Immigration and Asylum Bill (Eleventh sitting)
Tuesday 27th October 2026
(1 day, 20 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Immigration and Asylum Bill 2026-27 View all Immigration and Asylum Bill 2026-27 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 27 October 2026 - (27 Oct 2026)
The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Anna Turley)
I beg to move amendment 113, in clause 25, page 24, line 17, after “Crown Court” insert “or Court of Appeal”.
This amendment means that where the Court of Appeal makes a slavery and trafficking risk order under section 29(1)(a) of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 any application to vary, renew or discharge the order will be determined by the Crown Court.
Anna Turley
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Dr Murrison. Good morning to all colleagues.
Before we get into the detail of the various clauses, I want to place part 5 of the Bill, and all the provisions concerning modern slavery, in their wider context. Modern slavery is a vicious, cruel and barbaric crime that dehumanises people. This Government are absolutely committed to tackling it in all its forms, and to identifying victims and giving them the support that they need.
However, for the Government to continue to meet that commitment, we must go further. We need a robust end-to-end system supporting earlier identification, ensuring clear decisions and addressing opportunities for improper use, so that the system works effectively for those it is intended to protect. These measures will improve alignment with wider immigration and support systems while enhancing protections for child victims. We need to reduce further the risk of exploitation by increasing expectations on businesses to tackle abuse in their supply chains, and by strengthening the enforcement powers available to our courts and the police to stop offenders in their tracks. The clauses in the Bill will do all that.
Clauses 25 to 34 are focused on strengthening slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders. As modern slavery offending continues to evolve, the tools used to manage offending behaviour must keep pace to enable law enforcement and the courts to take more efficient and tougher action. Slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders give law enforcement agencies and the courts powers to apply for and grant orders to prohibit certain behaviour and to prevent harm, but they are not operating as effectively as they could be. The measures will strengthen those powers, making them more efficient and flexible to use, and improving their effectiveness as preventive tools. The changes will help to prevent further exploitation, better protect victims from harm and reduce the risk of exploitation and reoffending.
Clause 25 amends the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and provides the power for the court before which a person is acquitted of a slavery and human trafficking offence to make a slavery and trafficking risk order. The appropriate court is the court where the person was acquitted following a trial, the court allowing an appeal, or the Crown court on remittal following a successful appeal to the Court of Appeal.
Under existing legislation, a slavery and trafficking risk order is available only on application to the magistrates court. In circumstances where a person is acquitted of slavery and trafficking offences by the Crown court, the process places additional pressure on law enforcement and court time. Allowing the court that made the acquittal decision—including on appeal—to make an order, and extending the power to make an order to the higher court, will remove delays caused by the current process. As the trial court has already heard the evidence, it need not be repeated in the magistrates court. That will also mean that the courts can make an order of their own motion. That will improve efficiency and effectiveness by dealing with an individual immediately following the trial, reducing the risk of offending and preventing harm to others without delay.
The clause also enables the court to adjourn proceedings relating to a slavery and trafficking risk order on acquittal. The reasons we need adjournment of proceedings will be discussed in further detail under clause 30.
Government amendment 113 sets out a technical amendment to clause 25 to clarify which court is responsible for dealing with any future application to vary, renew or discharge a slavery and trafficking risk order made by the Court of Appeal on acquittal. The amendment makes it very clear that any subsequent application will be heard by the Crown court, rather than the Court of Appeal. That aligns the provision of the slavery and trafficking risk order made on acquittal with the existing approach under section 29 of the 2015 Act, which covers appeals of the decision to make an order and ensures a consistent process for managing such orders. The amendment will also ensure that the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal is not taken up by further matters in respect of the orders. I commend the amendment to the Committee.
Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)
It is, as ever, a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Murrison.
Clause 25 allows a court to make a slavery and trafficking risk order when someone is acquitted of a slavery or trafficking offence. The court may do so only when it is satisfied that the person’s conduct shows a risk that they will commit such an offence, and that an order is necessary to protect people from harm. It is worth reminding the Committee that these orders exist because of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, brought forward by Theresa May as Home Secretary. That legislation put this country at the forefront of the fight against modern slavery, and the Opposition welcome measures that build on it.
Modern slavery is a vile crime. It preys on the vulnerable and hides in plain sight in our towns and on our high streets, and the police need every reasonable tool to get ahead of it. Let me be clear: an acquittal must be respected, and nobody should treat a risk order as a second verdict. However, a trial can bring out evidence of risky conduct that falls short of proving the offence charged. Where the statutory test is met, it makes sense for the court that has heard all the evidence to be able to act there and then. The alternative is that the police must start again in another court, with another application, another handover and another chance for the case to fall through the cracks. The person at risk cannot afford that.
This power will not use itself, however. Prosecutors and police need to have considered it before the trial ends, with the evidence ready and a plan for who will manage any restrictions afterwards. Otherwise, we risk passing a good clause that goes unused at the very moment it matters. Government amendment 113 corrects the Government’s own drafting—I suspect that it will not be the last correction we see in Committee. An appeal against such an order will be treated like an appeal against sentence. The Court of Appeal may end up making an order itself. The amendment ensures that any late application to vary, renew or discharge that order goes to the Crown court.
Officers should know which court to go to without a dispute over jurisdiction, so we support the amendment, but we should be honest about where many of the applications will land. The Crown court backlog reached a new record of more than 80,800 cases at the end of June. Every additional application joins that queue, and victims are already waiting far too long. That is not a reason to oppose this power, but it is a reason for the Government to tell the Committee what assessment they have made of the court time needed and how it will be found.
The clause also amends the Scottish and Northern Irish legislation, so that breaching one of the new orders is an offence in those jurisdictions, too. Those who exploit others do not stop at borders, and someone subject to an order must not be able to escape enforcement by moving to another part of the United Kingdom.
We support the clause and the Government amendment, but I would be grateful if the Minister answered three questions. First, who will be responsible for identifying suitable cases before an acquittal brings proceedings to an end, and what guidance will prosecutors be given? Secondly, how many of the orders do the Government expect to be made each year? Thirdly, if someone subject to one of the orders moves to Scotland or Northern Ireland, how will the order be enforced there promptly?
Anna Turley
I thank the shadow Minister for his response to this debate. As discussed, the clause makes important amendments to the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and provides the power for the court before which a person is acquitted of a slavery and human trafficking offence to make a slavery and trafficking risk order.
Let me address a couple of the points made by the hon. Gentleman. He asked whether the measures would contribute to an increase in court time. The court will have heard the evidence during the trial or considered it on appeal, and it will be best placed to assess whether an order is necessary. The Government amendment will also mean that the evidence heard in the Crown court does not need to be repeated in the magistrates court, so court time in the magistrates court will be reduced, improving efficiency and effectiveness by handling the case immediately following the trial.
The hon. Gentleman also asked whether the measures will increase the use of orders and how many orders we expect to see. As hon. Members know, we have published an impact assessment setting out the analytical case for the proposed measures, and developed a justice impact test with the Ministry of Justice. The estimated impacts are therefore only indicative, as no available evidence or data estimates the magnitude of the increase in the number of orders issued as a result of the changes, but the scenarios assume that the number of prevention or risk orders will increase by between 25% and 75%, which equates to an increase of 20 to 30 orders per year.
Government amendment 113 is technical and will merely clarify which court is responsible for dealing with any future application to vary, renew or discharge a slavery and trafficking risk order made by the Court of Appeal on acquittal. I commend it to the Committee.
Amendment 113 agreed to.
Clause 25, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 26
Power for Chief Constable of the British Transport Police Force to apply for prevention and risk orders etc
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Anna Turley
The hon. Member for Stockton West was right to raise the concerns of law enforcement partners about the limitations to the effectiveness of slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders. We are seeking to deal with that issue through these clauses.
Our ambition is to ensure that law enforcement agencies have exactly the right tools they need to respond as offending evolves. Currently, the British Transport police must rely on a local force to make an application for a slavery and trafficking order on their behalf, even if the British Transport police have undertaken all relevant investigations. That means that there are delays between identifying a risk and an application for a slavery and trafficking order.
Clause 26 extends the list of bodies to allow the chief constable of the British Transport police to apply to a magistrates court to make, vary, discharge and renew slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders. Giving an express power to the British Transport police will enhance the force’s capability to disrupt and tackle criminal exploitation and sexual exploitation on the transport network, and to keep pace with how modern slavery offending has evolved. It will also reduce costs and the time spent by local forces on making and processing applications of these orders on behalf of the British Transport police, and will enable swifter protection of victims by minimising the length of time between the offence taking place and the application being made. Extending these powers to the British Transport police will send a message to organised criminal gangs that all areas of law enforcement are equipped to take decisive action against perpetrators who exploit vulnerable individuals.
Clause 27 will remove a further limitation on law enforcement applications for slavery and trafficking orders: the restriction on chief officers of police of being able to make applications for slavery and trafficking orders only in relation to a person who lives in their police force area. The nature of modern slavery offending, and the links to other types of crime, have evolved since the Modern Slavery Act 2015 was introduced. Both criminal and sexual exploitation offending can take place across force areas, in multiple locations across the country, and online.
The legislation also needs to evolve to remain effective and to reduce the risk of offending and harm caused. The current legislation does not account for instances where the perpetrator has never visited or does not intend to visit the location where the offending occurs—that includes circumstances in which the offending takes place online. In such cases, the offending is more likely to be identified by the force in the location where the offending occurs, but the responsibility for applying for an order currently falls on the force in the perpetrator’s area of residence. Removing that restriction will enable law enforcement to improve the way it targets and disrupts modern slavery and human trafficking offending by relieving the burden on forces. It will cut back on application delays by allowing any force to apply for the order. The application will need to be made in the area where the defendant lives, or in the police area where the applicant believes the defendant is or is intending to come to. I commend the clauses to the Committee.
Matt Vickers
Clause 26 brings the chief constable of the British Transport police into the arrangements for applying for slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders. Clause 27 widens the ability of territorial police forces to apply for these orders against people who live outside their area. The Opposition welcome both clauses.
The gangs behind modern slavery do not respect police boundaries, and our ability to stop them should not be hemmed in by those boundaries. The gangs move people by road and rail, they recruit in one town and exploit in another, and they rely on the gaps between agencies. Officers on our railways might be the first to see what is going on. If a British Transport police officer keeps seeing the same man shepherding the same frightened young people between stations, and gathers the evidence and identifies the risk, the next step should not be a phone call to ask another force to make the application.
Clause 27 deals with the same problem for territorial forces. Under the current law, a force can apply only in respect of someone who lives in its area or who intends to come into its area, but someone can live in one force area and do their damage in another. The force holding the evidence should be able to act, but wider powers require clear responsibility. If several forces have an interest in the same individual, who leads? Who checks that the person is complying with the order? Who answers the phone when a victim reports contact that might breach the order? Criminals exploit gaps, and we should not create new gaps between police forces.
Let me make a point that applies to the whole of part 5 of the Bill, so that I do not have to repeat it when addressing every group of amendments. Every new power in clauses 25 to 34 comes with work attached. Officers must recognise when an order is appropriate, build an application that will stand up in court, attend hearings and then manage the order for years. The British Transport police already have a demanding job keeping passengers safe, and our courts are already stretched. This is not about point-scoring on resources, but none of those powers will work just because a clause has been passed. Officers need training, guidance and capacity, and Ministers cannot hand forces new duties and leave them to pick up the bill.
We support clauses 26 and 27, but I would be grateful if the Minister could answer the following questions. First, were these changes requested by chief officers, including the chief constable of the British Transport police, and if so, what problems did they identify? Secondly, will there be an agreed protocol in place before these powers come into force, setting out which force leads when more than one force is involved? Thirdly, what assessment have the Government made of the training, guidance and capacity that forces will need to use the new powers set out in this part of the Bill?
Anna Turley
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his contribution and his questions, and we appreciate his support for these important clauses.
Put simply, clauses 26 and 27 address the important issue of how law enforcement agencies will deal with the issues in their area. Clause 26 extends the provisions to the British Transport police, while clause 27 removes the restriction on chief officers of police of being able to apply for orders only in relation to people living in their local area.
As I set out earlier, currently there are unnecessary limitations on law enforcement’s ability to apply for slavery and trafficking orders. The constraints on how the orders can be applied for restrict their effectiveness. This means that we could be doing more to manage the risks identified, to protect vulnerable people who are at risk of exposure to these horrendous crimes.
To manage that, we have worked closely with enforcement colleagues—including, to respond to the hon. Gentleman, the British Transport police—to design new clauses that will allow forces to apply for the orders and remove the restriction on chief officers of police of being able to apply for orders in relation only to individuals living in their local police area. That will allow forces to better manage individuals who are committing offences across police force boundaries.
The hon. Gentleman asked about how the responsibility for monitoring and enforcing would be managed, and how the process would work. This amendment will improve co-operation between local forces and the British Transport police, who have to work collaboratively at almost every stage of the process, from application to monitoring. The British Transport police will still need to engage with the relevant local forces, give notice of the application to the chief officer of police, and conduct monitoring of the orders.
The hon. Gentleman asked whether a national monitoring system would be introduced. Law enforcement is responsible for monitoring and managing compliance with slavery and trafficking orders. The former modern slavery and organised immigration crime unit issued guidance to law enforcement on obtaining and managing slavery and trafficking prevention risk orders, to help ensure consistency across forces in England and Wales. When the changes are introduced, that statutory guidance will be updated to align with them, ensuring that all those involved have the right training and preparation for the new powers.
Together, clauses 26 and 27 allow the Modern Slavery Act 2015 to remain relevant to the modern world. I commend them to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 26 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 27 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 28
Notification requirements in slavery and trafficking prevention orders
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Anna Turley
Under section 19 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, courts may require individuals subject to slavery and trafficking prevention orders and slavery and trafficking risk orders to notify the police or another specified agency of personal information, including their name and address. However, monitoring and enforcement are currently inconsistent across police forces, which affects their ability to manage individuals and respond effectively to risk. That can result in police forces collecting information on individuals subject to an order in different ways, leading to delays in identifying breaches and an inconsistent approach to preventing individuals from engaging in criminal behaviour.
Matt Vickers
Clauses 28 and 29 make compulsory the core notification requirements for slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders. The clauses also allow for the specification in regulations of further information that a court can require in a particular order.
The principle behind the clauses is simple: if the police are to enforce an order, they need to know who the person is and where to find them. An order is not worth the paper it is written on if the person it covers can simply disappear, so the Opposition welcome making the requirements compulsory, rather than optional. A “requirement” to notify must be exactly that—a requirement, not a polite request. Anyone who gives false details or deliberately keeps the police in the dark should expect consequences. We made the same argument during the passage of the Crime and Policing Bill, to which we tabled amendments that would have put real penalties on registered sex offenders who failed to notify. An obligation with no teeth is no obligation at all.
However, collecting information is only half the job. A notification requirement is only as good as the system behind it. If someone moves but the police are still working from their old address, officers knock on the wrong door and time is lost; when someone is at risk of exploitation, lost time can mean real harm. An address being on a form does not prove that anyone lives there. Someone has to check and record that address, and make sure that the information reaches the officers who need it, including those in other forces.
The clauses leave further requirements to be made under regulations. I welcome the fact that those regulations will be subject to the affirmative procedure, but before we give the Minister this regulation-making power, the Committee should understand the gap it is meant to close. What can officers not currently find out through the orders, and how would that information help them to prevent exploitation?
Finally, I want to raise the orders already in force. Under current law, a court making an order can choose whether to include notification requirements, meaning that some existing orders will contain no such requirement at all. Subsections 28(6) and 29(5) make clear that the new requirements will not apply to orders made before the clauses come into force. That means that even after the Bill becomes law, a person already subject to an order may have no duty to tell the police their name or address. The Committee will come on to discuss the powers to vary and renew orders under clause 34 of the Bill, but the Government should not wait for cases to come back to court by chance. They need a plan to find the existing orders that do not have those requirements, and to bring them up to the new standard.
We support clauses 28 and 29, but for these requirements to work in practice the Committee needs answers to three questions. First, on the regulation-making powers in both clauses, what additional information do the Government expect to require, and will the Committee see draft regulations before Report? Secondly, on enforcement, who will check that the details a person gives are true, and how will that information reach other police forces when the person moves? Thirdly, how many existing orders are currently enforced without notification requirements, and what is the Government’s plan for reviewing them?
Anna Turley
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his questions. As he has set out, the orders in clauses 28 and 29 are crucial tools to allow our law enforcement to protect victims, and we appreciate the support of His Majesty’s Opposition.
The clauses address a gap in the current framework for managing individuals subject to slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders. Currently, notification requirements are discretionary, which has contributed to there being different approaches to monitoring and enforcement across police forces, and that can limit law enforcement’s ability to identify breaches, manage risk and safeguard potential victims. Clauses 28 and 29 strengthen that regime by making the notification requirements mandatory, while also enabling courts to impose additional risk-based notifications where necessary and proportionate. This flexibility will allow the requirements placed on individuals to keep pace as modern slavery evolves.
The hon. Gentleman asked about the additional data that will be collected under clause 29. Currently, each force collects and records said data differently; that is part of the problem we are trying to address according to local needs. It is for the forces to decide how to monitor and manage individuals subject to an order. He also asked about some of the things that could be requested and collated: those could include phone numbers, email addresses, online usernames and vehicle registrations. They will be considered on a case-by-case basis specific to an individual that addresses proportionality and necessity based on the risk of offending, which I think answers his question about additional data. The shadow Minister also mentioned the regulations we refer to. We will publish those as soon as possible.
Together, these measures will support a more consistent and effective approach to monitoring individuals subject to orders. Strengthening orders and increasing notification requirements sends a strong message to both perpetrators and victims that exploitation will be detected. I commend clauses 28 and 29 to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 28 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 29 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 30
Slavery and trafficking prevention orders: adjournment of proceedings
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Anna Turley
There is a risk that the current legislation is not clear that a court can adjourn proceedings, although it is common practice for courts to adjourn proceedings in relation to the slavery and trafficking prevention orders. Clause 30 makes it explicit that a court can adjourn proceedings when a person has been found guilty of a slavery and trafficking offence before making a slavery and trafficking prevention order. It ensures that the court has the option to adjourn proceedings for a slavery and human trafficking offence even after sentencing. That will remove any existing or future doubt.
The clause also includes provision for when an individual does not attend proceedings, to ensure that the criminal justice process can continue. It is simply about ensuring that courts have the necessary powers to ensure a smooth and effective court process.
Matt Vickers
Clause 30 allows a court to adjourn proceedings on a slavery and trafficking prevention order at sentencing. If the defendant does not attend the adjourned hearing, the court may adjourn again, issue a warrant for their arrest or, subject to safeguards, proceed in their absence. A court deciding whether to make one of these orders needs the evidence to get it right, and the Opposition support giving it the time to do so. Proposed restrictions may need checking, or information from another force may still be outstanding. Rushing that work could produce an order that misses the very conduct it is meant to stop.
We should be clear about what an adjournment means in practice: another hearing has to be listed, officers may have to return to court, and if the offender is not in custody the risk they pose has to be managed while the case waits. When someone has been convicted of exploiting another human being, the public will rightly expect any continuing risk to be dealt with promptly. Given the Crown court backlog of a record more than 80,000 cases, nobody should be adding avoidable hearings to that list.
It is also worth noting that the clause places no limit on how long proceedings can be adjourned or how many times. That is why so much depends on preparation. The possibility of a prevention order should not suddenly occur to someone at the end of a sentencing hearing. An adjournment may sometimes be necessary, but it must not become the fall-back for an application that nobody got ready.
We welcome the power to proceed when the defendant fails to attend; a convicted offender should not be able to hold up a protective order simply by staying at home. The safeguards in the clause matter. Before issuing a warrant, the court must be satisfied that the defendant had “adequate notice” of the hearing before proceeding in their absence. It must also be satisfied that the defendant was told the hearing could go ahead without them. If that is not done properly, the court cannot take the next step. Getting the paperwork right is what allows the court to act firmly.
We must not forget the victim. If the hearing has been put off, the victim needs to know that restrictions are not in place. Otherwise, they may rely on protection that does not yet exist. We support clause 30, but I would be grateful if the Minister answered the following questions. When proceedings are adjourned and the offender is not in custody, how will any immediate risk be managed until the order is made? Who will be responsible for telling victims that an order has been delayed and what has and has not been put in place? Will the Government monitor how often such proceedings are adjourned and how many times in a single case, so that a sensible power does not become another source of delay?
Anna Turley
I thank the shadow Minister for his thoughtful contributions. Clause 30 is simple: although courts can adjourn proceedings, the current legislation does not explicitly provide for that, which has created the potential for real uncertainty.
During the passage of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 in the House of Lords, a specific provision was requested in related to serious violence reduction orders to make it clear that proceedings could be adjourned even after sentencing took place. The specific provision for adjournment has been included in domestic abuse protection orders. That is intended to enable the court to determine any outstanding prevention orders, even after the criminal proceedings have concluded. Replicating measures such as those for instances of modern slavery will remove any current or future doubt that the court is able to determine a slavery and trafficking prevention order after sentencing.
Adjournment is a procedural tool that the court might take after sentencing or acquittal to consider imposing an order. The court may then consider further evidence related to the future risk of offending when considering whether to make a slavery and trafficking prevention order. Clause 30 is about enabling the court to more effectively address offending while the defendant is still under their power and to ensure that outstanding matters in a case can be dealt with at the same time. Adjourning proceedings in relation to the making of a prevention order is currently common practice, but we are making that explicit and mirroring the similar provisions in other legislation providing for civil orders.
The shadow Minister asked whether the measure would result in an increase in non-attendance in the courts and potentially an increase in warrants. A court can hear the proceedings in a person’s absence if it is satisfied that the defendant
“has had adequate notice of the time and place of the adjourned proceedings, and…has been informed that if the defendant does not appear for those proceedings the court may hear the proceedings in the defendant’s absence.”
As such, a person cannot continually delay proceedings by not attending, but the notice requirements are safeguarded to ensure that defendants are aware of the proceedings. The court cannot issue a warrant unless it is satisfied that the person
“has had adequate notice of the time and place of the adjourned proceedings”.
Clause 30 also makes clear that a court can adjourn proceedings where a person has been found guilty of a slavery and trafficking offence before making a slavery and trafficking prevention order.
I will pick up on the shadow Minister’s point about victim liaisons because that is important; I will undertake to get back to him and the Committee about that. The clause also undertakes a court process, which is currently common practice in relation to these orders and mirrors established legislative precedent from other civil orders. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 30 according ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 31
Slavery and trafficking prevention orders: electronic monitoring
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Anna Turley
There is currently no express power in the Modern Slavery Act 2015 to impose an electronic monitoring requirement as a condition of slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders. Case law suggests that that may be within the court’s existing powers; however, as it is not explicit in the current legislation, it can be unclear to the court that electronic monitoring—tagging, as we know it—is an option as a monitoring tool for slavery and trafficking orders. Introducing an express power will ensure that there is no doubt that electronic monitoring can be used where it is deemed necessary.
Clauses 31 and 32 set out the explicit provision for courts to impose an electronic monitoring requirement as part of a slavery and trafficking prevention order or an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order, or a slavery and trafficking risk order or an interim slavery and trafficking risk order. Such a requirement will be applied only where the court is satisfied that it is necessary for the purpose of protecting persons from physical or psychological harm. We want to ensure that law enforcement has all the tools it needs to manage offenders effectively.
Electronic monitoring enables law enforcement to monitor compliance with the conditions of an order where they include an exclusion zone, a curfew or travel restrictions. The conditions imposed by each order are tailored by the court depending on the nature of the individual’s risk of offending. Electronic monitoring, as a condition of a slavery and trafficking order, would also help to prevent reoffending and prevent offenders from fleeing, leaving the country and escaping criminal punishment.
We know that electronic monitoring of an offender can make victims and survivors feel safer in some instances and improve their engagement with the criminal justice system. Electronic monitoring can also act as a deterrent to perpetrators while the tag is being worn. Electronic monitoring will ensure certainty of detection when protective licence conditions are breached, strengthen offender management, help victims and survivors feel safe following the release of their perpetrators and help to prevent further offending.
Clause 33 sets out a number of consequential amendments to the Modern Slavery Act 2015 to support the introduction and enforcement of electronic monitoring requirements for individuals subject to slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders. The clause updates section 30 of the 2015 Act so that the existing offence of breaching an order applies consistently to all the modern slavery and trafficking orders. This ensures a consistent enforcement framework across the full range of orders.
The clause also sets out a requirement for the Secretary of State to issue a code of practice governing the processing of data obtained through electronic monitoring. That will provide clear guidance on the handling of information gathered through electronic monitoring while ensuring that appropriate safeguards are in place. The clause also provides the appropriate regulation-making framework for electronic monitoring arrangements and clarifies the parliamentary procedure for regulations specifying who may be responsible for electronic monitoring.
Clauses 31 to 33 will strengthen the operation of slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders, support the use of electronic monitoring and provide a clear framework for enforcement, governance and oversight, and I commend them to the Committee.
Matt Vickers
Clauses 31 to 33 provide for electronic monitoring in slavery and trafficking prevention orders and risk orders, including interim orders, and require the issuance of a code of practice on how the monitoring data is handled. A court order must mean something. If somebody is told to stay away from a potential victim or a particular place, the authorities need to know when that order is broken, and they need to act. Electronic monitoring can help with that, and the Opposition support these powers.
However, we should not view tagging through rose-tinted glasses. A tag tells the authority where someone is. It cannot stop the person picking up a phone and getting someone else to do their dirty work, and a tag is only as good as the response when it goes off. Picture someone walking into an area the court has barred them from because a potential victim lives there. The device records it and an alert is raised. Then what? Who receives that alert first, how quickly is it passed to the police, and how quickly do officers arrive? Someone who is at risk at 11 o’clock on a Saturday night cannot wait until Monday morning for someone to check a screen.
That is not a theoretical concern. Only this week, Sky News reported that the Metropolitan police will no longer respond to curfew or tag battery breaches lasting under an hour, unless the wearer is judged to pose a particular risk. The commissioner says his officers are dealing with more than 100 tag breaches a day, driven in part by the Government’s early release scheme. One sergeant put it simply:
“there are not enough cops”.
The Met itself described cases in which officers were told about a breach many hours after it had happened. The problem is therefore at both ends: alerts that are slow to reach the police, and police too stretched to respond when they do. The Minister must tell us how alerts under these new orders will avoid both.
Monitoring can also be imposed only where suitable arrangements are available in the area, so a court may decide that monitoring is necessary but still be unable to order it. Will monitoring be available consistently across the country from the day these powers come into force, or will protection depend on where a victim happens to live?
The person being monitored must allow the equipment to be fitted and maintained, and must not interfere with it. Deliberate tampering cannot be allowed to defeat an order, and it must be treated as the enforcement matter it is. Equally, officers need to be able to tell a flat battery from a deliberate attempt to go off the radar, so that they spend their time on the real risks. Clause 33 requires a code of practice on monitoring data. That code must protect the data properly, but it must also let the right officers get hold of information quickly, and make sure that it is preserved where it may be needed as evidence.
We support clauses 31 to 33, but we have questions for the Minister. When an alert is raised under one of these orders, who receives it? How is it passed to the police, and how quickly will officers respond, including at night and on weekends? Where will monitoring be available when these powers come into force, and when will it be available everywhere? When will the Committee see a draft of the code of practice on monitoring data?
Anna Turley
I thank the hon. Gentleman again for his helpful and thoughtful contributions, and for his support for the clauses. As discussed, this group covers the electronic monitoring requirements for slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders, along with consequential amendments.
As I laid out previously, law enforcement does not always have the tools needed to support it in effectively monitoring those subject to these orders or to identify breaches at an earlier stage. The clauses will enable courts, where necessary and proportionate, to impose electronic monitoring requirements. That will strengthen the management and enforcement of orders, help to identify breaches sooner and disrupt further offending, and provide greater protection and reassurance to victims.
The hon. Member for Stockton West raised a few questions, which I am very happy to answer. First, he asked whether the code of practice would be subject to parliamentary procedure. Given the likely content and nature of the code, the fact that it is not going to define or create any new legal responsibilities, and that the processing of data must be in accordance with the requirements of data protection legislation, the Government do not consider it necessary for the code to be subject to any parliamentary procedure.
The hon. Gentleman asked for some more detail on what the code of practice would look like. This clause sets out that the Secretary of State must issue a code of practice relating to the processing of data gathered in the course of the electronic monitoring of individuals where that has been imposed. The code of practice is intended to set out the appropriate tests and safeguards for the processing of such data, in order to ensure compliance with the UK General Data Protection Regulation and the Data Protection Act 2018.
The Government consider that a code of practice is the most appropriate vehicle for setting out expectations and responsibilities in relation to the processing of data gathered under electronic monitoring requirements. It is important to have the flexibility to update the code to keep pace with any changes to that legislation and to ensure that it can be aligned with operational guidance.
The hon. Gentleman asked about resourcing. There is currently no intention to increase the number of electronic monitoring cases. Electronic monitoring will be used only in cases where it is justified against the legislative requirements and considered necessary to protect persons from harm. The number of orders issued with electronic monitoring as a condition will depend on the nature of the offending, the assessment of the court hearing the case and the other conditions available that could address the risk. As such, it is not possible to say whether, overall, the use of electronic monitoring will increase or decrease. It is about giving the courts the clarity that they need.
It is important to consider that electronic monitoring can help to reduce the amount of resource used trying to trace offenders who breach the conditions of their orders. Electronic monitoring would enable forces to respond more effectively to the risk posed by offenders, and we could see some early intervention and prevention as a result of that.
Electronic monitoring can be a condition of an order only if the court has been notified by the Secretary of State that electronic monitoring arrangements are available in the relevant area, and the court is satisfied that the necessary provision can be made under the arrangements currently available. I think I have covered the issues raised by the shadow Minister.
Clauses 31 to 33 will also align the slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders with other civil orders, as I mentioned, which have explicit provision for electronic monitoring. This is about clarity for the courts on the face of the law. I commend the clauses to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 31 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 32 and 33 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 34
Variation etc of slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Anna Turley
This clause, building on the group we have just discussed, strengthens the operation of slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders by allowing courts to include additional notification requirements and electronic monitoring when orders are renewed or varied. It ensures that such measures may be applied only when the court is satisfied that the requirement is necessary for the purpose of protecting persons from physical or psychological harm, and it introduces safeguards governing the use of electronic monitoring, including limits on the duration of monitoring extensions.
Matt Vickers
The clause brings the new notification and electronic monitoring requirements into the process for varying and renewing slavery and trafficking prevention orders and risk orders. An order has to keep protecting people long after the day it is made. Those subject to the orders could move, change how they operate or find a way around a restriction and the police must be able to respond. The Opposition support the clause. There should be no reward for wriggling around an order. If the evidence shows the restrictions need strengthening, the authorities should be back in front of the court quickly, not waiting for someone to come to further harm.
A power to apply for a variation, however, does not tell an officer when to use it. Take someone whose activities have shifted to a different town. The police know things have changed and that the original conditions no longer fit the risk, but unless someone picks up the file and takes it back to court, the order stays exactly as it was. Someone has to be responsible for spotting that gap and closing it.
The clause also deals with orders made before the Bill. As we discussed under clauses 28 and 29, some such orders contain no notification requirements at all. Under clause 34, when an older order is varied, the court can add those requirements only if it is satisfied that they are necessary, but when an older order is renewed, they must be included. That is welcome, but it means the protection depends on someone bringing the older order back to court.
Electronic monitoring brings deadlines of its own. A court can extend a monitoring requirement by no more than 12 months at a time, so every order with a tag will need to come back to court at least once a year to keep it in place. Expiry dates should never come as a surprise. An ongoing risk must not go unmonitored because a renewal application was left sitting in someone’s in-tray. There is a practical catch, too: a tag can be added on variation only if the defendant is present in court, so the person who stays away from the hearing may be the very person who cannot be tagged. I will be grateful if the Minister could say how that will be handled.
The clause rightly keeps the requirement for the court to assess risk and necessity. Good evidence makes for a stronger order, and a stronger order is one that officers can enforce with confidence. I set out our concerns about police and court capacity when we debated clauses 26 and 27, and they bite the hardest here. Reviewing existing orders and returning to court every year is exactly the kind of work that does not happen unless someone is given the job of doing it. We support clause 34, but I would be grateful if the Minister could answer the following questions. Who will review existing orders, and who will ensure that a renewal reaches the court before the order or the monitoring runs out? How quickly will an urgent variation be heard when fresh evidence shows that the risk has grown, and what happens if the defendant does not attend? How will victims be told when an order is varied, renewed or allowed to lapse, so that they know what protection they actually have?
Anna Turley
As I laid out earlier, we want to ensure that law enforcement and the courts have the tools required to prevent harmful behaviour, including when orders are renewed or varied. Put simply, clause 34 strengthens the operation of slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders by allowing courts to include additional notification requirements and electronic monitoring when orders are renewed and varied. That will enable orders to respond to changing risks, help law enforcement manage those risks effectively and better protect potential victims.
The hon. Gentleman asked an earlier question about resource, and it is important to re-emphasise that electronic monitoring can often reduce the resource wasted in trying to trace offenders. Instead, it can allow forces to effectively respond to the risk posed by offenders. He also asked who will be involved, but it will follow the existing process already undertaken by those police forces.
I want to further discuss the balance between the powers given under the clause and human rights, as I think it is important to get this on the record. Electronic monitoring would only be applied by a judge to orders where it is appropriate within the confines of the European convention on human rights. There are also restrictions on the specified length of the electronic monitoring period that can be applied, based on the circumstances of the individual cases—for example, it could be up to 12 months. The decision to electronically monitor a subject will only be made following great consideration by the courts, and it will be applied only where there is justification and it is demonstrated to be proportionate in that case.
Providing the courts with this explicit power to require electronic monitoring as a condition of a slavery and trafficking order does not mean that what constitutes an acceptable threshold for electronic monitoring will be lowered. The provision will only allow for it to be quickly put in place where merit is identified. If I have not addressed any of the hon. Gentleman’s questions, I commit to write to him further on those, but I am grateful for his support. The clause introduces important safeguards governing the use of electronic monitoring, and I commend it to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 34 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 35
Authority responsible for deciding if a person is a victim etc
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss schedule 4 and clause 36 stand part.
Anna Turley
I will speak to clauses 35 to 43. Since the modern slavery system was established, the nature and volume of referrals have changed. Compared with 2014, referrals into the national referral mechanism—the system for identifying potential victims of modern slavery—have increased by 900%. In 2025, modern slavery referrals from those who arrived by small boat were the highest since records began in 2018, and more than half of referrals now relate to exploitation that took place overseas. Our system seeks to identify, support and protect individuals at the earliest opportunity, and that is in everyone’s interest.
However, we cannot ignore the fact that, because of the protections offered by the system, there is value for some in seeking to misuse it. In 2025, over a third of chartered flight returns that failed to go ahead involved a modern slavery referral lodged after that return was arranged. That type of action undermines the integrity of the system and creates disproportionate operational pressures.
We need a robust end-to-end system—one that supports earlier identification of victims, delivers clear and timely decisions and addresses opportunities for improper use. Importantly, it must be one that works effectively for those who it is intended to protect. This Government have been particularly clear in our commitment to embed protections for those who are most vulnerable, including exploited and trafficked children, and the clauses will bring balance and order to the system to do just that.
First, clause 35 clarifies a key part of our modern slavery system: who can make decisions about whether an individual is a victim of modern slavery for the purposes of part 5 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022. For adults, it will formalise the existing operational model where the Secretary of State acts as the competent authority or decision-making body for all modern slavery decisions. For children, it will enable the Secretary of State to nominate other public authorities to act as the competent authority in relation to reasonable and conclusive grounds decisions on a case-by-case basis. We know this model can be successful; we have been piloting the approach since 2021, enabling local safeguarding partners, who will often be involved in the child’s care, to make decisions about whether the child is a victim of modern slavery.
Stakeholders have told us that embedding decisions with those working directly with a child removes the perceived disconnect between identification and support and delivers a more sustainable model of decision making aligned with existing safeguarding frameworks. However, legislative change is required to implement this approach on a greater scale.
That is what this clause delivers: the legal foundation to devolve modern slavery decision making for children nationally, ensuring decisions are made by those best placed to safeguard them. By embedding these responsibilities within existing local safeguarding structures, the clause will strengthen partnership working, increase awareness of exploitation, support earlier identification of vulnerable children and create greater opportunity to prevent harm before it occurs.
Schedule 4 will play a critical role in implementing the changes made through clause 35 of the Bill, making consequential amendments to reflect the definition of “competent authority” and ensure consistency across the statute book. It will enable the Secretary of State to lay regulations on the making of reasonable or conclusive grounds decisions by all competent authorities and issue guidance on the processes to be followed by nominated public authorities.
Together, the measures will enable consistent, high-quality devolved decision making for children by local safeguarding partners. First, schedule 4 updates definitions to reflect the change in who can make decisions set out in clause 35. Secondly, the regulations ensure persistent decision making across all decision-making bodies, setting a clear framework for the making of modern slavery decisions, what bodies should make them and how they should do so. This will be underpinned by guidance that makes it clear what is expected of public authorities while also providing transparency on how their competence will be addressed. That will help ensure consistent and quality decision making, and that public authorities are trained and supported to deliver to the required standard.
Thirdly, regulations will make it clear that information sharing and joint working across multi-agency safeguarding partners is paramount to strong decision making, enabling the Secretary of State to require public authorities other than the Home Office to engage in decision making. That is crucial not just for information sharing for partners with the Home Office, but to deliver the tried-and-tested approach to decision making for children, which will see responsibility embedded with those best able to make decisions for children and ensure it is done in a consistent and controlled way.
Turning to clause 36, the Government are committed to ensuring that decisions made under the national referral mechanism are robust, preventing opportunities for improper use of the system and providing clarity in legislation. To deliver that, it is essential that the factors that a decision maker must consider to negatively impact a person’s credibility are clear.
Currently, decision makers can consider factors such as the timing of disclosure and consistency in the information a person has provided, which may have an impact on the credibility of a person’s account. This assessment can be used to inform the outcome of a reasonable grounds or conclusive grounds decision. However, there is no legal requirement for this credibility assessment to inform part of the decision making.
The clause will place those credibility considerations on a statutory footing, making it clear that those factors, which can often be an indicator of a lack of veracity, will be considered to be damaging to a person’s credibility unless good reasons are put forward. That will provide a more robust framework supporting consistent decision making and a clear understanding across potential victims and those representing them.
We recognise that there may be factors that explain the presence of credibility indicators. For example, a person may be suffering from coercion, fear or trauma. That is why the legislation also requires decision making to assess whether there are good reasons that could explain the presence of factors that would otherwise impact on an individual’s credibility. Detailed guidance will be set out on what will constitute good reasons, recognising that these are non-exhaustive. It will support decision makers in considering each person’s individual circumstances and experience.
This is a key safeguard that balances the importance of preventing improper claims with the recognition that some factors that point to a lack of credibility are the result of individual circumstances that require consideration. By setting out a statutory duty to consider credibility considerations and the impact of those factors on decisions, the clause will strengthen the legal robustness of decision making and provide greater clarity for decision makers, potential victims and those representing them. I commend clauses 35 and 36 to the Committee.
Matt Vickers
There were 23,411 referrals into the national referral mechanism last year, which is the highest number since it began, and 25,373 in the year to June. Behind those numbers are genuine victims who deserve our protection, but there are also people who have worked out that a modern slavery claim can be used to frustrate removal.
The British public want two things from our modern slavery system, and they are not in conflict: they want genuine victims protected, and they want the system to stand firm against those who try to game it to avoid removal. Every bogus claim wastes taxpayers’ money, ties up officials who should be helping real victims, and delays the removal of people with no right to be here, and every bad decision risks leaving someone who has been exploited in the hands of the very people who exploited them. The Opposition believe that these clauses can help on both counts and we support them.
Clause 35 sets out who makes the decisions. For adults, it is the Secretary of State. For children, it can be the Secretary of State or another public authority nominated for that purpose. Schedule 4 makes the consequential changes needed for that to work. A name in legislation has to mean real accountability. A child’s treatment should not depend on whose desk the file happens to land on.
Clause 36 deals with credibility. When deciding whether to believe someone’s account, decision makers must treat certain things as damaging to credibility unless there are good reasons for them. Those things include a delay in making a claim or providing information, material inconsistencies and omissions, inconsistencies with what the person has said in an asylum claim or in court, and striking similarities with other people’s accounts. That is common sense. If someone tells one story in an immigration application and a very different one the moment removal becomes a real prospect, the decision maker should test that difference hard. If an account bears an uncanny resemblance to someone else’s, officials must be free to ask whether they are looking at genuine evidence or a script supplied to frustrate removal.
The principle behind the clause is one that we legislated for in the Nationality and Borders Act 2022: that late disclosure without good reason should count against credibility. Labour opposed the Act at the time, so I welcome the fact that the Government now recognise the value of that principle and are building on it. There is common ground across the Committee on this issue. The clause is carefully drawn. It is about damage to credibility. It does not say that every claim must fail or that every inconsistency proves a lie, and it allows for good reasons. Someone threatened by a gang may be terrified to speak. Someone describing horrific events that they have witnessed may not get it all out at once.
However, the Bill does not define a good reason; it leaves it to guidance. That guidance must help caseworkers tell a genuine explanation from a convenient excuse, and it needs to be ready before the clause comes into force, not cobbled together afterwards. The rules will work only if caseworkers have the information to apply them. The clause asks them to compare an account with what the person said in an asylum claim or in court proceedings, and with accounts given by other people. That is not much use if the caseworker cannot see the earlier account or has no means of spotting that the same story has appeared in a dozen other claims.
We support clauses 35 and 36 and schedule 4, but I would be grateful if the Minister could answer the following questions. First, which authorities does she expect to be nominated to make decisions in children’s cases? Has legislative consent been sought from Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and who will check the quality of decisions across the United Kingdom? Secondly, will the guidance on what counts as a good reason be published in draft before Report, and how will it apply at the reasonable grounds stage where the threshold is deliberately low? Thirdly, what systems will caseworkers have to see earlier accounts held elsewhere in the Home Office and to identify striking similarities across different claims?
Clear credibility rules should mean quicker and better decisions. What happens to support once a negative decision has been made is the subject of clause 37 in the next group, and I will come to it there.
Mr Paul Kohler (Wimbledon) (LD)
It is an honour to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Murrison. Clause 35 will allow nominated public authorities to make reasonable and conclusive grounds decisions in relation to children. That has been welcomed by the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner, who notes, as the Minister did, that this has
“been successfully piloted and has demonstrated stronger identification and support where local authority partners such as social care workers can contribute to decision-making.”
My party consequently supports clause 35.
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
I rise to oppose clause 36. I believe that the roots of the plan lie in the previous Prime Minister’s Administration, and the fact that the clause will affect and harm so many victims and survivors of modern slavery in the face of so few actual cases reflects and results from the awfulness of the rhetoric around migration in recent years, on which the Government have joined in.
The British Medical Association made that point in its written evidence to the Committee. It said:
“We are also concerned by the rise in anti-migrant rhetoric in the UK. Public debate on immigration and asylum has too often relied on misinformation, alarmist language and unfair scapegoating of migrant communities. Sections of the media and some politicians have played a significant role in shaping and amplifying this hostile framing. For example, language used by the then Prime Minister, Sir Keir Starmer, when launching the Immigration White Paper”.
It was referring there to the “island of strangers” speech. The BMA also said:
“the Government and others since, has contributed to racist and xenophobic narratives…This hostile climate has real consequences. International healthcare workers, including doctors and nurses, have reported rising racist abuse and discrimination, both in workplaces and in the wider community. A recent RCN survey showed a 55% increase in racist incidents experienced by nursing staff in the last three years. The real figures are likely to be much higher”.
That is the background to the Bill and I absolutely believe that clause 36 needs to be removed. The Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner is utterly opposed to the clause being included in the Bill and has brought many victims’ voices into the evidence we have received.
Clause 36 requires those deciding whether an individual should receive modern slavery support to regard the following factors as damaging to a person’s credibility: delays in making a modern slavery claim; delays in providing relevant information; significant inaccuracies, inconsistencies or omissions in the information provided; inconsistencies between a modern slavery claim and other protection, human rights or civil or criminal proceedings; and striking similarities between one person’s claim and another person’s claim or related legal proceedings.
The Home Office has said these factors will not apply where there is a “good reason”, and Ministers lean heavily on that in the human rights memorandum and say that decision makers must “assess all evidence fairly” and exercise “powers reasonably”. However, Ministers have yet to define for us what a “good reason” is. The clause introduces vagueness and an automatic duty to doubt victims into law, while the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 already has clauses that would enable further questions and deadlines to be put to victims where credibility is genuinely in doubt.
Treating all survivors this way—mandating detrimental treatment for any late claim—is a massively traumatic response to a tiny issue by any measure. There is no evidence of widespread misuse. The Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner told us that in oral evidence. She said:
“Of the flights that did not go ahead in 2025 after 3 pm, that is less than 1% of the number of potential victims of modern slavery whom we identified in the UK last year.” ––[Official Report, Immigration and Asylum Public Bill Committee, 15 September 2026; c. 6.]
We were also told that in 2025, 180 referrals were made after 3 pm on the day before an arranged return. That is all there were; these are really small numbers. We also heard that in the national referral mechanism as a whole, only six potential victims were disqualified on bad faith grounds, and only 224 in total were disqualified on any ground, public order or bad faith combined, which is again under 1% of all referrals.
The director general of the Office for Statistics Regulation has, in contrast, sent a reprimand letter to the Home Office expressing concerns around its claims that people are gaming the modern slavery system. He said the office does not have any evidence to confirm those claims and reprimanded the previous Home Secretary for failing to back up public statements with evidence. There is a lack of further background in relation to how long since their arrival people were removed. It does not offer a breakdown of the other reasons why someone may not have been removed, so even the data that the Minister is quoting at us is not reliable.
The Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner also points out the vital issue that people cannot self-refer. In written evidence that we received from Professor Parosha Chandran via Unseen UK, she says that the overall approach of adding all these reasons to doubt to the legislation is legally wrong. She says:
“It creates a statutory adverse inference from precisely the features that frequently arise in trafficking and modern slavery cases: delayed disclosure, partial disclosure, inconsistent accounts, inaccurate accounts, gaps in memory, fear, shame, mistrust of authorities…and inability to recognise oneself as a victim.”
The Bill’s explanatory notes give this away. Professor Chandran says:
“They reveal that Clause 36 is intended to close what the Government characterises as opportunities for immigration misuse”,
based on poor data, as we have just seen. She says:
“That is an immigration-control rationale, not a victim-identification rationale.”
Can the Government really justify mixing up these motivations at such detriment to the wider population of victims beyond the tiny number of examples of abuse that they have talked about?
I think this is a very important objection that we have received from many groups. The clause will apply to all victims of trafficking and exploitation, including children and UK nationals. It will include doubting young women who have been sexually exploited, children involved in county lines, and older people and disabled people who are cuckooed in their homes. Survivors across the board are calling for the clause to be removed.
In the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner’s briefing to us, she quoted participants in her recent summit, which had representatives from 15 lived experience advisory panels. They said:
“Trauma affects memory, behaviour and disclosure. Trauma shapes communication, memory and presentation of information. It leads to inconsistencies, gaps in memory, delayed disclosure, or confused details. These are typical trauma responses, not signs of dishonesty. Disclosure happens once trust and safety are established, which takes time: ‘becoming safe’ is different from ‘feeling safe.’
Fear of authorities and consequences, fear of deportation, imprisonment, or loss of support can lead to delay and inconsistency when recounting experiences. Mistrust of authorities compounds this, and traffickers exploit legal knowledge as a scare tactic and threaten victims with this information. Threats to survivors or their families and emotional ties to traffickers create powerful barriers to speaking out. It takes time for someone to feel safe enough to disclose their experience.”
A spokesperson for No One Above, which represents survivors linked to Mohammed al-Fayed, said:
“For many survivors of Mohamed Al Fayed, it has taken years or even decades to speak about what happened to them. The fact that somebody did not disclose their exploitation at the time does not make their experience less real. Survivors can face fear, shame, trauma and enormous power imbalances, while the institutions around them may completely fail to recognise what is happening. We are deeply concerned that these changes will make it even harder for survivors to be believed and get the support they need simply because they were not able to come forward sooner.”
Via the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner, we also have evidence from Sosa Henkoma, a survivor of child criminal exploitation. He said:
“I was eleven years old when I was first exploited by a gang. I didn’t know I was a victim—I was a child. When I was twelve, I tried to tell social services what was happening, I was called a fantasist.”
The Bill will create the conditions for more children like Sosa to be treated like fantasists. Clause 36 is not trauma informed, and will cause incredible harm.
We should also listen to the people who are actually facing immigration enforcement, as those victims matter too, and the clause harms victims of trafficking and exploitation more widely. The Gatwick detainees self-advocacy group says:
“When people arrive, like with any serious trouble people have, people are exhausted. They can’t go into these things straight away—they don’t trust the home office or the police. It is really hard to talk about these things because you don’t know what it might bring you—it might bring you trouble as well.”
In recent years, the Government have made good progress on violence against women and girls and on modern slavery, but clause 36 is completely contrary to very recent Government promises to believe and support survivors. The VAWG strategy, “Freedom from violence and abuse”, which was published in December 2025, acknowledges that victims are
“more likely to struggle to engage with support due to trauma and negative previous experiences with services.”
It says:
“We also recognise how immigration status can affect victims of VAWG and that many migrant and asylum-seeking victims will not come forward to report abuse out of fear about their future.”
How does the Bill fulfil the pledges in that Government strategy? Importantly, the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association said in its written evidence that clause 36 is
“inverting the trauma-informed approach that Article 13 of the European Convention Against Trafficking in Human Beings”
requires.
Government Members will not have received these briefings, as the organisation working on this campaign, Freedom United, decided that it was only worth asking me and the two Liberal Democrat Members on the Committee. That is really sad. We have received nearly 700 emails from people and member groups who are really worried about this. They ask us to guarantee that survivors of modern slavery are believed and supported, not penalised for their trauma. I urge the Government to listen to the victims’ voices that we have heard, listen to the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner and think again about clause 36.
Anna Turley
I thank all hon. Members for their contributions. This is a really important discussion because these are important clauses. Clause 35 clarifies who can make decisions about whether an individual is a victim of modern slavery for the purposes of part 5 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022. For adults, as I have said, it will formalise the existing operational model, with the Secretary of State acting as a competent authority for all modern slavery decisions. For children, it will enable the Secretary of State to nominate other public authorities to act as the competent authority. That will allow modern slavery decisions relating to children to be devolved nationally, ensuring that decisions are made by those best placed to safeguard and support them, building on the success of the pilot.
Schedule 4 complements these changes by making important consequential amendments to reflect the definition of competent authority and ensure consistency across the statute book. It will enable the Secretary of State to lay regulations on the making of reasonable or conclusive grounds decisions by all competent authorities and issue guidance on the processes to be followed by nominated public authorities.
Clause 36 places on a statutory footing credibility considerations that are already set out in guidance. That will make it clear that these factors will be considered to be damaging to a person’s credibility unless good reasons are put forward. That will provide a more robust framework—one that supports consistent decision making while recognising factors that could impact credibility indicators, such as a person suffering from coercion, fear or trauma.
I come back to the points raised during the discussion. I am afraid that I take issue with the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion for talking as if the purpose of the Bill is just to drive rhetoric or a political argument. These important measures will give our constituents confidence in the immigration and asylum system, and they will make sure that these important provisions, which are a credit to the Conservatives, are genuinely there to protect those who require and deserve support having faced the horrendous issue of modern slavery. It is really important that we protect them from abuse.
I go back to some of the facts and evidence I have already mentioned. The hon. Lady seems to dismiss the evidence out of hand, but there are some important factors here. I mentioned in my introductory remarks that modern slavery referrals have gone up 900% since 2014. Of arranged returns that failed to go ahead, 34%, or over a third, involved a referral for modern slavery made after the return had been arranged—not prior, but after. That is people who have gone through numerous appeals processes and have had numerous opportunities to highlight issues or concerns, but who had a return arranged because they have no right to be in this country.
Of cases raised through the national referral mechanism’s out-of-hours decision-making service ahead of a charter flight, 76% were raised between the hours of 3 pm on the day prior to the planned removal and 6 am on the day of the planned charter removal. Of the total referrals, 15% were raised after 11 pm.
Anna Turley
I am just addressing the hon. Lady’s point. She said that those are not big statistics, or she dismissed them. They might appear small in scale, but they place a hugely disproportionate pressure on operations. Home Office officials are getting all the paperwork in place and liaising with different countries and airlines. These cases are hugely expensive and damaging for operations. They delay removal action due to disingenuous claims, prevent proper decision making and impact support for those who need it most. That is what the Bill aims to address.
Siân Berry
This is a useful debate, because the Minister’s points are speaking to the operational nature of this. I hope she will go away and reflect on the wider harm that will be caused by adding this to all victims, in response to what is an operational decision. She is very much relying on that, rather than on our obligations under human rights law and the nature of why late referrals may occur in those circumstances.
Anna Turley
I appreciate the hon. Lady’s intervention. I will come on to trauma and the exemptions that we have, because this is really important. We want to make sure that genuine victims are protected, but I want to outline another fact—the facts are really important here—because the UK refers more victims of modern slavery than the whole of Europe put together. In 2023, the UK referred 17,004 cases, yet there were 10,907 referrals in the whole EU. I do not think anyone can accuse us of not living up to our obligations on modern slavery.
The hon. Lady and the hon. Member for Wimbledon have both mentioned victims of trauma. As a Government, we have engaged extensively with organisations working to address modern slavery. We have had a call for evidence and lived experience forums. We have had a range of expert insights, including survivor voices, to ensure that we have informed policy development. That has helped to ensure that the reforms reflect how the system operates in practice and take a trauma-informed approach to identifying and supporting victims. We will continue to engage with stakeholders as the Bill progresses, to ensure that the system remains responsive to victims’ needs.
I reiterate that individuals have opportunities throughout their immigration process to raise any modern slavery-related information, or any other information.
Anna Turley
I will give way, and then I will make the point I had intended to make.
Siân Berry
The Minister repeatedly refers to “individuals” making the claim, but people cannot self-refer to the national referral mechanism. A professional is making the judgment that they may be a victim. Will the Minister acknowledge that? These claims of abuse hinge on the belief that individuals are making claims, but they are not.
Anna Turley
The hon. Lady must not misinterpret us; we are absolutely clear that individuals do not make those claims. However, they raise information. If they raise information on the plane’s steps, it is very clear that many individuals are knowingly gaming the sorts of information that will be relevant to a modern slavery claim. Individuals can raise, at any point in the immigration process, not a referral but any information relating to any concerns they may have about their experience of modern slavery. That could be at the moment they arrive at a UK port, when they are encountered by immigration officials, or it could be to the police, a local authority, a community group or a charity. All this information can be flagged.
If modern slavery information is raised, or if it is identified through general immigration screening processes, a trained first responder—in these circumstances, from UK Visas and Immigration, Border Force, Immigration Enforcement or the police—will make a national referral mechanism referral. Adults must consent to such a referral being made. The referral process includes questions designed to surface any modern slavery experience, to aid decision making by the single competent authority and the immigration enforcement competent authority. People are trained specifically to ask questions throughout the process to identify victims of modern slavery.
Returning to the issues of trauma, the Government recognise the horrific experience that many victims of modern slavery have endured. We understand that trauma can have a profound effect on their ability to raise and discuss it, which is why decision makers are trained and must consider whether there are good reasons to explain the factors that might otherwise be viewed as undermining an individual’s credibility.
Detailed guidance will support decision makers in considering each person’s individual circumstances and experience. That will be trauma-informed, and it will ensure that credibility assessments are made fairly and on a case-by-case basis. First responders are also trained to recognise any signs of modern slavery and identify potential victims, to use trauma-informed approaches to help individuals disclose their experiences and, where appropriate, to refer them to the national referral mechanism.
The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion asks about the provisions applying to children. The Bill’s credibility provisions will apply to individuals of all ages, but specific safeguards will be in place with regard to age. The Government recognise the specific vulnerabilities that children can have, which may affect their ability to disclose relevant modern slavery information. That will be factored into decision makers’ consideration of whether there are good reasons to explain the factors that might otherwise be viewed as undermining an individual’s credibility. This could include, for example, a child’s developmental stage and emotional maturity, which could have an impact on their ability to disclose information. Detailed guidance will support decision makers in considering each person’s individual circumstances and experiences, ensuring that credibility assessments are made fairly and on a case-by-case basis.
The hon. Lady also asks whether the credibility provisions will apply to British nationals. Yes, they will apply to all individuals, including British nationals. We recognise that some individuals, including British nationals who have experienced modern slavery, may have reasons for being unable to disclose information at an early opportunity. For example, victims of historical exploitation may not have previously come into contact or had repeated interactions with authorities, resulting in delayed disclosure. Equally, victims might not recognise themselves as victims of modern slavery or might be reluctant to be identified as such. That is why our first responders are trained to understand and identify signs that may indicate that a person is a victim.
The clause also requires decision makers to consider all relevant circumstances and evidence when assessing the credibility of an individual’s account on a case-by-case basis. As I said, where they identify that there are good reasons for the delayed disclosure, they will not draw a negative credibility finding on that basis alone.
The hon. Lady mentioned the al-Fayed cases. We are absolutely committed to supporting victims to come forward and disclose their experiences, including victims of historical exploitation, victims of grooming gangs and al-Fayed trafficking victims. Those are horrendous cases. Under the modern slavery system, first responders must refer consenting adults and children to the national referral mechanism when modern slavery indicators are present. This is true regardless of how long ago the incidents may have occurred. Decision makers will take this into account when considering cases. Where there is an explanation for the time taken between the exploitation and disclosing it, the delay in disclosure will not result in a negative credibility finding on that basis alone. The credibility provisions on delayed disclosure focus on where individuals have had repeated opportunities to disclose and did not do so. It is not a blanket provision on all lateness.
Hon. Members have asked for more detail on why good reasons are not listed in the Bill. The Bill sets out a pretty exhaustive list of five specific factors that decision makers are required to consider as having a negative impact on credibility when assessing the account of an individual referred to the national referral mechanism, while recognising there might be legitimate reasons for these issues arising. Where the competent authority is satisfied that there are good reasons for the issues with an individual’s account, such as delayed disclosure and inconsistency of account, this will mitigate against any adverse credibility finding. The legislation does not include an exhaustive list of good reasons, primarily because the range of potential mitigating circumstances is so broad that any attempt to provide a closed list would inevitably fail to capture the full range of potential mitigating circumstances.
Decision makers should not be restricted to a set of good reasons. Having these reasons in guidance will retain flexibility for decision makers to consider individual factors that appear to impact on an individual’s credibility. Those decision makers should consider all relevant factors in the round on a case-by-case basis before making a credibility finding. In terms of good reasons, relevant consideration may include the impact of trauma, fear of authorities, cultural or gender-related barriers to disclosure, a lack of self-identification as a victim or, for children, factors such as developmental stage, maturity and the effects of grooming, coercion and control.
The hon. Member for Stockton West asked about consistency across local authorities and local decision-making structures. It is important to say that any individual would receive a consistent decision and outcome. That is important to us, irrespective of which competent authority makes the decision. Regulations will be put in place to establish a clear framework that all competent authorities will be expected to operate within in order to ensure that decisions are taken consistently across all areas. All decisions will be made in line with modern slavery statutory guidance that will be consistent across all competent authorities. For decisions made by local public authorities, there will be separate additional guidance setting out the process and timelines for decision making through this model.
The shadow Minister also asked who might be nominated. Ahead of any public authority being nominated as a competent authority, it will be provided with a comprehensive programme of training to ensure that it understands its responsibilities as a competent authority and is able to make timely and accurate decisions. In addition, the Home Office will put in place clear oversight processes, including clear intervention steps that will be taken should concerns be raised about performance.
The shadow Minister also asked how the measures will apply in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The intention is for this model of decision making to apply to children across all parts of the United Kingdom. We already have successful pilot sites operating in all four nations, as the model allows for local safeguarding partners to have flexibility over how they deliver many elements of the decision-making process. This means that decisions can work alongside any differences in legislative framework across the UK, while ensuring that all decisions are made to a consistent standard. We will continue to work with local safeguarding partners and devolved Governments on this approach and implementation.
Anna Turley
This Government are clear that we must be able to move individuals more efficiently through the system without unnecessary delay, and ensure that those who are deemed not to be victims of modern slavery do not receive protection and support that they do not need and are not entitled to. Clause 37 makes it clear that a negative conclusive grounds decision ends the modern slavery recovery period, so there will be no requirement to wait for the 30-day recovery period to end before confirming that an individual is not a victim.
At present, after referral to the national referral mechanism, if an individual receives a positive reasonable grounds decision, they receive a statutory 30-day recovery period. That protects them from removal and enables access to support. Even where a decision maker has the evidence to issue a negative conclusive grounds decision within 30 days, and so conclude that the individual is not a victim, that would not end the recovery period nor these entitlements.
Clause 37 rectifies this problem. Where there is enough evidence to conclude that an individual is not a victim of modern slavery, a negative conclusive grounds decision can be issued within the recovery period, and the issuing of that negative decision will end the recovery period. This is important to ensure that we remove inefficiencies in our system and do not retain unnecessary barriers to removal. It will also ensure that support resources remain focused on supporting and protecting genuine victims. I commend clause 37 to the Committee.
Matt Vickers
Clause 37 raises a simple question: once the competent authority has considered a claim and reached a negative conclusive grounds decision, why should the recovery period carry on just because the calendar has not yet reached 30 days? Under clause 37, the recovery period ends when a negative conclusive grounds decision is made, even if that is before the 30 days are up. If no decision has been made by then, the period continues until a decision is made. Corresponding changes are made for further recovery periods. The Opposition support this principle.
The recovery period exists so that a claim can be properly considered. Once it has been considered and found wanting, the protection should not roll on automatically. Our immigration system will not command respect if an unsuccessful claim simply buys another stretch of waiting at taxpayers’ expense. Where the legal process is complete and someone has no right to be here, they should leave.
We should be honest about what the clause does and does not do. Ending a recovery period lifts the legal bar on removal and ends the support that goes with it. However, it does not remove a single person; that depends entirely on what happens next, which is a point that applies just as much to the groups of clauses either side of this one. Too often, a decision is made in one part of the Home Office, while another part carries on as if nothing has happened. Ministers should be lining up the next steps while a case is still being considered, so that a negative decision is followed swiftly by action, not by a trip to the back of another queue.
Speed must not come at the expense of getting it right. A rushed decision that falls apart under scrutiny helps nobody and ends up in court. In the year to June, more than four in five conclusive grounds decisions that were reconsidered came out positive. Whatever the reason for that, it tells us that first decisions do not always hold up. If a negative decision will now end support immediately, the quality of that decision matters more than ever.
The Government announced earlier this month that the backlog of conclusive grounds decisions had been cleared, yet more than 6,000 cases were still waiting at the end of September, and that number has been rising. The Home Office’s own statistics show that the number of cases awaiting a final decision fell in every quarter until April this year, but has since risen by 23% between March and June and by a further 6% in September alone. I would be grateful if the Minister explained what the Government mean by “cleared”, and what they are doing to stop the queue from growing again.
The person, their representative and the organisations supporting them also need to know what has been decided and what happens next. A recovery period that ends overnight must not leave anyone unsure of whether they are still entitled to support.
We support clause 37, but I would be grateful if the Minister answered three questions. First, what checks will take place before a negative conclusive grounds decision is issued, and how will a genuine mistake be put right without that process becoming an endless source of delay? Secondly, once a negative decision is made, who takes ownership of the case, and how will cases that are already in the system when the clause comes into force be treated? Thirdly, will the Government publish regular figures showing how long it takes, after a negative conclusive grounds decision, for the next enforcement step to happen? Counting decisions alone will tell us nothing about whether the system is actually working.
Mr Kohler
Under section 61 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, a person is entitled to a minimum 30-day recovery period from the day on which they receive a positive reasonable grounds decision. Clause 37 amends section 61 so that, in the event that a person receives a negative conclusive grounds decision within the 30-day period, the recovery period and its associated protections come to an end. It also makes similar provision enabling an equivalent outcome with regard to any additional recovery period under section 62.
This cliff edge risks placing vulnerable people in the way of future harm. A report published by the Modern Slavery and Human Rights Policy and Evidence Centre, led by the University of Oxford, describes the overturn rate of negative NRM decisions as extremely high. Such decisions are not perfect, and removing the recovery period for those with a negative decision means that people who have been trafficked will, in many cases, face being left without protection.
The statistics are stark. Since 2023, the proportion of reconsidered decisions that turn positive has been higher than the proportion of initial positive decisions at the reasonable grounds and conclusive grounds stages. At the reasonable grounds stage, positive outcomes after reconsideration ran between 62% and 82% between 2021 and 2025, while initial positive rates fell as low as 53% in 2024. Between January 2021 and June 2025, of those won a reconsideration of a negative reasonable grounds decision, 646—or 70% of that group—went on to get a positive conclusive grounds decision, too.
I ask the Minister to reflect on those figures and explain why she wants to continue with this cliff edge. I call upon the Government not to pursue clause stand part.
Siân Berry
I also oppose clause 37. Under that clause, survivors who receive a negative decision could be immediately removed from support, which could expose them to destitution, homelessness and an increased risk of further harm and exploitation.
Allowing competent authorities to make and serve conclusive grounds decisions during the recovery and reflection period could have a devastating impact on survivors’ wellbeing and recovery. This approach may reduce the amount and quality of evidence available to inform decision making, because survivors may not have sufficient time to understand the process, build trust with support providers or access legal advice. Given the complexity of many cases and the evidential requirements often associated with conclusive grounds decisions—including the need for medical or mental health assessment reports—many individuals may find it difficult to obtain and submit the necessary evidence within such a short timeframe.
I believe that there will also be wider impacts on survivors and society—particularly an increase in homelessness, which the Prime Minister is committed to reducing. Clause 37 could result in survivors being exited from support on the same day that they receive a negative decision, which would clearly put them at a heightened risk of destitution and homelessness. A negative decision notwithstanding, anyone in the national referral mechanism was referred by a first responder who identified trafficking indicators. Those indicators suggested the need for appropriate support to prevent the individual’s situation from deteriorating, whether or not they met the threshold for identification as trafficked at the point of referral.
Additionally, instructing decision makers to decide at any point in the recovery and reflection period means that survivors may be expected to provide far too much relevant information about their case far too quickly after being rescued or escaping a situation of exploitation. Those decisions may be rushed; there may be political or administrative pressure on decision makers to rush processes so that decisions are made more quickly and support can be withdrawn. The overturning data is very instructive on that point. I agree that the quality of decisions matters more than speed. Clause 37 is very risky in its potential to do harm.
The Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association suggested in evidence that if clause 37 is retained, a further short 30-day period of support should be provided, to avoid the cliff edge. No amendment to that effect has been tabled. Does the Minister really intend for people to receive literally nothing after a negative decision, risking homelessness, destitution and re-exploitation? She should bear in mind not the six people disqualified on bad faith grounds, or the small number of people whose cases start while they are under removal plans, but the huge number of potential survivors this will affect right across the country.
Anna Turley
I appreciate the contributions that hon. Members have made. As I have made clear, the Government are committed to ensuring that the modern slavery national referral mechanism operates efficiently and effectively. Clause 37 is an important part of that. It will remove inefficiencies and allow for support to be targeted at those who are recognised as victims, rather than having an arbitrary period to wait when we have conclusively identified that an individual is not a victim. As I am sure hon. Members would agree, support should be removed in a recovery period when there is sufficient evidence to conclude that an individual is not a victim of modern slavery.
Let me respond to some of the points that colleagues have made. I have heard language describing people whose conclusive grounds decisions state that they are not victims of modern slavery described as “survivors”. It is important to note that the conclusive grounds decision is that they are not a victim of modern slavery, and therefore that they are not considered to have recovery needs stemming from modern slavery. It stands to reason that those individuals should not be entitled to the recovery period or to modern slavery-specific support—nor would they need them.
For someone who does not receive a negative conclusive grounds decision in the recovery period, those protections will continue for the duration of the 30 days or until such time as a conclusive grounds decision is made. During the recovery period, when there are still reasonable grounds to suspect that a person is a victim of modern slavery, protection from removal and entitlement to support will be ongoing. The recovery period itself is not being reduced; the new provision merely makes it clear that, where there is sufficient evidence to warrant making a negative conclusive grounds decision during that time, doing so will end the recovery period.
The quality of decision making has been flagged by a number of Opposition Members. We are talking about highly trained staff, and negative conclusive grounds decisions are always checked by a second pair of eyes, so there is quality assurance and effective decision making. In 2025, of the 17,560 negative decisions, only 1,467 were accepted for reconsideration. Changing the outcome, however, does not mean that the original decision was incorrect. In most cases, additional information was provided that was not available originally, so that is not an issue of decision-making quality.
Anna Turley
I beg to move amendment 114, in clause 38, page 40, line 16, leave out—
“except where the person is within subsection (1A)”
and insert—
“in a case where the person is aged 18 or over”.
This amendment limits the duty of the Secretary of State to disqualify potential victims of slavery or trafficking from certain protections when they are a threat to public order so that the duty will apply only in respect of adults.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 115 to 118.
Clause stand part.
Anna Turley
Our modern slavery system is generous in the rights and protections it provides those who require them to recover from that abhorrent crime. The Government remain committed to ensuring that such protections are available to those for whom they are intended. It is right—indeed, it is within our international obligations—that the Government can deny modern slavery protections to those who pose a threat to public order or seek to misuse the system through dishonest claims made in bad faith.
The practical operation of the disqualification mechanisms has long-standing challenges, including in cases involving foreign national offenders. The current disqualification framework does not always provide sufficient clarity on when disqualification should apply and what the consequences of that decision are, or on when a claim should be treated as having been made in bad faith. Such ambiguities have created operational uncertainty and complicated decision making, and ultimately mean that the disqualification framework does not operate as effectively as it should.
Clause 38 addresses those issues by strengthening and clarifying the public order and bad faith disqualification frameworks, while maintaining appropriate safeguards for children and those at risk of re-trafficking. First, it expands the grounds on which a person can be disqualified, based on the national security or public order threat that they pose, to include suspended sentences, reflecting the changes made in the Sentencing Act 2026. Secondly, it clarifies the consequences that follow a decision to disqualify, making clear that no onward modern slavery decision making is required, rectifying an existing lack of clarity. Thirdly, it clarifies that where an individual is at an immediate and significant risk of re-trafficking in the UK, the national security or public order disqualification will not apply. That necessary and targeted safeguard provides clarity for decision makers, potential victims and professionals, and balances the need to protect people at significant risk with the duty to disqualify. That exemption ensures that, where there is a direct risk of someone being exploited or exploited again in the UK, they retain access to NRM support for protection.
Clause 38, combined with amendment 115, also introduces a specific, targeted exemption from disqualification for all children on public order grounds, while maintaining the disqualification where the national security criteria are met, to ensure that the acute vulnerabilities of children are appropriately recognised. Importantly, the clause also separates bad faith from public order, and, for the first time in statute, defines circumstances in which a claim is to be treated as having been made in bad faith. That includes claims based on falsified documents or claims made only after removal action has commenced without compelling justification, thereby disincentivising people from trying to misuse the system.
Those measures will provide a more consistent and robust approach to disqualification decisions, helping to ensure that the modern slavery system safeguards the public interest, commands public confidence and strengthens the Government’s ability to respond where individuals pose a threat to public order or seek to misuse the system. The clause therefore addresses existing uncertainty that underpins the current disqualification framework, strengthens and clarifies the circumstances in which disqualification will apply, embeds more appropriate safeguards, and ultimately supports a more effective modern slavery system.
Amendment 115, which is consequential on amendment 114, ensures that all children are treated equally under the public order disqualification in clause 38. Presently, clause 38 exempts children with leave to remain or right of abode in the UK from disqualification based on public order threat based on criminality. Amendments 114 and 115 recognise the vulnerabilities of all children and make an important change to ensure that all children under the age of 18 are treated consistently. The same exemption from the public order disqualification on criminality grounds will therefore be afforded to all children regardless of their immigration status. The amendments do not affect disqualification on national security grounds, for which all children remain in scope. I hope that Members will agree that the amendments are sensible and proportionate, and ensure that the public order disqualification provision, and our safeguarding duties, can operate as intended.
Amendment 118 is a technical amendment to provide greater clarity win the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 on how the public order disqualification, bad faith disqualification and temporary permission to stay provisions operate together. Amendments 116 and 117, which are consequential on amendment 118, remove references to temporary permission to stay from the public order and bad faith disqualification provisions in section 63 of the 2022 Act.
That will create a clearer distinction between a disqualification decision and a temporary permission to stay decision under section 65 of the same Act, the latter of which can be considered only after a positive conclusive grounds decision has been made. Importantly, section 65 already makes clear the circumstances in which the duty to grant permission to stay does not apply, including where public order, national security or bad faith concerns arise. The amendments therefore improve the clarity and consistency of the legislation, without changing the underlying policy intent.
Matt Vickers
A modern slavery claim must never become a “get out of jail free” card for someone who threatens our national security or is deliberately abusing our immigration system. Clause 38 deals with disqualification from protection on grounds of national security, public order and bad faith, and the Opposition support its purpose. It builds on the public order disqualification that the last Conservative Government introduced in the Nationality and Borders Act 2022—a measure that Labour voted against.
When we legislated again in 2023, the then Prime Minister said that our modern slavery measures would drive “a coach and horses” through protections. Labour has kept those measures and is now are adding to them—we welcome that. However, the Committee must understand exactly who is caught, which protections fall where and how such decisions will be taken. The Government have had to table—
Immigration and Asylum Bill (Twelfth sitting)
Tuesday 27th October 2026
(1 day, 20 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Immigration and Asylum Bill 2026-27 View all Immigration and Asylum Bill 2026-27 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 27 October 2026 - (27 Oct 2026)
The Chair
I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:
Government amendments 115 to 118.
Clause stand part.
Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg.
As we read the amended clause, the national security ground applies regardless of age. I would be grateful if the Minister confirmed that, where a child has been groomed and exploited into offending, that must be properly weighed. The public also expect serious offending by under-18s to be dealt with, so the Minister should tell us what assessment has been made of the cases affected and how the safeguarding, criminal justice and security systems will handle that.
The bad faith provisions apply to claims made as an adult, including where someone knowingly provides false information or makes a claim when their removal is due. We all know the pattern of the claim that appears at the 11th hour, just as the flight is booked. The Home Office’s own figures show the scale of this: last year, around a third of charter flight returns that failed to go ahead involved a modern slavery referral made after the return had been arranged. On flights with an out-of-hours decision service, three quarters of the referrals were made between 3 pm the day before and 6 am on the day of removal, with one in seven made after 11 pm. Members can draw their own conclusions about what that pattern tells us.
The clause contains exceptions to the timing rule when someone met a claim notice deadline or had compelling reasons for not claiming earlier. Those exceptions have their place, but “compelling reasons” has to mean something. It cannot become a catch-all for explaining away every claim made at the departure gate. I would welcome the Minister giving the Committee examples of what would and would not meet that test, and telling us who will make that judgment. A late claim and a knowingly fabricated one are not the same thing. Decisions needs clear reasons if they are to survive a challenge. Otherwise, an attempt to tackle delay just produces another round of litigation.
Government amendments 116 and 117 take the provisions on leave out of disqualification sections, and amendment 118 deals with leave in section 65 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, covering national security, adult public order cases and bad faith claims made as an adult. We accept that restructuring, but the decisions on protection and leave must join up. The Minister should set out how existing grants of leave will be reviewed and how revocation decisions will be made where the law allows. Disqualification is not removal. The point I made about clause 37 applies here in full. Once a disqualification decision is made, the case must not fall into the gap between two processes. These measures are a step in the right direction, and we support clause 38 and the Government’s amendments. We look to the Minister to show that the amended clause will work in practice.
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
I wish to speak briefly against clause 38. Public order disqualification, in the way it has been applied so far, has exacerbated ongoing systemic issues arising from failures in identification and safeguards within the criminal justice system. Available evidence shows that this provision has disproportionately affected individuals subjected to criminal exploitation.
As we heard when discussing previous clauses, many survivors of criminal exploitation were forced to commit offences as part of their exploitation. They are often prosecuted for those crimes as a result of gaps in the application of the non-punishment principle in the UK, including defences under section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. Those who have criminal convictions are at heightened risk of exploitation, too. The criminalisation of survivors has been used time and again as a tool to control people and keep them in exploitation. The clause is an unnecessary extension of existing harms and should be dropped.
The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Anna Turley)
It is a pleasure to serve under chairmanship, Mr Twigg. I thank colleagues for their contributions to the discussion of the clause.
Clause 38 strengthens and clarifies the public order and bad faith disqualification frameworks due to long-standing challenges in their practical operation, especially in cases involving foreign national offenders. It expands the grounds on which an individual can be disqualified if they pose a threat to national security or public order by including suspended sentences to reflect the changes in the Sentencing Act 2020. It provides clarity in statute as to what is meant by bad faith, ensuring that those who seek to misuse the system with false and fabricated claims, or by raising information for the first time only after removal directions have been set, can be disqualified, ensuring that they are not able to take advantage of the generosity of our system.
The clause also makes it clear that no further modern slavery decision making is required should someone become disqualified. Finally, it exempts child victims from disqualification on public order grounds and makes the exemption for all victims where the risk of re-trafficking is clear. The clause provides a more consistent and robust approach to disqualification decisions and strengthens the Government’s ability to respond where individuals pose a threat to public order or seek to misuse the system.
I shall respond to some of the points that hon. Members made. The shadow Minister asked for case studies or examples of where the clause would be implemented. Suppose that individual C is convicted and receives an 11-month custodial sentence for common assault, battery or breach of a restraining order, which are not covered by public order disqualifications; when they raise modern slavery grounds, that is considered by the national referral mechanism. Where they are a victim, the individual will proceed through the decision-making stages, gaining protection from removal and access to support, and on to a conclusive grounds determination. Where they have ongoing needs and no right to remain, they would get a temporary permission to stay consideration.
Under the new system, even if individual C is a modern slavery victim, a foreign national offender who has received any custodial sentence, including a suspended sentence, will fall within scope of public order disqualification. Where the disqualification is applied, they will be disqualified from support and no further decision making on modern slavery will take place unless an “immediate and significant” risk of re-trafficking in the UK is identified. That means they will not receive a conclusive grounds decision and will not therefore be eligible for temporary permission to stay. British nationals are subject to a different threshold; they will be disqualified on the basis of a public order threat where they have committed one of the crimes set out in section 4 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015.
The shadow Minister also asked why children are still in scope of the national security limit disqualification. It is right that we can withhold modern slavery protections where an individual poses a threat to national security. That principle should apply regardless of age. Retaining the power to disqualify a child on national security grounds exists solely as a backstop for the rare circumstances in which an individual under 18 poses a significantly serious national security threat and disqualification from the national referral mechanism is therefore appropriate. The exception to disqualification where there is a risk of re-trafficking in the UK will still apply and require decision makers to consider the facts of each case.
This approach intends to strike an appropriate balance between safeguarding children and ensuring that national security considerations are prioritised where necessary. In parallel with our modern slavery response, the UK has one of the most robust counter-terrorism frameworks in the world. Prevent is one of the four pillars of the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy; it operates in the non-criminal space and is designed to support people away from radicalisation before they commit an offence. The Home Office is testing new approaches to better spot and refer individuals at risk of radicalisation online, and testing how those insights can be translated into timely, proportionate interventions. That is particularly important considering the rise in children being arrested for terrorism-related activity, much of which is carried out online.
The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion asked about how we will ensure people who are exploited in criminal activity will not be unduly penalised for the exploitation that they have suffered. It is important to flag that the criminal justice system contains safeguards against penalising victims of exploitation, including under section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. That provides a defence in criminal proceedings for people who have been forced or compelled to commit crimes through slavery or exploitation. Clause 38 also expressly sets out that disqualification will not apply where a person is considered to be at “immediate and significant risk” of exploitation in the UK.
I hope I have responded to all of the questions that hon. Members had and provided clarification. I commend amendments 114 to 118 and clause 38 to the Committee.
Amendment 114 agreed to..
Amendment 115 to 118 agreed to.
Clause 38, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 39
Removal of duty to grant leave to remain to assist recovery
Anna Turley
I beg to move amendment 119, in clause 39, page 43, line 13, at end insert—
‘(za) in subsection (1)—
(i) omit “and” at the end of paragraph (a),
(ii) in paragraph (b), after “leave to” insert “enter or”, and
(iii) at the end of paragraph (b) insert
“, and
(c) who does not have a right of abode in the United Kingdom”,’
This amendment will clarify that the duty to grant limited leave to remain to a victim of slavery or human trafficking does not apply if the victim already has leave to enter the United Kingdom or a right of abode in the United Kingdom.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause stand part.
New clause 29—Changes to leave to remain for victims of slavery or human trafficking—
“(1) Section 65 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (leave to remain for victims of slavery or human trafficking) is amended as follows.
(2) For subsection (2), substitute—
‘(2) The Secretary of State must grant the person—
(a) leave to remain in the United Kingdom for a period lasting no less than 60 months,
(b) recourse to public funds, and
(c) the right to work.’
(3) After subsection (2), insert—
‘(2A) A person granted leave to remain in the United Kingdom under subsection (2) is eligible for settlement in the United Kingdom after residing, with any form of leave, in the United Kingdom for a period of five years.”
(4) Omit subsections (4) and (5).’”
This new clause is a redrafted version of Clause 39 and would, if that clause is omitted, give limited leave to remain to all victims of slavery or human trafficking and prevent such leave being withheld if the Secretary of State believes a victim’s needs can be met elsewhere.
Anna Turley
Through the Bill, the Government are seeking to simplify and clarify protection and leave routes while ensuring fairness and public confidence in the system. The modern slavery system and the associated temporary permission to stay provision are not intended to be a broad route to immigration status for victims of modern slavery. Instead, the UK offers comprehensive protection and leave routes for individuals who would otherwise be at risk upon return or who need to remain in the UK for broader reasons.
The modern slavery-specific provision is intended for very particular purposes, which clause 39 clarifies. The clause will end the provision of a specific form of modern slavery leave to remain in the UK to assist victims in their recovery from physical or psychological harm arising from their exploitation. The Government’s view is that granting temporary permission to stay on recovery grounds goes beyond what is necessary to meet our international obligations, and we simply need to restore the right balance to the system. Temporary permission to stay will remain available for victims who need to remain in the UK to seek compensation or to support police investigations to bring perpetrators to justice.
I want to be extremely clear up front that this Government remain absolutely committed to supporting victims of modern slavery. This change does not alter the support entitlements for victims while they are in the UK. Access to modern slavery support in the UK is not dependent on the grant of temporary permission to stay. This Government provide a comprehensive support package while individuals are in the UK. Confirmed adult victims will continue to access specialist support where they have ongoing needs through the adult victim support contract and wider state services. Confirmed child victims will continue to receive statutory safeguarding support via local authorities, healthcare and the independent child trafficking guardian service.
Both currently and following this change, individuals not granted temporary permission to stay will continue to have access to other routes to remain in the UK, depending on their circumstances. Any applications will be considered on their individual merits in line with published policy. For example, permission to stay may be available to a victim of modern slavery who entered the UK as an overseas domestic worker, a domestic worker in a private household or as a private servant in a diplomatic household. The change to temporary permission to stay will not alter that. An individual’s immigration status and assessment of risk upon return is considered if an individual makes a protection claim. That includes an assessment of serious harm and consideration of risk of re-trafficking and reflects risks of success of specific exploiters, wider vulnerabilities of the individual to re-trafficking and the ability of the return country to protect that individual. Any claim will be considered on its individual merits.
Clause 39 will therefore create a clearer and more coherent temporary permission to stay framework, while maintaining support for victims and preserving the appropriate immigration and protection routes for those who qualify. Amendment 119 is a technical change that clarifies the eligibility criteria for individuals to be considered for temporary permission to stay. It makes clear that individuals who already hold valid leave to enter, leave to remain or a right of abode in the United Kingdom are not eligible for temporary permission to stay.
The change relates only to eligibility for temporary permission to stay. It does not change the grounds for granting temporary permission to stay, or the entitlements available to those granted the leave. As I have already made clear, that change does not impact support entitlements. Victims will still have access to support provided through the national referral mechanism while they remain in the UK. A grant of temporary permission to stay is not needed to access support.
New clause 29 was tabled in the name of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. I will respond to it in full once the hon. Lady has spoken about it. The clause would require the Secretary of State to grant all eligible confirmed victims of modern slavery at least five years’ leave to remain with a route towards settlement. Although I appreciate the intention behind the new clause, temporary permission to stay was never intended to be a general immigration route or a pathway towards settlement to meet the UK’s international obligations under the refugee convention. The new clause goes far beyond what is proportionate and reasonable in these circumstances, though I look forward to hearing the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion’s arguments for it.
Siân Berry
My new clause 29 is intended as a replacement for clause 39, being a redrafted version of it. It would give limited leave to remain to all victims of slavery or human trafficking, and prevent such leave being withheld if the Secretary of State believes that a victim’s needs can be met elsewhere.
Clause 39 removes the Secretary of State’s duty to grant temporary permission to stay for the purpose of assisting survivors in their recovery from any physical or psychological harm arising from their exploitation. That is currently the most common reason for granting leave to remain of this kind, and 96% of those granted leave to remain as victims of trafficking in 2024 were given it for recovery purposes. Grants of leave continue to be low, however, and are usually for very short periods, leaving survivors at risk. Clearly, removing the duty altogether will reduce grants further and cause harm. Forcibly returning more survivors of trafficking to their countries risks disrupting existing therapy and support, leaving them unable to obtain specialist care and putting them at further risk on return, including of re-trafficking.
We must remember the purpose of survivors securing limited leave and, as I propose, long-term immigration status. It provides victims with the security necessary to engage meaningfully with recovery, protection and support processes and to rebuild their lives free from the influence of traffickers. This is the essence of our obligations under international agreements. Insecure immigration status is a well-recognised vulnerability factor that perpetrators frequently exploit to facilitate and maintain survivors’ exploitation, using the threat of immigration enforcement, detention or removal as a means of control.
As my new clause sets out, granting a 60-month residency permit with a pathway to settlement is an essential safeguard in addressing these vulnerabilities, freeing people from exploitation, bringing perpetrators to justice and providing meaningful protection and support to victims, while supporting their reintegration into society and rebuilding their independence.
It is so important that survivors have this alternative route to leave to remain. The Minister has talked about other options for people within the immigration system, but there are examples of migrant victims of human trafficking or modern slavery with a valid skilled worker visa who have been denied VTS leave on those grounds. That meant that those victims could be tied to their exploiters due to their visas, including those co-operating with the authorities to prosecute their exploiters.
Following legal challenge in August 2026, the Home Office conceded that discretion can be exercised when considering whether or not to grant VTS leave to someone with a valid skilled worker visa. From what the Minister has said today, clause 39 seems to be reversing that. We know now that the concession is applied only on a discretionary basis, and is therefore susceptible to a range of variables. The need for a duty to grant long-term leave to victims remains critical in providing recovery, protection and support for survivors and in preventing trafficking and modern slavery going further.
The Government, as well as providing no rationale for the scrapping of VTS leave, have not provided any data showing how many survivors of trafficking are granted leave by other routes. If the Government press ahead with this measure, they should provide further evidence and detail on how these rights will still be protected under the clause.
Matt Vickers
Supporting a victim of modern slavery and deciding what immigration permission that person should have are related questions, but they are not the same. The law must protect people who have been exploited while maintaining an immigration system that is controlled, and that the public can have confidence in. Clause 39 removes the specific duty to grant limited leave to help someone recover from physical or psychological harm caused by their exploitation. It keeps the duty where leave is needed for a victim to seek compensation or to co-operate with an investigation or criminal proceedings.
Whatever some may claim, this is not the removal of every route by which a confirmed victim can receive leave. The Opposition support keeping this route focused on a specific, evidenced need. A finding that someone has been exploited does not answer every question about where they should live or for how long. The Minister needs to tell us how this will work for a genuine victim who still needs help, and how continuity of recovery support will be ensured.
There is also a bigger point here: the grounds that remain are the ones that matter most for bringing traffickers to justice. However, according to the figures that charities have put before the Committee, in 2024 only a handful of grants were made so that victims could seek compensation or help with criminal proceedings. A prosecution that collapses because the key witness left the country is a win for the trafficker, and nobody on the Committee wants that. Can the Minister tell us how the Home Office will ensure that these remaining grounds are actually used, and that its decisions never undermine a victim’s ability to help put an exploiter behind bars?
Government amendment 119 adds existing leave to enter and the right of abode to the circumstances in which there is no duty to grant leave under this provision. Avoiding duplication makes sense, and we support it. New clause 29 goes in a very different direction: it would require at least five years’ leave for qualifying confirmed victims, with access to public funds and permission to work, as well as eligibility for settlement after five years’ residence with any form of leave. That is a very substantial immigration proposal, and it would send exactly the wrong signal to the gangs who sell places on small boats. We oppose it.
Being recognised as a victim is a serious finding, but it should not automatically settle the separate question of a long period of residence, access to public funds and a route to settlement. Those who back the new clause need to explain why five years is the right minimum in every single qualifying case; how many people it would cover; what it would cost in housing and public services; and why residence under any form of leave should count towards settlement. We support clause 39 and Government amendment 119, and we hope that the Minister will set out the safeguards that will sit alongside them.
Anna Turley
I thank all the hon. Members who have tabled amendments in this group and contributed to the debate. I want to start with new clause 29, tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. As was set out earlier, it would grant eligible confirmed victims of modern slavery at least five years’ leave to remain, with a route towards settlement.
I want to be clear that temporary permission to stay is a targeted and temporary form of leave designed to meet specific needs arising from an individual’s experience of exploitation that meets the UK’s international obligations under the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings. Temporary permission to stay will continue to be available where it is necessary for a confirmed victim to remain in the UK to co-operate with law enforcement agencies in the investigation of crimes or to seek compensation in relation to their exploitation.
New clause 29 would require the Government to grant leave in a way that would go beyond what is proportionate or reasonable and would significantly exceed what is required under our international obligations.
Siân Berry
I asked in my speech not about people claiming asylum but about those here under other forms of immigration status. Does the Minister not see the replacement of those with VTS leave being reduced as a result of clause 39? That is one of the problems that I wanted to raise. When people are here under potentially coercive forms of leave, such as sponsored work visas, will VTS leave still be available as a replacement to prevent people being left in the hands of exploiters?
Anna Turley
I will cover that in the more in-depth response to the hon. Lady’s comments at the appropriate time.
As I said, the new clause would require the Government to grant leave in a way that would go beyond what is proportionate or reasonable, and that would significantly exceed what is required under our international obligations. When individuals require protection or are seeking to remain in the UK, other routes remain available, depending on the individual circumstances. Creating an automatic pathway to long-term leave and settlement through modern slavery provisions would conflate the modern slavery identification and support system with an immigration route, and thus risks blurring that distinction. That has the potential to increase opportunities for improper use of the system and would have significant implications for wider immigration objectives, which we have been clear must operate on the principles of fairness.
I hope to cover some of the points that the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion raised—if I fail to pick them up, I ask her to come back to me or I can respond in writing. She asked whether the temporary permission to stay framework meets our international obligations. Decision to grant temporary permission to stay does not automatically lead to removal from the UK. There are various routes to remain in the UK that will remain available to foreign nationals depending on their circumstances. Any applications will be considered on their individual merits in line with published policy.
The hon. Lady asked whether any further statistics could be shared. Temporary permission to stay data is currently drawn from a number of different Home Office systems. Further work is under way to establish the most robust dataset. We are continuing to assess what information can be shared publicly and we will provide further data in due course where appropriate.
The hon. Lady also asked whether we are disadvantaging people by removing recovery from exploitation. The measure does not prevent individuals from accessing support from the point of their positive reasonable grounds decision—or earlier, if emergency support is required to assist with recovery from their exploitation. Access to the national referral mechanism support is based on national referral mechanism status, not immigration status. All adult victims in England and Wales who need to can continue to access specialist needs-based support to assist their recovery, irrespective of their immigration status or a refusal of temporary permission to stay.
The hon. Lady also flagged whether the changes were compliant with international law. The Government’s view is that the change to the temporary permission to stay policy absolutely does not impede our compliance with our international compliance. Temporary permission to stay, in its current forms, goes beyond what is required under article 14 of the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings. The changes will provide stronger clarity on the UK’s obligations while still complying with article 14.
Article 4 of the European convention on human rights imposes a positive obligation on member states to identify and protect victims of trafficking, which is met in part through the operation of the national referral mechanism. That obligation does not go so far as to require member states to grant leave. In any event, support is not dependent on temporary permission to stay leave being granted, so that even when an individual is not granted temporary permission to stay leave, they can still access modern slavery support while they remain in the UK.
Further, an individual’s immigration status and assessment of risk on return are considered if an individual makes a protection claim. That includes an assessment of whether the individual has a well-founded fear of persecution or is at real risk of serious harm. Any claim will be considered on its individual merits, in line with published policy and country information.
The hon. Lady also asked about skilled workers. As of 8 October 2026, skilled workers who receive a positive conclusive grounds decision, where that decision was made during their most recent permission, may have their visa amended for the remaining period of extant leave. Individuals will not need to be sponsored and can work in any occupation. The change supports skilled workers to leave exploitative employers and move to new, safe employment. In the immigration White Paper, the Government committed to explore introducing further reforms to our sponsorship system by putting more responsibility and accountability on effective and responsible sponsors. That will include exploring whether the Government can make it easier for workers to move between licensed sponsors for the duration of their visa, giving them more control over who they work for and reducing the risk of exploitation.
The hon. Member for Stockton West asked what the changes will mean for compensation and people’s co-operation with the process. Under the changes to temporary permission to stay, victims can continue to engage with law enforcement agencies in supporting criminal investigations and pursue compensation in relation to their exploitation. By focusing temporary permission to stay on those specific purposes, the Government can ensure that it remains available in supporting victims’ engagement with the criminal justice system and accessing compensation. More broadly, the Government are strengthening the tools available to law enforcement and courts to disrupt criminal activity, prevent modern slavery and protect those at risk.
On victim engagement with the criminal justice system, I should say that the modern slavery victim care contract provides adult victims in the national referral mechanism with a dedicated support worker to assist them to access legal aid and legal representation. That support will be further strengthened when the modern slavery victim care contract is replaced by the new support for victims of modern slavery service. The new contract introduces specialist support workers to help victims to engage better with the criminal justice system. That will include, but is not limited to, providing tailored guidance and advocacy to help victims understand complex legal processes, and helping to remove barriers to accessing and receiving the assistance they need at every point in the criminal justice process.
Anna Turley
I turn to our commitments to ensure that all exploited and trafficked children can access the support they need for their recovery. Clause 40 seeks to amend sections 48 and 58 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 to rename independent child trafficking advocates as independent child trafficking guardians, following the recommendation of the independent review of the Modern Slavery Act and the subsequent renaming of the role in June 2019. The Government consider that “guardian” better reflects the role and is more easily understood and used by children and the professionals supporting them. The clause makes a change in terminology and does not alter the functions or powers of independent child trafficking advocates.
As I have said, this Government are committed to supporting vulnerable children. Clause 41 makes clear our ongoing commitment to providing specialist modern slavery support for children through independent child trafficking guardians across England and Wales. The clause ensures that all children in England and Wales who are potential victims of this horrendous crime will have a statutory right to access that support. It reflects the lessons learned from the existing pilot and stakeholder engagement, and gives independent child trafficking guardians flexibility to respond to each child’s needs. It clarifies that they can provide representation, support, or both—either directly to the child or indirectly by supporting other professionals who provide services or make decisions about the child.
Although independent child trafficking guardians already engage in practice from the point of referral, references to “reasonable grounds” in section 48 of the Modern Slavery Act risk creating confusion with national referral mechanism decision-making thresholds, which in turn risks an inconsistent approach to supporting vulnerable children. The clause clarifies that support should be provided at the earliest opportunity, and implements recommendations made by the independent review of the Modern Slavery Act. Importantly, it also clarifies the need for collaboration by requiring public bodies to have due regard to independent child trafficking guardians’ expertise, to share relevant information and to involve independent child trafficking guardians in discussions and decisions relating to the child. That will help independent child trafficking guardians work effectively with the authorities responsible for the child’s care, providing specialist expertise to help make sure that children access the support required to recover from this awful abuse.
Further detail will be outlined in the regulations and statutory guidance, which will be published alongside the national roll-out of the service. The clause ensures that there is clear and consistent support for exploited children; I commend it to the Committee.
Clause 42 removes a fulfilled requirement in section 48 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 for the Secretary of State to lay before Parliament a report setting out proposed steps in relation to the arrangements for independent child trafficking guardians within nine months of the Modern Slavery Act’s being passed.
The then Government fulfilled that obligation in 2015 when they laid before Parliament a report setting out their proposed approach to implementing the service. Since then, the independent child trafficking guardian service has been developed, tested and refined through the pilot service, independent evaluations, feedback from children and young people, and the recommendations from the independent review of the Modern Slavery Act 2015.
The requirement to report again on the proposed approach is therefore no longer necessary as the service model is now established and its operation is well understood. The clause also removes the specific commencement provisions relating to the independent child trafficking guardian measures in section 61 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. The relevant provisions in section 48 of the Modern Slavery Act will instead be subject to the general commencement arrangements in the Act. The clause does not itself alter the functions or powers of independent child trafficking guardians. I commend clauses 40 to 42 to the Committee.
Matt Vickers
A child who has been trafficked or enslaved has already been let down by adults in the worst way imaginable; they now need adults who will take responsibility and keep them safe, not a maze of agencies arguing about whose job that is. That is the test that we apply to these clauses and, based on that test, the Opposition support them.
Clause 40 renames independent child trafficking advocates as independent child trafficking guardians. Those advocates were one of the innovations of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, and we have no difficulty with a title that better describes their role. However, a new name will not, on its own, protect a single child. What matters is whether the guardian has the expertise, access and authority to make a difference.
Clause 41 is more substantive. It allows guardians to provide representation, support or both, and makes clear that the role covers children who may be victims of slavery as well as trafficking. That recognises that exploitation does not always fit neatly into one box. Many of us have seen in our own communities how county line gangs groom children to run drugs. That is exploitation, plain and simple.
The clause also allows assistance to be given indirectly through the professionals who provide services to or make decisions about the child. Helping those professionals to understand the risks has real value, but indirect support must never become a convenient substitute for someone actually being there for a child who needs them. I would be grateful if the Minister could tell us who will decide whether indirect support is enough and how the child’s own voice will be heard in that decision.
The guardians’ involvement in decisions must also be meaningful. There is little point in appointing someone to stand up for a child if the big decisions have been made before they are in the room. Guardians also need a clear and fast route to the police when an exploiter is trying to get back in touch with a child. They are part of the safeguarding response, and the gangs who prey on children must be hunted down and prosecuted.
Clause 42 would remove the requirement to report to Parliament on proposed steps under section 48 of the Modern Slavery Act and change the commencement arrangements. In July, the Government announced £25 million to extend the guardian service to the remaining 179 local authorities in England that do not have it yet. We welcome that, but a child in one of those areas needs a guardian now. Can the Minister tell us when the service will be available in every one of them? Removing a reporting requirement must not mean that Parliament knows less about whether children are actually being kept safe.
Finally, the service will work only if it can meet demand. Can the Minister tell us how many children the expanded service is expected to support and what will happen when demand outstrips capacity? The Government should set out how they will measure whether guardians are actually making children safer, to ensure that this is a real step forward and not simply a change of name. We support clauses 40 to 42.
Anna Turley
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his questions; I will seek to respond to them in my reply. This group of clauses makes clear the Government’s commitment to providing specialist modern slavery support for children through the independent child trafficking guardians across England and Wales. Clause 40 amends the Modern Slavery Act 2015 to rename independent child trafficking advocates as independent child trafficking guardians, as recommended by the independent review of the Modern Slavery Act, and their service’s renaming in 2019.
Clause 41 ensures that all children in England and Wales have a statutory right to access support. It reflects lessons learned from existing pilot and stakeholder engagement. It clarifies that support should be provided at the earliest opportunity, and the need for collaboration between independent child trafficking guardians and public bodies.
Clause 42 removes a requirement in the 2015 Act for the Secretary of State to lay before Parliament a report setting out proposed steps in relation to the arrangements for independent child trafficking guardians within nine months of the Act being passed. The Government at the time fulfilled the obligation and now consider it unnecessary. It removes the commencement provisions relating to independent child trafficking guardian measures in section 61 of the Modern Slavery Act. Instead, they will be subject to general commencement arrangements in the Act.
The hon. Member for Stockton West asked about the UK-wide application of the child trafficking guardianship service. In England and Wales, we recently announced a £25 million investment in the national independent child trafficking guardianship service, which—combined with the provisions in the Bill to place the guardian support on a statutory footing—will end the postcode lottery and ensure that exploited and trafficked children will have access to the support that they need.
The hon. Gentleman asked about the model and how we decided on the more indirect model. The independent child trafficking guardian support model remains largely unchanged from the 2024 operational model. This flexible, needs-based approach was found better to meet the needs of vulnerable children by the independent evaluation of the independent child trafficking guardian service, published in 2024. It is supported by best practice and the Home Office response to the modern slavery review.
Every child is entitled to indirect support where independent child trafficking guardians promote effective, multi-agency working to ensure that the child’s needs are met by the most appropriate professional, and provide specialist modern slavery and exploitation expertise to support professionals who may already have established relationships with children. Direct one-to-one support is generally provided to children with no figure of parental responsibility in the UK. However, the service also has the flexibility to provide direct support in other cases where that is appropriate to meet a child’s needs. As the independent child trafficking guardian service is rolled out nationally, the Government will continue to monitor and evaluate its impact to ensure that it remains effective in supporting child victims of modern slavery.
The hon. Gentleman asked about safeguarding partners. If they already have legal duties, why are independent child trafficking guardians needed, and how will different organisations work together not to duplicate the contact with the child and the help for that child to navigate the system? Independent child trafficking guardians provide specialist modern slavery expertise and independent advocacy, complementing rather than duplicating the statutory safeguarding role of other agencies. The legislation strengthens collaboration by requiring public bodies to have due regard to independent child trafficking guardians’ views and recommendations, to provide access to the relevant information and to involve independent child trafficking guardians in discussions and decisions relating to the child.
That means that public authorities must properly consider and take account of independent child trafficking guardians’ views when exercising their functions, but retain responsibility for making decisions and discharging their statutory duties. Details of how that will be achieved will be outlined in the independent child trafficking guardians statutory guidance, which will be published alongside national roll-out of the guardians service. The legislation does not require public authorities to follow any particular recommendation made by an independent child trafficking guardian. Rather, public authorities must have due regard to the independent child trafficking guardian’s views and recommendations before reaching their own decisions. That requirement will be further supplemented by guidance. For public bodies not paying due regard to independent child trafficking guardians, concerns may be expressed through existing safeguarding and accountability processes. Public bodies remain accountable for ensuring that the decisions are lawful, properly reasoned and consistent with their statutory duties.
The hon. Member for Stockton West asked further about indirect and direct support, and the more appropriate form of it. It will be for Barnardo’s—the service provider—to determine what support a child needs. Clear guidance will be provided by the Home Office. The service also has the flexibility to determine where direct support is appropriate to meet a child’s needs, for instance where there is no figure of parental responsibility for the child in the UK. We believe it is appropriate this decision making sit with the service provider that is best able to make this decision. This flexible, needs-based approach was found to better meet the needs of vulnerable children by the independent evaluation of the independent child trafficking guardian service, published in 2024.
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
I beg to move amendment 70, in clause 43, page 45, line 1, leave out subsection (3).
This amendment would remove the provision which enables the Secretary of State to override an assessment that a potential victim of slavery or trafficking requires assistance and support.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 71, in clause 43, page 45, line 4, at end insert—
“(3A) In considering whether assistance and support is necessary, the Secretary of State or an authorised person must have regard to—
(a) the best interests of the person receiving such assistance and support and of any children dependent on that person;
(b) the need to ensure that assistance and support is provided on the basis of the individual needs of the person receiving it; and
(c) the need to act in a way which is compatible with the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings and the European Convention on Human Rights.”
This amendment would require parties considering whether a potential victim of slavery or trafficking requires assistance and support to consider the best interests of the person (and any dependent children) and to comply with the Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings and the ECHR.
Amendment 72, in clause 43, page 45, line 6, leave out “do not apply in relation to a child” and insert
“apply in relation to a child, and any necessary assistance and support must be provided in a manner that is age-appropriate, trauma-informed and consistent with the best interests of the child.
(4B) Nothing in this section prevents a local authority or any other public authority from discharging duties owed to a child under any other enactment, and the existence of such duties does not relieve the Secretary of State of the duties imposed by this section.”
This amendment would assert that the requirement to provide assistance and support to potential victims of slavery or trafficking does apply to child victims, regardless of whether the child would be otherwise supported by a local or other public authority.
Government amendments 120 to 123
Amendment 73, in clause 43, page 45, line 18, at end insert—
“(5A) After subsection (6), insert—
‘(6A) The Secretary of State must—
(a) ensure that adequate funding and resources are provided to local authorities for the purpose of ensuring that potential victims who are children receive assistance and support which is—
(i) compliant with the obligations of the United Kingdom under Article 12 of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, and
(ii) at least equivalent in nature and extent to that which would be provided to a potential victim who is an adult under this section.
(b) within 12 months of the passing of the Immigration and Asylum Act 2026 and annually thereafter, lay before Parliament a report setting out—
(i) the funding provided to local authorities for the purpose of supporting potential victims who are children,
(ii) an assessment of whether such funding is sufficient to enable compliance with Article 12 of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, and
(iii) the number of potential victims who are children who have not received assistance and support equivalent to that which would have been provided under this section to a potential victim who is an adult.’”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to ensure that sufficient funding is provided to local authorities to support child victims of slavery and trafficking, and to report annually on the provision and adequacy of such funding.
Clause stand part.
Siân Berry
It is my view and that of a wide range of refugee and modern slavery organisations that clause 43, particularly subsection (3), is incompatible with article 12 of the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings, which puts a duty on state parties to afford support to survivors of modern slavery in receipt of a reasonable grounds decision. The removal of the duty to provide support will put adults, children and young people at risk of destitution, homelessness and further harm, as we have discussed in relation to previous clauses.
We know that trauma can manifest in a wide range of ways and may significantly affect an individual’s ability to engage consistently with support services or comply with procedural requirements. Penalising people for such difficulties fails to take account of the realities of trauma and recovery and, again, creates detriment from a known feature of abuse. Additionally, while we agree that safeguarding and supporting children should be the responsibility of local authorities, they do need to receive adequate resources in order to discharge those duties appropriately and in the best interests of the child. Local authorities do not currently receive any funding to offer specialist support to children affected by trafficking and exploitation, and my amendments to this clause therefore seek both to reduce the harms being caused by it and to boost the support that can be offered to survivors.
Amendment 70 would remove subsection (3) and take away the Secretary of State’s power to override professional assessments. Support for the survivors of modern slavery is currently delivered through Government-funded contracts such as the modern slavery victim care contract in England and Wales, and equivalent arrangements across the devolved Administrations. Specialist organisations and trained support workers provide this support directly to survivors and are responsible for carrying out detailed assessments of need. The assessments should be informed by the professional expertise of frontline practitioners and crucially by survivors’ own views and experiences. I believe that support workers and survivors are best placed to identify an individual’s needs, because they are in direct and ongoing contact with the person concerned. It would therefore be harmful for the Secretary of State, who is removed from this direct engagement, to override such assessments without having had contact with the individual or a comparable understanding of their circumstances.
Allowing decision makers who are distant from a survivor’s situation to disregard professional assessments risks undermining survivor-centred support and could result in people being discharged from support with outstanding high needs. The Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group has presented further evidence to us on these points, around subsection (3). It says that it
“reflects the operational reality of how the MSVCC contract already functions in assessing survivors' needs.”
It therefore makes worse what is already bad. At the moment, an MSVCC provider completes a needs assessment and submits it to the Home Office for approval. The Home Office then reviews the assessment and either agrees or disagrees with both the assessment itself and the level of support recommended. It is concerning that this decision maker power, that ultimately rests with the Home Office, will be given directly to the Secretary of State.
The Secretary of State will be even further removed from the care, safeguarding and day-to-day insight available to frontline service providers, and could issue blanket rules or directives in situations of strained resources, for example, that would even more arbitrarily remove support from survivors. The Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group tells us that there is evidence for already ongoing issues with meeting the thresholds required to secure additional support, including for mental health needs. The recovery needs assessment process is highly bureaucratic—individuals are often discharged from support despite having significant unmet needs. If a similar approach is applied to decisions relating to the recovery and reflection period, there is a substantial risk that individuals will be discharged from support while still experiencing high levels of unmet need, exposing them to an increased risk of re-exploitation.
In amendment 72, I have asked for assistance to apply to children. While we agree that safeguarding and supporting children should be the responsibility of local authorities, I think it is very important that the Secretary of State retains an overarching duty to ensure that children receive support in line with article 12 of the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings. This would help ensure national accountability for the protection and recovery of child victims of trafficking and not leave it to the piecemeal provisions of local authorities. Maintaining this duty would also ensure that the Secretary of State remains responsible for ensuring that local authorities are adequately resourced, as my next amendment would require. It would be, therefore, an important safeguard to ensure that all children receive the support and assistance to which they are entitled, regardless of where they are located.
Amendment 73 would ensure funding for local authorities to support children. We need to make sure that they have adequate resources to discharge their duties in the best interest of children. Currently, local authorities do not receive any specialist support funding for children affected by trafficking and exploitation, but it is essential, as is the mainstream child protection that local authorities provide. The charity, ECPAT, which stands for Every Child Protected Against Trafficking, has told me that not providing dedicated funding to local authorities to meet the ECAT entitlements of children leaves an enormous gap. It says that the Home Office provides local authorities with £143 per child, per night, towards the cost of supporting unaccompanied children, but there is no equivalent funding attached to a child’s identification as a potential victim of trafficking. That responsibility is placed on the existing social care system, which we all know is under substantial financial pressure. I really hope that the Government will listen to that point.
A final point in relation to subsection (3) is that all it says is
“where the Secretary of State disagrees”
—which is incredibly broad. Will the Minister tell us whether the Secretary of State will publish criteria governing when this override power may be used, and will she address the fact that there is currently no defined threshold for displacing an authorised person’s professional assessment by the Home Office? I will not press my amendments to a vote, but I want to see the risks and problems identified by them addressed, either in regulations or in the Bill, before the legislation leaves this House and goes to the other place.
Anna Turley
I thank the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion for tabling amendments 70 to 73, which propose several changes to clause 43 on support and assistance provided to adult and child potential victims of modern slavery. I will start by reiterating the purpose of clause 43 and then turn to the amendments. Currently, where a potential victim has had suitable statutory support put in place to meet a modern slavery need, and that support is removed due to their conduct, the Secretary of State is required to provide that person with the equivalent support again. That results in the duplication of support provided across Government and the associated excessive costs to the taxpayer.
Clause 43 will ensure that the Secretary of State is not required to provide equivalent support again in those circumstances. For example, if a potential victim has their asylum accommodation withdrawn because they did not follow asylum support conditions, they will no longer be able to access equivalent modern slavery accommodation in its place. That will safeguard the integrity of the modern slavery system, ensuring support is not provided unconditionally and indefinitely. We recognise, however, the specific vulnerabilities and impact that trauma may have on an individual’s conduct. To safeguard vulnerable victims, support will not be withheld if there is a good reason, related to their modern slavery experience, for the conduct that led to that element of support being removed.
I wish to be clear that the Government remain committed to supporting vulnerable people. We have invested £25 million in the national independent child trafficking guardianship service and are in the process of procuring the new adult victim support contract to assist victims to achieve long-term stability and to live independently, and to reduce their risk of re-exploitation. Together, those investments form part of our wider programme of modern slavery reform, designed to safeguard the integrity of the system and ensure that resources are targeted at those who need them.
Clause 43 also makes technical amendments to section 50A of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. They will not change the support provided to adult or child victims; rather, the clause ensures that current support arrangements for adult and child victims are correctly reflected in statute. In line with existing practice, the amendments remove children from the provision to reflect that local authorities safeguard and promote the welfare of all children within their area, and the independent child trafficking guardian service provides further specialist modern slavery support. The amendments also make it clear that an authorised support provider can assess the support needs of adult victims of modern slavery.
Turning to amendments 70 to 73, the Government understand that their intention is to safeguard vulnerable potential victims. The Government share that commitment and are equally committed to ensuring that all victims of modern slavery, including child victims, can access the necessary support and assistance they require. The Government do not, however, consider the amendments necessary. In fact, they directly contradict the intention of clause 43 in two ways.
First, amendment 70 seeks to remove the Secretary of State’s power to override an authorised person’s assessment that support is necessary to assist a potential victim in their recovery. That would mean that the Secretary of State would be unable to intervene where appropriate to ensure that the outcome of a support assessment aligned with the relevant statutory guidance. That is a necessary power, ensuring fairness in the provision of support to adult victims across England and Wales. The power provides an important safeguard to ensure that Government-issued guidance on the assessment of necessary support is appropriately adhered to.
The need to intervene may arise in particularly complex cases and where other state support services have jurisdiction. For example, where an authorised support provider has determined that financial support is necessary but has not accounted for income the victim receives from another statutory service, the Secretary of State must be able to intervene to ensure that financial support is not provided where it is not necessary, in line with guidance.
As an another example, where an authorised support provider has determined that ongoing support should be provided to a victim despite their lack of engagement, but it has not given due attention to the non-engagement policy and the other statutory support available to a victim, the Secretary of State must be able to intervene to withdraw that support in line with statutory guidance on non-engagement to ensure consistency and fairness in the application of the policy across victims in England and Wales. I want to be clear, however, that the Home Office has a robust contract management regime in place to ensure that our supplier will deliver a high-quality service to victims in line with its contractual obligations underpinned by statutory guidance. The supplier has consistently met and exceeded delivery expectations, and the Home Office has a strong relationship with it.
Siân Berry
My concern is that subsection (3) provides the Home Secretary with a broad, unqualified power to disagree with the assessments that the Minister has just mentioned. Amendment 71 seems to provide a perfectly reasonable set of safeguards against breaching those international obligations. Will the Minister look at providing more detail about the criteria that the Home Secretary would use in future regulation to reassure us?
Anna Turley
I appreciate the hon. Lady referencing that. Of course, we will always consider any issues and desires for clarification that are raised in this Committee through the development of the regulations. Her concerns have been noted, but I am reassured that we are compliant with the ECAT and ECHR obligations.
The hon. Lady made a couple of other points about a potential increase in homelessness and destitution. The Home Office remains committed to meeting legal obligations, ensuring that policies do not leave people destitute or at risk of re-trafficking. However, individuals should not be able to use modern slavery to circumvent the conditions for other statutory support services. To ensure a coherent approach across Government to supporting victims, adult modern slavery support will be withheld in particular circumstances in order to align with decisions made by wider statutory services to withdraw support from someone who has failed to follow reasonable conditions.
To safeguard vulnerable victims, support will not be withheld if a victim has a good reason related to their modern slavery experience to explain why they were unable to meet reasonable conditions. As only the particular element of modern slavery support that was removed by another service will be withheld, where necessary, support worker assistance will remain available to advise and signpost to other avenues of accommodation or financial support.
The hon. Lady also asked about the Home Office’s oversight and monitoring of local authorities to ensure that children do not fall through gaps in provision. I think I have covered most of that, but the children’s social care national framework is statutory guidance for local authorities that sets the national direction for practice. It provides clarity on the outcomes that children’s social care should achieve for children, young people and families. “Working Together to Safeguard Children 2026” is the multi-agency statutory guidance. It provides detailed information on the duties and responsibilities of all agencies to safeguard children.
Both pieces of statutory guidance—the national framework and “Working Together”—should be read alongside each other. Ofsted independently inspects local authority children’s services through its inspecting local authority children’s services framework. Those inspections consider the experiences and progress of children and families, the quality of practice and leadership, and whether services are meeting their statutory duties. Local authorities are assessed using performance data, reform, delivery and wider regional intelligence to determine the appropriate level of support and intervention.
As I have outlined, the amendments are unnecessary, as the Government are confident that support provisions for adult and child potential victims are compliant with our international obligations. Adult support needs assessments already consider the individual support needs and circumstances of victims, and local authorities already have a duty to safeguard and promote the welfare of all children within their areas. For the reasons outlined, I respectfully request that the amendments not be pressed.
Government amendments 120 to 123 will make minor changes to proposed new subsection 50A(5ZA) of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, inserted by clause 43, to clarify how the provision will work in practice. First, amendments 120 to 122 put beyond doubt that proposed new subsection 50A(5ZA) is a targeted provision such that where a particular form of support is to be withheld, such as accommodation, the duty to provide other forms of support, such as financial support, will continue. That will prevent the duplication of support provided across Government and the associated excessive costs to taxpayers by ensuring that specific forms of support are not provided unconditionally and indefinitely. However, we recognise the specific vulnerabilities and impact that trauma may have on an individual’s conduct, which is why the amendments will make the safeguards for vulnerable potential victims clearer.
As a result of amendment 123, when decision makers are deciding whether an element of support should be withheld, they will consider whether the conduct that resulted in other statutory support being removed is attributable rather than “properly” attributable to their modern slavery experience. That is to avoid decision makers having to make unduly complex assessments, which could have an adverse impact on vulnerable potential victims. I commend Government amendments 120 to 123 and clause 43 to the Committee.
Matt Vickers
Support for potential victims must reach those who genuinely need it, with clear responsibility for decisions and proper accountability for every pound of taxpayers’ money. Clause 43 raises three practical questions. Who assesses that need? Who can overrule that assessment? How does this support fit alongside other services?
The clause allows an authorised person to assess the assistance someone needs while keeping a power for the Secretary of State to override a positive assessment. Amendment 70 would scrap that override. I understand the worry about specialist advice being set aside, but Ministers must remain answerable to this House for the public money in this system, so we cannot support the amendment. What the power does demand is clear reasons. I would welcome the Minister telling us when the override is expected to be used, what evidence would justify it, and how a wrong decision would be put right.
Amendment 71 would add a list of factors to be assessed, including the best interests of the person and their dependent; their individual needs; and compatibility with the relevant conventions. Good decision makers should already be weighing a person’s need, and writing a long list of factors into statute invites challenge on every one of them and risks turning each decision into a legal contest. We do not support the amendment.
Government amendments 120 to 123 are the latest in a string of changes that the Government have made to their Bill in this part alone, but these amendments are an improvement. Where someone loses support elsewhere because of their conduct, the exclusion is narrowed to the particular kind of support they have lost, rather than letting the loss of one service become a reason to withhold everything. That is a fair balance. Conditions attached to public assistance must still mean something, and the taxpayer should not simply be asked to replace support that someone has lost through their own misconduct.
Government amendment 123 removes the word “properly” from the test of whether that conduct is attributable to harm arising from exploitation. We will not oppose it, but the Minister should explain why the word is going, and confirm that it does not lower the bar. The question must still be answered on the evidence. Neither an automatic excuse nor an automatic penalty makes for good decisions.
Amendments 72 and 73 concern children. Clause 43 removes children from these Home Office support duties while separate duties on local authorities and other agencies remain. Amendment 72 would keep the Home Office duty for children, and amendment 73 would require resources for local authority provision and reporting on funding.
Protecting children is essential, but keeping two overlapping duties risks the very thing we all want to avoid: two bodies each assuming that the other has it covered while the child falls through the middle. We do not support these amendments either, but the Government must be clear about where responsibility now lies. I would be grateful if the Minister could set out who is responsible at each stage of a child’s case, how local authority provision will be funded, and what happens immediately if that provision is not there. We support clause 43 and Government amendments 120 to 123.
Anna Turley
I think I have answered most of the hon. Gentleman’s questions, and if not, I will clarify in writing.
Siân Berry
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendments made: 120, in clause 43, page 45, line 9, after “support” insert “of a particular kind”.
This amendment and amendments 121 and 122 clarify that where assistance or support of a particular kind would have been available from elsewhere had it not been for the victim’s conduct it is only assistance or support of that particular kind that the Secretary of State will no longer be under a duty to provide.
Amendment 121, in clause 43, page 45, line 10, leave out first “the”.
See the explanatory statement for amendment 120.
Amendment 122, in clause 43, page 45, line 10, after “support” insert “of that kind”.
See the explanatory statement for amendment 120.
Amendment 123, in clause 43, page 45, line 15, leave out “properly”.—(Anna Turley.)
This amendment leaves out an unnecessary word from the inserted subsection (5ZA).
Clause 43, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 44
Content of slavery and human trafficking statements
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this, it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Schedule 5.
Clause 45 stand part.
Anna Turley
I shall now speak to clauses 44 to 49. While we take seriously the need to investigate modern slavery within the UK and provide support to victims, we must also remain cognisant of the global reach of UK business and supply chains. Globally, it is estimated that 27.6 million people are trapped in forced labour, with around two thirds of those cases linked to global supply chains. Section 54 of the Modern Slavery Act established the UK as the first country in the world to require businesses to report on how they are tackling modern slavery in their operations and supply chains. While the transparency in supply chains regime was widely welcomed by businesses and non-governmental organisations when it was first introduced, it has since faced criticism that it is merely a tick-box exercise that lacks any teeth in respect to enforcement.
Compliance with section 54 is difficult to quantify, but analysis from the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre in 2021 suggested that around only 60% of companies have met basic reporting requirements. This month, the Rathbones “Votes Against Slavery” report identified 194 instances of non-compliance across 160 FTSE 350 companies over the last six years. Measures in the Bill will address that by raising expectations on businesses and public sector organisations to improve their reporting and act on exploitation in their supply chains, with stronger consequences for non-compliance. We are bringing in a more consistent approach to how organisations report, and by penalising those that do not comply, we can better highlight those that are taking positive action to ensure their supply chains are free from modern slavery. Those that fall short will be clearly exposed, encouraging a race to the top.
Clause 44 strengthens transparency by requiring organisations to cover mandatory content in their annual modern slavery statement, as set out in proposed new schedule 4ZA. It replaces the existing discretionary reporting areas in section 54 of the Modern Slavery Act with mandatory areas in proposed new schedule 4ZA, set out in schedule 5 of the Bill. We expect businesses and the public sector to report meaningfully on the actions they are taking. In making this change, reports will become more standardised, comprehensive and open to greater public scrutiny. Clause 44 also enables the Secretary of State to amend those requirements through regulations following consultation with persons the Secretary of State considers appropriate.
Schedule 5 sets out the information that must be provided in a slavery and human trafficking statement. Statements must include information on the organisation’s structure, operations and supply chains; risks in their operations and supply chains, and steps taken to manage those risks; policies in relation to slavery and human trafficking; relevant due diligence processes; training for staff; and an assessment of the effectiveness of action taken. If an organisation does not have any relevant information to provide under any of these topics, they must provide a reason.
This provides a clear and consistent framework for businesses and public authorities to report on action they have taken to assess and address risks of modern slavery in their operations and supply chains. By standardising reporting in line with the Government’s comprehensive guidance, consumers and investors will have greater access to relevant information to support making informed choices on where to spend their money.
The Modern Slavery Act is ambiguous in its expectations on organisational accountability for the content of modern slavery statements and how group structures may meet their reporting requirements. The Government want to ensure that senior parties are held to account for the contents of their organisations’ statements, and to certify that they are current. Clause 45 mandates that signatories state that the contents of their reports are accurate to the best of their knowledge and belief, and that they sign after the end of the financial year to which it relates.
We also want to continue to allow the private sector to report in groups, where appropriate, as a means of balancing transparency with the burdens on business. Clause 45 sets out that parent companies may produce statements on behalf of their subsidiaries. It therefore clarifies responsibility for modern slavery statements by ensuring that accountability rests with a clearly identifiable senior individual. That will strengthen governance and oversight, promote greater board-level engagement and reinforce the expectation that signatories take responsibility both for the accuracy of the statement and for the organisation’s approach to managing modern slavery risks. I commend the clauses to the Committee.
Matt Vickers
Clauses 44 and 45, together with schedule 5, set out what businesses must tell us about modern slavery and who takes responsibility for that information. The Modern Slavery Act 2015 put responsibility on businesses to explain what they were doing about the slavery in their operations and supply chains. That was an important Conservative reform. We should build on that where there are gaps, and judge the changes by whether they help to expose and stop exploitation.
An honest business that pays its workers properly should not be undercut by someone whose low prices depend on exploitation further down the chain. Nor should a customer have to wonder whether the bargain they have bought came at somebody else’s expense. Clear information can help with both, but a longer statement is not necessarily a better one, and paying someone to produce a polished document is no substitute for checking what is happening on the ground. Clause 44 and schedule 5 make reporting topics compulsory. They cover the organisation and its supply chains; the risks and the steps taken to address them; policies, checks and staff training; and whether action taken has worked.
We support the principle of making statements more useful and easier to compare. A reader should be able to work out what an organisation has actually done without wading through pages of comforting language. Ministers will have a power to change the required content, so I would be grateful for an assurance that any future change will be assessed for its cost to business as well as for its expected benefit.
There is an important qualification, however. Schedule 5 still allows an organisation to say that it has not assessed the risk, put policies in place or taken particular steps, provided that it gives an explanation. The Minister should be clear about what is being promised. This is a duty to report on specified matters; it does not, by itself, require every organisation to take every action described in the schedule. That raises an obvious question: what happens when the same organisation reports year after year that it has done nothing? Who will look at the explanation and what will prompt further scrutiny? There is a difference between being honest about a gap and treating an annual explanation as permission to leave that gap untouched.
The detail must be workable. A company may buy through several suppliers before the chain reaches the people making the product, and information will not always be easy to obtain. Ministers need to explain what reasonable inquiries look like to avoid creating a system in which large companies simply pass endless questionnaires down to smaller firms. Small suppliers should be able to spend their time dealing with real risks, rather than answering the same question in 10 different formats. Businesses will also need proper notice before the new requirements apply; I hope the Minister will tell us how much notice they will get.
Clause 45 deals with approval and signing, including certification by a parent undertaking. That can avoid duplication, but it must not allow the activities of a subsidiary to disappear inside a vague statement about the wider group. The person signing should have asked enough questions to stand behind the declaration of accuracy. Board approval should mean that somebody has actually paid attention. The Minister should explain how group reporting will stay clear about which businesses it covers, and what evidence directors should have in front of them before they sign. We support clearer reporting and proper responsibility at the top, but the Government must show that the changes will help to identify exploitation, and that the information produced will actually be used. Otherwise, we will have added to the paperwork and left the people being exploited exactly where they were.
Anna Turley
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his questions on these important measures, which we are very proud to bring in.
As discussed, clause 44 strengthens the transparency of modern slavery statements by requiring organisations to cover the mandatory topics set out in schedule 4ZA. That will allow statements to be more standardised and comprehensive, and open to greater public scrutiny. Schedule 5 provides a clear and consistent framework for businesses and public authorities to report on the action they have taken to assess and address risks of modern slavery in their operations and supply chains. Clause 45 improves accountability for reporting by holding senior parties to account, while also allowing private sector group structures to balance transparency on those important issues with the burdens of running a business.
The hon. Gentleman asked what the mandatory content requirements would be. As I said, they are set out in schedule 5. Statements will need to contain information on the organisation’s structure, operations and supply chains; the modern slavery risks within them; the steps taken to address those risks; modern slavery policies; due diligence processes; relevant staff training; and the assessment of the organisation’s effectiveness in preventing modern slavery in its operations and supply chains. If a statement does not contain relevant information under any of those topics, the organisation must state that the information has not been included for that topic and give a reason why. The mandatory content requirements align with updated statutory guidance published in March 2025. The guidance was updated with input from stakeholders from Government, business, civil society and academia to ensure that it reflects best practice and international standards.
The hon. Gentleman asked why these topics in particular have been selected. They build on the voluntary topics set out in the original legislation, informed by the updated statutory guidance, which, as I have just outlined, was developed in consultation with stakeholders. The guidance sets out how an organisation may produce a modern slavery statement in line with best practice and international standards, which include the UN guiding principles on business and human rights and the OECD due diligence guidance for responsible business conduct. The mandatory topics also align with legislation in Australia and Canada. Organisations in scope of reporting requirements across the three jurisdictions may use the joint-reporting template published in July 2025 to create one statement that would be compliant in all three countries.
The hon. Gentleman asked about enforcement, about organisations that have said they would take no action or have identified no risk, and about what teeth are behind the measures. The new measures require businesses to provide a reason if they have not taken any steps to assess modern slavery risks. If they have assessed that there are no risks, they must set out their risk assessment approach. The purpose of the regime is not to penalise organisations for identifying risks or for being at an earlier stage in managing them, but to ensure greater transparency about the action they are taking and the basis for their decisions.
By bringing a more consistent approach to how businesses report, we can better shine a light on those that take positive action to ensure that their supply chains are free from modern slavery, and highlight those that fall short, encouraging a race to the top. Stronger transparency enables consumers and investors to make informed choices and hold businesses and private sector organisations to account, encouraging more proactive efforts to manage modern slavery in supply chains. Of course, we will consider some of the other reporting and monitoring measures, and the punishment measures, as part of the coming groups.
On businesses wanting further clarity on reporting requirements, we consulted widely, as I have said, with businesses, non-governmental organisations and civil society during the recent update to the guidance on transparency in supply chains, which was published in March 2025. Businesses themselves asked for greater clarity on how parent companies and their subsidiaries can report as a group. The updated guidance now includes details on the best-practice approach to reporting as a group when, for example, companies share the same procurement or operate in similar markets. To enable that practice to continue, we have included measures in the Bill to make it clear that companies may report as a group and thereby continue to report in the most efficient way for their business.
As I said, schedule 5 improves the accountability for reporting, holding senior parties to account, while allowing private sector group structures to balance transparency on such important issues against the burdens of running a business. I hope hon. Members share our view that making the requirements mandatory will help individuals, consumers and all those of us who are concerned about the impact of modern slavery in supply chains across the globe to hold companies to account further.
Siân Berry
I add my support—for a change in this Committee—to the broad approach taken in this part of the Bill. I realise that the Bill’s scope is narrow, but have the Minister or the Home Secretary had any discussions with colleagues in the Cabinet and other Departments about using these quite creative new reporting requirements—which cover the supply chain and require reasons to be given for not doing things—as a template for use in other areas, such as environmental pollution or other human rights issues? Will the Minister commit the Home Office to taking the learnings from implementing this to other Departments?
Anna Turley
The hon. Lady makes an important point. We are proud of the provisions, and a review is being undertaken by the Department for Business, Innovation, Science and Trade to consider how to develop them further. I hope that the Home Office example is setting out best practice for other Departments to ensure that, in a world of global business, we are able to hold corporations to account in our legislative and democratic framework. I appreciate her point.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 44 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 5 agreed to.
Clause 45 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 46
Application to public authorities
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Anna Turley
As just discussed, section 54 of the Modern Slavery Act requires large businesses to report on the steps that they take to prevent modern slavery within their operations and supply chains. However, equivalent requirements do not apply to the public sector. Given that the Government spend approximately £295 billion annually on procurement, there is a clear risk that public sector supply chains may also be exposed to modern slavery. The clause addresses that gap by extending transparency requirements to public authorities and strengthening accountability for modern slavery risks in public procurement.
Public authorities will be required to publish annual modern slavery statements covering the mandatory topics set out in schedule 4ZA, and to upload those statements to the modern slavery statement registry within six months of the end of the relevant financial year. The clause also sets out who may sign a statement, requires signatories to confirm its accuracy to the best of their knowledge and belief, and provides for group reporting where appropriate.
By bringing the public sector into line with the private sector, the clause will improve transparency, strengthen accountability and help ensure that public money is not contributing to modern slavery. It is important to note that this is a groundbreaking and important aspect of the Bill. As I have set out, we spend a huge amount on public procurement contracts, and I am sure that the vast majority of people would hope and expect that taxpayers’ money spent by the Government, local authorities and our broader public sector does not have any damaging effect on modern slavery around the world.
Placing this responsibility on public bodies, as we do for private bodies, is not just a really important statement about levelling up; it is an important statement that every penny of taxpayers’ money should be spent in an ethical way and must not support modern slavery in any of our supply chains. It is an important provision, and we should be proud to have included it in the Bill.
Matt Vickers
Clause 46 brings public authorities within the modern slavery reporting system. It is right that we look closely at how they account for the money they spend. If we expect businesses to explain what they are doing about exploitation in their supply chains, public bodies should be prepared to do the same. Taxpayers are entitled to know that money taken from their wages is being spent responsibly. The fact that a contract is paid for by the state does not make the risks behind it disappear. We support the principle of the clause.
Let us consider a public body that buys uniforms, cleaning services or equipment. The contract may look perfectly respectable, but who has checked the arrangements further down the chain? Who has asked how the workers are recruited, or whether a subcontractor is using labour supplied on terms that should ring alarm bells? Those questions need asking before a problem becomes a scandal, and the Government should lead by example here. Ministers cannot demand standards from the private sector and then accept an annual statement from a public body as evidence that everything must be fine. The statement needs to reflect the decisions made by the people who are actually buying the goods and services. If the procurement team finds a serious risk, it needs a clear route to someone who can act on it.
The threshold also matters. The Bill leaves both the minimum budget and the way in which it is calculated to be decided by regulations. Until we see them, we cannot know which bodies will be covered or what the burden will be. Businesses must report once their turnover reaches £36 million; I would be grateful if the Minister told us whether the public sector threshold will match that. How many authorities are expected to be covered, and what assessment has been made of their capacity to comply? The Government’s notes say that applying those duties to public authorities in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland requires the consent of the devolved legislatures. Has that consent has been sought?
The clause also allows one public authority to certify another’s statement. There may be sensible reasons for that, particularly where services or purchasing arrangements are shared, but responsibility must remain clear. If a statement turns out to be inaccurate, the answer cannot be that one authority relied on another and neither checked. The Minister should tell us what assurance the signing authority will be expected to obtain. The named intelligence agencies are excluded—there are obvious sensitivities around public disclosure of their operations—but the power to add further exemptions should be used sparingly. I would welcome it if the Minister set out the principles that will govern any further exclusions.
We support clause 46, but now we need is a workable timetable, clear responsibility and a proper connection between reporting and purchasing decisions. Public bodies should be able to show that they are tackling the risks that they find, and Ministers should be ready to answer when those bodies are not doing so.
Anna Turley
I appreciate the hon. Gentleman’s contribution. Abhorrent practices such as modern slavery have no place in public supply chains. We have taken action, through the Procurement Act 2023, to strengthen the rules around excluding suppliers because of serious misconduct anywhere in their operations, including certain key subcontractors.
In February 2025, the Government updated procurement policy note 009, “Tackling modern slavery in government supply chains”, advocating a risk-based approach to identifying and managing modern slavery risks, and encouraging Departments to conduct due diligence using a range of tools, such as the modern slavery assessment tool.
The modern slavery assessment tool is a risk identification management tool that has been designed to help public sector organisations to work in partnership with suppliers to improve protections and reduce the risk of exploitation of workers in their supply chains. The Government also made the anti-slavery risk tiering tool available to public sector buyers in October 2025. That tool enables faster risk assessments and clear next steps to mitigate modern slavery risks across the commercial lifecycle.
The hon. Gentleman asked which organisations will be required to start reporting. Based on the evidence in our impact assessment, we estimate that around 1,040 organisations will be required to report, and that, because of the ability to report in groups, which we have explicitly allowed for, that will likely result in approximately 380 statements.
The hon. Gentleman also asked about devolved Government consent. We are having conversations as part of this process. He asked about timings and when public sector organisations will start to publish their statements. Through the Bill, the Government are extending the duty to report on actions being taken to address modern slavery in supply chains, as introduced in section 4 of the Modern Slavery Act. We expect the measures to take effect for an organisation’s financial year beginning on or after commencement. While commencement timelines are still to be finalised, we do not expect the first compliance statements will be required any earlier than the end of 2028.
I think I have answered all the shadow Minister’s questions. I thank Members for their interest in the clause, which is about extending transparency requirements relating to modern slavery to public authorities. Our intention is to align the public sector procurement process with the private sector, and to ensure that no public money is contributing to modern slavery.
Matt Vickers
We talked about the number of organisations that we expect to be impacted. In terms of proportionality and balance, where will the threshold lie? For businesses, it is a turnover of £36 million, but what will be the scale of public sector organisations expected to comply versus the private sector?
Anna Turley
It is difficult to make a direct comparison. Organisations will be expected, to some extent, to lead this themselves. For example, NHS England will make a decision on whether it is accountable as a body as a whole, or whether it provides multiple responses from regional bodies. Those organisations will come forward to us with their recommendations on how they would like to report, which will give us a sense of the scale. I do not think this is directly comparable to the private sector in a like-for-like way. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 46 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 47
Statements: publication and submission
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Anna Turley
Under the Modern Slavery Act 2015, organisations are required to publish modern slavery statements on a prominent place on their website. If they do not have a website, they must make their statement available on request. That makes it difficult to access modern slavery statements, assess levels of compliance and hold organisations to account, as there is no central means of reporting.
Clause 47 seeks to address that gap by creating a clear requirement for organisations to submit their modern slavery statements to a specified electronic platform, such as the modern slavery statement registry that exists for voluntary submissions. The clause requires statements to be submitted within six months of the end of the relevant financial year, ensuring that reporting is timely, accessible and easily monitored. By centralising statements in a single location, the Government will be more able to identify organisations that are complying with their statutory obligations and take action on those that are failing to do so.
That will strengthen oversight, improve transparency and support more effective enforcement of the reporting regime. It will also make information on modern slavery risks and actions more readily available to consumers, investors, civil society and other stakeholders, enabling greater scrutiny of organisational practices and more informed decision making. The clause transforms a reporting requirement into a more effective accountability mechanism. By ensuring that statements are submitted to a central registry within a defined timeframe, it will improve monitoring of compliance, strengthen enforcement and increase transparency across both public and private sector supply chains.
Matt Vickers
Following our consideration of what these statements should contain, clause 47 turns to whether they reach the people who need to read them. There is little value in requiring a statement if nobody can find it, or if the only version available is several years out of date. A customer, supplier or member of the public should be able to see what an organisation says it is doing and when it last accounted for its actions. We support making that information easier to find.
The clause requires publication on an organisation’s website, when it has one, with a prominent link on the home page. It also allows regulations to require electronic submission to the Secretary of State. Organisations must comply as soon as reasonably practicable after the financial year ends and within six months at the latest. That gives them a clear deadline, but the practical question is whether the Home Office will know when it has been missed. A collection of statements tells us who has submitted what; it does not, on its own, tell us who should have submitted one and has stayed silent.
The existing registry can already send reminders to organisations that have signed up, but it cannot chase an organisation that should be reporting and has never registered at all. I would be grateful if the Minister explained how the Department will identify every organisation covered, and how it will follow up missing statements.
Anna Turley
I thank the hon. Gentleman. To reassure him, we will be building on the modern slavery statement registry. More than 34,000 organisations are already registered there. Therefore, familiarisation costs to those organisations are likely to be minimal, as they already use that platform. For organisations that have not used the registry before, we expect the costs of familiarisation, which includes the time taken for personnel for register and learn how to use it, to be very low. The impact assessment estimates the first-year cost to businesses is approximately £0.4 million, and the ongoing costs are estimated to be approximately £0.2 million per year.
The hon. Gentleman asked about timetable and whether there should be a single reporting deadline. It is important that we recognise that businesses may have different financial reporting periods based on how their financial year operates, as most businesses’ reporting will align with their financial year timescales. We want to ensure that businesses can align their modern slavery reporting with their ongoing reporting operations and obligations to minimise the burdens.
I want to clarify the broader impact of the measures. It is important to reiterate that this requirement is not new; businesses in scope should already be producing their modern slavery statements in line with section 54 of the Modern Slavery Act. The measures in the Bill will require some changes to the content and process for completing and submitting a statement, but those will be minimal. A full impact assessment and breakdown of costs, as I have said, has already been published. On registry notifications and how to identify the organisations covered, we are working with the Department for Business to build the in-scope list, so I can keep the hon. Gentleman and the Committee updated on that.
The hon. Gentleman also asked about the enforcement. Multiple models could be used to deliver that, including conferring functions on an existing regulator or within the Home Office. We are doing the work to ensure that the most appropriate model for enforcement and for administering these financial penalties will be in place. We will consult on the draft regulations during the passage of the Bill.
I thank Members for this important debate. The clause strengthens reporting requirements, improves transparency and makes it easier to identify and take action against modern slavery risks. I commend it to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 47 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 48
Guidance
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Anna Turley
Given the changes to reporting requirements in the Bill, clause 48 seeks to ensure that the provision for the Secretary of State to issue guidance aligns with these updates. The clause sets out that the Secretary of State can issue guidance for both the private and public sectors on how to write a modern slavery statement and provide examples of good practice in tackling modern slavery in supply chains and examples of information that may be included in addition to the mandatory information. That will ensure that there is adequate information to support organisations in producing modern slavery statements that cover all of the mandatory content requirements set out in schedule 5.
In summary, clause 48 will help promote consistency, transparency and good practice in reporting across both the public and private sectors, strengthening the overall effectiveness of the modern slavery transparency regime. I commend clause 48 to the Committee.
Matt Vickers
For these new duties to work, the people carrying them out need clear instructions. That is where the guidance under clause 48 comes in. It is a short clause, but the guidance will matter a great deal to the people expected to make the preceding clauses work. They need to know what a useful statement looks like, what information they should seek from suppliers and how to explain a risk they have identified. They should not need a lawyer to translate the Government’s instructions before they can get started.
Timing matters. Organisations need time to understand the requirements and put arrangements in place. Publishing guidance at the last minute would create avoidable mistakes and leave Ministers blaming people for confusion of the Government’s own making. Will the Minister commit to having the guidance available well before the new duties take effect?
Businesses have also only recently been told to review updated Home Office guidance on their statements. They should not have to rewrite everything a second time; the new guidance should build on what organisations have just put into place rather than start again from scratch. There also needs to be a clear distinction between what the law requires and what the Government would like organisations to do voluntarily. The clause allows guidance to cover additional information that statements may include. That should be plainly labelled; businesses should not discover that an optional suggestion has become an unofficial requirement when somebody comes to assess their compliance.
Practical examples would help, particularly for organisations with different kinds of supply chains. Guidance should explain how to report a problem honestly and what to do when there is evidence that somebody is being exploited. Nobody should wait for the next annual statement before raising a serious concern with the appropriate authorities.
We support clause 48, but the Minister should tell us who will be consulted on the guidance and how future changes will be communicated, so that organisations are never caught out. Clear instructions from the outset would save everybody time and keep the focus where it belongs: on the people these measures are intended to protect.
Anna Turley
Simply put, clause 48 gives the Secretary of State the power to provide practical guidance on how modern slavery statements should be prepared in line with the new requirements in the Bill, including, as the shadow Minister suggested, good practice in identifying and tackling modern slavery risks within operations and supply chains.
The shadow Minister asked when the updated guidance will be issued; I am pleased to reassure him that the Secretary of State will issue the new guidance in time for commencement. He also wanted further clarity on the reporting requirements. During the recent update to the transparency and supply chain guidance, published in March 2025, we consulted widely with businesses, NGOs and civil society. This has been well received. It aligns with the international standards that I set out earlier, such as the OECD due diligence guidelines.
The purpose of clause 48 is to support compliance and improve the overall quality of reporting. I commend it to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 48 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 49
Enforcement
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Anna Turley
Compliance with reporting requirements remains inconsistent and there are limited consequences for organisations that fail to meet their obligations. Clause 49 introduces a civil enforcement framework, including financial penalties, for organisations that fail to comply with their statutory reporting obligations under section 54 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015.
The clause provides the Secretary of State with powers to impose penalties of up to £1 million or 1% of annual turnover—or of the budget, for public authorities—to make sure that there are real consequences for those who do not take the duty seriously. It also provides a power, by regulation, for the Secretary of State to set out procedural safeguards, including warning notices, opportunities to make representations, rights of appeal and provisions relating to determination of the penalty amount, cost recovery, interest on late payment, and enforcement of unpaid penalties. That will ensure that enforcement is fair, proportionate and effective.
The changes are central to strengthening the transparency in supply chains regime, ensuring that there are meaningful consequences for non-compliance and addressing long-standing concerns that the current framework lacks teeth. I commend clause 49 to the Committee.
Matt Vickers
Clause 49 brings us to the practical question of what happens when an organisation fails to do what the law requires. We have spent preceding groups discussing what organisations must report, and how we must publish it. Those duties need to mean something. A business that takes its responsibility seriously should not find that a competitor can ignore the rules and carry on without consequence. We support effective enforcement against organisations that fail to comply without a reasonable excuse.
The clause allows Ministers to establish financial penalties through regulations. The maximum for an individual penalty will be the higher of £1 million or 1% of the organisation’s total turnover, or of a public authority’s total budget. That is a substantial power. It is a ceiling, not a standard fine, and how penalties are set below it will matter enormously. There must be a sensible distinction between a genuine mistake that is quickly corrected and a deliberate refusal to comply.
An organisation that has ignored repeated requests should not be treated in the same way as one that has made an isolated administrative error. Equally, the “reasonable excuse” provision must not become a stock response for those who simply cannot be bothered. Much of that detail is left to regulation. The clause allows for warning notices, representations and appeals. Organisations should know how a penalty has been calculated and have a fair opportunity to challenge a wrong decision. I would be grateful if the Minister confirmed which of those safeguards the regulations will include, and how the seriousness of a failure will be assessed.
There is a particular issue with fining public authorities. A fine on a public body ultimately comes out of public money, but that does not mean that public bodies should escape enforcement. However, moving money out of a service budget while leaving the same failures untouched would achieve very little. The Minister should explain how a penalty will lead to better conduct and how senior officials will be held accountable for putting matters right.
The clause also provides for civil court enforcement; the Minister should explain how that route and the penalty regime will fit together, and who will make the decisions. There is an example here from the existing law. The 2015 Act already allows the Home Secretary to seek an injunction against a business that fails to publish a statement, yet that power has, as far as I am aware, never been used. A strong power on paper is of little use if the enforcement team lacks the information or capacity to use it. The Minister should tell us what resources have been judged necessary and when the new arrangements will be up and running.
Finally, we should be clear about what the penalties address. They concern failures to comply with the reporting duties. The compliance statement is not proof that exploitation is absent and a reporting penalty is no substitute for investigating evidence of slavery. Where such evidence emerges, there needs to be a clear route to the agencies that can protect victims and pursue the perpetrators. We support giving these duties proper teeth and we support clause 49. The test for Ministers is whether persistent non-compliance is tackled, whether decisions are fair and whether identified risks lead to action. I look forward to the Minister’s explanation of how the regulations will deliver that in practice.
Siân Berry
Very briefly, although I think this is a good clause because it allows for fines and payments to be made, I want to echo a question asked of us in written evidence by Dame Sara Thornton, the former Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner. Although she describes the clause as a “game changer”, she highlights evidence that there is widespread non-compliance with the current reporting requirements: she provides data showing 194 instances across 160 companies over the past six years. She says that the legislation is
“silent on who will enforce these requirements”.
At the moment, the clause simply calls this the “enforcement authority” in lowercase letters—it is not yet an official body. It is incredibly important that the issue is resolved properly and that the enforcement body has the teeth, resources and ability to enforce the rules. If this is done properly it will be self-financing, but have the Government any plans to put more detail behind it before the Bill finally becomes law? This seems to me to be a very crucial part of any new powers.
Anna Turley
I thank hon. Members for their contributions and questions on these important clauses.
The shadow Minister and the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion asked who will be determining and enforcing the financial penalties. The Secretary of State may determine who will impose financial penalties on non-compliant organisations, and a number of models can be used to deliver that. That work is ongoing, but it could potentially be done through an existing regulator or within the Home Office itself. I appreciate that that will be an important part of the regulations we are drafting, and they will be shared during the Bill’s passage. We continue to engage with partners to ensure that we develop the most appropriate model for enforcement, so that we can administer financial penalties without placing an additional burden on the taxpayer by creating a new institution.
The shadow Minister asked about the High Court injunction power. Under the current framework, if an organisation fails to publish a statement, the Home Secretary can seek an injunction to require compliance. However, that power has not been used to date, due to the difficulties of monitoring compliance under the current regime, where there are no mandatory requirements or clear deadlines.
Pursuing an injunction can be a burdensome and resource-intensive process, and the court could only require the injuncted organisation to comply; it cannot issue a financial penalty. The measures in the Bill provide clearer expectations on what compliance looks like, allowing for more effective monitoring of compliance. They also introduce powers to impose stronger consequences on those who do not take their duties seriously.
On our expectations for the collection of these civil penalties, the purpose of the penalties is to encourage compliance with the transparency in supply chain requirements. We know from similar reporting regimes, such as gender pay gap reporting, and from Companies House, that organisations typically comply with their obligations once an investigation is opened, and before it gets to a stage where a financial penalty is issued. Therefore, the expectation is that the number of penalties issued will actually be very low. In addition, the penalty amount will vary depending on a number of factors, including organisational turnover. Given the penalty calculations and the expectation of almost full compliance, it is difficult to give an estimate of expected revenue from civil penalties. On where those penalties will go, the Bill provides that any financial penalties received by the enforcement agency must be paid into the Consolidated Fund, as is typical for such penalty regimes.
The shadow Minister asked about public bodies. As I said, they will be in scope of the reporting requirements, and financial penalties will apply to organisations that are legally separate from the Crown, such as local authorities and arm’s length bodies. As a matter of constitutional principle, the Government do not impose financial penalties on themselves.
We expect that the provisions will apply to modern slavery statements covering an organisation’s financial year that begins on or after commencement. While commencement timelines are still to be confirmed, we do not expect that the first compliance statements will be required any earlier than 2028. As I said, clarification on the details of the enforcement body will be provided as the Bill progresses through Parliament.
I thank Members again for their contributions to this discussion. Clause 49 introduces a new civil enforcement framework that will include financial penalties for companies that fail to comply with their reporting obligations under section 54 of the Modern Slavery Act, as improved by the previous clauses. Doing so will strengthen the regime and give it real teeth when looking to tackle the problem of modern slavery in supply chains.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 49 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
New Clause 1
Enforcement
“(1) A sum payable in pursuance of a decision of the IIAA is recoverable in England and Wales as if it were payable under an order of the county court.
(2) A sum payable in pursuance of a decision of the IIAA may be enforced in Scotland in the same manner as an extract registered decree arbitral bearing a warrant for execution issued by the sheriff court of any sheriffdom in Scotland.
(3) A sum payable in pursuance of a decision of the IIAA is recoverable in Northern Ireland as if it were payable under an order of the county court.
(4) Where action is taken under this section for the recovery of a sum payable in pursuance of a decision of the IIAA, the decision—
(a) in relation to England and Wales, is to be treated for the purposes of section 98 of the Courts Act 2003 (register of judgments and orders etc) as if it were a judgment entered in the county court;
(b) in relation to Northern Ireland, is to be treated for the purposes of Article 116 of the Judgments Enforcement (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/226 (N.I. 6)) (register of judgments) as if it were a judgment in respect of which an application has been accepted under Article 22 or 23(1) of that Order.
(5) IIAA Procedure Rules may provide for any or all of subsections (1) to (4)—
(a) to apply only in relation to sums of a description specified in the Rules, or
(b) not to apply except in relation to sums of a description specified in the Rules.”—(Anna Turley.)
This new clause would insert a new clause, to go after clause 10, which makes provision about the enforcement of the payment of any sums required to be paid by virtue of decisions of the IIAA.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill
New Clause 2
Increasing the availability of IIAA advice and IIAA representation
“(1) The Secretary of State may take such steps as the Secretary of State considers appropriate to increase the general availability of IIAA advice and IIAA representation.
(2) The power under subsection (1) may, in particular, be used to provide financial or other assistance (subject to any conditions the Secretary of State considers appropriate)—
(a) for persons undertaking education or training;
(b) for persons providing education, training or accreditation;
(c) for persons who provide IIAA advice or IIAA representation.
(3) In this section—
‘IIAA advice’ means advice from a qualified person about an appeal or bail application that has been or may be made to the IIAA;
‘IIAA representation’ means representation by a qualified person in proceedings before the IIAA;
‘qualified person’ means a person who is qualified for the purposes of section 84 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999.”—(Anna Turley.)
This new clause authorises the Secretary of State to take steps to increase the general availability of advice and representation for persons who make an appeal or bail application to the IIAA. The new clause would be inserted after clause 10.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 3
Late claims process: credibility
“(1) This section applies to proceedings that are subject to the late claims process (see section 12).
(2) In determining whether to believe a statement made by or on behalf of the appellant, an IIAA adjudicator must take account, as damaging the appellant’s credibility, of the fact that they provided late information.
(3) But if the IIAA adjudicator considers that there are good reasons why the appellant provided the information late, the adjudicator may decide that subsection (2)—
(a) applies to a lesser extent than it would if there were no good reasons, or
(b) does not apply at all.
(4) If in the course of the proceedings the appellant provides late evidence, an IIAA adjudicator must take that fact into account, as damaging the appellant’s credibility.
(5) But if the IIAA adjudicator considers that there are good reasons to do so, they may decide that subsection (4)—
(a) applies to a lesser extent than it otherwise would, or
(b) does not apply at all.
(6) The IIAA adjudicator must include, as part of their reasons for a decision that disposes of the proceedings, a statement explaining—
(a) how the adjudicator has applied subsection (2), and in particular—
(i) the extent to which they decided that the appellant’s credibility was damaged by the provision of late information,
(ii) the impact any credibility damage had on the determination of the appeal, and
(iii) if the appellant provided reasons for the provision of late information, what those reasons were and how they affected the application of subsection (2);
(b) whether the adjudicator has applied subsection (4), and in particular—
(i) whether the appellant provided late evidence and if so what that evidence was,
(ii) the extent to which the adjudicator decided that the appellant’s credibility was damaged by the provision of late evidence,
(iii) the impact any credibility damage had on the determination of the appeal, and
(iv) if the adjudicator considered that there were good reasons as mentioned in subsection (5), what those reasons were and how they affected the application of subsection (4).
(7) In this section—
‘late evidence’ means evidence provided to the IIAA after any deadline imposed in relation to the evidence by or under IIAA Procedure Rules;
‘late information’ means immigration information provided by the recipient of a claim notice in response to the notice—
(a) after the claim notice deadline, and
(b) at a time when the recipient was detained or had been given a notice of departure details as mentioned in section 12(1)(a) or (b);
‘immigration information’ has the meaning given in section 12;
‘claim notice’ and ‘claim notice deadline’ have the meanings given in section 11.”—(Anna Turley.)
This new clause would insert a new clause, to go after clause 12, providing that, where proceedings are subject to the late claims process (see clause 12), the appellant’s credibility is damaged. And if such an appellant provides evidence late, their credibility is damaged further. It also requires IIAA adjudicators to make a statement about the application of this section.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 4
Late information etc: proceedings before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission
“In the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997, after section 2 insert—
‘2ZA Provision of late information etc: effect on credibility
(1) This section applies where an appellant in proceedings before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission under section 2—
(a) has been served with a claim notice, and
(b) has provided any immigration information in response to the notice after the claim notice deadline—
(i) at a time when they are detained under a relevant detention provision, or
(ii) at any time after they have been given a notice of departure details.
(2) In determining whether to believe a statement made by or on behalf of the appellant, the Commission must take account, as damaging the appellant’s credibility, of the fact that they provided late information.
(3) But if the Commission considers that there are good reasons why the appellant provided the information late, the Commission may decide that subsection (2)—
(a) applies to a lesser extent than it would if there were no good reasons, or
(b) does not apply at all.
(4) If in the course of the proceedings the appellant provides late evidence, the Commission must take that fact into account, as damaging the appellant’s credibility.
(5) But if the Commission considers that there are good reasons to do so, it may decide that subsection (4)—
(a) applies to a lesser extent than it otherwise would, or
(b) does not apply at all.
(6) The Commission must include, as part of its reasons for a decision that disposes of the proceedings, a statement explaining—
(a) how the Commission has applied subsection (2), and in particular—
(i) the extent to which it decided that the appellant’s credibility was damaged by the provision of late information,
(ii) the impact any credibility damage had on the determination of the appeal, and
(iii) if the appellant provided reasons for the provision of late information, what those reasons were and how they affected the application of subsection (2);
(b) whether the Commission has applied subsection (4), and in particular—
(i) whether the appellant provided late evidence and if so what that evidence was,
(ii) the extent to which the Commission decided that the appellant’s credibility was damaged by the provision of late evidence,
(iii) the impact any credibility damage had on the determination of the appeal, and
(iv) if the Commission considered that there were good reasons as mentioned in subsection (5), what those reasons were and how they affected the application of subsection (4).
(7) In this section—
“claim notice” and “claim notice deadline” have the meanings given in section 11 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 2026;
“immigration information,” “notice of departure details” and “relevant detention provision” have the same meanings as in section 12 of that Act;
“late evidence” means evidence provided to the Commission after any deadline imposed in relation to the evidence by or under rules under section 5;
“late information” means information provided by the recipient of a claim notice in response to the notice—
(a) after the claim notice deadline, and
(b) at a time when the recipient was detained or had been given a notice of departure details as mentioned in subsection (1)(b);’”—(Anna Turley.)
This new clause would add a new clause making similar provision for proceedings before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission to that made by the new clause inserted by NC3. It would be inserted into the Bill after the new clause inserted by NC3.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 5
Liability to deportation of certain residents despite section 7 of the Immigration Act 1971
“In section 7 of the Immigration Act 1971 (exemption from deportation for certain existing residents), after subsection (1) insert—
‘(1A) But the Secretary of State may decide that, despite subsection (1)(b), a person to whom subsection (1)(b) applies is liable to deportation (and may accordingly make a deportation order against them under section 5) if the Secretary of State—
(a) has deprived the person of citizenship status under section 40(2) of the British Nationality Act 1981 (deprivation where conducive to public good), or
(b) is satisfied that the person has engaged in behaviour that would render them liable to deprivation of citizenship status under section 40(2) of that Act (whether or not they have such status).
(1B) A decision under subsection (1A) must be taken personally by the Secretary of State.
(1C) The Secretary of State may make a decision under subsection (1A) where the person—
(a) was deprived of citizenship status, or
(b) engaged in behaviour that would render them liable to deprivation of citizenship status,
before subsection (1A) came into force.’”—(Anna Turley.)
This new clause, to be inserted after clause 49, would enable the Secretary of State to override the exemption from deportation in s.7(1)(b) of the Immigration Act 1971 for certain Commonwealth and Irish citizens where they have behaved in a way that would render them liable to citizenship deprivation.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Anna Turley
New clause 5 will mean that a person’s exemption from deportation under section 7 of the Immigration Act 1971 can be disapplied where they have engaged in conduct such as terrorism, war crimes or serious organised crime. Section 7 provides protection from deportation for certain Commonwealth and Irish citizens who were ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom before 1 January 1973. It is an important safeguard for many people with long-standing ties to the UK.
The recent high-profile case of Shabir Ahmed highlighted a significant anomaly in the current law. In cases where the person’s conduct is serious enough to justify the removal of their citizenship, section 7 prevents us from deporting them. That cannot be right. Some of the most serious offenders, including individuals involved in terrorism, serious organised crime, sexual grooming or war crimes, should not be able to avoid deportation purely on the basis that they have been in this country since before 1973.
Our new clause will end the disparity in the powers available to protect the public from the most dangerous people. Decisions to disapply the exemption will be taken personally by the Home Secretary. Safeguards put in place by the new clause ensure that the legislation will not affect the vast majority of people protected by section 7. It will be used to ensure that only those individuals whose conduct places them among the most serious threats to the public can be deported.
As we saw with the case I mentioned, changing the law is only half the problem. Arranging the deportation of such individuals can take time, as successive Governments have found previously. Introducing this important new clause will ensure that we have the power to deport this individual, and that will be taken forward in the usual way. Given the danger that this individual poses, Government amendment 47 would amend the commencement clauses in the Bill to ensure that the new clause comes into effect upon Royal Assent.
Blake Stephenson (Mid Bedfordshire) (Con)
New clause 5 closes an anomaly that dates back to 1973, under which Commonwealth and Irish citizens living in the country when the Immigration Act 1971 came into force are protected from deportation by section 7, however serious their conduct. The new clause would let the Home Secretary decide that such a person is liable to deportation where they have been or could have been deprived of citizenship on conduct grounds. We support it and amendment 47, which brings it into force on Royal Assent.
The Conservative plan is to deport all foreign criminals. Not some of them—all of them. Any measure that removes a barrier to deportation is a step in that direction. New clause 5 is indeed a step in the right direction, but it is such a small step that it is challenging to see that it will make a noticeable impact. It is a personal discretion, not a duty, for the Home Secretary. Every person it covers will still be able to resist removal under article 8 and article 3, through the Human Rights Act 1998. Compare that with the much more robust new clause 45, tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), which would mean automatic deportation for every foreign national convicted of an offence. That is what our borders plan means by deporting all foreign criminals.
For the purposes of the debate, I have three questions for the Minister. How many people do the Government estimate are protected by section 7 and could be made liable to deportation under new clause 5? What is the Government’s legal assessment of the clause’s reliance on conduct before commencement? How will the power apply to Irish citizens, given the common travel area, and have the Irish Government been consulted on the measure?
We will support Government new clause 5, but if the Government accept the principle that dangerous people should not be protected from deportation by legal technicalities, I hope they will support our new clauses in that regard too.
Siân Berry
I want to raise a few alarm bells in terms of what I feel about this measure, and I hope the Minister can answer me clearly. My misgivings arise partly because the Minister talked about basing the need for the new clause on a single case example; partly because it has been introduced into the Bill at a late stage in our considerations; and partly because it will come into force immediately on Royal Assent. It appears to be a rush, and I am not convinced that it will not have equalities impacts or overlap with the lessons we should have learned from the Windrush scandal. If the Minister can give some more assurance that this has been looked at carefully and not rushed into on the basis of a single case, I would be glad to hear it.
Anna Turley
I can be explicit: this change in the legislation has been inspired by one particular case. I will not apologise for that, because I am sure the hon. Lady would agree that the current situation is not acceptable. Some of the most serious offenders, including individuals involved in terrorism, serious organised crime or war crimes, cannot be deported even after we have stripped them of British citizenship, because of this loophole. It is important that we take steps to address it.
I want to give the hon. Lady some reassurance, however, because people may express concerns about protection given in law to others—for example, the Windrush generation or others who came here previously. I will be absolutely clear and explicit in Committee: they will not be affected. Any broader protection for the Windrush generation is not affected by the new clause. The power will be exercised personally by the Home Secretary. The Government are clear that the wider protections offered by section 7 will remain intact. The new clause will not affect the overwhelming majority of people protected by section 7 or their rights. This measure is intended solely to ensure that specific individuals whose conduct places them among the most serious threats to the public can be deported.
Tom Gordon (Harrogate and Knaresborough) (LD)
We support closing this gap. Given that the test is an issue of the Home Secretary’s judgment, rather than of a conviction, and that it applies to past conduct, it would be helpful if the Minister can give reassurances. Given how serious and huge the power will be, some sort of reporting mechanism will help us to understand how often it might be used and how many people fall under it.
Anna Turley
The power is similar to those the Home Secretary has already, including the ability to prevent people from coming here and to ask for people to be removed. We agree that if deprivation on conducive grounds is to be used sparingly, it should be against those who pose a serious threat to the UK or whose conduct has involved very high harm. Other than where a decision is taken on the grounds that the person has conducted themselves in a manner that is seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the UK, the conducive power is limited so that it can be applied only to those who are dual citizens. Parliament chose to enact the power on that basis to avoid the prospect of leaving people stateless, which would be contrary to the UK’s commitments under the 1961 statelessness convention. To respond further, the Home Secretary is of course accountable to this place on a daily basis. On high-profile cases, I am sure she will continue to give her usual response on the Floor of the House.
The hon. Member for Stockton West asked for an estimated projection. We do not have the statistics, but I have been clear and up front that we are responding to a particular case. We expect these to be extreme and unusual cases, where someone has been guilty of a crime of this magnitude, but is of that generation prior to 1973. The hon. Gentleman also asked about the consideration of the legal assessment. We have reviewed the legal position very carefully. We are content that it is lawful, which is why we are taking this measure forward.
The hon. Gentleman mentioned Irish citizens. Irish citizens are liable to deportation, but in practice are only pursued in limited circumstances.
I thank hon. Members for their contributions to this important debate. As they will know, the Government have made this change to end the disparity in powers available to protect the public from the most dangerous people. The recent high-profile case of Shabir Ahmed has highlighted a significant anomaly in the current law. In cases where the person’s conduct is serious enough to justify the removal of their citizenship, section 7 currently prevents us from deporting them.
Tom Gordon
I sit on the Joint Committee on Human Rights, and we have published a report on accountability for Daesh war crimes. Included in that report was the fact that the UK Government use their powers to strip citizenship more than almost any other country in the world, and in a way that has often been described as not particularly transparent. Could I press the Minister to go further on the reporting mechanisms that we need to see if we have this new clause and also existing Government citizenship stripping?
Anna Turley
This new clause does not influence our decisions to deprive people of citizenship—that remains. This is simply about our ability to remove them. That is the important loophole that we are trying to close, to create consistency on that front.
Safeguards put in place by Government new clause 5 ensure that legislation will not affect the vast majority of people protected by section 7. It will only be used to ensure that those individuals whose conduct places them among the most serious threats to the public can be deported.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 5 read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 32
Exception from automatic deportation of foreign criminals
“In section 33 of the UK Borders Act 2007 (exceptions from automatic deportation of foreign criminals) for subsection (6A) substitute—
‘(6A) Exception 6 is where—
(a) the foreign criminal has limited leave to remain in the United Kingdom under section 65(2) of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (leave to remain for victims of slavery or human trafficking),
(b) the Secretary of State is under a duty to grant the foreign criminal limited leave to remain in the United Kingdom under that section, or
(c) the Secretary of State intends to grant the foreign criminal limited leave to remain in the United Kingdom under that section despite not being required to do so as a result of the application of subsection (7)(a) of that section.’”.—(Anna Turley.)
This new clause, to go after clause 39, replaces an exception from the duty to deport foreign criminals. The existing exception operates by reference to the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings. The replacement exception will operate by reference to the domestic legislation that gives effect to that Convention.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Anna Turley
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Section 33 of the UK Borders Act 2007 sets out exceptions to the automatic deportation of foreign criminals. This technical amendment provides greater legal clarity in relation to the exception that may apply where a foreign criminal is also a confirmed victim of modern slavery.
At the time the UK Borders Act was enacted, there was not a detailed domestic legal framework in place for the identification and protection of victims of modern slavery. Since then, the Government have introduced specific domestic modern slavery legislation, including the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and the Nationality and Borders Act 2022. The ongoing work on this Bill has highlighted the outdated reference to the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings—ECAT—and this provides an opportune moment to update the legislation so that it refers to the relevant domestic modern slavery framework.
New clause 32 replaces the existing reference to the United Kingdom’s obligations under ECAT with a reference to the relevant domestic modern slavery legislation, namely the temporary permission to stay provision in the Nationality and Borders Act 2022.
Since the introduction of the 2007 Act, the UK has introduced specific modern slavery legislation and these provisions will now provide the legal framework for identifying and protecting victims of modern slavery in the UK. The new clause aligns the deportation framework with existing domestic legislation on modern slavery provisions and provides greater legal clarity.
The new clause does not expand or alter the protections. It simply clarifies and clears up any ambiguity in the law. It simply places the exception to automatic deportation on a clearer domestic statutory footing, while ensuring the Secretary of State retains flexibility to grant temporary permission to stay in exceptional circumstances where appropriate.
Blake Stephenson
New clause 32 rewrites the exception to automatic deportation for foreign criminals who are victims of trafficking. At present, section 33(6A) of the UK Borders Act 2007 disapplies automatic deportation where removal would breach our obligations under the Council of Europe trafficking convention. The new clause would replace that with a test based on leave under section 65 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, including where the Home Secretary merely intends to grant such leave, even where she is under no duty to do so.
A criminal conviction should trigger automatic deportation, and those deported as foreign criminals should not be able to make protection claims to stop that deportation. New clause 32 keeps a route by which a foreign criminal can avoid automatic deportation and it widens the discretion to use it.
I am sure nobody in this Committee wants genuine victims of trafficking to be left unsupported, but in clause 38, the Government accept that people who pose a threat to public order should be disqualified from protection. Why, then, keep the exception to automatic deportation for people who have been convicted of crimes here? Why widen the range of cases where there is no duty to grant leave at all?
How many foreign criminals relied on the trafficking exemption in each of the past three years? In what circumstances would the Home Secretary intend to grant leave under section 65 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 where there is no duty to do so? How many foreign criminals do the Government expect to benefit? Unless the Minister can show that this exception will be rare and tightly controlled, it is a back door through which foreign criminals will continue to avoid removal.
Anna Turley
Temporary permission to stay is granted only in limited circumstances for specific purposes and for time-limited periods. Confirmed victims who are considered a risk to public order who have made a modern slavery claim in bad faith will not usually be granted temporary permission to stay in the UK. In rare cases, the Secretary of State may decide that temporary permission to stay is to be granted to an individual who has been convicted of a crime, for example, where their presence is necessary to support a law enforcement investigation or criminal proceedings. The new clause ensures that the Secretary of State retains this discretion as is befitting with clauses we considered earlier. Any grant of temporary permission to stay is subject to the individual continuing to meet the relevant requirements and lasts only for as long as it is necessary to achieve the purpose for which it is granted.
I will undertake to write to the Committee on the specific numbers that the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire asked for. I thank Members for their interest in the new clause. It replaces the existing reference to the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings with a reference to the relevant domestic modern slavery legislation, namely the temporary permission to stay provision in the Nationality and Borders Act. The technical new clause provides greater legal clarity in relation to the exception that may apply where a foreign criminal is also a confirmed victim of modern slavery.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 32 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 33
Enforcement of decisions of the Immigration Services Commissioner
“(1) Part 5 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (immigration advisers and immigration service providers) is amended as follows.
(2) In section 92F (enforcement of penalty notices) (inserted by paragraph 9 of Schedule 1 to the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025)—
(a) in subsection (1), after ‘notice’ insert ‘(“a penalty”)’;
(b) for subsections (2) to (4) substitute—
‘(2) In England and Wales, the penalty is recoverable as if it were payable under an order of the county court.
(3) In Scotland, the penalty may be enforced in the same manner as an extract registered decree arbitral bearing a warrant for execution issued by the sheriff court of any sheriffdom in Scotland.
(4) In Northern Ireland, the penalty is recoverable as if it were payable under an order of the county court.
(5) Where action is taken under this section for the recovery of a penalty, the penalty—
(a) in relation to England and Wales, is to be treated for the purposes of section 98 of the Courts Act 2003 (register of judgments and orders etc) as if it were a judgment entered in the county court;
(b) in relation to Northern Ireland, is to be treated for the purposes of Article 116 of the Judgments Enforcement (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/226 (N.I. 6)) (register of judgments) as if it were a judgment in respect of which an application has been accepted under Article 22 or 23(1) of that Order.’
(3) In Schedule 5 (the Immigration Services Commissioner), in paragraph 9C (enforcement of orders to refund fees or pay compensation) (inserted by paragraph 14(5) of the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025)—
(a) for sub-paragraph (3) substitute—
‘(3) Any amount to be refunded or paid under the order (“the amount owing”)—
(a) in England and Wales, is recoverable by P or the Commissioner (on P’s behalf) as if it were payable under an order of the county court;
(b) in Scotland, may be enforced by P or the Commissioner (on P’s behalf) in the same manner as an extract registered decree arbitral bearing a warrant for execution issued by the sheriff court of any sheriffdom in Scotland;
(c) in Northern Ireland, is recoverable by P or the Commissioner (on P’s behalf) as if it were payable under an order of the county court.’;
(b) in sub-paragraph (4), for ‘make an application under sub-paragraph (3)’ substitute ‘take steps to recover or enforce an amount owing’;
(c) for sub-paragraphs (5) and (6) substitute—
‘(5) Where action is taken under this paragraph for the recovery of an amount to be refunded or paid under an order of the Commissioner, the order—
(a) in relation to England and Wales, is to be treated for the purposes of section 98 of the Courts Act 2003 (register of judgments and orders etc) as if it were a judgment entered in the county court;
(b) in relation to Northern Ireland, is to be treated for the purposes of Article 116 of the Judgments Enforcement (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/226 (N.I. 6)) (register of judgments) as if it were a judgment in respect of which an application has been accepted under Article 22 or 23(1) of that Order.
(6) For the purposes of this paragraph, an appeal is pending during the period—
(a) starting when the appeal is brought, and
(b) ending when the appeal is finally determined, abandoned or withdrawn.’”—(Anna Turley.)
This amendment would insert a new clause, to go in after clause 49, amending the provision inserted into the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 about the enforcement of orders made by the Immigration Services Commissioner for penalties, refunds and compensation, so as to make it work effectively in Northern Ireland.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Anna Turley
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Government new clause 33 seeks to amend the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 to ensure that the enforcement of orders made by the Immigration Services Commissioner under that Act for penalties, refunds and compensation work effectively in Northern Ireland. Provisions regarding enforcement of unpaid monetary penalties, refunds of fees or payments of compensation in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland were part of the Immigration Services Commissioner measures in the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025. Upon making preparations to commence the measures, however, it became apparent that the current provisions are not compatible with the system in place in Northern Ireland. Therefore, the Government are taking steps to rectify the situation so that the enforcement regime can operate as intended.
The Government new clause ensures that any unpaid monetary penalty, refund of fees or payment of compensation imposed by the Immigration Services Commissioner on advisers providing poor or illegal immigration services or advice can be recovered in Northern Ireland as they can in England, Wales and Scotland. It also makes provision for penalties to be entered into the relevant registers in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Procedures for recovery of debts differ in Scotland from those in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. In Scotland, statutory penalties need not be treated as an existing court judgment. In keeping with other types of statutory penalty in Scotland, the proposed drafting allows for these penalties to be treated as an extract registered decree arbitral, bearing a warrant for execution for purposes of enforcement. That means that no application is needed to the court to enforce a debt or penalty, as it is treated as having been registered with the court and authority given the execution.
Amendments in later groups will make provision for the commencement of the new clause to take place in conjunction with the measures it relates to within the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 as amended by the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025.
Blake Stephenson
New clause 33 makes the Immigration Services Commissioner’s penalties, refund orders and compensation orders enforceable as court orders across the United Kingdom, including in Northern Ireland. These are technical improvements and we support them.
Rogue immigration advisers do real damage. They take money from vulnerable people, and, too often, they coach claims designed not to establish the truth but to delay removal, including the late claim lodged the night before a flight, and the fresh claim built on a story that has changed. We would end immigration legal aid and limit judicial review to cases where the Home Office has acted outside its powers, which would remove much of the market that these advisers exploit.
In the meantime, the regulator should have teeth. How many penalties has the commissioner imposed in the last three years, how much has actually been recovered and how many prosecutions for giving unregulated immigration advice have there been? As I said, we support this move, but I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Anna Turley
I undertake to write to the shadow Minister with those figures as I do not have them to hand, but I appreciate his interest in the new clause. Government new clause 33 ensures that any unpaid monetary penalty, refund of fees or payment of compensation imposed by the Immigration Services Commissioner on advisers for providing poor or illegal immigration advice or services can be recovered in Northern Ireland, just as they can be in England, Wales or Scotland. It also makes provision for penalties to be entered into the relevant registers in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. The new clause will ensure that the system relating to the Immigration Services Commissioner operates as intended.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 33 read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 34
Meaning of “the Immigration Acts”
“In section 61(2) of the UK Borders Act 2007 (meaning of ‘the Immigration Acts’)—
(a) omit the ‘and’ at the end of paragraph (n);
(b) at the end insert
‘, and
(p) the Immigration and Asylum Act 2026.’”—(Anna Turley.)
This new clause, which would go in after clause 50, would add the Bill to the list of “Immigration Acts” in the UK Borders Act 2007. “The Immigration Acts” is a general term used across the statute book and is defined in the Interpretation Act 1978.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Anna Turley
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
This new clause makes a straightforward technical amendment to the UK Borders Act 2007. It adds the Bill, once enacted, to the statutory list of enactments that comprise “the Immigration Acts” in the 2007 Act. References to “the Immigration Acts” appear throughout the statute book and are used in connection with a wide range of immigration powers, enforcement provisions and other immigration functions. It is therefore important that, once enacted, the Bill is included within that established statutory definition.
The effect of the new clause is to ensure that references elsewhere in the legislation to “the Immigration Acts” will apply consistently to the revisions contained in the Bill in the same way as they apply to other immigration legislation. The new clause is a technical provision that ensures the legislation fits coherently within the wider immigration statute book and that existing references to “the Immigration Acts” operate as intended.
Blake Stephenson
Mr Twigg, you and the Committee members will be pleased to hear that this will be the shortest speech of the day. The new clause adds the Bill, once enacted, to the list of “the Immigration Acts”. It is a technical provision, and we do not oppose it.
Anna Turley
I thank Members for their overwhelming interest in and enthusiasm for this new clause. As discussed, this is a straightforward amendment that adds the Bill to the statutory list of enactments that comprise “the Immigration Acts” in the 2007 Act. It will simply mean that references elsewhere in legislation to “the Immigration Acts” will apply consistently to the provisions contained in the Bill in the same way that they apply to other immigration legislation.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 34 read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Jade Botterill.)
Social Housing Bill (First sitting)
Tuesday 27th October 2026
(1 day, 20 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Social Housing Bill [HL] 2026-27 View all Social Housing Bill [HL] 2026-27 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 27 October 2026 - (27 Oct 2026)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 11 -
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 2 / Noes: 8 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 2 / Noes: 8 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 2 / Noes: 8 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
I remind Members to switch their electronic devices off or to silent. Tea and coffee are not allowed during the sittings.
Ordered,
That—
(1) the Committee shall (in addition to its first meeting at 9.25 am on Tuesday 27 October) meet—
(a) at 2.00 pm on Tuesday 27 October;
(b) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 29 October;
(c) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 3 November.
(2) proceedings on consideration of the Bill in Committee shall be taken in the following order: Clauses 1 to 14; Schedule 1; Clause 15; Schedule 2; Clauses 16 and 17; Schedule 3; Clauses 18 and 19; new Clauses; new Schedules; Clauses 20 to 23; remaining proceedings on the Bill;
(3) the proceedings shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at 5.00 pm on Tuesday 3 November.—(Matthew Pennycook.)
Resolved,
That, subject to the discretion of the Chair, any written evidence received by the Committee shall be reported to the House for publication.—(Matthew Pennycook.)
The Chair
Copies of written evidence that the Committee receives will be made available in the Committee Room.
Members are responsible for declaring any interests in accordance with the code of conduct at the start of proceedings and when speaking or tabling amendments. Does any Members wish to declare an interest?
Rachel Blake (Cities of London and Westminster) (Lab/Co-op)
I draw Members’ attention to my category 8—miscellaneous—interest.
Gideon Amos (Taunton and Wellington) (LD)
I wish to draw the Committee’s attention to my registered interest as a social landlord.
The Chair
We will now begin line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The selection list for today’s sitting is available in the room and on the parliamentary website; it shows how the clauses, schedules and selected amendments have been grouped for debate. A Member who has put their name to the lead amendment in a group is called first. For debates on clause stand part, the Minister will be called first, and then other Members will be free to indicate, by bobbing, that they wish to speak in the debate. Please bob on each occasion on which you wish to speak during the proceedings.
At the end of the debate on a group of amendments and new clauses, I shall call the Member who moved the lead amendment or new clause again. Before they sit down, they will need to indicate if they wish to withdraw the amendment or new clause, or if they seek a decision. If any Member wishes to press any other amendment—this includes grouped clauses—that will be at my discretion.
Clause 1
Qualifying period for right to buy
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause stand part.
New clause 55—Strategy relating to Right to Buy: 16 to 25 year olds.
“Within 12 months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must publish a strategy for promoting awareness of the Right to Buy scheme to people aged 16 to 25.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to issue a strategy for promoting the Right to Buy scheme among young people.
New clause 57—Transitional arrangements relating to qualifying period for right to buy.
“(1) Section 119 of the Housing Act 1985 (qualifying period for right to buy) is amended as follows.
(2) After subsection (A1) insert –
‘(A2) Subsection (A1) does not apply in relation to a secure tenancy entered into before the coming into force of section 1 of the Social Housing Act 2026.
(A3) In relation to a tenancy within subsection (A2), the right to buy does not arise unless the period which, in accordance with Schedule 4, is to be taken into account for the purposes of this section is at least three years.’”
This new clause seeks to extend the transition period for the commencement of provisions in Clause 1 in relation to secure tenancies
Amendment 84, in clause 22, page 16, line 27, leave out paragraph (a).
This amendment would prevent section 1 of this Bill coming into effect on the day on which the Act is passed. Together with amendment 85, section 1 would come into force at the period of three years beginning on the day on which the Act is passed.
Amendment 85, in clause 22, page 17, line 16, at end insert—
“(3A) Section 1 (right to buy: qualifying period) comes into force at the end of the period of three years beginning with the day on which this Act is passed.”
This amendment together with amendment 84 would prevent section 1 of this Bill coming into effect on the day on which the Act is passed, instead making the commencement of section 1 to be three years following the day on which the Act is passed.
The Minister for Housing and Planning (Matthew Pennycook)
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Mr Vickers. Before I speak to clause 1, I would like to put on the record once again my sincere thanks to my ministerial colleague Baroness Taylor of Stevenage for ably shepherding the Bill through its House of Lords stages. I also thank all noble Lords who took part in the debates on the Bill in the other place. It goes without saying that we did not agree with all the arguments made—we cannot accept the incorporation into the Bill of clause 13, for reasons that I will detail in due course—but overall the expert scrutiny and challenge provided by peers have helped to improve the Bill. A number of Government amendments that we have tabled arise directly from the issues raised and the points made during the debates in the Lords.
The Bill has three core objectives. The first is to protect much-needed social housing stock and thereby to incentivise the building of more social rented homes. The second is to create a fairer tenancy system with greater protection for tenants who are victims of domestic abuse. The third is to reduce unnecessary bureaucracy and give providers greater regulatory certainty so that they can invest in new social and affordable homes with confidence.
At the heart of the Bill are comprehensive reforms to the right-to-buy scheme that are designed to put it on a fair and sustainable footing for the future. They are informed by the feedback that we received in the public consultation, which ran from November 2024 to 2025, and are set out in clauses 1 to 10.
More than 2 million tenants have exercised the right to buy since it was introduced in 1980. However, as we all know, many of the homes sold under the scheme have not been replaced, which has depleted social housing stock. There is now an insufficient supply of good-quality social housing to meet demand. More than 1.3 million households are on the social housing waiting list, and almost 180,000 children are living homeless in temporary accommodation. The right-to-buy scheme has also reduced the motivation and confidence of councils to build, since new homes can be sold before the council can recover its investment.
Although we respect those who believe that right to buy should be abolished outright, the Government’s position remains that social housing tenants who have lived in and paid rent on their homes for many years should retain the opportunity to purchase them at a reasonable discount. However, as I argued on Second Reading, there is a pressing need to radically reform the right to buy to reduce the significant outflow of stock that has taken place since discounts were drastically increased by the coalition Government in 2012, to incentivise councils to once again build at scale, and to attract broader investment in council housing.
As things stand, to qualify for the right to buy an individual must be a secure tenant and must have spent at least three years as a public sector tenant—in other words, their landlord must be a public body, usually a council or a housing association. The three years do not have to have been continuous, and an individual can add together any time they spent as a public sector tenant. They are also able to count any period when their husband, wife or civil partner was a public sector tenant.
Until 2014, the minimum eligibility requirement was five, not three, years. The main rationale given at the time for reducing the qualifying period by two years was explicitly to drive an increase in the take-up of right to buy. The decision was taken in the full knowledge that a tenant occupying a property for three years is extremely unlikely to have paid rent that equates to the available discount.
The Government believe that a more sustainable balance must be struck to support councils to rebuild their stock of homes. Clause 1 therefore amends section 119 of the Housing Act 1985 to increase the minimum eligibility requirement from three to 10 years. As under the existing law, a combination of present and previous tenancies will continue to count towards the qualifying period.
Increasing the minimum eligibility period in that way has received strong support from stakeholders. In our consultation on reforming the right to buy, 81% of respondents, including 62% of tenants who responded, supported increasing the minimum period of tenancy required to at least 10 years. In fact, the majority of respondents supported someone having to be a public sector tenant for longer than 10 years before becoming eligible for the right to buy.
The Government believe that 10 years strikes the right balance between allowing long-standing tenants the opportunity to own their own home and protecting much-needed social housing stock. Incidentally, 10 years is also the average length of tenancy for someone buying under the scheme currently. This targeted change will maintain access to the right to buy for long-standing tenants, but in a way that provides for a fairer and more sustainable scheme and better supports the long-term supply of social housing.
Gideon Amos
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Mr Vickers.
I rise to support the clause. For Liberal Democrats, this is the most important and significant clause in the Bill, as it constrains the selling off of council houses. It is concerning that the Conservatives have tabled an amendment that would essentially reverse it. With 1.32 million people on the housing waiting list and 177,000 children in temporary accommodation, the last thing that we need is to continue the gradual loss of social housing. There has been a net loss of 2 million social homes since the introduction of right to buy. If that does not show that we cannot fill the bath with the plug taken out, nothing does. We stand squarely in support of the clause, although we would go further and give local authorities the ability and power to suspend right to buy completely if that is right for their area so that they can rebuild their stock of council housing and social rent homes.
Gareth Bacon (Orpington) (Con)
I echo the Minister’s welcome: it is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Mr Vickers.
This Bill fails the British people. It effectively destroys right to buy for millions of families. It does nothing to free up stock for British nationals. It fails to introduce efficient stock management regulations. Most egregiously, it fails to build a single social home—a point completely missed by the Government and the Liberal Democrats. In scrutinising the Bill line by line, it is critically important that we defend aspiration and refocus the debate on the delivery of new homes.
I will speak to new clauses 55 and 57 and amendments 84 and 85, in my name. On new clause 55, in the past, Conservative Government-backed schemes such as Help to Buy and stamp duty discounts made a real difference to people buying their first home, and helped about 1 million first-time buyers to get on to the housing ladder. That contributed to 800,000 people buying their first home under the previous Government. However, since 2024 the Government have not shown that they have the aspiration to match that. Instead, they have cut a lot of the products that turbocharged first-time buyers getting on to the housing ladder.
Even when the Government try to support young people into property ownership, it emerges that all that glisters is not gold. I am primarily referring to the Your First Home scheme—a policy limited to new homes and expected to be constrained by income caps. Young people, especially young people in social housing, deserve better than that.
Deirdre Costigan (Ealing Southall) (Lab)
The hon. Gentleman mentions Your First Home—the product that the Government announced to get young people on to the housing ladder. Does he agree that the targeted approach of that new idea is in stark contrast to the Conservative Government’s Help to Buy scheme? About half of the people who bought under that scheme were already able to buy a home, and it just allowed them to buy a bigger home, probably in a more affluent area.
Gareth Bacon
It rather depends on the detail, but if the income caps that we hear about in the press are even remotely accurate, we can rule out the whole of Greater London and the south-east of England, because people will not be able to access the financing. That would be yet another example of the Government pretending to do something without actually doing it, but we await the detail on that.
Right to buy is not a shameful practice, nor is it an exercise in capitalistic greed. It is a hand up on to the housing ladder for those in need, and an extension in the fundamental rights of property. New clause 55 would help realise that for young people. After all, it is critical that more is done to help young people to buy their first home. They face the greatest barriers to home ownership of any recent generation, and yet the Government’s answer is to cut one of their only routes to property ownership. We believe that that approach is fundamentally wrong, and I urge colleagues to join me in supporting young people by backing new clause 55.
On new clause 57, clause 1 in its current form not only enables the injustice of preventing future hard-working residents from owning their own homes but prevents current tenants from doing so. The Opposition are completely against that retrospective change. The Government have shown time and again that they have no regard for the property rights of individuals. The Government’s socialistic focus has targeted landlords, freeholders and renters, now they turn their gaze towards residents in social homes.
The vast majority of people in social housing deserve a hand up on to the property ladder and a chance to share in the pride of owning their own home. Many people in social housing know that their best chance at getting that is through right to buy.
Rachel Blake
On new clause 55, can the hon. Member share the evidence base for his proposal, including the number of tenants aged between 16 and 25? I struggle to believe that the proposal would make any difference in terms of home ownership for people aged between 16 and 25. In fact, it is the long-run shortage of genuinely affordable homes, rental properties and home ownership products that is responsible for young people struggling to get on to the housing ladder.
Gareth Bacon
The hon. Lady makes an interesting point, but she does not say how the Government will increase home building. There is no increase in home building. The point of the new clause is to raise awareness of right to buy among 16 to 25-year-olds. The point of the new clause is about aspiration—something this Government have absolutely no idea about. Aspiration turned into opportunity by the Conservative party in the 1980s is being arbitrarily and retrospectively axed by a Bill that offers no other route into the housing market, builds no more social housing and effectively excludes 5 million people from the fundamental right to property ownership.
Danny Beales (Uxbridge and South Ruislip) (Lab)
Will the hon. Gentleman give way on that point?
Gareth Bacon
I will not give way. I need to make some progress.
That is the least that can be done to support families aspiring to own their own home, whether they find themselves on the cusp of reaching their three-year qualifying period or on day one of the road towards making their home ownership dream a reality.
On amendments 84 and 85, the Bill opens with a statement claiming that its purpose is to make provision about social housing, but clause 1 makes no effort to increase the supply, build-out rates or funding for social housing. Instead, an ideological aversion to property ownership—a fundamental right—takes the top spot at the very beginning of the Bill. Ever since Margaret Thatcher gave millions of people the chance to own their own home, rather than rent it from the state, local authority or a registered provider, Labour MPs have for generations sought to crush that right and the aspiration that it exists to serve.
Gareth Bacon
No. More than 2 million households have exercised the right to become homeowners and gain a stake in society. Until 1980, that would have been out of reach for far too many British people, but the Government are determined to wind back the clock to the 1970s and cut off the right for hard-working families up and down the country to own their own home.
Amendments 84 and 85 would take out the extended qualifying period from the day the Bill is passed, thus preventing clause 1 from coming into effect for three years following Royal Assent. That would delay the Government’s dogma and continue to support the right of 5 million people to find their place in the community, and to feel the pride and safety that comes with owning one’s own home.
Matthew Pennycook
I thank the hon. Member for Orpington for tabling new clauses 55 and 57 and amendments 84 and 85, and for speaking to them. I should say at the outset that, in political terms, he and I could not be further apart. However, he is a decent and diligent shadow Minister, as is the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Taunton and Wellington—I do not want to leave him out. I very much look forward to the robust yet civil debates we will have over the coming sessions.
I do not want to dwell too long on the more general points made by the hon. Member for Orpington, but I think it is worth responding to two of them. We are not extinguishing the right to buy through the Bill. We could have abolished the right to buy outright, but that is not what we are doing. We are ensuring that those who benefit from the scheme are long-standing tenants who have lived in and paid rent on their homes for many years.
In response to the hon. Gentleman’s point about the Bill having no impact on supply, he really ought to get out and speak to local authorities. They tell us that the benefits that they will see from the regulatory certainty and stability that we are providing, as well as the grant funding, will give them the confidence to go out and build new social homes, safe in the knowledge that, thanks to clause 1, they will not be immediately sold off after three years.
Lewis Cocking (Broxbourne) (Con)
I thank the Minister for giving way; he is always very generous with his time, and I think he is a very competent and diligent Minister in the Department. Can he provide the evidence base for what he has just said? I was the leader of a local authority, and I never once met a housing provider that told me they cannot build any more social housing because of the right to buy.
Matthew Pennycook
That is not my experience from discussing the matter with councils, and it does not reflect the feedback that we received in the consultation. Councils up and down the country tell us that they could build more if they had certainty that their stock would not be lost in the proportion that it is—and certainly not after a minimum qualifying period of three years.
Danny Beales
Having been a cabinet member responsible for council house building in Camden for seven years, and building 1,000 homes, I can say that it is a challenge when council homes can quickly leave our stock through right to buy. Having built them at great public expense, and having borrowed on a 30-year basis to deliver them, the possibility of losing that asset at a discount without recouping the investment is a material consideration. Does the Minister agree that authorities that do not build council homes but rely on housing associations might not see this as a problem, as housing associations are not included in right to buy in the same way?
Matthew Pennycook
I thank my hon. Friend for sharing his very considerable experience. There is a difference in experience between local authorities that have housing revenue accounts and those that do not, and those that build at scale and those that do not. However, it is certainly the case that councils knowing they can lose stock three years after building it without recuperating that investment is a disincentive to build.
Patrick Spencer (Central Suffolk and North Ipswich) (Con)
Will the Minister give way?
Matthew Pennycook
I will give way to the hon. Gentleman but then, in the interests of getting to the Opposition new clauses, which I am told they want to speak to, I will make some progress.
Patrick Spencer
I appreciate the Minister’s point about recouping councils’ investment, which is why there are elements of the Bill that change that deal for councils. What my residents and I do not understand—and what people across this country do not understand—is why the Government are restricting access to right to buy for a whole group of people, including young people, young parents and people at the beginning of their professional lives, who might want to get on to the housing ladder. It seems they are tackling one problem by focusing on the completely wrong element of the issue.
Matthew Pennycook
I think I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point, but I respectfully disagree. It is a problem that local authorities up and down the country build new social homes but then, after three years, they can be purchased. That is leading to an unsustainable outflow of social housing stock from the system. We are not net positive on social homes—we have not been for many years—but the Bill will ensure that we are. It gives an incentive to councils to build, as they will know that they are building more than they are losing, and therefore the 1.3 million people on waiting lists will not increase but decrease over time.
I must turn to the amendments and new clauses tabled by the hon. Member for Orpington. New clause 57 would exempt existing secure tenants from the new 10-year minimum qualifying period introduced by the Bill. As I have said, a core aim of the Bill is to protect social housing stock better and to ensure that more social homes are built than lost. If existing tenancies were excluded from the changes to eligibility rules, the vast majority of tenants would be unaffected by our qualifying period reforms. I have no doubt that that is the hon. Gentleman’s intention, but the result would be homes continuing to be sold as little as three years after a tenancy was secured, and the continued loss of significant amounts of social housing stock. That is not the Government’s aim or the aim of the Bill. For that reason, the Government cannot accept the new clause, and I hope that the shadow Minister will not press it.
The Chair
The Questions on new clauses 55 and 57 and amendments 84 and 85 will be put later in the proceedings when we reach them.
Clause 2
Exercise of the right to buy by residential property owners
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Matthew Pennycook
Clauses 2 and 3 further tighten the eligibility criteria for right to buy, to ensure that the scheme is fair and well targeted. Clause 2 prevents existing residential property owners from exercising the right to buy, which we believe is a reasonable and rational approach. We have set out what we think is an appropriate definition of a residential property owner in the clause. The clause will apply to anyone who owns a residential property, whether owned outright or with a mortgage. Leasehold and freehold properties will be captured, with exceptions for short-term leases of less than 21 years, as will properties in joint ownership or owned outside England, including those held in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and abroad.
Exemptions will be made for victims of domestic abuse who have moved from the accommodation that they were occupying for reasons connected to the abuse. As part of the application process, tenants will be required to declare to the landlord whether they own another property, and landlords will be able to check the information that the tenant provides. If tenants are seeking exceptionally to buy under the right-to-buy scheme where they already own a residential property because they have been the victim of domestic abuse, they will also be required to provide evidence of that to the landlord.
Clause 3 prevents those who have previously exercised the right to buy from doing so again, with exceptions in place for cases of domestic abuse and irretrievable relationship breakdown. I hope hon. Members will agree that repeat purchases would undermine the objectives of the right-to-buy scheme. It would lead to more social housing stock being lost to those who have already benefited from a publicly funded discount to buy their own home.
During our consultation on reforming the right to buy, 91% of respondents stated that they would support preventing someone who has either previously benefited from the right to buy or owns another property from being able to access the scheme. The terms of the referenced exceptions are set out in the clause and will be reinforced by updated guidance when the Act comes into force. It will be for social landlords to be satisfied that the exceptions apply, for which they will be able to ask for evidence from the applicant as part of the application process. Obviously, councils are already well practised at doing this as, under the current rules, those who have previously exercised the right to buy have their discount reduced if they seek to exercise the right to buy again.
We think clauses 2 and 3 are fair and proportionate. They are designed to appropriately restrict access to the right-to-buy scheme.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 2 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 3 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 4
Timescales
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Matthew Pennycook
Clause 4 concerns the statutory periods in which local authorities have to consider applications under the right to buy. The clause amends sections 124 and 125 of the Housing Act 1985 by extending the periods within which landlords must serve notices either admitting or denying a tenant’s eligibility for the right to buy, which relates to section 124, and setting out the purchase price and other required information, which is section 125. The period under section 124 will be extended from four to eight weeks where the tenant has been a tenant of the same landlord for the qualifying period and from eight to 12 weeks in any other case. The period under section 125 will be extended from eight to 12 weeks for freehold properties and from 12 to 16 weeks for leasehold properties.
The revised statutory periods are intended to provide additional flexibility where applications are complex, for example where there are valuation issues or safeguarding concerns. Importantly, they will give landlords more time to verify eligibility based on the new criteria and support them in carrying out preliminary counter-fraud and money laundering checks. Although we are extending the time period that landlords have to respond to right-to-buy applications, I stress that these timescales are an upper limit, not an expectation. We expect landlords to continue to process applications as quickly as they can.
Clause 5 inserts proposed new section 124A into the Housing Act 1985, enabling a landlord to suspend a right-to-buy application where there is reason to suspect that the claim may be fraudulent. A suspension under section 124A does not cancel the application; it temporarily pauses the statutory process while an investigation is carried out and must end no later than six months after the date of the suspension, or sooner if the investigation is concluded.
In response to the consultation on reforming the right to buy, we committed to carry out more effective fraud prevention, including mitigating vulnerable tenants being pressured into buying and cracking down on third-party backed applications. We are clear—I hope the Committee will support us in this principle—that fraudulent applications backed by unscrupulous lenders have no place under right to buy. They undermine the scheme. By ensuring that social landlords have more time to investigate suspected fraud when managing applications, the clause will help to prevent fraudulent applications from slipping through the cracks and maintain the integrity of the scheme.
During the period of suspension, the procedural requirements of the Act, including statutory time limits, will not apply. The tenant will, therefore, not be able to issue delay notices during this period. Guidance will make it clear that timelines for processing applications can be extended only where fraud is suspected and are not to be used by landlords as a way to delay the processing of more routine applications.
We will also strengthen guidance for landlords and tenants on fraud prevention, including third-party companies lending money for purchases. Any such companies will need to be registered with the Financial Conduct Authority, which will support both the FCA and landlords with enforcement.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 4 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 5 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 6
Discount
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 29—Report on the impact of changes to right to buy discounts—
“Within the period of 12 months beginning with the day on which section 6 (discount) comes into force, the Secretary of State must publish and lay before Parliament a report assessing the impact of the changes made by that section on—
(a) overall rates of home ownership,
(b) the number of social housing tenants exercising the right to buy,
(c) social housing supply, and
(d) the provision of replacement social housing.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to assess the impact of the Bill’s changes to right to buy discounts on home ownership, right to buy uptake and housing supply.
Matthew Pennycook
As I have already set out, the Bill’s reforms aim to ensure that the right-to-buy scheme is sustainable, including by ensuring that discounts are set at the right level to enable long-standing tenants to buy under the scheme but without depleting levels of social housing stock.
This Government already took action in November 2024 to reduce the maximum cash discounts, returning those to pre-2012 levels. We subsequently committed to revise the discounts available as a percentage of the property value, so that they align better with the revised cash cap amounts. Clause 6 delivers on that commitment by reducing percentage discounts so that they start at 5% of the property value after 10 years of public sector tenancy, and increase for every extra year of a tenancy up to a maximum of 15%. As is the case now, the percentage discounts will be subject to cash caps that set out the maximum cash discount that a tenant can receive in their area. Aligning the discounts available as a percentage of the property value with the cash caps ensures that those who have been in their homes the longest benefit the most, while avoiding disproportionately large discounts in high-value areas.
The revised percentage discount aims to strike a balance between the responses received during the right-to-buy consultation, in which many respondents supported setting the percentage discounts lower than those proposed by the clause. We are also simplifying the rules by applying a single set of discount arrangements to both houses and flats to make the scheme clearer and more consistent for tenants.
Patrick Spencer
Would it be possible for the Government to present some kind of analysis on the impact that this policy will have on the number of sales made available to tenants? That would be important to establishing the long-term economic impact on properties across the country.
Matthew Pennycook
I simply refer the hon. Gentleman to the impact assessment. If he has further, detailed questions about it, I am more than happy to answer, but we have set out our analysis of the impact of the Bill and in particular that of the ambition to go net positive on new social housing as a result of the changes we are making.
The clause also extends the discount repayment period from the current five years to 10 years after the original sale, during which time a repurchaser looking to resell the property will be required to repay all or some of the discount on a sliding scale. That measure was supported by 72% of respondents to our consultation and it will ensure that there is less incentive for early resale, which can undermine the purpose of the scheme. It will encourage people buying to retain the property and discourage profiteering.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
You did not bob. I stated the need to do that at the beginning of the sitting.
The Chair
You did not bob, Gareth. We will move on.
Clause 7
Right of first refusal
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Matthew Pennycook
Clause 7 extends the existing right of first refusal for councils to buy back homes that were previously sold under the right to buy when they are resold. The right of first refusal period is currently 10 years after the original sale, and councils have eight weeks to decide whether to buy back the home when informed by the owner that they plan to sell; following that period, the property can be sold on the open market. Under the clause, the period in which councils must be given the right of first refusal will increase, so that it applies in perpetuity, meaning that councils will have the opportunity to buy back a property every time it is resold.
This proposal received strong support from respondents to the Government’s consultation. The change will apply only to applications to exercise the right to buy after the measures come into force. Homes already sold under the right to buy will be subject to the terms of the covenants that were attached to them when they were sold under the scheme.
Giving social landlords greater opportunity to buy back properties sold under the scheme increases their ability to acquire social housing that may otherwise be lost to the open market. That directly supports the Government’s ambition to grow the volume of council housing. Clause 7 is an important safeguard that supports the effective operation of the right-to-buy scheme. It will help to ensure that public subsidy is protected, discourage short-term purchases for financial gain and support the Bill’s wider objective to protect social housing stock. I commend the clause to the Committee.
The Chair
I can see no one bobbing, so I will put the Question.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 7 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 8
Exceptions to the Right to Buy
Gareth Bacon
I beg to move amendment 90, in clause 8, page 8, leave out from line 2 to end of line 18.
This amendment removes the restriction on those living in National Parks, Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty, and areas designated as being exempt from Right to Buy.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendment 13.
Amendment 104, in clause 8, page 8, line 10, at end insert—
“(1A) Regulations made under subsection (1)(a) above must use the Rural Urban Classification to determine whether an area is rural or urban.”
Amendment 83, in clause 8, page 8, line 25, leave out “35” and insert “10”.
This amendment seeks to reduce the period during which newly built social housing is exempt from the Right to Buy from 35 years to 10 years.
Amendment 9, in clause 8, page 9, line 10, at end insert—
“Community-led housing
20 Irrespective of the provisions of paragraph 18, the right to buy does not arise in relation to a dwelling where—
(a) the dwelling is owned, managed, controlled or on land owned by—
(i) a Community Land Trust;
(ii) a Community Benefit Society;
(iii) a housing co-operative; or
(iv) another community-led housing body prescribed by regulations; and
(b) the dwelling is subject to arrangements intended to secure affordability in perpetuity.”
This amendment seeks to provide a permanent exemption from Right to Buy for community-led housing, instead of the 35-year exemption otherwise provided by the Bill.
Government amendments 14 and 15.
Amendment 91, in clause 8, page 9, leave out lines 41 and 42 and insert—
“(c) may not be made unless a draft of the regulations has been laid before and approved by a resolution of both Houses of Parliament.”
This amendment would require an affirmative parliamentary approval for regulations defining rural exempt from Right to Buy.
Clause stand part.
Government amendments 16 to 18.
New clause 2—Power of local housing authorities to suspend or abolish right to buy—
“Before section 121(A) of the Housing Act 1985 insert—
‘Power of local housing authorities to suspend or abolish right to buy
(1) A local housing authority in England may make a determination that the right to buy does not arise in relation to dwelling-houses in its area.
(2) A determination under subsection (1) may apply to—
(a) all dwelling-houses within the authority’s area, or
(b) dwelling-houses of a description specified in the determination.
(3) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about the procedure to be followed by a local housing authority in making a determination under this section.’”
Gareth Bacon
It is a pleasure, Mr Vickers, to speak to amendment 90, which stands in my name.
Since 2024, when the Government have raised rural issues, they have often found themselves in trouble. The Opposition were therefore surprised to see the elements of clause 7 giving the Secretary of State the power to decide what is classed as rural housing and to restrict the rights of those deemed to live in rural areas.
Mr Lee Dillon (Newbury) (LD)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Vickers. I rise to speak to my own amendment 104, as well as amendment 9, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for St Ives (Andrew George). I agree with the Opposition that amendment 104 is about seeking clarity from the Government around how a rural area would be designated.
I welcome the Government amendments tabled since the publication of the Bill that hand more power to local authorities to determine the designation. Amendment 104 would provide some certainty regarding what classification could be used in that determination. What decision-making process would the Minister use to arrive at a designation whereby he has the power to make regulations for a rural area?
On amendment 9, as a party we believe that social housing is a crucial element of a settled society and protecting that stock is a must. That is why we support the overall objectives of the Bill, but we seek to go further than what the Government have currently legislated for by ensuring that community-led housing is included in the prohibition on losing stock to the private market. That is why my hon. Friend the Member for St Ives, who represents west Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly, has tabled amendment 9.
Gideon Amos
I rise to speak to our Liberal Democrat amendments. New clause 2 would provide local authorities with the power to suspend right to buy in an area completely and bring it to an end. Perhaps for the first and last time, I agree 100% with the hon. Member for Orpington, completely and wholeheartedly; he said that local areas are best placed to decide what is right for them on council housing provision and council housing stock. That is why we would give local authorities the ability to say that they have lost enough council housing. Some 2 million council homes were lost to right to buy and 4 million social homes have been lost altogether. Enough is enough. Local communities should have the right to decide whether they want to continue to see the loss of council homes in their area.
Patrick Spencer
The hon. Gentleman talks about council houses being lost to right to buy; it would be remiss not to say they are being gained by tenants who own a property—part of a property-owning democracy that we hold dear in this country.
Gideon Amos
If we have a system where 4 million homes have been lost and 1.3 million people are on the council waiting list, something has gone radically wrong. We need a different approach.
Gideon Amos
From a sedentary position, the hon. Gentleman is asking me to give way, but I have not yet answered his initial question. Yes, we need to find ways to help people into home ownership. That is vital and fundamental to a thriving society. We need to build more homes. We need to provide more and better shared ownership arrangements, as the current arrangements are not working. We need to help people on to the housing ladder. That does not mean we need to erode and diminish our social housing stock.
Several hon. Members rose—
Deirdre Costigan
Is the hon. Gentleman aware of the research that shows that up to 40% of homes bought under right to buy have actually ended up in the hands of private landlords? In fact, if we are looking to help people into long-term housing, right to buy is not the solution.
Gideon Amos
The hon. Member is quite right. Not only that, but local authorities end up paying over the odds for placing families in temporary accommodation, sometimes in homes that were built as council houses to provide for those families in the first place. Now they are being sublet, sometimes multiple times, to provide that housing.
Gareth Bacon
The hon. Gentleman is being very generous with his time. He has made a point that has been made by Members today and on Second Reading: right to buy diminishes the social housing stock. I would agree on paper that it does, but that has to be read in the context, as shown by the House of Lords Library, that right to buy applies only to people in long-term tenancies who have been social tenants for a long time. Some 78% of people living in social housing are on lifetime tenancies. Those properties are not available. They could not be given to anybody else because they are lifetime tenancies. Right to buy is actually providing the receipts to build more social homes for people to live in.
Gareth Bacon
Stopping people from getting on the housing ladder does not help one bit, because it does not increase the supply, and that point seems to have been missed completely by the Liberal Democrats and by the Government.
Gideon Amos
I am somewhat surprised that the Opposition spokesperson has entered into the realm of social housing supply, given the record of the previous Conservative Government. Of course, we need to increase supply as well as saving the stock that has been built with public funds—taxpayer’s money—for the community, rather than giving over discounts, sometimes to the extent of a £70,000 or £80,000 transfer of cash, from the taxpayer into the hands of individual property owners for no good reason.
We need to increase supply. That is why the Liberal Democrats have a target to build 150,000 social rent homes per year. I do not know the hon. Gentleman’s party’s target for the delivery of social housing—they did not build many when they were in government. We need to give local authorities the power and flexibility to decide for themselves whether it is right to continue with right to buy in their areas. If we believe in local communities and local democracy, we should give them the ability to say that right to buy and the loss of more council housing stock is no longer right for their area. I commend new clause 2 to the Committee and urge all Committee members to vote for it.
Matthew Pennycook
I will speak to clause 8 and amendments 13 to 18, tabled in my name, and then I will turn to various amendments that have been tabled and spoken to.
Clause 8 amends schedule 5 to the Housing Act 1985 to introduce new and updated exceptions to the right to buy. Under the scheme, exceptions already include homes suitable for occupation by the elderly, sheltered housing and homes due to be demolished. Of respondents to our consultation, 76% agree that the existing exceptions should be retained, and we are doing so. The clause does, however, make a small change to amend outdated terminology in the current exemption for dwellings for persons of pensionable age, to update the reference to resident or non-resident wardens to resident or non-resident managers.
The clause introduces three new exceptions. First, it exempts newly built social homes from the scheme for 35 years, giving councils the confidence to invest in new supply. At present, councils are disincentivised from building because homes can be sold before costs are recovered through rent, undermining housing revenue accounts. A 35-year exemption period reflects the typical pay-back period and ensures that councils are not losing new homes prematurely. Despite what the shadow Minister continues to assert, that is a significant supply-side reform that helps to deliver the Government’s commitment to back councils to build at a scale not seen in decades.
Councils have been clear to the Government that the risk of early sale deters investment. Removing that risk provides greater certainty over stock and income and supports new development. We recognise the frustration of seeing newly built homes sold so quickly before they can meet local need. The Government’s manifesto committed to better protecting newly built social housing from the right to buy, and the introducing the exemption was supported by the vast majority of respondents to our consultation on the basis that it will give councils, as I have said, greater confidence to build new homes and provide greater protection than the existing cost floor rules.
Secondly, the clause exempts homes in national parks, areas of outstanding natural beauty and designated rural areas from the right to buy. That recognises the particular pressures on rural housing where land and planning constraints mean that homes are significantly harder to replace once lost from the social sector. In many cases, replacement is not feasible at all, exacerbating already acute shortages in those areas. There was clear recognition of these challenges in the other place, where the difficulty of replacing rural homes and the importance of protecting stock in these areas was highlighted. This measure responds directly to those concerns and will help safeguard rural social housing.
Existing rural designations will continue to have effect for the purpose of this exemption until we implement the new framework for local authorities to self-designate as rural, as set out in Government amendments 13 to 18, which I will come to shortly, as well as clause 8. The covenants attached to homes that have been sold under the right to buy in rural areas, which restricts sale to a local person or a social landlord, will also continue to apply.
Thirdly and finally, council-owned market rent homes will also be excluded, supporting councils to use mixed tenure and cross-subsidy models to deliver more housing. That recognises the important role that market rent homes can play in enabling councils to generate additional income to reinvest in social and affordable homes. These changes are part of the wider package of reforms to ensure that more homes are built than lost.
Government amendments 13 to 18 deliver on commitments made during the Bill’s passage in the other place to put the criteria for rural designation into regulations. That was a call that came from noble peers on the Opposition Benches. The regulations will use the long-established criteria of a population density of no more than two persons per hectare and a population of 3,000 or fewer. That criteria will be applied using census-derived population data, and local authorities will be expected to ensure that the criteria will continue to be met in relevant areas every 10 years, as new census data becomes available.
It was also agreed in the other place that the Government would explore whether the existing process under which local authorities need to apply to the Government for designation could be replaced with a new system under which local authorities will be able to self-designate rural areas where they meet the criteria. I can confirm that we do intend to implement that change, and these amendments will enable that. These changes will provide transparency on the criteria for rural designation. They will also empower local areas and reduce bureaucracy for both local authorities and the Government compared with the current process, which, as I have said, requires local authorities seeking designation to apply to the Secretary of State, and secondary legislation to be made for each individual designation.
Matthew Pennycook
My apologies; it was tabled in the name of the Liberal Democrats. The amendment would require the Government to use the urban-rural classification system when determining whether an area is rural or urban for the purposes of the designated rural area exemption. As I have made clear, our intention is to continue with the long-established criteria for rural designation. Areas will need to have a population of 3,000 people or fewer and a population density of two persons or fewer per hectare, and we intend to set out those criteria in regulations. In our view, that strikes the right balance in defining designated rural areas for exclusion from the right to buy. Including areas with a population of 10,000 or fewer would bring far too many areas into the scope of the exclusion. For those reasons, I will not be able to take—[Interruption.] I can see the hon. Member for Newbury, and I give way.
Matthew Pennycook
I welcome that clarification from the hon. Gentleman.
Amendment 91 would require regulations made under section 37 of the Housing Act 1985, which allows restrictions to be imposed on the disposal of a home in a rural area, to be approved by both Houses before they could come into force. I understand that the intention of the amendment may have been to require the affirmative procedure to designate areas as rural for the purposes of the right to buy. Under self-designation, rural areas will be designated by local authorities instead of by regulations, so no parliamentary procedure will be needed.
The new power to prescribe the criteria will be, as I have said, subject to the negative resolution. In any event, the Government do not accept the premise that the affirmative procedure is required in that instance; there may be a principled point of disagreement on that. The current powers are subject to the negative procedure—that is the existing arrangement—which, in our view, provides an appropriate, proportionate level of parliamentary scrutiny. The powers amended or created by the Bill are also subject to the negative resolution procedure. Requiring the affirmative procedure would add an additional parliamentary step without affecting the substance or effect of the policy. For those reasons, I respectfully ask the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Orpington, not to press amendment 91.
Amendment 83 would reduce the exemption from the right to buy for newly built social homes from 35 to 10 years. The Government cannot support the amendment. Our starting point is that the exemption should reflect the time needed for rental income to repay the costs of building a new social home. That payback period is generally between 30 and 50 years, depending on the viability of the site. We therefore concluded that 35 years strikes the right balance. It protects councils from losing newly built homes before they have recovered their investment while retaining a route to home ownership for tenants over the longer term. Reducing the exemption to 10 years would not provide sufficient protection and would act in direct contradiction to our commitment to back councils to build again at scale. It would allow homes to be sold long before their development costs have been recovered. A 35-year exemption will give councils the certainty and confidence to build, knowing that new homes will remain available as social housing for a meaningful period.
New clause 2 was tabled by the hon. Member for Taunton and Wellington. I recognise the concerns that motivated this proposed new clause. However, the Government cannot support a proposal that would allow individual local authorities to suspend or abolish the right to buy in their area. We remain committed to a reformed right to buy that continues to provide long-standing council tenants with a route into home ownership while better protecting social housing stock, and we are reforming the scheme nationally to strike that balance. This new clause would create inconsistent access to that statutory right, with a tenant’s position depending on the local authority in which they live. That would, in effect, create a postcode lottery and make it difficult for tenants to understand whether the right to buy is available to them.
We believe that the right approach is a consistent national framework, supported by national reforms that better protect council housing stock. That will ensure a fair and consistent offer for council tenants across the country. We also recognise that housing markets vary significantly across England. However, rather than creating different rights in different areas, the Government’s reforms reflect those differences through the discount regime. As I have already set out, discounts are calculated as a percentage of a property’s value and are subject to regional cash caps, helping to ensure that the scheme responds to local property market conditions while maintaining a fair and consistent national entitlement for eligible tenants.
Amendment 9, which was tabled by the hon. Member for St Ives, has been spoken to by the Liberal Democrat members of the Committee. Again, I recognise the intention behind this amendment. Community-led housing is established to meet local needs and often includes arrangements intended to protect affordability for the long term. This Government have done a huge amount in this area and there is more to come to better support community-led housing. But in our view, the amendment is not necessary in relation to the principal form of community-led housing it identifies. Homes owned by community land trusts and fully mutual housing co-operatives are already outside the right to buy, and for those reasons the amendment would not provide the protection intended, beyond that which already exists. For those reasons, I would respectfully ask that hon. Members withdraw all their amendments, and I commend clause 8 to the Committee.
Gareth Bacon
We do not share the Government’s position on this. We will be pressing for a Division on amendment 90. On amendment 83, I understand the point that the Minister made about recouping the cost. However, we believe that that is a convenience for local authorities, not for local people, and we are more interested in local people.
Gareth Bacon
No, I will not. I am just summing up. We will press for a Division on amendment 83, because we think that 10 years is more appropriate than 35. On amendment 91, we also disagree with the Government. We think that there should be an affirmative rather than negative procedure for this, so we will also be pressing that to a Division.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Matthew Pennycook
This simple and straightforward clause ensures that the reforms to the right to buy are applied fairly and consistently. It protects tenants who have already made a valid application by ensuring that applications received by landlords ahead of the reforms coming into force will continue to be subject to the existing rules. That will avoid retrospective changes that could disadvantage applicants partway through the process.
The clause also makes important provision in relation to rural exemptions, which links directly to the reforms in clause 8 and Government amendments 13 to 18. It provides that existing rural designations will continue to have effect after commencement, as if they were made under the new powers introduced by clause 8. That means that there will be no gap in protection for rural areas while the new framework in which local authorities self-designate as rural is implemented.
Together, these provisions ensure a smooth and legally certain transition, protecting both tenants’ rights and the integrity of rural housing protections. Overall, the clause provides legal clarity, fairness and continuity as the reformed right to buy scheme is introduced.
Clause 9, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 10
Right to Buy: receipts
Gareth Bacon
I beg to move amendment 92, in clause 10, page 10, line 19, leave out “a determination” and insert “regulations”.
This amendment removes the power of the Secretary of State to make a determination, but that changes to the use of capital receipts must be made by regulations instead.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 93, in clause 10, page 10, line 29, leave out “a determination” and insert “regulations”.
This amendment removes the power of the Secretary of State to make a determination, but that changes to the use of capital receipts must be made by regulations instead.
Amendment 94, in clause 10, page 10, line 30, leave out “A determination” and insert “Regulations”.
This amendment removes the power of the Secretary of State to make a determination, but that changes to the use of capital receipts must be made by regulations instead.
Amendment 96, in clause 10, page 10, leave out lines 33 to 40.
This amendment would remove the Secretary of State’s ability to make different provisions in respect of different local authorities and to make retroactive provisions through a determination.
Amendment 97, in clause 10, page 10, line 39, leave out “determination is” and insert “regulations are”.
This amendment removes the power of the Secretary of State to make a determination, but that changes to the use of capital receipts must be made by regulations instead.
Amendment 95, in clause 10, page 10, line 41, leave out from beginning of line to end of line 5 on page 11 and insert—
“(5E) Regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft has been laid before and agreed by both Houses of Parliament.”
Amendment 98, in clause 10, page 11, line 5, at end insert—
“(5F) Before making a determination relating to the use of capital receipts under this section, the Secretary of State must consult local housing authorities.”
This amendment would require consultation before determinations are made on the use of capital receipts.
Clause stand part.
Gareth Bacon
The amendments concern the Bill’s proposals for the governance of capital receipts. Under clause 10, the Secretary of State would gain new powers to make significant determinations, including scope to vary provisions between local authorities and to apply determinations retrospectively.
Much like my concern about deciding the definition and scope of “rural”, this is not about firming up an already over-rigid system, but about ensuring that the Bill does not tear away too much power from Parliament and give it to Whitehall. It is only right that Parliament, not unelected civil servants, should decide the criteria for the allocation of capital receipts. That is why we have tabled these amendments, so that a regulatory framework can be established to provide parliamentary oversight and to give confidence and certainty to local authorities. This is an essential change to the Bill, and we will seek to divide the Committee on it.
As it stands, leaving determinations to the whim of the Secretary of State means leaving local leaders unsure of the direction of future decisions. It undermines precedent and destabilises already fragile funding requirements. The amendments replace the proposed determinations with clear and unequivocal guidance, with amendment 95 specifically ensuring that such decisions come with the approval of both Houses of Parliament. Amendment 98 doubles down on that by also requiring consultation with local authorities.
The Minister may believe that bringing such decisions in-house comes with the bonus of speeding them up, but we believe that making decisions in Marsham Street’s corridors rather than in town halls means local authorities will be left with uncertainty, which will not speed up the building of social homes, but slow it down. Moreover, nothing would be a greater barrier to building social homes than watching receipts being siphoned away.
Under clause 10, the ability to reallocate capital receipts between local authorities will always lead to some councils losing out. It is never going to be popular with councils when they find that, after running the numbers, planning the funding, consulting local people and preparing the foundations, the Secretary of State has robbed them of their funding and given it to another council. It sounds suspiciously similar to the injustice arising from the Government’s disastrously unfair funding review. I therefore urge colleagues to support amendments 92 to 98 and ensure that power stays local.
Edward Argar (Melton and Syston) (Con)
I support the amendments in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Orpington. They involve a perfectly reasonable and proportionate request for this House to have a role in scrutinising what is put forward by the Government and recommended by the Secretary of State.
I spent six years as a Minister. I took countless statutory instruments through Delegated Legislation Committees. By and large, it is not a complex process; it requires a bit of time on the part of officials to get the drafting right, but the process in this House is not complicated. It ensures that a Minister is directly accountable: they have to be on their brief, and they have to be able to clearly articulate the rationale behind what they are doing and, quite rightly, to be challenged by right hon. and hon. Members. That is so important in maintaining or even in creating trust from our communities—the transparency that that democratic accountability brings to what, as my hon. Friend clearly set out, will on occasion undoubtedly be relatively, if not significantly, contentious decisions relating to significant sums of money.
My hon. Friend set out the case for amendment 95 very clearly. The powers in clause 10, when exercised, may well see some local authorities feeling that they are losing out, to the benefit of other local authorities. Without getting into what those decisions may be or where the money may go, in terms of process and democratic accountability, it is not unreasonable that both Houses should have the opportunity to scrutinise the powers in clause 10.
Rachel Blake
I am listening with interest to the right hon. Member’s remarks, and I have some professional experience in this area. Amendments 95 and 98 seem more about delaying a reasonable approach to the Government administering right-to-buy receipts. I am interested to know what the Opposition think would be the alternative to any kind of movement of right-to-buy receipts between local authorities. Would it be entirely acceptable for right-to-buy receipts not to be reinvested in council homes?
Edward Argar
The hon. Lady appears to be making a point that I was not actually making in my remarks. My point is about the process. As I said before she intervened, I am not making a judgment on the decisions the Secretary of State may or may not make about those capital receipts; I am making a point about democratic accountability and transparency.
Going back to the earlier group of amendments praised by my hon. Friend the Member for Orpington, the procedure that is used when legislation comes before Delegated Legislation Committees in this House is not complex. It does not engender lengthy delay; it just ensures that our constituents can see that we are considering that legislation, that we are debating it and that the Minister can answer the questions put to him. I have no doubt, in the case of this Minister, that he will be able to answer them; sadly, it has not always been the case that every Minister, on both sides of the House, has been capable of doing that. However, I am sure this Minister would have no challenges in coming before a Delegated Legislation Committee and answering the questions put to him.
Amendment 98, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Orpington and supported by my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne, would require consultation before determinations were made on capital receipts. Again, consultations do not have to be overly complex or lengthy. If Members go on gov.uk, they will see that there are myriad Government consultations out there at any one time on very significant issues, down to issues such as, for example, the methodology used for reporting land use statistics in the country. The Government routinely consult on a whole range of things, whether that be a significant, detailed and lengthy consultation on something complex or, often, a very short and sharp consultation. They give people the opportunity to have their say, and those who genuinely have something in the way of expert knowledge to contribute.
Mr Dillon
On amendment 98 and the consultation, have the right hon. Member and the Opposition considered whether, if a local authority felt it had not been consulted, that would open up a legal route to delay the allocation of capital financing and therefore slow down the growth of house building?
Edward Argar
Over many years, I have found that consultation done properly leaves very limited legal risk. Where Governments get it wrong—I do not want to overly speculate on what has happened with the Government’s consultations and process around local government reorganisation—the hon. Member is right that there is a potential for JRs, although I would highlight that a judicial review can focus only on process, not on whether the decision should be relitigated.
If consultation is done well—I would have thought that consultation on this issue should be fairly simple—I believe it can enhance the transparency that is important in bringing our constituents with us and in ensuring that the Government are directly accountable to hon. and right hon. Members in this House. When the legislation is introduced, under our amendments as a regulation, that consultation is there to be drawn on. I genuinely believe—I have seen it for myself—that when a Government are willing to listen to a consultation response, they can, if they do things openly, often come up with a slightly better or tweaked outcome.
Danny Beales
The right hon. Gentleman is being very generous with his time. My experience is that local councils that are seeking to deliver new council homes have been calling for right-to-buy receipt reform for a long time. The previous Government had an overly restrictive approach to right-to-buy receipts. Councils were only allowed to keep a third of them for three years, and if they could not spend them within that time, they had to return them to the Treasury with interest. As a result, many decided not to take their receipts at all.
It therefore seems quite sensible not to tie up councils that are trying to build new homes, which is quite a complicated and time-consuming process, in consultations and discussions, but to give the Secretary of State the flexibility to work with local authorities, to give them more receipts, to increase the period within which receipts can be used or to reallocate them to schemes and councils that can build within an acceptable period. Does the right hon. Gentleman not agree?
Edward Argar
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that point, but he makes the same point, in a sense, as the hon. Member for Cities of London and Westminster, and it is not what I am speaking about, which is the process. I do not believe that a consultation would tie councils up in knots or delay things inordinately, or indeed that introducing these changes through regulations rather than by diktat of the Secretary of State would cause unnecessary delays.
This process is about transparency and accountability. We have done it before in Government; indeed, this Government have done it with regulations. I have sat on a number of DLs; maybe I have upset the Whips at some point, because I sit on a DL almost every week, when I am not sitting in a Bill Committee—such is the fate of a former Cabinet Minister on the Back Benches. However, the point I am making is that this Government and other Governments have used the delegated legislation system to get things through quickly but none the less with democratic accountability to this House. That is the point being made by my hon. Friend the Member for Orpington in these amendments. It is about giving our constituents the confidence to trust that this House has debated what the Secretary of State recommends. Knowing the majority in the House at the moment, I have no doubt that the Minister would easily win any votes in a DL on matters such as this.
Rachel Blake
I will have a go at delving into the process point; I do think that these are simply delaying amendments from the Opposition, but I will nevertheless engage on the principle of the process point. What is it about a determination, which would be open to written or oral questions, that the Opposition do not think is transparent and democratically accountable?
Edward Argar
The very simple fact that there would be no vote on it by Members of this House, regardless of whether that was in a Committee, which is of course a subset of the House where we can debate and raise issues. I have a lot of time for the hon. Lady. I spent almost 10 years sitting on her local council before I was elected to this place, and I still closely follow Westminster politics. Consequently, I know that she is a hard-working and diligent Member who engages with all these issues particularly closely. However, the simple answer to her question is that Members would not have a vote on the Secretary of State’s determination.
With that, I will conclude by again reiterating my support for the intent behind the amendments that my hon. Friend the Member for Orpington has tabled.
Matthew Pennycook
Let me say to hon. Members that I have never found the process in Delegated Legislation Committees particularly fast in any instance, but I recognise the reasonable concerns that have been put. I think they are unfounded, and for the reasons I will set out, I hope to reassure hon. Members.
Clause 10 simplifies and modernises how the rules on right-to-buy receipts are managed. Its intent is to improve administrative efficiency and to provide flexibility. To understand our purpose behind the clause, it is important to have an accurate view of the current arrangements. As things stand, every stock-holding authority has an agreement with the Secretary of State, allowing it to retain all its net right-to-buy receipts, provided that it spends those receipts on replacement social housing.
In practice, this is hugely administratively burdensome. There are over 160 stock-holding local authorities, all of which must be issued with identical section 11(6) retention agreements whenever the rules change. That requires issuing, tracking and chasing agreements for signature across every one of those authorities, creating unnecessary bureaucracy for both councils and central Government.
Clause 10 replaces that with a simpler approach. It provides the Secretary of State with a power to disapply or modify the requirements on the use of receipts set out in regulations by determination, which will then apply consistently across all local authorities. That removes the need to replicate the same agreement process many times over.
Concerns were raised in the other place that we may be seeking to use the clause to require councils to start repaying a portion of their receipts to the Treasury. Let me reassure the Committee that that is absolutely not the case. We fought hard to ensure that local authorities could retain 100% of their receipts. Hon. Members may recall that the previous Government temporarily made that change, but reversed it before the last election.
Gareth Bacon
The Minister has said that his intent is to improve efficiency and, as always, I respect his sincerity and what he said. It is simply a point of difference between us.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Melton and Syston made a compelling case about the democratic accountability and transparency of the affirmative procedure as opposed to the negative procedure. The point that we have made in the amendments is about the process not the outcome, and our contention is that the process should be as democratically accountable and transparent as possible. We will therefore press all the amendments to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Matthew Pennycook
Clause 11 concerns the right-to-acquire scheme for housing association tenants, which is broadly modelled on the right-to-buy scheme, with most of the same rules applying. The right to acquire applies to housing association homes built or acquired with social housing grant after 1997. The Committee has already discussed the effect of and rationale for clauses 1 to 10, which amend the Housing Act 1985 to alter rules regarding the right to buy. Under section 184 of the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008, those changes also apply to the right-to-acquire scheme for housing association tenants. The Committee will understand that it is only right for the same eligibility criteria and exemptions to apply to both schemes, to ensure consistency and fairness for social housing tenants, regardless of whether they live in a council home or a housing association home. My officials have engaged with relevant stakeholders, such as the National Housing Federation, which is supportive of our consistent approach.
Clause 11 also supports the broader policy objective of protecting social housing stock. That is a core objective of this Bill, and the Committee has debated it at length. As the discounts for the right to acquire are set out separately from those for the right to buy, they remain unaffected and will continue to be £9,000 to £16,000, depending on the location. Increasing them to align with the right-to-buy discounts would contradict our objective of better protecting social housing stock.
The clause is consequential on previous clauses, and reflects the changes made to the rural area provisions, which is currently an area of divergence between the two schemes. Under the right to acquire, homes in designated rural areas are already exempt from sale, in recognition of the challenges of replacing stock in such areas. The clause helps to ensure that the new rural exemptions in the Bill apply consistently across both schemes. The clause will provide fairness for social housing tenants, support our objective of protecting social housing stock and ensure that the new rural exemptions operate coherently across both schemes. I commend it to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 11 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 12
Restriction on certain sales of social housing by private registered providers
Mr Dillon
I beg to move amendment 102, in clause 12, page 11, line 24, at end insert—
“(1A) In the case of a dwelling—
(a) in a designated rural area, or
(b) with four bedrooms or more,
condition D also applies.”
This amendment, along with Amendment 103, would require written consent from a local authority for the sale of certain social housing properties.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 101, in clause 12, page 11, line 33, at end insert—
“(ba) each community land trust providing social housing in that area at the time the sale notice is given, and”.
Amendment 5, in clause 12, page 11, line 35, at end insert—
“(d) the Regulator of Social Housing.”
This amendment seeks to extend the notification of proposed sale to cover the Regulator of Social Housing.
Amendment 99, in clause 12, page 11, line 35, at end insert—
“(2A) Condition AA is that a copy of any notice given in relation to the relevant sale is published on the registered provider’s website.”
Government amendment 19.
Amendment 6, in clause 12, page 11, line 36, leave out “four weeks” and insert
“eight weeks, or twelve weeks if the property is in an area designated as a rural area under paragraph 17(1)(c) of Schedule 5 to the Housing Act 1985,”.
This amendment seeks to extend the timescale for notice to be given of a sale.
Amendment 1, in clause 12, page 12, line 2, at end insert—
“(4A) A sale notice given under subsection (2) must be given to the Regulator of Social Housing at the same time as it is given to the persons specified in that subsection.”
This amendment requires the Regulator of Social Housing to receive a copy of every sale notice at the same time as local housing authorities and registered providers are notified.
Amendment 103, in clause 12, page 12, line 2, at end insert—
“(4A) Condition D is that, in the case of a dwelling in a designated rural area or a dwelling with four bedrooms or more, the local authority has given written consent for the sale.”
This amendment, along with Amendment 102, would require written consent from a local authority for the sale of certain social housing properties.
Amendment 8, in clause 12, page 12, line 31, at end insert—
“171BA Extension to the notification period
(1) Where condition B under section 171A is met but condition D is also met, the period of four weeks beginning with the relevant day is extended by a further four weeks beginning with the day after the end of the four weeks.
(2) Condition D is that a local housing authority or registered provider has—
(a) notified the disposing provider that steps are being taken to offer to acquire the dwelling; and
(b) provided evidence of substantive steps taken towards making an offer, including but not limited to—
(i) obtaining a valuation of the dwelling,
(ii) securing funding for the offer, or
(iii) seeking necessary approvals for the offer.”
This amendment seeks to extend the four week notification period for the disposal of social housing where a local authority or another registered provider can provide evidence that it is preparing to offer to purchase the property.
Mr Dillon
Before I begin my remarks on amendment 102, I declare an interest: my wife works for a social housing provider. I apologise to the Committee for not declaring that before my earlier contribution.
Amendment 102 is a simple amendment that would protect larger homes within social housing stock. It refers to designated rural areas, which the Committee covered during earlier consideration, but also to homes with four or more bedrooms. The reason for that is simple: of all our social housing stock, larger homes are the most precious commodity.
We know that the social housing market makes up 48% of properties that are considered overcrowded in the UK. If we look at Merton or Westminster council, for example, there is a 90 to 99-year wait for a three or more bed property; if we go north to Rochdale, about 550 families there were registered for a four-bed home, but only 14 became available in a year; if we go to Bath in the west of the country, an officer there said that, in principle, a family could be on the register for a four-bed for over 200 years, and added that four-beds are popular under right to buy but are also expensive to build. When you add those comments to our ambition to ensure that overcrowding impacts as few people as possible, making four-bed or larger homes exempt means that we protect the homes we really need.
Amendment 101 is similar to a previous amendment, which went into more detail. It would make sure that each community land trust that provided social housing was also given notice of a sale. It would expand the remit of who is notified, so that if providers were willing to take up those social homes when they were being disposed of, we would retain them in some sort of community ownership.
Gideon Amos
I will speak to amendments 5, 6, 1 and 8. Amendment 5 would extend the notification of proposed sale to cover the Regulator of Social Housing.
Amendment 6 would extend the timescales of notice from four to eight weeks. I note that, since we tabled the amendment, the Government have come up with their own amendment to extend the timescales; they have obviously been reading everything we table closely. I am glad that we are already having an impact on the Bill and I will be happy to press the amendment to a vote if necessary, to ensure that the Government succeed in getting the change in timescale that they clearly want. Otherwise, depending on the order of voting—I still sometimes have a problem following that—I am sure that one or the other will fulfil the same purpose.
Amendment 1 would require the Regulator of Social Housing to receive a copy of the notice. Amendment 8 is effectively a stop-the-clock amendment, whereby, if negotiations are ongoing for the acquisition of a social home by a local authority, the time period would be extended by a further four weeks. I recognise that the amendment refers to the four-week period in the Bill, which may be extended to eight weeks through other amendments. However, the principle of allowing an extension of time when negotiations are ongoing is significant, and something that the Local Government Association would support. Although I will not push amendment 8 to a vote, it would be helpful if the Minister considered whether an extension could be provided where negotiations are ongoing, so that there is a real chance for the purchase of that property to be completed and for the local authority to succeed in that endeavour.
Matthew Pennycook
I will speak to Government amendment 19 and respond to each of the eight amendments in this rather large group. I have listened to concerns raised by parliamentarians and stakeholders over recent weeks and months that a four-week period between a private provider notifying a council or other provider in their area of the sale of a social home and the disposing of that home is not sufficient for local authorities to consider purchasing the property.
I appreciate that local authorities were concerned that a four-week window would not align with their internal timing constraints, such as monthly cabinet or committee meetings. On that basis, the Government have tabled amendment 19 to extend the window of time that must pass between notification and the sale of a property from four to eight weeks. We think the amendment strikes the right balance between maximising opportunities to retain social homes and not causing undue delays to sales. I will come to the specific point that the hon. Member for Taunton and Wellington made about negotiations that are in train.
Amendments 6 and 8, tabled by the hon. Member for Taunton and Wellington, seek to extend the disposal notification period. Amendment 8, as he just argued, would require an extension of the window to eight weeks where a provider could demonstrate they were taking steps towards purchasing the property. The Government’s amendment 19 goes further than that proposal by requiring eight weeks in all cases, so I hope he will support it.
Amendment 6 would require a further extension to 12 weeks in areas designated as rural. We are not persuaded by the case for a longer notification window specifically for rural areas. A statutory minimum of 12 weeks could unnecessarily delay sales and require providers to deal with the additional burden and costs associated with having homes left unoccupied for extended periods. I should also stress that the notification period is just a minimum. I would expect private registered providers to engage and be flexible beyond that period where there is a serious interest from another landlord in the social housing sector.
Mr Dillon
The Government do not accept that there is a compelling case to extend the period to 12 weeks for rural areas, but an organisation may be looking to buy a property in an area of outstanding natural beauty or where there is no hard-wired infrastructure. Does the Minister not accept that more consideration needs to be given when taking on a social home in a rural area than in a well-developed town, and that someone in that situation should be given longer—on top of what the Government have already graciously accepted—to go through the sale and make sure they have all their ducks in a row and can convert the property however they might want to under restrictive planning laws?
Matthew Pennycook
I appreciate the concern. I will make two points in response to the hon. Gentleman. First, it is just a matter of fact that there will be different challenges in different areas. What we have tried to get to with the increase in the notification period from four to eight weeks is a period in which we think it is reasonable for all local authorities to consider these matters. What I have not had is compelling evidence—if he has any, I would like to see it—to suggest that local authorities would not be able to deal with these matters in an eight-week period. I stress again that the notification period is just a minimum. We would expect private registered providers to engage and be flexible beyond this period where there is a serious interest from another landlord in the social housing sector. I hope that reassures him.
Amendments 102 and 103, tabled by the hon. Members for Newbury and for Taunton and Wellington, would require written consent from the local authority for the sale of a social home in a rural area or one with four or more bedrooms. Again, I recognise the strength of feeling on this matter. I and the Government want to ensure that every opportunity is taken to protect much needed social housing stock. I would expect private registered providers to think particularly carefully before selling homes that meet acute housing needs in local areas. However, housing associations remain independent organisations responsible for their own asset management, and the Government cannot support an approach that would prevent landlords from making legitimate business decisions about how to manage their stock without the agreement of the local authority. I am happy to go into the reclassification risks that arise in this area with the hon. Members. I have debated those points at length with a number of Members on both sides of the House.
I should also point out that the previous restrictions that required approval by the Regulator of Social Housing for disposals of homes had to be removed in 2017—the hon. Member for Newbury, with his experience in the sector, will remember this—to reclassify the housing association sector back to private. I fear that introducing a requirement for local authority approval would represent a significant classification risk. It is not the only classification risk—these things are considered by the Office for National Statistics in the round—but nevertheless it is a material risk from our point of view.
Lewis Cocking
I ask genuinely about disposals, in a nice and polite way, so I wonder what the Minister’s comments will be. When housing associations or councils dispose of properties, they generally do so for a reason—for example, not being able to spend the money to get it up to a certain EPC grade that the Government have set for them. What evidence does he have that, where one company cannot do something for a social home, such as spending the money to increase the EPC rating, and therefore is selling it, another social housing provider will be able to do it? I want to understand where we are going with these amendments and this part of the Bill. When properties are disposed of, it is usually done for a reason. What makes him think that where someone cannot do it, someone else in the industry could?
Matthew Pennycook
That is a fair point. The particular reasons that individual providers dispose of stock vary wildly across the country. In the case of disposals that are driven by increases in standards, we are seeing some of that, but it is also the case that there are occasions when local authority or other providers are, for their own reasons, based on their own assessment of the stock, able and willing to take those homes on. I do not think that we can specify a general rule. What we are trying to do here is to give local authorities and other providers the maximum possible opportunity to pick up those stocks and to retain them in the social housing sector, if that is possible. To be very clear and honest with the hon. Member, that may not always be possible, and those homes may be disposed of on the open market, but we want to increase the chances of them being able to be retained in the sector, for all the reasons that we have gone into.
Amendments 1 and 5 would add the Regulator of Social Housing to those bodies that must be notified prior to a disposal. The regulator plays a vital role in ensuring that our social landlords deliver the quality homes and services that their tenants deserve. As part of the regulatory framework, private registered providers must be able to demonstrate a strategic rationale for disposals and understand the implications for their total social housing stock. I am not persuaded that requiring private registered providers to notify the regulator of a future disposal would enable it to better regulate against the standards that it sets. The regulator plays no role in approving such disposals; that decision properly rests with the landlord. The regulator is already notified once a disposal has occurred, so it has an overview of the numbers and types of disposals that are occurring.
Amendment 101 would, similarly, require community land trusts with social housing in the area to be notified. Of course, community land trusts that are registered with the Regulator of Social Housing would already be notified under the requirements of the clause. I am aware that not all community land trusts are registered with the regulator, and that is their choice, but the focus of the clause is to keep homes in the regulated sector where it is possible to do so. The notification process is therefore focused on notifying providers that are registered with the regulator.
Amendment 99 would require a sales notice provided to the local authority and other registered providers in the local area to be published on the website of the private registered provider intending to dispose of the property. One of the main aims of the clause is to increase transparency around disposals. However, there is a balance to be struck between the benefits of transparency and the burdens and costs to private registered providers. We believe that the amendment would introduce an unhelpful level of bureaucracy around the disposal notification process. While some providers may choose to publish notifications of sale on their websites, requiring publication via legislation is disproportionate.
Gideon Amos
If we are after transparency, I have difficulty with the Minister’s basing his argument on the massive cost of putting something on a website. I understand that it is a tradition of this place that the Government resist all amendments that come from all quarters other than their own, but this seems to be taking things to an illogical conclusion.
Matthew Pennycook
I certainly do not make it a point of principle to resist all amendments despite how sensible some will be. The hon. Member will see in the list of Government amendments that we will be debating many points that were raised by noble peers and that we have taken on. I will go away and reflect on how much of a burden this would be, but let me make a general point. This is my third Bill Committee as a Minister, and I sat on probably 13 while in opposition. The natural tendency of Oppositions is to call for further requirements, further regulations, further reviews and further assessments, because often they have nothing more to say on the point of principle of the particular clause. There is a cumulative impact of layering all of that on top. We want to ensure that the balance is struck properly, and that the disposals process is proportionate and is streamlined to an extent, but I will go away and reflect on the particular point and review whether requiring private registered providers to do what he suggests would be as burdensome as we think.
Mr Dillon
I support the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Taunton and Wellington and appreciate the Minister’s commitment to go away and reflect on them. May I just add a plea? There is concern, when stock is being disposed of in local communities, that the community does not know what is going on. Having disposal notifications published online would not just allow the sector to know what is going on, but allow the local community to know what is going on with its housing stock.
Matthew Pennycook
I take the hon. Member’s point and, as I committed to doing in response to the hon. Member for Taunton and Wellington, I will go away and reflect. I am happy to provide a fuller, written answer to both hon. Members.
Mr Dillon
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment proposed: 99, in clause 12, page 11, line 35, at end insert—
“(2A) Condition AA is that a copy of any notice given in relation to the relevant sale is published on the registered provider’s website.”—(Mr Dillon.)
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Gideon Amos
I beg to move amendment 2, in clause 12, page 12, line 5, at end insert—
“171AA Right of first refusal: local housing authorities
(1) This section applies where—
(a) a sale notice has been given under section 171A in relation to a dwelling, and
(b) the dwelling—
(i) is let at social rent, or
(ii) was previously transferred from a local housing authority.
(2) During the period specified in section 171A(3), the local housing authority for the area in which the dwelling is situated may make an offer to acquire the dwelling.
(3) Where an offer is made under subsection (2), the private registered provider must dispose of the dwelling to the local housing authority at existing use value for social housing.
(4) A dwelling acquired under this section must be retained as social housing within the meaning of Part 2 of this Act.
(5) Any dispute as to the existing use value for social housing shall be determined by an independent valuer appointed by the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors.
(6) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about the operation of this section.”
This amendment gives local housing authorities a right of first refusal to acquire social rent dwellings and dwellings previously transferred from local authorities at existing use value for social housing.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 3, in clause 12, page 12, line 5, at end insert—
“171AA Right of first refusal: registered providers
(1) This section applies where—
(a) a sale notice has been given under section 171A in relation to a dwelling, and
(b) the dwelling—
(i) is let at social rent, or
(ii) was previously transferred from a local housing authority.
(2) During the period specified in section 171A(3), any registered provider which received a sale notice under section 171A(2) may make an offer to acquire the dwelling.
(3) Where an offer is made under subsection (2), the private registered provider must dispose of the dwelling to the registered provider at existing use value for social housing.
(4) A dwelling acquired under this section must be retained as social housing within the meaning of Part 2 of this Act.
(5) Any dispute as to the existing use value for social housing shall be determined by an independent valuer appointed by the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors.
(6) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about the operation of this section.”
This amendment gives registered providers a right of first refusal to acquire social rent dwellings and dwellings previously transferred from local authorities at existing use value for social housing.
Amendment 10, in clause 12, page 12, line 5, at end insert—
“171AA Right of first refusal: local affordable housing providers
(1) This section applies where—
(a) a sale notice has been given under section 171A in relation to a dwelling, and
(b) the dwelling—
(i) is let at social rent, or
(ii) was previously transferred from a local housing authority.
(2) During the period specified in section 171A(3), where a qualifying local affordable housing provider makes an offer to acquire the dwelling, a private registered provider must dispose of the dwelling to the qualifying local affordable housing provider at existing use value for social housing.
(3) A dwelling acquired under this section must be retained as social housing.
(4) In this section, a ‘qualifying local affordable housing provider’ means—
(a) a community land trust;
(b) a housing co-operative;
(c) a community benefit society;
(d) a charity whose purposes include the provision of affordable housing; or
(e) such other locally based not-for-profit housing body as may be prescribed by regulations,
which operates, or intends to operate, affordable housing within the local housing authority area in which the dwelling is situated.
(5) Any dispute as to existing use value for social housing shall be determined by an independent valuer appointed by the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors.
(6) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about the operation of this section.”
This amendment seeks to extend the right of first refusal to not-for-profit community-led housing organisations and other non-registered providers capable of retaining homes as affordable housing within the local area, and provides that the disposal must be at existing use value.
Gideon Amos
I will be brief. Amendment 2 would give local housing authorities right of first refusal to acquire social rent dwellings and dwellings previously transferred from local authorities at existing use value for social housing. The acquisition of those properties at existing use value for social housing, rather than at market value or existing use value, is significant, because obviously the existing use value for social housing is lower. It is important that local authorities have the ability to acquire homes that are being disposed of, so that the net reduction in social housing is not increased. I commend the amendment to the Committee.
Matthew Pennycook
As the hon. Member for Taunton and Wellington set out, amendments 2 and 3 would introduce a right of first refusal for the local authority and other registered providers notified via a sale notice during the notice period. That right would be on the condition that the home would remain as social housing and would require the private registered provider to sell the home at the existing use value for social housing. The corresponding amendment 10, tabled by the hon. Member for St Ives, would extend the right of first refusal to specific types of bodies that provide affordable housing. Some of those bodies would be registered with the Regulator of Social Housing, and therefore would already be included within amendment 3, but amendment 10 would also extend the right of first refusal to unregistered housing providers.
I have heard clearly, both on Second Reading and today, the desire of hon. Members to protect social homes. I very much share that desire, but that must be balanced with the ability of private providers to operate efficiently and manage their housing assets, including by investing in more new homes or their existing stock. Sometimes that can mean selling a social home out of the sector. I can assure the Committee that I have fought long and hard, and challenged officials—they can verify that with nods—to ensure that we look in a lot of detail at what requirements can be put in place, and what levers we can try to pull, to keep as many social homes in the regulated sector as possible.
A key consideration when thinking through possible interventions is the reality that interfering with private registered providers’ freedom to use and sell their assets as they wish would present a significant risk of reclassifying the sector. Not only would that bring £110 billion of debt on to the public books, but it would bring with it risk and uncertainty that could impact on the investment in the sector that is so needed.
As I have said, I hope the disposals measure in the Bill will ensure greater transparency around disposals and support better dialogue between private registered providers and local authorities. I hope it will also focus minds to ensure that we minimise any negative impact resulting from disposals. Of course, there is nothing to prevent a private registered provider from choosing to sell to another provider at a lower price on the understanding that it remains social housing. I hope that the notification requirement introduced by the Bill will support such discussions. I am very open to ideas about what more can be done to support that dialogue, and I have tasked my officials to work with the sector to identify and promote good practice, as well as to explore what more the Government might do to reinforce it.
Given the issues that I have highlighted, I believe we will get the best results by working together with private registered providers and local authorities to explore what more they can do and where we can support them to keep homes in the regulated sector. For the reasons that I have set out, primarily around reclassification risk, we cannot accept the amendments, and I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment 2.
Gideon Amos
I appreciate the Minister’s response. The amendments are genuinely intended to provide councils with the ability to acquire stock rather than see it lost from the social housing sector. This is a particularly important area and, I believe, an important amendment. I understand the risks of reclassification on to the public sector balance sheet. I wonder whether the Minister would be willing to publish the advice he has received on that, because the sector will want to understand why first refusal cannot be given to local authorities.
Matthew Pennycook
I appreciate the attempt, let us say, to have confidential advice to Ministers published in the round. That is not the usual practice—
Social Housing Bill (Second sitting)
Tuesday 27th October 2026
(1 day, 20 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Social Housing Bill [HL] 2026-27 View all Social Housing Bill [HL] 2026-27 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 27 October 2026 - (27 Oct 2026)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
I have a few preliminary reminders for the Committee. Please switch any electronic devices to silent. No food or drink should be consumed during the sitting, other than the bottles of water that are available on your desks. Hansard will be grateful if Committee members email their speaking notes or pass written notes to the Hansard colleagues in the room.
Before we resume line-by-line consideration of the Bill, does any Member wish to make a declaration of interests?
Sagal Abdi-Wali (Holborn and St Pancras) (Lab)
I am still the council leader in Camden.
Rachel Blake (Cities of London and Westminster) (Lab/Co-op)
I draw Members’ attention to my category 8 —miscellaneous—interest.
Mr Lee Dillon (Newbury) (LD)
My wife works for a social housing provider.
Clause 12
Restriction on certain sales of social housing by private registered providers
Amendment proposed (this day): 2, in clause 12, page 12, line 5, at end insert—
“171AA Right of first refusal: local housing authorities
(1) This section applies where—
(a) a sale notice has been given under section 171A in relation to a dwelling, and
(b) the dwelling—
(i) is let at social rent, or
(ii) was previously transferred from a local housing authority.
(2) During the period specified in section 171A(3), the local housing authority for the area in which the dwelling is situated may make an offer to acquire the dwelling.
(3) Where an offer is made under subsection (2), the private registered provider must dispose of the dwelling to the local housing authority at existing use value for social housing.
(4) A dwelling acquired under this section must be retained as social housing within the meaning of Part 2 of this Act.
(5) Any dispute as to the existing use value for social housing shall be determined by an independent valuer appointed by the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors.
(6) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about the operation of this section.”—(Gideon Amos.)
This amendment gives local housing authorities a right of first refusal to acquire social rent dwellings and dwellings previously transferred from local authorities at existing use value for social housing.
Question again proposed, That the amendment be made.
The Chair
I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:
Amendment 3, in clause 12, page 12, line 5, at end insert—
“171AA Right of first refusal: registered providers
(1) This section applies where—
(a) a sale notice has been given under section 171A in relation to a dwelling, and
(b) the dwelling—
(i) is let at social rent, or
(ii) was previously transferred from a local housing authority.
(2) During the period specified in section 171A(3), any registered provider which received a sale notice under section 171A(2) may make an offer to acquire the dwelling.
(3) Where an offer is made under subsection (2), the private registered provider must dispose of the dwelling to the registered provider at existing use value for social housing.
(4) A dwelling acquired under this section must be retained as social housing within the meaning of Part 2 of this Act.
(5) Any dispute as to the existing use value for social housing shall be determined by an independent valuer appointed by the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors.
(6) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about the operation of this section.”
This amendment gives registered providers a right of first refusal to acquire social rent dwellings and dwellings previously transferred from local authorities at existing use value for social housing.
Amendment 10, in clause 12, page 12, line 5, at end insert—
“171AA Right of first refusal: local affordable housing providers
(1) This section applies where—
(a) a sale notice has been given under section 171A in relation to a dwelling, and
(b) the dwelling—
(i) is let at social rent, or
(ii) was previously transferred from a local housing authority.
(2) During the period specified in section 171A(3), where a qualifying local affordable housing provider makes an offer to acquire the dwelling, a private registered provider must dispose of the dwelling to the qualifying local affordable housing provider at existing use value for social housing.
(3) A dwelling acquired under this section must be retained as social housing.
(4) In this section, a ‘qualifying local affordable housing provider’ means—
(a) a community land trust;
(b) a housing co-operative;
(c) a community benefit society;
(d) a charity whose purposes include the provision of affordable housing; or
(e) such other locally based not-for-profit housing body as may be prescribed by regulations,
which operates, or intends to operate, affordable housing within the local housing authority area in which the dwelling is situated.
(5) Any dispute as to existing use value for social housing shall be determined by an independent valuer appointed by the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors.
(6) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about the operation of this section.”.
This amendment seeks to extend the right of first refusal to not-for-profit community-led housing organisations and other non-registered providers capable of retaining homes as affordable housing within the local area, and provides that the disposal must be at existing use value.
The Minister for Housing and Planning (Matthew Pennycook)
It is an absolute pleasure to see you in the Chair, Mr Western. When we finished this morning’s sitting, I was responding to a point from the hon. Member for Taunton and Wellington, who is not in his place; I know he is a trusty reader of Hansard, so I am sure he will see my remarks.
Essentially, I was saying that it would not be appropriate for me to share any specific advice that I have received on the matter that we are debating. It is not the standard procedure for the Government to put official advice in the public domain. I again draw the Committee’s attention to the fact that the decision taken by the Office for National Statistics back in 2015 clearly identified the approval of disposals by the Regulator of Social Housing as a key control that resulted in the reclassification of the housing association sector to public.
It is the Government’s considered opinion that many of the suggestions for further controls over housing association assets, which go beyond the notification requirement in the Bill, would likely be a significant classification risk. I have committed to writing to the hon. Gentleman if there is any further detail that I can provide, but we are somewhat limited in what we can say about how the ONS makes those decisions.
The Chair
As we have heard, Gideon Amos is not present. Mr Dillon, do you know what his wishes are? Does he want to withdraw the amendment?
Gareth Bacon (Orpington) (Con)
I beg to move amendment 82, in clause 12, page 12, line 31, at end insert—
“(7) In exercising functions under this section and section 171A, the Secretary of State must have regard to the operational and financial independence of private registered providers.”.
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to have regard to the independence of housing associations when exercising powers under new sections 171A and 171B of the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendment 20.
Amendment 7, in clause 12, page 13, line 11, at end insert—
“(h) whether the dwelling is let at social rent,
(i) the dwelling’s energy performance certificate rating,
(j) whether the dwelling meets the Decent Homes Standard,
(k) whether the interest to be disposed of is freehold or leasehold,
(l) details of any accessibility adaptations made to the dwelling,
(m) details of any public grant received in relation to the dwelling, including any disabled facilities grant, and
(n) whether the dwelling was previously transferred from a local housing authority and, if so, the consideration paid on that transfer.”
This amendment requires that sale notices provided by a private registered providers to local housing authorities must provide additional information about the dwellings for sale.
Amendment 100, in clause 12, page 13, line 11, at end insert—
“(1A) The private registered provider’s stated reason for making the relevant sale must be one of the following reasons—
(a) financial viability,
(b) the cost to retrofit energy efficiency measures,
(c) stock rationalization, or
(d) another specified reason as set out in regulations made by statutory instrument.
(1B) A statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (1A)(d) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before, and approved by, a resolution of each House of Parliament.”
New clause 8—Monitoring and reporting on private registered provider disposals—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the passing of this Act and annually thereafter, publish a report on notifications and disposals of social housing by private registered providers.
(2) A report under subsection (1) must include—
(a) the number of sale notices given under section 171A of the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008 in the period to which the report relates or otherwise notified to Homes England;
(b) the number and tenure of the dwellings to which those notices related;
(c) the number of those dwellings that were subsequently disposed of;
(d) the number of disposed dwellings that remained within social housing; and
(e) the number of disposed dwellings that ceased to be social housing.”
Gareth Bacon
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Western. I will be relatively brief. I tabled amendment 82 to introduce a vital legal safeguard to protect the structural integrity of the UK housing association sector.
Private registered providers are independent, non-profit businesses. They work hard to run a fair and efficient sector providing social housing and to see much-needed homes built. The amendment would protect registered providers from overreaching state interventions that could have serious, if inadvertent, financial consequences.
Housing associations can rely on private debt to fund development, and any perception that central Government can arbitrarily dictate their financial operations is a threat, both to business independence and to the positive outcomes that they effect. We must ensure that even well-intentioned regulatory oversight does not compromise the financial viability and building capacity of some of the most important businesses in our housing industry. We will seek to divide the Committee on the amendment.
Mr Dillon
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Western. I would like to speak to amendments 100 and 7. Amendment 7, which in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Taunton and Wellington, really gets to the “what”: what is being offered for disposal, whether it is at social rent and what the energy performance certificate rating is. Amendment 100 is a follow-up to that: the “why”. Why is a property being disposed of? Is it for financial viability? Is it because of the cost of retrofit? If we were to collate that data, the Government would be able to reflect on the success of this policy in later years.
Matthew Pennycook
Government amendment 20 requires sales notices from private providers to include information about whether the rent standard applies to the dwelling and, if it does, the rent category of the dwelling. Engagement with the sector has highlighted the importance of potential purchasers knowing the rent category of a home when taking decisions about purchasing it. That is because the rent category has implications for the future rent that can be charged, and therefore the future income potential of the property.
I remain mindful of the need to ensure the disposal notification is proportionate and limited to the information that is most useful to those considering purchasing the property. We believe information relating to the dwelling rent category is a useful and reasonable addition to the information requirements. I therefore urge the Committee to support the amendment.
Amendment 82 would require the Secretary of State to have regard to the operational and financial independence of private registered providers when making regulations under proposed new sections 171B or 171A of the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008. A common theme in my responses to the amendments on the disposals measure in this Bill is that I recognise that private registered providers are private bodies that need to be allowed to make their own business decisions. In short, for that reason, I do not think the amendment is required. If making regulations, the Secretary of State would necessarily be aware that housing associations are private bodies. I reassure the shadow Minister that we have no current intentions to use these powers.
I believe that the hon. Member for Newbury spoke only to amendment 100. Am I wrong?
Matthew Pennycook
I will deal with both, in that case. Amendment 7, in the name of the hon. Member for Taunton and Wellington, would significantly expand the information required to be included in sales notices where a private registered provider intends to dispose of a property outside of the regulated sector, to include, for example, whether a property complies with the decent homes standard, its EPC rating and whether it has been adapted for accessibility.
The Government’s view is that adding requirements for more information to be included in the sale notice would not be proportionate. We do not want to impose additional unnecessary burdens on providers, and we certainly would not wish to see information requirements introduced that would mean additional reports need to be produced, or surveys carried out, though I note the hon. Member’s amendment does seek to avoid this.
Our view is that extending the notification window to eight weeks will allow providers to have the opportunity to request further information that they judge to be necessary to their consideration of a potential purchase. However, I do not think that requiring the inclusion of all this information by law is a proportionate response. Our aim is to capture the basic elements that will always be relevant to providers when considering purchasing a home, and provide more time for inquiries to be made where needed. That point has come up previously. The provisions in the Bill do not prevent those notifications and requests for further information between the parties in question from being made. That is the basis on which I brought forward amendment 19, which requires information on the category of rent, which we think is an important improvement.
Amendment 100, which is in the name of the hon. Member for Newbury, would require providers to categorise their reason for disposing of a property as either financial viability, the cost of energy efficiency retrofits, stock rationalisation or some other reason that might be specified through secondary legislation. My concern is that seeking to prescribe particular categories of reason in the notice might result in a less helpful notification. Let me explain why.
First, it requires providers to identify one particular reason behind the sale. It is possible that the proposed sale will be based on more than one of these categories. It is also possible that there might be a different driver entirely. In response to a very reasonable question from the hon. Member for Broxbourne, I tried to give a sense of the variety of reasons that individual providers might be disposing of particular stock.
Secondly, there is a risk that by setting out the categories in legislation, providers will just use the default descriptions of the reason and fail to provide a fuller and more helpful description for those being notified. Thirdly, although I do not think this was the intention of the hon. Member for Newbury, the amendment would have the effect of preventing sales from going ahead. No sale can proceed without a notice, and the notice must be valid. To be valid with this amendment in place, the notice must include one of a limited list of reasons. The Government cannot support an amendment that would prevent legitimate disposals. For those reasons, I hope that the hon. Member will not press the amendment to a Division.
Gareth Bacon
I have heard the Minister’s response. As always, I do not in any way doubt his sincerity, but unfortunately he will not always be in post. We would prefer to keep the Government honest on this point, so we intend to press amendment 82 to a Division.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Mr Dillon
I beg to move amendment 4, in clause 12, page 13, line 23, at end insert—
“171CA Requirement to consult with a relevant local authority before a planned disposal in a designated rural area
(1) A private registered provider must provide the relevant local authority in a designated rural area with a report on social housing stock condition information on an annual basis.
(2) A private registered provider must consult with the relevant local authority on options to regenerate social housing in the designated rural area before any decision to dispose of a property in the area has taken place.
(3) For the purposes of this section, a designated rural area is defined as any area with a population density of no more than two persons per hectare and a population of 3,000 or fewer.”
This amendment seeks to ensure that the private registered provider and relevant local authority discuss appropriate solutions to the possible disposal of affordable housing in sensitive rural communities well before a disposal has taken place.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 11, in clause 12, page 13, line 23, at end insert—
“171CA Impact on rural communities
(1) Before making a relevant sale in relation to a dwelling located in a rural area, a private registered provider must undertake an assessment of the likely impact of the proposed disposal on the local community.
(2) An assessment under this section must consider—
(a) the availability of affordable housing within the settlement;
(b) local housing needs;
(c) the total loss of social housing within the parish, town or settlement over the preceding ten years, if any;
(d) the contribution of the dwelling to maintaining a balanced and sustainable community; and
(e) the availability of replacement social housing within the same settlement.
(3) A copy of the assessment must be provided to—
(a) the local housing authority;
(b) the parish or town council, where one exists; and
(c) the Regulator of Social Housing.
171CB Regulator of Social Housing and rural communities
(1) In exercising its functions under this Part, the Regulator of Social Housing must have regard to—
(a) the impact of social housing disposals on the sustainability of rural communities; and
(b) the maintenance, availability of, and need for affordable housing provision within rural settlements.”
This amendment requires registered providers and the Regulator of Social Housing to consider the impact of disposals on rural communities.
Clause stand part.
New clause 17—Rural exception sites—
“(1) A social housing dwelling developed on a rural exception site may not be disposed of on the open market.
(2) Any disposal of a social housing dwelling developed on a rural exception site must preserve affordability restrictions in perpetuity.
(3) No social housing dwelling developed on a rural exception site shall be eligible for—
(a) Right to Buy;
(b) Right to Acquire; or
(c) any successor scheme.
(4) A planning obligation securing social or affordable housing on a rural exception site may not be modified or discharged if the effect would be to reduce the number of social or affordable dwellings or weaken any affordability restrictions.
(5) In determining any—
(a) application,
(b) appeal,
(c) permission in principle,
(d) technical details consent application,
(e) local development order, or
(f) development consent,
relating to social or housing affordable housing on land which is, or has previously been, a rural exception site, the absence of a five-year supply of deliverable housing sites does not constitute a reason for granting permission for a development that would reduce the number of social or affordable dwellings secured on that site.
(6) The presumption in favour of sustainable development does not apply where its application would result in—
(a) the loss of social or affordable dwellings secured on a rural exception site;
(b) the reduction of affordability restrictions applying to such dwellings; or
(c) the substitution of market housing for social or affordable housing secured for local housing need.”
This new clause seeks to preserve social housing and affordable homes provided under rural exception site policies for future generations of local residents.
New clause 64—Replacement of disposed rural social housing stock—
“(1) Within 12 months of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must, by regulations made by statutory instrument, make provision to require disposed social housing providers to guarantee rural social housing is replaced like for like.
(2) Under subsection (1) ‘like for like’ means housing that is—
(a) in the same local area, and
(b) with the same number of bedrooms.
(3) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”
This new clause would require a local replacement guarantee where rural social housing is disposed of.
New clause 65—Rural social housing targets—
“(1) Within 12 months of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must set rural social housing targets, and every year thereafter, publish a report on progress towards those targets.
(2) The ‘rural social housing targets’ under subsection (1) should include individual targets for the amount of social housing that is available for—
(a) social rent,
(b) affordable rent, and
(c) shared ownership.”
This new clause would require the Government to create and publish progress towards targets for rural social housing, broken down by tenure type.
Mr Dillon
Amendment 4 seeks to ensure that registered providers and local authorities discuss solutions to possible disposal in sensitive rural communities well before that disposal has taken place. I will not rehearse the arguments that we had this morning about rural communities and the exceptions that they face, but I think the Minister will understand our concern that they should have as much protection as possible.
Matthew Pennycook
As I have set out, the Government are committed to protecting our much-needed social housing stock. As it stands, there is no requirement for advance notification of disposals of social homes, meaning that opportunities to retain them within the social housing sector can be missed. Although private registered providers may choose to dispose of homes for valid reasons, including to support investment in new supply and the effective management of their stock, we understand that that can have a particularly acute impact in areas where the supply of social housing is already constrained.
It is therefore important that opportunities to retain homes within the social housing sector are not missed, particularly in areas with significant demand or where replacement is particularly difficult. Clause 12 will achieve that by requiring providers to notify the relevant local authority and other registered providers in the area before a sale can be completed. It creates a short window during which completion of a disposal cannot take place, while still allowing providers to market the property and continue with their disposal plans as usual. The window was set at four weeks upon introduction of the Bill, and the Government are seeking to extend that window to eight weeks, in response to concerns raised by both Houses and by stakeholders that it was too short.
The new window of time allows local authorities and other providers to consider whether they wish to acquire the property, helping to retain homes within the social housing sector. To help them in that initial assessment, the notice is required to provide certain basic information such as the address, the number of bedrooms and bathrooms and its estimated value. Earlier, I spoke to an amendment to include the category of rent in the sale notice, which we think is a reasonable and fair addition.
The clause is targeted and proportionate. It includes sensible exceptions such as sales to another registered provider, sales to the tenant and certain low-cost home ownership transactions. It is important to be clear that this is not a consent regime. The clause does not prevent disposals, does not restrict who a property may be sold to, and does not interfere with providers’ ability to make legitimate stock management decisions. It is a light touch and proportionate measure to improve transparency, embed consistent good practice across the sector—I have detailed some of the non-legislative means where we intend to work with the sector to go further— and support the Bill’s broader objective of safeguarding and sustaining social housing stock.
Amendment 4, in the name of the hon. Member for Taunton and Wellington, would introduce additional requirements for disposals in designated rural areas. I support the intention behind it: to ensure that a private registered provider and the relevant local authority discuss appropriate solutions to possible disposals of social housing in rural communities well before a disposal has taken place. I am not convinced, however, that the best way to achieve that outcome is by requiring annual reports on stock condition and a statutory consultation on options for the regeneration of social housing prior to disposal.
The provisions in the Bill will ensure that a local authority is aware of a potential disposal. I hope that that gives local authorities, particularly in rural areas, an opportunity to ensure that there is an effective dialogue before the disposal takes place. Requiring statutory consultations on the regeneration of social housing would likely place significant time and administrative costs on both local authorities and private registered providers, and materially impact the ability of private registered providers to make the necessary commercial decisions required to manage their assets effectively and safely.
More broadly, through information published by the Regulator of Social Housing, local authorities can already access information about PRP-owned social housing stock within their local authority area, including information relating to whether stock meets the decent homes standard. An annual report on stock condition would be duplicative of the existing rigorous requirements. I am sympathetic to what lies behind the amendment, but I am not convinced that we need to legislate in this way to achieve our shared aim.
Mr Dillon
I thank the Minister for that reply. I hope that local authorities and housing providers are listening to this debate, and understand that the Government expect them to work in a collaborative manner for the best outcome for social tenants. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 12, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 13
Review of shared ownership and staircasing
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 41—Shared ownership strategy—
“(1) Within 12 months of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must publish and lay before Parliament a strategy for increasing opportunities for access to the shared ownership scheme.
(2) The strategy under this section must include proposals relating to—
(a) first-time buyers,
(b) key workers,
(c) housing association provision, and
(d) staircasing arrangements.
(3) For the purposes of this section, ‘staircasing’ means the practice of buying additional shares in a Shared Ownership home in order to increase overall equity.”
This new clause would require publication of a strategy for expanding shared ownership.
New clause 45—Model shared ownership agreement—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, publish a model shared ownership agreement.
(2) The model shared ownership agreement must include standard provisions relating to—
(a) rent reviews,
(b) staircasing,
(c) service charges,
(d) administrative fees,
(e) sales and resales, and
(f) capital improvements undertaken by shared owners.
(3) Registered providers must have regard to the model agreement when granting shared ownership leases.”
This probing new clause would require the publication of a standardised model shared ownership agreement.
Matthew Pennycook
Shared ownership is an important route into home ownership and has enabled hundreds of thousands of people to get on to the property ladder who otherwise would not have been able to do so. However, the Government are fully aware that shared owners continue to face serious difficulties relating to affordability, transparency, management, staircasing and resale challenges. Although some of these challenges affect leaseholders more widely—high and rising service charges are a good example—they can have a disproportionate impact on shared owners, given that the product is aimed at households on lower-to-middle incomes.
Yesterday, I tabled a written ministerial statement setting out the Government’s position on shared ownership and the action we are taking to improve the experience of shared owners. We are determined to ensure that shared ownership is fair, transparent and affordable across its life cycle. That is why we are taking forward a phased programme of targeted improvements. The first phase, which has been under way for some time, has focused on improving the customer experience and giving providers greater certainty, stability and confidence to deliver new shared ownership homes.
We have set clearer expectations for registered providers receiving funding through the social and affordable homes programme, including giving greater consideration to long-term customer affordability, increasing transparency and fairness around costs, and allowing customers to opt out of fees for optional services. We have also made it clear that fees charged to shared owners should not be used as a source of profit or to cross-subsidise other activity.
Work is now under way on the second phase of our improvement programme. This will include reducing barriers and costs associated with staircasing; exploring options to support resales; improving information and guidance for existing shared owners; and reviewing buy-backs as an exit route for those who either cannot afford to remain in or cannot sell their home. Alongside that, we will improve shared ownership data quality and collection, helping us to better understand the experience of shared owners over time and pressures such as long-term affordability.
Clause 13 would require a statutory review of shared ownership. I recognise the concerns that motivated the amendment in the other place—Lord Young has been a consistent and forceful champion for shared owners and I commend his work in doing so—but these are precisely the issues the Government are already focused on and will continue to progress through the improvement programme that is already under way.
As is set out in the written ministerial statement I made on Monday, we have done lots to date. There is more to come on those issues I identified. For that reason, we feel that a statutory review would duplicate that rather than deliver the practical improvements that shared owners need beyond the work that the Government are already undertaking. I urge the Committee to oppose the question that clause 13 stand part of the Bill.
Gareth Bacon
I rise to speak to new clauses 41 and 45, which are in my name. I was obviously aware that it is the Government’s intention to strike down clause 13 and remove it in its entirety from the Bill. I heard what the Minister just said about what the Government are doing at the moment. The Opposition are not convinced that the clause would require unnecessary duplication. What it would do is make sure that a review is actually done and published, so we disagree with the Government.
My noble Friends in the other place worked hard and successfully on a cross-party basis to bring shared ownership into the debate and into this Bill. Shared ownership issues have gone on for far too long and for far too many people it has been a logistical, legal and financial nightmare when it should have been their first and proudest step on to the housing ladder. This is an important national issue, and the commitments that my noble Friends made must not be stripped from the Bill. Indeed, we must build on them. That is why I tabled new clause 41, which would require publication of a strategy for expanding shared ownership. I call on the Minister to repair shared ownership, back first-time buyers and support this new clause.
New clause 45 asks the Secretary of State to publish a model of shared ownership agreement within six months of the Bill receiving Royal Assent. The Opposition believe this is a crucial development for the future of shared ownership. What should be a pathway towards owning a first home is for so many people, as I have just said, a logistical and legal labyrinth of rent reviews, service charges, admin fees and staircasing costs, which makes the dream of home ownership a nightmare. A model shared ownership agreement would provide a consistent framework with clear protections for buyers, and it would also require registered providers to have regard to it. Not only do I hope the Minister agrees with that, but I hope he will give assurances as we debate the new clauses, even if the Government choose not to support them.
Edward Argar (Melton and Syston) (Con)
As always, Mr Western, it is a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship. I rise to support clause 13 remaining part of the Bill. With his typical eloquence, the Minister set out both the opportunities and challenges presented to those with shared ownership, including the regulatory challenges sitting around it. He also described the very real impact that it can have on those individuals—who are often starting off on the path to home ownership—when it does not work well.
I therefore think that clause 13 is important. I do not in any way want to gainsay the important work that the Minister is doing. As I said this morning, I have a lot of respect for the Minister; he is extremely able and I know that he will be pursuing this work with vigour. However, I believe that a statutory review offers the opportunity for a much broader look at this issue in the round, and actions such as those that the Minister has outlined can sit under such a review perfectly reasonably.
The two things are not in contradiction. A statutory review would not stop the Minister from continuing to pursue some of the immediate actions that he has already set out. It just provides an opportunity to take a step back and look at this important sector of home ownership to assess whether it is working well. Where there are things that the Government or the Minister may have missed—as diligent as I know him to be— it gives that extra opportunity.
I know that the Minister has been very clear in his determination to continue pursuing shared ownership, as he set out in his written statement and in his announcement. However, I have to say that this Minister, in whom I have a lot of confidence, may not always be in this post. When he inevitably ascends to higher office, his successor may not be as focused on this issue as him. Therefore, I think that a statutory review as set out in clause 13 offers the opportunity to publish something that has been considered carefully, which Members of this House and future Ministers can then refer back to when considering the way forward. I do not think that it trammels the Minister’s freedom in deciding what to announce or his discretion in any way; it would just be a very important addition.
Deirdre Costigan (Ealing Southall) (Lab)
Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that the Minister has shown that he is willing to take action on the shared ownership eligibility cap, which I think has been frozen since 2019, and on which the previous Conservative Government took no action? He has already announced that he is raising the cap from £80,000 and £90,000 to £90,000 and £110,000 in London and outside London respectively. That shows the vigour with which he is progressing reforms to the shared ownership system.
Edward Argar
The hon. Lady amplifies what I have already said about the Minister. Before I do his political career too much harm by being too nice about him in front of his Whip, I have been very clear in my respect for the Minister and the work he is doing. However, as we have seen in previous Governments—not only Conservative but Labour Governments since 2024—Ministers come and go with an alarming rapidity.
When something is as important as this is to so many people, there must be something underpinning it. Whether Ministers move—in this Minister’s case, I hope he ascends—or whether they leave Government, it is important that whoever succeeds that office and its responsibilities has something on which they can hang their hat and plan their strategy. That is why I think that a review would not be a hindrance to any Minister or Government. Actually, it could be of great help, not least in potentially giving the opportunity to objectively consider some of the issues that the hon. Lady has just raised further.
Mr Dillon
Clause 13 relates to the review of shared ownership and staircasing, which the Liberal Democrats support. However, new clause 41 refers to
“a strategy for increasing opportunities for access to the shared ownership scheme”.
It seems to me that it would be logical to carry out the review of shared ownership first, before committing to increasing shared ownership opportunities.
Edward Argar
It is always a pleasure to give way to the hon. Gentleman. I am seeking to make the point that this review has the potential to underpin a much longer-term approach to this important sector. That is why the clause is important. I do not see the new clauses tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Orpington as in contradiction to that, but rather as complementary to it. There may be a question about phasing and how it works, but I do not believe that that is a reason not to retain the clause for what it seeks to do. The Minister is always a reflective man, so I hope that he will reflect on that carefully.
Danny Beales (Uxbridge and South Ruislip) (Lab)
I will speak briefly to the challenges of shared ownership, building on what the Minister has outlined in the Government response and the written ministerial statement. This issue was raised in the main Chamber when the Bill was discussed recently. Many of us passed on our constituents’ stories of shared ownership, the hopes of a first step on the ladder quickly turning into a nightmare—trapped, unable to staircase and facing all the responsibilities of ownerships, but none of the rights to decide about major works. They have to shoulder all the costs of major works, with mortgage increases and rent increases. They feel lost and unable to have a voice.
With much of the Government’s agenda on reforming leasehold or improving the rights of tenants, many shared owners feel that they fall between the gaps with their specific and unique form of tenure. That is why when the Bill was first discussed, many colleagues were interested in the potential for review as a means to address some of those concerns and issues. I have been heartened by the Minister’s response and the written ministerial statement, which I think specifically commits to review those areas of concern.
I have heard from my constituents about the challenges of buy-backs or when major repairs are needed. In particular on the Union Park development in my constituency, many shared owners are trapped at the moment with Home Group as their landlord, unable to get buy-backs unless they are in extreme financial distress and unable to sell, because the market value is now not there, with millions of pounds of repairs to cladding and heating systems due. Their lives change, as all our lives change, but when the need to move happens, they are unable to do so.
I welcome the commitment to a comprehensive review of buy-backs and consideration of the challenges of staircasing. We would all envisage that shared ownership is initially a stake that we hope grows in future, but many find that that is not the lived reality of shared ownership. It becomes difficult to staircase and difficult to sell out of it. The written ministerial statement commits to hearing the voice of shared owners in the phase 2 review; will the Minister in his summing up elaborate a bit on how exactly he envisages shared owners will be involved in sharing their experience to shape its work? If he could outline the timeline for phase 2 a bit more, that would be very welcome.
Lewis Cocking (Broxbourne) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Western. I have lived in a shared ownership home, so I thought it only right to support this part of the Bill. Usually on Bill Committees, I speak against and ask the Government to take something out of a Bill, rather than keep it in.
This is important. The Minister, on opening, summed up the issues that lots of constituents with shared ownership face right across the country. If the Government are already doing part of the review anyway, and if they are committed to that review, I do not see why it cannot stay part of the Bill. The cynic in me thinks that the only reason why the Government want to remove it from the Bill is so that they can change their mind and not actually do that review of shared ownership, which has been a long-standing feature of the housing market for a number of years. It is high time that we do a review.
The hon. Member for Uxbridge and South Ruislip spoke eloquently about the issues that his constituents face in some of the developments in his constituency. That is not too dissimilar from developments in my constituency. Staircasing has major issues, particularly if ownership is shared with a large social housing provider, such as one of those that operate all across the south-east and London. Residents who buy those shared-ownership homes feel that the social housing provider is unaccountable. They lack transparency on their fees, and I have heard some horrific stories about people buying into shared ownership and wanting to use that as a stepping stone to buy a house on the open market, but having to buy selling packs off the social housing provider at extortionate costs, or the provider not getting back to them and the sale of their property falling through.
New clauses 41 and 45 are trying to solve a number of issues in the Bill. If the Government are doing some of the work already and think that this review is needed, I urge them to keep it in the Bill. As I said, the cynic in me thinks that the Government want to leave it out so that a few months down the line they can say, “We’ve changed our mind. We’re not doing a review.” Do the Government really want a review of shared ownership and to listen to shared owners? The Minister outlined quite eloquently some of the issues that affect shared owners, such as leasehold and commonhold—we look forward to that Bill coming forward—but shared ownership does tend to fall through the cracks.
We have not spent enough time speaking about the issues that shared ownership tenants face, so I really urge the Government to change their mind. I was left with the impression on Second Reading that clause 13 would remain part of the Bill and that the Government would accept the amendments tabled in the other place. I hope that the Government can reflect and keep this clause as part of the Bill.
Matthew Pennycook
I thank hon. Members for their contributions. I said this in my opening remarks, but let me reinforce it: we absolutely appreciate that shared owners across the country face issues, but I do think that there is a regional element to this. From the feedback I receive, it seems to me that the experience of shared owners in London and other parts of the south are far more problematic than shared ownership in parts of the north, where it is quite a successful product and does not have the issues that are often confronted. Serious affordability, transparency, management, staircasing, and resale challenges are being experienced. I know that from my own postbag; I have lots of shared owners in my constituency.
I speak as someone who grew up with a single parent myself, but lots of shared owners are often single women who got a mortgage on the basis of an affordability calculation and have seen, within two or three years, service charges and other costs increase to the point that their home is no longer affordable and would not be counted as such on that affordability check. They are under real pressure. We recognise those pressures and I understand that any shared owners watching will see this clause as a sort of lifeline.
Notwithstanding the points made by the right hon. Member for Melton and Syston about the frequency with which Ministers in previous Conservative Administrations were cycled through, I think I am right in saying that if I make it to Thursday I will be the longest serving Housing Minister since 2010.
Matthew Pennycook
We have better form on permanence of our policy and our ministerial certainty and stability. Notwithstanding the right hon. Member’s attempts to beguile and flatter me, I cannot accept the new clauses, for two reasons. I will take them in turn, but essentially I do not think that either is proportionate or necessary.
New clause 45 would require the Secretary of State to publish a model shared ownership agreement, but model shared ownership leases are already available, and they contain the fundamental clauses governing how shared ownership operates—including many of the matters raised by the right hon. Gentleman. Providers delivering grant-funded shared ownership are required to use leases containing these clauses and comply with wider grant funding requirements.
To give Members a sense that we are thinking about these things, part of the reason that I made the written ministerial statement on Monday was because we have done a huge amount of work in this area, but we have never brought it together into one place in the context of a wider improvement programme. The fault for that is on me and I throw my hands up, but a lot of work has already been done, and a lot of work is to come.
Tackling specific issues, we know that shared owners who want to staircase can face barriers such as transaction costs, a lack of information, rising property values and wider affordability pressures. HomeOwners Alliance estimates typical transaction costs of around £2,000—that was two years ago, in 2024. In the WMS, we have committed to considering measures to reduce existing barriers to staircasing, such as those up-front and ongoing transaction costs.
The issue of buy-backs arose in the context of the Renters’ Rights Act 2025, again from Lord Young pressing the case for shared owners. I am absolutely and acutely aware that buy-backs can be a lifeline for shared owners who, through no fault of their own, find themselves unable either to afford to remain in their home or to sell it, whether due to building safety defects, high service charges or lease-related restrictions. Again, we have committed and made clear in the WMS that we are intent on undertaking a comprehensive review of the functioning of buy-backs, to better understand practical barriers and solutions, and to look at specific issues such as the current use of recycled capital funding grants. That work is under way.
It is also worth saying that lots of the problems that affect shared owners go beyond them to affect other leaseholders. The actions we are taking in several areas will benefit shared owners along with other long residential leaseholders.
A good case is the standardisation and transparency measures that we are introducing in respect of service charges using powers in the previous Government’s Leasehold and Freehold Reform Act 2024. We will lay those statutory instruments in the very near future, so hon. Members can look forward to that. Shared owners who are experiencing those high and rising service charges will benefit from those provisions.
The right hon. Member for Melton and Syston got to the point of the substantive matter at hand, which he framed as an “extra opportunity”. If he can put his ministerial hat on from when he stood here for many years, I gently ask him whether it is reasonable and proportionate to require, through a Social Housing Bill, a statutory review of shared ownership, given all that the Government are doing. Is it really proportionate to require a statutory review just to give that extra opportunity?
We already consult the Shared Owners’ Network and other representative groups. If hon. Members are telling me that we can do more, I am happy to work with them to get shared owners and their experiences into the Government’s thinking so that they are better reflected. If there is more that we can do to improve the improvement programme that is already under way, I am more than happy to hear about that, but it is a little stretching to say that it is absolutely essential just for, to quote the right hon. Member for Melton and Syston, that “little extra opportunity” to cover those issues. We are looking at issues in the round. We are considering the comprehensive set of challenges that shared owners face.
Edward Argar
On that basis, is the Minister prepared to commit—whether explicitly in the Bill or not—to the Government’s launching a formal review of this?
Matthew Pennycook
In some ways, it is pure semantics. We have a comprehensive improvement programme under way. If the right hon. Member looks at my written ministerial statement from yesterday, he will see the work that we have already undertaken: material changes, including to the social and affordable homes programme, where we are setting firmer expectations for providers that receive grant funding. A lot of work is already under way. Whether the right hon. Member calls it a review or an improvement programme, shared owners across the country will rightly focus not on what we term the work that is under way, but on the benefits they see coming out of that work. They can already see some of those in the expectations that we have set, but there will be more to follow.
Lewis Cocking
To draw out the point a little further, will the Minister commit to making an oral statement on the Floor of the House in the near future so that Members from across the House can ask questions and he can update us on what he is doing about shared ownership and improvements to shared ownership?
Matthew Pennycook
My Whip whispers in my ear that that is a matter for Mr Speaker. The hon. Member and any other Member of the Opposition can secure a Westminster Hall debate or an Adjournment debate on this subject. I am more than willing to debate shared ownership or any other housing matter.
Matthew Pennycook
I have made a written ministerial statement that sets out the Government’s work in this area.
Taken together, the existing framework of model leases and guidance, alongside the substantive programme of improvements that is already under way, address the issues at the heart of both new clauses. We continue to have constructive engagement with Lord Young and others in the other place who have concerns about this issue, but we do not believe that a further statutory model agreement or a separate statutory strategy is necessary. I therefore ask the shadow Minister not to press new clauses 41 and 45.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 22 to 25, 46, 47, 26, 29, 27, 28, 30, 31, 48 to 57, 32, 58, 33, 59, 34, 60, 35, 61, 36 to 42, 62 to 65, 43, 44, 66 to 72, 45 and 73.
Amendment 12, in schedule 1, page 34, line 27, at end insert—
“3A In section 160ZA of the Housing Act 1996 (allocation only to eligible and qualifying persons: England), after subsection (11) insert—
‘(12) In deciding what classes of persons are not qualifying persons under subsection (7), a local housing authority must disregard housing-related debt or any other priority debt that was accrued, either by an applicant for housing accommodation or by a member of their household, where that debt was accrued in connection with domestic abuse.
(13) For the purposes of subsection (12), “domestic abuse” has the meaning given by section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021.’
3B In section 166A of the Housing Act 1996 (allocation in accordance with allocation scheme: England), after subsection (14) insert—
‘(15) A local housing authority in England must, in preparing or modifying their allocation scheme, disregard housing-related debt or any other priority debt that was accrued, either by an applicant for housing accommodation, or by a member of their household, where that debt was accrued in connection with domestic abuse.
(16) For the purposes of subsection (15), “domestic abuse” has the meaning given by section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021.’”
This amendment is intended to ensure that people in England who have incurred housing-related or other priority debt, for example rent arrears, as the result of domestic financial abuse are not prevented from bidding for social housing.
Schedule 1.
New clause 30—Domestic abuse protections: implementation review—
“(1) Within the period of 12 months beginning with the day on which section 14 and Schedule 1 (Protection for victims of domestic abuse) come into force, the Secretary of State must publish and lay before Parliament a review of the effectiveness of those provisions at protecting victims of domestic abuse who hold social housing tenancies.
(2) The review under this section must include an assessment of—
(a) the effectiveness of the courts and relevant agencies at identifying when incidents of domestic abuse have occurred within social housing dwellings; and
(b) the ability of local authorities and other relevant agencies to identify previous victims and perpetrators of domestic abuse when allocating social housing tenancies.”
This new clause would require the Government to assess the effectiveness of the provisions on protecting domestic abuse victims.
Matthew Pennycook
Clause 14 and its associated schedule 1 will address a clear legal gap in respect of social housing tenancies, namely that existing legislation provides scant protection for social housing tenants who are victims of domestic abuse and who wish to remain in their current home without their abuser. Landlords can evict perpetrators but only in cases where the victim has already left. That means that, all too often, victims are forced to choose between staying in danger and losing their home. As I argued on Second Reading, that is an utterly unacceptable state of affairs; taken together, the clause and schedule will end it.
Schedule 1 will introduce stronger powers for landlords to enable them to take possession of a property where domestic abuse has taken place without the requirement for the victim to leave. It also strengthens protections to help victims remain safely in their homes where possible or move to suitable alternative accommodation where necessary. These measures form part of the Government’s wider commitment to tackle violence against women and girls, ensuring that the housing system supports, rather than frustrates, a victim’s route to safety and recovery. The new mandatory grounds in the schedule seek to provide a clear framework by which courts must grant possession if the threshold has been met. Crucially, under the discretionary grounds in the schedule, the court must take into account the opinion of the victim before making the decision, helping to ensure that victims remain at the centre of the process.
A key focus of the measures is providing certainty in cases of joint tenancies. The schedule ensures that, if conditions are met for joint tenancies, the court will transfer the perpetrator’s interest in the joint tenancy so that the victim becomes the sole tenant. Where it is not appropriate for a victim to remain in their current home, the Bill allows a court to order suitable alternative social housing where the landlord has such accommodation available. The court must, as far as possible, take into account the victim’s views when considering the suitability of alternative accommodation. If a landlord cannot satisfy the court that a suitable home will be available, the victim will not be forced to move under these provisions.
Clause 14 and schedule 1 provide that the new measures will apply where the victim and perpetrator are personally connected and the victim currently lives in the property or has left due to domestic abuse. The measures critically remove the requirement for the victim to have fled the property before possession action can be taken. They also protect victims of modern slavery where the victim and perpetrator are personally connected and the other conditions in the Bill are met.
We will continue to work with the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner, the Home Office and the wider sector to ensure effective implementation. It would be remiss of me not to say that our work with the Ministry of Justice and the Home Office has been, in my view, an exemplar of cross-departmental working to resolve a pressing issue. In aligning with the definition of domestic abuse under the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, the measures also cover a broader range of conduct. They protect those most at risk who currently live, or previously lived, in a property with a perpetrator, while remaining clear and workable in practice.
Government amendments 22 to 73 address concerns raised in the other place about the evidence needed to use the discretionary grounds in domestic abuse cases. We have listened carefully to those concerns and we have acted. The amendments strengthen the discretionary domestic abuse grounds by ensuring that the existence of a relevant protective order is sufficient to satisfy the first stage of the ground ahead of the court’s determining whether it is reasonable to grant possession.
Where either a non-molestation order or a domestic abuse protection order is in force against a perpetrator, landlords may rely on it as evidence for the courts to then progress to consider whether it is reasonable to grant possession. That removes the need to separately establish whether domestic abuse has taken place where an order is in place, making it easier for social landlords to take possession action where a court has already made an order protecting the victim. An order will be disregarded if an appeal remains unresolved or results in the order being overturned.
The amendments do not make possession automatic. The courts will still need to consider whether it is reasonable to make a possession order, retaining judicial oversight through the existing reasonableness test. The amendments will simplify the process and give greater confidence to landlords and victims when seeking possession.
The amendments also make technical and consequential changes to the domestic abuse provisions in schedule 1. They align the terminology used in the Bill with the definition of domestic abuse in section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, make consequential changes and align wording across equivalent provisions in the Bill and, finally, clarify how the tenancy transfer and possession provisions operate.
The amendments will ensure that, where the conditions for making a possession order on the basis of suitable alternative accommodation apply, the transfer of tenancy provision will also operate. The effect is that the perpetrator tenant’s interest is severed in all cases where the ground for possession is met and the court is satisfied that an order should be made. That will help deliver more consistent outcomes for victims in joint tenancy cases.
Taken together, the amendments improve the clarity and consistency of schedule 1 and ensure that the domestic abuse provisions operate as intended. I commend clause 14, schedule 1 and the Government amendments to the Committee.
Mr Dillon
I will speak to amendment 12, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Taunton and Wellington. The amendment looks at the impact of rent arrears on a victim of domestic abuse and quite simply asks that that not be a consideration when bidding for a future social home.
While on my feet, I will also talk about clause 14 in its totality. We Liberal Democrats welcome the amendments that the Government have tabled on domestic abuse, but will the Minister outline why the Government use only discretionary powers rather than mandatory powers, such as ground 7A, which is mandatory for antisocial behaviour?
Gareth Bacon
I will speak to new clause 30, which stands in my name. This is a probing amendment. There is much in this Bill that is fundamentally political or ideological, but I am sure that I speak for all Members when I say that supporting victims of domestic abuse is an issue that we all agree needs critical, cross-party work. We will not oppose any of the 52 amendments that the Government have tabled to this part of the Bill, because it is vital that anyone stuck in an abusive household receives the urgent care, support and access to legal pathways that they need.
That is why I have tabled new clause 30, which would require the Government to assess the effectiveness of the provisions in protecting domestic abuse victims. If the Bill is to make real change in this area, I believe it is only right that the Government give victims a guarantee that they will closely analyse and monitor the effectiveness of these measures. I look for an assurance from the Minister on that when he sums up.
Edward Argar
I will speak briefly to this grouping, simply to reiterate what the shadow Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Orpington, has just said. In a Bill of this sort, there is inevitably much that we will to-and-fro across this Committee about and disagree on. However, throughout my time as Victims Minister, and under the new Government now, there has been significant consensus about a shared desire, on both sides of the House, to make progress in supporting victims of domestic violence and domestic abuse. I therefore just reiterate my hon. Friend’s and my party’s support for what the Minister seeks to do here. There is genuinely a high degree of consensus on this group; we want to move forward and make that difference.
Matthew Pennycook
I thank the hon. Member for Newbury, the shadow Minister and the right hon. Member for Melton and Syston—I never know whether I am pronouncing that entirely correctly—
Matthew Pennycook
I welcome the cross-party support for the intent behind these provisions and their effect. In some ways, I would go so far as to say that they are groundbreaking in what we have tried to achieve. As I said, there has also been very effective cross-departmental working.
On the specific point that the hon. Member for Newbury raised, there are mandatory grounds for possession in the Bill, but they apply only when a breach of a relevant order has taken place. The changes we have made to the discretionary possession grounds are to allow for the existence of an order to be relevant grounds for the court, rather than a breach having to take place. However, there are mandatory grounds in place. I am happy to set that out in more detail for the hon. Member, in writing, if he is interested. I know that he takes a keen interest in these matters.
I will turn to the two non-Government amendments that have been tabled, starting with amendment 12. This issue, and a version of the amendment, was raised in the other place by Baroness Neate. I would like to give the Committee the same reassurances that we gave the noble Baroness, and that she accepted, in debates in the other place.
First, the Government agree, as I think we all would, with the principle that survivors of domestic abuse should not face unfair barriers to social housing because of debt arising from that abuse. That is why, in the national plan to end homelessness, we committed to addressing the barriers faced by survivors of domestic abuse with debt when applying for social housing through our update to the statutory guidance on social housing allocations.
We continue to believe that primary legislation is not the right approach in this area. There are sensitive and inherently complex cases at play here, and the amendment would introduce a rigid rule that would not allow local authorities to take proper account of individual circumstances. Updated statutory guidance will allow us to set clear national expectations while preserving the flexibility needed to reach fair and sustainable decisions in individual cases. Work is already under way to review the guidance, and we will consult on the updated guidance early next year.
We continue to believe that guidance is the best route to resolving this issue, as I made clear on Second Reading—I think my hon. Friends the Members for Uxbridge and South Ruislip and for Birmingham Yardley (Jess Phillips) pressed me on that. I am happy to reiterate that if guidance proves insufficient, we have the option of making regulations to amend the relevant legislation. The Government’s position has not changed. We support the objective of removing unfair barriers for survivors, but believe that updated statutory guidance, backed by existing regulation-making powers, if necessary, is the more proportionate and effective route.
Danny Beales
I thank the Minister for referencing our previous debate on this topic. I welcome the Government’s action in developing guidance. I have seen worrying cases in my constituency of rent arrears being a barrier to victims of domestic violence getting a tenancy. There is concern that, even though rules have already been changed about local connection tests, they may not always be applied effectively, and local connection tests may still be used as a route to block victims of domestic violence. I welcome the development of guidance, but will the Minister commit to collecting evidence about the effectiveness of the guidance and whether further measures might be needed?
Matthew Pennycook
We will absolutely keep the effectiveness of that guidance under review. I reiterate the commitment I have made, which I have tried to put as plainly as possible: if that guidance is not effective, we will introduce regulations to ensure that we resolve the issue. However, we believe that there is a high chance that the guidance will be successful in achieving the outcomes we want. That is our preferred route in the near term, but I am determined to ensure that the issue is addressed. The Baroness accepted the commitments we made in the other place, and those regulations are available if we require them.
Turning to new clause 30, the Department already collects data through CORE— continuous recording of lettings and sales in social housing—on how many new tenancies were given to victims who left their previous tenancy because of domestic abuse, which provides an important baseline for monitoring outcomes as the reforms are implemented. The Ministry of Justice also publishes quarterly statistics on landlord possession proceedings in the county courts of England and Wales. Those cover claims, possession orders, warrants and repossessions, including for social landlords. We will work with the Ministry of Justice, social landlords and the domestic abuse sector on implementation—the hon. Member for Orpington would expect nothing less. That includes developing clear guidance so that landlords know how and when to use the measures and how to support victims.
The new clause would also require an assessment of how courts and other organisations identify domestic abuse. On 5 October, the Government launched the judicial finding of domestic abuse, a significant step forward in improving the identification and management of domestic abuse offenders across the criminal justice system. As part of sentencing, judges will be required to make a judicial finding of domestic abuse in open court where the evidence supports such a finding as defined by the Domestic Abuse Act 2021. That will provide a formal record where an offence involves domestic abuse. Those findings will be recorded in court records and shared with police and probation. The judicial finding will enable police, courts, prisons and probation services to recognise domestic abuse offenders and respond to the risks they pose more effectively.
Subsection (2)(b) of the new clause extends beyond the purpose of these measures. The Bill does not alter the way local authorities identify previous victims or perpetrators when allocating new social housing tenancies. That is a matter for local authorities to determine when assessing need and priority for an allocation of social housing.
The measures that the Government have put forward in this part of the Bill will help ensure that our reforms can operate effectively. The Government amendments provide the necessary technical changes to support the operation of the provisions and ensure that the legislation works as intended. I welcome the cross-party support for the measures and ask the Committee to support Government amendments 22 to 73.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 14 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 1
Protection for victims of domestic abuse
The Chair
With this, it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendment 74.
Schedule 2.
Matthew Pennycook
Clause 15 introduces schedule 2, which gives the Secretary of State the power to create one new general consent and removes the need to obtain the Secretary of State’s consent for certain transactions altogether. There are a range of circumstances in which local authorities must obtain the Secretary of State’s consent to undertake certain actions relating to their social homes, including how they account for them and when and how they can dispose of them. Some of the consents also apply to private individuals who own property that was once owned as social housing by a council or a new town corporation.
The first measure gives the Secretary of State the power to issue a general consent to non-housing assets—for example, shops or recreation grounds—that are being accounted for in the housing revenue account in accordance with part II of the Housing Act 1985. That will enable the Secretary of State to permit all such accounting practices when they meet certain criteria. That will remove one obstacle from the process of planning new council developments. It will also make it easier for councils to include these additional premises in their developments, supporting the creation of thriving, liveable communities.
The second measure streamlines the process by which local authorities can serve demolition notices, when homes are due to be demolished, that suspend or end tenants’ right to buy. Under schedules 5 and 5A to the 1985 Act, initial demolition notices can be issued for up to seven years, and final demolition notices, which can be issued once the local authority has acquired all the relevant properties for demolition or entered into binding agreements to acquire them, for up to two years. The provision removes the requirement for the Secretary of State’s consent when local authorities need to serve further interim or final demolition notices if demolition cannot be completed during the time of the original notice, and it sets out requirements that local authorities must follow when serving further interim or final demolition notices. Those changes will help local authorities to manage redevelopment schemes more efficiently while still requiring them to follow clear statutory conditions.
Finally, the measure amends or repeals provisions in a number of Acts that require the Secretary of State’s consent for the onward sale of homes that have previously been owned by a local housing authority or new town corporation, even if those homes are already in the private market. The changes do not have effect in Wales, where the previous regime will continue. The changes will take away a completely unnecessary brake on these housing transactions in the private market. There is no longer any rationale for these now private homes to be subject to the Secretary of State’s consent, and consent is never in practice denied. All the changes are part of a suite of measures planned by the Government to simplify and streamline the council housing consent system in England and to empower local authorities who know their communities best.
Government amendment 74 makes minor and consequential amendments to schedule 2. Paragraph 1(3) of the schedule omits section 171D(2) of the Housing Act 1985. That subsection currently requires the Secretary of State’s consent for certain onward disposal of homes already sold under the right to buy. As a consequence of that omission, references elsewhere in the Housing Act 1985 to consent under section 171D(2) are no longer required. Amendment 74 removes those redundant references, ensuring that the legislation will operate coherently once the requirement for consent is removed. The amendment does not make any further substantive change to policy; it simply makes necessary consequential amendments to give full effect to paragraph 1(3) of schedule 2.
I commend clause 15 and schedule 2 to the Committee, and ask the Committee to support Government amendment 74.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 15 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 2
Social housing: consent requirements
Amendment made: 74, in schedule 2, page 37, line 22, at end insert—
“1A ‘(1) Schedule 9A (land registration and related matters where right to buy preserved) is amended as follows.
(2) In paragraph 4 (entries on register protecting preserved right to buy), in sub-paragraph (2), omit paragraph (b) and the ‘and’ preceding it.
(3) In paragraph 5 (change of qualifying dwelling-house), in sub-paragraph (2), omit paragraph (b) and the ‘and’ preceding it.”—(Matthew Pennycook.)
Section 171D(2) of the Housing Act 1985 is omitted by paragraph 1(3) of Schedule 2 to the Bill. This contains amendments that are consequential on that omission.
Schedule 2, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 16
Vacant higher value local authority housing
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Matthew Pennycook
It is essential that local housing authorities have the flexibility to manage their stock in the way that best enables them to meet the needs of their local communities. Clause 16 therefore removes provisions in the Housing and Planning Act 2016 that would have forced councils to sell their highest-value council homes whenever they became vacant. I say, “would have forced” because these provisions were never implemented by previous Governments. Even so, the presence of the provision on the statute book has a negative effect on local authorities’ spending plans, since they could not be certain of the income streams from these properties, which typically earn higher than average rents and are cheaper to maintain.
The policy was intended—I recall this because, as a relatively new Member, I sat on the Committee that considered the Bill that became the 2016 Act—to raise capital to supply new social homes, but it would ultimately have led to a net loss of social homes. Furthermore, when the 2016 Act was passed, a major aim of the policy was to help to fund the extension of the right to buy to housing associations. This Government have made it clear that they do not intend to take that extension forward. The last Conservative Government chose never to implement the measures due to the negative impact that they would have had on local authorities, and we are now going one step further by repealing the provisions altogether. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 16 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 17
Secure tenancies, introductory tenancies and demoted tenancies
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause stand part.
Government amendments 75 to 77.
Schedule 3.
New clause 40—Fixed-term tenancies for social housing—
“Nothing in this Act prevents a local housing authority or registered provider from granting a fixed-term tenancy for social housing in accordance with existing enactments.”
This new clause would preserve local authority discretion to use fixed-term tenancies for social housing.
New clause 58—Review of lifetime secure tenancies—
“(1) A local housing authority must review each lifetime secure tenancy at intervals of no more than five years.
(2) A review under subsection (1) must consider—
(a) whether the tenant continues to require the accommodation having regard to their housing needs,
(b) whether the accommodation remains suitable having regard to the size and composition of the tenant’s household,
(c) whether the tenant has developed a local connection with another local housing authority area,
(d) whether the tenant requires support to move to more suitable accommodation, and
(e) such other matters as may be prescribed by regulations made by the Secretary of State.
(3) Following a review under this section, the local housing authority may—
(a) confirm the continuation of the tenancy,
(b) offer alternative suitable accommodation, or
(c) take such other action as may be provided for by regulations.
(4) The Secretary of State must issue guidance to local housing authorities on the conduct of reviews under this section.
(5) Local housing authorities must have regard to guidance issued under subsection
(6) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”
This new clause requires local housing authorities to review lifetime secure tenancies every five years to ensure that social housing continues to meet tenants’ needs and that existing stock is being used effectively.
Matthew Pennycook
Clause 17 introduces schedule 3, which will repeal uncommenced provisions of the Housing and Planning Act 2016 that would have phased out lifetime secure tenancies and required new social housing tenants to be given fixed-term secure tenancies instead. As with the provisions that we have just debated, the rules were never brought into force and would have reduced security for tenants. Indeed, the inclusion of the fixed-term provisions in the 2016 Act received strong objections throughout the Bill’s passage.
The Government support the use of lifetime tenancies because they provide stability and security for households, and help people to put down roots in their communities. Security of tenure matters, particularly for families, older residents, disabled people and others for whom a settled home is the foundation of wider wellbeing and opportunity. That was the rationale for the changes we recently implemented through the Renters’ Rights Act 2025.
Although we promote the use of lifetime tenancies, the Government expect landlords to make the best and most effective use of their homes to meet housing need. Landlords can support tenants to downsize, transfer or mutually exchange their homes if their circumstances change. That helps people to move to properties that are better suited to them and ensures that social housing is used in the fairest way possible.
Retaining the option for landlords to grant fixed-term tenancies is an important tool that allows councils to respond to specific circumstances, such as supporting time-limited resettlement schemes. The schedule also retains the existing approach to succession by reinserting the relevant provisions from the 2016 Act, ensuring that there are no substantial changes to how succession works in practice.
The repeal of the uncommenced provisions will provide greater certainty to tenants and landlords, and ensure that the law continues to work properly after they are removed. The previous Government confirmed in their 2018 social housing Green Paper, after listening to residents’ concerns, that they had no intention of implementing those provisions. Once again, this Government are going a step further and repealing them from the statute book.
Government amendments 75 to 77 make minor and technical changes to the succession provisions in schedule 3. Amendment 77 corrects the provision dealing with demoted tenancies so that it refers only to changes that apply to those tenancies. References to provisions that apply only to introductory tenancies are removed, as those cases are already covered separately. Amendments 75 and 76 make it clear that the sections 143H and 143J to which the provisions refer are sections of the Housing Act 1996. The amendments do not change policy or tenants’ rights; they simply clarify the Bill’s wording and make sure that references are correct and in order. I commend clause 17 and Government amendments 75 to 77 to the Committee.
Gareth Bacon
I rise to speak to new clauses 40 and 58, which I tabled.
Social housing is not a one-size-fits-all, and new clause 40 would protect the invaluable and expert knowledge of local authorities by giving them a greater say over the type of tenancy that they can offer to local people. That would preserve local authorities’ discretion to use fixed-term tenancies for social housing. Used appropriately, fixed-term tenancies allow a landlord to review a household’s circumstances at the end of a term and make sure that the home can be put to best use for those who need it most. They allow for the flexibility necessary to ensure that when a tenant’s situation has improved, a home can be made available for local people with the greatest need. The new clause is about empowering local authorities and delivering an efficient social housing system—two things that the Bill fails to do in many ways. Importantly, it imposes nothing and takes nothing away. It protects local knowledge, expertise and discretion.
Social housing exists for the express purpose of providing those who are most in need with not just shelter, but a place to call home. In a system under severe financial strain and lacking in adequate supply, it is essential that social homes are allocated to those in genuine need who are at the most severe risk, not just those who once needed them but no longer do. That is why we have tabled new clause 58, which would require local housing authorities to review lifetime secure tenancies every five years to ensure that social housing continues to meet tenants’ needs. It would also ensure that existing stock is used as effectively as possible. With 1.34 million people on the waiting list, a record number of people sleeping rough and a staggering 178,000 children in temporary accommodation, not a single social home can afford to be filled by somebody who could reasonably afford market rent or buy their own property.
Danny Beales
I completely agree that there is a desperate need for social homes in this country after decades of under-delivery, which this Government are starting to turn the tide on. It is interesting that earlier in Committee, Opposition Members were proposing amendments to support the further loss of council homes through allowing extensive right-to-buy provisions. The arguments do not seem to be compatible. Does the shadow Minister have any reflections on that? Does he not think that the threat of a review and potentially losing a council home if a person earns a bit more money might dampen their aspiration of trying to progress in life and get a better job?
Gareth Bacon
As I said earlier, the Bill will not add a single social home to this country’s current tally. If social housing was in abundant supply, I would agree with the hon. Gentleman, but it is not. It is a scarce resource and the important thing that we are trying to make clear is about how we use that scarce resource.
Right to buy generates receipts that can be reinvested in building more social housing. Given that the overwhelming majority of people living in social housing are in lifetime tenancies, regardless of their circumstance, that housing is not available to people on the waiting list. It is already occupied and nobody is saying that that should change. So, it is not the case that right to buy causes a depletion of available social housing stock— it simply does not.
New clause 58 is not an eviction notice. It would not grant new powers to remove people from their homes. It is a common-sense move to assess how best to ensure that scarce resources are used for those who need a home most.
Matthew Pennycook
Let me start with new clause 40, which seeks to clarify that social landlords can continue to grant fixed-term tenancies.
Fixed-term tenancies will no longer be available within the assured tenancy framework once the relevant Renters’ Rights Act 2025 reforms take effect. I therefore understand that the proposal is aimed principally at ensuring that local housing authorities and other secure tenancy landlords can continue to grant fixed-term tenancies when appropriate.
I want to be clear that the new clause is not needed. Nothing in the Bill prevents secure-tenancy landlords from granting fixed-term tenancies. As I have said, the Bill repeals uncommenced provisions in the Housing and Planning Act 2016, which would have required most new secure tenancies to be fixed-term tenancies. As we have just debated, those provisions were never brought into force and we are now removing them in order to provide clarity. Secure-tenancy landlords will still be able to offer fixed-term tenancies where they consider it appropriate to do so; as I have said, the Bill does not change that. The proposed measures risk repeating what is already the case in law for secure-tenancy landlords and would create confusion by suggesting that the Bill removes flexibility in this area when it does not. For those reasons, I ask the shadow Minister not to press new clause 40.
New clause 58 would require local housing authorities to review lifetime secure tenancies every five years. I made it clear when speaking to clause 17 that the Government support the use of lifetime tenancies because they provide stability and security for households and help people to put down roots in their communities. That is precisely why we are repealing uncommenced provisions in the 2016 Act that would have phased out lifetime secure tenancies in favour of mandatory fixed-term tenancies.
We expect local authorities and other social landlords to make the best and most effective use of their stock to meet housing need. However, we do not believe that a statutory requirement for local authorities to review every secure tenancy once every five years would be an appropriate way to support them in doing so, given the administrative burden that that would entail. We also believe that it would have detrimental impacts on tenants and communities. Those are some of the reasons why the previous Government did not commence the provisions they had legislated for in the 2016 Act.
Patrick Spencer (Central Suffolk and North Ipswich) (Con)
I am losing track of the narrative in this debate. The Government do not want to sell the unit to the tenant, but that means they will forgo all the long-term health, economic, social and community benefits of home ownership. At the same time, you want to lock them into lifelong tenancies, which would take their house out of action and reduce its availability to other households that are more in need. Perhaps I have misunderstood the Bill, but that is the narrative that I understand the Government are setting out. Can the Minister confirm that for me?
The Chair
Order. I remind Members that I am not involved in any way with this legislation. Members should not refer to the Minister as “you”.
Matthew Pennycook
I fear that the hon. Gentleman does misunderstand the Bill in a number of respects. First, we are not abolishing or phasing out the right to buy. As I have persistently made clear, we want to ensure that the right to buy is available for long-standing tenants who have lived in—[Interruption.] The hon. Gentleman can intervene once I have answered his first question. I refer to those tenants who have lived in and paid rent on their homes for many years.
I have already made it clear in a previous debate that landlords can already consider the changing needs of tenants through a variety of methods, ranging from tenant surveys to direct engagement. They can already support tenants to downsize, to transfer or to mutually exchange their home if their circumstances change. The new clause would mandate, through primary legislation, a review of every secure tenancy once every five years. I simply put it to the hon. Gentleman—this picks up on the precise reason why the previous Conservative Government did not bring into force the provisions in their own 2016 Act—that that would entail huge administrative burdens for local authorities. We think, because we believe in the principle of secure tenancies in social housing—in terms of the benefits for tenants and for communities more widely—that we should not impose such a statutory review every five years. I am struggling to see how that is incompatible with trying to place the right-to-buy scheme on a fairer and more sustainable footing.
The Government are reviewing how effectively social housing providers are using their stock. That work is considering issues such as under-occupation, overcrowding and how landlords are supporting tenant movement. We will set out findings from that review and the next steps in due course. We think social landlords can, in some instances, make better and more effective use of their stock. That does not necessarily require, as a means to support them to do so, a statutory requirement to review every secure tenancy every five years.
John Slinger (Rugby) (Lab)
Regarding social landlords reassessing the use of their stock, does the Minister agree that there needs to be more focus on the needs of disabled members of our community? My constituent Keeley Callan came to see me on Friday. She is disabled, and I would argue she is actually disabled by the social housing system because she has been waiting for at least five years to move into her own accommodation. That is totally unacceptable, given her equal rights to housing in law. Will the Minister briefly reflect on that as he sums up?
Matthew Pennycook
I am sorry to hear about that case; if my hon. Friend wants to write to me with further details, I am more than happy to look into it. I would make two points: local authorities are best placed to decide the types of social homes their communities need and to plan for them appropriately. Local authorities also have a statutory duty to promote adaptations for disabled people in all housing tenures, subject to a needs assessment, and the Government provide the disabled facilities grant to support them. I am happy to write to my hon. Friend with more details about the support that should be in place and the expectations that the Government have in respect of local authorities. If he wants to write to me, I am more than happy to come back to him on the particular points that might arise from the case he has mentioned.
We cannot accept new clause 58 and I have already spoken to new clause 40, tabled by the shadow Minister. I ask the Committee to support Government amendments 75 to 77 and I commend clause 17 to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 17 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 3
Secure, introductory and demoted tenancies: uncommenced legislation etc
Amendments made: 75, in schedule 3, page 41, line 1, after “143H” insert
“of the Housing Act 1996”.
This would clarify that this sub-paragraph amends the Housing Act 1996.
Amendment 76, in schedule 3, page 42, line 5, after “143J” insert
“of the Housing Act 1996”.
This would clarify that this sub-paragraph amends the Housing Act 1996.
Amendment 77, in schedule 3, page 42, line 23, leave out “to (10)” and insert
“, (9) and (10)(c) and (d)”.—(Matthew Pennycook.)
This would clarify that only sub-paragraph 10(c) and (d) are relevant to sub-paragraph (13). Sub-paragraph 10(a) and (b) concern introductory, rather than demoted, tenancies.
Schedule 3, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 18
Rents for high income social tenants
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 42—Review of income eligibility for social housing—
“(1) Within two years of the passing of this Act and every five years thereafter, the Secretary of State must review income eligibility thresholds for social housing.
(2) A review under subsection (1) must include consideration of the following trends over the previous five years—
(a) household earnings,
(b) regional housing costs,
(c) housing affordability, and
(d) levels of demand for social housing.
(3) The Secretary of State must publish the findings of each review and lay them before Parliament.”
This new clause would require regular reviews of income eligibility thresholds for social housing.
Matthew Pennycook
Clause 18 will repeal unimplemented provisions that would have required councils to charge higher rents to higher-income social tenants. We are now removing them to provide certainty and clean up the statute book. The provisions, as with others we have debated this afternoon, were never implemented. Once again, I note that the original provisions in the Housing and Planning Act 2016 received strong objections during the passage of that legislation.
A mandatory pay-to-stay scheme would be difficult and costly to administer. Indeed, the previous Government, despite legislating for this policy, chose not to commence it on the explicit basis that the costs outweighed the benefits. Income alone is also not the only determinant of who is allocated social housing. Some households may have additional needs or circumstances which mean that social housing remains the only viable or appropriate option for them. That can be the case even where their income may be somewhat higher than others on the waiting list.
Social housing is targeted at those who need it most, but some tenants’ incomes may rise over time. Our focus is on keeping rents affordable and supporting all social tenants, not penalising tenants for improving their circumstances. As we debated in the previous group, landlords can encourage tenants to move if their circumstances change. Where tenants want to move or downsize, we expect landlords to support them to do so through transfers or mutual exchanges, which helps people move to properties that are better suited to them, and helps to ensure that social housing is used in the fairest way possible. Where councils and private registered providers choose, they can run voluntary pay-to-stay schemes, which allows landlords to decide whether a scheme is suitable for their area.
Councils can also consider an applicant’s income and financial circumstances when deciding whether they qualify for social housing and what priority they should receive. Households with higher incomes may be given less priority, or may not qualify at all. However, councils will also consider whether the household has other needs, as I have referenced, which can mean that social housing is still the right option for them.
Repealing these measures provides a fairer and more workable approach. This change will help keep rents affordable for social tenants, especially those on lower and middle incomes, avoid disincentives to work and mean that tenants are not incentivised to reduce their working hours to avoid higher rent. I commend clause 18 to the Committee.
Gareth Bacon
I rise to speak to new clause 42. If the Bill fails to build any new social housing, which we know it will, it could at the very least ensure that stock is allocated to those most in need. We believe that one of the fairest and most suitable ways to do so is to review the income eligibility thresholds for social housing. At present, up-to-date figures from the English housing survey suggest that around 186,000 social housing households have incomes above £50,000. That is both an injustice and an inefficiency in need of fixing, yet the Bill will not do so.
We must ensure that any changes to the structure of the social housing system are made to enable a fairer and more effective programme for the most vulnerable to find shelter. Social housing is a safety net, not a guarantee. People’s circumstances change over time. Those who have the means to pay market rent should do so, and that is why new clause 42 would require regular reviews of income eligibility thresholds. Without the new clause, the Bill would provide no avenue through which we can manage stock to free up more homes, no route towards building more social housing, and no light at the end of the tunnel for the 1.34 million people on the waiting list.
Matthew Pennycook
Before I respond to new clause 42, I must address something that the shadow Minister keeps saying, which is that the Bill does not build any new social housing. I have made this incredibly clear, and I encourage him to go and talk to his local authority, although I am not sure its record on social housing is a particularly good one. Local authorities are very clear and have said to us in plain terms that the measures in the Bill will incentivise them to build more social homes. Of course, it is not the case that this piece of legislation is the only means by which we are building new social and affordable housing. We have a £39 billion social and affordable homes programme, which dwarfs anything that the previous Conservative Government allocated in this area, and there is additional funding to come on top of that.
New clause 42 would require the Secretary of State to review income eligibility thresholds for social housing within two years of the Bill’s passage, and every five years thereafter, and to publish the findings and lay them before Parliament. Each review would consider trends over the previous five years in household earnings, regional housing costs, housing affordability and demand for social housing.
I recognise the importance of considering income to ensure that social housing is targeted at those most in need. Indeed, it is a sad truth that the residualisation of social housing over many years—not least because of the engineered decline of it under previous Conservative Governments, with increased right-to-buy discounts explicitly targeted to ensure that more is sold—has meant that, in most cases, it has become targeted to those on very low incomes, but we do not believe that the new clause is necessary.
Eligibility for social housing is considered through the allocations process, and there is no general national income eligibility threshold for social rented housing. As I have made clear, local authorities can take financial resources into account in determining qualification and relative priority under their allocation schemes, subject to statutory requirements, and private registered providers also operate their own lettings polices. This allows local and individual circumstances to be taken into account.
Rachel Blake
The Minister has been incredibly generous. I wonder whether he will reflect in his closing remarks on the clause—which repeals what were, in my view, ideological attacks on something that is a very practical solution to a range of market needs and the affordability options open to people—that the previous Government did not enact these measures because they were found to be impractical, and because their implementation would actually cost the taxpayer money due to the risks of an additional administrative burden on local authorities and increasing homelessness; or will he remain as gracious and generous as he has been in our discussions so far?
Matthew Pennycook
I thank my hon. Friend for the invitation to become ungracious in respect of Opposition Members. I remember the debates in that 2016 Bill Committee. Those were deeply ideological measures, but I think it says everything that Conservative Ministers decided they were impractical, unworkable, could not be implemented, and made it clear—[Interruption.] They did. I encourage Opposition Members to go and read the 2018 social housing Green Paper, in which Conservative Ministers made it very clear that huge administrative burdens would come from some of these measures, in addition to their detrimental impact on tenants and communities. What we are doing is going a step further, as I have said, and removing these measures, and the uncertainty they create, from the statute book.
On the new clause, it is important to be clear that only a very small minority of social housing lettings are to high-income households. This is based on household income, not individual income, and in many cases could reflect two people each earning a modest salary, rather than a single person on what anyone would reasonably describe as a high income. Some households may have additional needs or circumstances that mean that social housing remains, as I have said, the only viable or appropriate option for them. That can be the case even when their income may be somewhat higher than that of others on the waiting list.
Income should be considered alongside a household’s wider housing needs and circumstances, but we do not believe that this duty is necessary, or that it would be an appropriate use of resources for the Government to review every one of these independently set thresholds. In repealing the pay-to-stay provisions in the Housing and Planning Act 2016, councils and registered providers will still be able to operate voluntary pay-to-stay schemes for households earning over £60,000 if they wish to do so. That discretion is important and it remains, but there will be no mandatory national requirement. That approach will, as I have said, avoid disincentives for people to work or increase their earnings, and will support a more sensible system overall. I therefore ask that the new clause not be pressed, and I commend clause 18 to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 18 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 19
Health and safety lead: Parliamentary procedure
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Matthew Pennycook
Clause 19 will make a minor technical amendment to the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008, section 320 of which sets out the parliamentary procedure that applies to regulations made under its provisions. Regulations made under sections 70, 72 and 126A are subject to the affirmative procedure, which means that a draft of the regulations must be laid before and approved by both Houses of Parliament before they can be made.
However, the provision governing the negative procedure currently excludes only regulations made under sections 70 and 72; it does not also refer to section 126A. Clause 19 corrects that inconsistency and ensures that all regulations that section 320 specifies as being subject to the affirmative procedure are properly excluded from the negative procedure. The clause does not confer any new powers or reduce the level of parliamentary scrutiny; it simply ensures that the existing statutory provisions operate clearly and consistently. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 19 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
New Clause 21
Management of local authority housing by TMOs
“Schedule (Management of local authority housing by TMOs) makes provision about the management of local authority housing accommodation by tenant management organisations.”—(Matthew Pennycook.)
This would introduce NS1 which provides for a revised and expanded legislative regime about the management of council housing by tenant management organisations.
Brought up, and read the First time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government new schedule 1—Management of local authority housing by TMOs.
Government amendment 79.
Matthew Pennycook
The right to manage can be a powerful tool through which social housing residents can take greater control of the housing services that they receive, but it must operate within a clear, robust framework that protects residents and clarifies respective responsibilities. Taken together, these changes will update and strengthen the right to manage, making it easier for social housing tenants to exercise that right with confidence, while ensuring that appropriate safeguards are in place.
These reforms have been informed by the findings of the review of the right to manage that was undertaken by the Government. Through the review, we heard clearly from stakeholders that the current right to manage framework has not kept pace with wider regulatory change. They highlighted the need for governance that is more proportionate and for greater clarity on roles, responsibilities and information sharing.
We also heard from landlords and residents that the current routes for intervention if things go wrong can be slow and cumbersome. Within schedule 1, proposed new sections 27AD to 27AF of the Housing Act 1985 will enable a more proportionate approach to governance requirements. They will put in place lighter-touch requirements where residents take on more limited services, and stronger requirements where tenant management organisations assume more complex functions, including building safety responsibilities.
Those provisions will also provide broader powers to strengthen the framework governing right to manage arrangements, helping to ensure that it keeps pace with wider regulatory requirements, including on the safety and decency of social homes and quality of services to tenants. These are enabling powers that will allow us to update the right to manage regulations and guidance to govern management agreements, ballots of residents, regular reviews and information sharing. The powers will come into effect on Royal Assent, but we will consult on the detail before introducing the new regulations and guidance.
Proposed new sections 27AG to 27AL will also require regular reviews of the management agreements, strengthen the requirements for residents to be balloted on continuation of TMO arrangements, and require better information sharing between TMOs and their landlords. They will also strengthen requirements on landlords to consult TMOs on policy changes affecting functions exercised under management agreements.
Proposed new sections 27AM to 27AQ will create a targeted court-backed route for intervention in exceptional cases, including removal of board members where there is serious mismanagement of a TMO or a risk to residents’ safety. That route will be subject to judicial oversight, with the court required to be satisfied that urgent intervention is appropriate. That will help to address the concerns raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Dulwich and West Norwood (Helen Hayes) about the ability of councils to act swiftly where serious failings are putting residents at risk.
We know that many TMOs work hard to deliver good-quality housing services that respond to local priorities and are supported by tenants who give up their own time to serve on committees. These reforms will make the right to manage easier to exercise, clearer to operate and safer for residents. They will support resident empowerment while ensuring that landlords have the tools they need to meet their regulatory requirements and safeguard residents.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 21 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 22
Duty of private registered provider to offer accommodation after local authority request
“(1) After section 193C of the Housing Act 1996 insert—
‘193D Duty of private registered provider to offer accommodation after local authority request
(1) This section applies where—
(a) a local housing authority in England has a duty under section 193 to secure accommodation for an applicant, and
(b) the authority has made a written request to a private registered provider of social housing to provide low cost rental accommodation in the authority’s district for the applicant.
(2) The provider must make an offer of low cost rental accommodation in the authority’s district to the applicant within a reasonable period, unless the provider has a good reason not to.
(3) If the provider considers that there is a good reason not to make an offer of low cost rental accommodation in the authority’s district, the provider must, as soon as reasonably practicable, give written notice of the reason to the local housing authority.
(4) In deciding whether to make a request under subsection (1)(b), the local housing authority must have regard to—
(a) the type and amount of low cost rental accommodation that the provider in question owns or manages in the authority’s district, and
(b) the extent to which the provider is already providing accommodation in the authority’s district to persons who are homeless.
(5) The local housing authority may by written notice require the provider to provide the information described in subsection (4)(a) or (b), unless it is not reasonably practicable to do so.
(6) A notice under subsection (5) may require the information to be provided—
(a) within a specified period;
(b) in a specified manner or form.
(7) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision for the purposes of subsection (2) as to what constitutes—
(a) a reasonable period;
(b) a good reason.
save-line2(8) “Low cost rental accommodation” has the same meaning as in the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008 (see section 69)
(9) An offer made under this section is not an offer of accommodation under Part 6 (allocation of housing).’”—(Matthew Pennycook.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Matthew Pennycook
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Many councils and housing associations already work closely together to secure settled homes for people facing homelessness. We are committed to building on the many examples of good practice and collaboration that exist, but informal agreements between councils and other providers do not always work. Private registered providers are less likely than councils to offer accommodation to homeless households. New clause 22 will give local housing authorities an additional tool to help them to discharge the main homelessness duty.
Where a council owes a household the main homelessness duty, it will be able to ask a private registered provider with social housing in its area to offer social housing to that household. The provider must respond and offer suitable accommodation within a reasonable period unless it has good reason not to do so. We will consult councils, housing providers and other relevant providers before setting out in regulations what constitutes a reasonable period and a good reason, but, to give an example, a private registered provider would not be expected to offer accommodation if they do not have anything suitable available in a reasonable timeframe.
The power includes important safeguards. Before making a referral, the council must take account of the type and amount of accommodation that the provider has locally, and the extent to which it is already housing homeless households. That will ensure that referrals are fair and proportionate and that they reflect local circumstances. The approach builds on established practice in Scotland and delivers a commitment in our national plan to end homelessness. I commend the new clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 22 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 23
Referral of homelessness cases to other local housing authorities
“(1) Section 198 of the Housing Act 1996 (referral of case) is amended in accordance with subsections (2) and (3).
(2) After subsection (4) insert—
‘(4ZA) The Secretary of State may by regulations specify circumstances in which—
(a) the conditions for referral mentioned in subsection (2),
(b) the conditions for referral mentioned in subsection (2ZA), or
(c) the conditions for referral mentioned in subsection (4),
are not met for the purposes of referral of a case by a local housing authority in England.’
(3) In subsection (7) after ‘order’, in the first two places it occurs, insert ‘or regulations’.”—(Matthew Pennycook.)
This would allow the Secretary of State to make regulations specifying circumstances where a local housing authority in England cannot refer a person who is homeless to another local housing authority.
Brought up, and read the First time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss Government new clause 24—Duties of specified bodies to collaborate and act on homelessness.
Matthew Pennycook
New clauses 23 and 24 will strengthen homelessness prevention and ensure that support reaches those who need it most, as quickly as possible.
We owe a debt of gratitude to those who have served in our armed forces. They have given so much of their life in service to their country, and it is right that we support them to have a safe home on leaving active service. The number of former armed service personnel seeking homelessness support is thankfully relatively small, but the Government recognise that those who do so can face challenges, particularly if they seek to establish themselves in an area where they may have no existing local connections. The existing legislation permits a local housing authority to refer someone who is seeking housing support, but does not have any connections to their local area, to the area of another local housing authority where they do.
New clause 23 provides a power for the Secretary of State to define in regulations where that should not apply. We propose to use that power to exempt our armed forces veterans from local connection referrals. That means that there will be no barriers or delays to veterans receiving homelessness assistance. They will be able to seek support from anywhere in the country, and the local authority will be required to provide assistance. This builds on the action that we took last year to exempt veterans from any local connection test that councils might apply to determine who qualifies for an allocation of social housing.
Rachel Blake
I strongly welcome the move to remove the local connection test for armed forces veterans. It indicates this Government’s recognition that the local connection sometimes creates barriers for people to making their way off the streets, particularly when they are vulnerable. I welcome the Bill’s acknowledgment of the issue. I hope that there can be an ongoing conversation about the role of local connection tests, particularly regarding rough sleeping and how we support people to stop sleeping rough.
Matthew Pennycook
I very much welcome my hon. Friend’s support for this measure. I am more than happy to have an ongoing dialogue about the issue with her, as I do with so many others. It is absolutely right that we look to do everything possible to support our veterans.
I turn to new clause 24. We know that homelessness rarely occurs without warning. Yet too often, people come to the attention of local housing authorities only when they have already reached crisis point. Many of them will have been in contact with different public services long before, but opportunities to identify risk, co-ordinate support and intervene early are often missed. People often face homelessness despite engaging with services that are well placed to help prevent it. The new clause addresses this challenge by introducing new duties on specified bodies to identify and act on a person’s homelessness or risk of homelessness. This supports the Government’s commitment to prevent and relieve homelessness at the earliest possible stage.
The specified bodies will also be required to take meaningful action as part of the existing functions to address or relieve homelessness. The duty will replace and extend the existing duty to refer. It will mandate earlier engagement with local housing authorities, alongside notifying them if someone requires support. It also mandates continued engagement with the local authority to enable it to support an individual as effectively as possible, and will require specified bodies to consider other sources of support for the individual.
Preventing homelessness should not be the responsibility of a single organisation. People at risk of homelessness often have multiple and overlapping needs, including poor health, unemployment, financial hardship or involvement with the justice system. No single service can address these issues effectively alone.
Danny Beales
On the point about specific bodies, can the Minister clarify whether this provision would extend to hospital trusts and prisons within the criminal justice system? I am sure he knows that one of the most significant routes on to the street is from both of those public sector institutions. Unfortunately, hospitals rarely if ever count those who are likely to sleep rough on discharge or are currently doing so. Positively, the Government’s rough sleeping strategy is committed to ending discharge to street from hospitals, but getting that engagement from the NHS and trusts as well as the asylum system and prisons will be crucial to making that happen. Will this new clause be a step forward in that regard?
Matthew Pennycook
I appreciate my hon. Friend’s points. We will set out the specified bodies in due course. I hear what he says about hospital trusts in particular. I think engagement is to take place on the precise scope of the specified bodies that we want to be caught by the new duty. On the point of principle—these are broad enabling powers—effective prevention depends on earlier identification, co-ordinated action and shared responsibility across services.
Importantly, this is not about creating an entirely new system. Many services already undertake these activities to support homelessness prevention, whether by identifying vulnerabilities, signposting support, making referrals or working with partners to resolve housing issues. These new duties build on existing good practice and should drive a consistent national framework to support those who are most vulnerable.
The Government intend to define in secondary legislation the bodies within scope and the actions required to comply with the duty, but my officials and I have heard the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Uxbridge and South Ruislip makes.
Mr Dillon
The new clause refers to identifying the local housing authority to which the notification could be made. In additional legislation, is it possible that H could notify more than one local housing authority— if they had a local connection, say, in Liverpool and in Berkshire—to get them off the streets as soon as possible?
Matthew Pennycook
If the hon. Member will allow me, I will write to him on that specific point; I do not have an answer to hand. I am more than happy to set out how these provisions might work where multiple local authorities are involved. I take his point on that. ‘relevant steps section 213AC(3)’; ‘specified body section 213AB(2)’.”
As I say, we intend to define in secondary legislation the bodies within scope and the actions required to comply with the duty. This will allow us to work closely with stakeholders to ensure that implementation is proportionate and effective and that it reflects the differing functions of individual services. Ultimately, the new clause is about ensuring that services work together to identify risks earlier and intervene before people reach crisis point. By creating a more joined-up approach to homelessness prevention, we can help more people to remain in their homes, shift the system away from crisis response and deliver our ambition on homelessness and rough sleeping, as the Prime Minister has rightly outlined. I commend the new clauses to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 23 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 24
Duties of specified bodies to collaborate and act on homelessness
“(1) This section amends the Housing Act 1996.
(2) After section 213AA insert—
‘213AB Specified bodies must identify actual or possible homelessness
(1) A specified body must take reasonable steps to identify persons in England in relation to whom it exercises functions who it considers are or may be—
(a) homeless,
(b) threatened with homelessness, or
(c) otherwise at risk of becoming homeless.
(2) When a specified body becomes subject to that duty in relation to a particular person (taking into account any effect of regulations made under section 213AG(1)), the body must comply with the duty promptly.
213AC Specified bodies must act on actual or possible homelessness
(1) A specified body must comply with the duty to notify the local housing authority (see section 213AD) in relation to a person (H) if the body identifies H as a person who the body considers is or may be—
(a) homeless, or
(b) threatened with homelessness.
(2) But the specified body does not need to comply with the duty to notify if it is satisfied that—
(a) H has already made an application for assistance, and
(b) the application has not been disposed of.
(3) A specified body must comply with the general duty to act (see section 213AE) in relation to a person (H) if the body identifies H as a person who the body considers is or may be—
(a) homeless,
(b) threatened with homelessness, or
(c) otherwise at risk of becoming homeless.
(4) A “relevant step”, in relation to H, means a step to—
(a) prevent H becoming homeless,
(b) reduce the risk of H becoming homeless,
(c) relieve H’s homelessness, or
(d) alleviate the effects of H’s homelessness.
213AD The duty to notify the local housing authority
(1) The “duty to notify the local housing authority” in relation to H consists of the duties set out in this section.
(2) The specified body must ask H—
(a) whether H has made an application for assistance under this Part, and
(b) if so, to which local housing authority the application was made.
(3) If H has not made an application for assistance, the specified body must ask whether H agrees to the body notifying a local housing authority in England—
(a) that the body considers that H is or may be homeless or threatened with homelessness, and
(b) how H may be contacted by the local housing authority.
(4) If H agrees to the specified body making the notification, the body must ask H—
(a) whether H consents to the body sharing with the authority such information as is necessary to make the notification (including information provided by H and information already held by the body), and
(b) to identify a local housing authority in England to which H would like the notification to be made.
(5) If H agrees to the specified body making the notification and consents to the body sharing the information that is necessary to make the notification, the body must notify the local housing authority in England to which H would like the notification to be made.
213AE The general duty to act
(1) The “general duty to act” in relation to H consists of the duties set out in this section.
(2) The specified body must—
(a) consider the question of what relevant steps could be taken by it or other persons, and
(b) raise that question with such persons as the body considers appropriate, who must include any other persons that could take relevant steps.
(3) After complying with subsection (2) the specified body—
(a) must take any relevant steps which it concludes it can take, and
(b) must provide to the persons with which it has raised that question reasonable assistance to assist or enable them to take relevant steps.
(4) This section does not affect any right of the specified body, whether by virtue of a contract, enactment or other law, to seek to obtain vacant possession of any accommodation.
(5) If a specified body must also comply with the duty to notify in relation to H, making the notification under section 213AD(5) does not satisfy the general duty to act in relation to H.
(6) A reference in this section to a relevant step—
(a) includes a relevant step that can be taken with the assistance of another person;
(b) in relation to a specified body, only includes a relevant step that the body can reasonably take in the exercise of its functions;
(c) in relation to a person who is not a specified body, only includes a relevant step that the person can reasonably take in the exercise of their functions or in carrying out their activities.
213AF Duty to engage with local housing authorities
(1) This section applies where a local housing authority in England considers—
(a) that a person is or may be homeless, threatened with homelessness or otherwise at risk of becoming homeless, and
(b) that a specified body exercises functions in relation to that person.
(2) The local housing authority may ask the specified body to engage with them for the purpose of assisting the authority with the discharge of their functions under this Part in relation to that person.
(3) The specified body must engage with the local housing authority in such manner and to such extent as the body considers reasonable in the circumstances.
213AG Regulations and guidance
(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about how specified bodies can or must comply with—
(a) the duty to identify homelessness,
(b) the duty to notify the local housing authority,
(c) the general duty to act, or
(d) the duty to engage.
(2) Regulations made under subsection (1) may, in particular, make provision about the following matters—
(a) factors to be considered by a specified body when identifying whether a person is homeless, threatened by homelessness or otherwise at risk of becoming homeless;
(b) what information is necessary to make a notification to a local housing authority in England;
(c) what relevant steps by a specified body in the exercise of its functions are reasonable;
(d) the process to be followed by a specified body when identifying which persons it is appropriate to raise the question in section 213AE(2)(b) with.
(3) Regulations under subsection (1) may not be made unless a draft of the statutory instrument containing them (whether alone or with other provisions) has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.
(4) The Secretary of State may issue guidance to specified bodies in relation to any of the following duties—
(a) the duty to identify homelessness;
(b) the duty to notify the local housing authority;
(c) the general duty to act;
(d) the duty to engage.
(5) Specified bodies must have regard to guidance issued to them under subsection (4).
213AH “Specified bodies” and other interpretation
(1) In sections 213AB to 213AG and this section—
“duty to engage” means the duty imposed by section 213AF for specified bodies to engage with local housing authorities;
“duty to identify homelessness” means the duty imposed by section 213AB;
“duty to notify the local housing authority” has the meaning given in section 213AD;
“general duty to act” has the meaning given in section 213AE;
“H” has the meaning given in section 213AC;
“relevant step” has the meaning given in section 213AC;
“specified body” means a body or other person that is—
(a) specified in regulations, or
(b) of a description specified in regulations.
(2) Regulations made under this section may provide that a person is a specified body only in relation to a particular function exercised by that person.
(3) If a provision under subsection (2) specifies a particular function of a specified body, any reference in sections 213AB to 213AG to the functions of a specified body has effect in relation that body only as a reference to that particular function.
(4) In this section, “regulations’ means regulations made by the Secretary of State.
(5) Regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the statutory instrument containing them (whether alone or with other provisions) has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.’
(3) Omit section 213B (duty of public authority to refer cases in England to local housing authority).
(4) In section 218 (index of defined expression Part 7) insert in the table at the appropriate places—
—(Matthew Pennycook.)
This would amend the Housing Act 1996 to introduce a duty for specified bodies to identify and act on homelessness.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Laurence Turner.)