independent Police Complaints Commission, and what additional resources does my noble friend have in mind for the crime commissioners?
There have been no proposals to do that. The Independent Police Complains Commission, to which police and crime commissioners are also accountable, is covered by the present regime. Police and crime commissioners can play a leading role in helping to produce more effective policing locally, as is the case in Northamptonshire, where they have instituted co-operation between the police, fire and ambulance service in order to reduce costs and protect front-line policing.
My Lords, I also declare my interest in policing. I want to go back to the Minister’s Answer to the noble Lord, Lord Cormack. After five years in office, is it not rather surprising that the Government do not have a strategy for what to do next?
Obviously I defer to the noble Lord and his expertise, but the Government do have a strategy. We want the police to focus on cutting crime. We give the responsibility to police and crime commissioners and to chief constables to try to determine what the allocation of those resources should be in their local communities. That is what our strategy is. It is then down to the police and crime commissioners and chief constables to implement that. They are doing a terrific job, which is the reason why recorded crime is down to its lowest level.
(9 years, 8 months ago)
Lords Chamber
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what progress has been made towards the appointment of a chairman for the independent panel inquiry into child sexual abuse.
My Lords, the Home Secretary takes the appointment of the next chairman extremely seriously. Following the resignation of Fiona Woolf, the Home Secretary has sought the views of survivors’ groups to inform her on the appointment and she will update Parliament in due course.
My Lords, can my noble friend say whether the Government have approached the Lord Chief Justice to see whether a serving judge might be available to chair the inquiry—and, if so, with what result? Can he say what the Government’s position would be if a potential chair made acceptance of appointment conditional on having statutory powers to compel witnesses and disclosure of documents?
I am grateful to my noble friend for that question. With regard to the Home Secretary’s Statement on this matter on 3 November, we have since had 130 applications, some of which have been from serving judges. Therefore, it would be entirely appropriate for the Lord Chief Justice to be consulted on their availability to perform such a task if they were asked. With regard to the statutory footing, my right honourable friend the Home Secretary has said that if the chairman requested that the inquiry should be put on a statutory footing, she would take that into consideration. However, it does not have to be a judge for it to be statutory, because the statutory powers come from the Inquiries Act 2005.
My Lords, given the catalogue of mishaps in the appointing of a chairman, does the Home Secretary personally see a person she is minded to appoint as chairman?
Part of the issue here is that because of a series of announcements and revelations which brought about huge concern, there was a desire to move very quickly to establish the inquiry. The important thing, we recognise now, is to put survivors’ groups, and the confidence of those groups, at the heart of this, which is the reason the Home Secretary has met survivors’ groups three times—on 3, 20 and 25 November—and indeed is meeting them today.
My Lords, while we are discussing who is to be the chairperson for this inquiry—it is important that we get the right person—my concern is to support the victims in the mean time. What assurances can the Minister give about the support that will be provided, because it is not right through the bureaucratic processes to ask these victims what has gone on in their lives while they are being hit by barriers and not being given the right support and recognition of what they have gone through?
My noble friend is absolutely right. I also pay tribute to her work as the Victims’ Commissioner, which she carries out assiduously. Of course more needs to be done to help the victims. We are consulting with the Department of Health to find out what additional help we can provide, and in the interim we will be announcing a further package of £2 million of support for victims’ groups in the ongoing discussions.
We seem to be getting nowhere fast on this one, which is in marked contrast to the successful work done by my noble friend Lord Harris of Haringey on campaigning to close the loopholes on soliciting sexual material from a child—an issue which the Government have at last decided to take on board. Frankly, that they have still failed to find a chairman suggests that suitably qualified candidates are perhaps now being put off by the inevitable trawling through their personal lives, backgrounds and families by the media which the Government’s ineptitude has ensured will now occur. Can the Minister tell us why the Home Office failed to carry out basic background checks on Fiona Woolf, having had the first appointee stand down? Further, while I think the Minister has said that the survivors and victims of abuse are being consulted on the issue of the new chairman, can he say whether the terms of reference and the format of the inquiry are also being discussed with them?
The noble Lord’s latter point is of course central to the discussion with the survivors. They want to have confidence that individuals can be compelled to give evidence and that that evidence will actually be available to them. Perhaps I may say that it is a bit unfortunate for the noble Lord to take that tone in relation to the appointments. Both the people who were appointed to the role of chair are eminently qualified to do the work, but the question mark was over whether they would command the confidence of the survivors’ groups. It became apparent that that was not the case, and that is the reason the Home Secretary is going to the lengths that she is to listen to them now.
My Lords, when consulting with potential candidates for the chair, will the Home Secretary consider the length of time that that person will be available for the inquiry? We must bear in mind the fact that the very nature of the inquiry means that various new issues probably will arise during the course of the panel’s investigations, and they will need to be given proper consideration. She is going to need someone who can be available for really quite a long time.
That was one of the reasons why the panel was set up in its current form for the initial period. It wanted to draw on the excellent work that had been done by Ann Coffey, Alexis Jay and the NSPCC, among others, who had produced literature and evidence. We did not want the panel to reinvent the wheel but rather to get on and make sure that our institutions are sound, that victims’ voices are heard, and that we take action to ensure that these things could not happen again. The emphasis is now on speed. We want to get this done, but obviously the work must be carried out with the confidence of the survivors’ groups.
(9 years, 8 months ago)
Lords Chamber
To ask Her Majesty’s Government for what reasons British parents living abroad must wait for a minimum of eight weeks after having applied for their newborn baby’s first passport before they receive it.
My Lords, it is necessary for the safety and protection of the child that we undertake a full and careful assessment of each application. First-time passport applications for children are subject to additional checks and overseas applications can require documents to be verified in the country of issue with the relevant issuing authority.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his helpful and sensible Answer. Since I put down the Question, luckily, the eight-week advised wait for a newborn baby’s passport did not occur; it arrived nine days after application and the Home Office is to be commended. However, I would still like to ask the Minister for his reassurance that a minimum eight-week wait is not the norm but something of the past for low-risk areas, so as to alleviate the anxiety of new parents?
My Lords, we are always pleased to hear about a satisfied customer of the passport services, especially this year. That is good news. The reality is that delays can occur for three reasons. Sometimes they are caused by the passport service, and we are trying to bear down on that and improve on it. Sometimes the cause is the applicant not filling in forms or providing the necessary documents. Sometimes it is the country from which parents are applying for the overseas passport not giving in the documents in sufficient time. I agree that we should be doing much better.
Does my noble friend happen to know whether the communications problems between the Passport Office in Liverpool and the Passport Office in London have been sorted out yet?
Yes, for overseas passports it is Durham and Liverpool and we have put in an extra 1,100 staff to clear the backlog and improve our performance. Of those, so far 500 have been appointed and the rest will be appointed in the next few months.
At the peak of the summer holiday season, the Passport Office had a backlog of more than half a million passport applications. Thousands of people who had booked and paid for holidays were left uncertain whether they would be able to travel. In an editorial on 10 July on the great passport backlog, the Times wrote:
“The Passport Office has failed. The minister responsible … has failed”.
The Times was right. What guarantees can the Government give that there will not be the same shambles in the first half of next year?
There was a failure. That is why the Home Secretary intervened to annul agency status and to bring the problem into the Home Office to get a grip on it. That is why the delay in the process time for applications—which had sunk as low as 20%, which is appalling and for which we apologise—is now above 50% and heading towards 60% to 70%. That is as a result of the actions that have been taken and the grip that the Home Secretary has on the situation.
Can the Minister outline what powers an ambassador or consulate has in the event of an urgent need to repatriate a family with a newborn baby, because of either illness or tragedy?
Where there are exceptional cases then it is possible to apply for emergency travel documentation. Of course, such a matter is dealt with through the local embassy and the local consulate.
My Lords, has the agency status of the Passport Office now been resolved? In that case, where does the ultimate responsibility for delays, et cetera lie?
The ultimate responsibility now lies with the Home Office. We have taken that decision. Sometimes in the history of government it has been the case, when there was a problem, that we push it out and call it “agency status”. Here we have brought it in-house to get a grip on it. That is clearly happening.
May I ask the Minister what the position is regarding records, in view of his last statement? Every time I have to apply for a right of abode every time I get a new passport—I still have only my Australian passport—I am asked to provide all the original documents of my husband’s birth, his parents’ marriage and my marriage. I do not know whether the documents are going to give out or whether I am going to be dead first. Is there no way that these things can be kept on record?
Documentation is, of course, a critical element of this. The British passport is arguably the most prestigious travel and residence document in the world because of the security and steps we take to maintain its integrity. We cannot do that without having documents verified in-country to ensure that we award passports to people who are entitled to receive them. That is a key part of what we are trying to do.
My Lords, will the passport service remain for ever in the Home Office or will it be re-established as an arm’s-length body under new and perfect conditions?
The most important thing we have to do is to get a grip on the situation to ensure that the problems that led to delays last year—an increase of some 1 million applicants over what was normally forecast and expected—are dealt with, that people get the service that they expect and that we keep the security of our borders as our highest priority.
My Lords, the Minister has admitted that the real problem last year, in his words, was that there were a million more applications than normal. It was nothing to do with agency status. Has he thought through the law of unintended consequences? One of the reasons why the asylum figures and deportation of foreign prisoners were so difficult is that, after a long series of judicial appeals, someone could go to their MP. When the MP applied to the Home Office Minister, the case had to be opened again. Does the Minister think that bringing this back into the Home Office and thus permitting that has had anything to do with the escalation of the asylum and immigration problem?
That is a possibility. I defer to the noble Lord’s deep expertise in this area. The problem that happened with the numbers was an issue of forecasting and therefore ensuring that we had the right number of staff. We are now confident that we have the right number of staff to deal with that. Where issues are raised with a Member of Parliament then they should also apply to the ombudsman, which can deal with these matters if it thinks there has been maladministration.