Baroness Hamwee
Main Page: Baroness Hamwee (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Hamwee's debates with the Home Office
(9 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 62, 63 and 64. The Committee will be pleased to know that I am aiming to be extremely brief on all the amendments left in my name for today.
Amendment 57 is an amendment to Clause 3(6), which provides:
“If a temporary exclusion order is revoked, it ceases to be in force when notice of its revocation is given”.
I am intrigued to know why the effect of the order continues until notice is given. By definition, there is a delay between the decision to revoke and the notice of revocation. Although this is not the whole of the point I am making, I am not sure whether notice being given means a notice received or a notice, as it were, sent out. In any event, there is a time difference between the decision and the notice, and I should have thought that the revocation should take effect immediately.
Amendment 62 is an amendment to Clause 8, which provides for the obligations on an individual who returns under an order. Here, the notice imposes the obligations on an individual who is subject to the order and who has returned to the UK. Are there no obligations in a period before the return to the UK or is this something to do with the proceedings which have taken place in the UK? The status of somebody who is subject to an order but has not returned intrigues me. Are there no obligations which may apply to an individual before he returns to the UK? The obligations are backed up by Clause 9, which is about offences if restrictions are contravened. My question here is about status.
Amendment 63, also an amendment to Clause 8, is similar to Amendment 57. I note that the notice of the obligations comes into force when it is given and is in force until the order ends. Is there a point at which the notice is deemed to be given? My amendment will provide for it actually to be given. My noble friend will understand that I am seeking to understand when it comes into force.
Amendment 64, also to Clause 8, is similar to Amendment 57 in that the variation or revocation should come into effect immediately, not take effect when notice is given, and the same questions are raised as for the earlier amendment. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for bringing forward these amendments, which provide an opportunity to put further information on the record as to how temporary exclusion orders will work in practice. Amendment 57 seeks to provide that a temporary exclusion order ceases to be in force immediately when revoked, not when notice of revocation is given. We believe it is important that notice of revocation is given and that this is the point at which the order ceases to be in force. It is right that the individual concerned is made aware that the restrictions and obligations imposed on them will no longer be in place.
Similarly, Amendment 64 seeks to ensure that any variation or revocation of the in-country obligations placed on an individual come into effect immediately rather than once notice has been given to that individual. In the same way, we believe that it is right that notice of revocation is given and that this is the point at which the obligations cease to be in force. It is important that the individual concerned is made aware that the obligations imposed on them will no longer be in place. More importantly, it is vital that the individual is informed of any variation to the obligations before these variations take effect to avoid an unintentional breach, which could lead to prosecution.
Amendment 63 seeks to provide that notice of any in-country obligations comes into force when an individual is actually given the notice. As the individual will have returned to the UK under the terms of the temporary exclusion order, we will usually know the whereabouts of the individual and, in practice, should always be able to serve the notice on them in person. But it may be expedient for an individual as well as for the authorities for notice of a variation, for example, to be posted to the individual rather than served in person. In addition, there may be circumstances in which an individual absconds and is therefore no longer at the contact address. In all those circumstances, it is right that notice can be deemed to have been given, provided proper procedures are followed. Parliament will be able to review those procedures, but I can assure your Lordships that they will be based on well established practice in relation to immigration decisions.
Finally, Amendment 62 seeks to allow the Secretary of State to impose the in-country obligations of a temporary exclusion order on an individual who is about to return to the UK, as well as on those who have already returned to the UK. The in-country elements of a temporary exclusion order cannot be imposed until the individual has returned to the United Kingdom, a point on which my noble friend sought clarification. This will allow law enforcement partners to assess the most appropriate measures to manage the risk posed by the individual at that time, which may be a matter of years after the decision to impose the order was originally taken. It may even be appropriate to arrest and prosecute the individual, rather than impose any in-country measures on them. Therefore, it would not be appropriate to apply the in-country measures to someone who is about to return. It is better to wait until the individual is in the UK and form an assessment about the in-country measures at that stage.
In terms of the obligations and when they come into effect before return to the UK, the obligations made against the individual will apply only when the individual returns to the UK. Before that point, the individual will be subject to the temporary exclusion order in that their return will be disrupted and controlled, and they may be subject to conditions under the permit to return. But they will not be subject to in-country measures until they return for the reasons that I have outlined. I trust that that is a helpful reply to my noble friend and I invite her to withdraw her amendment.
I am grateful to my noble friend for seeking clarification on this issue. The clause follows the same procedures as apply to other measures that might be introduced, such as those concerning immigration. Clearly, we would like to serve the notice in person but, given that the person might be overseas and engaged in terrorist activities, that might not be possible. However, that cannot be a reason why the order cannot be deemed to have been served. Therefore, we have followed the same routes as in immigration cases and the notice would go to their last known address.
I am grateful to my noble friend for giving me the opportunity to expand on this point. The key issue is that we want the individual to get the message that they are subject to a temporary exclusion order because we want them to make contact with the authorities so that they can have a properly managed return to the UK. We do not want the risks which might occur of somebody turning up and seeking to board a flight and only at that point discovering that their travel documents have been invalidated. It would serve everyone’s purpose that the procedures are followed and that people are made aware. I hope that is helpful to my noble friend.
My Lords, I thank my noble friend for his reply. At the same time as he was saying that it is important that the individual knows—I absolutely go along with that—he also said that it is possible for there to be deemed notice. I need to read how those two fit together. I take the point that there is a distinction between variation of obligations and the revocation of an order. Of course, one is accustomed to a notice sometimes having to be served by post or whatever—there are many instances where a notice is deemed to have been given—because if that were not the case the prospective recipient of the notice could always avoid being given it by slipping around.
I was a little alarmed by my noble friend’s comment, if I heard him aright, on Amendment 62 that it could be years before an individual came back, which takes us back to earlier discussions. However, the Minister has covered the ground and I will do my best to cover his answer properly when I read it. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, Clause 4(3) provides that an individual’s,
“failure to comply with a specified condition has the effect of invalidating the permit to return”.
My amendment would confine that to a “material failure to comply”. A deliberately absurd example would be if the individual was 10 minutes late for an appointment. There must, presumably, be some de minimis provision around this and I would be grateful if the Minister could flesh this out. In my view, minor or trivial breaches should not invalidate the permit to return.
Amendment 60 is on similar lines. It is an amendment to Clause 5 under which, specifically, the Secretary of State can refuse the permit if the individual fails to attend an interview. Amendment 60 proposes that the individual’s failure to attend should be an unreasonable failure—the bus is late or whatever. I am picking trivial examples in order to point up what I think needs to be pinned down.
Finally, Amendment 61 would leave out subsection (3) of Clause 5 which provides that the,
“return time must fall within a reasonable period after the application is made”.
I can see that we would not want the individual roaming the world for a year and going off the radar, but I would like to probe how this would operate. I am concerned, as much as anything, with the workability of the provision. At the end of the day, it would be for a court, but how is “reasonable” to be determined and who determines it? I beg to move.
My Lords, this brief debate has discussed the permit to return which would be issued under a temporary exclusion order so that an individual can return to the UK. The amendments tabled by my noble friends seek to specify that a permit to return is invalidated only if the individual’s failure to comply with a specified condition is material and that the Secretary of State may not refuse to issue a permit to return for failure to attend an interview unless the individual unreasonably fails to attend that interview. I appreciate the rationale behind these probing amendments but I hope I can reassure my noble friends that they are not necessary in this instance.
Conditions will be put into a permit to return where the Secretary of State considers they are necessary in order to protect national security. Any failure to comply with a specified condition will therefore be material, on a common-sense definition of the word. Amendment 58 would have the effect of ensuring that a person is not criminalised by an inadvertent failure to comply, but this is already provided for by the “reasonable excuse” defence in Clause 9 and the amendment is therefore superfluous.
Amendment 60 seeks to provide that the Secretary of State may not refuse to issue a permit to return for failure to attend an interview unless the individual unreasonably fails to attend that interview. I can reassure your Lordships that, in such instances, the Government would exercise discretion on what constitutes a reasonable or unavoidable failure. The Bill already provides that the Secretary of State retains the ability to issue a permit to return even if she has required someone to attend an interview and the person has failed to do so. Clearly, in the case of a reasonable failure, the Secretary of State would be minded to allow the person to return in a controlled manner, which is, after all, the object of the exercise.
Finally, Amendment 61 seeks to probe the timeframe for return specified in a permit to return. The Bill provides that the return time specified in the permit must be within a reasonable period after the application is made. This is a key provision for the temporary exclusion power because it ensures that it meets our requirements under international law. What constitutes a reasonable period, which is what my noble friend Lady Hamwee asked, will of course be determined on a case-by-case basis, and it will need to take account of factors such as the frequency of flights to and from the country where the person subject to the order is.
On the basis of these explanations, I hope that my noble friend feels that I have addressed the issues being probed by these amendments. I invite her to withdraw Amendment 58.
My Lords, on the explanation about material failure and so on, it seems that there is a distinction between the consequences of failure under Clause 4, the situation under Clause 5, and the offences which are dealt with in Clause 9, to which the Minister pointed the Committee. There are other consequences to the failures which are the subject of my first two amendments. I would like to think about that a little further. I thought that I was going to get a reassurance based on case law as well as common sense, which do come together quite often. I had not quite expected to be pointed forward to Clause 9, so I will have a think about that after today. For now, certainly, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, at Second Reading it was clear that a number of us were finding it difficult to get our heads around how this would work at the point of the process that the noble Baroness has indicated. I wrote down a list of questions and I have crossed most of them out, because she has been so thorough in the questions that she has asked of my noble friend.
Whether in this form of amendment or something similar, it is immensely important that there is transparency and general understanding of what the processes are, and of how they should work. First, this is because of the civil liberties and restrictions inherent in all of this. Secondly, we want regular reports on how the process is working. We want the independent reviewer to be able to report and he probably needs criteria to report against. The issues that the noble Baroness has raised are hugely important. I am sorry to use the term “workability” again. Shall I slightly change the tune to “operability”? We want the operability to be satisfactory.
I support this important probing amendment. I hope it will provide an opportunity to iron out some of this detail. With a provision such as this, especially when there are real concerns within certain communities about the motivation for it and the impact that it will have on them, transparency of process is essential. Therefore, the more that we can get in the Bill, and the more of detailed process that we can have, the more that will help to get what we want to achieve.
This amendment returns to the purpose of the exclusion orders. In many ways, the temporary exclusion order would probably have better been called the controlled entry order or even the managed return order. In that way, it would have been much more reflective of what the TEO is trying to do. It would have said what it was on the tin and would have dealt with some of the controversy that surrounds it. It may be that this is something that Ministers will want to reconsider. Maybe they will. It is general election year, so maybe they will not.
Following on from the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, on the importance of the detail of the process, I should like to ask one or two questions. Have we considered the implications of what we would be expecting other states to do in relation to our commitments under other international obligations? We can take the example that the noble Baroness gave, of someone being detained but subsequently tortured or mistreated somewhere overseas, wherever it may be. There is a lot of talk of places such as Turkey, but this person could be engaged in terrorist activity in Afghanistan and return via Pakistan. What are implications of this and what assurances about these countries would we have?
How would these people be returned? If a person is considered to be a dangerous individual who has in some way been involved in terrorist activity, I am not sure I would want to be sitting on a commercial flight back from Istanbul with them. Have we considered the implications of returning these people and the resource implications of having to pay for individual flights for them to be returned?
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for giving way. I was not going to go back to the points I had made although my point about the independent reviewer having criteria against which to report is actually sort of overarching, picking up on the other points. I want to put to him that while we all understand that decisions have to be taken case by case, that does not negate the need for a structure and clearly understood procedures to which reference can be made for all the reasons given about not further alienating the subjects of orders, their families and so on. The noble Baroness was very clear about the dangers, as was the noble Lord, Lord Harris.
I am not, of course, dismissing the assurances that the Minister has given, but I do not think they are quite on the point that I have been alerted to by this debate about having a framework and procedures that are not made up on the hoof but which are known and understood before they are ever applied.
My Lords, Clause 10(3) provides:
“The Secretary of State may make regulations providing for legislation relating to passports … to apply … to permits to return”.
The amendment, which would rather inelegantly extend this by adding “and generally with regard to the passport of an excluded individual”, is designed to probe how a passport becomes valid again. If a passport is invalidated under Clause 3(9), what provisions will there be about the return of a passport on revocation or in the event of an unfavourable outcome of proceedings? In other words, there are more issues around passports than are dealt with in the relatively narrow provisions of Clause 10(3) and I hope that my noble friend will be able to add something to our understanding of how this will operate. I beg to move.
My Lords, we have had a long day of debates which has benefited from the great insight, experience and expertise in your Lordships’ House. I am grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed.
Amendment 67 seeks to provide that regulations are made by the Secretary of State relating to passports of individuals who are subject to temporary exclusion orders. Under a temporary exclusion order, an individual’s British passport will be cancelled and invalid for travel. In the event that the order was quashed, revoked or otherwise came to an end, it would be open to the individual in question to apply for a further passport. There will be no need for the Secretary of State to make further regulations for circumstances in which the individual no longer had a valid passport as there is a well established process already in place for obtaining passports.
I hope this helps and reassures my noble friend and that she will feel able to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I confess that, stupidly, that had not occurred to me. If the individual applies for a passport, it will not be available instantly—they rarely are. However, most importantly, he should be informed that that is what he has to do. This takes us back to the points that have been made on clarity. I am glad now to understand how this will operate. However, as ever, it raises extra points—probably far more than I have mentioned—but the Minister will be pleased to know that I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.