Immigration and Asylum Bill (Twelfth sitting)
Tuesday 27th October 2026
(1 day, 22 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesImmigration and Asylum Bill 2026-27 View all Immigration and Asylum Bill 2026-27 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 27 October 2026 - (27 Oct 2026)
The Chair
I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:
Government amendments 115 to 118.
Clause stand part.
Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg.
As we read the amended clause, the national security ground applies regardless of age. I would be grateful if the Minister confirmed that, where a child has been groomed and exploited into offending, that must be properly weighed. The public also expect serious offending by under-18s to be dealt with, so the Minister should tell us what assessment has been made of the cases affected and how the safeguarding, criminal justice and security systems will handle that.
The bad faith provisions apply to claims made as an adult, including where someone knowingly provides false information or makes a claim when their removal is due. We all know the pattern of the claim that appears at the 11th hour, just as the flight is booked. The Home Office’s own figures show the scale of this: last year, around a third of charter flight returns that failed to go ahead involved a modern slavery referral made after the return had been arranged. On flights with an out-of-hours decision service, three quarters of the referrals were made between 3 pm the day before and 6 am on the day of removal, with one in seven made after 11 pm. Members can draw their own conclusions about what that pattern tells us.
The clause contains exceptions to the timing rule when someone met a claim notice deadline or had compelling reasons for not claiming earlier. Those exceptions have their place, but “compelling reasons” has to mean something. It cannot become a catch-all for explaining away every claim made at the departure gate. I would welcome the Minister giving the Committee examples of what would and would not meet that test, and telling us who will make that judgment. A late claim and a knowingly fabricated one are not the same thing. Decisions needs clear reasons if they are to survive a challenge. Otherwise, an attempt to tackle delay just produces another round of litigation.
Government amendments 116 and 117 take the provisions on leave out of disqualification sections, and amendment 118 deals with leave in section 65 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, covering national security, adult public order cases and bad faith claims made as an adult. We accept that restructuring, but the decisions on protection and leave must join up. The Minister should set out how existing grants of leave will be reviewed and how revocation decisions will be made where the law allows. Disqualification is not removal. The point I made about clause 37 applies here in full. Once a disqualification decision is made, the case must not fall into the gap between two processes. These measures are a step in the right direction, and we support clause 38 and the Government’s amendments. We look to the Minister to show that the amended clause will work in practice.
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
I wish to speak briefly against clause 38. Public order disqualification, in the way it has been applied so far, has exacerbated ongoing systemic issues arising from failures in identification and safeguards within the criminal justice system. Available evidence shows that this provision has disproportionately affected individuals subjected to criminal exploitation.
As we heard when discussing previous clauses, many survivors of criminal exploitation were forced to commit offences as part of their exploitation. They are often prosecuted for those crimes as a result of gaps in the application of the non-punishment principle in the UK, including defences under section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. Those who have criminal convictions are at heightened risk of exploitation, too. The criminalisation of survivors has been used time and again as a tool to control people and keep them in exploitation. The clause is an unnecessary extension of existing harms and should be dropped.
The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Anna Turley)
It is a pleasure to serve under chairmanship, Mr Twigg. I thank colleagues for their contributions to the discussion of the clause.
Clause 38 strengthens and clarifies the public order and bad faith disqualification frameworks due to long-standing challenges in their practical operation, especially in cases involving foreign national offenders. It expands the grounds on which an individual can be disqualified if they pose a threat to national security or public order by including suspended sentences to reflect the changes in the Sentencing Act 2020. It provides clarity in statute as to what is meant by bad faith, ensuring that those who seek to misuse the system with false and fabricated claims, or by raising information for the first time only after removal directions have been set, can be disqualified, ensuring that they are not able to take advantage of the generosity of our system.
The clause also makes it clear that no further modern slavery decision making is required should someone become disqualified. Finally, it exempts child victims from disqualification on public order grounds and makes the exemption for all victims where the risk of re-trafficking is clear. The clause provides a more consistent and robust approach to disqualification decisions and strengthens the Government’s ability to respond where individuals pose a threat to public order or seek to misuse the system.
I shall respond to some of the points that hon. Members made. The shadow Minister asked for case studies or examples of where the clause would be implemented. Suppose that individual C is convicted and receives an 11-month custodial sentence for common assault, battery or breach of a restraining order, which are not covered by public order disqualifications; when they raise modern slavery grounds, that is considered by the national referral mechanism. Where they are a victim, the individual will proceed through the decision-making stages, gaining protection from removal and access to support, and on to a conclusive grounds determination. Where they have ongoing needs and no right to remain, they would get a temporary permission to stay consideration.
Under the new system, even if individual C is a modern slavery victim, a foreign national offender who has received any custodial sentence, including a suspended sentence, will fall within scope of public order disqualification. Where the disqualification is applied, they will be disqualified from support and no further decision making on modern slavery will take place unless an “immediate and significant” risk of re-trafficking in the UK is identified. That means they will not receive a conclusive grounds decision and will not therefore be eligible for temporary permission to stay. British nationals are subject to a different threshold; they will be disqualified on the basis of a public order threat where they have committed one of the crimes set out in section 4 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015.
The shadow Minister also asked why children are still in scope of the national security limit disqualification. It is right that we can withhold modern slavery protections where an individual poses a threat to national security. That principle should apply regardless of age. Retaining the power to disqualify a child on national security grounds exists solely as a backstop for the rare circumstances in which an individual under 18 poses a significantly serious national security threat and disqualification from the national referral mechanism is therefore appropriate. The exception to disqualification where there is a risk of re-trafficking in the UK will still apply and require decision makers to consider the facts of each case.
This approach intends to strike an appropriate balance between safeguarding children and ensuring that national security considerations are prioritised where necessary. In parallel with our modern slavery response, the UK has one of the most robust counter-terrorism frameworks in the world. Prevent is one of the four pillars of the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy; it operates in the non-criminal space and is designed to support people away from radicalisation before they commit an offence. The Home Office is testing new approaches to better spot and refer individuals at risk of radicalisation online, and testing how those insights can be translated into timely, proportionate interventions. That is particularly important considering the rise in children being arrested for terrorism-related activity, much of which is carried out online.
The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion asked about how we will ensure people who are exploited in criminal activity will not be unduly penalised for the exploitation that they have suffered. It is important to flag that the criminal justice system contains safeguards against penalising victims of exploitation, including under section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. That provides a defence in criminal proceedings for people who have been forced or compelled to commit crimes through slavery or exploitation. Clause 38 also expressly sets out that disqualification will not apply where a person is considered to be at “immediate and significant risk” of exploitation in the UK.
I hope I have responded to all of the questions that hon. Members had and provided clarification. I commend amendments 114 to 118 and clause 38 to the Committee.
Amendment 114 agreed to..
Amendment 115 to 118 agreed to.
Clause 38, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 39
Removal of duty to grant leave to remain to assist recovery
Anna Turley
I beg to move amendment 119, in clause 39, page 43, line 13, at end insert—
‘(za) in subsection (1)—
(i) omit “and” at the end of paragraph (a),
(ii) in paragraph (b), after “leave to” insert “enter or”, and
(iii) at the end of paragraph (b) insert
“, and
(c) who does not have a right of abode in the United Kingdom”,’
This amendment will clarify that the duty to grant limited leave to remain to a victim of slavery or human trafficking does not apply if the victim already has leave to enter the United Kingdom or a right of abode in the United Kingdom.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause stand part.
New clause 29—Changes to leave to remain for victims of slavery or human trafficking—
“(1) Section 65 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (leave to remain for victims of slavery or human trafficking) is amended as follows.
(2) For subsection (2), substitute—
‘(2) The Secretary of State must grant the person—
(a) leave to remain in the United Kingdom for a period lasting no less than 60 months,
(b) recourse to public funds, and
(c) the right to work.’
(3) After subsection (2), insert—
‘(2A) A person granted leave to remain in the United Kingdom under subsection (2) is eligible for settlement in the United Kingdom after residing, with any form of leave, in the United Kingdom for a period of five years.”
(4) Omit subsections (4) and (5).’”
This new clause is a redrafted version of Clause 39 and would, if that clause is omitted, give limited leave to remain to all victims of slavery or human trafficking and prevent such leave being withheld if the Secretary of State believes a victim’s needs can be met elsewhere.
Anna Turley
Through the Bill, the Government are seeking to simplify and clarify protection and leave routes while ensuring fairness and public confidence in the system. The modern slavery system and the associated temporary permission to stay provision are not intended to be a broad route to immigration status for victims of modern slavery. Instead, the UK offers comprehensive protection and leave routes for individuals who would otherwise be at risk upon return or who need to remain in the UK for broader reasons.
The modern slavery-specific provision is intended for very particular purposes, which clause 39 clarifies. The clause will end the provision of a specific form of modern slavery leave to remain in the UK to assist victims in their recovery from physical or psychological harm arising from their exploitation. The Government’s view is that granting temporary permission to stay on recovery grounds goes beyond what is necessary to meet our international obligations, and we simply need to restore the right balance to the system. Temporary permission to stay will remain available for victims who need to remain in the UK to seek compensation or to support police investigations to bring perpetrators to justice.
I want to be extremely clear up front that this Government remain absolutely committed to supporting victims of modern slavery. This change does not alter the support entitlements for victims while they are in the UK. Access to modern slavery support in the UK is not dependent on the grant of temporary permission to stay. This Government provide a comprehensive support package while individuals are in the UK. Confirmed adult victims will continue to access specialist support where they have ongoing needs through the adult victim support contract and wider state services. Confirmed child victims will continue to receive statutory safeguarding support via local authorities, healthcare and the independent child trafficking guardian service.
Both currently and following this change, individuals not granted temporary permission to stay will continue to have access to other routes to remain in the UK, depending on their circumstances. Any applications will be considered on their individual merits in line with published policy. For example, permission to stay may be available to a victim of modern slavery who entered the UK as an overseas domestic worker, a domestic worker in a private household or as a private servant in a diplomatic household. The change to temporary permission to stay will not alter that. An individual’s immigration status and assessment of risk upon return is considered if an individual makes a protection claim. That includes an assessment of serious harm and consideration of risk of re-trafficking and reflects risks of success of specific exploiters, wider vulnerabilities of the individual to re-trafficking and the ability of the return country to protect that individual. Any claim will be considered on its individual merits.
Clause 39 will therefore create a clearer and more coherent temporary permission to stay framework, while maintaining support for victims and preserving the appropriate immigration and protection routes for those who qualify. Amendment 119 is a technical change that clarifies the eligibility criteria for individuals to be considered for temporary permission to stay. It makes clear that individuals who already hold valid leave to enter, leave to remain or a right of abode in the United Kingdom are not eligible for temporary permission to stay.
The change relates only to eligibility for temporary permission to stay. It does not change the grounds for granting temporary permission to stay, or the entitlements available to those granted the leave. As I have already made clear, that change does not impact support entitlements. Victims will still have access to support provided through the national referral mechanism while they remain in the UK. A grant of temporary permission to stay is not needed to access support.
New clause 29 was tabled in the name of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. I will respond to it in full once the hon. Lady has spoken about it. The clause would require the Secretary of State to grant all eligible confirmed victims of modern slavery at least five years’ leave to remain with a route towards settlement. Although I appreciate the intention behind the new clause, temporary permission to stay was never intended to be a general immigration route or a pathway towards settlement to meet the UK’s international obligations under the refugee convention. The new clause goes far beyond what is proportionate and reasonable in these circumstances, though I look forward to hearing the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion’s arguments for it.
Siân Berry
My new clause 29 is intended as a replacement for clause 39, being a redrafted version of it. It would give limited leave to remain to all victims of slavery or human trafficking, and prevent such leave being withheld if the Secretary of State believes that a victim’s needs can be met elsewhere.
Clause 39 removes the Secretary of State’s duty to grant temporary permission to stay for the purpose of assisting survivors in their recovery from any physical or psychological harm arising from their exploitation. That is currently the most common reason for granting leave to remain of this kind, and 96% of those granted leave to remain as victims of trafficking in 2024 were given it for recovery purposes. Grants of leave continue to be low, however, and are usually for very short periods, leaving survivors at risk. Clearly, removing the duty altogether will reduce grants further and cause harm. Forcibly returning more survivors of trafficking to their countries risks disrupting existing therapy and support, leaving them unable to obtain specialist care and putting them at further risk on return, including of re-trafficking.
We must remember the purpose of survivors securing limited leave and, as I propose, long-term immigration status. It provides victims with the security necessary to engage meaningfully with recovery, protection and support processes and to rebuild their lives free from the influence of traffickers. This is the essence of our obligations under international agreements. Insecure immigration status is a well-recognised vulnerability factor that perpetrators frequently exploit to facilitate and maintain survivors’ exploitation, using the threat of immigration enforcement, detention or removal as a means of control.
As my new clause sets out, granting a 60-month residency permit with a pathway to settlement is an essential safeguard in addressing these vulnerabilities, freeing people from exploitation, bringing perpetrators to justice and providing meaningful protection and support to victims, while supporting their reintegration into society and rebuilding their independence.
It is so important that survivors have this alternative route to leave to remain. The Minister has talked about other options for people within the immigration system, but there are examples of migrant victims of human trafficking or modern slavery with a valid skilled worker visa who have been denied VTS leave on those grounds. That meant that those victims could be tied to their exploiters due to their visas, including those co-operating with the authorities to prosecute their exploiters.
Following legal challenge in August 2026, the Home Office conceded that discretion can be exercised when considering whether or not to grant VTS leave to someone with a valid skilled worker visa. From what the Minister has said today, clause 39 seems to be reversing that. We know now that the concession is applied only on a discretionary basis, and is therefore susceptible to a range of variables. The need for a duty to grant long-term leave to victims remains critical in providing recovery, protection and support for survivors and in preventing trafficking and modern slavery going further.
The Government, as well as providing no rationale for the scrapping of VTS leave, have not provided any data showing how many survivors of trafficking are granted leave by other routes. If the Government press ahead with this measure, they should provide further evidence and detail on how these rights will still be protected under the clause.
Matt Vickers
Supporting a victim of modern slavery and deciding what immigration permission that person should have are related questions, but they are not the same. The law must protect people who have been exploited while maintaining an immigration system that is controlled, and that the public can have confidence in. Clause 39 removes the specific duty to grant limited leave to help someone recover from physical or psychological harm caused by their exploitation. It keeps the duty where leave is needed for a victim to seek compensation or to co-operate with an investigation or criminal proceedings.
Whatever some may claim, this is not the removal of every route by which a confirmed victim can receive leave. The Opposition support keeping this route focused on a specific, evidenced need. A finding that someone has been exploited does not answer every question about where they should live or for how long. The Minister needs to tell us how this will work for a genuine victim who still needs help, and how continuity of recovery support will be ensured.
There is also a bigger point here: the grounds that remain are the ones that matter most for bringing traffickers to justice. However, according to the figures that charities have put before the Committee, in 2024 only a handful of grants were made so that victims could seek compensation or help with criminal proceedings. A prosecution that collapses because the key witness left the country is a win for the trafficker, and nobody on the Committee wants that. Can the Minister tell us how the Home Office will ensure that these remaining grounds are actually used, and that its decisions never undermine a victim’s ability to help put an exploiter behind bars?
Government amendment 119 adds existing leave to enter and the right of abode to the circumstances in which there is no duty to grant leave under this provision. Avoiding duplication makes sense, and we support it. New clause 29 goes in a very different direction: it would require at least five years’ leave for qualifying confirmed victims, with access to public funds and permission to work, as well as eligibility for settlement after five years’ residence with any form of leave. That is a very substantial immigration proposal, and it would send exactly the wrong signal to the gangs who sell places on small boats. We oppose it.
Being recognised as a victim is a serious finding, but it should not automatically settle the separate question of a long period of residence, access to public funds and a route to settlement. Those who back the new clause need to explain why five years is the right minimum in every single qualifying case; how many people it would cover; what it would cost in housing and public services; and why residence under any form of leave should count towards settlement. We support clause 39 and Government amendment 119, and we hope that the Minister will set out the safeguards that will sit alongside them.
Anna Turley
I thank all the hon. Members who have tabled amendments in this group and contributed to the debate. I want to start with new clause 29, tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. As was set out earlier, it would grant eligible confirmed victims of modern slavery at least five years’ leave to remain, with a route towards settlement.
I want to be clear that temporary permission to stay is a targeted and temporary form of leave designed to meet specific needs arising from an individual’s experience of exploitation that meets the UK’s international obligations under the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings. Temporary permission to stay will continue to be available where it is necessary for a confirmed victim to remain in the UK to co-operate with law enforcement agencies in the investigation of crimes or to seek compensation in relation to their exploitation.
New clause 29 would require the Government to grant leave in a way that would go beyond what is proportionate or reasonable and would significantly exceed what is required under our international obligations.
Siân Berry
I asked in my speech not about people claiming asylum but about those here under other forms of immigration status. Does the Minister not see the replacement of those with VTS leave being reduced as a result of clause 39? That is one of the problems that I wanted to raise. When people are here under potentially coercive forms of leave, such as sponsored work visas, will VTS leave still be available as a replacement to prevent people being left in the hands of exploiters?
Anna Turley
I will cover that in the more in-depth response to the hon. Lady’s comments at the appropriate time.
As I said, the new clause would require the Government to grant leave in a way that would go beyond what is proportionate or reasonable, and that would significantly exceed what is required under our international obligations. When individuals require protection or are seeking to remain in the UK, other routes remain available, depending on the individual circumstances. Creating an automatic pathway to long-term leave and settlement through modern slavery provisions would conflate the modern slavery identification and support system with an immigration route, and thus risks blurring that distinction. That has the potential to increase opportunities for improper use of the system and would have significant implications for wider immigration objectives, which we have been clear must operate on the principles of fairness.
I hope to cover some of the points that the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion raised—if I fail to pick them up, I ask her to come back to me or I can respond in writing. She asked whether the temporary permission to stay framework meets our international obligations. Decision to grant temporary permission to stay does not automatically lead to removal from the UK. There are various routes to remain in the UK that will remain available to foreign nationals depending on their circumstances. Any applications will be considered on their individual merits in line with published policy.
The hon. Lady asked whether any further statistics could be shared. Temporary permission to stay data is currently drawn from a number of different Home Office systems. Further work is under way to establish the most robust dataset. We are continuing to assess what information can be shared publicly and we will provide further data in due course where appropriate.
The hon. Lady also asked whether we are disadvantaging people by removing recovery from exploitation. The measure does not prevent individuals from accessing support from the point of their positive reasonable grounds decision—or earlier, if emergency support is required to assist with recovery from their exploitation. Access to the national referral mechanism support is based on national referral mechanism status, not immigration status. All adult victims in England and Wales who need to can continue to access specialist needs-based support to assist their recovery, irrespective of their immigration status or a refusal of temporary permission to stay.
The hon. Lady also flagged whether the changes were compliant with international law. The Government’s view is that the change to the temporary permission to stay policy absolutely does not impede our compliance with our international compliance. Temporary permission to stay, in its current forms, goes beyond what is required under article 14 of the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings. The changes will provide stronger clarity on the UK’s obligations while still complying with article 14.
Article 4 of the European convention on human rights imposes a positive obligation on member states to identify and protect victims of trafficking, which is met in part through the operation of the national referral mechanism. That obligation does not go so far as to require member states to grant leave. In any event, support is not dependent on temporary permission to stay leave being granted, so that even when an individual is not granted temporary permission to stay leave, they can still access modern slavery support while they remain in the UK.
Further, an individual’s immigration status and assessment of risk on return are considered if an individual makes a protection claim. That includes an assessment of whether the individual has a well-founded fear of persecution or is at real risk of serious harm. Any claim will be considered on its individual merits, in line with published policy and country information.
The hon. Lady also asked about skilled workers. As of 8 October 2026, skilled workers who receive a positive conclusive grounds decision, where that decision was made during their most recent permission, may have their visa amended for the remaining period of extant leave. Individuals will not need to be sponsored and can work in any occupation. The change supports skilled workers to leave exploitative employers and move to new, safe employment. In the immigration White Paper, the Government committed to explore introducing further reforms to our sponsorship system by putting more responsibility and accountability on effective and responsible sponsors. That will include exploring whether the Government can make it easier for workers to move between licensed sponsors for the duration of their visa, giving them more control over who they work for and reducing the risk of exploitation.
The hon. Member for Stockton West asked what the changes will mean for compensation and people’s co-operation with the process. Under the changes to temporary permission to stay, victims can continue to engage with law enforcement agencies in supporting criminal investigations and pursue compensation in relation to their exploitation. By focusing temporary permission to stay on those specific purposes, the Government can ensure that it remains available in supporting victims’ engagement with the criminal justice system and accessing compensation. More broadly, the Government are strengthening the tools available to law enforcement and courts to disrupt criminal activity, prevent modern slavery and protect those at risk.
On victim engagement with the criminal justice system, I should say that the modern slavery victim care contract provides adult victims in the national referral mechanism with a dedicated support worker to assist them to access legal aid and legal representation. That support will be further strengthened when the modern slavery victim care contract is replaced by the new support for victims of modern slavery service. The new contract introduces specialist support workers to help victims to engage better with the criminal justice system. That will include, but is not limited to, providing tailored guidance and advocacy to help victims understand complex legal processes, and helping to remove barriers to accessing and receiving the assistance they need at every point in the criminal justice process.
Anna Turley
I turn to our commitments to ensure that all exploited and trafficked children can access the support they need for their recovery. Clause 40 seeks to amend sections 48 and 58 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 to rename independent child trafficking advocates as independent child trafficking guardians, following the recommendation of the independent review of the Modern Slavery Act and the subsequent renaming of the role in June 2019. The Government consider that “guardian” better reflects the role and is more easily understood and used by children and the professionals supporting them. The clause makes a change in terminology and does not alter the functions or powers of independent child trafficking advocates.
As I have said, this Government are committed to supporting vulnerable children. Clause 41 makes clear our ongoing commitment to providing specialist modern slavery support for children through independent child trafficking guardians across England and Wales. The clause ensures that all children in England and Wales who are potential victims of this horrendous crime will have a statutory right to access that support. It reflects the lessons learned from the existing pilot and stakeholder engagement, and gives independent child trafficking guardians flexibility to respond to each child’s needs. It clarifies that they can provide representation, support, or both—either directly to the child or indirectly by supporting other professionals who provide services or make decisions about the child.
Although independent child trafficking guardians already engage in practice from the point of referral, references to “reasonable grounds” in section 48 of the Modern Slavery Act risk creating confusion with national referral mechanism decision-making thresholds, which in turn risks an inconsistent approach to supporting vulnerable children. The clause clarifies that support should be provided at the earliest opportunity, and implements recommendations made by the independent review of the Modern Slavery Act. Importantly, it also clarifies the need for collaboration by requiring public bodies to have due regard to independent child trafficking guardians’ expertise, to share relevant information and to involve independent child trafficking guardians in discussions and decisions relating to the child. That will help independent child trafficking guardians work effectively with the authorities responsible for the child’s care, providing specialist expertise to help make sure that children access the support required to recover from this awful abuse.
Further detail will be outlined in the regulations and statutory guidance, which will be published alongside the national roll-out of the service. The clause ensures that there is clear and consistent support for exploited children; I commend it to the Committee.
Clause 42 removes a fulfilled requirement in section 48 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 for the Secretary of State to lay before Parliament a report setting out proposed steps in relation to the arrangements for independent child trafficking guardians within nine months of the Modern Slavery Act’s being passed.
The then Government fulfilled that obligation in 2015 when they laid before Parliament a report setting out their proposed approach to implementing the service. Since then, the independent child trafficking guardian service has been developed, tested and refined through the pilot service, independent evaluations, feedback from children and young people, and the recommendations from the independent review of the Modern Slavery Act 2015.
The requirement to report again on the proposed approach is therefore no longer necessary as the service model is now established and its operation is well understood. The clause also removes the specific commencement provisions relating to the independent child trafficking guardian measures in section 61 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. The relevant provisions in section 48 of the Modern Slavery Act will instead be subject to the general commencement arrangements in the Act. The clause does not itself alter the functions or powers of independent child trafficking guardians. I commend clauses 40 to 42 to the Committee.
Matt Vickers
A child who has been trafficked or enslaved has already been let down by adults in the worst way imaginable; they now need adults who will take responsibility and keep them safe, not a maze of agencies arguing about whose job that is. That is the test that we apply to these clauses and, based on that test, the Opposition support them.
Clause 40 renames independent child trafficking advocates as independent child trafficking guardians. Those advocates were one of the innovations of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, and we have no difficulty with a title that better describes their role. However, a new name will not, on its own, protect a single child. What matters is whether the guardian has the expertise, access and authority to make a difference.
Clause 41 is more substantive. It allows guardians to provide representation, support or both, and makes clear that the role covers children who may be victims of slavery as well as trafficking. That recognises that exploitation does not always fit neatly into one box. Many of us have seen in our own communities how county line gangs groom children to run drugs. That is exploitation, plain and simple.
The clause also allows assistance to be given indirectly through the professionals who provide services to or make decisions about the child. Helping those professionals to understand the risks has real value, but indirect support must never become a convenient substitute for someone actually being there for a child who needs them. I would be grateful if the Minister could tell us who will decide whether indirect support is enough and how the child’s own voice will be heard in that decision.
The guardians’ involvement in decisions must also be meaningful. There is little point in appointing someone to stand up for a child if the big decisions have been made before they are in the room. Guardians also need a clear and fast route to the police when an exploiter is trying to get back in touch with a child. They are part of the safeguarding response, and the gangs who prey on children must be hunted down and prosecuted.
Clause 42 would remove the requirement to report to Parliament on proposed steps under section 48 of the Modern Slavery Act and change the commencement arrangements. In July, the Government announced £25 million to extend the guardian service to the remaining 179 local authorities in England that do not have it yet. We welcome that, but a child in one of those areas needs a guardian now. Can the Minister tell us when the service will be available in every one of them? Removing a reporting requirement must not mean that Parliament knows less about whether children are actually being kept safe.
Finally, the service will work only if it can meet demand. Can the Minister tell us how many children the expanded service is expected to support and what will happen when demand outstrips capacity? The Government should set out how they will measure whether guardians are actually making children safer, to ensure that this is a real step forward and not simply a change of name. We support clauses 40 to 42.
Anna Turley
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his questions; I will seek to respond to them in my reply. This group of clauses makes clear the Government’s commitment to providing specialist modern slavery support for children through the independent child trafficking guardians across England and Wales. Clause 40 amends the Modern Slavery Act 2015 to rename independent child trafficking advocates as independent child trafficking guardians, as recommended by the independent review of the Modern Slavery Act, and their service’s renaming in 2019.
Clause 41 ensures that all children in England and Wales have a statutory right to access support. It reflects lessons learned from existing pilot and stakeholder engagement. It clarifies that support should be provided at the earliest opportunity, and the need for collaboration between independent child trafficking guardians and public bodies.
Clause 42 removes a requirement in the 2015 Act for the Secretary of State to lay before Parliament a report setting out proposed steps in relation to the arrangements for independent child trafficking guardians within nine months of the Act being passed. The Government at the time fulfilled the obligation and now consider it unnecessary. It removes the commencement provisions relating to independent child trafficking guardian measures in section 61 of the Modern Slavery Act. Instead, they will be subject to general commencement arrangements in the Act.
The hon. Member for Stockton West asked about the UK-wide application of the child trafficking guardianship service. In England and Wales, we recently announced a £25 million investment in the national independent child trafficking guardianship service, which—combined with the provisions in the Bill to place the guardian support on a statutory footing—will end the postcode lottery and ensure that exploited and trafficked children will have access to the support that they need.
The hon. Gentleman asked about the model and how we decided on the more indirect model. The independent child trafficking guardian support model remains largely unchanged from the 2024 operational model. This flexible, needs-based approach was found better to meet the needs of vulnerable children by the independent evaluation of the independent child trafficking guardian service, published in 2024. It is supported by best practice and the Home Office response to the modern slavery review.
Every child is entitled to indirect support where independent child trafficking guardians promote effective, multi-agency working to ensure that the child’s needs are met by the most appropriate professional, and provide specialist modern slavery and exploitation expertise to support professionals who may already have established relationships with children. Direct one-to-one support is generally provided to children with no figure of parental responsibility in the UK. However, the service also has the flexibility to provide direct support in other cases where that is appropriate to meet a child’s needs. As the independent child trafficking guardian service is rolled out nationally, the Government will continue to monitor and evaluate its impact to ensure that it remains effective in supporting child victims of modern slavery.
The hon. Gentleman asked about safeguarding partners. If they already have legal duties, why are independent child trafficking guardians needed, and how will different organisations work together not to duplicate the contact with the child and the help for that child to navigate the system? Independent child trafficking guardians provide specialist modern slavery expertise and independent advocacy, complementing rather than duplicating the statutory safeguarding role of other agencies. The legislation strengthens collaboration by requiring public bodies to have due regard to independent child trafficking guardians’ views and recommendations, to provide access to the relevant information and to involve independent child trafficking guardians in discussions and decisions relating to the child.
That means that public authorities must properly consider and take account of independent child trafficking guardians’ views when exercising their functions, but retain responsibility for making decisions and discharging their statutory duties. Details of how that will be achieved will be outlined in the independent child trafficking guardians statutory guidance, which will be published alongside national roll-out of the guardians service. The legislation does not require public authorities to follow any particular recommendation made by an independent child trafficking guardian. Rather, public authorities must have due regard to the independent child trafficking guardian’s views and recommendations before reaching their own decisions. That requirement will be further supplemented by guidance. For public bodies not paying due regard to independent child trafficking guardians, concerns may be expressed through existing safeguarding and accountability processes. Public bodies remain accountable for ensuring that the decisions are lawful, properly reasoned and consistent with their statutory duties.
The hon. Member for Stockton West asked further about indirect and direct support, and the more appropriate form of it. It will be for Barnardo’s—the service provider—to determine what support a child needs. Clear guidance will be provided by the Home Office. The service also has the flexibility to determine where direct support is appropriate to meet a child’s needs, for instance where there is no figure of parental responsibility for the child in the UK. We believe it is appropriate this decision making sit with the service provider that is best able to make this decision. This flexible, needs-based approach was found to better meet the needs of vulnerable children by the independent evaluation of the independent child trafficking guardian service, published in 2024.
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
I beg to move amendment 70, in clause 43, page 45, line 1, leave out subsection (3).
This amendment would remove the provision which enables the Secretary of State to override an assessment that a potential victim of slavery or trafficking requires assistance and support.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 71, in clause 43, page 45, line 4, at end insert—
“(3A) In considering whether assistance and support is necessary, the Secretary of State or an authorised person must have regard to—
(a) the best interests of the person receiving such assistance and support and of any children dependent on that person;
(b) the need to ensure that assistance and support is provided on the basis of the individual needs of the person receiving it; and
(c) the need to act in a way which is compatible with the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings and the European Convention on Human Rights.”
This amendment would require parties considering whether a potential victim of slavery or trafficking requires assistance and support to consider the best interests of the person (and any dependent children) and to comply with the Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings and the ECHR.
Amendment 72, in clause 43, page 45, line 6, leave out “do not apply in relation to a child” and insert
“apply in relation to a child, and any necessary assistance and support must be provided in a manner that is age-appropriate, trauma-informed and consistent with the best interests of the child.
(4B) Nothing in this section prevents a local authority or any other public authority from discharging duties owed to a child under any other enactment, and the existence of such duties does not relieve the Secretary of State of the duties imposed by this section.”
This amendment would assert that the requirement to provide assistance and support to potential victims of slavery or trafficking does apply to child victims, regardless of whether the child would be otherwise supported by a local or other public authority.
Government amendments 120 to 123
Amendment 73, in clause 43, page 45, line 18, at end insert—
“(5A) After subsection (6), insert—
‘(6A) The Secretary of State must—
(a) ensure that adequate funding and resources are provided to local authorities for the purpose of ensuring that potential victims who are children receive assistance and support which is—
(i) compliant with the obligations of the United Kingdom under Article 12 of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, and
(ii) at least equivalent in nature and extent to that which would be provided to a potential victim who is an adult under this section.
(b) within 12 months of the passing of the Immigration and Asylum Act 2026 and annually thereafter, lay before Parliament a report setting out—
(i) the funding provided to local authorities for the purpose of supporting potential victims who are children,
(ii) an assessment of whether such funding is sufficient to enable compliance with Article 12 of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, and
(iii) the number of potential victims who are children who have not received assistance and support equivalent to that which would have been provided under this section to a potential victim who is an adult.’”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to ensure that sufficient funding is provided to local authorities to support child victims of slavery and trafficking, and to report annually on the provision and adequacy of such funding.
Clause stand part.
Siân Berry
It is my view and that of a wide range of refugee and modern slavery organisations that clause 43, particularly subsection (3), is incompatible with article 12 of the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings, which puts a duty on state parties to afford support to survivors of modern slavery in receipt of a reasonable grounds decision. The removal of the duty to provide support will put adults, children and young people at risk of destitution, homelessness and further harm, as we have discussed in relation to previous clauses.
We know that trauma can manifest in a wide range of ways and may significantly affect an individual’s ability to engage consistently with support services or comply with procedural requirements. Penalising people for such difficulties fails to take account of the realities of trauma and recovery and, again, creates detriment from a known feature of abuse. Additionally, while we agree that safeguarding and supporting children should be the responsibility of local authorities, they do need to receive adequate resources in order to discharge those duties appropriately and in the best interests of the child. Local authorities do not currently receive any funding to offer specialist support to children affected by trafficking and exploitation, and my amendments to this clause therefore seek both to reduce the harms being caused by it and to boost the support that can be offered to survivors.
Amendment 70 would remove subsection (3) and take away the Secretary of State’s power to override professional assessments. Support for the survivors of modern slavery is currently delivered through Government-funded contracts such as the modern slavery victim care contract in England and Wales, and equivalent arrangements across the devolved Administrations. Specialist organisations and trained support workers provide this support directly to survivors and are responsible for carrying out detailed assessments of need. The assessments should be informed by the professional expertise of frontline practitioners and crucially by survivors’ own views and experiences. I believe that support workers and survivors are best placed to identify an individual’s needs, because they are in direct and ongoing contact with the person concerned. It would therefore be harmful for the Secretary of State, who is removed from this direct engagement, to override such assessments without having had contact with the individual or a comparable understanding of their circumstances.
Allowing decision makers who are distant from a survivor’s situation to disregard professional assessments risks undermining survivor-centred support and could result in people being discharged from support with outstanding high needs. The Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group has presented further evidence to us on these points, around subsection (3). It says that it
“reflects the operational reality of how the MSVCC contract already functions in assessing survivors' needs.”
It therefore makes worse what is already bad. At the moment, an MSVCC provider completes a needs assessment and submits it to the Home Office for approval. The Home Office then reviews the assessment and either agrees or disagrees with both the assessment itself and the level of support recommended. It is concerning that this decision maker power, that ultimately rests with the Home Office, will be given directly to the Secretary of State.
The Secretary of State will be even further removed from the care, safeguarding and day-to-day insight available to frontline service providers, and could issue blanket rules or directives in situations of strained resources, for example, that would even more arbitrarily remove support from survivors. The Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group tells us that there is evidence for already ongoing issues with meeting the thresholds required to secure additional support, including for mental health needs. The recovery needs assessment process is highly bureaucratic—individuals are often discharged from support despite having significant unmet needs. If a similar approach is applied to decisions relating to the recovery and reflection period, there is a substantial risk that individuals will be discharged from support while still experiencing high levels of unmet need, exposing them to an increased risk of re-exploitation.
In amendment 72, I have asked for assistance to apply to children. While we agree that safeguarding and supporting children should be the responsibility of local authorities, I think it is very important that the Secretary of State retains an overarching duty to ensure that children receive support in line with article 12 of the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings. This would help ensure national accountability for the protection and recovery of child victims of trafficking and not leave it to the piecemeal provisions of local authorities. Maintaining this duty would also ensure that the Secretary of State remains responsible for ensuring that local authorities are adequately resourced, as my next amendment would require. It would be, therefore, an important safeguard to ensure that all children receive the support and assistance to which they are entitled, regardless of where they are located.
Amendment 73 would ensure funding for local authorities to support children. We need to make sure that they have adequate resources to discharge their duties in the best interest of children. Currently, local authorities do not receive any specialist support funding for children affected by trafficking and exploitation, but it is essential, as is the mainstream child protection that local authorities provide. The charity, ECPAT, which stands for Every Child Protected Against Trafficking, has told me that not providing dedicated funding to local authorities to meet the ECAT entitlements of children leaves an enormous gap. It says that the Home Office provides local authorities with £143 per child, per night, towards the cost of supporting unaccompanied children, but there is no equivalent funding attached to a child’s identification as a potential victim of trafficking. That responsibility is placed on the existing social care system, which we all know is under substantial financial pressure. I really hope that the Government will listen to that point.
A final point in relation to subsection (3) is that all it says is
“where the Secretary of State disagrees”
—which is incredibly broad. Will the Minister tell us whether the Secretary of State will publish criteria governing when this override power may be used, and will she address the fact that there is currently no defined threshold for displacing an authorised person’s professional assessment by the Home Office? I will not press my amendments to a vote, but I want to see the risks and problems identified by them addressed, either in regulations or in the Bill, before the legislation leaves this House and goes to the other place.
Anna Turley
I thank the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion for tabling amendments 70 to 73, which propose several changes to clause 43 on support and assistance provided to adult and child potential victims of modern slavery. I will start by reiterating the purpose of clause 43 and then turn to the amendments. Currently, where a potential victim has had suitable statutory support put in place to meet a modern slavery need, and that support is removed due to their conduct, the Secretary of State is required to provide that person with the equivalent support again. That results in the duplication of support provided across Government and the associated excessive costs to the taxpayer.
Clause 43 will ensure that the Secretary of State is not required to provide equivalent support again in those circumstances. For example, if a potential victim has their asylum accommodation withdrawn because they did not follow asylum support conditions, they will no longer be able to access equivalent modern slavery accommodation in its place. That will safeguard the integrity of the modern slavery system, ensuring support is not provided unconditionally and indefinitely. We recognise, however, the specific vulnerabilities and impact that trauma may have on an individual’s conduct. To safeguard vulnerable victims, support will not be withheld if there is a good reason, related to their modern slavery experience, for the conduct that led to that element of support being removed.
I wish to be clear that the Government remain committed to supporting vulnerable people. We have invested £25 million in the national independent child trafficking guardianship service and are in the process of procuring the new adult victim support contract to assist victims to achieve long-term stability and to live independently, and to reduce their risk of re-exploitation. Together, those investments form part of our wider programme of modern slavery reform, designed to safeguard the integrity of the system and ensure that resources are targeted at those who need them.
Clause 43 also makes technical amendments to section 50A of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. They will not change the support provided to adult or child victims; rather, the clause ensures that current support arrangements for adult and child victims are correctly reflected in statute. In line with existing practice, the amendments remove children from the provision to reflect that local authorities safeguard and promote the welfare of all children within their area, and the independent child trafficking guardian service provides further specialist modern slavery support. The amendments also make it clear that an authorised support provider can assess the support needs of adult victims of modern slavery.
Turning to amendments 70 to 73, the Government understand that their intention is to safeguard vulnerable potential victims. The Government share that commitment and are equally committed to ensuring that all victims of modern slavery, including child victims, can access the necessary support and assistance they require. The Government do not, however, consider the amendments necessary. In fact, they directly contradict the intention of clause 43 in two ways.
First, amendment 70 seeks to remove the Secretary of State’s power to override an authorised person’s assessment that support is necessary to assist a potential victim in their recovery. That would mean that the Secretary of State would be unable to intervene where appropriate to ensure that the outcome of a support assessment aligned with the relevant statutory guidance. That is a necessary power, ensuring fairness in the provision of support to adult victims across England and Wales. The power provides an important safeguard to ensure that Government-issued guidance on the assessment of necessary support is appropriately adhered to.
The need to intervene may arise in particularly complex cases and where other state support services have jurisdiction. For example, where an authorised support provider has determined that financial support is necessary but has not accounted for income the victim receives from another statutory service, the Secretary of State must be able to intervene to ensure that financial support is not provided where it is not necessary, in line with guidance.
As an another example, where an authorised support provider has determined that ongoing support should be provided to a victim despite their lack of engagement, but it has not given due attention to the non-engagement policy and the other statutory support available to a victim, the Secretary of State must be able to intervene to withdraw that support in line with statutory guidance on non-engagement to ensure consistency and fairness in the application of the policy across victims in England and Wales. I want to be clear, however, that the Home Office has a robust contract management regime in place to ensure that our supplier will deliver a high-quality service to victims in line with its contractual obligations underpinned by statutory guidance. The supplier has consistently met and exceeded delivery expectations, and the Home Office has a strong relationship with it.
Siân Berry
My concern is that subsection (3) provides the Home Secretary with a broad, unqualified power to disagree with the assessments that the Minister has just mentioned. Amendment 71 seems to provide a perfectly reasonable set of safeguards against breaching those international obligations. Will the Minister look at providing more detail about the criteria that the Home Secretary would use in future regulation to reassure us?
Anna Turley
I appreciate the hon. Lady referencing that. Of course, we will always consider any issues and desires for clarification that are raised in this Committee through the development of the regulations. Her concerns have been noted, but I am reassured that we are compliant with the ECAT and ECHR obligations.
The hon. Lady made a couple of other points about a potential increase in homelessness and destitution. The Home Office remains committed to meeting legal obligations, ensuring that policies do not leave people destitute or at risk of re-trafficking. However, individuals should not be able to use modern slavery to circumvent the conditions for other statutory support services. To ensure a coherent approach across Government to supporting victims, adult modern slavery support will be withheld in particular circumstances in order to align with decisions made by wider statutory services to withdraw support from someone who has failed to follow reasonable conditions.
To safeguard vulnerable victims, support will not be withheld if a victim has a good reason related to their modern slavery experience to explain why they were unable to meet reasonable conditions. As only the particular element of modern slavery support that was removed by another service will be withheld, where necessary, support worker assistance will remain available to advise and signpost to other avenues of accommodation or financial support.
The hon. Lady also asked about the Home Office’s oversight and monitoring of local authorities to ensure that children do not fall through gaps in provision. I think I have covered most of that, but the children’s social care national framework is statutory guidance for local authorities that sets the national direction for practice. It provides clarity on the outcomes that children’s social care should achieve for children, young people and families. “Working Together to Safeguard Children 2026” is the multi-agency statutory guidance. It provides detailed information on the duties and responsibilities of all agencies to safeguard children.
Both pieces of statutory guidance—the national framework and “Working Together”—should be read alongside each other. Ofsted independently inspects local authority children’s services through its inspecting local authority children’s services framework. Those inspections consider the experiences and progress of children and families, the quality of practice and leadership, and whether services are meeting their statutory duties. Local authorities are assessed using performance data, reform, delivery and wider regional intelligence to determine the appropriate level of support and intervention.
As I have outlined, the amendments are unnecessary, as the Government are confident that support provisions for adult and child potential victims are compliant with our international obligations. Adult support needs assessments already consider the individual support needs and circumstances of victims, and local authorities already have a duty to safeguard and promote the welfare of all children within their areas. For the reasons outlined, I respectfully request that the amendments not be pressed.
Government amendments 120 to 123 will make minor changes to proposed new subsection 50A(5ZA) of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, inserted by clause 43, to clarify how the provision will work in practice. First, amendments 120 to 122 put beyond doubt that proposed new subsection 50A(5ZA) is a targeted provision such that where a particular form of support is to be withheld, such as accommodation, the duty to provide other forms of support, such as financial support, will continue. That will prevent the duplication of support provided across Government and the associated excessive costs to taxpayers by ensuring that specific forms of support are not provided unconditionally and indefinitely. However, we recognise the specific vulnerabilities and impact that trauma may have on an individual’s conduct, which is why the amendments will make the safeguards for vulnerable potential victims clearer.
As a result of amendment 123, when decision makers are deciding whether an element of support should be withheld, they will consider whether the conduct that resulted in other statutory support being removed is attributable rather than “properly” attributable to their modern slavery experience. That is to avoid decision makers having to make unduly complex assessments, which could have an adverse impact on vulnerable potential victims. I commend Government amendments 120 to 123 and clause 43 to the Committee.
Matt Vickers
Support for potential victims must reach those who genuinely need it, with clear responsibility for decisions and proper accountability for every pound of taxpayers’ money. Clause 43 raises three practical questions. Who assesses that need? Who can overrule that assessment? How does this support fit alongside other services?
The clause allows an authorised person to assess the assistance someone needs while keeping a power for the Secretary of State to override a positive assessment. Amendment 70 would scrap that override. I understand the worry about specialist advice being set aside, but Ministers must remain answerable to this House for the public money in this system, so we cannot support the amendment. What the power does demand is clear reasons. I would welcome the Minister telling us when the override is expected to be used, what evidence would justify it, and how a wrong decision would be put right.
Amendment 71 would add a list of factors to be assessed, including the best interests of the person and their dependent; their individual needs; and compatibility with the relevant conventions. Good decision makers should already be weighing a person’s need, and writing a long list of factors into statute invites challenge on every one of them and risks turning each decision into a legal contest. We do not support the amendment.
Government amendments 120 to 123 are the latest in a string of changes that the Government have made to their Bill in this part alone, but these amendments are an improvement. Where someone loses support elsewhere because of their conduct, the exclusion is narrowed to the particular kind of support they have lost, rather than letting the loss of one service become a reason to withhold everything. That is a fair balance. Conditions attached to public assistance must still mean something, and the taxpayer should not simply be asked to replace support that someone has lost through their own misconduct.
Government amendment 123 removes the word “properly” from the test of whether that conduct is attributable to harm arising from exploitation. We will not oppose it, but the Minister should explain why the word is going, and confirm that it does not lower the bar. The question must still be answered on the evidence. Neither an automatic excuse nor an automatic penalty makes for good decisions.
Amendments 72 and 73 concern children. Clause 43 removes children from these Home Office support duties while separate duties on local authorities and other agencies remain. Amendment 72 would keep the Home Office duty for children, and amendment 73 would require resources for local authority provision and reporting on funding.
Protecting children is essential, but keeping two overlapping duties risks the very thing we all want to avoid: two bodies each assuming that the other has it covered while the child falls through the middle. We do not support these amendments either, but the Government must be clear about where responsibility now lies. I would be grateful if the Minister could set out who is responsible at each stage of a child’s case, how local authority provision will be funded, and what happens immediately if that provision is not there. We support clause 43 and Government amendments 120 to 123.
Anna Turley
I think I have answered most of the hon. Gentleman’s questions, and if not, I will clarify in writing.
Siân Berry
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendments made: 120, in clause 43, page 45, line 9, after “support” insert “of a particular kind”.
This amendment and amendments 121 and 122 clarify that where assistance or support of a particular kind would have been available from elsewhere had it not been for the victim’s conduct it is only assistance or support of that particular kind that the Secretary of State will no longer be under a duty to provide.
Amendment 121, in clause 43, page 45, line 10, leave out first “the”.
See the explanatory statement for amendment 120.
Amendment 122, in clause 43, page 45, line 10, after “support” insert “of that kind”.
See the explanatory statement for amendment 120.
Amendment 123, in clause 43, page 45, line 15, leave out “properly”.—(Anna Turley.)
This amendment leaves out an unnecessary word from the inserted subsection (5ZA).
Clause 43, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 44
Content of slavery and human trafficking statements
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this, it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Schedule 5.
Clause 45 stand part.
Anna Turley
I shall now speak to clauses 44 to 49. While we take seriously the need to investigate modern slavery within the UK and provide support to victims, we must also remain cognisant of the global reach of UK business and supply chains. Globally, it is estimated that 27.6 million people are trapped in forced labour, with around two thirds of those cases linked to global supply chains. Section 54 of the Modern Slavery Act established the UK as the first country in the world to require businesses to report on how they are tackling modern slavery in their operations and supply chains. While the transparency in supply chains regime was widely welcomed by businesses and non-governmental organisations when it was first introduced, it has since faced criticism that it is merely a tick-box exercise that lacks any teeth in respect to enforcement.
Compliance with section 54 is difficult to quantify, but analysis from the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre in 2021 suggested that around only 60% of companies have met basic reporting requirements. This month, the Rathbones “Votes Against Slavery” report identified 194 instances of non-compliance across 160 FTSE 350 companies over the last six years. Measures in the Bill will address that by raising expectations on businesses and public sector organisations to improve their reporting and act on exploitation in their supply chains, with stronger consequences for non-compliance. We are bringing in a more consistent approach to how organisations report, and by penalising those that do not comply, we can better highlight those that are taking positive action to ensure their supply chains are free from modern slavery. Those that fall short will be clearly exposed, encouraging a race to the top.
Clause 44 strengthens transparency by requiring organisations to cover mandatory content in their annual modern slavery statement, as set out in proposed new schedule 4ZA. It replaces the existing discretionary reporting areas in section 54 of the Modern Slavery Act with mandatory areas in proposed new schedule 4ZA, set out in schedule 5 of the Bill. We expect businesses and the public sector to report meaningfully on the actions they are taking. In making this change, reports will become more standardised, comprehensive and open to greater public scrutiny. Clause 44 also enables the Secretary of State to amend those requirements through regulations following consultation with persons the Secretary of State considers appropriate.
Schedule 5 sets out the information that must be provided in a slavery and human trafficking statement. Statements must include information on the organisation’s structure, operations and supply chains; risks in their operations and supply chains, and steps taken to manage those risks; policies in relation to slavery and human trafficking; relevant due diligence processes; training for staff; and an assessment of the effectiveness of action taken. If an organisation does not have any relevant information to provide under any of these topics, they must provide a reason.
This provides a clear and consistent framework for businesses and public authorities to report on action they have taken to assess and address risks of modern slavery in their operations and supply chains. By standardising reporting in line with the Government’s comprehensive guidance, consumers and investors will have greater access to relevant information to support making informed choices on where to spend their money.
The Modern Slavery Act is ambiguous in its expectations on organisational accountability for the content of modern slavery statements and how group structures may meet their reporting requirements. The Government want to ensure that senior parties are held to account for the contents of their organisations’ statements, and to certify that they are current. Clause 45 mandates that signatories state that the contents of their reports are accurate to the best of their knowledge and belief, and that they sign after the end of the financial year to which it relates.
We also want to continue to allow the private sector to report in groups, where appropriate, as a means of balancing transparency with the burdens on business. Clause 45 sets out that parent companies may produce statements on behalf of their subsidiaries. It therefore clarifies responsibility for modern slavery statements by ensuring that accountability rests with a clearly identifiable senior individual. That will strengthen governance and oversight, promote greater board-level engagement and reinforce the expectation that signatories take responsibility both for the accuracy of the statement and for the organisation’s approach to managing modern slavery risks. I commend the clauses to the Committee.
Matt Vickers
Clauses 44 and 45, together with schedule 5, set out what businesses must tell us about modern slavery and who takes responsibility for that information. The Modern Slavery Act 2015 put responsibility on businesses to explain what they were doing about the slavery in their operations and supply chains. That was an important Conservative reform. We should build on that where there are gaps, and judge the changes by whether they help to expose and stop exploitation.
An honest business that pays its workers properly should not be undercut by someone whose low prices depend on exploitation further down the chain. Nor should a customer have to wonder whether the bargain they have bought came at somebody else’s expense. Clear information can help with both, but a longer statement is not necessarily a better one, and paying someone to produce a polished document is no substitute for checking what is happening on the ground. Clause 44 and schedule 5 make reporting topics compulsory. They cover the organisation and its supply chains; the risks and the steps taken to address them; policies, checks and staff training; and whether action taken has worked.
We support the principle of making statements more useful and easier to compare. A reader should be able to work out what an organisation has actually done without wading through pages of comforting language. Ministers will have a power to change the required content, so I would be grateful for an assurance that any future change will be assessed for its cost to business as well as for its expected benefit.
There is an important qualification, however. Schedule 5 still allows an organisation to say that it has not assessed the risk, put policies in place or taken particular steps, provided that it gives an explanation. The Minister should be clear about what is being promised. This is a duty to report on specified matters; it does not, by itself, require every organisation to take every action described in the schedule. That raises an obvious question: what happens when the same organisation reports year after year that it has done nothing? Who will look at the explanation and what will prompt further scrutiny? There is a difference between being honest about a gap and treating an annual explanation as permission to leave that gap untouched.
The detail must be workable. A company may buy through several suppliers before the chain reaches the people making the product, and information will not always be easy to obtain. Ministers need to explain what reasonable inquiries look like to avoid creating a system in which large companies simply pass endless questionnaires down to smaller firms. Small suppliers should be able to spend their time dealing with real risks, rather than answering the same question in 10 different formats. Businesses will also need proper notice before the new requirements apply; I hope the Minister will tell us how much notice they will get.
Clause 45 deals with approval and signing, including certification by a parent undertaking. That can avoid duplication, but it must not allow the activities of a subsidiary to disappear inside a vague statement about the wider group. The person signing should have asked enough questions to stand behind the declaration of accuracy. Board approval should mean that somebody has actually paid attention. The Minister should explain how group reporting will stay clear about which businesses it covers, and what evidence directors should have in front of them before they sign. We support clearer reporting and proper responsibility at the top, but the Government must show that the changes will help to identify exploitation, and that the information produced will actually be used. Otherwise, we will have added to the paperwork and left the people being exploited exactly where they were.
Anna Turley
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his questions on these important measures, which we are very proud to bring in.
As discussed, clause 44 strengthens the transparency of modern slavery statements by requiring organisations to cover the mandatory topics set out in schedule 4ZA. That will allow statements to be more standardised and comprehensive, and open to greater public scrutiny. Schedule 5 provides a clear and consistent framework for businesses and public authorities to report on the action they have taken to assess and address risks of modern slavery in their operations and supply chains. Clause 45 improves accountability for reporting by holding senior parties to account, while also allowing private sector group structures to balance transparency on those important issues with the burdens of running a business.
The hon. Gentleman asked what the mandatory content requirements would be. As I said, they are set out in schedule 5. Statements will need to contain information on the organisation’s structure, operations and supply chains; the modern slavery risks within them; the steps taken to address those risks; modern slavery policies; due diligence processes; relevant staff training; and the assessment of the organisation’s effectiveness in preventing modern slavery in its operations and supply chains. If a statement does not contain relevant information under any of those topics, the organisation must state that the information has not been included for that topic and give a reason why. The mandatory content requirements align with updated statutory guidance published in March 2025. The guidance was updated with input from stakeholders from Government, business, civil society and academia to ensure that it reflects best practice and international standards.
The hon. Gentleman asked why these topics in particular have been selected. They build on the voluntary topics set out in the original legislation, informed by the updated statutory guidance, which, as I have just outlined, was developed in consultation with stakeholders. The guidance sets out how an organisation may produce a modern slavery statement in line with best practice and international standards, which include the UN guiding principles on business and human rights and the OECD due diligence guidance for responsible business conduct. The mandatory topics also align with legislation in Australia and Canada. Organisations in scope of reporting requirements across the three jurisdictions may use the joint-reporting template published in July 2025 to create one statement that would be compliant in all three countries.
The hon. Gentleman asked about enforcement, about organisations that have said they would take no action or have identified no risk, and about what teeth are behind the measures. The new measures require businesses to provide a reason if they have not taken any steps to assess modern slavery risks. If they have assessed that there are no risks, they must set out their risk assessment approach. The purpose of the regime is not to penalise organisations for identifying risks or for being at an earlier stage in managing them, but to ensure greater transparency about the action they are taking and the basis for their decisions.
By bringing a more consistent approach to how businesses report, we can better shine a light on those that take positive action to ensure that their supply chains are free from modern slavery, and highlight those that fall short, encouraging a race to the top. Stronger transparency enables consumers and investors to make informed choices and hold businesses and private sector organisations to account, encouraging more proactive efforts to manage modern slavery in supply chains. Of course, we will consider some of the other reporting and monitoring measures, and the punishment measures, as part of the coming groups.
On businesses wanting further clarity on reporting requirements, we consulted widely, as I have said, with businesses, non-governmental organisations and civil society during the recent update to the guidance on transparency in supply chains, which was published in March 2025. Businesses themselves asked for greater clarity on how parent companies and their subsidiaries can report as a group. The updated guidance now includes details on the best-practice approach to reporting as a group when, for example, companies share the same procurement or operate in similar markets. To enable that practice to continue, we have included measures in the Bill to make it clear that companies may report as a group and thereby continue to report in the most efficient way for their business.
As I said, schedule 5 improves the accountability for reporting, holding senior parties to account, while allowing private sector group structures to balance transparency on such important issues against the burdens of running a business. I hope hon. Members share our view that making the requirements mandatory will help individuals, consumers and all those of us who are concerned about the impact of modern slavery in supply chains across the globe to hold companies to account further.
Siân Berry
I add my support—for a change in this Committee—to the broad approach taken in this part of the Bill. I realise that the Bill’s scope is narrow, but have the Minister or the Home Secretary had any discussions with colleagues in the Cabinet and other Departments about using these quite creative new reporting requirements—which cover the supply chain and require reasons to be given for not doing things—as a template for use in other areas, such as environmental pollution or other human rights issues? Will the Minister commit the Home Office to taking the learnings from implementing this to other Departments?
Anna Turley
The hon. Lady makes an important point. We are proud of the provisions, and a review is being undertaken by the Department for Business, Innovation, Science and Trade to consider how to develop them further. I hope that the Home Office example is setting out best practice for other Departments to ensure that, in a world of global business, we are able to hold corporations to account in our legislative and democratic framework. I appreciate her point.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 44 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 5 agreed to.
Clause 45 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 46
Application to public authorities
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Anna Turley
As just discussed, section 54 of the Modern Slavery Act requires large businesses to report on the steps that they take to prevent modern slavery within their operations and supply chains. However, equivalent requirements do not apply to the public sector. Given that the Government spend approximately £295 billion annually on procurement, there is a clear risk that public sector supply chains may also be exposed to modern slavery. The clause addresses that gap by extending transparency requirements to public authorities and strengthening accountability for modern slavery risks in public procurement.
Public authorities will be required to publish annual modern slavery statements covering the mandatory topics set out in schedule 4ZA, and to upload those statements to the modern slavery statement registry within six months of the end of the relevant financial year. The clause also sets out who may sign a statement, requires signatories to confirm its accuracy to the best of their knowledge and belief, and provides for group reporting where appropriate.
By bringing the public sector into line with the private sector, the clause will improve transparency, strengthen accountability and help ensure that public money is not contributing to modern slavery. It is important to note that this is a groundbreaking and important aspect of the Bill. As I have set out, we spend a huge amount on public procurement contracts, and I am sure that the vast majority of people would hope and expect that taxpayers’ money spent by the Government, local authorities and our broader public sector does not have any damaging effect on modern slavery around the world.
Placing this responsibility on public bodies, as we do for private bodies, is not just a really important statement about levelling up; it is an important statement that every penny of taxpayers’ money should be spent in an ethical way and must not support modern slavery in any of our supply chains. It is an important provision, and we should be proud to have included it in the Bill.
Matt Vickers
Clause 46 brings public authorities within the modern slavery reporting system. It is right that we look closely at how they account for the money they spend. If we expect businesses to explain what they are doing about exploitation in their supply chains, public bodies should be prepared to do the same. Taxpayers are entitled to know that money taken from their wages is being spent responsibly. The fact that a contract is paid for by the state does not make the risks behind it disappear. We support the principle of the clause.
Let us consider a public body that buys uniforms, cleaning services or equipment. The contract may look perfectly respectable, but who has checked the arrangements further down the chain? Who has asked how the workers are recruited, or whether a subcontractor is using labour supplied on terms that should ring alarm bells? Those questions need asking before a problem becomes a scandal, and the Government should lead by example here. Ministers cannot demand standards from the private sector and then accept an annual statement from a public body as evidence that everything must be fine. The statement needs to reflect the decisions made by the people who are actually buying the goods and services. If the procurement team finds a serious risk, it needs a clear route to someone who can act on it.
The threshold also matters. The Bill leaves both the minimum budget and the way in which it is calculated to be decided by regulations. Until we see them, we cannot know which bodies will be covered or what the burden will be. Businesses must report once their turnover reaches £36 million; I would be grateful if the Minister told us whether the public sector threshold will match that. How many authorities are expected to be covered, and what assessment has been made of their capacity to comply? The Government’s notes say that applying those duties to public authorities in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland requires the consent of the devolved legislatures. Has that consent has been sought?
The clause also allows one public authority to certify another’s statement. There may be sensible reasons for that, particularly where services or purchasing arrangements are shared, but responsibility must remain clear. If a statement turns out to be inaccurate, the answer cannot be that one authority relied on another and neither checked. The Minister should tell us what assurance the signing authority will be expected to obtain. The named intelligence agencies are excluded—there are obvious sensitivities around public disclosure of their operations—but the power to add further exemptions should be used sparingly. I would welcome it if the Minister set out the principles that will govern any further exclusions.
We support clause 46, but now we need is a workable timetable, clear responsibility and a proper connection between reporting and purchasing decisions. Public bodies should be able to show that they are tackling the risks that they find, and Ministers should be ready to answer when those bodies are not doing so.
Anna Turley
I appreciate the hon. Gentleman’s contribution. Abhorrent practices such as modern slavery have no place in public supply chains. We have taken action, through the Procurement Act 2023, to strengthen the rules around excluding suppliers because of serious misconduct anywhere in their operations, including certain key subcontractors.
In February 2025, the Government updated procurement policy note 009, “Tackling modern slavery in government supply chains”, advocating a risk-based approach to identifying and managing modern slavery risks, and encouraging Departments to conduct due diligence using a range of tools, such as the modern slavery assessment tool.
The modern slavery assessment tool is a risk identification management tool that has been designed to help public sector organisations to work in partnership with suppliers to improve protections and reduce the risk of exploitation of workers in their supply chains. The Government also made the anti-slavery risk tiering tool available to public sector buyers in October 2025. That tool enables faster risk assessments and clear next steps to mitigate modern slavery risks across the commercial lifecycle.
The hon. Gentleman asked which organisations will be required to start reporting. Based on the evidence in our impact assessment, we estimate that around 1,040 organisations will be required to report, and that, because of the ability to report in groups, which we have explicitly allowed for, that will likely result in approximately 380 statements.
The hon. Gentleman also asked about devolved Government consent. We are having conversations as part of this process. He asked about timings and when public sector organisations will start to publish their statements. Through the Bill, the Government are extending the duty to report on actions being taken to address modern slavery in supply chains, as introduced in section 4 of the Modern Slavery Act. We expect the measures to take effect for an organisation’s financial year beginning on or after commencement. While commencement timelines are still to be finalised, we do not expect the first compliance statements will be required any earlier than the end of 2028.
I think I have answered all the shadow Minister’s questions. I thank Members for their interest in the clause, which is about extending transparency requirements relating to modern slavery to public authorities. Our intention is to align the public sector procurement process with the private sector, and to ensure that no public money is contributing to modern slavery.
Matt Vickers
We talked about the number of organisations that we expect to be impacted. In terms of proportionality and balance, where will the threshold lie? For businesses, it is a turnover of £36 million, but what will be the scale of public sector organisations expected to comply versus the private sector?
Anna Turley
It is difficult to make a direct comparison. Organisations will be expected, to some extent, to lead this themselves. For example, NHS England will make a decision on whether it is accountable as a body as a whole, or whether it provides multiple responses from regional bodies. Those organisations will come forward to us with their recommendations on how they would like to report, which will give us a sense of the scale. I do not think this is directly comparable to the private sector in a like-for-like way. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 46 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 47
Statements: publication and submission
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Anna Turley
Under the Modern Slavery Act 2015, organisations are required to publish modern slavery statements on a prominent place on their website. If they do not have a website, they must make their statement available on request. That makes it difficult to access modern slavery statements, assess levels of compliance and hold organisations to account, as there is no central means of reporting.
Clause 47 seeks to address that gap by creating a clear requirement for organisations to submit their modern slavery statements to a specified electronic platform, such as the modern slavery statement registry that exists for voluntary submissions. The clause requires statements to be submitted within six months of the end of the relevant financial year, ensuring that reporting is timely, accessible and easily monitored. By centralising statements in a single location, the Government will be more able to identify organisations that are complying with their statutory obligations and take action on those that are failing to do so.
That will strengthen oversight, improve transparency and support more effective enforcement of the reporting regime. It will also make information on modern slavery risks and actions more readily available to consumers, investors, civil society and other stakeholders, enabling greater scrutiny of organisational practices and more informed decision making. The clause transforms a reporting requirement into a more effective accountability mechanism. By ensuring that statements are submitted to a central registry within a defined timeframe, it will improve monitoring of compliance, strengthen enforcement and increase transparency across both public and private sector supply chains.
Matt Vickers
Following our consideration of what these statements should contain, clause 47 turns to whether they reach the people who need to read them. There is little value in requiring a statement if nobody can find it, or if the only version available is several years out of date. A customer, supplier or member of the public should be able to see what an organisation says it is doing and when it last accounted for its actions. We support making that information easier to find.
The clause requires publication on an organisation’s website, when it has one, with a prominent link on the home page. It also allows regulations to require electronic submission to the Secretary of State. Organisations must comply as soon as reasonably practicable after the financial year ends and within six months at the latest. That gives them a clear deadline, but the practical question is whether the Home Office will know when it has been missed. A collection of statements tells us who has submitted what; it does not, on its own, tell us who should have submitted one and has stayed silent.
The existing registry can already send reminders to organisations that have signed up, but it cannot chase an organisation that should be reporting and has never registered at all. I would be grateful if the Minister explained how the Department will identify every organisation covered, and how it will follow up missing statements.
Anna Turley
I thank the hon. Gentleman. To reassure him, we will be building on the modern slavery statement registry. More than 34,000 organisations are already registered there. Therefore, familiarisation costs to those organisations are likely to be minimal, as they already use that platform. For organisations that have not used the registry before, we expect the costs of familiarisation, which includes the time taken for personnel for register and learn how to use it, to be very low. The impact assessment estimates the first-year cost to businesses is approximately £0.4 million, and the ongoing costs are estimated to be approximately £0.2 million per year.
The hon. Gentleman asked about timetable and whether there should be a single reporting deadline. It is important that we recognise that businesses may have different financial reporting periods based on how their financial year operates, as most businesses’ reporting will align with their financial year timescales. We want to ensure that businesses can align their modern slavery reporting with their ongoing reporting operations and obligations to minimise the burdens.
I want to clarify the broader impact of the measures. It is important to reiterate that this requirement is not new; businesses in scope should already be producing their modern slavery statements in line with section 54 of the Modern Slavery Act. The measures in the Bill will require some changes to the content and process for completing and submitting a statement, but those will be minimal. A full impact assessment and breakdown of costs, as I have said, has already been published. On registry notifications and how to identify the organisations covered, we are working with the Department for Business to build the in-scope list, so I can keep the hon. Gentleman and the Committee updated on that.
The hon. Gentleman also asked about the enforcement. Multiple models could be used to deliver that, including conferring functions on an existing regulator or within the Home Office. We are doing the work to ensure that the most appropriate model for enforcement and for administering these financial penalties will be in place. We will consult on the draft regulations during the passage of the Bill.
I thank Members for this important debate. The clause strengthens reporting requirements, improves transparency and makes it easier to identify and take action against modern slavery risks. I commend it to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 47 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 48
Guidance
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Anna Turley
Given the changes to reporting requirements in the Bill, clause 48 seeks to ensure that the provision for the Secretary of State to issue guidance aligns with these updates. The clause sets out that the Secretary of State can issue guidance for both the private and public sectors on how to write a modern slavery statement and provide examples of good practice in tackling modern slavery in supply chains and examples of information that may be included in addition to the mandatory information. That will ensure that there is adequate information to support organisations in producing modern slavery statements that cover all of the mandatory content requirements set out in schedule 5.
In summary, clause 48 will help promote consistency, transparency and good practice in reporting across both the public and private sectors, strengthening the overall effectiveness of the modern slavery transparency regime. I commend clause 48 to the Committee.
Matt Vickers
For these new duties to work, the people carrying them out need clear instructions. That is where the guidance under clause 48 comes in. It is a short clause, but the guidance will matter a great deal to the people expected to make the preceding clauses work. They need to know what a useful statement looks like, what information they should seek from suppliers and how to explain a risk they have identified. They should not need a lawyer to translate the Government’s instructions before they can get started.
Timing matters. Organisations need time to understand the requirements and put arrangements in place. Publishing guidance at the last minute would create avoidable mistakes and leave Ministers blaming people for confusion of the Government’s own making. Will the Minister commit to having the guidance available well before the new duties take effect?
Businesses have also only recently been told to review updated Home Office guidance on their statements. They should not have to rewrite everything a second time; the new guidance should build on what organisations have just put into place rather than start again from scratch. There also needs to be a clear distinction between what the law requires and what the Government would like organisations to do voluntarily. The clause allows guidance to cover additional information that statements may include. That should be plainly labelled; businesses should not discover that an optional suggestion has become an unofficial requirement when somebody comes to assess their compliance.
Practical examples would help, particularly for organisations with different kinds of supply chains. Guidance should explain how to report a problem honestly and what to do when there is evidence that somebody is being exploited. Nobody should wait for the next annual statement before raising a serious concern with the appropriate authorities.
We support clause 48, but the Minister should tell us who will be consulted on the guidance and how future changes will be communicated, so that organisations are never caught out. Clear instructions from the outset would save everybody time and keep the focus where it belongs: on the people these measures are intended to protect.
Anna Turley
Simply put, clause 48 gives the Secretary of State the power to provide practical guidance on how modern slavery statements should be prepared in line with the new requirements in the Bill, including, as the shadow Minister suggested, good practice in identifying and tackling modern slavery risks within operations and supply chains.
The shadow Minister asked when the updated guidance will be issued; I am pleased to reassure him that the Secretary of State will issue the new guidance in time for commencement. He also wanted further clarity on the reporting requirements. During the recent update to the transparency and supply chain guidance, published in March 2025, we consulted widely with businesses, NGOs and civil society. This has been well received. It aligns with the international standards that I set out earlier, such as the OECD due diligence guidelines.
The purpose of clause 48 is to support compliance and improve the overall quality of reporting. I commend it to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 48 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 49
Enforcement
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Anna Turley
Compliance with reporting requirements remains inconsistent and there are limited consequences for organisations that fail to meet their obligations. Clause 49 introduces a civil enforcement framework, including financial penalties, for organisations that fail to comply with their statutory reporting obligations under section 54 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015.
The clause provides the Secretary of State with powers to impose penalties of up to £1 million or 1% of annual turnover—or of the budget, for public authorities—to make sure that there are real consequences for those who do not take the duty seriously. It also provides a power, by regulation, for the Secretary of State to set out procedural safeguards, including warning notices, opportunities to make representations, rights of appeal and provisions relating to determination of the penalty amount, cost recovery, interest on late payment, and enforcement of unpaid penalties. That will ensure that enforcement is fair, proportionate and effective.
The changes are central to strengthening the transparency in supply chains regime, ensuring that there are meaningful consequences for non-compliance and addressing long-standing concerns that the current framework lacks teeth. I commend clause 49 to the Committee.
Matt Vickers
Clause 49 brings us to the practical question of what happens when an organisation fails to do what the law requires. We have spent preceding groups discussing what organisations must report, and how we must publish it. Those duties need to mean something. A business that takes its responsibility seriously should not find that a competitor can ignore the rules and carry on without consequence. We support effective enforcement against organisations that fail to comply without a reasonable excuse.
The clause allows Ministers to establish financial penalties through regulations. The maximum for an individual penalty will be the higher of £1 million or 1% of the organisation’s total turnover, or of a public authority’s total budget. That is a substantial power. It is a ceiling, not a standard fine, and how penalties are set below it will matter enormously. There must be a sensible distinction between a genuine mistake that is quickly corrected and a deliberate refusal to comply.
An organisation that has ignored repeated requests should not be treated in the same way as one that has made an isolated administrative error. Equally, the “reasonable excuse” provision must not become a stock response for those who simply cannot be bothered. Much of that detail is left to regulation. The clause allows for warning notices, representations and appeals. Organisations should know how a penalty has been calculated and have a fair opportunity to challenge a wrong decision. I would be grateful if the Minister confirmed which of those safeguards the regulations will include, and how the seriousness of a failure will be assessed.
There is a particular issue with fining public authorities. A fine on a public body ultimately comes out of public money, but that does not mean that public bodies should escape enforcement. However, moving money out of a service budget while leaving the same failures untouched would achieve very little. The Minister should explain how a penalty will lead to better conduct and how senior officials will be held accountable for putting matters right.
The clause also provides for civil court enforcement; the Minister should explain how that route and the penalty regime will fit together, and who will make the decisions. There is an example here from the existing law. The 2015 Act already allows the Home Secretary to seek an injunction against a business that fails to publish a statement, yet that power has, as far as I am aware, never been used. A strong power on paper is of little use if the enforcement team lacks the information or capacity to use it. The Minister should tell us what resources have been judged necessary and when the new arrangements will be up and running.
Finally, we should be clear about what the penalties address. They concern failures to comply with the reporting duties. The compliance statement is not proof that exploitation is absent and a reporting penalty is no substitute for investigating evidence of slavery. Where such evidence emerges, there needs to be a clear route to the agencies that can protect victims and pursue the perpetrators. We support giving these duties proper teeth and we support clause 49. The test for Ministers is whether persistent non-compliance is tackled, whether decisions are fair and whether identified risks lead to action. I look forward to the Minister’s explanation of how the regulations will deliver that in practice.
Siân Berry
Very briefly, although I think this is a good clause because it allows for fines and payments to be made, I want to echo a question asked of us in written evidence by Dame Sara Thornton, the former Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner. Although she describes the clause as a “game changer”, she highlights evidence that there is widespread non-compliance with the current reporting requirements: she provides data showing 194 instances across 160 companies over the past six years. She says that the legislation is
“silent on who will enforce these requirements”.
At the moment, the clause simply calls this the “enforcement authority” in lowercase letters—it is not yet an official body. It is incredibly important that the issue is resolved properly and that the enforcement body has the teeth, resources and ability to enforce the rules. If this is done properly it will be self-financing, but have the Government any plans to put more detail behind it before the Bill finally becomes law? This seems to me to be a very crucial part of any new powers.
Anna Turley
I thank hon. Members for their contributions and questions on these important clauses.
The shadow Minister and the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion asked who will be determining and enforcing the financial penalties. The Secretary of State may determine who will impose financial penalties on non-compliant organisations, and a number of models can be used to deliver that. That work is ongoing, but it could potentially be done through an existing regulator or within the Home Office itself. I appreciate that that will be an important part of the regulations we are drafting, and they will be shared during the Bill’s passage. We continue to engage with partners to ensure that we develop the most appropriate model for enforcement, so that we can administer financial penalties without placing an additional burden on the taxpayer by creating a new institution.
The shadow Minister asked about the High Court injunction power. Under the current framework, if an organisation fails to publish a statement, the Home Secretary can seek an injunction to require compliance. However, that power has not been used to date, due to the difficulties of monitoring compliance under the current regime, where there are no mandatory requirements or clear deadlines.
Pursuing an injunction can be a burdensome and resource-intensive process, and the court could only require the injuncted organisation to comply; it cannot issue a financial penalty. The measures in the Bill provide clearer expectations on what compliance looks like, allowing for more effective monitoring of compliance. They also introduce powers to impose stronger consequences on those who do not take their duties seriously.
On our expectations for the collection of these civil penalties, the purpose of the penalties is to encourage compliance with the transparency in supply chain requirements. We know from similar reporting regimes, such as gender pay gap reporting, and from Companies House, that organisations typically comply with their obligations once an investigation is opened, and before it gets to a stage where a financial penalty is issued. Therefore, the expectation is that the number of penalties issued will actually be very low. In addition, the penalty amount will vary depending on a number of factors, including organisational turnover. Given the penalty calculations and the expectation of almost full compliance, it is difficult to give an estimate of expected revenue from civil penalties. On where those penalties will go, the Bill provides that any financial penalties received by the enforcement agency must be paid into the Consolidated Fund, as is typical for such penalty regimes.
The shadow Minister asked about public bodies. As I said, they will be in scope of the reporting requirements, and financial penalties will apply to organisations that are legally separate from the Crown, such as local authorities and arm’s length bodies. As a matter of constitutional principle, the Government do not impose financial penalties on themselves.
We expect that the provisions will apply to modern slavery statements covering an organisation’s financial year that begins on or after commencement. While commencement timelines are still to be confirmed, we do not expect that the first compliance statements will be required any earlier than 2028. As I said, clarification on the details of the enforcement body will be provided as the Bill progresses through Parliament.
I thank Members again for their contributions to this discussion. Clause 49 introduces a new civil enforcement framework that will include financial penalties for companies that fail to comply with their reporting obligations under section 54 of the Modern Slavery Act, as improved by the previous clauses. Doing so will strengthen the regime and give it real teeth when looking to tackle the problem of modern slavery in supply chains.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 49 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
New Clause 1
Enforcement
“(1) A sum payable in pursuance of a decision of the IIAA is recoverable in England and Wales as if it were payable under an order of the county court.
(2) A sum payable in pursuance of a decision of the IIAA may be enforced in Scotland in the same manner as an extract registered decree arbitral bearing a warrant for execution issued by the sheriff court of any sheriffdom in Scotland.
(3) A sum payable in pursuance of a decision of the IIAA is recoverable in Northern Ireland as if it were payable under an order of the county court.
(4) Where action is taken under this section for the recovery of a sum payable in pursuance of a decision of the IIAA, the decision—
(a) in relation to England and Wales, is to be treated for the purposes of section 98 of the Courts Act 2003 (register of judgments and orders etc) as if it were a judgment entered in the county court;
(b) in relation to Northern Ireland, is to be treated for the purposes of Article 116 of the Judgments Enforcement (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/226 (N.I. 6)) (register of judgments) as if it were a judgment in respect of which an application has been accepted under Article 22 or 23(1) of that Order.
(5) IIAA Procedure Rules may provide for any or all of subsections (1) to (4)—
(a) to apply only in relation to sums of a description specified in the Rules, or
(b) not to apply except in relation to sums of a description specified in the Rules.”—(Anna Turley.)
This new clause would insert a new clause, to go after clause 10, which makes provision about the enforcement of the payment of any sums required to be paid by virtue of decisions of the IIAA.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill
New Clause 2
Increasing the availability of IIAA advice and IIAA representation
“(1) The Secretary of State may take such steps as the Secretary of State considers appropriate to increase the general availability of IIAA advice and IIAA representation.
(2) The power under subsection (1) may, in particular, be used to provide financial or other assistance (subject to any conditions the Secretary of State considers appropriate)—
(a) for persons undertaking education or training;
(b) for persons providing education, training or accreditation;
(c) for persons who provide IIAA advice or IIAA representation.
(3) In this section—
‘IIAA advice’ means advice from a qualified person about an appeal or bail application that has been or may be made to the IIAA;
‘IIAA representation’ means representation by a qualified person in proceedings before the IIAA;
‘qualified person’ means a person who is qualified for the purposes of section 84 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999.”—(Anna Turley.)
This new clause authorises the Secretary of State to take steps to increase the general availability of advice and representation for persons who make an appeal or bail application to the IIAA. The new clause would be inserted after clause 10.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 3
Late claims process: credibility
“(1) This section applies to proceedings that are subject to the late claims process (see section 12).
(2) In determining whether to believe a statement made by or on behalf of the appellant, an IIAA adjudicator must take account, as damaging the appellant’s credibility, of the fact that they provided late information.
(3) But if the IIAA adjudicator considers that there are good reasons why the appellant provided the information late, the adjudicator may decide that subsection (2)—
(a) applies to a lesser extent than it would if there were no good reasons, or
(b) does not apply at all.
(4) If in the course of the proceedings the appellant provides late evidence, an IIAA adjudicator must take that fact into account, as damaging the appellant’s credibility.
(5) But if the IIAA adjudicator considers that there are good reasons to do so, they may decide that subsection (4)—
(a) applies to a lesser extent than it otherwise would, or
(b) does not apply at all.
(6) The IIAA adjudicator must include, as part of their reasons for a decision that disposes of the proceedings, a statement explaining—
(a) how the adjudicator has applied subsection (2), and in particular—
(i) the extent to which they decided that the appellant’s credibility was damaged by the provision of late information,
(ii) the impact any credibility damage had on the determination of the appeal, and
(iii) if the appellant provided reasons for the provision of late information, what those reasons were and how they affected the application of subsection (2);
(b) whether the adjudicator has applied subsection (4), and in particular—
(i) whether the appellant provided late evidence and if so what that evidence was,
(ii) the extent to which the adjudicator decided that the appellant’s credibility was damaged by the provision of late evidence,
(iii) the impact any credibility damage had on the determination of the appeal, and
(iv) if the adjudicator considered that there were good reasons as mentioned in subsection (5), what those reasons were and how they affected the application of subsection (4).
(7) In this section—
‘late evidence’ means evidence provided to the IIAA after any deadline imposed in relation to the evidence by or under IIAA Procedure Rules;
‘late information’ means immigration information provided by the recipient of a claim notice in response to the notice—
(a) after the claim notice deadline, and
(b) at a time when the recipient was detained or had been given a notice of departure details as mentioned in section 12(1)(a) or (b);
‘immigration information’ has the meaning given in section 12;
‘claim notice’ and ‘claim notice deadline’ have the meanings given in section 11.”—(Anna Turley.)
This new clause would insert a new clause, to go after clause 12, providing that, where proceedings are subject to the late claims process (see clause 12), the appellant’s credibility is damaged. And if such an appellant provides evidence late, their credibility is damaged further. It also requires IIAA adjudicators to make a statement about the application of this section.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 4
Late information etc: proceedings before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission
“In the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997, after section 2 insert—
‘2ZA Provision of late information etc: effect on credibility
(1) This section applies where an appellant in proceedings before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission under section 2—
(a) has been served with a claim notice, and
(b) has provided any immigration information in response to the notice after the claim notice deadline—
(i) at a time when they are detained under a relevant detention provision, or
(ii) at any time after they have been given a notice of departure details.
(2) In determining whether to believe a statement made by or on behalf of the appellant, the Commission must take account, as damaging the appellant’s credibility, of the fact that they provided late information.
(3) But if the Commission considers that there are good reasons why the appellant provided the information late, the Commission may decide that subsection (2)—
(a) applies to a lesser extent than it would if there were no good reasons, or
(b) does not apply at all.
(4) If in the course of the proceedings the appellant provides late evidence, the Commission must take that fact into account, as damaging the appellant’s credibility.
(5) But if the Commission considers that there are good reasons to do so, it may decide that subsection (4)—
(a) applies to a lesser extent than it otherwise would, or
(b) does not apply at all.
(6) The Commission must include, as part of its reasons for a decision that disposes of the proceedings, a statement explaining—
(a) how the Commission has applied subsection (2), and in particular—
(i) the extent to which it decided that the appellant’s credibility was damaged by the provision of late information,
(ii) the impact any credibility damage had on the determination of the appeal, and
(iii) if the appellant provided reasons for the provision of late information, what those reasons were and how they affected the application of subsection (2);
(b) whether the Commission has applied subsection (4), and in particular—
(i) whether the appellant provided late evidence and if so what that evidence was,
(ii) the extent to which the Commission decided that the appellant’s credibility was damaged by the provision of late evidence,
(iii) the impact any credibility damage had on the determination of the appeal, and
(iv) if the Commission considered that there were good reasons as mentioned in subsection (5), what those reasons were and how they affected the application of subsection (4).
(7) In this section—
“claim notice” and “claim notice deadline” have the meanings given in section 11 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 2026;
“immigration information,” “notice of departure details” and “relevant detention provision” have the same meanings as in section 12 of that Act;
“late evidence” means evidence provided to the Commission after any deadline imposed in relation to the evidence by or under rules under section 5;
“late information” means information provided by the recipient of a claim notice in response to the notice—
(a) after the claim notice deadline, and
(b) at a time when the recipient was detained or had been given a notice of departure details as mentioned in subsection (1)(b);’”—(Anna Turley.)
This new clause would add a new clause making similar provision for proceedings before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission to that made by the new clause inserted by NC3. It would be inserted into the Bill after the new clause inserted by NC3.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 5
Liability to deportation of certain residents despite section 7 of the Immigration Act 1971
“In section 7 of the Immigration Act 1971 (exemption from deportation for certain existing residents), after subsection (1) insert—
‘(1A) But the Secretary of State may decide that, despite subsection (1)(b), a person to whom subsection (1)(b) applies is liable to deportation (and may accordingly make a deportation order against them under section 5) if the Secretary of State—
(a) has deprived the person of citizenship status under section 40(2) of the British Nationality Act 1981 (deprivation where conducive to public good), or
(b) is satisfied that the person has engaged in behaviour that would render them liable to deprivation of citizenship status under section 40(2) of that Act (whether or not they have such status).
(1B) A decision under subsection (1A) must be taken personally by the Secretary of State.
(1C) The Secretary of State may make a decision under subsection (1A) where the person—
(a) was deprived of citizenship status, or
(b) engaged in behaviour that would render them liable to deprivation of citizenship status,
before subsection (1A) came into force.’”—(Anna Turley.)
This new clause, to be inserted after clause 49, would enable the Secretary of State to override the exemption from deportation in s.7(1)(b) of the Immigration Act 1971 for certain Commonwealth and Irish citizens where they have behaved in a way that would render them liable to citizenship deprivation.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Anna Turley
New clause 5 will mean that a person’s exemption from deportation under section 7 of the Immigration Act 1971 can be disapplied where they have engaged in conduct such as terrorism, war crimes or serious organised crime. Section 7 provides protection from deportation for certain Commonwealth and Irish citizens who were ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom before 1 January 1973. It is an important safeguard for many people with long-standing ties to the UK.
The recent high-profile case of Shabir Ahmed highlighted a significant anomaly in the current law. In cases where the person’s conduct is serious enough to justify the removal of their citizenship, section 7 prevents us from deporting them. That cannot be right. Some of the most serious offenders, including individuals involved in terrorism, serious organised crime, sexual grooming or war crimes, should not be able to avoid deportation purely on the basis that they have been in this country since before 1973.
Our new clause will end the disparity in the powers available to protect the public from the most dangerous people. Decisions to disapply the exemption will be taken personally by the Home Secretary. Safeguards put in place by the new clause ensure that the legislation will not affect the vast majority of people protected by section 7. It will be used to ensure that only those individuals whose conduct places them among the most serious threats to the public can be deported.
As we saw with the case I mentioned, changing the law is only half the problem. Arranging the deportation of such individuals can take time, as successive Governments have found previously. Introducing this important new clause will ensure that we have the power to deport this individual, and that will be taken forward in the usual way. Given the danger that this individual poses, Government amendment 47 would amend the commencement clauses in the Bill to ensure that the new clause comes into effect upon Royal Assent.
Blake Stephenson (Mid Bedfordshire) (Con)
New clause 5 closes an anomaly that dates back to 1973, under which Commonwealth and Irish citizens living in the country when the Immigration Act 1971 came into force are protected from deportation by section 7, however serious their conduct. The new clause would let the Home Secretary decide that such a person is liable to deportation where they have been or could have been deprived of citizenship on conduct grounds. We support it and amendment 47, which brings it into force on Royal Assent.
The Conservative plan is to deport all foreign criminals. Not some of them—all of them. Any measure that removes a barrier to deportation is a step in that direction. New clause 5 is indeed a step in the right direction, but it is such a small step that it is challenging to see that it will make a noticeable impact. It is a personal discretion, not a duty, for the Home Secretary. Every person it covers will still be able to resist removal under article 8 and article 3, through the Human Rights Act 1998. Compare that with the much more robust new clause 45, tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), which would mean automatic deportation for every foreign national convicted of an offence. That is what our borders plan means by deporting all foreign criminals.
For the purposes of the debate, I have three questions for the Minister. How many people do the Government estimate are protected by section 7 and could be made liable to deportation under new clause 5? What is the Government’s legal assessment of the clause’s reliance on conduct before commencement? How will the power apply to Irish citizens, given the common travel area, and have the Irish Government been consulted on the measure?
We will support Government new clause 5, but if the Government accept the principle that dangerous people should not be protected from deportation by legal technicalities, I hope they will support our new clauses in that regard too.
Siân Berry
I want to raise a few alarm bells in terms of what I feel about this measure, and I hope the Minister can answer me clearly. My misgivings arise partly because the Minister talked about basing the need for the new clause on a single case example; partly because it has been introduced into the Bill at a late stage in our considerations; and partly because it will come into force immediately on Royal Assent. It appears to be a rush, and I am not convinced that it will not have equalities impacts or overlap with the lessons we should have learned from the Windrush scandal. If the Minister can give some more assurance that this has been looked at carefully and not rushed into on the basis of a single case, I would be glad to hear it.
Anna Turley
I can be explicit: this change in the legislation has been inspired by one particular case. I will not apologise for that, because I am sure the hon. Lady would agree that the current situation is not acceptable. Some of the most serious offenders, including individuals involved in terrorism, serious organised crime or war crimes, cannot be deported even after we have stripped them of British citizenship, because of this loophole. It is important that we take steps to address it.
I want to give the hon. Lady some reassurance, however, because people may express concerns about protection given in law to others—for example, the Windrush generation or others who came here previously. I will be absolutely clear and explicit in Committee: they will not be affected. Any broader protection for the Windrush generation is not affected by the new clause. The power will be exercised personally by the Home Secretary. The Government are clear that the wider protections offered by section 7 will remain intact. The new clause will not affect the overwhelming majority of people protected by section 7 or their rights. This measure is intended solely to ensure that specific individuals whose conduct places them among the most serious threats to the public can be deported.
Tom Gordon (Harrogate and Knaresborough) (LD)
We support closing this gap. Given that the test is an issue of the Home Secretary’s judgment, rather than of a conviction, and that it applies to past conduct, it would be helpful if the Minister can give reassurances. Given how serious and huge the power will be, some sort of reporting mechanism will help us to understand how often it might be used and how many people fall under it.
Anna Turley
The power is similar to those the Home Secretary has already, including the ability to prevent people from coming here and to ask for people to be removed. We agree that if deprivation on conducive grounds is to be used sparingly, it should be against those who pose a serious threat to the UK or whose conduct has involved very high harm. Other than where a decision is taken on the grounds that the person has conducted themselves in a manner that is seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the UK, the conducive power is limited so that it can be applied only to those who are dual citizens. Parliament chose to enact the power on that basis to avoid the prospect of leaving people stateless, which would be contrary to the UK’s commitments under the 1961 statelessness convention. To respond further, the Home Secretary is of course accountable to this place on a daily basis. On high-profile cases, I am sure she will continue to give her usual response on the Floor of the House.
The hon. Member for Stockton West asked for an estimated projection. We do not have the statistics, but I have been clear and up front that we are responding to a particular case. We expect these to be extreme and unusual cases, where someone has been guilty of a crime of this magnitude, but is of that generation prior to 1973. The hon. Gentleman also asked about the consideration of the legal assessment. We have reviewed the legal position very carefully. We are content that it is lawful, which is why we are taking this measure forward.
The hon. Gentleman mentioned Irish citizens. Irish citizens are liable to deportation, but in practice are only pursued in limited circumstances.
I thank hon. Members for their contributions to this important debate. As they will know, the Government have made this change to end the disparity in powers available to protect the public from the most dangerous people. The recent high-profile case of Shabir Ahmed has highlighted a significant anomaly in the current law. In cases where the person’s conduct is serious enough to justify the removal of their citizenship, section 7 currently prevents us from deporting them.
Tom Gordon
I sit on the Joint Committee on Human Rights, and we have published a report on accountability for Daesh war crimes. Included in that report was the fact that the UK Government use their powers to strip citizenship more than almost any other country in the world, and in a way that has often been described as not particularly transparent. Could I press the Minister to go further on the reporting mechanisms that we need to see if we have this new clause and also existing Government citizenship stripping?
Anna Turley
This new clause does not influence our decisions to deprive people of citizenship—that remains. This is simply about our ability to remove them. That is the important loophole that we are trying to close, to create consistency on that front.
Safeguards put in place by Government new clause 5 ensure that legislation will not affect the vast majority of people protected by section 7. It will only be used to ensure that those individuals whose conduct places them among the most serious threats to the public can be deported.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 5 read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 32
Exception from automatic deportation of foreign criminals
“In section 33 of the UK Borders Act 2007 (exceptions from automatic deportation of foreign criminals) for subsection (6A) substitute—
‘(6A) Exception 6 is where—
(a) the foreign criminal has limited leave to remain in the United Kingdom under section 65(2) of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (leave to remain for victims of slavery or human trafficking),
(b) the Secretary of State is under a duty to grant the foreign criminal limited leave to remain in the United Kingdom under that section, or
(c) the Secretary of State intends to grant the foreign criminal limited leave to remain in the United Kingdom under that section despite not being required to do so as a result of the application of subsection (7)(a) of that section.’”.—(Anna Turley.)
This new clause, to go after clause 39, replaces an exception from the duty to deport foreign criminals. The existing exception operates by reference to the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings. The replacement exception will operate by reference to the domestic legislation that gives effect to that Convention.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Anna Turley
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Section 33 of the UK Borders Act 2007 sets out exceptions to the automatic deportation of foreign criminals. This technical amendment provides greater legal clarity in relation to the exception that may apply where a foreign criminal is also a confirmed victim of modern slavery.
At the time the UK Borders Act was enacted, there was not a detailed domestic legal framework in place for the identification and protection of victims of modern slavery. Since then, the Government have introduced specific domestic modern slavery legislation, including the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and the Nationality and Borders Act 2022. The ongoing work on this Bill has highlighted the outdated reference to the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings—ECAT—and this provides an opportune moment to update the legislation so that it refers to the relevant domestic modern slavery framework.
New clause 32 replaces the existing reference to the United Kingdom’s obligations under ECAT with a reference to the relevant domestic modern slavery legislation, namely the temporary permission to stay provision in the Nationality and Borders Act 2022.
Since the introduction of the 2007 Act, the UK has introduced specific modern slavery legislation and these provisions will now provide the legal framework for identifying and protecting victims of modern slavery in the UK. The new clause aligns the deportation framework with existing domestic legislation on modern slavery provisions and provides greater legal clarity.
The new clause does not expand or alter the protections. It simply clarifies and clears up any ambiguity in the law. It simply places the exception to automatic deportation on a clearer domestic statutory footing, while ensuring the Secretary of State retains flexibility to grant temporary permission to stay in exceptional circumstances where appropriate.
Blake Stephenson
New clause 32 rewrites the exception to automatic deportation for foreign criminals who are victims of trafficking. At present, section 33(6A) of the UK Borders Act 2007 disapplies automatic deportation where removal would breach our obligations under the Council of Europe trafficking convention. The new clause would replace that with a test based on leave under section 65 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, including where the Home Secretary merely intends to grant such leave, even where she is under no duty to do so.
A criminal conviction should trigger automatic deportation, and those deported as foreign criminals should not be able to make protection claims to stop that deportation. New clause 32 keeps a route by which a foreign criminal can avoid automatic deportation and it widens the discretion to use it.
I am sure nobody in this Committee wants genuine victims of trafficking to be left unsupported, but in clause 38, the Government accept that people who pose a threat to public order should be disqualified from protection. Why, then, keep the exception to automatic deportation for people who have been convicted of crimes here? Why widen the range of cases where there is no duty to grant leave at all?
How many foreign criminals relied on the trafficking exemption in each of the past three years? In what circumstances would the Home Secretary intend to grant leave under section 65 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 where there is no duty to do so? How many foreign criminals do the Government expect to benefit? Unless the Minister can show that this exception will be rare and tightly controlled, it is a back door through which foreign criminals will continue to avoid removal.
Anna Turley
Temporary permission to stay is granted only in limited circumstances for specific purposes and for time-limited periods. Confirmed victims who are considered a risk to public order who have made a modern slavery claim in bad faith will not usually be granted temporary permission to stay in the UK. In rare cases, the Secretary of State may decide that temporary permission to stay is to be granted to an individual who has been convicted of a crime, for example, where their presence is necessary to support a law enforcement investigation or criminal proceedings. The new clause ensures that the Secretary of State retains this discretion as is befitting with clauses we considered earlier. Any grant of temporary permission to stay is subject to the individual continuing to meet the relevant requirements and lasts only for as long as it is necessary to achieve the purpose for which it is granted.
I will undertake to write to the Committee on the specific numbers that the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire asked for. I thank Members for their interest in the new clause. It replaces the existing reference to the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings with a reference to the relevant domestic modern slavery legislation, namely the temporary permission to stay provision in the Nationality and Borders Act. The technical new clause provides greater legal clarity in relation to the exception that may apply where a foreign criminal is also a confirmed victim of modern slavery.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 32 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 33
Enforcement of decisions of the Immigration Services Commissioner
“(1) Part 5 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (immigration advisers and immigration service providers) is amended as follows.
(2) In section 92F (enforcement of penalty notices) (inserted by paragraph 9 of Schedule 1 to the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025)—
(a) in subsection (1), after ‘notice’ insert ‘(“a penalty”)’;
(b) for subsections (2) to (4) substitute—
‘(2) In England and Wales, the penalty is recoverable as if it were payable under an order of the county court.
(3) In Scotland, the penalty may be enforced in the same manner as an extract registered decree arbitral bearing a warrant for execution issued by the sheriff court of any sheriffdom in Scotland.
(4) In Northern Ireland, the penalty is recoverable as if it were payable under an order of the county court.
(5) Where action is taken under this section for the recovery of a penalty, the penalty—
(a) in relation to England and Wales, is to be treated for the purposes of section 98 of the Courts Act 2003 (register of judgments and orders etc) as if it were a judgment entered in the county court;
(b) in relation to Northern Ireland, is to be treated for the purposes of Article 116 of the Judgments Enforcement (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/226 (N.I. 6)) (register of judgments) as if it were a judgment in respect of which an application has been accepted under Article 22 or 23(1) of that Order.’
(3) In Schedule 5 (the Immigration Services Commissioner), in paragraph 9C (enforcement of orders to refund fees or pay compensation) (inserted by paragraph 14(5) of the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025)—
(a) for sub-paragraph (3) substitute—
‘(3) Any amount to be refunded or paid under the order (“the amount owing”)—
(a) in England and Wales, is recoverable by P or the Commissioner (on P’s behalf) as if it were payable under an order of the county court;
(b) in Scotland, may be enforced by P or the Commissioner (on P’s behalf) in the same manner as an extract registered decree arbitral bearing a warrant for execution issued by the sheriff court of any sheriffdom in Scotland;
(c) in Northern Ireland, is recoverable by P or the Commissioner (on P’s behalf) as if it were payable under an order of the county court.’;
(b) in sub-paragraph (4), for ‘make an application under sub-paragraph (3)’ substitute ‘take steps to recover or enforce an amount owing’;
(c) for sub-paragraphs (5) and (6) substitute—
‘(5) Where action is taken under this paragraph for the recovery of an amount to be refunded or paid under an order of the Commissioner, the order—
(a) in relation to England and Wales, is to be treated for the purposes of section 98 of the Courts Act 2003 (register of judgments and orders etc) as if it were a judgment entered in the county court;
(b) in relation to Northern Ireland, is to be treated for the purposes of Article 116 of the Judgments Enforcement (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/226 (N.I. 6)) (register of judgments) as if it were a judgment in respect of which an application has been accepted under Article 22 or 23(1) of that Order.
(6) For the purposes of this paragraph, an appeal is pending during the period—
(a) starting when the appeal is brought, and
(b) ending when the appeal is finally determined, abandoned or withdrawn.’”—(Anna Turley.)
This amendment would insert a new clause, to go in after clause 49, amending the provision inserted into the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 about the enforcement of orders made by the Immigration Services Commissioner for penalties, refunds and compensation, so as to make it work effectively in Northern Ireland.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Anna Turley
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Government new clause 33 seeks to amend the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 to ensure that the enforcement of orders made by the Immigration Services Commissioner under that Act for penalties, refunds and compensation work effectively in Northern Ireland. Provisions regarding enforcement of unpaid monetary penalties, refunds of fees or payments of compensation in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland were part of the Immigration Services Commissioner measures in the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025. Upon making preparations to commence the measures, however, it became apparent that the current provisions are not compatible with the system in place in Northern Ireland. Therefore, the Government are taking steps to rectify the situation so that the enforcement regime can operate as intended.
The Government new clause ensures that any unpaid monetary penalty, refund of fees or payment of compensation imposed by the Immigration Services Commissioner on advisers providing poor or illegal immigration services or advice can be recovered in Northern Ireland as they can in England, Wales and Scotland. It also makes provision for penalties to be entered into the relevant registers in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Procedures for recovery of debts differ in Scotland from those in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. In Scotland, statutory penalties need not be treated as an existing court judgment. In keeping with other types of statutory penalty in Scotland, the proposed drafting allows for these penalties to be treated as an extract registered decree arbitral, bearing a warrant for execution for purposes of enforcement. That means that no application is needed to the court to enforce a debt or penalty, as it is treated as having been registered with the court and authority given the execution.
Amendments in later groups will make provision for the commencement of the new clause to take place in conjunction with the measures it relates to within the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 as amended by the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025.
Blake Stephenson
New clause 33 makes the Immigration Services Commissioner’s penalties, refund orders and compensation orders enforceable as court orders across the United Kingdom, including in Northern Ireland. These are technical improvements and we support them.
Rogue immigration advisers do real damage. They take money from vulnerable people, and, too often, they coach claims designed not to establish the truth but to delay removal, including the late claim lodged the night before a flight, and the fresh claim built on a story that has changed. We would end immigration legal aid and limit judicial review to cases where the Home Office has acted outside its powers, which would remove much of the market that these advisers exploit.
In the meantime, the regulator should have teeth. How many penalties has the commissioner imposed in the last three years, how much has actually been recovered and how many prosecutions for giving unregulated immigration advice have there been? As I said, we support this move, but I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Anna Turley
I undertake to write to the shadow Minister with those figures as I do not have them to hand, but I appreciate his interest in the new clause. Government new clause 33 ensures that any unpaid monetary penalty, refund of fees or payment of compensation imposed by the Immigration Services Commissioner on advisers for providing poor or illegal immigration advice or services can be recovered in Northern Ireland, just as they can be in England, Wales or Scotland. It also makes provision for penalties to be entered into the relevant registers in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. The new clause will ensure that the system relating to the Immigration Services Commissioner operates as intended.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 33 read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 34
Meaning of “the Immigration Acts”
“In section 61(2) of the UK Borders Act 2007 (meaning of ‘the Immigration Acts’)—
(a) omit the ‘and’ at the end of paragraph (n);
(b) at the end insert
‘, and
(p) the Immigration and Asylum Act 2026.’”—(Anna Turley.)
This new clause, which would go in after clause 50, would add the Bill to the list of “Immigration Acts” in the UK Borders Act 2007. “The Immigration Acts” is a general term used across the statute book and is defined in the Interpretation Act 1978.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Anna Turley
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
This new clause makes a straightforward technical amendment to the UK Borders Act 2007. It adds the Bill, once enacted, to the statutory list of enactments that comprise “the Immigration Acts” in the 2007 Act. References to “the Immigration Acts” appear throughout the statute book and are used in connection with a wide range of immigration powers, enforcement provisions and other immigration functions. It is therefore important that, once enacted, the Bill is included within that established statutory definition.
The effect of the new clause is to ensure that references elsewhere in the legislation to “the Immigration Acts” will apply consistently to the revisions contained in the Bill in the same way as they apply to other immigration legislation. The new clause is a technical provision that ensures the legislation fits coherently within the wider immigration statute book and that existing references to “the Immigration Acts” operate as intended.
Blake Stephenson
Mr Twigg, you and the Committee members will be pleased to hear that this will be the shortest speech of the day. The new clause adds the Bill, once enacted, to the list of “the Immigration Acts”. It is a technical provision, and we do not oppose it.
Anna Turley
I thank Members for their overwhelming interest in and enthusiasm for this new clause. As discussed, this is a straightforward amendment that adds the Bill to the statutory list of enactments that comprise “the Immigration Acts” in the 2007 Act. It will simply mean that references elsewhere in legislation to “the Immigration Acts” will apply consistently to the provisions contained in the Bill in the same way that they apply to other immigration legislation.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 34 read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Jade Botterill.)