Immigration and Asylum Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Matt Vickers Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Anna Turley]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Dr Murrison. Good morning to all colleagues.

Before we get into the detail of the various clauses, I want to place part 5 of the Bill, and all the provisions concerning modern slavery, in their wider context. Modern slavery is a vicious, cruel and barbaric crime that dehumanises people. This Government are absolutely committed to tackling it in all its forms, and to identifying victims and giving them the support that they need.

However, for the Government to continue to meet that commitment, we must go further. We need a robust end-to-end system supporting earlier identification, ensuring clear decisions and addressing opportunities for improper use, so that the system works effectively for those it is intended to protect. These measures will improve alignment with wider immigration and support systems while enhancing protections for child victims. We need to reduce further the risk of exploitation by increasing expectations on businesses to tackle abuse in their supply chains, and by strengthening the enforcement powers available to our courts and the police to stop offenders in their tracks. The clauses in the Bill will do all that.

Clauses 25 to 34 are focused on strengthening slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders. As modern slavery offending continues to evolve, the tools used to manage offending behaviour must keep pace to enable law enforcement and the courts to take more efficient and tougher action. Slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders give law enforcement agencies and the courts powers to apply for and grant orders to prohibit certain behaviour and to prevent harm, but they are not operating as effectively as they could be. The measures will strengthen those powers, making them more efficient and flexible to use, and improving their effectiveness as preventive tools. The changes will help to prevent further exploitation, better protect victims from harm and reduce the risk of exploitation and reoffending.

Clause 25 amends the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and provides the power for the court before which a person is acquitted of a slavery and human trafficking offence to make a slavery and trafficking risk order. The appropriate court is the court where the person was acquitted following a trial, the court allowing an appeal, or the Crown court on remittal following a successful appeal to the Court of Appeal.

Under existing legislation, a slavery and trafficking risk order is available only on application to the magistrates court. In circumstances where a person is acquitted of slavery and trafficking offences by the Crown court, the process places additional pressure on law enforcement and court time. Allowing the court that made the acquittal decision—including on appeal—to make an order, and extending the power to make an order to the higher court, will remove delays caused by the current process. As the trial court has already heard the evidence, it need not be repeated in the magistrates court. That will also mean that the courts can make an order of their own motion. That will improve efficiency and effectiveness by dealing with an individual immediately following the trial, reducing the risk of offending and preventing harm to others without delay.

The clause also enables the court to adjourn proceedings relating to a slavery and trafficking risk order on acquittal. The reasons we need adjournment of proceedings will be discussed in further detail under clause 30.

Government amendment 113 sets out a technical amendment to clause 25 to clarify which court is responsible for dealing with any future application to vary, renew or discharge a slavery and trafficking risk order made by the Court of Appeal on acquittal. The amendment makes it very clear that any subsequent application will be heard by the Crown court, rather than the Court of Appeal. That aligns the provision of the slavery and trafficking risk order made on acquittal with the existing approach under section 29 of the 2015 Act, which covers appeals of the decision to make an order and ensures a consistent process for managing such orders. The amendment will also ensure that the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal is not taken up by further matters in respect of the orders. I commend the amendment to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

It is, as ever, a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Murrison.

Clause 25 allows a court to make a slavery and trafficking risk order when someone is acquitted of a slavery or trafficking offence. The court may do so only when it is satisfied that the person’s conduct shows a risk that they will commit such an offence, and that an order is necessary to protect people from harm. It is worth reminding the Committee that these orders exist because of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, brought forward by Theresa May as Home Secretary. That legislation put this country at the forefront of the fight against modern slavery, and the Opposition welcome measures that build on it.

Modern slavery is a vile crime. It preys on the vulnerable and hides in plain sight in our towns and on our high streets, and the police need every reasonable tool to get ahead of it. Let me be clear: an acquittal must be respected, and nobody should treat a risk order as a second verdict. However, a trial can bring out evidence of risky conduct that falls short of proving the offence charged. Where the statutory test is met, it makes sense for the court that has heard all the evidence to be able to act there and then. The alternative is that the police must start again in another court, with another application, another handover and another chance for the case to fall through the cracks. The person at risk cannot afford that.

This power will not use itself, however. Prosecutors and police need to have considered it before the trial ends, with the evidence ready and a plan for who will manage any restrictions afterwards. Otherwise, we risk passing a good clause that goes unused at the very moment it matters. Government amendment 113 corrects the Government’s own drafting—I suspect that it will not be the last correction we see in Committee. An appeal against such an order will be treated like an appeal against sentence. The Court of Appeal may end up making an order itself. The amendment ensures that any late application to vary, renew or discharge that order goes to the Crown court.

Officers should know which court to go to without a dispute over jurisdiction, so we support the amendment, but we should be honest about where many of the applications will land. The Crown court backlog reached a new record of more than 80,800 cases at the end of June. Every additional application joins that queue, and victims are already waiting far too long. That is not a reason to oppose this power, but it is a reason for the Government to tell the Committee what assessment they have made of the court time needed and how it will be found.

The clause also amends the Scottish and Northern Irish legislation, so that breaching one of the new orders is an offence in those jurisdictions, too. Those who exploit others do not stop at borders, and someone subject to an order must not be able to escape enforcement by moving to another part of the United Kingdom.

We support the clause and the Government amendment, but I would be grateful if the Minister answered three questions. First, who will be responsible for identifying suitable cases before an acquittal brings proceedings to an end, and what guidance will prosecutors be given? Secondly, how many of the orders do the Government expect to be made each year? Thirdly, if someone subject to one of the orders moves to Scotland or Northern Ireland, how will the order be enforced there promptly?

[Anna Turley]

I thank the shadow Minister for his response to this debate. As discussed, the clause makes important amendments to the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and provides the power for the court before which a person is acquitted of a slavery and human trafficking offence to make a slavery and trafficking risk order.

Let me address a couple of the points made by the hon. Gentleman. He asked whether the measures would contribute to an increase in court time. The court will have heard the evidence during the trial or considered it on appeal, and it will be best placed to assess whether an order is necessary. The Government amendment will also mean that the evidence heard in the Crown court does not need to be repeated in the magistrates court, so court time in the magistrates court will be reduced, improving efficiency and effectiveness by handling the case immediately following the trial.

The hon. Gentleman also asked whether the measures will increase the use of orders and how many orders we expect to see. As hon. Members know, we have published an impact assessment setting out the analytical case for the proposed measures, and developed a justice impact test with the Ministry of Justice. The estimated impacts are therefore only indicative, as no available evidence or data estimates the magnitude of the increase in the number of orders issued as a result of the changes, but the scenarios assume that the number of prevention or risk orders will increase by between 25% and 75%, which equates to an increase of 20 to 30 orders per year.

Government amendment 113 is technical and will merely clarify which court is responsible for dealing with any future application to vary, renew or discharge a slavery and trafficking risk order made by the Court of Appeal on acquittal. I commend it to the Committee.

Amendment 113 agreed to.

Clause 25, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 26

Power for Chief Constable of the British Transport Police Force to apply for prevention and risk orders etc

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Anna Turley]

The hon. Member for Stockton West was right to raise the concerns of law enforcement partners about the limitations to the effectiveness of slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders. We are seeking to deal with that issue through these clauses.

Our ambition is to ensure that law enforcement agencies have exactly the right tools they need to respond as offending evolves. Currently, the British Transport police must rely on a local force to make an application for a slavery and trafficking order on their behalf, even if the British Transport police have undertaken all relevant investigations. That means that there are delays between identifying a risk and an application for a slavery and trafficking order.

Clause 26 extends the list of bodies to allow the chief constable of the British Transport police to apply to a magistrates court to make, vary, discharge and renew slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders. Giving an express power to the British Transport police will enhance the force’s capability to disrupt and tackle criminal exploitation and sexual exploitation on the transport network, and to keep pace with how modern slavery offending has evolved. It will also reduce costs and the time spent by local forces on making and processing applications of these orders on behalf of the British Transport police, and will enable swifter protection of victims by minimising the length of time between the offence taking place and the application being made. Extending these powers to the British Transport police will send a message to organised criminal gangs that all areas of law enforcement are equipped to take decisive action against perpetrators who exploit vulnerable individuals.

Clause 27 will remove a further limitation on law enforcement applications for slavery and trafficking orders: the restriction on chief officers of police of being able to make applications for slavery and trafficking orders only in relation to a person who lives in their police force area. The nature of modern slavery offending, and the links to other types of crime, have evolved since the Modern Slavery Act 2015 was introduced. Both criminal and sexual exploitation offending can take place across force areas, in multiple locations across the country, and online.

The legislation also needs to evolve to remain effective and to reduce the risk of offending and harm caused. The current legislation does not account for instances where the perpetrator has never visited or does not intend to visit the location where the offending occurs—that includes circumstances in which the offending takes place online. In such cases, the offending is more likely to be identified by the force in the location where the offending occurs, but the responsibility for applying for an order currently falls on the force in the perpetrator’s area of residence. Removing that restriction will enable law enforcement to improve the way it targets and disrupts modern slavery and human trafficking offending by relieving the burden on forces. It will cut back on application delays by allowing any force to apply for the order. The application will need to be made in the area where the defendant lives, or in the police area where the applicant believes the defendant is or is intending to come to. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 26 brings the chief constable of the British Transport police into the arrangements for applying for slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders. Clause 27 widens the ability of territorial police forces to apply for these orders against people who live outside their area. The Opposition welcome both clauses.

The gangs behind modern slavery do not respect police boundaries, and our ability to stop them should not be hemmed in by those boundaries. The gangs move people by road and rail, they recruit in one town and exploit in another, and they rely on the gaps between agencies. Officers on our railways might be the first to see what is going on. If a British Transport police officer keeps seeing the same man shepherding the same frightened young people between stations, and gathers the evidence and identifies the risk, the next step should not be a phone call to ask another force to make the application.

Clause 27 deals with the same problem for territorial forces. Under the current law, a force can apply only in respect of someone who lives in its area or who intends to come into its area, but someone can live in one force area and do their damage in another. The force holding the evidence should be able to act, but wider powers require clear responsibility. If several forces have an interest in the same individual, who leads? Who checks that the person is complying with the order? Who answers the phone when a victim reports contact that might breach the order? Criminals exploit gaps, and we should not create new gaps between police forces.

Let me make a point that applies to the whole of part 5 of the Bill, so that I do not have to repeat it when addressing every group of amendments. Every new power in clauses 25 to 34 comes with work attached. Officers must recognise when an order is appropriate, build an application that will stand up in court, attend hearings and then manage the order for years. The British Transport police already have a demanding job keeping passengers safe, and our courts are already stretched. This is not about point-scoring on resources, but none of those powers will work just because a clause has been passed. Officers need training, guidance and capacity, and Ministers cannot hand forces new duties and leave them to pick up the bill.

We support clauses 26 and 27, but I would be grateful if the Minister could answer the following questions. First, were these changes requested by chief officers, including the chief constable of the British Transport police, and if so, what problems did they identify? Secondly, will there be an agreed protocol in place before these powers come into force, setting out which force leads when more than one force is involved? Thirdly, what assessment have the Government made of the training, guidance and capacity that forces will need to use the new powers set out in this part of the Bill?

[Anna Turley]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his contribution and his questions, and we appreciate his support for these important clauses.

Put simply, clauses 26 and 27 address the important issue of how law enforcement agencies will deal with the issues in their area. Clause 26 extends the provisions to the British Transport police, while clause 27 removes the restriction on chief officers of police of being able to apply for orders only in relation to people living in their local area.

As I set out earlier, currently there are unnecessary limitations on law enforcement’s ability to apply for slavery and trafficking orders. The constraints on how the orders can be applied for restrict their effectiveness. This means that we could be doing more to manage the risks identified, to protect vulnerable people who are at risk of exposure to these horrendous crimes.

To manage that, we have worked closely with enforcement colleagues—including, to respond to the hon. Gentleman, the British Transport police—to design new clauses that will allow forces to apply for the orders and remove the restriction on chief officers of police of being able to apply for orders in relation only to individuals living in their local police area. That will allow forces to better manage individuals who are committing offences across police force boundaries.

The hon. Gentleman asked about how the responsibility for monitoring and enforcing would be managed, and how the process would work. This amendment will improve co-operation between local forces and the British Transport police, who have to work collaboratively at almost every stage of the process, from application to monitoring. The British Transport police will still need to engage with the relevant local forces, give notice of the application to the chief officer of police, and conduct monitoring of the orders.

The hon. Gentleman asked whether a national monitoring system would be introduced. Law enforcement is responsible for monitoring and managing compliance with slavery and trafficking orders. The former modern slavery and organised immigration crime unit issued guidance to law enforcement on obtaining and managing slavery and trafficking prevention risk orders, to help ensure consistency across forces in England and Wales. When the changes are introduced, that statutory guidance will be updated to align with them, ensuring that all those involved have the right training and preparation for the new powers.

Together, clauses 26 and 27 allow the Modern Slavery Act 2015 to remain relevant to the modern world. I commend them to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 26 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 27 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 28

Notification requirements in slavery and trafficking prevention orders

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers]

Clauses 28 and 29 make compulsory the core notification requirements for slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders. The clauses also allow for the specification in regulations of further information that a court can require in a particular order.

The principle behind the clauses is simple: if the police are to enforce an order, they need to know who the person is and where to find them. An order is not worth the paper it is written on if the person it covers can simply disappear, so the Opposition welcome making the requirements compulsory, rather than optional. A “requirement” to notify must be exactly that—a requirement, not a polite request. Anyone who gives false details or deliberately keeps the police in the dark should expect consequences. We made the same argument during the passage of the Crime and Policing Bill, to which we tabled amendments that would have put real penalties on registered sex offenders who failed to notify. An obligation with no teeth is no obligation at all.

However, collecting information is only half the job. A notification requirement is only as good as the system behind it. If someone moves but the police are still working from their old address, officers knock on the wrong door and time is lost; when someone is at risk of exploitation, lost time can mean real harm. An address being on a form does not prove that anyone lives there. Someone has to check and record that address, and make sure that the information reaches the officers who need it, including those in other forces.

The clauses leave further requirements to be made under regulations. I welcome the fact that those regulations will be subject to the affirmative procedure, but before we give the Minister this regulation-making power, the Committee should understand the gap it is meant to close. What can officers not currently find out through the orders, and how would that information help them to prevent exploitation?

Finally, I want to raise the orders already in force. Under current law, a court making an order can choose whether to include notification requirements, meaning that some existing orders will contain no such requirement at all. Subsections 28(6) and 29(5) make clear that the new requirements will not apply to orders made before the clauses come into force. That means that even after the Bill becomes law, a person already subject to an order may have no duty to tell the police their name or address. The Committee will come on to discuss the powers to vary and renew orders under clause 34 of the Bill, but the Government should not wait for cases to come back to court by chance. They need a plan to find the existing orders that do not have those requirements, and to bring them up to the new standard.

We support clauses 28 and 29, but for these requirements to work in practice the Committee needs answers to three questions. First, on the regulation-making powers in both clauses, what additional information do the Government expect to require, and will the Committee see draft regulations before Report? Secondly, on enforcement, who will check that the details a person gives are true, and how will that information reach other police forces when the person moves? Thirdly, how many existing orders are currently enforced without notification requirements, and what is the Government’s plan for reviewing them?

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Turley]

There is a risk that the current legislation is not clear that a court can adjourn proceedings, although it is common practice for courts to adjourn proceedings in relation to the slavery and trafficking prevention orders. Clause 30 makes it explicit that a court can adjourn proceedings when a person has been found guilty of a slavery and trafficking offence before making a slavery and trafficking prevention order. It ensures that the court has the option to adjourn proceedings for a slavery and human trafficking offence even after sentencing. That will remove any existing or future doubt.

The clause also includes provision for when an individual does not attend proceedings, to ensure that the criminal justice process can continue. It is simply about ensuring that courts have the necessary powers to ensure a smooth and effective court process.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 30 allows a court to adjourn proceedings on a slavery and trafficking prevention order at sentencing. If the defendant does not attend the adjourned hearing, the court may adjourn again, issue a warrant for their arrest or, subject to safeguards, proceed in their absence. A court deciding whether to make one of these orders needs the evidence to get it right, and the Opposition support giving it the time to do so. Proposed restrictions may need checking, or information from another force may still be outstanding. Rushing that work could produce an order that misses the very conduct it is meant to stop.

We should be clear about what an adjournment means in practice: another hearing has to be listed, officers may have to return to court, and if the offender is not in custody the risk they pose has to be managed while the case waits. When someone has been convicted of exploiting another human being, the public will rightly expect any continuing risk to be dealt with promptly. Given the Crown court backlog of a record more than 80,000 cases, nobody should be adding avoidable hearings to that list.

It is also worth noting that the clause places no limit on how long proceedings can be adjourned or how many times. That is why so much depends on preparation. The possibility of a prevention order should not suddenly occur to someone at the end of a sentencing hearing. An adjournment may sometimes be necessary, but it must not become the fall-back for an application that nobody got ready.

We welcome the power to proceed when the defendant fails to attend; a convicted offender should not be able to hold up a protective order simply by staying at home. The safeguards in the clause matter. Before issuing a warrant, the court must be satisfied that the defendant had “adequate notice” of the hearing before proceeding in their absence. It must also be satisfied that the defendant was told the hearing could go ahead without them. If that is not done properly, the court cannot take the next step. Getting the paperwork right is what allows the court to act firmly.

We must not forget the victim. If the hearing has been put off, the victim needs to know that restrictions are not in place. Otherwise, they may rely on protection that does not yet exist. We support clause 30, but I would be grateful if the Minister answered the following questions. When proceedings are adjourned and the offender is not in custody, how will any immediate risk be managed until the order is made? Who will be responsible for telling victims that an order has been delayed and what has and has not been put in place? Will the Government monitor how often such proceedings are adjourned and how many times in a single case, so that a sensible power does not become another source of delay?

[Anna Turley]

I thank the shadow Minister for his thoughtful contributions. Clause 30 is simple: although courts can adjourn proceedings, the current legislation does not explicitly provide for that, which has created the potential for real uncertainty.

During the passage of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 in the House of Lords, a specific provision was requested in related to serious violence reduction orders to make it clear that proceedings could be adjourned even after sentencing took place. The specific provision for adjournment has been included in domestic abuse protection orders. That is intended to enable the court to determine any outstanding prevention orders, even after the criminal proceedings have concluded. Replicating measures such as those for instances of modern slavery will remove any current or future doubt that the court is able to determine a slavery and trafficking prevention order after sentencing.

Adjournment is a procedural tool that the court might take after sentencing or acquittal to consider imposing an order. The court may then consider further evidence related to the future risk of offending when considering whether to make a slavery and trafficking prevention order. Clause 30 is about enabling the court to more effectively address offending while the defendant is still under their power and to ensure that outstanding matters in a case can be dealt with at the same time. Adjourning proceedings in relation to the making of a prevention order is currently common practice, but we are making that explicit and mirroring the similar provisions in other legislation providing for civil orders.

The shadow Minister asked whether the measure would result in an increase in non-attendance in the courts and potentially an increase in warrants. A court can hear the proceedings in a person’s absence if it is satisfied that the defendant

“has had adequate notice of the time and place of the adjourned proceedings, and…has been informed that if the defendant does not appear for those proceedings the court may hear the proceedings in the defendant’s absence.”

As such, a person cannot continually delay proceedings by not attending, but the notice requirements are safeguarded to ensure that defendants are aware of the proceedings. The court cannot issue a warrant unless it is satisfied that the person

“has had adequate notice of the time and place of the adjourned proceedings”.

Clause 30 also makes clear that a court can adjourn proceedings where a person has been found guilty of a slavery and trafficking offence before making a slavery and trafficking prevention order.

I will pick up on the shadow Minister’s point about victim liaisons because that is important; I will undertake to get back to him and the Committee about that. The clause also undertakes a court process, which is currently common practice in relation to these orders and mirrors established legislative precedent from other civil orders. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 30 according ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 31

Slavery and trafficking prevention orders: electronic monitoring

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Turley]

There is currently no express power in the Modern Slavery Act 2015 to impose an electronic monitoring requirement as a condition of slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders. Case law suggests that that may be within the court’s existing powers; however, as it is not explicit in the current legislation, it can be unclear to the court that electronic monitoring—tagging, as we know it—is an option as a monitoring tool for slavery and trafficking orders. Introducing an express power will ensure that there is no doubt that electronic monitoring can be used where it is deemed necessary.

Clauses 31 and 32 set out the explicit provision for courts to impose an electronic monitoring requirement as part of a slavery and trafficking prevention order or an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order, or a slavery and trafficking risk order or an interim slavery and trafficking risk order. Such a requirement will be applied only where the court is satisfied that it is necessary for the purpose of protecting persons from physical or psychological harm. We want to ensure that law enforcement has all the tools it needs to manage offenders effectively.

Electronic monitoring enables law enforcement to monitor compliance with the conditions of an order where they include an exclusion zone, a curfew or travel restrictions. The conditions imposed by each order are tailored by the court depending on the nature of the individual’s risk of offending. Electronic monitoring, as a condition of a slavery and trafficking order, would also help to prevent reoffending and prevent offenders from fleeing, leaving the country and escaping criminal punishment.

We know that electronic monitoring of an offender can make victims and survivors feel safer in some instances and improve their engagement with the criminal justice system. Electronic monitoring can also act as a deterrent to perpetrators while the tag is being worn. Electronic monitoring will ensure certainty of detection when protective licence conditions are breached, strengthen offender management, help victims and survivors feel safe following the release of their perpetrators and help to prevent further offending.

Clause 33 sets out a number of consequential amendments to the Modern Slavery Act 2015 to support the introduction and enforcement of electronic monitoring requirements for individuals subject to slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders. The clause updates section 30 of the 2015 Act so that the existing offence of breaching an order applies consistently to all the modern slavery and trafficking orders. This ensures a consistent enforcement framework across the full range of orders.

The clause also sets out a requirement for the Secretary of State to issue a code of practice governing the processing of data obtained through electronic monitoring. That will provide clear guidance on the handling of information gathered through electronic monitoring while ensuring that appropriate safeguards are in place. The clause also provides the appropriate regulation-making framework for electronic monitoring arrangements and clarifies the parliamentary procedure for regulations specifying who may be responsible for electronic monitoring.

Clauses 31 to 33 will strengthen the operation of slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders, support the use of electronic monitoring and provide a clear framework for enforcement, governance and oversight, and I commend them to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

Clauses 31 to 33 provide for electronic monitoring in slavery and trafficking prevention orders and risk orders, including interim orders, and require the issuance of a code of practice on how the monitoring data is handled. A court order must mean something. If somebody is told to stay away from a potential victim or a particular place, the authorities need to know when that order is broken, and they need to act. Electronic monitoring can help with that, and the Opposition support these powers.

However, we should not view tagging through rose-tinted glasses. A tag tells the authority where someone is. It cannot stop the person picking up a phone and getting someone else to do their dirty work, and a tag is only as good as the response when it goes off. Picture someone walking into an area the court has barred them from because a potential victim lives there. The device records it and an alert is raised. Then what? Who receives that alert first, how quickly is it passed to the police, and how quickly do officers arrive? Someone who is at risk at 11 o’clock on a Saturday night cannot wait until Monday morning for someone to check a screen.

That is not a theoretical concern. Only this week, Sky News reported that the Metropolitan police will no longer respond to curfew or tag battery breaches lasting under an hour, unless the wearer is judged to pose a particular risk. The commissioner says his officers are dealing with more than 100 tag breaches a day, driven in part by the Government’s early release scheme. One sergeant put it simply:

“there are not enough cops”.

The Met itself described cases in which officers were told about a breach many hours after it had happened. The problem is therefore at both ends: alerts that are slow to reach the police, and police too stretched to respond when they do. The Minister must tell us how alerts under these new orders will avoid both.

Monitoring can also be imposed only where suitable arrangements are available in the area, so a court may decide that monitoring is necessary but still be unable to order it. Will monitoring be available consistently across the country from the day these powers come into force, or will protection depend on where a victim happens to live?

The person being monitored must allow the equipment to be fitted and maintained, and must not interfere with it. Deliberate tampering cannot be allowed to defeat an order, and it must be treated as the enforcement matter it is. Equally, officers need to be able to tell a flat battery from a deliberate attempt to go off the radar, so that they spend their time on the real risks. Clause 33 requires a code of practice on monitoring data. That code must protect the data properly, but it must also let the right officers get hold of information quickly, and make sure that it is preserved where it may be needed as evidence.

We support clauses 31 to 33, but we have questions for the Minister. When an alert is raised under one of these orders, who receives it? How is it passed to the police, and how quickly will officers respond, including at night and on weekends? Where will monitoring be available when these powers come into force, and when will it be available everywhere? When will the Committee see a draft of the code of practice on monitoring data?

[Anna Turley]

I thank the hon. Gentleman again for his helpful and thoughtful contributions, and for his support for the clauses. As discussed, this group covers the electronic monitoring requirements for slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders, along with consequential amendments.

As I laid out previously, law enforcement does not always have the tools needed to support it in effectively monitoring those subject to these orders or to identify breaches at an earlier stage. The clauses will enable courts, where necessary and proportionate, to impose electronic monitoring requirements. That will strengthen the management and enforcement of orders, help to identify breaches sooner and disrupt further offending, and provide greater protection and reassurance to victims.

The hon. Member for Stockton West raised a few questions, which I am very happy to answer. First, he asked whether the code of practice would be subject to parliamentary procedure. Given the likely content and nature of the code, the fact that it is not going to define or create any new legal responsibilities, and that the processing of data must be in accordance with the requirements of data protection legislation, the Government do not consider it necessary for the code to be subject to any parliamentary procedure.

The hon. Gentleman asked for some more detail on what the code of practice would look like. This clause sets out that the Secretary of State must issue a code of practice relating to the processing of data gathered in the course of the electronic monitoring of individuals where that has been imposed. The code of practice is intended to set out the appropriate tests and safeguards for the processing of such data, in order to ensure compliance with the UK General Data Protection Regulation and the Data Protection Act 2018.

The Government consider that a code of practice is the most appropriate vehicle for setting out expectations and responsibilities in relation to the processing of data gathered under electronic monitoring requirements. It is important to have the flexibility to update the code to keep pace with any changes to that legislation and to ensure that it can be aligned with operational guidance.

The hon. Gentleman asked about resourcing. There is currently no intention to increase the number of electronic monitoring cases. Electronic monitoring will be used only in cases where it is justified against the legislative requirements and considered necessary to protect persons from harm. The number of orders issued with electronic monitoring as a condition will depend on the nature of the offending, the assessment of the court hearing the case and the other conditions available that could address the risk. As such, it is not possible to say whether, overall, the use of electronic monitoring will increase or decrease. It is about giving the courts the clarity that they need.

It is important to consider that electronic monitoring can help to reduce the amount of resource used trying to trace offenders who breach the conditions of their orders. Electronic monitoring would enable forces to respond more effectively to the risk posed by offenders, and we could see some early intervention and prevention as a result of that.

Electronic monitoring can be a condition of an order only if the court has been notified by the Secretary of State that electronic monitoring arrangements are available in the relevant area, and the court is satisfied that the necessary provision can be made under the arrangements currently available. I think I have covered the issues raised by the shadow Minister.

Clauses 31 to 33 will also align the slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders with other civil orders, as I mentioned, which have explicit provision for electronic monitoring. This is about clarity for the courts on the face of the law. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 31 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 32 and 33 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 34

Variation etc of slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Anna Turley]

This clause, building on the group we have just discussed, strengthens the operation of slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders by allowing courts to include additional notification requirements and electronic monitoring when orders are renewed or varied. It ensures that such measures may be applied only when the court is satisfied that the requirement is necessary for the purpose of protecting persons from physical or psychological harm, and it introduces safeguards governing the use of electronic monitoring, including limits on the duration of monitoring extensions.

[Matt Vickers]

The clause brings the new notification and electronic monitoring requirements into the process for varying and renewing slavery and trafficking prevention orders and risk orders. An order has to keep protecting people long after the day it is made. Those subject to the orders could move, change how they operate or find a way around a restriction and the police must be able to respond. The Opposition support the clause. There should be no reward for wriggling around an order. If the evidence shows the restrictions need strengthening, the authorities should be back in front of the court quickly, not waiting for someone to come to further harm.

A power to apply for a variation, however, does not tell an officer when to use it. Take someone whose activities have shifted to a different town. The police know things have changed and that the original conditions no longer fit the risk, but unless someone picks up the file and takes it back to court, the order stays exactly as it was. Someone has to be responsible for spotting that gap and closing it.

The clause also deals with orders made before the Bill. As we discussed under clauses 28 and 29, some such orders contain no notification requirements at all. Under clause 34, when an older order is varied, the court can add those requirements only if it is satisfied that they are necessary, but when an older order is renewed, they must be included. That is welcome, but it means the protection depends on someone bringing the older order back to court.

Electronic monitoring brings deadlines of its own. A court can extend a monitoring requirement by no more than 12 months at a time, so every order with a tag will need to come back to court at least once a year to keep it in place. Expiry dates should never come as a surprise. An ongoing risk must not go unmonitored because a renewal application was left sitting in someone’s in-tray. There is a practical catch, too: a tag can be added on variation only if the defendant is present in court, so the person who stays away from the hearing may be the very person who cannot be tagged. I will be grateful if the Minister could say how that will be handled.

The clause rightly keeps the requirement for the court to assess risk and necessity. Good evidence makes for a stronger order, and a stronger order is one that officers can enforce with confidence. I set out our concerns about police and court capacity when we debated clauses 26 and 27, and they bite the hardest here. Reviewing existing orders and returning to court every year is exactly the kind of work that does not happen unless someone is given the job of doing it. We support clause 34, but I would be grateful if the Minister could answer the following questions. Who will review existing orders, and who will ensure that a renewal reaches the court before the order or the monitoring runs out? How quickly will an urgent variation be heard when fresh evidence shows that the risk has grown, and what happens if the defendant does not attend? How will victims be told when an order is varied, renewed or allowed to lapse, so that they know what protection they actually have?

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[Anna Turley]

I will speak to clauses 35 to 43. Since the modern slavery system was established, the nature and volume of referrals have changed. Compared with 2014, referrals into the national referral mechanism—the system for identifying potential victims of modern slavery—have increased by 900%. In 2025, modern slavery referrals from those who arrived by small boat were the highest since records began in 2018, and more than half of referrals now relate to exploitation that took place overseas. Our system seeks to identify, support and protect individuals at the earliest opportunity, and that is in everyone’s interest.

However, we cannot ignore the fact that, because of the protections offered by the system, there is value for some in seeking to misuse it. In 2025, over a third of chartered flight returns that failed to go ahead involved a modern slavery referral lodged after that return was arranged. That type of action undermines the integrity of the system and creates disproportionate operational pressures.

We need a robust end-to-end system—one that supports earlier identification of victims, delivers clear and timely decisions and addresses opportunities for improper use. Importantly, it must be one that works effectively for those who it is intended to protect. This Government have been particularly clear in our commitment to embed protections for those who are most vulnerable, including exploited and trafficked children, and the clauses will bring balance and order to the system to do just that.

First, clause 35 clarifies a key part of our modern slavery system: who can make decisions about whether an individual is a victim of modern slavery for the purposes of part 5 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022. For adults, it will formalise the existing operational model where the Secretary of State acts as the competent authority or decision-making body for all modern slavery decisions. For children, it will enable the Secretary of State to nominate other public authorities to act as the competent authority in relation to reasonable and conclusive grounds decisions on a case-by-case basis. We know this model can be successful; we have been piloting the approach since 2021, enabling local safeguarding partners, who will often be involved in the child’s care, to make decisions about whether the child is a victim of modern slavery.

Stakeholders have told us that embedding decisions with those working directly with a child removes the perceived disconnect between identification and support and delivers a more sustainable model of decision making aligned with existing safeguarding frameworks. However, legislative change is required to implement this approach on a greater scale.

That is what this clause delivers: the legal foundation to devolve modern slavery decision making for children nationally, ensuring decisions are made by those best placed to safeguard them. By embedding these responsibilities within existing local safeguarding structures, the clause will strengthen partnership working, increase awareness of exploitation, support earlier identification of vulnerable children and create greater opportunity to prevent harm before it occurs.

Schedule 4 will play a critical role in implementing the changes made through clause 35 of the Bill, making consequential amendments to reflect the definition of “competent authority” and ensure consistency across the statute book. It will enable the Secretary of State to lay regulations on the making of reasonable or conclusive grounds decisions by all competent authorities and issue guidance on the processes to be followed by nominated public authorities.

Together, the measures will enable consistent, high-quality devolved decision making for children by local safeguarding partners. First, schedule 4 updates definitions to reflect the change in who can make decisions set out in clause 35. Secondly, the regulations ensure persistent decision making across all decision-making bodies, setting a clear framework for the making of modern slavery decisions, what bodies should make them and how they should do so. This will be underpinned by guidance that makes it clear what is expected of public authorities while also providing transparency on how their competence will be addressed. That will help ensure consistent and quality decision making, and that public authorities are trained and supported to deliver to the required standard.

Thirdly, regulations will make it clear that information sharing and joint working across multi-agency safeguarding partners is paramount to strong decision making, enabling the Secretary of State to require public authorities other than the Home Office to engage in decision making. That is crucial not just for information sharing for partners with the Home Office, but to deliver the tried-and-tested approach to decision making for children, which will see responsibility embedded with those best able to make decisions for children and ensure it is done in a consistent and controlled way.

Turning to clause 36, the Government are committed to ensuring that decisions made under the national referral mechanism are robust, preventing opportunities for improper use of the system and providing clarity in legislation. To deliver that, it is essential that the factors that a decision maker must consider to negatively impact a person’s credibility are clear.

Currently, decision makers can consider factors such as the timing of disclosure and consistency in the information a person has provided, which may have an impact on the credibility of a person’s account. This assessment can be used to inform the outcome of a reasonable grounds or conclusive grounds decision. However, there is no legal requirement for this credibility assessment to inform part of the decision making.

The clause will place those credibility considerations on a statutory footing, making it clear that those factors, which can often be an indicator of a lack of veracity, will be considered to be damaging to a person’s credibility unless good reasons are put forward. That will provide a more robust framework supporting consistent decision making and a clear understanding across potential victims and those representing them.

We recognise that there may be factors that explain the presence of credibility indicators. For example, a person may be suffering from coercion, fear or trauma. That is why the legislation also requires decision making to assess whether there are good reasons that could explain the presence of factors that would otherwise impact on an individual’s credibility. Detailed guidance will be set out on what will constitute good reasons, recognising that these are non-exhaustive. It will support decision makers in considering each person’s individual circumstances and experience.

This is a key safeguard that balances the importance of preventing improper claims with the recognition that some factors that point to a lack of credibility are the result of individual circumstances that require consideration. By setting out a statutory duty to consider credibility considerations and the impact of those factors on decisions, the clause will strengthen the legal robustness of decision making and provide greater clarity for decision makers, potential victims and those representing them. I commend clauses 35 and 36 to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

There were 23,411 referrals into the national referral mechanism last year, which is the highest number since it began, and 25,373 in the year to June. Behind those numbers are genuine victims who deserve our protection, but there are also people who have worked out that a modern slavery claim can be used to frustrate removal.

The British public want two things from our modern slavery system, and they are not in conflict: they want genuine victims protected, and they want the system to stand firm against those who try to game it to avoid removal. Every bogus claim wastes taxpayers’ money, ties up officials who should be helping real victims, and delays the removal of people with no right to be here, and every bad decision risks leaving someone who has been exploited in the hands of the very people who exploited them. The Opposition believe that these clauses can help on both counts and we support them.

Clause 35 sets out who makes the decisions. For adults, it is the Secretary of State. For children, it can be the Secretary of State or another public authority nominated for that purpose. Schedule 4 makes the consequential changes needed for that to work. A name in legislation has to mean real accountability. A child’s treatment should not depend on whose desk the file happens to land on.

Clause 36 deals with credibility. When deciding whether to believe someone’s account, decision makers must treat certain things as damaging to credibility unless there are good reasons for them. Those things include a delay in making a claim or providing information, material inconsistencies and omissions, inconsistencies with what the person has said in an asylum claim or in court, and striking similarities with other people’s accounts. That is common sense. If someone tells one story in an immigration application and a very different one the moment removal becomes a real prospect, the decision maker should test that difference hard. If an account bears an uncanny resemblance to someone else’s, officials must be free to ask whether they are looking at genuine evidence or a script supplied to frustrate removal.

The principle behind the clause is one that we legislated for in the Nationality and Borders Act 2022: that late disclosure without good reason should count against credibility. Labour opposed the Act at the time, so I welcome the fact that the Government now recognise the value of that principle and are building on it. There is common ground across the Committee on this issue. The clause is carefully drawn. It is about damage to credibility. It does not say that every claim must fail or that every inconsistency proves a lie, and it allows for good reasons. Someone threatened by a gang may be terrified to speak. Someone describing horrific events that they have witnessed may not get it all out at once.

However, the Bill does not define a good reason; it leaves it to guidance. That guidance must help caseworkers tell a genuine explanation from a convenient excuse, and it needs to be ready before the clause comes into force, not cobbled together afterwards. The rules will work only if caseworkers have the information to apply them. The clause asks them to compare an account with what the person said in an asylum claim or in court proceedings, and with accounts given by other people. That is not much use if the caseworker cannot see the earlier account or has no means of spotting that the same story has appeared in a dozen other claims.

We support clauses 35 and 36 and schedule 4, but I would be grateful if the Minister could answer the following questions. First, which authorities does she expect to be nominated to make decisions in children’s cases? Has legislative consent been sought from Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and who will check the quality of decisions across the United Kingdom? Secondly, will the guidance on what counts as a good reason be published in draft before Report, and how will it apply at the reasonable grounds stage where the threshold is deliberately low? Thirdly, what systems will caseworkers have to see earlier accounts held elsewhere in the Home Office and to identify striking similarities across different claims?

Clear credibility rules should mean quicker and better decisions. What happens to support once a negative decision has been made is the subject of clause 37 in the next group, and I will come to it there.

[Mr Paul Kohler (Wimbledon) (LD)]

It is an honour to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Murrison. Clause 35 will allow nominated public authorities to make reasonable and conclusive grounds decisions in relation to children. That has been welcomed by the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner, who notes, as the Minister did, that this has

“been successfully piloted and has demonstrated stronger identification and support where local authority partners such as social care workers can contribute to decision-making.”

My party consequently supports clause 35.

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[Anna Turley]

This Government are clear that we must be able to move individuals more efficiently through the system without unnecessary delay, and ensure that those who are deemed not to be victims of modern slavery do not receive protection and support that they do not need and are not entitled to. Clause 37 makes it clear that a negative conclusive grounds decision ends the modern slavery recovery period, so there will be no requirement to wait for the 30-day recovery period to end before confirming that an individual is not a victim.

At present, after referral to the national referral mechanism, if an individual receives a positive reasonable grounds decision, they receive a statutory 30-day recovery period. That protects them from removal and enables access to support. Even where a decision maker has the evidence to issue a negative conclusive grounds decision within 30 days, and so conclude that the individual is not a victim, that would not end the recovery period nor these entitlements.

Clause 37 rectifies this problem. Where there is enough evidence to conclude that an individual is not a victim of modern slavery, a negative conclusive grounds decision can be issued within the recovery period, and the issuing of that negative decision will end the recovery period. This is important to ensure that we remove inefficiencies in our system and do not retain unnecessary barriers to removal. It will also ensure that support resources remain focused on supporting and protecting genuine victims. I commend clause 37 to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 37 raises a simple question: once the competent authority has considered a claim and reached a negative conclusive grounds decision, why should the recovery period carry on just because the calendar has not yet reached 30 days? Under clause 37, the recovery period ends when a negative conclusive grounds decision is made, even if that is before the 30 days are up. If no decision has been made by then, the period continues until a decision is made. Corresponding changes are made for further recovery periods. The Opposition support this principle.

The recovery period exists so that a claim can be properly considered. Once it has been considered and found wanting, the protection should not roll on automatically. Our immigration system will not command respect if an unsuccessful claim simply buys another stretch of waiting at taxpayers’ expense. Where the legal process is complete and someone has no right to be here, they should leave.

We should be honest about what the clause does and does not do. Ending a recovery period lifts the legal bar on removal and ends the support that goes with it. However, it does not remove a single person; that depends entirely on what happens next, which is a point that applies just as much to the groups of clauses either side of this one. Too often, a decision is made in one part of the Home Office, while another part carries on as if nothing has happened. Ministers should be lining up the next steps while a case is still being considered, so that a negative decision is followed swiftly by action, not by a trip to the back of another queue.

Speed must not come at the expense of getting it right. A rushed decision that falls apart under scrutiny helps nobody and ends up in court. In the year to June, more than four in five conclusive grounds decisions that were reconsidered came out positive. Whatever the reason for that, it tells us that first decisions do not always hold up. If a negative decision will now end support immediately, the quality of that decision matters more than ever.

The Government announced earlier this month that the backlog of conclusive grounds decisions had been cleared, yet more than 6,000 cases were still waiting at the end of September, and that number has been rising. The Home Office’s own statistics show that the number of cases awaiting a final decision fell in every quarter until April this year, but has since risen by 23% between March and June and by a further 6% in September alone. I would be grateful if the Minister explained what the Government mean by “cleared”, and what they are doing to stop the queue from growing again.

The person, their representative and the organisations supporting them also need to know what has been decided and what happens next. A recovery period that ends overnight must not leave anyone unsure of whether they are still entitled to support.

We support clause 37, but I would be grateful if the Minister answered three questions. First, what checks will take place before a negative conclusive grounds decision is issued, and how will a genuine mistake be put right without that process becoming an endless source of delay? Secondly, once a negative decision is made, who takes ownership of the case, and how will cases that are already in the system when the clause comes into force be treated? Thirdly, will the Government publish regular figures showing how long it takes, after a negative conclusive grounds decision, for the next enforcement step to happen? Counting decisions alone will tell us nothing about whether the system is actually working.

[Mr Kohler]

Under section 61 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, a person is entitled to a minimum 30-day recovery period from the day on which they receive a positive reasonable grounds decision. Clause 37 amends section 61 so that, in the event that a person receives a negative conclusive grounds decision within the 30-day period, the recovery period and its associated protections come to an end. It also makes similar provision enabling an equivalent outcome with regard to any additional recovery period under section 62.

This cliff edge risks placing vulnerable people in the way of future harm. A report published by the Modern Slavery and Human Rights Policy and Evidence Centre, led by the University of Oxford, describes the overturn rate of negative NRM decisions as extremely high. Such decisions are not perfect, and removing the recovery period for those with a negative decision means that people who have been trafficked will, in many cases, face being left without protection.

The statistics are stark. Since 2023, the proportion of reconsidered decisions that turn positive has been higher than the proportion of initial positive decisions at the reasonable grounds and conclusive grounds stages. At the reasonable grounds stage, positive outcomes after reconsideration ran between 62% and 82% between 2021 and 2025, while initial positive rates fell as low as 53% in 2024. Between January 2021 and June 2025, of those won a reconsideration of a negative reasonable grounds decision, 646—or 70% of that group—went on to get a positive conclusive grounds decision, too.

I ask the Minister to reflect on those figures and explain why she wants to continue with this cliff edge. I call upon the Government not to pursue clause stand part.

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[Anna Turley]

Our modern slavery system is generous in the rights and protections it provides those who require them to recover from that abhorrent crime. The Government remain committed to ensuring that such protections are available to those for whom they are intended. It is right—indeed, it is within our international obligations—that the Government can deny modern slavery protections to those who pose a threat to public order or seek to misuse the system through dishonest claims made in bad faith.

The practical operation of the disqualification mechanisms has long-standing challenges, including in cases involving foreign national offenders. The current disqualification framework does not always provide sufficient clarity on when disqualification should apply and what the consequences of that decision are, or on when a claim should be treated as having been made in bad faith. Such ambiguities have created operational uncertainty and complicated decision making, and ultimately mean that the disqualification framework does not operate as effectively as it should.

Clause 38 addresses those issues by strengthening and clarifying the public order and bad faith disqualification frameworks, while maintaining appropriate safeguards for children and those at risk of re-trafficking. First, it expands the grounds on which a person can be disqualified, based on the national security or public order threat that they pose, to include suspended sentences, reflecting the changes made in the Sentencing Act 2026. Secondly, it clarifies the consequences that follow a decision to disqualify, making clear that no onward modern slavery decision making is required, rectifying an existing lack of clarity. Thirdly, it clarifies that where an individual is at an immediate and significant risk of re-trafficking in the UK, the national security or public order disqualification will not apply. That necessary and targeted safeguard provides clarity for decision makers, potential victims and professionals, and balances the need to protect people at significant risk with the duty to disqualify. That exemption ensures that, where there is a direct risk of someone being exploited or exploited again in the UK, they retain access to NRM support for protection.

Clause 38, combined with amendment 115, also introduces a specific, targeted exemption from disqualification for all children on public order grounds, while maintaining the disqualification where the national security criteria are met, to ensure that the acute vulnerabilities of children are appropriately recognised. Importantly, the clause also separates bad faith from public order, and, for the first time in statute, defines circumstances in which a claim is to be treated as having been made in bad faith. That includes claims based on falsified documents or claims made only after removal action has commenced without compelling justification, thereby disincentivising people from trying to misuse the system.

Those measures will provide a more consistent and robust approach to disqualification decisions, helping to ensure that the modern slavery system safeguards the public interest, commands public confidence and strengthens the Government’s ability to respond where individuals pose a threat to public order or seek to misuse the system. The clause therefore addresses existing uncertainty that underpins the current disqualification framework, strengthens and clarifies the circumstances in which disqualification will apply, embeds more appropriate safeguards, and ultimately supports a more effective modern slavery system.

Amendment 115, which is consequential on amendment 114, ensures that all children are treated equally under the public order disqualification in clause 38. Presently, clause 38 exempts children with leave to remain or right of abode in the UK from disqualification based on public order threat based on criminality. Amendments 114 and 115 recognise the vulnerabilities of all children and make an important change to ensure that all children under the age of 18 are treated consistently. The same exemption from the public order disqualification on criminality grounds will therefore be afforded to all children regardless of their immigration status. The amendments do not affect disqualification on national security grounds, for which all children remain in scope. I hope that Members will agree that the amendments are sensible and proportionate, and ensure that the public order disqualification provision, and our safeguarding duties, can operate as intended.

Amendment 118 is a technical amendment to provide greater clarity win the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 on how the public order disqualification, bad faith disqualification and temporary permission to stay provisions operate together. Amendments 116 and 117, which are consequential on amendment 118, remove references to temporary permission to stay from the public order and bad faith disqualification provisions in section 63 of the 2022 Act.

That will create a clearer distinction between a disqualification decision and a temporary permission to stay decision under section 65 of the same Act, the latter of which can be considered only after a positive conclusive grounds decision has been made. Importantly, section 65 already makes clear the circumstances in which the duty to grant permission to stay does not apply, including where public order, national security or bad faith concerns arise. The amendments therefore improve the clarity and consistency of the legislation, without changing the underlying policy intent.

[Matt Vickers]

A modern slavery claim must never become a “get out of jail free” card for someone who threatens our national security or is deliberately abusing our immigration system. Clause 38 deals with disqualification from protection on grounds of national security, public order and bad faith, and the Opposition support its purpose. It builds on the public order disqualification that the last Conservative Government introduced in the Nationality and Borders Act 2022—a measure that Labour voted against.

When we legislated again in 2023, the then Prime Minister said that our modern slavery measures would drive “a coach and horses” through protections. Labour has kept those measures and is now are adding to them—we welcome that. However, the Committee must understand exactly who is caught, which protections fall where and how such decisions will be taken. The Government have had to table—