Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Bill [HL]
Wednesday 23rd May 2018
(6 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Act 2018 Read Hansard Text
Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Bill [HL]
Wednesday 20th June 2018
(6 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Act 2018 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)
My Lords, the Bill is a vital first step in delivering legislation to underpin our ambitious and far-reaching programme to create a modern, world-class courts and justice system that is swift and straightforward and that works for everyone. Our programme of reform will also foster innovation and cement our reputation for global legal excellence.
In our manifesto, and in last year’s Queen’s Speech, the Government committed to modernising our courts and tribunals so they are fit for the 21st century. The way justice is administered and delivered in our courts and tribunals cannot stand still while the world changes around them. The justice system must embrace new technologies and seize the opportunities of the digital revolution. It must work for, and fit in with, the way people live their lives today. But modernisation must also ensure that the judiciary and staff who work in our courts and tribunals are empowered to deliver smooth and efficient justice. We have a world-class judiciary, and through the Bill we want to enable it to continue to deploy its time and expertise where and when it is most needed.
The Bill will assist in a number of different ways. It will allow suitably qualified and experienced staff to be authorised to handle uncontroversial, straightforward matters under judicial supervision. This will free up judges’ time to focus on more complex matters and will improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the courts and tribunal system. The independent procedure rule committees will determine which functions staff may exercise in each jurisdiction. These judicially led committees are the right bodies to take these decisions, and this will ensure that the powers are properly scrutinised by judges, practitioners and other interested parties.
The Bill will make it possible for staff to carry out judicial functions in the Crown Court, where the activities of court officers are currently restricted to “formal and administrative matters” only. The Crown Court judiciary currently spends far too much time on routine tasks which could be delegated, such as changes to the starting time of a hearing, or changing the pretrial preparation hearing date, even if the parties are all in agreement about these matters. The Bill also removes the post of justices’ clerk, to enable the creation of a more flexible, cross-jurisdictional leadership role for authorised staff.
All this is subject to a robust framework of authorisation that affords the court and tribunal staff who exercise these functions the right protections and safeguards. Most significantly, the Bill makes such staff independent of the Lord Chancellor but accountable to the judiciary. Courts and tribunal staff will be able to exercise judicial functions only once authorised to do so by the Lord Chief Justice or his nominee, or the Senior President of Tribunals or his delegate. The judiciary will grant such authorisation only when satisfied that the relevant staff have the necessary competence and experience to exercise these functions. The Bill also applies to authorised staff the same protections that currently apply to justices’ clerks and assistants to justices’ clerks carrying out judicial functions in the magistrates’ and family courts. This includes protecting them from costs in legal proceedings and indemnification in respect of anything they do, or do not do, when exercising judicial functions in good faith.
Alongside these changes, the Bill includes measures to ensure that the system of judicial deployment is as flexible as possible. It will give the Lord Chief Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals greater flexibility to make the best use of our judges’ experience, expertise and time. The judicial measures in the Bill include enabling recorders to sit in the Upper Tribunal and senior employment judges to sit as judges in the First-tier Tribunal and Upper Tribunal. This will broaden the pool of expertise that the tribunals can draw from to help them meet business needs. They also include extending the range of High Court judges to act as arbitrators. This will help meet the growth in demand in recent years for arbitration—for example, to resolve cases in the Chancery Division of the High Court. They will also remove the restriction on a judge being the president of more than one chamber of the First-tier Tribunal or Upper Tribunal. This will give the Senior President of Tribunals greater flexibility to manage the leadership of the tribunals without having to recruit and appoint a new chamber president immediately that there is a vacancy. Taken together, these measures will enable the judiciary to respond to the changing demands of the case loads of different jurisdictions and will make the best use of the existing cohort of judges to benefit all users of our courts and tribunals.
We are delivering the court reform programme in partnership with the senior judiciary. I am pleased that the Lord Chief Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals have welcomed the Bill, commenting that its introduction is,
“a positive first step in legislation to deliver reform”.
Most of the measures have already been before Parliament as part of the Prisons and Courts Bill, which fell when the general election was called. The Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Bill is very much a first step, and we will bring forward further courts legislation as soon as parliamentary time allows.
We have not stood still waiting for this Bill; we have been pressing on with reform in areas where primary legislation is not required and we are making significant progress in enabling access to justice through online and digital means. In May, we rolled out nationally an online divorce service, allowing couples to apply for uncontested divorce digitally for the first time. People can also now make pleas online for low-level offences, such as traffic offences, and they can respond to jury summonses, track social security appeals, and issue and respond to civil money claims, all online. Over 16,000 people have already engaged with these pilots and are getting straightforward, digital access to the courts for the first time. The Bill supports that wider reform by making sure that we make best use of our judiciary and courts staff as we develop these new approaches to delivering justice.
The Bill, and our wider package of reforms, will ensure that our courts and tribunals system is fit for the 21st century and the digital age. It will help to ensure that both the judges and staff of our courts and tribunals are able to respond to the changing demands of a reformed system and, ultimately, to deliver better services for court users. The Bill marks an important first step in delivering a reformed courts and tribunals system and I commend it to the House. I beg to move.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, like many in your Lordships’ House, I have spent much of my life critiquing, seeking to improve and sometimes downright opposing legislation that I have seen as flamboyantly intrusive and therefore unjust. Clearly, this Bill is not in that category. However, legislation can also be deficient for what it does not contain, as that might lead to injustice as well.
As the noble and learned Lord said, the Government’s Queen’s Speech promised a programme of reforms that would transform the way in which the UK justice system operates. He referred to that reform as “ambitious”. Unlike last year’s Prisons and Courts Bill, which dealt head-on with those proposed reforms, this Bill is, by contrast, perhaps the beginning of a legislative drip feed.
Today of all days, we are conscious of the challenges and complexities of minority government. Clearly, one approach is the very skilful drafting of the scope of this Bill, with its very tight Long Title, perhaps to avoid controversy, amendment and so on. However, another approach in challenging times of minority government might be to be a little more ambitious and out in the open, and to pursue that ambition by consent. My hope would be that, during the passage and conduct of the Bill, the Government might consider moving from the more cautious to the more open approach to debating these matters—these ambitions—and subjecting them to appropriate parliamentary scrutiny. As the Minister just said, the reform programme is moving ahead in any event, in the absence of primary legislation, and one might query the appropriateness of that.
The reform programme cost of £1.2 billion to the taxpayer seeks to “modernise” the courts service by transferring more court hearings online or operating them through remote video links. Digital hearings will have implications worth considering for the principles of open justice and for public confidence in the justice system. The Equality and Human Rights Commission has raised concerns about the potentially detrimental impact on people with certain challenges and protected characteristics, who are more likely to be excluded by digital processes. My noble friend Lord Beecham will deal with this in more detail a little later.
There has been no real parliamentary scrutiny of this programme—this expensive modernising series of measures—or of the associated court closures and staff cuts, even by the Justice Committee. Since 2010 the Government have closed literally hundreds of courts and cut thousands of vital staff, with the Ministry of Justice launching a new consultation on further court closures in January. Opposition research suggests that 80% of the courts sold so far have raised on average little more than the average UK house price. This raises concerns over long-term damage to access to justice for civil litigants and indeed victims of crime.
Reductions in the number of local courts pile further pressure on those remaining courts, which are already creaking under the weight of budget and staff cuts over many years. So we on this side of your Lordships’ House ask and implore the Government not to proceed with any further court closures until legislation for this ambitious digitisation of courts programme is published and reforms can be subjected to full parliamentary and public scrutiny.
In May, the National Audit Office released a report on the Government’s ambitious reforms and it is pretty damning. Again, my noble friend Lord Beecham will consider this in more detail later. We already have precedent, however, of reforms to the justice system conducted without sufficient research and consultation. That precedent—not a great one—is LASPO.
LASPO has been an unmitigated disaster, widely criticised by expert stakeholders including the Bar Council, the Justice Committee and the Law Society. The Public Accounts Committee made it clear that in bringing forward that legislation the Ministry of Justice had,
“not properly assessed the full impact of the reforms”.
That impact has proved devastating for some of the most vulnerable people in our society, who as a result of those cuts have been shut out altogether from the legal aid system that we were once so proud of in this country.
The year before the relevant provisions of LASPO came into force, legal aid was granted in 925,000 cases. According to Amnesty, the year after it came into force assistance was given in fewer than 500,000 cases—a drop of 46% in legal assistance. This is not just a comparator. Drastic cuts to legal aid will and do have a direct relationship to pressures on judges and those who work in the court system when ill-advised and unassisted members of public turn up to seek justice.
Clause 3, as we have heard from the Minister, delegates judicial functions to authorised staff. This seemingly sensible and uncontroversial provision must be understood in the broader context of the wider reform agenda and the austerity measures behind it, because the savings generated through proposed reforms will arise only through the reduction of the court estate and through savings on judicial salaries. Further proposals include the relocation of many case management functions—listing, scheduling and so on—which currently take place within court buildings with the benefit of on-site judicial supervision. The implication is that these decisions will move to new off-site service centres—which I think we have all experienced with varying degrees of satisfaction in relation to other services. Given their off-site nature, the implication that these service centres will be supervised by authorised staff, not judges, is worrying. To have authorised staff who are not subject to the training, experience, ethos and oaths that a professional judge is, and who are performing judicial functions but employed directly by HMCTS, raises questions worth considering of accountability and independence. Concerns that they would be subject to administrative pressures, such as meeting targets, are also worth thinking about.
The devil will, therefore, be in the detail of how these provisions might operate. Without limits on who can be authorised and what powers can be given to authorised persons, this delegation has the potential, as currently drafted, to change the essential nature of our justice system. Transparent and public scrutiny by parliamentarians with a democratic mandate is necessary. While acknowledging the great work over many years and the existing remit of the procedure rule committee, I really would query whether delegation of judicial functions can be thought of as a simple procedural matter for a rules committee as opposed to something worthy of secondary legislation in both Houses of Parliament. If one accepts the case for the limited delegation of some of the most straightforward decisions to authorised staff, it is then potentially objectionable that these relatively low-paid staff—quite possibly paid less than lawyers in other government departments and who have already been hit by the public sector pay caps—are being used to save money, if they are not to be offered proper remuneration for this new, more challenging and increased workload.
On this side of your Lordships’ House, we will be seeking to probe the Government during the passage of this Bill and to push for a number of safeguards in the Bill, the first of which is limits to the delegation of these judicial powers to non-judicial personnel. The MoJ’s own factsheet on delegation to staff says that delegated decisions are unlikely to involve contested matters; why should that not appear in the Bill itself? Most case management decisions are vital judicial functions and, therefore, should not necessarily be delegated. Decisions that impact on the fairness of the process itself are, and must remain, the remit of judges and involve carefully weighing submissions by parties. In addition to concerns around transparency, there is a danger that efficiencies gained by delegating case management decisions will be lost if the court has to reconsider many of these decisions at a later stage in the process. There ought, again, to be minimum qualifications for these authorised staff in the Bill. The Law Society has suggested, for example, that no one with less than three years post-qualification legal practice—that is, a barrister or solicitor—should be delegated any judicial function under this Bill. That is a suggestion worth considering. Three years of post-qualification practice is not a high bar when you consider who may or may not take on a pupil or a trainee solicitor, for example, for supervision.
As your Lordships will have read, other interested parties have called for a statutory right of reconsideration allowing any party to a decision by an authorised person to have that decision reconsidered by a judge, as recommended by Lord Justice Briggs in his 2016 report. That statutory right would further assist in assuring compliance with Article 6 of the Convention on Human Rights, which requires decisions by an independent and impartial person.
Further, the Bar Council has called for key questions to be asked by your Lordships’ House on the nature and extent of the suggested powers of authorised staff. First, will the staff members have the power to determine the outcome of any matter which is contested by the parties? Secondly, if so, what rights of reconsideration would there be and to whom, and will this be consistent across all jurisdictions? Thirdly, will there be a right of reconsideration, not just a review or appeal? Fourthly, will staff be legally trained and, if so, to what level of qualification? Fifthly, in order to achieve the savings required, what is the number of judicial posts that the Government would expect to lose; and what number of additional authorised staff will the Government need to recruit? Sixthly, what are the limits to the functions that case officers should perform, and should not these be in the Bill to allow them to be subject to proper scrutiny?
Other provisions about the flexible deployment of judges are clearly of far less concern in this Bill but, none the less, the further and increased deployment of temporary judges to any court or tribunal on which a deputy judge of the High Court is able to sit is still worth thinking about. Given the planned savings on judicial salaries, we have to ask whether these provisions are a short cut to make up for a shortfall in the recruitment of permanent judges. Any move towards increasing reliance in the system on temporary judges— who will most likely seek a permanent appointment in the longer term—would be of concern because of independence, which is less likely when someone is a temporary judge. The Government must provide greater evidence of the need for such reliance on temporary judges and explain the proportionality of such measures.
A further omission from the Bill—a point well made by Women’s Aid—is the provisions prohibiting the cross- examination of victims of domestic violence which we all looked forward to in the abortive Bill of last year. We should be concerned that those provisions are not in this Bill and ask for further assurances on them.
This is a wafer-thin Bill which, on its face, is apparently uncontroversial. However, as the Minister said, it is the beginning of the fulfilment of a further ambitious programme. The Government appear to be testing the waters for more controversial court reforms and it is vital that we understand the limited provisions in the Bill in the context of that broader agenda of reforms and devastating cuts. Nor should we be completely persuaded that the Bill in itself does not have the potential, as currently drafted and unamended, to profoundly impact upon our justice system as we have all understood and loved it. Without further careful scrutiny and additional safeguards, this governmental drip-feed approach has the potential to erode some of our most fundamental institutions.
Lord Beith (LD)
My Lords, when the Bill was published, I described it as,
“a little mouse of a Bill”.—[Official Report, 6/6/18; col. 1306.]
I did so because it has been shorn of most of the provisions the Government had intended to include in legislation and is drafted in such a way as to try to discourage the addition of any of those provisions by way of amendments. That has to be set against the context of the Government’s very ambitious claims about what they were going to do to assist the justice system. In 2017, the government website stated that the then Prisons and Courts Bill would,
“transform the lives of offenders and put victims at the heart of the justice system, helping to create a safer and better society”.
But even if we look just at the briefing for the Queen’s Speech for this Parliament about the Government’s legislative intentions, it was a Bill that would,
“end the cross-examination of domestic violence victims”,
by those accused of perpetrating the violence. It was a Bill which would allow for fixed penalties for minor guilty pleas; it would allow fixed terms for some judicial leadership positions on the basis that some might be attracted to those posts if they could serve a shorter term in them; and it was in the context of the Government talking about wide reforms of procedure and practice, many of which required legislation, including avoiding the waste of time and money in unnecessary and entirely formal hearings.
When the Lord Chief Justice—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett of Maldon—appeared before the Constitution Committee of your Lordships’ House on 25 April 2018, he said:
“At the heart of what is in contemplation is a change in procedures and practices, some of which will require enabling legislation, followed by rules and practice directions. Of course, the latter will be under judicial control. The question whether all but the most basic procedural hearings will be by telephone or videolink will, in the end, be for the judge to decide, having received representations if necessary.
We hope the legislation that fell at the last election will be back before Parliament fairly soon. Without it, some of the courts and tribunals, or at least some of what we do, will remain trapped in the mid-20th century. At a more prosaic level, modernisation will simply align the courts and tribunals with ways of operating which the outside world, and even Government, have long ago adopted”.
That phraseology was echoed in the opening remarks of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, but does not seem to be greatly furthered by this Bill. What we have here, apart from a few changes of title for one or two judges and justices’ clerks, are some necessary and helpful provisions about the deployment of both judges and staff. Obviously they will have to be looked at in detail. Similarly, some of the issues raised by the noble Baroness will need to be looked at carefully. However, I think that there is generally a fair wind behind the belief that judges’ time and that of staff in the court system can be better used. It is these useful provisions which justify spending a little time on the Bill.
However, there are many other major issues around our courts. Not all of them can be dealt with through legislation, but many require legislative backing. If you talk to members of the judiciary, they will pretty soon mention the condition of the court estate, the working conditions of court staff and the impact all that has on recruitment. The recruitment problem in the senior judiciary is something that the Government will have to consider, and along with that go the issues around the retirement age. More widely, the growing pay gap between criminal practice and commercial practice makes it almost impossible to recruit young people to the criminal Bar for the future. The Times recently reported that 15 City law firms, all American-owned, offer newly qualified solicitors more than £100,000 a year. Against that background, it will be extraordinarily difficult to recruit the young people needed for the future of our courts both in advocacy and on the Bench. The development of problem-solving courts may need some more legislative encouragement.
I turn to a fundamental point which the Prisons and Courts Bill could have been used to improve: the fact that the courts can sentence only according to what is available. Prison is deemed always to be available, but non-custodial sentences are dependent on local services—whether they are in place at all, what their quality is, and what combination of services is required for a really serious non-custodial sentence. All those issues are uncertain. Moreover, commissioning is hopelessly divided. Prisons are commissioned nationally while these other services are commissioned largely on a local basis, so there is a mismatch that gives the courts fewer options for dealing with the offenders before them.
Some of these issues can be dealt with without legislation but some cannot. I hear Ministers such as the noble and learned Lord talk about bringing forward more legislation when parliamentary time allows. I look forward to the period that we are entering in Parliament, with 1,000 statutory instruments and four major Bills to do with exiting the European Union—I wonder how that phrase can be uttered seriously—supposedly coming our way. I believe that a further draft Bill is sitting somewhere in the Ministry of Justice, ready to be brought forward, but I do not see when the parliamentary time will come. It makes me wonder what has happened to the significance of the Ministry of Justice in the pecking order of the Government’s legislative programme. We have a two-year parliamentary Session, half of which we have used up. In that Session, the Ministry of Justice could not have a relatively uncontroversial Bill, which could have done considerable good; it had to be content with a totally shorn and reduced Bill and the vague hope of further measures when parliamentary time allows.
I will make one last point on the problem of parliamentary time. We know that it is a problem, although it does not seem so when you look at the agenda for these current weeks, dealing with the EU Bill; the pressures have not been so great but they will be pretty great in the year ahead. One thing that does not take up much parliamentary time is legislation by consolidation Bills. Law Commission Bills do not take up as much time as legislation that effects change in the law. The courts could be greatly assisted if the Government made more of the now rather neglected procedures of consolidation Bills; they would be greatly assisted if the current work being done on the consolidation of sentencing were achieved and brought forward by the Government in the more limited procedures that can be used when the law is simply being consolidated, not changed. The Government should look at that further and discuss giving it higher priority with the Law Commission. That can be done, at least, to assist the courts, even when parliamentary time is tightly rationed.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)
My Lords, I will immediately take up the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, about consolidation. It is a rather important function of Parliament, but it is not a particularly attractive one. I served on the Consolidation Committee for some time. I remember that it is a committee of both Houses. We had the greatest difficulty in securing a quorum for the committee to proceed—and not because of the absence of Members of the House of Lords.
When I first looked at the Bill, what astonished me was that court staff were going to be authorised to advise judges on the law. I thought that that was rather strange. I thought that judges were supposed to know the law before they got to that position. Of course, when you look at it more carefully, the judges are judges of the family court and justices of the peace. There will be professional judges in the family court from time to time, as well as judges who are there effectively as magistrates. As I understand it—and certainly for all the time that I have known anything about it—justices’ clerks have always been responsible for giving legal advice to magistrates in magistrates’ courts. That was dispensed with only when the court had a stipendiary magistrate because he, being stipendiary, was thought to know the law and therefore not to require the advice of the justices’ clerk.
It is a sad day for me to see the justices’ clerk’s title being set aside in a schedule to a Bill in Parliament. The office of justices’ clerk is very old and very distinctive, but it will be replaced. Let me find the passage. Paragraph 7(a) of the Schedule says that,
“for ‘justices’ clerk’ substitute ‘designated officer for the court’”.
Apart from anything else, it seems a little longer, so it will take longer to type—but it is anything but a distinguished-looking title.
Seeing my noble friend Lord Baker of Dorking not far away reminds me of a fact about justices’ clerks that I learned long ago. It was the habit of the Lord Chancellor to attend the annual meeting of the justices’ clerks of England and Wales. To one of these I went and I was told by the president of the Justices’ Clerks’ Society, who had recently been at an international conference of their brethren, that he had been told by the people there that they were astonished that a court official as important as a justices’ clerk should be responsible to a Minister who was also responsible for prisons. Of course, in those days the justices’ clerks were the responsibility of the Home Office, and the Home Secretary certainly had the undoubted privilege of being the Minister for Prisons.
That encouraged me to think that it was time for a change, so we had an arrangement under which the justices’ clerks’ policy department moved from the Home Office to the Lord Chancellor’s Department. I regret to say that that very important judicial development has now been reversed, in that the justices’ clerks, with all the other court staff, are in the political area of the Ministry of Justice, which has, as one of its most important functions, looking after prisons. So the whole improvement has been reversed, which is what you may call progress. So far as I am concerned, I think it rather unfortunate that there needs to be change of this title—but perhaps more enlightened people can advise me whether there is any option.
Another provision in the Bill changes the names of some officers. One that I would like to suggest, which my noble and learned friend knows all about, is the district judge (magistrates’ court). That title was suggested instead of “stipendiary magistrate” because it was thought that reference to remuneration was not quite the right thing for somebody of that order. Therefore, this is what has happened. So far as I am concerned, after a good deal of time during which this has been running, it would be quite a good idea to forget the bracketed “magistrates’ court”. In the Bill we are talking about judges getting legal advice who are in fact lay people, whereas the district judge sitting in a magistrates’ court is quite a distinct officer, so the necessity for the rather long title has now been removed.
One other point I will mention is not in the Bill, but the Bill changes the names of judicial officers and some of the masters now have a different title. I was in Edinburgh last Thursday when the President of the Supreme Court gave a lecture. One of the important functions of the Supreme Court is that it is the Supreme Court for the whole of the United Kingdom. Apparently when it was created—I learned this on Thursday—the staff of the Lord Chancellor’s Department wrote to the Scottish authorities to say that the Supreme Courts of Scotland were now required to change their name to something else. Not entirely to my surprise, they got a letter back to say that they were proposing to do no such thing and there are Supreme Courts in Scotland still.
However, the great jurisdiction of England and Wales has no Supreme Court; it is the Senior Courts. I do not know whether there is a junior court—I do not think expressly so; no doubt the magistrates’ courts and possibly the family court are part of that section. Surely it is time to recognise that the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom is not a court of England and Wales. Therefore, there is no reason why we should not have the old names—the High Court and the Court of Appeal, as they were for a long time before the Supreme Court. I think that this suggestion probably comes within the Long Title of the Bill, but I would be glad to know whether it can be contemplated before I put down an amendment for that purpose.
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)
Perhaps I may turn to the last point made by the noble and learned Lord about the titles of the courts of England and Wales. If it is within the scope of the Bill, there may be some advantage in that. Beyond that, I do not wish to say anything about titles, as it has generally been my experience that once you start the debate on judicial titles it can take a whole afternoon to resolve them, and I know that your Lordships have a huge number of other things that may or may not happen later this evening.
I want to say a little bit about the Bill. When I was Lord Chief Justice, I firmly supported the original comprehensive Bill that covered everything. Some of the matters which the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has referred to on a wider scale—issues of legal aid and the like—I am currently looking at as they affect Wales as chairman of the commission appointed by the Government in Wales to examine the justice system there, but I do not want today to go outside the scope of this Bill and its title.
I warmly welcome the Bill, as I warmly welcomed the many other clauses in the other Bill that was lost in 2017. It is essential to modernise the court system. It is very important that, wherever possible, savings can be made to make sure that every bit of the system is proportionate and affordable. The Bill reckons to save some £6 million. Bearing in mind the huge analysis to which all these figures have been subjected by accountants, consultants and Her Majesty’s Treasury, I suspect that this is a realistic figure. That is not an insubstantial sum in the light of the current expenditure on justice. Therefore, although a lot could be said about other aspects of the justice system and about adding more things that need to be done, I hope that your Lordships’ House will be able to pass this Bill as rapidly as possible.
Having abjured saying anything about titles, perhaps I may deal with just two provisions of the Bill. The first concerns flexible deployment. This is a very important step to be taken. During the past 15 to 20 years, the procedures of the courts and tribunals have come much closer together. It seems inevitable that one needs to deploy the judiciary flexibly. For example, I would hope that, where you have overlapping jurisdictions such as occurs in relation to property and housing, one could use this Bill to go some way along the lines of a single court that deals with property. Those provisions are unarguably needed.
I can see that great concern might be expressed about the authorisation provisions, but it is important to stress the degree of control inherent in the Bill by the use of the rule committee. I was a member of and chaired, de jure and sometimes de facto, the Criminal Procedure Rule Committee, which I can assure you is a highly representative body with many representatives of the legal profession. Certainly, the committee will always try to reach a view by consensus—when I was a member of it for more than six years there never was a division; we always managed to agree.
It was suggested in the course of today’s speeches that we may want to put restrictions on delegations. For example, would we impose a restriction such as, “If the matter is opposed, it cannot be dealt with through delegation”? A simple example shows how careful one has to be. If, for example, someone wants an extension of 14 days and someone else says, “No, you can only have seven”, that is an opposed proceeding. Do we really want to put restrictions into this Bill? Experience has shown that detailed restrictions on procedure are a very real fetter on the administration of justice. For example, some of the impediments to improving the way in which witnesses can give evidence over a videolink have been caused by the detailed procedural provisions of some of the legislation of the late 1990s and early 2000s. When the Bill comes to Committee, I sincerely hope that serious consideration will be given to fettering the discretion in requiring matters to come to this House, or to impeding the ability of the Criminal Procedure Rules Committee to modernise, particularly as digitisation, artificial intelligence and smart codes for procedural regimes will be characteristics of the justice system within the next few years.
I therefore hope that the Bill can be subject to realistic scrutiny. This is a small part of what is essential. It is important to remind the House that there is no plan B for the modernisation of the system. If modernisation does not go through, the only prospect for our court system is significant decline. I therefore hope that the Bill will be given detailed scrutiny in Committee and that people will try to resist the temptation to hang too many other things within the scope of the Bill on it. I am anxious for the Government to realise they can put this through so they can get the other ones through and we can have a modernised justice system as soon as conceivably possible, because that is what we have to do to restore justice to the people at an affordable cost.
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)
My Lords, I am most grateful to my noble and learned friend on the Front Bench for his introduction of the Bill, which I support, and in particular for his explanatory letter of 23 May, which laid out the background to it. As he knows only too well, I am not a lawyer, and speaking immediately behind a past Lord Chancellor and a past Lord Chief Justice on a technical Bill means that one needs to proceed with a certain degree of care.
More years ago than I care to remember, I attended a business school in the United States. The university used to arrange for distinguished visitors to come to lecture us. One such lecturer was a man called Peter Bauer who delivered a spellbinding piece of oratory. Peter Bauer’s name may not be familiar to all noble Lords. He was Jewish and was born in Hungary in 1915. He came to this country in the 1930s and taught for the rest of his life at Cambridge and the London School of Economics, and later became a Member of your Lordships’ House as Baron Bauer, of Market Ward in the City of Cambridge. His primary achievement was to revolutionise the way that foreign aid was distributed. He demonstrated how government-to-government aid, if it was not largely absorbed in corruption, often went on prestige projects such as national airlines or building dams, which did little for the average person in the country. He argued that it was more effective to give aid at a lower level, and the modern NGO structure is essentially a product of his thinking. In that spellbinding lecture, he pointed out that for such developments to take place successfully a degree of stability was needed, stability provided particularly by the rule of law and specifically by a respect for property rights. That is the relevance to our discussion today. His vision further required not just an effective legal system but, equally importantly, one that was understandable and accessible for the man in the street. He said that, without this, the critical ingredient of public trust and confidence would be missing. As he put it that afternoon all those years ago, “The law is too important to be left to lawyers alone”.
In my time in public life, one of my interests has therefore been to try to ensure that the law is kept up to date and is seen to be relevant by our fellow citizens. That lies behind my interest in the Bill today. As I say, it seems unobjectionable; nevertheless, I would like to raise a few points with my noble and learned friend. First, in his letter of 23 May, he wrote that one of the purposes of the Bill was to,
“make it easier for people to resolve disputes and secure justice”.
Amen to that, we all say, but—to touch on the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, in her opening remarks—to achieve that objective we need judges. To me as a lay man reading the newspapers, there appears to be a critical shortage of applicants for judicial posts. The reasons as I read them are pretty wide: they range from the financial, particularly the provision of pensions, to the physical state of our courts and indeed to the growing pressure being exerted on judges by social media. It will take time to resolve these challenges and some may not be resolvable at all. What could be done in the short term? One way would be to raise the retirement age. The compulsory retirement age of 70 makes appointments post 65 unlikely to be attractive either to the applicant or to the judicial system from the point of view of use of resources. With people living longer and healthier lives, many argue that ageism is a prejudice that we have yet to tackle successfully and properly. Why not kill two birds with one stone and increase the compulsory retirement age for judges to 75?
My second point concerns the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, about Law Commission Bills. In my view the Law Commission does incredibly valuable work updating the law in an entirely apolitical way, but too much of that work is shunted into a siding and left to rust. Surely we should be able to find sufficient parliamentary time for a couple of Law Commission Bills, given their uncontroversial nature, as he pointed out. Two in particular that stand shovel-ready, to use the modern parlance, are of special importance. One is on election law. What could be of greater importance than maintaining public trust and confidence in our electoral system? It is worth underlining that point with a short quote from the briefing by the Law Commission at the time of the launch of its recommendations:
“It is widely acknowledged by those involved in administering the electoral process that this body of laws has grown so large, fragmented, complex and outdated that it is no longer fit for purpose”.
Those are serious allegations that the Government should address by bringing forward this Bill. The other Bill concerns technical issues in charity law, in which I declare an interest because some of the recommendations arose from a report that I wrote for the Government as long ago as 2012 but which nevertheless the sector badly needs and would welcome. There have been endless—and I mean endless—promises about the intention to bring forward one or more Law Commission Bills. Perhaps my noble and learned friend can give me another endless promise when he winds up today.
The penultimate point is developments in the working practices of the tribunal system and some of the challenges that it now faces. For example, the Charity Tribunal, which arose from the Charities Act 2006, was designed to provide a quick, effective, user-friendly and economically attractive way for charities, many of which are quite small, as well as their regulator, the Charity Commission, to resolve differences.
I am not sure that our hopes during the passage of the Bill—cross-party hopes, I hasten to add—have been entirely fulfilled. Too many cases seem to have devolved to the familiar and expensive heavy artillery exchanges which take place in the courts. I do not suggest that individuals should be inhibited from employing legal representation, but the original vision was that the tribunal would provide surroundings—an atmosphere, if you like—in which interested parties could speak for themselves. This appears to be a diminishing hope. I fear that such developments are paralleled in other parts of the tribunal system. If you accept Peter Bauer’s contention that the law should be accessible and comprehensible, such developments are surely unwelcome.
Finally, I have a specific, technical point. The Charity Commission is the statutory regulator for the charity sector. It has a huge and important task, given that there are 160,000 regulated charities and probably as many again unregulated ones. Yet if the commission wishes to seek clarity on a point of law by taking a case to the Charity Tribunal—it might wish to do so to get general clarity for a number of charities which might otherwise have to pursue their own case—it has no power to do so, but can do so only with the permission of and through the Attorney-General. For the regulator of a sector, that cannot be a sensible state of affairs.
Worse than that, the Attorney-General can be exceptionally slow in responding to such requests. For example, in September 2016, the commission requested the Attorney-General to refer the issue of the Royal Albert Hall Corporation—a long-running charity saga—to the Charity Tribunal. On 4 January 2018—four months later—my noble and learned friend replied to a Parliamentary Question of mine, stating:
“The Attorney-General requested further information … He has now received that further information and expects to make a decision early in the year”.
Frankly, that is not good enough. This cumbersome and protracted procedure places the regulator of this important sector of our national life in an impossible position. We should surely move to a position where the Charity Commission is free to refer cases to the tribunal off its own back but must inform the Attorney-General that it is doing so.
The Bill has my support but, as other noble Lords have pointed out, we need to ensure that it represents more than just moving the furniture around if we are to keep pace with Peter Bauer’s belief in the importance of transparency and relevance in our judicial system.
Lord Flight (Con)
My Lords, the Bill seeks to make reforms to the rules regarding the deployment of judges and to provide for the undertaking of some judicial functions by HM Courts and Tribunals Service professional staff. It contains three substantive clauses and one schedule. Clause 1 changes existing legislation to remove restrictions on how judges can be deployed, Clause 2 makes minor changes to the law concerning some judicial titles, and Clause 3 and the Schedule provide for court and tribunal staff to carry out some judicial functions and provide legal advice to judges. They would establish a unified system for the judicial oversight of staff carrying out those tasks across the various jurisdictions.
The changes are part of an ongoing programme of reform of the Courts and Tribunals Service and comprise some of the provisions previously in the Prisons and Courts Bill, which was dropped due to the calling of the 2017 election. But the Bill does not make much progress towards the logical solution of what is needed: establishing a dedicated housing court. The Bill has been criticised in Parliament and the press for including only some of the proposed reforms, and especially for failing to advance the use of online technology. In a recent report on the private rental sector, the Housing, Communities and Local Government Select Committee agreed that,
“A specialist housing court would provide a more accessible route to redress for tenants”,
and urged the Government to issue “more detailed proposals” as soon as possible.
I had intended to table an amendment to give the Lord Chancellor the necessary powers to bring a single unified housing court into being, but apparently this has been ruled outside the scope of what is a two-topic Bill, although I would have thought it was the logical conclusion of those two topics. Anyway, it was intended to deal with business that relates to residential tenancies, which are currently split among the county courts, the First-tier Tribunal Property Chamber, the First-tier Tribunal General Regulatory Chamber, the Upper Tribunal and the magistrates’ courts. The intent was to make such a court modern in outlook, using online processes as far as possible and sitting flexibly according to needs.
In a speech in May, Sir Geoffrey Vos, Chancellor of the High Court, outlined the problem of there being multiple bodies that can be approached when things go wrong between landlord and tenant:
“Property legislation in recent years has bifurcated the responsibility for determining specific property disputes in numerous areas between the courts and the tribunals, such that in a significant number of cases, the parties have no choice but to engage in both types of proceeding. This increases the costs, causes additional delay, and in some cases, stress and frustration associated with an illogical judicial process. … But the great prize nonetheless remains an absence of duplication – in the modern jargon – a one-stop shop. For my part, I think a rationalisation of how we resolve disputes is overdue”.
The Residential Landlords Association has found that there are over 140 Acts of Parliament containing more than 400 regulations affecting the private rental sector. A landlord or tenant can go to one of two tribunals, the county courts, the High Court or the magistrates’ court to uphold their rights, depending on what their specific complaint is. In some cases, there is a need to go to more than one of these bodies. The Government propose, moreover, to increase the complexity with a further body, a new PRS housing ombudsman. It takes an average of 22 weeks to regain possession of property where a tenant is not paying their rent or is committing anti-social behaviour. I understand that average figure is from housing association and individual situations.
When Sajid Javid was CLG Secretary, in his speech to the Conservative Party conference last October, he pledged to look at establishing a new housing court as called for by the Residential Landlords Association,
“so that we can get faster, more effective justice”.
Since then, there has been little discernible action.
The Residential Landlords Association believes that the most efficient way of developing plans for the new court would be to build on the work of the existing First-tier Tribunal Property Chamber. The advantages of this would include: capitalising on the large number of cases decided on paper by the tribunal, making the process easier to access; using the mediation and enhanced alternative dispute resolution procedures the tribunal operates; enabling the use of the tribunal’s in-house surveyors and inspectors and thereby saving costs; and being able to integrate with and take full advantage of the new online court, so the majority of records could be dealt with online. The more informal operation of the tribunal should make it less daunting for tenants and landlords. The tribunal currently holds hearings in local public buildings, making it physically easier to access. The tribunal tends not to award legal costs where there would be advantages if the current cost-limited model were retained.
I had hoped the amendment, which I am not able to table, would be a useful probing amendment to explore how and in what timeframe the Government plan to progress with establishing a dedicated housing court, which is much needed.
The Earl of Listowel (CB)
My Lords, I begin by following the noble Lord, Lord Flight, in his encouragement to the Government to move forward in these specialist courts, and declare my interest as a landlord. We have in England, according to the statistics from last March, over 120,000 children living in bed-and-breakfast and temporary accommodation. The private rented sector can make an important contribution to dealing with that problem, if we can make it as attractive as possible—and these courts would make the private rented sector more attractive.
I thank the Minister for speaking to the Cross-Bench group and answering questions on the Bill and introducing it today. I particularly welcome it after listening to what my noble and learned friend Lord Thomas said about the potential savings from the Bill. Money is very short and we need to spend it where it can make most difference. I welcome particularly that aspect of the Bill, although there needs to be care where the savings are made. I welcome what the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has said on ensuring that there is a high level of qualification requirement for people overseeing the new arrangements.
I declare my interest as a trustee of the Michael Sieff Foundation, a child welfare charity that has been working for the last four years to seek to support the implementation of my noble friend Lord Carlile’s inquiry into youth justice. I am also vice-chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group for Looked After Children and Care Leavers and treasurer of the All-Party Parliamentary Group for Children. I have been in those roles for 15 years, so I am particularly interested in the matters relating to family courts and youth courts.
I welcome the first clause in this Bill as it at least opens the possibility of ensuring that we get exactly the right judges into the family courts. The judges in the family courts have a very complex and difficult task; they need to be hugely empathetic and, to use that term, emotionally intelligent. It is a very specific requirement, so if this Bill allows an opportunity to encourage and find more appropriate judges in those courts, it would be most welcome. I look forward to probing that in Committee and outwith the Chamber.
Sir James Munby, the president of the Family Division, was speaking recently, and gave examples of families going to the private courts arguing about the length of their child’s hair and asking a judge to sort that out, or asking what time exactly on an afternoon they can be dealt with. They can also come in with concerns about domestic violence, and the judge has to decide whether it is in the child’s best interests to have a relationship with both parents or whether the risk of domestic violence is significant and it cannot be permitted. It is a hugely challenging role.
The noble Lord, Lord Beith, raised the issue of problem-solving courts. My noble friend Lord Carlile highlighted the need to develop those in his report about four years ago. We have moved forward on that very slowly; I believe that progress is imminent, and I would be grateful if the Minister could confirm that and assure us that the Government have very strong support for these courts. I believe that the Ministry of Justice innovation arm is taking that forward, but assurance from the Minister would be very welcome.
I was very sad to hear that the Family Drug and Alcohol Court implementation unit is to close in September. I learned this just this week from Sir James Munby—and I am sorry not to have given the Minister notice that I wished to raise it as a concern today. I am very concerned; I visited it several times and have seen parents being given certificates enabling them to retain their child, who otherwise might be taken into care. This wonderful court, introduced by the district judge Nicholas Crichton, allows judicial continuity over 12 months with a family. It allows the use of a multi-disciplinary team, including social workers and clinical psychologists, to work with these families. It is tremendously effective in preventing children being taken into local authority care. To go back to concerns raised by my noble and learned friend Lord Thomas, it may not save the courts or the MoJ huge amounts of money, but it saves local authorities huge amounts of money and saves society a great deal of money in the longer term.
I will read briefly from an article by Sir James Munby on the closure of FDAC, which is to be published shortly:
“In the same week as we saw the launch of the Care Crisis Review, undertaken by the Family Rights Group with the support of the Nuffield Foundation, came the news that the Family Drug and Alcohol Court (FDAC) National Unit has had to withdraw its application for funding to the Life Chances Fund because of lack of support from local authorities”,
on which it now depends. The Government have historically funded its work, which has been most welcome. They have recently stopped doing so, which is why it needs local authority funding. In addition, he says, came the news that,
“the National Unit would be closing in September because of the lack of continuing funding from central govermment. This is grim news, not least at a time when, as both I and my designated successor made clear at the launch, the care system is in crisis”.
That refers to the system of child protection for children in foster care. Sir James continues:
“FDAC is the most researched of the recent innovations in family justice. Rigorous, high quality academic evaluation … has proved, conclusively, that FDAC works … Similarly rigorous independent evaluation proves that FDAC saves the local authorities who participate significant sums of money: £2.30 for every £1 spent. FDAC is one of the most important developments in family justice in the last 40 years”.
So, in parenthesis, in a Bill that is looking at modernising the justice system, we should certainly be discussing this, if not in the Chamber, then outside it. To continue:
“The continued expansion of FDAC is critically dependent upon the work of the National Unit, whose invaluable work, as midwife and then as health visitor, is so important in the planning, implementation and nurturing of each new FDAC. FDAC improves the life chances of some of the most vulnerable and marginalised parents and children in our society: it increases the sum of human happiness and decreases the sum of human misery—and it saves the system money”.
I wish to detain the House for as little time as possible this afternoon. However, can the Minister say what assistance he might give me in seeking to ensure that no stone is left unturned in trying to avoid this closure? I would also appreciate advice from your Lordships on what might be done to prevent it. If any noble Lords are concerned about this, I would be grateful to hear what support they can give in raising this matter with the Government.
I look forward to taking part in Committee and to scrutinising this important legislation. I also look forward to the Minister’s response.
Baroness Newlove (Con)
My Lords, this has been a wonderful debate. As someone who used to work in the courts, I have learned quite a lot about the history of titles in the courts, and so on. The speech given by my wonderful noble and learned friend Lord Mackay was delightful—and of course I have had the pleasure of working alongside the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, on victims’ issues.
As a former committal court assistant I was saddened to see that that role is now given and gone, as they say, because of money and wasting court time, but I was proud to sit alongside justices’ clerks, which we are discussing in the Bill alongside other titles that are going. That role in courts is important, and it was very important to me when I sat alongside them when we were dealing with the Libyan bombers, who were very active in Manchester many years ago. That shows how important roles within our court system are very important to the people who use them. So I find this to be a small Bill which deals with a lot of functions that have carried on for many years and done a commendable job as they do this.
That brings me to why I want to speak here today. I commend the Bill, and there is little in it I can disagree with. It takes a pragmatic approach on how best to use the resource and expertise within our courts and will, I hope, give both court staff and our judiciary more fulfilling working days. However, I cannot help but feel that it has missed an opportunity to protect some of the most vulnerable in our society. So, standing here, it pains me that we are going for a quick win rather than concentrating parliamentary time on legislation that will have the most impact on the lives of users of our judicial system.
Speaking on behalf of victims in my role as Victims’ Commissioner, and as a person who has gone through a 10-week court trial for my late husband’s murder, what victims tell me they want—and, I believe, should have—is access to a fair judicial system that treats victims with care and respect. As originally drafted, it appeared that the Prisons and Courts Bill went some way towards achieving this. Indeed, as was mentioned, it was a starting point in ensuring that victims’ voices were listened to.
The area that particularly concerns me—it was mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti—is the continuation of cross-examination of domestic abuse victims by perpetrators in our family courts. Over the last few months, I have been around the country speaking to many victims of this horrendous crime. Hearing their stories has left me shocked, as has the way that the courts have treated these vulnerable victims. Time is now of the essence. It is within our gift to transform these people’s experiences now, if only we can implement the legislation. How can it be right that a victim can give evidence behind a screen in our criminal courts and yet, sadly, when they appear in our family courts, despite a restraining order being in place, cross-examination can be carried out by the individual who has made the lives of that victim and their children pure hell?
I thank Women’s Aid for its briefing on some very important points. Its recent study carried out alongside Queen Mary University shows that nearly a quarter of domestic abuse victims are still being allowed to be cross-examined by the perpetrator in our family courts, and 61% are offered special measures. The original Bill put a precise prohibition on that practice.
My noble and learned friend the Minister says that the Government are still committed to a ban, but the parliamentary timetable is so frustratingly and agonisingly tight that I fear for many victims, especially where tactics such as gaslighting are used. Victims will continue to suffer a continuation of their abuse in our family courts because abusive partners are allowed to continue their controlling and coercive behaviour in plain sight, not only towards the victims but towards the children. I may add that victims feel, and say to me, that it appears when judges and Cafcass officers conclude with their directions.
How can we expect a victim in such a traumatic environment to give the best evidence and argue for the best scenario for their children—one that keeps them safe—when the person they are standing up against is the person they are most afraid of in the world? So I join Women’s Aid in calling for a bar on the ability of perpetrators to cross-examine their victim to be enacted by the quickest available legislative vehicle. I challenge my noble and learned friend by asking: is this Bill not the very vehicle he has been waiting for? I also call on the Government to introduce a victim’s advocate scheme in our courts, so that all victims of crime are truly supported through the judicial maze.
We do not have the luxury of waiting for this to be brought forward in the domestic abuse Bill. That Bill will not reach this place for some six to nine months at least. How many victims will be allowed to be questioned about their sex life by their abusive partners in that time, and how many will be manipulated into agreeing contact arrangements that put their children at high risk? I am not prepared to let this moment pass without making sure that those victims’ voices are heard.
Victims must be able to access a system that helps them move towards a safer future for their family—not one that adds to the abuse and the anxiety of the situation they found themselves in in the first place. There are people in refuges who had businesses but are now scraping around for funding, while the perpetrators are able to start a new relationship and a new family and are smiling all the way. If we are talking about a digital platform and a common place, surely common sense must be put in our legislation.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, when my noble friend Lord Beith asked a Question on 6 June about the proposed modernisation of the courts, he described the Bill—and he repeated this today—as,
“a little mouse of a Bill”.
The Minister then contradicted him in response, saying that,
“this is a mouse that roared”.—[Official Report, 6/6/18; cols. 1305-06.]
I think there is consensus around the House today that, as it stands, the Bill is more of legislative squeak than anything approaching a roar. The Bill we all wanted to have would have covered the whole gamut of court modernisation and I fully endorse what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, said: the central point is that the alternative to comprehensive modernisation is significant decline.
I found Joshua Rozenberg’s description of the Bill in the Law Society Gazette as,
“a little too late and quite a lot too little”,
pretty accurate. In opening, the noble and learned Lord described the Bill as a positive first step in reforming the court system. Mr Rozenberg, however, criticised it as drip-feeding—a term also used by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. The problem with drip-feeding is that you cannot see the entire flow, and the Bill gives little indication of the Government’s direction of travel.
There has been little substantive criticism today of the specific provisions that have found their way into the Bill. I shall, however, make a couple of points on those provisions. First, Clause 1 allows for the more flexible deployment of judges, which is generally sensible and to be welcomed, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, explained. I would, however, caution against rowing back from our developing reliance on judges’ specialist expertise in centres across England and Wales, which has been uniformly beneficial. This was a theme pursued by the noble Lord, Lord Flight. It has been particularly true of specialist family judges, as forcefully argued by the noble Earl, Lord Listowel. It has been true also of mercantile judges, since last year called Circuit Commercial Court judges, which has ensured a spread of circuit judges with specialist commercial expertise in court centres across the country. It has been true also of judges of the Technology and Construction Court—the TCC—who handle difficult and lengthy cases in construction, engineering and IT disputes economically and efficiently in regional centres as well as in London. I also welcome the recently announced development of one overarching umbrella for specialist business and property courts across the country.
While there has been considerable cross-ticketing of judges, as it is inelegantly known, whereby judges from one specialism are deployed in a similar field, it is important that flexible deployment develops alongside and in sympathy with the continuing specialisation of judges where it is needed. I never again wish to argue a long and complicated matrimonial finance case, as I did some years ago, in front of a deputy High Court judge who was highly distinguished in his field as tax counsel but had entirely the wrong end of the stick—and, frankly, not a clue—about his task in a matrimonial context.
Secondly, I accept that, as proposed by Clause 3, suitably qualified staff should be able to make not only administrative decisions but some of the less significant case management judicial decisions. I agree that it is not a definitive criterion that such a decision should be unopposed. If that is to be the case, however, we need robust safeguards to ensure that decisions that should be taken by judges are indeed taken by judges and not delegated to too low a level. We must also guarantee that staff making judicial decisions are adequately qualified.
I am also concerned about the prospect of under- qualified court officers giving advice to judges in the family court—they are often lay magistrates, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, pointed out—or the magistrates’ courts. I note that the Schedule will provide that qualifications will be determined by regulations to be made by the Lord Chancellor with the agreement of the Lord Chief Justice. It is vital that such regulations establish clearly that those advising magistrates and judges are completely qualified to do so.
We have heard in this debate much more about what the Bill does not do but should do than about what it in fact does. So, turning to what is not in the Bill, I note that the Long Title is relatively wide:
“To make provision about the judiciary and the functions of the staff of courts and tribunals”.
It is certainly wide enough, I suggest, to accommodate the campaign of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, to give England and Wales back its supreme court, but not—sadly, I think—wide enough to comprise the campaign by Women’s Aid to prevent victims of domestic abuse being cross-examined by the perpetrators of that abuse. Having listened to the speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, many of us would no doubt hope that the Government and the noble and learned Lord might see their way to extending the Long Title to encompass provision in that regard. Noble Lords may wish to explore the process of modernisation with inventive amendments within the Long Title, as it exists, in that context.
I suggest that there are three significant areas for improvement. The first area is judicial diversity. Since the report of the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger, in 2010, we have made some considerable progress, particularly with the work done by the judicial diversity task force. However, we have a very long way to go. I would like to see this Bill require more action on judicial diversity, more women judges, more judges with BAME heritage and backgrounds and a more socially diverse bench generally, to make our court system look and in fact be more attuned to and more in touch with our society. We could start with taking on the recommendations of the organisation Justice in its excellent paper, Increasing Judicial Diversity. I am not sure that accepting the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, that we increase the retirement age of judges, would help. Flexible, family-friendly hours and more job sharing for judges, on the other hand, almost certainly would.
The second area is accessibility. I suggested on 6 June that we need court staff, in person and over the phone, court documents and online resources all to be committed to helping court users, particularly litigants in person, to navigate their way through the litigation process. This would mean court officers changing their traditional position that they are not there to give advice. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, gave me a very encouraging reply. He said that,
“there is no reason why reallocated court staff will not be in a position to provide advice”.
But he then added the words,
“as they have in the past”.—[Official Report, 6/6/17; col. 1307.]
I think that the added words were overoptimistic. Those of us who regularly attend court tend not to appreciate quite how daunting an experience going to court is for members of the public. Traditionally, court staff have taken the view that their job is to be detached, impartial and objective, giving the advice that is needed on procedure but leaving it to litigants to get advice from their solicitors and other advisers. However, more litigants in person and less legal aid make it essential that court staff are trained to give real assistance to all concerned, including advice not only on procedures but on completing documents and the evidence that people will need to prove a case. The noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, with her call for help for victims, adds to the point. That does not mean that court staff have to act as lawyers for individual parties, and they should not. But they should act as firm friends in court for those without lawyers—litigants in the civil courts and defendants in the criminal courts. That should be true whether the contact is face-to-face, over the phone, by email or through the court’s online resources.
Thirdly and finally, we must make progress with the development of a fully online system, to enable cases that can be dealt with online to be processed efficiently and quickly through digital technology, with users feeling informed and not at sea. I accept that there has been considerable progress in pilot projects in this area, as the noble and learned Lord mentioned in opening. Online divorce; applications for probate, on which I should add that we never want to see the reintroduction of the ridiculous proposal for hyperinflated probate fees; online pleas in minor criminal cases; and huge numbers of debt recovery cases—these are all areas where the court could be made user-friendly and efficient with digital technology.
I look forward to working with the noble and learned Lord and others, in the likely absence of parliamentary time for other justice Bills, to inject a little more ambition into this Bill. If we can give the mouse if not a full-throated roar then at least a bit of an increase in volume, that will be all to the good.
Lord Beecham (Lab)
My Lords, I refer to my interests as an unpaid consultant of my former firm of solicitors and as the father of a practising barrister who specialises in employment and housing law and who would, I think, be very interested in the suggestion by the noble Lord, Lord Flight, of a housing court—a suggestion with which, with my other hat on, as a local councillor with concerns about these matters, I would also concur.
The National Audit Office report Early Progress in Transforming Courts and Tribunals, published six weeks ago, begins with a set of key facts, identifying the Government’s expectation of savings of £265 million a year from 2023-24 onwards, with a staff reduction of 5,000—one third of the current staffing—and 2.4 million fewer cases held in physical courtrooms. The NAO describes the change as,
“a very significant challenge”,
with changes,
“far broader than those in comparable programmes in other countries”.
The timetable has been extended from four years to six, interestingly without changing the budget, and this is still shorter than the smaller programmes of this kind in other countries.
Moreover, the Infrastructure and Projects Authority concluded in its latest assurance review that successful delivery of the programme is in doubt. It avers that less progress overall has been made, such that a spending gap of between £61 million and £177 million has appeared, depending on whether the Treasury will allow earlier underspending to be carried forward, while costs have increased and planned benefits reduced. The NAO points out that Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service still needs to develop how the services will work and that,
“stakeholders do not fully understand how the reformed services will work in detail”.
It concludes that a lack of clarity has contributed to delays and programme failings.
The NAO adds:
“Failure to sustain commitment from all delivery organisations will significantly reduce the likelihood of success and the benefits achieved … Delivering change on this scale at pace means that HMCTS risks making decisions before it understands the system-wide consequences”.
To cap it all, it asserts:
“The benefits claimed so far by HMCTS exceed expectations but risk putting pressure on its ability to maintain services”.
It concludes that, while it has improved,
“its governance and programme management … there is a long way to go”,
and warns of major risks in a number of areas.
This damning critique may resonate with Members who recall the fanfare with which the coalition Government launched the disaster entitled universal credit—or discredit, as I and many others afflicted by the problems are apt to describe it. But the National Audit Office does more than list these problems. It states:
“The scale of the challenge is increasing and the programme is under significant pressure to meet what is still a demanding timetable”.
It makes four critical recommendations, to which I invite the Minister to respond. It says HMCTS should allow enough time to engage with affected parties within the justice system, to consult widely and respond to the results, to provide more detail of how the system will work and to carry the staff along with it. It says HMCTS should resist pressure to claim savings until planned changes are fully embedded. It says HMCTS should provide greater transparency on objectives and progress. Finally, it says HMCTS should work with the department and the Treasury to address the system-wide consequences of planned changes. In more general terms, the NAO suggests that there should be greater transparency on the Government’s objectives and progress, and clarity on how plans are adapted in response to risks.
We are, after all, dealing with a system through which 4 million cases pass yearly: 1.7 million criminal court matters, 1.9 million civil cases and 250,000 family court cases. Thanks to the massive cuts in legal aid and advice, which have led in some areas of law and in different parts of the country to the creation, in effect, of a desert of professional legal support, too many people have to struggle unaided with their legal problems or are driven to rely on claims management companies, the nefarious activities of which featured in our recent discussions on the Civil Liability Bill.
Inevitably, these changes in both the criminal and civil areas are impacting on the supply of qualified professionals, as well as the number of litigants acting in person, causing considerable delays in the court process. But we also have to consider other difficulties which are increasingly confronting people with legal problems. The court closure programme may be saving money for the Ministry of Justice, but it is increasingly impacting on court users in terms of cost and lengthy travelling times—an issue raised by the Law Society, which points to the impact on vulnerable court users in particular. More than 200 courts have been closed since 2011. Yet the MoJ has made the curious decision to close Cambridge magistrates’ court, which already has videolink technology. It seems a rather strange choice for closure.
No doubt the Government’s response will be to talk up the impact of increasing the use of digital technology in the conduct of legal processes—very much part of their reform programme—but I suspect I am not alone among Members of your Lordships’ House in struggling with this new and constantly developing world and being ever grateful for what used to be PICT and is now PDS, the Parliamentary Digital Service, rescuing me from time to time. I find myself in the position exemplified by Groucho Marx, who once declared:
“A child of five would understand this. Send someone to fetch a child of five”.
Even children of that age could probably match my performance—and, I suspect, others’—and therefore, almost certainly, that of many of those who will be having to rely on that approach as people involved in the justice system. I fear that, as we have learned from the introduction of universal credit and the dreadful record of the Home Office, the digital world is not one within which everybody is comfortably able to manage.
The Equality and Human Rights Commission draws attention to both pros and cons of the modernisation programme. It welcomes the opportunity to improve accessibility for some disabled people by providing alternatives to attending court in person; I would add some family cases, where one party, perhaps the wife or mother, cannot be face-to-face with an abusive partner—the sort of area that the noble Baroness was concerned about. But it has concerns that,
“people with certain protected characteristics are excluded by digital processes, and that video-link hearings and online courts negatively affect access to justice and fair trial rights. There are also implications for principles of open justice and for public confidence in the justice system”.
One wonders, too, how far these developments will take us. Will we see the development of a “Justice Alexa”, initially providing advice but ultimately deciding cases? The Law Society has expressed concerns that new technology has not been fully tested and evaluated, while court closures proceed in any event. It urges that before embarking on a significant court closure programme and much-increased reliance on new technology and online courts, there should be a full evaluation of these developments. Will the Government agree, and with what sort of timescale in mind? In any event, what is the Government’s estimate of the cost of the new technology on which £100 million has already been spent, or of the likely receipts from the sale of court buildings? As we have heard, 80% of those that have been sold only realised sums equivalent to average house prices—hardly a financial bonanza likely to contribute significantly to the programme.
We are at one with the Government in their intention to modernise the court system, with the important caveat that the objective must be to facilitate access to justice—including the areas raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, about victims of domestic violence—not merely to engender visible financial savings at the possible expense of those who really need the protection of the law.
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, it is perhaps too late to bring our court system into the 20th century but this is the opportunity to take it into the 21st century. This may be a small step, but a small step on a long journey, when properly directed, will take us closer to our goal, and that is the intention of this legislation. To that extent it has been welcomed around the House. Let me address some of the points raised by noble Lords in the course of this helpful discussion.
First, we have seen the development of digital access, by way of pilots and its wider use, in conjunction with the issue of redundancy within physical court buildings. That means that there has to be a balance between the development of that digital provision and the closure of courts, as anticipated by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham. That will continue. However, it has to be a balancing act—we appreciate that—and judgments will have to be made. We should not allow one aspect of digitisation to run ahead of the necessary demands for physical court buildings, and we have that in mind.
The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, spoke of the need for legislation so that we could review what was happening with the digitisation process. However, with respect, the purpose of primary legislation is to implement law, not to review that which we can already do. Of course, there are means and methods by which we can keep in mind and review the progress of the changes that we are taking forward.
The noble Baroness also referred to Clause 3 of the Bill and the delegation of official functions. There are two aspects to this: the delegation of judicial functions and the provision for legal advice. The two are distinct and have to be understood as being so. One should not confuse the two or push them together.
On the question of legal advice, justices’ clerks and assistant justices’ clerks are highly qualified individuals who, for a long time, have been in a position of tendering legal advice within the magistrates’ courts and the family courts. That, essentially, will continue; there will be no fundamental changes. It is hoped that these senior and well-qualified individuals will be able to deploy their talents beyond the magistrates’ courts if necessary. That is one aspect of flexibility that is being considered. However, when determining their qualification and function in the provision of legal advice, it is intended that these provisions will be specified by the Lord Chancellor in regulations in order that we can maintain the present system with one or two developments to it.
The staff who will be authorised to carry out certain judicial functions—the “box work” of district and circuit judges—will be determined by the independent jurisdictional rule committees, which are the appropriate bodies to take these decisions and ensure that the powers are properly scrutinised by judges, practitioners and other interested parties. It will be part of the role of the rule committees in determining the functions to consider whether staff should be required to have particular experience or qualifications. That is the level at which this should be done.
The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, also referred to the use of temporary judges. We consider that there are appropriate safeguards in place with regard to the deployment of temporary judges. We have to remember that there are some highly experienced members of the legal profession who would prefer to maintain their position as temporary judges rather than go forward to a permanent appointment because of the flexibility it provides for them. That is an extremely useful resource and not one that we would wish to imperil.
The noble Lord, Lord Beith, reminded us that there were provisions in the Prisons and Courts Bill that went well beyond the provisions in this Bill. I fully accept that, and in particular the issue—also raised by my noble friend Lady Newlove, who is the Victims’ Commissioner—of the cross-examination of victims of domestic violence. It does not fall within the purview of this Bill but we have it at the forefront of our minds and are determined to take it forward. It is an issue of parliamentary time.
The noble Lord also referred to the use of consolidation Bills. My noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern alluded to the difficulties that sometimes arise in ensuring that the Joint Committee on Consolidation Bills is quorate. That is not because of the availability of Members of this House but possibly because of the non-availability of Members of the other House, given that it is a Joint Committee. We see the usefulness of consolidation as a way forward with regard to sentencing. I am aware of the work that the Law Commission has been and is still doing on this matter, but it will be necessary for some primary legislation to be brought forward in order, as it were, to establish a pathway for such consolidation provisions. We are conscious of that and again, we have it in mind. It is to be hoped that we will see some further developments in this area. Reference was also made to the utility of the Law Commission procedure for its own Bills, and again we are conscious of that when parliamentary time is limited.
My noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern also alluded to the fact that while Scotland very sensibly managed to retain a Supreme Court, England and Wales rather lost their way in that regard. I am not privy to how it came about, but they agreed to cease to be a supreme court and became a senior court instead. It may be that there is room to revisit that issue at some point, but whether in the context of this Bill or otherwise is a different matter.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, welcomed the Bill and I thank him for that. He referred to the importance of flexibility in the deployment of judicial availability, and the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, is one I agree with entirely. While clearly wanting to have flexibility in the deployment of our judicial asset, we do not want to lose the benefit of the specialist expertise that has been built up in areas such as family law, mercantile law, and the example he gave us of the Technology and Construction Court. We and the Lord Chief Justice will be conscious of that when taking forward the powers here with regard to cross-ticketing, as I believe it is sometimes called.
My noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts raised the question of the judicial retirement age. What I would say at this stage is that we are awaiting the report of the Senior Salaries Review Body, which I think is due in the late autumn, with regard to judicial salaries and pension conditions. I am aware that there have been issues with the judicial pension situation in particular. Once we have the report, it may be possible to look again at the judicial retirement age. My understanding is that at present, the average judicial retirement age is 67 or 68, so it is not a case of the judiciary actually going as far as the existing ceiling. There may be other explanations for that, including the desire of some in judicial office to contemplate an alternative career structure when they cannot proceed beyond 70 on the judicial Bench. It is clear that that requires further consideration.
My noble friend Lord Flight raised the issue of a dedicated housing court. I am aware of the discussions that have taken place on this. Sir Geoffrey Vos recently alluded to the fact that property disputes can take place anywhere between the county court, the First-tier Tribunal Property Chamber, and the High Court. We intend to consult later in the year, I hope, on the provision of a housing court so that this issue can be addressed.
The noble Earl, Lord Listowel, referred to the Family Drug and Alcohol Court. I do not have up-to-date details on what is happening with the funding for that but I undertake to write to him in due course. I will place a copy of the letter in the Library.
On the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, particularly that we should engage and consult widely before taking further steps, the danger is that that will engender further delay in the implementation of a courts modernisation process, which should not be unduly delayed if possible. We consider that there is general consensus about the need to move towards a more effective, modern and efficient courts system, involving the digitisation of the courts process but remembering the risk that some people may somehow be excluded from access to justice unless their needs and requirements are catered for. We are conscious of that.
With that, I hope that noble Lords will accept that, as I said, this is a small step but a step in the right direction that takes us closer to our goal. I therefore ask the House to give the Bill a Second Reading.
Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Bill [HL]
Tuesday 10th July 2018
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Act 2018 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 108-I Marshalled list for Committee (PDF, 76KB) - (6 Jul 2018)
Baroness Chakrabarti
“Report on availability of judicial training to support deployment
(1) Within twelve months of the coming into force of section 1, the Lord Chancellor must publish a report on the availability of the judicial training necessary to enable judges to be deployed more flexibly.(2) The report under subsection (1) must be laid before each House of Parliament.”
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, at Second Reading, it was widely acknowledged around the House that there were practical arguments for expanding the flexible deployment of judges, including some temporary judges appointed outside the usual Judicial Appointments Commission selection process, to a wider pool of courts and tribunals. However, the appointment of temporary judges as a principle should be approached with caution. Further, it is important to view flexible deployment in general through the prism of the Government’s wider programme of reforms and cuts. Given the planned savings on judicial salaries, we have to ask whether the provisions are at least in part a short cut to make up for a shortfall—even a crisis—in the recruitment of permanent judges that will become a de facto cost-saving measure. Any trend towards an increasing reliance on temporary judges would be worrying. Temporary judges, most likely seeking permanent appointment, are by their nature less independent than their permanent counterparts.
The Government should surely provide greater evidence of the need for these provisions, such as the detail of the changes in business demand referred to in the impact assessment and the reasoning for the proportionality of these measures. If introduced, it is surely a reasonable requirement on the Government to ensure that proper training is made available for these temporary appointments whose deployment will involve oversight of areas of law new to the personnel concerned. This is already a routine practice in the deployment of judges in the Crown Court: the paucity of Crown Court judges with a criminal law background is well acknowledged and, arguably, none the less regrettable. There is no argument against proper provision of support and training to those less practised, temporary judges or, indeed, permanent judges deployed in new areas. Given the backdrop of major cuts to the MoJ, the need for effective and proper training is all the more acute to ensure the quality of judicial practice. That is why I am probing with this amendment and I beg to move.
Lord Beith (LD)
This gives us an opportunity to look at whether the training is intended to embrace the increasing use of online and virtual court facilities. We cannot advance that cause in the context of the Bill, because it has been drafted to exclude some of the things that we all assumed were part of the modernisation programme. It would indeed be difficult to ensure that the training and deployment of judges meant that they were well equipped for these changes, because we do not know what the parliamentary underpinning would be, but this would be a useful moment for the Minister to indicate how far the well-declared and strongly supported plans that emerged from the Briggs and Leveson reports form part of the Government’s thinking on how judicial deployment and training should operate.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
My Lords, I take this opportunity to raise a question, in the confines of this amendment, about training. I know that my noble and learned friend has explained on a previous occasion that the role of justice clerks is changing and that that is the purpose of this. What stage are we at with consulting the justice clerks? I understand, looking at paragraph 10 of the impact assessment, on page 5, that currently the most senior lawyers in Her Majesty’s Courts & Tribunals Service are indeed justice clerks. To what extent are they agreeable to these changes? I want to be assured that we will not find ourselves in a situation in the autumn where perhaps they do not entirely agree to what we are asking of them. At the same time, I wonder if there is an expectation that those undertaking this new role will travel further to courts, particularly magistrates’ courts, given that in rural areas there are so few of them. We have seen an increase in cancellations of trials and cases not being heard, where witnesses have found it difficult to travel to and reach the court on time.
Lord Judge (CB)
My Lords, one issue that arises is that, if we are to require more judicial training, it will have to be funded. The second point is that the Lord Chief Justice is responsible for the organisation of judicial training and a report from the Lord Chancellor—if I may say so, with respect—is completely unnecessary. These issues can be addressed by the Lord Chief Justice in his annual report.
Lord Pannick (CB)
Can the Minister say whether he thinks that Clause 1 of the Bill will make any significant contribution to resolving what the Lord Chief Justice has described as the unsustainable recruitment crisis that is facing the Bench?
Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury (CB)
My Lords, I will just add a footnote to what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, has said. The Lord Chief Justice’s annual report is laid before Parliament, so the information about judicial training will be laid before Parliament in so far as the Lord Chief Justice considers it appropriate, he being responsible for training.
The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)
My Lords, as the noble Baroness said, this amendment would require the Lord Chancellor to publish, within 12 months of Clause 1 coming into force, a report on the availability of training for judges that will enable them to be flexibly deployed.
As has been noted, the Lord Chief Justice and indeed the Senior President of Tribunals already have far-reaching powers of deployment. The measures in the Bill seek to amend and build on existing powers in legislation. Of course, it is the Lord Chief Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals who are responsible for arrangements for the training of the judiciary. As the noble and learned Lords, Lord Judge and Lord Neuberger, observed, it will be for the Lord Chief Justice, who is responsible for training, to report on these matters, as he seeks to do in his annual report. It would not be appropriate in these circumstances for that responsibility to pass to the Lord Chancellor.
With regard to funding for training, the Lord Chancellor is committed to providing suitable funding for the judiciary; that includes funding in the area of training, particularly by the Judicial College. I add only that that is in accordance with the arrangements that have to be made for resourcing under the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. As I indicated, the Senior President of Tribunals has an equivalent responsibility in relation to judges and members of the tribunals within the scope of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. Those responsibilities are exercised through the Judicial College.
The report that the Lord Chief Justice provides with regard to judicial training is a report to Parliament, so it will be available to Parliament in due course. Therefore, it would be inappropriate for the Lord Chancellor to report to Parliament on the availability of judicial training, a matter that is properly for the senior judiciary.
In these circumstances, I venture that the amendment is unnecessary. We can be confident that all our judges are recommended for appointment by the Judicial Appointments Commission following a rigorous process. At a minimum, they will have met the statutory eligibility criteria for the relevant office. In relation to the offices in Clause 1, in many cases the judges will have already met the statutory eligibility criteria. In addition, when it is required, they will have also demonstrated specialist expertise—for example, where judges are appointed or authorised to specific jurisdictions, such as the Commercial Court, the Media and Communications List and the Technology and Construction Court or TCC.
The Judicial College strategy for 2018-20, published in December last year, states:
“All newly appointed and newly assigned judicial office holders will receive induction training”.
It says that, over this period:
“The College expects to deliver more induction training to support increasing flexibility of judicial deployment across courts and tribunals when workload fluctuates”.
The Judicial College has also been devising more cross-jurisdictional training in skills required for all jurisdictions because of the flexibility in deployment that will be available.
On whether or not the provisions in Clause 1 will make a significant contribution to what has been referred to as the recruitment crisis, I cannot say that on its own it will make a significant contribution to recruitment, but certainly the flexibility that is being introduced into the system may assist in that regard. We recognise that more needs to be done with regard to that matter. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, will be aware that the terms and conditions of the senior judiciary will be the subject of a report later this year. I look forward to that so that we can consider how the matter can be taken forward.
The noble Lord, Lord Beith, raised the rollout of digitisation with regard to the court process. Of course, we hope eventually to bring all these developments together. They are complementary to each other. I acknowledge that we have not yet been able to introduce further provision within the narrow confines of this Bill, but it is our intention that the provisions anticipated by the Queen’s Speech, and indeed laid out in the original Prison and Courts Bill, will be brought forward when legislative time allows.
I hope that I have gone some way to reassuring the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, that the appropriate training arrangements are in place to support flexible deployment of the judiciary and that she will see fit to withdraw her amendment. I pause to observe that the points raised by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, arise in respect of later groups. Perhaps I may address them at that time.
Baroness Chakrabarti
I am grateful to the Minister for that reassurance as to process and to other noble and learned Lords for their exposition of the responsibilities on the Lord Chief Justice, the Judicial College and so on. I have yet to be reassured, however, about the adequacy of funding for this training or the adequacy of funding to the MoJ to deal with, among other things, this recruitment crisis. I fear that we may have to return to this matter but, for the moment at least, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 1.
“Report on the impact of the provisions under section 1 on the diversity of the judiciary
(1) The Secretary of State must carry out an assessment of the impact of the provisions under section 1 of this Act on the diversity of the judiciary.(2) This assessment must make reference to whether increasing flexibility in the deployment of judges has had an impact on the diversity of the judiciary.(3) The Secretary of State must lay a report of the assessment before both Houses of Parliament within one year of this Act passing.”
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I said at Second Reading that I regarded the area of judicial diversity as a significant one for the improvement of the Bill. Amendment 2 is an attempt—drawn as widely as possible while keeping it within scope—to retain the Government’s focus on the need to have judicial diversity at the centre of their programme for the modernisation of the courts.
I am not one who believes that the Government do not understand the need for the judiciary to look, feel, seem and actually be more similar to and representative of the public at large, whose cases and disputes it is their job to determine and resolve. Often, such disputes involve very human problems. Only as recently as 24 April, the Lord Chancellor wrote jointly with the Lord Chief Justice and the noble Lord, Lord Kakkar, the chairman of the Judicial Appointments Commission, to your Lordships’ Constitution Committee to announce a funded programme to encourage applicants for judicial office, aimed partly at increasing the diversity of successful applicants by providing targeted support to underrepresented groups.
However, I emphasise that the importance of this issue has become all the greater as the number of unrepresented litigants in civil and criminal courts has increased. It was bad, but not so bad perhaps, when advocates looked and sounded like me and perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and we addressed judges in court who looked and sounded like the former judges in this House, for whom we all have the greatest of respect and affection. But a great deal of modern litigation in courts and a great many cases in tribunals are not like that at all. Litigants are often representing themselves or are represented by informal McKenzie friends. It makes it no better that they are often opposed by more powerful parties represented by qualified lawyers whom they perceive, probably rightly, in part at least, as having an understanding with the judge or tribunal that leaves them at a serious disadvantage. I fear that, for too many unrepresented litigants, we lawyers, judges and tribunal members often sound as if we come from another planet.
Judicial diversity will not solve all these problems but it can do a lot to help. We have come a long way in securing better representation of women on the Bench. It is now somewhere between 20% and 25%, but that is nowhere near enough. The recent and frankly long-overdue appointment to the Supreme Court of Lady Arden has of course helped, but we need the appointment of more women at all levels of the judiciary. In 2010, the report of the advisory panel chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger, on improving judicial diversity pointed out that there was no easy route to achieving a representative judiciary. It made a large number of important recommendations which were widely welcomed by the professions and the Bench but which, frankly, have not been addressed with the full-hearted commitment that they demanded.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for managing to table an amendment to this anodyne Bill that raises an issue of real significance. I say simply that it is a remarkable achievement for the Government to bring forward a Bill on courts and tribunals that ignores all the serious problems facing our justice system, not simply diversity but the recruitment crisis, the crisis in legal aid, the appalling state of the judicial estate and the vital need for modernisation.
Lord Beecham (Lab)
My Lords, I concur with the remarks of the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Marks. I remind the House that I have a parental interest in these matters in that my daughter is a barrister and sits as a part-time district judge. We support the amendment, particularly because of the concern about both gender and ethnic representation in the judicial system, which is currently well below what should be expected.
I have only one reservation about the amendment, which is that it calls for a report to be laid within a year of the Act passing. That does not seem to be a reasonably long enough period in which to judge the extent to which progress is being made. I would have thought that if the Government were disposed to accept the principle here, and I hope they would be, a more realistic period of two to three years would be one in which we would be able to genuinely measure whether there was an impact that all of us around the House would wish to see. Subject to that, we certainly support the principles of the amendment and I hope the Government will look at it sympathetically.
Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)
My Lords, this amendment would require the Secretary of State to assess and report on the impact on judicial diversity of the measures before noble Lords today.
The judiciary already has wide powers to deploy judges between jurisdictions in our courts and tribunals. The judicial deployment measures in the Bill are intended to amend existing legislation in specific areas to enhance these powers to ensure that judges continue to be deployed where needed and appropriate. Being able to make the best use of judges’ time and expertise to react to changes in case loads of different jurisdictions has benefits for all court and tribunal users.
The measures are targeted to specified judicial roles and are intended to fill gaps in existing deployment measures. They are therefore limited in scope. As the measures are about how our existing judiciary may be deployed, they do not impact directly on new appointments to the judiciary.
Implementing these measures will largely follow existing processes by which the senior judiciary authorise judges to sit in additional courts or tribunals. In the interests of fairness and transparency, where it is appropriate in accordance with the circumstances of each case, deployment decisions will be taken following an expression of interest exercise across the eligible pool of judges.
Increases in flexible deployment may enable individuals to gain valuable experience in sitting in other jurisdictions. For example, the measure which provides for the 14 senior employment judges also to be judges of the unified tribunals may enable them to demonstrate their competencies across a broader range of case types. This may in future result in more diverse appointments to higher courts and tribunals.
I am sure that all Members of your Lordships’ House would agree with many or most of the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Marks. I, too, have a long-standing interest in this area. However, I was struck by the assumption he sometimes seems to hold that only women have caring responsibilities. I hope he will agree that men should care, too.
I am happy to place on record this Government’s commitment to working with the judiciary and the Judicial Appointments Commission to increase judicial diversity. We have seen gradual improvements in gender and ethnic diversity since 2014, but we know that there is more to do to improve judicial diversity at all levels. For example, the representation of men and women from BAME communities has increased from 6% to 7% in the courts and from 9% to 10% in tribunals, and the first BAME judge was appointed to the Court of Appeal in 2017. The judiciary publishes annual judicial diversity statistics, and this year’s publication will take place on Thursday.
It is important for the quality, independence and impartiality of our judges that we always appoint the most talented candidates on merit. We know that there are many talented potential candidates from a diverse range of backgrounds and we want to encourage and support even more of them to apply for judicial office. That is why the Ministry of Justice strongly supports the work of the Judicial Diversity Forum and works as part of the forum alongside legal professional bodies, judicial representatives and the Judicial Appointments Commission to co-ordinate action to increase judicial diversity.
In April we announced funding for a pre-application judicial education programme, PAJE, which will provide information and support to those considering a judicial role, and will be targeted in particular at those from underrepresented groups. This is very much a partnership project, and the Ministry of Justice is working closely with the Judicial College, members of the judiciary, the Bar Council, the Law Society and the Chartered Institute of Legal Executives to finalise the programme content. We anticipate that the first candidates will be able to participate in PAJE in early 2019.
There are several other initiatives and support schemes for potential candidates from diverse groups that are run by the Judicial Office and the legal professions, and supported by the Judicial Appointments Commission. These include outreach events, judicial-run workshops and mentoring schemes.
The Lord Chancellor is personally committed to working with the Lord Chief Justice and the chair of the Judicial Appointments Commission to consider all practical actions that would impact positively on diversity, assess the impact of our existing activities and measure progress. The Lord Chancellor appears regularly before the Justice Select Committee and the Lords Constitution Committee on matters relating to the judiciary, including diversity. We think that this is the appropriate and proportionate way of advising noble Lords on actions that we are taking to improve judicial diversity.
I hope that what I have said has reassured the noble Lord of our commitment to improving judicial diversity—
Baroness Chakrabarti
I apologise for intervening. Before the noble Baroness sits down—I love this convention—I was just thinking about her comments on meritocracy and the importance of having merit. Surely she is not suggesting an inherent tension between merit and diversity. I was a little concerned that she might be satisfied with the current pace of change. Have I misunderstood that? Is she not impatient for a greater speed of change in this area, in the light of the constitutional and public concerns aired by the noble Lord, Lord Marks?
Baroness Vere of Norbiton
I think that the noble Baroness is perhaps not entirely understanding my comments. It is absolutely key that we get the best candidates into the job. The point of this is to make sure that the pool of possible candidates is as broad as possible. No candidate, whether they be from a BAME community, female or disabled, should be left out of the pool—and from that pool it is important that we select those candidates who are the best for that particular job.
I hope that, in the light of my comments, the noble Lord will be content to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, when the Minister started her response, I was tempted to accuse her of complacency. However, I now accept, after the length of her speech and what she said subsequently, that that was directed only to the limited ambit of the Bill.
On the subject of men’s caring responsibilities, I think she will find that Hansard will show that I specifically mentioned them—although I may have emphasised women’s. But as a father of seven, it would be wrong for me to omit mention of caring responsibilities myself. I should also perhaps have echoed the parental declaration of interest of the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, because one of my children is a solicitor.
I respond to the point that the Minister made about merit regardless of all. The whole point of the tipping amendment that we tabled to the courts Bill was to ensure that, where there were candidates of equal merit, it was permissible to choose a candidate who had a protected characteristic over an equally qualified candidate, in much the same way as happens in organisations across the land. That ought to be important.
Finally, I do not accuse the Minister of complacency. What she said plainly showed that the Government do care. However, I echo the words of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, in attacking this Bill for its failure to address the very real problems and make good the promise of modernisation of the courts in a comprehensive fashion. I know that the noble and learned Lord has told us that other legislation will follow on the modernisation of the courts, but there are real issues to address, and judicial diversity is one of them. Saying that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Chakrabarti
“( ) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.”
Baroness Chakrabarti
My Lords, currently the Bill provides that regulations under Clause 3 shall be made under the negative resolution procedure and then interact with rules of court to be made and come into force without the need for parliamentary scrutiny altogether. This stipulation of which judicial functions may be delegated and to whom, and an authorised person’s requisite qualifications or experience, is to be provided with quite light parliamentary scrutiny. I would be grateful to the noble and learned Lord or the noble Baroness if they would say a little more in their reply about the relationship between the regulations and the rules for those purposes.
Since the fall of the Prisons and Courts Bill last year, there has been no parliamentary scrutiny, even by the Justice Committee, of the Government’s ambitious programme of expensive modernisation measures or the associated court closures and staff cuts. By providing that regulations in the Bill be made under the negative resolution procedure, the Government seem once more to be seeking to avoid proper parliamentary scrutiny, even in relation to quite significant changes to our justice system.
At Second Reading, in response to similar concerns, the Minister said that,
“the purpose of primary legislation is to implement law, not to review that which we can already do”.—[Official Report, 20/6/18; col. 2053.]
On reflection, I respectfully disagree with that constitutional analysis. To my mind, the legislative process is to create law and certainly, at times, to review, direct and even constrain government policy, particularly when it has the potential profoundly to impact on our justice system. Without careful scrutiny and additional safeguards, this governmental drip feed may be capable of eroding some of our most fundamental institutions. I beg to move.
Lord Judge
My Lords, there should be an upgrade here, in accordance with the proposed amendment.
Lord Beith
My Lords, one of the things that might be reviewed is how the arrangements for delegating decisions work in the context—mentioned by my noble friend—of a large number of litigants in person. This number has increased since the withdrawal and limiting of legal aid. Court officials find themselves giving forms of advice to unrepresented litigants, if only to ensure that the court can proceed with the minimum of chaos and disruption. A clerk in a county court, for example, may simply remind the litigant of what the court needs to know in order to resolve a case and what would not be advantageous to spend lots of time on. That is a valuable function. Of course, legal advice can go far beyond that into areas on which it would be wholly inappropriate for a court official to give, or purport to give, advice. Wise officials make quite clear the limit of what they can say.
By whatever mechanism we review these provisions, whether it is that suggested in the amendment or the reasonably adequate existing ones offered by the Justice Select Committee and Constitution Committee, we should look at them in a context in which officials are being asked for advice or guidance by people who are not represented.
Lord Pannick
My Lords, I echo the words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. We are dealing here—at least potentially—with matters of significant constitutional concern. The power which the Secretary of State or Lord Chancellor is being given includes a power to make “consequential provision”. That is a very broad phrase: it is not merely transitional, or transitory or saving, it is consequential—something that is a consequence of that which is in the legislation. It is, therefore, entirely appropriate that this amendment should be approved by this House.
The Earl of Listowel (CB)
My Lords, on the matter of meeting the new challenge of litigants in person, particularly in the family courts, I highlight the value of the family, drug and alcohol court national unit. While the national unit supports these drug and alcohol courts for children in the public law system, the same judges—and I imagine the same clerks—also work in public family law. The wonderful thing about this unit is that it supports judges, clerks and the administration in family courts to become better at their job; better at managing these cases which are often very difficult and troubling.
So when the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, writes to me—I am grateful to him for his letter today on the matter of the Family Drug and Alcohol Court National Unit—and says that the responsibility is now passing down to local authorities, I hear what he says and understand why he says it. However, there is a distinct benefit to the judiciary and the courts in training them to be more effective in working with these families, particularly now that they are often litigants in person. I therefore hope that he may keep an open mind, and that perhaps he will be persuaded that some money should come from central government for this special national unit for supporting family drug and alcohol courts.
We have a challenge with regard to the many families in this country who are struggling to stay together or to manage amicably and effectively a separation with the least damage to their children. Having well-equipped judges and clerks in the courts to help this process is vital, and I suggest to the noble and learned Lord that this special national unit can help with that.
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, Amendment 3 relates to the power in Clause 3 for the Secretary of State to make consequential, transitional, transitory or saving provisions in relation to the authorised staff provisions by way of regulations. It provides that they are subject to a process of negative resolution by Parliament, while the amendment seeks to apply the affirmative resolution procedure.
We believe that it is necessary to take the power in Clause 3(2) to avoid any implementation difficulties or legislative inconsistencies that could arise from changing the law. We have already identified consequential amendments to primary legislation and have made provision for them in the Schedule to the Bill. The necessary changes to secondary legislation may not become apparent until after the provisions in the Bill are implemented; therefore, this power is needed so that the authorised staff provisions can be given full effect. However, I emphasise that it is not concerned with making consequential amendments to primary legislation, for which provision is already made in the Schedule, and so this is a narrow power. As I indicated, the power cannot be used to amend primary legislation, so in these circumstances we considered that the negative resolution procedure is entirely appropriate.
I hear what noble Lords and noble and learned Lords have said about moving from the negative to the affirmative procedure, and I will give further thought to that. However, at this stage I invite the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Chakrabarti
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister, and in particular to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for their kind encouragement. In the light of all that, I am happy at this stage to beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Chakrabarti
“( ) is a qualified solicitor, barrister or chartered legal executive with more than three years’ experience post-qualification, and”
Baroness Chakrabarti
My Lords, I will also speak to Amendments 6 and 7. These amendments in aggregate stipulate that authorised persons must have the following minimum legal qualifications: to be,
“a qualified solicitor, barrister or chartered legal executive with more than three years’ experience post-qualification”,
as recommended by the Law Society. Clause 3 delegates judicial functions to authorised staff, which must be understood in the broader context of the wider reform agenda and the austerity measures behind it. The savings generated through the proposed reforms will arise only through the reduction of the court estate, together with savings in judicial salaries. Further proposals include the relocation to new off-site service centres of many case management functions, listings and scheduling, which currently take place within court buildings with the benefit of on-site judicial supervision. The implication has to be that these off-site service centres will be supervised by authorised staff and not by judges. Concerns about that eventuality are hardly assuaged by the assurance in the related policy note that authorised staff will remain under the supervision of the judiciary if the judiciary are not on site.
The Earl of Listowel
My Lords, I understand that the purpose of the amendment is to ease the burden on the courts. In a statement last year, the President of the Family Division highlighted the ever-increasing burden on the public side of the family courts as the number of children taken into local authority care accelerates. This is an area of the courts that is experiencing a lot of pressure, and I just want to highlight to the noble and learned Lord and to the Committee that problem-solving courts can also be a good solution to the pressures on our courts. The family drug and alcohol courts are a good solution to reducing the pressure on the courts and might help to limit the use of the innovation to which the Schedule refers.
The founder of the family drug and alcohol courts, District Judge Nicholas Crichton, highlights that the problem-solving courts are much less adversarial and more solution based. For instance, one often finds with children being taken into care that a young, teenage mother addicted to drugs and alcohol will have one child and that child will be removed. She will promptly have another child, and then another child, and each one will be removed. However, if one treats the mother’s addiction and gets her off alcohol and drugs, which the family drug and alcohol court is good at doing, she may well stick with the one child or the second child, and this eases the burden on the public family courts. I recognise that the Schedule seeks to deal with the heavy burden on our courts. I encourage the Minister to look carefully at developments in this area and to consider problem-solving courts as another way of dealing with this issue.
The family drug and alcohol courts highlight the value of the achievement of District Judge Nicholas Crichton in introducing them. The Government have generously funded them from the beginning, through both the Department for Education and the Ministry of Justice, and it is highly commendable that they have invested in this important new approach to keeping families together and stopping children from being removed into local authority care unnecessarily.
Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury
My Lords, the noble Baroness is right to be concerned about the expertise and experience of the people who make decisions. My concern about the amendment is that it puts a potential straitjacket on the ability to appoint the appropriate people to make appropriate decisions. There will be many decisions where people with her requisite experience would be appropriate, but there will be others where less experience would be adequate for the decision-making.
Given that the rules which will set out the requirements will have to be laid before Parliament, and that many of the decisions outside the rules are made, effectively, by the Lord Chief Justice, while what the noble Baroness said has considerable force in some circumstances, it would unsatisfactorily reduce the flexibility of these proposals. They are largely not concerned with the problems of judicial recruitment which have been canvassed in the House today—which any self-respecting former judge, such as myself, is concerned about—but, none the less, the proposals in the amendment would unduly constrain the flexibility which the measures in the Schedule sensibly envisage.
Lord Keen of Elie
I am obliged to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, the noble Earl and the noble and learned Lord for their contributions.
There are two strands to this group of amendments, and it is important to differentiate between them at the outset. Amendments 5 and 6 relate to the qualifications for staff providing legal advice; Amendment 7 relates to the qualifications for staff exercising judicial functions. For those staff authorised to provide legal advice to judges at the family court and magistrates, the measures in this Bill replace existing statutory provision for legal advice to be provided by justices’ clerks and assistant clerks. In future, the function of giving legal advice will be exercised by a member of court or tribunal staff authorised by the Lord Chief Justice, or at least a party nominated by him.
Currently, there are different provisions governing the qualifications required of justices’ clerks and assistant clerks. The qualifications required of justices’ clerks are set out in statute. Those for assistant clerks, however, are provided in regulations made by the Lord Chancellor under the powers in Section 27 of the Courts Act 2003. Broadly, an assistant clerk must be a barrister in England and Wales, or a solicitor of the senior courts of England and Wales, or have passed the necessary exams for either of those professions, or have qualified as a legal adviser under historical rules that were in place prior to 1999. The vast majority of legal advice is currently provided by assistant justices’ clerks.
The position in the Bill is that the qualifications required for staff to be authorised to provide legal advice to justices of the peace and family court judges will also be specified by the Lord Chancellor in regulations, and the regulations must be made with the agreement of the Lord Chief Justice, which provides a further important check on this power. The Government take the view that regulations will provide a flexible and proportionate approach to establishing the right qualifications for those authorised staff providing legal advice to judges of the family court and magistrates. I note the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, about avoiding a straitjacket so far as these matters are concerned.
I understand the desire of the noble Baroness to see more detail of how our proposals will work in practice. In order to assist the debate on this matter, yesterday we published a draft of the regulations setting out the qualifications for those authorised staff giving legal advice. These regulations broadly reflect the legal qualifications currently required by assistant clerks, with the important addition of fellows of the Chartered Institute of Legal Executives or those who have passed the necessary examinations to be a CILEx fellow. While the Government do not envisage that the regulation-making power will need to be exercised regularly, it would allow us to reflect any developments in the legal profession as to qualifications required to practise. The addition of CILEx fellows is an example of where this flexibility might well be needed.
I should add that Amendments 5 and 6 would impose a much stricter requirement than the current arrangements. Some of our legal advisers qualified through a scheme which has not been available since 1999 and which did not result in qualification as solicitors, barristers or fellows of the Chartered Institute of Legal Executives. In addition, those who have completed the necessary examinations to become barristers in England and Wales or solicitors may become assistant clerks. The current practice works well and demonstrates that assistant clerks are appropriately qualified and experienced for the role they undertake, and we intend to retain these provisions in the new regulations. However, the approach taken by Amendments 5 and 6 would exclude some of our best and most experienced legal advisers. That, I would suggest, cannot be right. I want to be very clear about the Government’s intention. Legal advice will continue to be provided by authorised court and tribunal staff with appropriate legal qualifications as it is now. The draft regulations, which we have published, seek to confirm this.
Turning now to Amendment 7, as I have said, the powers in Clause 3 and the Schedule are not entirely new. For example, in the First-tier Tribunal and Upper Tribunal there is already a power for rules to provide for the exercise of judicial functions by staff. The most basic functions, such as issuing standard directions at the commencement of a case, can be carried out in some tribunal jurisdictions by authorised staff with no legal qualifications. Slightly more complex functions, such as applications for postponements of hearings, extensions of time, withdrawals and reinstatements, can be undertaken by caseworkers who have legal qualifications. The most complex of the delegated functions, such as the consideration of late appeals, are generally reserved to registrars who are legally qualified and have legal experience. It is not necessary for all authorised staff exercising judicial functions to possess legal qualifications, as many will be carrying out routine, straightforward tasks. Where powers currently exist, rule committees are already used to determining the qualifications needed for staff to exercise particular functions, and this works well. Again I note the observations of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, about not placing these matters into an unnecessary straitjacket.
The Bill will allow the relevant procedure rule committees to set requirements relating to the necessary qualifications or experience of such staff. The committees are best placed to assess these requirements for their jurisdictions in light of the functions that they are authorising staff to exercise. As a further safeguard, a member of staff will not be able to exercise judicial functions until they have been authorised to do so by the Lord Chief Justice or his nominee, or by the Senior President of Tribunals or his delegate. Authorisations are therefore ultimately the responsibility of the judiciary, and they will not authorise staff unless satisfied as regards their competence.
As with Amendments 5 and 6, setting the qualifications bar as high as in Amendment 7 would rule out a large proportion of courts staff from exercising judicial functions, even though they might have been doing so for a number of years. Such a loss of expertise would render the provisions in Clause 3 and in the Schedule essentially unworkable. Based on that explanation, I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, will feel able not to press her amendment.
Baroness Chakrabarti
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for that. I certainly do not seek to place a straitjacket on reasonable management of the court system, but I am still concerned about the breadth of this power to delegate judicial functions in particular. These amendments, which are probing at this stage, are all of a piece. In the light of the further debate to come, for the time being I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Chakrabarti
“( ) No authorisation under subsection (2) shall include the power to—(a) make an order of the court which is opposed by one or more party,(b) make any order of the court in a civil claim with a value of more than £25,000,(c) make any order of the court with a penal notice or power of arrest,(d) make any order of the court in a matter in which one or more parties lack capacity as defined in section 2(1) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005,(e) make any order of the court in a matter in which one or more witnesses are a vulnerable witness as defined in section 16(1) of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999,(f) make any order of the court under section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 for an injunction, including any freezing order,(g) make any order of the court, referred to as a “search order”, under section 7 of the Civil Procedure Act 1997,(h) make any order of the court as to costs,(i) make any order of the court concerning expert evidence,(j) take a plea from a defendant in criminal proceedings, or(k) make any other determination which is dispositive of the cause.”
Baroness Chakrabarti
My Lords, in moving Amendment 8, I will speak to Amendment 10. Once more, these amendments would place restrictions in the Bill as to what type of function will be permitted to be delegated to authorised persons. The previous amendments were about who might be an authorised person. The restrictions this time include that no authorisation,
“shall include the power to … make an order of the court which is opposed by one or more party … make any order of the court in a civil claim with a value of more than £25,000 … make any order of the court with a penal notice or power of arrest”.
The stated intent of the policy of delegating judicial powers is to improve the efficiency of the courts service by diverting judges’ time from routine administrative tasks to allow them to focus their time and expertise on more complex and significant matters. However, there must be reasonable limits to what powers can be given to authorised persons who are not judges. Without those limits, we have a power that has the potential to change the essential nature of our judicial system. I am sure that this is not the Government’s intention, but we need to construct this power for future Governments of whatever stripe because significant judicial power should be exercised by judges.
While it is almost impossible to create a definitive or exhaustive list of appropriate judicial functions for the delegations that will cover every tribunal and eventuality, it is reasonable to expect some red lines and limits relating to the most significant decisions and exercise of power. It does not seem unreasonable to ask that Parliament have an opportunity to set out a framework for such delegation and to exclude decisions that deprive an individual of their liberty or of life-changing sums of money for most people, and decisions that parties have contested or those involving vulnerable witnesses or people lacking mental capacity.
Other provisions in the amendment provide a mop-up of what might provide a red line around a decision which could dispose of a matter altogether. Lord Briggs drew such a line in his civil court structure review, at caseworkers making dispositive decisions, which he saw essentially as a judicial role. All delegated functions in the civil jurisdiction are routine case management functions and are often confined to cases where all parties consent. Legal advisers do not currently make decisions that represent a final determination and a party may request reconsideration of any decision of a legal adviser within 14 days of being served notice of it. Are these not therefore reasonable restrictions to place on delegated functions in the context of criminal proceedings, where so much is potentially at stake? The MoJ’s own factsheet on delegation to staff says that delegated decisions are unlikely to involve contested matters. Why not put such a reasonable restriction in the Bill, given that many case management decisions are potentially important judicial functions that should not be delegated?
In addition to concerns about transparency, there is a danger that efficiencies gained by delegating case management decisions will be lost if the court then has to reconsider such decisions at a later stage in the process. Further, if one accepts the case for the limited delegation of some of the most straightforward decisions to such authorised staff, one has to raise concerns that these relatively low-paid staff—HMCTS staff being paid less than other government lawyers—are being used to save money without proper remuneration for their increased workload. I beg to move.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, I have some sympathy with two of the new paragraphs proposed in the amendments. I have sympathy with those relating to orders of the tribunal or the court with a penal notice or power of arrest. I have some sympathy, too, with the restriction on the power of a court to make an order under Section 37 of the Senior Courts Act for an injunction, including any freezing order, and the corresponding power for the tribunal.
I am afraid that is as far as my support goes for the noble Baroness’s amendment, because all the other powers may be entirely trivial. In particular, the noble Baroness places reliance on the idea that a contested order should not be made. Some contested orders are unbelievably trivial. If I seek a 14-day extension for the service of my defence and the other side says that I should do it in seven, and the authorised person says, “Well, you can have 10”, the idea that he or she should not have the power to make that order is wrong.
One has to leave it to the good sense of the rule committees to decide where it is sensible that such restrictions should be drawn. Injunctions are in a different category and where the liberty of the individual is at stake we have a different category, but otherwise I am afraid I cannot support the amendments.
Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury
My Lords, I applaud the noble Baroness’s concerns, which, as in the previous amendments, are directed towards ensuring that the high standards of justice in this country are maintained.
I echo to a considerable extent what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Marks. However, in the end, these are matters for the rule committee. There are two protected factors: one is that nothing can be done without it being in the rules, and the second is that the Lord Chief Justice needs to give his or her authorisation to the person who makes the decision. The other amendment concerns the Senior President of Tribunals. With the rules, there is the protection of them having to be laid before Parliament, and therefore any restrictions of the sort that the noble Baroness wishes to put forward would have to be considered by the rule committee. If they were not in the rules, and this House felt that they should be, this House would then have an opportunity to see what was said and why. I again suggest that these matters are best left to the rule committee. As the noble Lord has indicated, there is clearly room for disagreement over which items and categories should be included and what should not be included. That is best left to the rule committee and, in due course, to the Lord Chief Justice.
Baroness Vere of Norbiton
My Lords, I thank all contributors to this short debate. These amendments seek to place in the Bill a list of functions that authorised staff would not be permitted to undertake. I ask the same question that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, asked at Second Reading: do we really want to put such restrictions—which he described as a fetter on the administration of justice—in this Bill? An example would be the proposal to prevent authorised officers making orders that are opposed by one or more party. I accept that there will be circumstances in which it could be inappropriate for an authorised member of staff to adjudicate on such a matter. However, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks, pointed out, where, for example, the parties to a case are simply disagreeing about a date on which a hearing should be set, should it not be possible for an authorised member of staff to deal with this under the supervision of a judge?
I fully understand the intention behind these amendments and recognise the importance of ensuring that adequate safeguards are in place. Our provisions ensure that the judicial functions that authorised staff may or may not exercise will be subject to appropriate scrutiny by experts, generally in the form of the procedure rule committees. The Bill will also ensure that, where staff are authorised to provide legal advice or to exercise judicial functions, they are suitably experienced and qualified. It is important to recognise that the concept of authorised staff performing judicial functions is not a new one for courts and tribunals. Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service staff can already be authorised to exercise the jurisdiction of almost every court or tribunal, up to and including the High Court and Upper Tribunal. Rule committees already have experience in deciding the functions that such staff may exercise.
I remind noble Lords that the purpose of these provisions is to increase the efficiency of our courts by allowing authorised staff to undertake a wider range of functions under the supervision of judges, so that judges themselves are free to deal with the more complex matters before them. This amendment would not only place unnecessary limitations on what we could achieve in this area but undermine the progress that we have already made. For example, justices’ clerks and assistant justices’ clerks currently make cost orders and search orders in appropriate cases. They also make orders for special measures for vulnerable defendants, victims and witnesses giving evidence, such as the use of video links and screens. They carry out these tasks efficiently and effectively.
The Bill provisions build on the existing process for assignment of judicial responsibilities in a sensible and proportionate way, and will allow authorised staff to carry out judicial functions in the Crown Court for the first time. Staff will be authorised by the Lord Chief Justice or his nominee and will work under the supervision of the judiciary. The Bill puts decision-making as to which functions may or may not be exercised by authorised staff in the right hands: the procedure rule committees. Here, the powers can be properly scrutinised by judges, practitioners and other interested parties. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, spoke powerfully about his own experience of chairing the Criminal Procedure Rule Committee, the expertise of the committee and the fact that it always managed to reach consensus. The judiciary is ultimately responsible for authorising court and tribunal staff to exercise such functions and, as is currently the case, it will do so only if satisfied as to their competence. As pointed out by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, procedure rules are also subject to parliamentary scrutiny via the negative resolution procedure, which provides an additional check on these provisions. In the light of the reasons I have set out, I hope the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, will withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Chakrabarti
My Lords, I am once again grateful to the Minister and to other noble Lords for engaging in the argument for the amendments. I fully understand that this is all about efficiency, but that is not completely reassuring in the context of the biggest cuts to any department, even in a time of significant austerity.
I fear that the public outside this Palace think of the adjudication of contested matters in a court as a judicial function. That is the general perception of the public of what happens when there is a dispute between parties in the courts. It does not seem unreasonable to suggest, for example, that only a judge should be responsible in court for depriving someone of their liberty, or indeed, for making orders involving large sums of money. Noble Lords will forgive me for saying that even some of the more trivial decisions referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, could be far less than trivial in a given context. I am being offered the reassurance of the procedure rule committee, but delegating judicial functions to non-judges is not a matter of mere procedure.
I am afraid that I feel this is a question of principle, to which we may have to return again on Report. But for the time being, at least, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Chakrabarti
“67BA Right to judicial reconsideration of decision made by an authorised personA party to any decision made by an authorised person in the execution of the person’s duty as an authorised person exercising a relevant judicial function, by virtue of section 67B(1), may apply in writing, within 14 days of the service of the order, to have the decision reconsidered by a judge of the relevant court within 14 days from the date of application.”
Baroness Chakrabarti
My Lords, in moving Amendment 9, I shall also speak to Amendment 11, both of which have been drafted by the Bar Council. The amendments will ensure that a,
“party to any decision made by an authorised person in the execution of … a relevant judicial function”,
or, “of a tribunal”,
“by virtue of section 67B(1)”,
or,
“by virtue of paragraph 3 of Schedule 5”,
respectively,
“may apply in writing, within 14 days of the service of the order, to have the decision reconsidered by a judge of the relevant court within 14 days from the date of application”.
The statutory right of reconsideration sits alongside the other amendments we have been discussing to create some constraint on this delegation of judicial function to non-judges. That approach would allow any,
“party to a decision made by an authorised person … to have the decision reconsidered by a judge”,
as recommended by Lord Justice Briggs in his 2016 report, Civil Courts Structure Review. He said:
“The creation of an extensive right to have the decisions of Case Officers reconsidered by a judge has from the outset been regarded as the natural safety valve for concerns about what was … described as the delegation of judicial functions to persons who are not judges”.
As a minimum safeguard, the right of reconsideration has the benefit of freeing an authorised person from the obligation to produce detailed reasons for every decision, as would be the case if a right of appeal were created. It has the additional benefit of going further than a right of review, guaranteeing judicial oversight of the decision, which a right of review would not ensure.
The statutory right would also ensure compliance with Article 6 of the Convention on Human Rights, which requires decisions by an independent and impartial person. I beg to move.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, I fully support the noble Baroness’s Amendments 9 and 11. It seems to me that the Bar Council is absolutely right to draw a distinction between the nature of rules specifying what decisions can be made by authorised persons and the question of whether such decisions made by authorised persons should be subject to a review.
The noble and learned Lord was good enough to circulate to us not only the draft statutory instrument that he mentioned but the policy statement in support of it. It is quite clear that the procedure rule committees will be responsible for making the decision as to what decisions should be made by authorised persons: that is, the Criminal Procedure Rule Committee, the Family Procedure Rule Committee and the Civil Procedure Rule Committee. Of course, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, is right to point out that those rule committees make rules that are both subject to scrutiny by Parliament and subject to approval by the Lord Chief Justice. However, that does not have a bearing on the question of whether decisions, once made, should be reviewable.
I commend these two amendments because they set a simple and short time limit of 14 days for making the application for review, and a further 14 days only for the decision upon that review. Furthermore, I believe that there is some benefit to be gained from uniformity, so that all such decisions made by authorised persons are subject to the same time limits and the same procedure. It seems to me that to have different rules for different types of decisions would be a mistake.
I would of course expect that, in due course, the review provisions would be implemented by applying a test that the decision of an authorised person would be overturned only if it was outwith the range of reasonable responses to the question posed to the authorised person—the traditional appellate test, rather than a fundamental review test. Subject to that, it seems to me that to give an authorised person an unappealable, unreviewable power to make what will sometimes be very important decisions, even if they are sanctioned by the rules, would be going too far. So I support these amendments.
Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury
My Lords, I have considerable sympathy with these amendments, in the sense that, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has said, the idea of a decision being made by a non-judicial person and not being referable to a judicial figure is inconsistent with justice. Whether it is right to provide in such clear terms, and such uncompromising general terms, for the circumstances and requirements for such an appeal seems to me, again, to be questionable. While I absolutely see the requirement for a right of appeal, I would have thought that, again, it would be better to leave it to the rule committee, which, as the noble Baroness has said, consists of experienced people from all aspects of the justice system.
Having chaired the Civil Procedure Rule Committee for three years, I can say, as has been quoted in relation to its criminal equivalent by my noble and learned friend Lord Thomas, that considerable care is given to ensure that all the requirements of justice are met. It is very rare, if ever, that I can remember a decision being arrived at which was not arrived at by consensus. To my mind, in those circumstances, while it is essential that there is this right, it is a right whose details should be worked out, at any rate, by the rule committee—the rules of which, as I have said, sounding like a scratched record, are put to the House.
Lord Keen of Elie
Again, I am obliged to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, and other noble Lords for their contributions on this matter. Of course, the purpose of the amendments is to give a party in a case the right to request in writing that any decision of an authorised person exercising the functions of a court or tribunal be considered afresh by a judge.
The Schedule to the Bill ensures that the functions of a court or judge that authorised staff may exercise will be determined, and be given appropriate scrutiny, by experts in the form of the independent procedure rule committees. The purpose of these provisions is to enable authorised staff to undertake straightforward case management and preparation duties, thereby freeing up judges to focus on more complex and contentious matters. We are not proposing that these officeholders will undertake, for example, the determination of the final outcome in a contested case. It is our view that a statutory right set out in the Bill to have any decision made by an authorised person considered afresh by a judge would be inappropriate and disproportionate.
I have some sympathy with the intention behind the amendments and the desire to provide protections for court users. Our view, which I believe is reflected in the observations of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, is that a decision about whether a right to reconsideration is needed should be left to the experts on the rule committees who are best placed to understand the circumstances in which a review mechanism may be required in their particular jurisdictions. It is not a case of one size fits all. To that extent, I would take issue with the observations of the noble Lord, Lord Marks. The committees should also consider any appropriate time limits for review and the way in which any application should be made. Again, that is essentially a matter for the committees.
These provisions already exist in our procedure rules. Practice Direction 2E of the Civil Procedure Rules makes express provision for review in civil money claims of a decision by a legal adviser. Under the tribunals procedure, in accordance with Rule 4(3) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, there may be a review of a decision made by a caseworker. In the magistrates’ court, there is provision for an application to be renewed before the magistrates where it has been dealt with previously by a caseworker. In the Crown Court, there is an inherent jurisdiction to hear such applications at the time of an appropriate hearing. I seek to emphasise that there is a diversity of approaches, all of which generally apply their mind to the question of the review of the decision of a caseworker, and those reflect the views of the relevant rule committee as to what is appropriate for the particular tribunal, court or level of court. That is what we feel should be left open and which would be lost by this amendment.
I go back to an observation that was made earlier, quoting the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, at Second Reading, that,
“detailed restrictions on procedure are a very real fetter on the administration of justice”.—[Official Report, 20/6/18; col. 2039.]
That is what we want to free up here. It is appropriate that these decisions should be made by the procedure rule committees. I hope that in the light of those observations, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, will see fit to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Chakrabarti
Once more, I am grateful to the Minister and other noble Lords for engaging with this argument. I do not wish to bore your Lordships’ with this, but there are some really serious concerns at play. I am told to be reassured by the rule committees, and of course I hold the rule committees in enormous esteem, but the rule committees cannot provide the funding that would avoid pressure to overdelegate to underqualified people in the future. When I raise these concerns, I am told that I must not worry because of the rule committees.
My second concern is that the public have a real and reasonable expectation that significant contested decisions in a court will be made by a judge; or, if not, at least that there would be a right of appeal or review before a judge. In the light of the repeated reassurances in the context of different attempts to constrain delegation in the Bill, we will have to return to this issue on Report. For the time being, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Bill [HL]
Tuesday 16th October 2018
(6 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Act 2018 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 108-R-I Marshalled list for Report (PDF) - (12 Oct 2018)
16:55 - Division on Amendment 8 - Ayes: 146 / Noes: 236 - Amendment 8 disagreed.
Baroness Chakrabarti
“( ) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.”
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, I believe we have some settled agreement in your Lordships’ House on the constitutional system we serve, which is still much admired around the world. In that system, notwithstanding the peculiarities of your Lordships’ revising House, accountable primary legislators make our laws and independent judges apply them.
I fear that we have been lulled into a false sense of security on this so-called mouse of a Bill. We have been encouraged to wave it through your Lordships’ House without much of a squeak, but I fear none the less that it breaches the crucial distinction I just attempted to set out. It attempts to sneak through principal changes that, in my view, constitute a double delegation of legislative powers to unaccountable judges by way of the procedure rule committee—and ultimately not even to judges because in my experience, government lawyers will draft those rules, which will pass on the rule committee without much by way of amendment.
Secondly, judicial powers are to be delegated to non-independent courts and tribunal staff. The procedure rule committee is primarily made up of senior judges. That would ensure relatively little external public scrutiny of this delegation of judicial functions to non-judicial staff, to employees of Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service. It is vital that Clause 3, which delegates judicial functions to authorised staff, is understood in the context of a much wider court reform agenda, and the significant austerity measures—because austerity is not quite over yet—that sit behind this.
Efficiencies generated by the proposed reforms will arise not only through the reduction of the court estate but through savings on judicial salaries. The Government’s Queen’s Speech promised a programme of reforms that would transform the way the United Kingdom justice system operates. Unlike last year’s Prisons and Courts Bill, which dealt with these proposed reforms head on, the courts and tribunals Bill is the beginning of a slower legislative drip-feed process. There has been no adequate parliamentary scrutiny of this broad programme of expensive modernising measures—even by the Justice Committee—nor indeed of the associated court closures and staff cuts.
The Bill currently provides that regulations under Clause 3 shall be made under a negative resolution procedure. This would allow for new rules of court stipulating which judicial functions may be delegated and to whom, and an authorised person’s requisite qualifications or experience to take on those judicial functions. As the Bill stands, this delegation will come into force without any real parliamentary scrutiny. By providing that the regulations in the Bill be made under the negative resolution procedure, the Government are once again seeking to avoid proper scrutiny by democratically mandated legislatures, principally the other place. This amendment, supported by the Bar Council, attempts to ensure more constitutionally appropriate accountability and scrutiny, through at least the affirmative resolution procedure, of the potentially sweeping regulations to be made under Clause 3. Those regulations concern powers to make rules stipulating which judicial functions may be delegated and to whom, alongside appropriate stipulations regarding the qualifications or experience required before this member of the administration—potentially quite a junior member of Whitehall staff—be given these judicial functions.
As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, who I see in his place, pointed out in Committee:
“The power which the Secretary of State or Lord Chancellor is being given”,
under the clause,
“includes a power to make ‘consequential provision’”.—[Official Report, 10/7/18; col. 878.]
Despite the Government’s promise to give further consideration to the issue during the previous debate, they seem to have offered only the assurance that the power will be limited to changes to statutory instruments. If that is the assurance, why should it not appear in the primary legislation? As a legislator, that seems an assurance worth having.
At Second Reading, the Minister said in response to concerns expressed about the lack of consultation and scrutiny of this ambitious reform programme that,
“the purpose of primary legislation is to implement law, not to review that which we can already do”.—[Official Report, 20/6/18; col. 2053.]
I once more respectfully disagree with that constitutional analysis, for to my mind the role of the legislative process is most certainly in part to review government policy and to restrain executive action, particularly when that policy has the potential—just the potential—profoundly to impact on our justice system. Without careful scrutiny and additional safeguards, the Government’s drip-feed might erode some of our most fundamental institutions and our understanding of the rule of law. The safeguards that we are calling for on the powers created by this Bill are not unreasonable, or seeking to wreck the fundamental notion of reasonable delegation of non-contentious administrative functions. They are minimal if we consider that provisions in this so-called uncontroversial Bill have the potential profoundly to impact on our justice system. The relatively unrestrained double delegation of legislative and judicial powers that the Bill encourages is a slippery constitutional slope that we can, and ought to, resist.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, since Committee on 10 July there have been meetings and extensive correspondence with the noble and learned Lord’s department. The question arises on this amendment as to what is the ambit of the power. If it were as described by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, one would have considerable sympathy with the amendment—indeed, I do have sympathy with it, but it needs a little more analysis.
When serving on the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, as I did for some years, we were astute always in not ruling out a negative resolution procedure in cases where the power was strictly limited, but insisting on an affirmative resolution where it was not. In the analysis that we have conducted I have been very grateful to the Bill team, and in particular to the Bill manager, Dominic Smales, for the careful and thorough way in which he in particular responded to my persistent and probably rather troubling questioning. What has concerned me is Clause 3(1), to which the noble Baroness referred, which states:
“The Schedule provides for authorised court and tribunal staff”—
it is subsection (b) that worries me—
“to exercise judicial functions where procedure rules so provide”.
The phrase,
“where procedure rules so provide”,
is important.
Lord Judge (CB)
My Lords, it is very geeky to wonder whether secondary legislation amending a schedule should be affirmative or negative. It is rather like a storm in an egg-cup. But there is rather an important issue here. If I may for present purposes adopt what my noble and learned friend has recently said rather than repeat it, the issue that troubles me about this is in the Schedule itself. It makes very clear provision for the Lord Chief Justice to have various responsibilities. He may authorise a person to do this; he may do that; he may nominate the other, and so on. The whole Schedule contains a series of powers and responsibilities vested in the Lord Chief Justice.
The Schedule also includes a number of provisions which expressly say that the Lord Chancellor may not interfere in the exercise of these powers, for which, on page 11, new Section 67C provides a perfect example. I shall not burden the House by going through all the provisions. My concern is that it is not at all clear from the Bill that the Lord Chief Justice is to be consulted, let alone asked for his concurrence, with any of these proposed changes—and the proposed changes relate to issues over which the Lord Chancellor now has no statutory authority.
Since the changes—I shall use the word advisedly—in 2003, 2004 and 2005, the Lord Chancellor has ceased to be head of the judiciary. He no longer has any of the functions that former Lord Chancellors used to have. All those responsibilities are vested in the current Lord Chief Justice and, in relation to tribunals, the Senior President of Tribunals. Suddenly, there is a clear danger that, by exercising the powers given in Clause 3(3), the Lord Chancellor may seek at some stage in the future to transfer back to the Lord Chancellor powers that have been vested in the Lord Chief Justice.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, we are dealing here with a very sensitive subject: that of authorising court and tribunal staff to exercise judicial functions. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, emphasised that the question may well be the scope of the Clause 3(2) power to make consequential provision. I am still puzzled as to why the Minister says that it is a power only to amend subordinate legislation, because that is not what it says. It states:
“The Secretary of State or Lord Chancellor may, by regulations made by statutory instrument, make consequential … provision”—
that is the part that concerns me—
“in relation to the Schedule”.
I understand the Minister seeking to reassure the House, as he sought to reassure the Committee, that the power may be validly used only to amend subordinate legislation, but I would welcome an explanation as to why that is so.
The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)
My Lords, I am obliged for all the contributions that have been made with regard to this matter. Your Lordships will be aware that the power in Clause 3 allows the Secretary of State to make consequential, transitional, transitory or saving provisions in relation to certain provisions for staff by way of regulations.
I say immediately that I am most obliged to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, because it would appear that we are being briefed by the same Bill team. That is hardly a surprise, but I am in a position to say that he has eloquently and clearly expounded the rationale for these provisions being in the Bill. I accept his point about how they are intended to operate as set out between Clause 3 and the schedule.
The power that we are talking about is constructed narrowly, both in regard to the nature of the amendments that it provides for and being in respect only of secondary, rather than primary, legislation. However, there seems to be some confusion about the extent of the provision. Perhaps noble Lords will allow me briefly to explain the interaction between the substantive power in paragraph 32 of the schedule and the consequential power in Clause 3(2).
The key substantive power in paragraph 32 is that the rules of court may provide for the exercise of judicial functions by authorised court and tribunal staff. It will therefore be the procedure rules that set out the details of which functions authorised staff may exercise, the qualifications and experience that they may require and any specific right of reconsideration should the relevant rule committee consider that one is needed. Rules are made by independent committees to govern procedure within courts and tribunals. All rules are made by statutory instrument subject to negative resolution in Parliament.
However, the procedure rules cannot be used to make all the necessary amendments to other secondary legislation, such as consequential changes to remove references within existing secondary legislation—I take as an example those to “justices’ clerks”, which will become redundant once these provisions are in force. For that, we will use regulations under Clause 3(2), which will in turn be subject to the negative resolution procedure. We could not use this consequential power to make substantive provision in relation to judicial functions.
Further, I refer to the width of the provision itself. The concept of an amendment that is consequential, transitional, transitory or saving is well understood, with many precedents. I should note that these terms are construed strictly by the courts. The power in Clause 3 is a narrow power so, although the rules may provide for a wide variety of functions to be exercised by authorised staff, it does not follow that the consequential power has wide application. In our case, this power is needed principally, as I say, to amend references in secondary legislation from, for example, “justices’ clerk” to “authorised officer”. So far, I think that we have identified about 200 references in over 60 pieces of secondary legislation that would need amendment; there may be more.
I come to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, as to which legislation may be amended. It is normal practice in legislation to say expressly when a power is to be used to amend primary legislation. The Government have no intention of using this power to amend primary legislation, so there is no express provision for such amendments in Clause 3. We have identified consequential amendments to primary legislation for these provisions, which are provided for in the schedule. We do not need, or seek, any further power to amend primary legislation in the Bill.
In drafting the Bill, we thought carefully about the extent of the power in Clause 3(2). The Prisons and Courts Bill, from which the clauses originated, included powers to make consequential provision and for such powers to be able to be used to amend primary as well as secondary legislation. As we have now identified the consequential changes needed, as I say, we do not intend to make any further changes to primary legislation. In drafting Clause 3, there was therefore no inclusion of the express provision to make such changes to primary legislation.
I am happy to give noble Lords an undertaking in Hansard that the power in the Bill will not be used to amend primary legislation. If a future Government attempted to do so, I would expect the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments to bring this to the attention of Members of both Houses. I am content to give that undertaking without qualification, for the purposes of Hansard.
Lord Pannick
Can the noble and learned Lord not merely give the House an assurance that the Government do not intend to use the power to amend primary legislation but also tell the House that the Government’s intention and understanding is that the scope of this power in Clause 3 is such that it could not validly be used for that purpose?
Lord Keen of Elie
I endeavoured to set that point out in my previous observations, but I am happy to repeat them. If the Government’s intention had been to seek the power to amend primary legislation then, in accordance with precedent and court decisions on interpretation, they would have included the express power to do so in Clause 3, as they did in the Prisons and Courts Bill. There is no intention of doing that and they have not included that power. I do not consider that such a power is available to the Government, in light of the way in which Clause 3 is carefully framed, so I have no difficulty with that.
The provisions that we have now made within the Bill for dealing with this by way of the negative procedure found approval with the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which is of course charged with reporting on such provisions. It noted in its 29th report that there was nothing in the Bill to which it wished to draw the attention of the House. I am aware that in the past the Magistrates’ Association raised a point similar to that raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, but I understand that once we—by which I mean the Bill managers—had explained the position, as they did to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, it withdrew its concerns because it appreciated the narrow scope of this provision. With that explanation, I hope that the noble Baroness will see fit to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Chakrabarti
I am grateful to the Minister for his answer and to other noble Lords for their interventions, particularly the comments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I set out my broad concerns about the Bill, but I want to be distinct about this amendment in particular. I think that it was worth asking the Minister to set out in some detail not only the Government’s intentions in relation to this power but their view of the power, what they are able and not able to do and the fact that they are not able under this power to amend primary legislation. With that firm statement of belief on the law around this power and the intention, I am grateful to the Minister and happy to beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Chakrabarti
“Review of the delegation of legal advice and judicial functions to authorised staff
(1) Within the period of three years from the coming into force of this Act, the Lord Chancellor must arrange for a review to be undertaken on the impact of the implementation of the provisions contained within section 3 and the Schedule to this Act.(2) A report setting out the findings of the review must be laid before both Houses of Parliament.”
Baroness Chakrabarti
My Lords, this amendment would ensure that within three years of the coming into force of the Act the Lord Chancellor must arrange for a review of the impact of the implementation of its provisions, including provisions within what would by then be Section 3 and the Schedule. The report would have to be laid before both Houses of Parliament. We should bear in mind the potential perils of justice reforms without sufficient research, consultation and subsequent evaluation.
I hope noble Lords will forgive me reminding your Lordships’ House of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. The Public Accounts Committee made clear that, in bringing forward that legislation, the Ministry of Justice had not properly assessed the full impact of those reforms. That impact has proved devasting for some of the most vulnerable in our society who, as a result of that reform and those cuts, have almost been shut out altogether from the legal aid system of which we were once so very proud.
We are still awaiting the much-anticipated review of the operation of LASPO required after three to five years of implementation in 2013. The hope for the many thousands of people who have been locked out of our justice system due to the withdrawal of legal aid is that a sober assessment of LASPO might precipitate reform and recognition of the need to reverse some of the more destructive elements of that legislation. The Bach commission report—conducted by my noble friend Lord Bach—made many recommendations for reform, but we continue to wait for the Government to deliver on that statutory obligation to review and report.
The fact that the LASPO review has been delayed makes such mechanisms no less vital. For the same reasons of accountability and adequate evaluation of reform, we are seeking to ensure that this Government are obliged to assess and report on the impact of the reforms to our court system proposed by the Bill. The Bar Council has also expressed support for this amendment. I beg to move.
Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)
My Lords, this amendment would require the Lord Chancellor to arrange a review of the impact of the authorised staff provisions within a period of three years of the Act coming into force. As the impact assessment for these measures states, we will work closely with the rule committees and the senior judiciary to monitor the impact of any future assignment of functions and responsibilities to authorised staff. HM Courts & Tribunals Service is also committed to evaluating and testing the impacts of the reforms to courts and tribunals.
As noble Lords will be aware, the majority of the authorised staff provisions in the Bill are not new. Within the civil and tribunals jurisdictions, and in the magistrates’ courts and family court, staff can already be authorised to undertake a variety of judicial case management responsibilities. The exercise of judicial functions by staff is already kept under review. For example, earlier this year HMCTS conducted a review of the work of tribunal caseworkers two years after the role was created. We would expect the rule committees and the senior judiciary to continue to keep these provisions under review across the jurisdictions as they feel necessary, drawing on their relevant expertise to do so. We would expect the rule committee meeting minutes where authorised staff are discussed to be published where it is in the public interest to do so.
Where we are extending these provisions to a new jurisdiction—namely, the Crown Court—we expect the Criminal Procedure Rules Committee to conduct a review along the lines of those undertaken in other jurisdictions. It is right that the committee conducts the review; it is independent of government and its membership includes judges, lawyers who practise regularly in criminal courts and representatives of voluntary organisations with a direct interest in the work of the criminal courts. It is therefore very well placed.
The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, asked for more information about recent reforms. We are already committed to evaluating and testing the impact of our wider package of reforms to the courts and tribunals system. That evaluation will be published in due course.
The amendment is at best an unnecessary duplication of effort and resources. I hope I have been able to provide the noble Baroness with the appropriate assurance that the authorised staff provisions will continue to be kept under review in all jurisdictions. I trust that she will now feel able to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Chakrabarti
I am grateful to the Minister for that. I am grateful that there is a continuing commitment to evaluate such reforms in future, notwithstanding the lack of evaluation of LASPO to date. Once more I feel that the fact that she has made that commitment in your Lordships’ House should give me and others some assurance, and we must make sure that we follow up on that assurance in due course. With that in mind, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Chakrabarti
“( ) is a qualified solicitor, barrister or chartered legal executive with more than three years’ experience post-qualification, and”
Baroness Chakrabarti
My Lords, I shall also speak to Amendments 4 and 6, which are consequential. These amendments in aggregate stipulate that authorised persons must have the following bare minimum legal qualifications: that they be a qualified solicitor, barrister or chartered legal executive with more than three years’ experience post-qualification, as recommended and drafted by the Law Society and supported by the Bar Council. This is a very minimal ask of the Government in the circumstances. It is a lower qualification threshold than is currently required for pupil supervisors or for solicitors to supervise an office.
Authorised staff who are not subject to the training, experience, ethos and oaths of professional judges could be performing judicial functions and employed directly by HMCTS. Even the concept of such delegation, as I said earlier, raises questions of independence. There is legitimate concern that they would inevitably be subject to administrative pressures—for example, meeting targets in a very difficult fiscal climate—and potentially subject to political pressures as well. Without some reasonable limit on who can be authorised, this delegation has, as I said, the potential—perhaps just the potential, but the potential none the less—to change an essential aspect of our judicial system.
I acknowledge that the relevant procedure rules committee will set out procedural requirements about who is empowered to carry out those procedures, but, as we have heard, the committees are made up predominantly of senior judges. This marks a growing trend towards forcing a judiciary that is already bearing the brunt of cuts to the MoJ’s budget also to have to mark its own homework. This has implications for the rule of law and for the independence of judicial decision-making. We also argue that such a shift may well fall short of reasonable expectations held by members of the public about the level of experience and independence of those charged with making judicial decisions—not least about their fundamental rights.
The draft Authorised Court Staff Qualifications Regulations which have been offered in response to those concerns offer only that authorised persons are legally qualified solicitors or barristers. The Bill policy statement provided by the MoJ states:
“We do not expect legal qualifications to necessarily be required for all the different types of judicial functions that authorised staff will carry out”,
so that assurance does not go very far. The Opposition, along with key stakeholders—in this case, the Law Society and the Bar Council—are clear that further qualification is necessary for authorised persons adequately to take on judicial functions of whatever magnitude and that minimum requirements ought to be included in the Bill.
I note that the Minister previously pointed out that three years’ post-qualification experience sets the bar higher than that currently required of assistant justices’ clerks, who currently tend to legal advice within magistrates’ and family courts. However, assistant justices’ clerks are not currently performing judicial functions. If the object here is to provide uniformity to the practice of delegation across all courts and tribunals, surely we should set the bar at least three years PQE.
One has to ask whether the reluctance on the Government’s part to set minimum qualifications just a little higher than nowhere is not due to fiscal concerns about HMCTS staff salaries. Once again, the Government are asking the public—on this occasion, users of our courts and justice system—to bear the burden of austerity, which we have only just been told is over. I beg to move.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, the noble Baroness has opened our debate on the amendment with considerable eloquence and a beguiling argument. We have approached the question of whether an authorised member of staff needs to be a qualified lawyer of stipulated experience with an eye on what the extent of the delegated powers of authorised persons would be. In particular, the concern that I expressed in Committee was that the delegated powers should not extend to taking away a person’s liberty, or to ejecting a person from his or her family home, or the family from that home, or to granting an injunction or an order for preserving evidence, which can have far-reaching consequences, or authorise searches of private premises.
Lord Garnier (Con)
My Lords, I do not wish to be impertinent. This is my first intervention and exchange with the Government Front Bench on any legislation. My diffidence is reinforced by the fact that I was not a functioning Member of the House in the earlier stages of this Bill. I note what the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said in relation to the minimum qualifications required, and quite correctly, he points out in anticipation of what the Government seek in Amendment 5 what an authorised person may not do. It is probably my fault, but I am not entirely clear what an authorised person may do. Once one knows what an authorised person may do, it might be possible to reach an intelligent conclusion on what the proper level of qualifications should be.
Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury (CB)
My Lords, as has been said, the purpose of this part of the Bill is to introduce a degree of flexibility and take the pressure off serving judges who are under considerable pressure at the moment, as we all know. It is right and proper that the officers who are appointed to carry out these very low-level judicial functions—and the principle is accepted—should have appropriate qualifications. However, echoing what the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said, the qualifications will be determined either by regulations or rules set down by the rules committee, which have to be put before this House, and approved by the Lord Chief Justice. Given the large number of low-level decisions which will be involved in this case, rather than fettering either of those bodies by legislating on the sort of people who can do this job, why not leave it to the Lord Chief Justice and the rules committee or the regulations? Our minds in this House cannot cater for these circumstances because, as the noble Lord said, we do not know all the types of orders which these people might be expected to make. We will have the regulations and we will trust the Lord Chief Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals.
Lord Pannick
My Lords, I am all in favour of flexibility and entirely understand the argument, in relation to the exercise of judicial functions, that we should be careful not to prescribe conditions that are more appropriately left to the rules committee and the Lord Chief Justice. I have more difficulty with Amendment 3, which concerns the function of giving legal advice to judges. We are concerned here with paragraph 14 of the Schedule. As I understand it, Amendment 3 seeks to impose a minimum standard for those who perform the function of giving legal advice to judges. I have some difficulty in understanding how that function can appropriately be performed by someone who does not have at least the minimum qualification of three years’ experience post qualification as a solicitor, barrister, or chartered legal executive. Unless the Government are able to say that they envisage this function being performed by someone who does not have that minimum qualification, I see great force in Amendment 3.
Amendment 4 is slightly more difficult, as it is concerned with the same function—giving legal advice—but in relation to justices of the peace. It may be that that minimum standard is not appropriate to that function. I will listen carefully to what the Minister says about that. Amendment 6 is concerned with a different question: the function of actually performing relevant judicial functions, which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, has spoken about. I am most troubled by the issue raised by Amendment 3.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, as a former judge of the family court, I wonder in what circumstances such judges—district judges, circuit judges or even possibly High Court judges—might need the advice of those who were not themselves qualified lawyers. I find that difficult. I see no difficulty with justices of the peace—that is perfectly obvious—but at the moment I cannot see how any family court judge, at any level, should be advised on legal issues by someone who is not legally qualified. I would be grateful to the noble and learned Lord for explaining what he sees this applying to, and in what circumstances.
Baroness Vere of Norbiton
My Lords, these amendments relate to two elements of the Bill. Amendments 3 and 4 require that any authorised person who gives legal advice to lay judges or judges of the family court must be legally qualified and have more than three years’ experience post-qualification. Amendment 6 makes the same requirement of staff carrying out judicial functions.
The qualifications for staff giving legal advice have been set out in regulations since 1979. They remain substantively the same today: broadly, one must be a barrister or solicitor or have passed the necessary exams to become one. The qualifications will continue to be set out in regulations and subject to parliamentary scrutiny. We are not proposing any changes to that process. Allowing qualifications to be set out in regulations has not resulted in a lowering or lessening of this bar. Amendments 3 and 4 would, however, raise it to a height that is unnecessary and could adversely impact on the diversity of legal experience in our courts.
In our draft regulations, which we published ahead of Committee stage, we are proposing to take the opportunity to modernise the qualifications required for legal advisers by adding to those eligible to give legal advice fellows of the Chartered Institute of Legal Executives—CILEx—and those who have passed the necessary exams to be fellows. The addition of CILEx fellows highlights the danger of all three of these amendments. Prescribing qualifications on the face of the Bill means that, should an alternative route to legal qualification emerge, adding this qualification to these provisions could only be achieved through primary legislation.
I turn to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, about Amendment 3. One might be in a circumstance where a judge would need advice from somebody with less than three years’ qualification. It may be exceptional—for example, a judge might reasonably ask for advice on procedure. Legal advisers must know, understand and apply the law, and advise judges and magistrates accordingly. The bar we have had in place for almost 40 years has worked perfectly well, and our current legal advisers are providing an excellent service.
Requiring three years’ post-qualification experience would restrict the avenues through which people can qualify as lawyers and would also exclude experienced legal advisers. Amendment 6 takes a similarly one-size-fits-all approach, but for the qualifications needed for staff to exercise judicial functions. The difficulty with this is that it does not allow for a variety of qualifications to mirror the variety of tasks that staff may carry out. I stress that the exercise of judicial functions by authorised staff is not new anywhere but in the Crown Court. Courts and tribunals staff already carry out judicial functions in the Court of Appeal, magistrates’ courts and family courts, as do registrars and caseworkers in the tribunals. Some of these staff are legally qualified; others are not. For example, there are specialist registrars in some of the tribunals, such as the tax tribunal, where tax specialists are not legally qualified. Their qualifications depend on the work they are carrying out—as in any job—and many of them already exercise the jurisdiction of our courts on a daily basis.
As my noble and learned friend Lord Keen said in Committee, the kinds of tasks authorised staff already carry out—and could undertake more of in future—are largely preparatory or interlocutory. These staff support the progression of cases: getting things ready for court and working out what the court should do. Their work will ensure that hearings and trials are as effective as they can be and that our courts, tribunals and resources are put to best use.
Perhaps that goes some way to answering the question from my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier about the sorts of roles these authorised members of staff will undertake. It is right that we have sought to carve out those roles that we feel they should not undertake. However, the number of roles they could undertake is extremely broad. The level of qualification that staff need should vary according to the work they do. The Bill allows the procedure rule committees to set the requirements as to the qualifications or experience of authorised staff exercising judicial functions. This is the right approach. The committees are best placed to assess the requirements for their jurisdictions in light of the functions that they permit authorised staff to carry out.
Amendment 6 would require that someone carrying out the simplest of tasks, such as changing the start time of a hearing, must be a qualified and experienced lawyer. This is plainly unnecessary. The judiciary is ultimately responsible for authorising court and tribunal staff to exercise judicial functions, and will do so only if satisfied of their competence. An applicant’s formal qualifications will be checked before appointment, and their judgment, skills and knowledge assessed by a supervising judge or senior lawyer before any authorisation can take place.
For the reasons that I have set out, I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Chakrabarti
Once again, I am grateful to the Minister and other noble Lords for that interesting and illuminating discussion. I would like to take this opportunity to welcome the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier. He is a first-rate lawyer, judge and parliamentarian, and I have no doubt that he will make many important contributions in your Lordships’ House.
The noble Lord, Lord Marks, nailed the basic thrust of the objections to this group of amendments: they fly in the face of efficiency and cost savings. Less was offered, I am afraid, by way of reassurance as to the quality of justice that the public may look forward to as a result of this Bill.
As always, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, for pointing out the slight anomaly that legal advisers to the judiciary need not be qualified lawyers. That is perhaps a little strange, and points to the underlying motive behind this draft legislation.
Anyone who has spent any time in a magistrates’ court will realise that very serious decisions about people’s lives are made in that jurisdiction, under a great deal of pressure. Therefore, I do not share the relaxed approach to the training and qualifications required to be a legal adviser to lay magistrates or justices of the peace. None the less, I do not want to trouble your Lordships’ House with a Division that is doomed due to lack of support from the noble Lord, Lord Marks. So, with a somewhat heavy heart, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Keen of Elie
“but does not include a function to which any of the following subsections applies.(2) This subsection applies to any function so far as its exercise involves authorising a person’s committal to prison.(3) This subsection applies to any function so far as its exercise involves authorising a person’s arrest, but it does not apply to the issue of a warrant (whether or not endorsed for bail) for a person’s arrest in order to secure that the person attends court proceedings relating to an offence of which the person has been accused or convicted in a case in which no objection is made by or on behalf of the person to the issue of the warrant.(4) This subsection applies to the function of making an order to recover possession of a building, or part of a building, which is occupied as a dwelling by—(a) the person against whom the order is made, or(b) the person’s spouse, civil partner or dependent child aged under 18,but it does not apply to the making of an order in a case in which no objection is made by or on behalf of the person against whom the order is made to the making of the order.(5) This subsection applies to the function of granting an injunction under section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981.(6) This subsection applies to the function of making an order under section 7 of the Civil Procedure Act 1997 (order for preserving evidence etc).”
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, in moving Amendment 5, I will speak also to Amendment 12, standing in my name. I am most obliged to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for his engagement, not only with me but with the Bill team, in consideration of the issues he raised in Committee and the time he took to discuss how we could address the concerns he mentioned during the debate on earlier amendments. As he indicated, the purpose of these amendments is to place in the Bill a limit to the functions that authorised staff may carry out by specifying certain functions that they will not be permitted to undertake. We consider that there are certainly judicial functions that authorised staff should not be permitted to exercise, particularly where these relate to deprivation of liberty or repossession of residential property. We have therefore brought forward amendments in response to the concerns that were raised.
Amendment 12 would prevent the Tribunal Procedure Committee enabling authorised tribunals staff to carry out functions that involve authorising a person’s committal to prison or arrest, or the granting of an injunction. Amendment 5 provides that similar restrictions will apply in the courts, subject to certain exceptions. Amendment 5 also prevents the relevant rule committees allowing authorised courts staff to make orders for repossession of residential property where the case is contested, and making search orders. Whether authorised staff may exercise other functions beyond those prohibited by this amendment will, as indicated, be for the independent rule committees to decide.
I hope that these amendments will find support across the House. I beg to move.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, the noble and learned Lord has indicated that we support these amendments, and indeed they respond to concerns that I raised. I indicated in Committee, and in discussion and correspondence with the department since, that I did not see the need to restrict the ambit of delegated functions in a way that could prevent authorised officers extending time for the service of documents, or making consent orders of a procedural nature in substantial civil claims.
However, I was extremely concerned that an authorised officer should not have the power to: make orders taking away the liberty of the subject; make a possession order that would have the effect of depriving someone, or their family, of their home; take the serious steps and risk the far-reaching consequences of granting injunctions; or make orders to preserve evidence—which, as I said earlier, could involve searches of private premises.
I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord, and to the Bill team, for their consideration and acceptance of the principles I have made. Amendments 5 and 12 respond fully to our concerns and we support them.
Baroness Chakrabarti
My Lords, as far as I am concerned, this is the good news in this afternoon’s proceedings. I am very grateful to the Government, assisted by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for responding to some of the gravest concerns about the gravest decisions that ought not to be delegated to non-judicial persons. I have been trying to suggest that there is an ocean of difference between purely procedural decisions and those that could have, for example, the effect of depriving an individual of their freedom. Without limits on who can be authorised, and what powers can be delegated, measures such as those that we have been discussing could have a very profound effect on the nature of our judicial system. Such a profound change really requires proper scrutiny by parliamentarians.
The stated intention of the policy is to improve the efficiency of the Courts Service by diverting judges’ time from routine tasks, to allow them to focus their time and expertise on more complex matters. Matters of personal liberty and of people’s homes should surely be considered in that higher order of decision-making. That is why I am particularly grateful for having been heard by both the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and by the Government, in relation to concerns raised at earlier stages and in discussion.
While it is almost impossible to create a definitive or exhaustive list of appropriate judicial functions for delegation, covering each tribunal and eventuality—particularly as these roles cover a broad range from the administrative to the determinative, depending on the jurisdiction—we can surely all agree that functions that might deprive a person of their home or their liberty are never appropriate for this kind of delegation. These particular limitations really are the bare minimum. It is worth noting that, in his civil courts structure review, Lord Justice Briggs drew the line at caseworkers making any dispositive decisions, which he saw as being a purely judicial role.
All delegated functions in the civil jurisdiction are routine case-management functions, and are often confined only to cases where all parties consent. Legal advisers do not currently make decisions that represent a final determination, and a party may request a reconsideration of any decision of a legal adviser within 14 days of being served a notice of that decision. Are these not reasonable restrictions to have been placed on delegated functions in criminal proceedings? The MoJ’s own factsheet on delegation to staff says that delegated decisions are unlikely to involve contested matters. In addition to concerns around transparency, there is a danger that efficiencies gained by delegating case management decisions will be lost if the court has to reconsider these decisions at a later stage in the process.
I give the Government due credit for having gone some way towards addressing real concerns raised at the Lords Committee stage with an amendment that prohibits the delegation of decisions affecting people’s homes and personal liberty. We wholeheartedly support these government amendments, which are very welcome; none the less, they highlight the potential hidden dangers in an apparently benign Bill.
Lord Keen of Elie
“67BA Exercise of relevant judicial functions: reconsideration of decisions (1) Before making rules of court that provide for the exercise of relevant judicial functions by authorised persons by virtue of section 67B(1), the authority with power to make the rules must take the following steps in relation to each of the functions in question.(2) The authority must consider whether the rules should include a right for the parties to proceedings in which a decision is made by an authorised person exercising the function to have the decision reconsidered by a judicial office holder.(3) If the authority considers that the rules should include such a right, it must include provision to that effect when it makes the rules.(4) If the authority does not consider that the rules should include such a right, it must inform the Lord Chancellor of—(a) its decision, and(b) its reasons for reaching that decision.”
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, as well as moving Amendment 7, I shall speak also to Amendments 9, 10 and 13, which stand in my name. When the Bill was in Committee, there was a general desire to see more safeguards on the face of the Bill and greater transparency around the process of making court and tribunal procedure rules. The Government have listened to these concerns and, after further discussion, we have tabled these amendments.
The purpose of the amendments is to require the committees, when making any rules to allow authorised staff to exercise judicial functions, to consider whether the rules should include a right to judicial reconsideration of decisions made by authorised staff exercising those functions. This means that the rule committees would have to consider whether each judicial function should be subject to a right to reconsideration. Furthermore, the amendments require that, if a rule committee decides against the creation of such a right in the rules that it makes, it will have to inform the Lord Chancellor of its decision and the reasons for it.
The amendments should be read alongside existing statutory provisions relating to the making of court and tribunal rules. The committees are under a statutory obligation to,
“consult such persons as they consider appropriate”,
before making rules. If, following consultation, a rule committee chose not to include a right to reconsideration in its rules, it would have to inform the Lord Chancellor of this and, as I indicated, it would also have to give reasons for the decision. The Lord Chancellor would then have two options: either to ask the committee to reconsider its decision, as he has the power to ask the rule committees to make rules, or, if he agrees with the committee, to lay the rules in Parliament. In doing so, we would expect the Lord Chancellor to set out, in the Explanatory Memorandum to accompany the statutory instrument containing the rules, the committee’s rationale for not including a right to reconsideration. The amendments would therefore ensure much greater transparency in the decision-making process.
Our amendments would ensure that the jurisdictional rule committees continued to play a full part in determining the most appropriate mechanism for reviewing decisions by authorised persons. I hope that in the light of these amendments the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, will consider her position with regard to her Amendments 8 and 11, which fall within this group, but perhaps I can defer that and allow her to state her position with regard to those amendments.
Lord Pannick
Before the Minister sits down, can he give the House a practical example of the exercise of relevant judicial functions by someone who is not a judge in respect of which it would not be appropriate to allow for a review by someone who is a judge?
Lord Keen of Elie
One obvious example is the issuing of a summons. Such persons issue about 2.5 million summonses at the instigation of public authorities each year. If every one of those applications for a summons was the subject of judicial reconsideration, with the kind of time limits alluded to in Amendments 8 and 11, the delays involved would be enormous. There are other means by which, in due course, a party may seek to challenge the issuance of such a summons. I take that as one clear example of where it would not be appropriate for there to be judicial reconsideration.
Baroness Chakrabarti
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 8 and to Amendment 11, which is consequential, both of which were drafted by the Bar Council.
Clause 3 and the Schedule to the Bill provide for judicial functions to be delegated to authorised staff across the criminal, civil and family courts and tribunals. This would allow decisions that are currently made by independent judges to now be made by employees of Her Majesty’s Courts & Tribunals Service. The Bill provides that authorised staff will be independent of the Lord Chancellor when carrying out these delegated judicial functions, but they will remain court staff and will not take the judicial oath of independence.
Amendments 8 and 11 would ensure that a party to any decision made by an authorised person in the execution of relevant judicial functions or of a tribunal—by virtue of Section 67B(1) or paragraph 3 of Schedule 5 respectively—may apply in writing within 14 days of the service of the order to have the decision reconsidered by a judge of the relevant court within 14 days from the date of application.
A statutory right of reconsideration allowing any party to a decision by an authorised person to have that decision reconsidered by a judge was recommended by Lord Justice Briggs in his 2016 report Civil Courts Structure Review: Final Report. That right is currently already provided for, for example, in the tribunal procedure rules. Lord Justice Briggs said:
“The creation of an extensive right to have the decisions of Case Officers considered by a judge has from the outset been regarded as the natural safety valve for concerns about what was … described as the delegation of judicial functions to persons who are not judges”.
As a minimum safeguard, the right of consideration has the benefit of freeing an authorised person from the obligation to produce detailed reasons for every decision, as would be the case if the right of appeal were, for example, created. It is important to point out that this consideration on the papers by a judge is not the same as a full right of appeal. It has the additional benefit of going further than a right of review, guaranteeing judicial oversight of a decision which a right of review would not ensure.
Crucially, this statutory right would also ensure compliance with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights—the right to a fair trial—surrounding decisions affecting people’s rights by an independent and impartial person, which is not a member of court staff. It is a proportionate safeguard relevant to the new powers created by the Bill. Your Lordships are aware that Article 6 provides that the determination of a person’s civil rights and obligations or any criminal charge against them must be undertaken by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.
The requirements of independence apply not only to the tribunal but also to any judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power. As the Ministry of Justice acknowledges in its memorandum on the Bill,
“In considering independence, … guarantees against outside pressures are relevant – as is the question whether the body presents an appearance of independence”.
In that human rights memorandum, the MoJ suggests that it is intended that,
“case management decisions which it is proposed these authorised members of staff will be able to take will be uncontentious and not of sufficient importance to engage Article 6”.
However, case management decisions can have a significant impact on shaping the issues, progress and ultimate outcome of the case. For example, a decision on the appropriate timescales within which a party should take a step in proceedings may be significant, as failures to comply with that timescale can subsequently lead to some or all of the party’s case being struck out.
Furthermore, the Ministry of Justice’s fact sheet on the delegation of functions to non-judicial staff states:
“In future, we expect that authorised staff will be able to carry out a range of functions and responsibilities, including case management powers and some mediation roles”.
This suggests that it is envisaged that such staff will have a role beyond merely making non-contentious decisions on purely procedural matters in future.
The Government’s welcome amendment excludes some functions from delegation, but there are still others that may be significant to the progress and outcome of an important case. Such functions—for example, the issuing of an arrest warrant to secure a person’s attendance in court—can still be delegated to non-judicial staff.
In Committee, the Minister argued that a blanket right to reconsideration across all jurisdictions will not work in practice, as it will add significant cost and delay to the process on the basis that a dissatisfied party will inevitably apply for reconsideration by a judge, thereby negating the benefits of delegating decisions to staff. However, this objection was dealt with by Lord Briggs in his Civil Courts Structure Review: Final Report. He accepted that,
“an unfettered right of reconsideration will be a necessary long-stop”.
He also cited evidence from real-life precedents, suggesting that where such a right exists elsewhere, the number of reconsideration applications is low. Surely that should continue to be the case, particularly if, as the Ministry of Justice suggests, the decisions being made by authorised staff are properly non-contentious.
The Government’s concession, placing an obligation on the relevant rule committee to consider a right to judicial reconsideration for delegated functions, does much less to satisfy our concerns than their concession on delegated functions themselves, such as the safeguard in relation to a person’s liberty in their home. In fact, the Government’s concession here replicates the fundamental problem with the effect of the Bill. Placing the obligation on the rules committee, which ultimately does not have the budget to fund the Courts Service, delegates a legislative duty to an unaccountable body.
We on this side of your Lordships’ House strongly believe that Parliament has a legitimate role in ensuring that the new system of delegation proposed in the Bill includes a backstop protection for the right to a fair trial. Consequently, I urge noble Lords to support our amendments, which have already been endorsed by the Law Society, the Bar Council and the Equality and Human Rights Commission. They propose a statutory right to judicial reconsideration for any party to a judicial decision made by an authorised person, or non-judge. This would afford stronger protection for the right to a fair trial and guarantee the independent and impartial determination required by Article 6.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, in Committee I spoke in favour of a blanket right to judicial reconsideration of all delegated decisions of authorised persons, much along the lines suggested just now by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. During the debate, and after I had spoken, I was gently chided—if I may put it that way—by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury. He said that he sympathised with my view, stating that,
“the idea of a decision being made by a non-judicial person and not being referable to a judicial figure is inconsistent with justice”.
However, he went on:
“Whether it is right to provide in such clear terms, and such uncompromising general terms, for the circumstances and requirements for such an appeal seems to me, again, to be questionable. While I absolutely see the requirement for a right of appeal, I would have thought that, again, it would be better to leave it to the rule committee”.—[Official Report, 10/7/18; col. 890.]
I stress, as has been stressed before, that rules made by the rule committee have to be laid before Parliament, and are subject to annulment if Parliament so decides. The question is, then: how far do the amendments tabled by the Government in this group ensure that a right of judicial reconsideration will apply, when such a right ought to apply?
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, suggested meeting the need to provide for judicial reconsideration by introducing requirements for the rule-making bodies to consider and work on the judicial reconsideration specific for each type of function. Amendments 7 and 13 reflect the Government’s thinking on that. The rule-making body will first have to consider and decide whether rules delegating functions should, in respect of each delegated function—that is important, because they are function-specific—include a right to judicial reconsideration. Secondly, if the rule-making body considers that the rules should include such a right, that body will be compelled to include it, so the right will stand. Thirdly, if the rule-making body considers that the rules should not include such a right, the body should be compelled to inform the Lord Chancellor of its decision and reasoning. Not only are these function-specific arrangements, but they meet the point that there would be no judicial reconsideration.
I was initially concerned when I saw these amendments that they would stop there, without providing for what the Lord Chancellor should do when informed of a decision by a rule-making body not to include a right to judicial reconsideration. But the Lord Chancellor has the power to require rules to be made. It seems to me that if the Lord Chancellor is of the view—being answerable to Parliament and having to lay rules before it—that a rule-making body is wrong in failing to provide for judicial reconsideration, he may be expected to require appropriate rules to be made. That is enhanced by the fact that, if he decides that they are right, he will have to come back to Parliament and say so. In my view, that meets the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, while providing for the introduction of rights to judicial reconsideration and delegated decisions where appropriate.
I do not see that there is a contravention of Article 6 simply because a judicial decision is delegated to an authorised officer. That would be a matter of consideration of the particular function and delegation and the presence of a right of appeal. A decision taken by someone who is not a judge is not necessarily a decision by a non-independent party. Indeed, in private litigation between parties, I can see no reason why a decision by an authorised officer should not be a decision by an independent party compliant with Article 6.
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)
My Lords, I support what the Government seek to do and urge a substantial degree of caution in respect of the proposal put forward by the noble Baroness. The Criminal Procedure Rule Committee and the other ones—the civil, family and tribunals committees—are independent bodies. They look at and scrutinise everything with a great deal of care. They are representative of all interests in litigation. For example, the Criminal Procedure Rule Committee has a number of defence lawyers and people from other aspects of the criminal justice system who proceed with great care to look at what is before them. It was suggested that they are unaccountable. I say on this amendment that the provisions for having to consider the right of reconsideration and then reporting that to the Lord Chancellor informing him of the decision and reasons is a traditional form of explanatory accountability.
Secondly, we ought to take into account the fact that, in our system of justice, the operation of the criminal, civil, tribunals and family procedures rule committees has enabled us far more than any other state to keep our rules up to date. I urge the greatest caution in trying to put into primary legislation anything that restricts in this way the powers of the rule committees. For example, there are areas where it has proved difficult to modernise and to reform the system—for example, for extradition appeals, where provisions put into primary legislation made the system almost unworkable. Certainly what was in the primary legislation in relation to videolinks and the protection of vulnerable witnesses proved a great obstacle.
I therefore urge your Lordships to consider that this amendment, as my friend the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said, provides the right balance. It gives discretion to a body that knows and has a lot of experience, but it contains that degree of explanatory accountability that will make sure that it does not do anything—even if we were to worry that it might—that goes outside a proper and just delegation. It is always difficult to think of issues on the spur of the moment but, for example, one of the areas that troubles courts quite often is the short time limits if you have a recalcitrant party. It might be that, in very restricted circumstances, a rule committee would say, “This is the kind of area where a reconsideration is not necessary when a final extension has been given”. But the important point is that I urge your Lordships to trust the rule committees, particularly now that there is this additional safeguard.
Lord Keen of Elie
I am obliged to all noble Lords for their contributions. The Government’s position remains that the independent procedure rule committees, comprised of experts and practitioners from each jurisdiction, are best placed to decide whether a right of reconsideration is needed for each judicial function that staff are permitted to exercise. Similarly, they are best placed to determine what such a right should look like. In that context, I gratefully adopt the observations of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, the former Lord Chief Justice, and of the noble Lord, Lord Marks.
The approach taken in Amendments 8 and 11, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, would impose a blanket right of reconsideration across all jurisdictions, with arbitrary deadlines. It simply would not work in practice. For example, the amendments would allow a person 14 days to apply for reconsideration. Why would a 14-day limit apply across all jurisdictions and for every judicial function that authorised persons are permitted to exercise, some of which are entirely straightforward case management and preparation duties? Indeed, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, referred to time limits. What happens if you have a request to adjourn a hearing due to take place the following day? If it is refused, you then have 14 days for reconsideration. In other words, it would automatically be successful because of this blanket provision. That is just one of many examples.
Each jurisdiction has its own ways of working and needs mechanisms for reviewing decisions that can respond to this. For example, the rule committees in the civil and tribunals jurisdictions have already built in a specific right to judicial reconsideration of decisions made by authorised staff. The magistrates’ courts and the family court have their own existing mechanisms for reviewing various decisions. These amendments, as proposed by the noble Baroness, would cut across all those existing provisions.
I mentioned an example in response to a query from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. The magistrates’ courts issue something in excess of 2 million local authority summonses every year. If there were a right to reconsideration in every one of those cases, where would we begin and end with regard to the administration of such applications? Indeed, in the magistrates’ courts, there are already a number of ways for a defendant to challenge a case in which a summons has been issued. He or she can make an initial argument to the court hearing the case that the summons should not have been issued. You can contest the substantive application made by the local authority. There is even the possibility of judicial review. The matter is already covered.
Creating a mandatory right to apply for judicial reconsideration of the decision is not only unnecessary but would also be burdensome and ineffective. It is in these circumstances that I reiterate that it is appropriate, as other noble Lords have observed, that these matters should remain with the independent procedure rule committees and that I again commend Amendments 7, 9, 10 and 13. I invite the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, not to press her amendments in this group. I cannot commit to reflecting any further between now and Third Reading on these matters, so if the noble Baroness wishes to test the opinion of the House, she should do so now.
Baroness Chakrabarti
“67BA Right to judicial reconsideration of decision made by an authorised personA party to any decision made by an authorised person in the execution of the person’s duty as an authorised person exercising a relevant judicial function, by virtue of section 67B(1), may apply in writing, within 14 days of the service of the order, to have the decision reconsidered by a judge of the relevant court within 14 days from the date of application.”
Baroness Chakrabarti
My Lords, once more I am grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to the discussion, which once again highlighted the fundamental differences on the principles in this Bill between some of us on each side of this House. I have tried hard not to be completely disruptive to the idea that certain, non-contentious, administrative decisions might be delegated as part of modernising the justice system in the 21st century, but I have heard no satisfactory response to the recommendations by Lord Justice Briggs.
These judicial decisions that will be delegated will be uncontentious or contentious. If it is the latter, Article 6 rights are engaged and, with the greatest respect to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, I cannot see how junior members of court staff—potentially not even three years post-qualification in their legal experience, and employed by the Government—are going to be independent and impartial for the purposes of satisfying Article 6.
The assurance that I am given in response to this concern is that I should put trust in the rule committees to make judgments about which decisions that have been delegated to these junior staff should and should not be subject to reconsideration by a judge. My concern is that the rule committees will be under the same pressure that the judiciary is under in relation to all this. It is a pressure with which I sympathise and which has been reflected eloquently in contributions to this debate by noble Lords and noble and learned Lords in particular.
At the end of the day, the rule committees do not have the access to the budget that would make it possible to ensure reconsiderations where they are required. Therefore, it seems rather unfair to put the pressure on the committees. The committee may feel that it has no choice because it cannot fund a system of adequate judicial consideration, which is because it cannot fund an adequate justice system in this country. That is not a state of affairs that I believe your Lordships’ House would want to sanction. With that in mind, I beg to move and seek to test the mood of the House.
Lord Keen of Elie
“Schedule 5 (Tribunal Procedure Rules) is amended as follows.”
Lord Keen of Elie
““function” does not include—(a) any function so far as its exercise involves authorising a person’s committal to prison or arrest;(b) any function of granting an injunction;”
“After paragraph 28 insert—“Delegation of functions to staff: reconsideration of decisions28A(1) Before making Rules that provide for the exercise of functions of the First-tier Tribunal or Upper Tribunal by authorised persons by virtue of paragraph 3, the Committee must take the following steps in relation to each of the functions in question.(2) The Committee must consider whether the Rules should include a right for the parties to proceedings in which a decision is made by an authorised person exercising the function to have the decision reconsidered by a judicial office holder.(3) If the Committee considers that the rules should include such a right, it must include provision to that effect when it makes the Rules.(4) If the Committee does not consider that the rules should include such a right, it must inform the Lord Chancellor of—(a) its decision, and(b) its reasons for reaching that decision.(5) In this paragraph “authorised person” and “judicial office holder” have the same meanings as in Chapter 2A of Part 1 of this Act (see section 29A).””
Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Bill [HL]
Tuesday 13th November 2018
(6 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Act 2018 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 108-R-I Marshalled list for Report (PDF) - (12 Oct 2018)
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, I shall not trouble the House for long. Notwithstanding some differences of principle between us, I am very grateful to the Minister and his Bill team for the limited movement towards safeguards in the Bill, but it is a shame that the Bill was not a possible vehicle for the prohibition of cross-examination of domestic violence victims in the family courts. It is government policy and it would surely command cross-party and non-party support, so I hope the Minister will talk to his colleagues in government and make time for this discrete but vital measure before too long.
The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)
My Lords, we are conscious of the need to address this measure and have of course addressed it in the past. I note what the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has said on that topic but, nevertheless, I beg to move that this Bill do now pass.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
The noble and learned Lord has pre-empted me but I wanted to add to what the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, with our thanks for the co-operative way in which this Bill was handled. I also thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, his ministerial colleague the noble Baroness, Lady Vere, and the excellent Bill team who did so much work on it. We on these Benches are very grateful for the way in which new Sections 67A and 67C of the Courts Act 2003 were inserted, limiting the functions of delegated officers and providing for judicial reconsideration of delegated decisions. They were dealt with co-operatively and it is a tribute to the way this House can deal with matters co-operatively and achieve improvements to the Bill. We are content with the Motion.
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, I apologise to the House for pre-empting the noble Lord and I am obliged for his observations. Again, I move that the Bill do now pass.
Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Bill [Lords]
Tuesday 27th November 2018
(6 years ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Act 2018 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 108-R-I Marshalled list for Report (PDF) - (12 Oct 2018)
The Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice (Mr David Gauke)
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
It is a great pleasure to move the Second Reading motion. It is possible that in Westminster at the moment other matters are catching Members’ attention and that the focus of the House has not been sufficiently on the Bill, but I am delighted to have the opportunity to move the motion. The Bill has already been considered in the other place and takes an important step forward for our courts system.
Our judiciary, together with our courts and tribunal service, are rightly regarded as among the finest and most independent in the world. However, the way our courts and tribunals work cannot stand still. They must be able to meet the demands of delivering modern-day justice, meet the needs of the society they serve, and administer justice in the most effective and efficient way.
The justice system must work for all those who use it, as well as for the judges and legal professionals who work in it. That means realising the huge potential of new technology and the law tech revolution to improve people’s experience of and access to the justice system and to open up new routes to justice. It is certainly my determination that the UK should be seen as being at the forefront of adopting new technology, whether in our courts and tribunal system, which is the issue before us today, or more widely, with legal professionals making use of technology. That is one of the reasons that we have instituted a law tech committee, led by Christina Blacklaws of the Law Society, which is designed to take us forward in that area. It is an important part of what we need to do.
John Howell (Henley) (Con)
My right hon. Friend may be aware that I did an Industry and Parliament Trust fellowship in the law with judges, and my experience of the different courts I went to showed the enormous gap between the commercial courts, which were technologically very superior, and the tribunal system, where we might as well have been using a quill pen. Is this reform going to solve that problem?
Mr Gauke
Our court reform programme as a whole, which I will come on to, will ensure that we use technology wherever possible. It is right that we embrace that. The Bill is part of the process—it is not all of the process—that will ensure that we modernise. I have cited in the past ways in which artificial intelligence, for example, is being used within the legal profession. An example I have given is a case where AI was used to check a number of contracts to spot potential errors. The rate of success of the AI was somewhat better than that of the experienced lawyers, and if I remember rightly the task was done in 26 seconds rather than 92 minutes. I make that point to illustrate the opportunities in terms of technology and the law.
Alex Chalk (Cheltenham) (Con)
Innovation and modernisation are vital, but will the Secretary of State take this opportunity to recognise that the single most important strength of our judicial system is the judiciary who work in it and that everything must be done to ensure that we have a broad pipeline of talent so that they continue to be the best in the world?
Mr Gauke
I very much agree. We have a judicial system that is widely respected around the world for its independence and excellence, and that must long continue. I suspect that my hon. Friend is hinting at the question of how we can get more outstanding candidates to apply to the judiciary. It is right that we should address that challenge. He is right to suggest that this is one of our strengths as a country. It will be important in the years ahead as we leave the European Union that our legal system should continue to be widely respected. I believe that there are great opportunities for the UK to become even stronger as a legal centre, and I am keen for that to happen.
Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)
Will the Secretary of State give way?
Robert Neill
The Secretary of State makes an important point about the balance that needs to be struck in these areas. He has given an example of the use of artificial intelligence being appropriate for the checking of documents, and work on dealing with disclosure parameters has already been successfully piloted by the Serious Fraud Office. Would he concede that there is a distinction to be drawn between those essentially transactional but important operations, such as disclosure searches, and the application of human judgment that should be brought to, for example, a charging decision by the SFO? Does he agree that any determination of the facts or issues of a case should clearly be done by a human judge, having heard the arguments, and that their workload could be slimmed down but not replaced by the use of AI?
Mr Gauke
I agree. I note that my hon. Friends are all quick to make the case for the importance of the skilled human being in these circumstances, and rightly so. We must remember that technology is our servant and not our master.
I make these points because our court reform programme is being undertaken in the context of an embracive technology and the Bill is an aspect of that programme. I will digress no further because it is not essentially a technology-based Bill. However, to follow up on the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill), the importance of skilled individuals will continue to be key, and the Bill will ensure that the time of our most skilled individuals—our judges—is deployed as efficiently as possible.
Nigel Huddleston (Mid Worcestershire) (Con)
I have to say that innovation and modernisation are not normally things that we associate with our courts. Given the feedback that has already come in on things such as making responses on juries online, does my right hon. Friend agree that this is not only useful to the courts but makes life easier for the public?
Mr Gauke
Absolutely; that is a key point. Perhaps my hon. Friend has set my Department the challenge of ensuring that people associate the modernisation of technology with the court system. We will know that we have succeeded when he tells us that that is the case. He makes the strong point that this is ultimately about delivering justice. We need to have strong support for the process involved and ensure the satisfaction of those who need to resolve a dispute or to undertake a process. The early signs from our work with online divorce processes are encouraging, and the feedback has been very positive.
Liz Saville Roberts (Dwyfor Meirionnydd) (PC)
I rise as the co-chair of the Justice Unions Parliamentary Group. I am interested in what the Secretary of State is saying about artificial intelligence, but it seems to me that one of the driving forces behind the Bill is not necessarily to improve the administration of justice but to cut costs by pushing workloads down the grades so that staff will be taking on additional work above their current grade without additional remuneration. Surely he should recognise that making savings in the application of justice comes at a cost to staff and to the public’s experience of justice.
Mr Gauke
I do not think that the hon. Lady is correct in the association that she makes. The reality is that we have to ensure that our resources are deployed as efficiently as possible. That is to the benefit of the system as a whole. I will make the case in more detail as to why the steps taken in the Bill to give authorised staff greater responsibility to undertake some roles that they are currently unable to undertake will be to the benefit of the system as a whole. I make no apology for wanting to find efficiencies within the system, but this is in the context of a £1 billion court reform programme. Those efficiencies can improve the experience of the users of the system, and could also ensure that judges will be able to use their time in the areas that are most useful to them. Indeed, the experience of authorised Courts and Tribunals Service staff will be a more positive one, as they will be able to make a greater contribution to the efficient running of the court system.
Simon Hoare (North Dorset) (Con)
Setting aside the whys and wherefores of the Bill, may I invite my right hon. Friend to confirm from the Dispatch Box that the independence of the judiciary and the separation of powers between the judiciary and Parliament will be absolutely sacrosanct and at the heart of everything that he, his ministerial colleagues and the Department will do? This is an issue of great concern to many people, irrespective of the Bill, and people always need to have faith that this central pillar of how we are governed in this country will remain intact, protected and preserved.
Mr Gauke
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for giving me the opportunity to respond to that point. The independence of the judiciary is at the heart of our system and a long-standing part of it. It is as important, if not more important, than it has ever been that we reiterate that and support those institutions. As I was saying a moment ago, this is a big part of what our nation is about, and in the years ahead, after we have left the European Union, one of the most important institutions to us will be our independent judiciary. It is a large part of what the UK is about and of how we should project ourselves around the rest of the world.
Jeremy Lefroy (Stafford) (Con)
My right hon. Friend is making a strong case. Perhaps this is for another time, but in the context of having a strong, independent judiciary, will he look again at the rather arbitrary cap of the age of 70 for magistrates? We have many really qualified people who wish to contribute to the independent justice system of this country but who are prevented from doing so simply because of their age.
Mr Gauke
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for making that point, although he takes me away a little from the terms of the Bill. I realise that there is a debate about that matter, and there are arguments either way about the current age limit. I have certainly received representations calling for an increase on the current age of 70, and we continue to look closely at those arguments. I believe that there has to be an age limit, and it is a question of judgment as to what it should be. I would be delighted to discuss this with my hon. Friend in the Tea Room if the opportunity to do so should arise.
Alex Chalk
Building on the point that was well made by my hon. Friend the Member for North Dorset (Simon Hoare) about independence, may we have an assurance that under the Bill the procedure rule committees that decide what the authorised staff can do will be able to exercise that discretion free from any interference from the centre, so that they can ensure that only those jobs that ought properly to be delegated to those staff are so delegated, and that extraneous considerations such as cost need not be forced upon them when they make their decisions?
Mr Gauke
My hon. Friend brings me back to the Bill and makes a good point—one which came up on several occasions during the deliberations in the other place about the extent to which we should be prescriptive, or whether powers should be left with the rule committees. I share his instinct that as much as possible should be left to the rule committees, because they are best placed to make such assessments. Indeed, that leads to points made by distinguished retired judges in the other place about not being over-prescriptive. Such matters may be a point of discussion this afternoon or at the Bill’s later stages.
I now turn to the Bill in greater detail. The measures will help to provide the greater flexibility and responsiveness that we need within our court system. That includes freeing up judges’ time from the most routine tasks associated with court cases. The Bill will build on existing powers that already enable staff in most courts and tribunals to be authorised to exercise some of the functions of judges. It will continue to allow appropriately qualified and experienced staff in the civil, family and magistrates courts, the High Court, the Court of Appeal, the Court of Protection and tribunals to be authorised to carry out uncontroversial and straightforward judicial functions under judicial supervision. The Bill will enable those arrangements to be extended for the first time to the Crown court, where court officers can only currently undertake formal and administrative matters. Allowing court and tribunal staff to exercise a wider range of judicial functions will potentially free judges up from undertaking more regular tasks, such as changing the start time of a hearing or changing a pre-trial preparation hearing date, so that they can focus on the more substantive matters of the case.
Sir Edward Davey (Kingston and Surbiton) (LD)
I welcome the Government’s amendments in the other place to paragraphs 32 and 44 of the schedule, which were secured by my noble Friend Lord Marks, because they ensure that only a judge will have the power to deprive people of their liberty or eject them from their family home. As we give court staff some more powers, it is important that we set down some markers for the types of decisions that should be reserved for trained professional judges.
Mr Gauke
Indeed, and I will turn to that point in a moment. I hope that the clarification provided by those amendments will be widely welcomed in this House. The passage of this Bill in the other place was characterised by a constructive and co-operative approach from both sides, and I hope that that will continue to be the case—I suspect it will, but we shall see—because the point of those amendments was to provide particular protections. Other issues debated in the other place included suggestions about being more prescriptive. As I said to my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk), it is right that we use the judicially led rule committees in many of those areas, but the right hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton (Sir Edward Davey) makes a perfectly fair point.
Luke Hall (Thornbury and Yate) (Con)
My right hon. Friend is being generous in giving way. He is talking about the use of judicial time, so will he explain in a bit more detail how the measures will address the problem of the backlog of cases and what effect the Bill is likely to have on improving the current situation?
Mr Gauke
My hon. Friend raises a good point that comes back to how we ensure that judges’ time is used most effectively, freeing them up from the most routine tasks, such as changing the start time of the hearing, and enabling them to focus on more complex matters. They could then ensure that case preparation and management was resolved proportionately and at an appropriate level. That could also help to improve the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the court tribunal system. There is an opportunity to ensure greater consistency in the current arrangements, and it is right that we strengthen safeguards, as has already been touched upon.
It is important to guarantee the independence of all authorised staff when they are exercising judicial functions. Clause 3 will bring authorised staff under the leadership of senior lawyers. Although we are removing the post of justices’ clerk from the statute, the functions that such clerks undertake will continue to be carried out by heads of legal operations, who have a much greater leadership role across all jurisdictions. The change will ensure that we make all authorised staff ultimately accountable and subject to the direction of the Lord Chief Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals.
John Howell
My right hon. Friend is being generous with his time. The place where these changes can have the most effect is in the tribunal system. I have sat through tribunals that have lasted for days for no good reason, tying up three independent assessors. Surely, it is there that the changes he proposes can have the biggest effect.
Mr Gauke
My hon. Friend may well be right. The Bill of course relates to courts and tribunals, and it is important to bear in mind the impact on tribunals. Tribunals perhaps do not always attract the attention that they might, but they play a vital role within our justice system. If we can find ways to improve their efficiency, we should all welcome that. That is a key part of what this Bill is about.
Kevin Hollinrake (Thirsk and Malton) (Con)
My right hon. Friend mentioned the start times of hearings. As he will know, Northallerton magistrates court, which serves many of my constituents, is due to close under these reforms. It is important that people can get to a hearing on time, so will requiring people to travel further to a more distant court be taken into account? Will there be mitigation, such as video links, and will those things be in place and operating before the court closes?
Mr Gauke
Journey times are taken into account. I am conscious that substantial issues can arise in rural areas, but journey times are considered. As for technology, if I remember correctly, the change at Northallerton magistrates court is conditional upon ensuring that the technology is properly in place. In the context of this Bill, authorised staff will be able to play a bigger role in determining start times, for example, and one hopes that that might enable the process to run as smoothly as possible and ensure that people’s concerns about when they can get to court can be properly considered.
Bambos Charalambous (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)
With the distance between courts being a factor not just for claimants and defendants but for witnesses, does the right hon. Gentleman agree that witnesses may sometimes choose not to go to a court if it is too far away, which can cause hearings to be cancelled?
Mr Gauke
The hon. Gentleman takes me further in the direction of the debate about the court closure plan, but we need to ensure that our resources are deployed as efficiently and effectively as possible. In that context, we have reduced the number of courts, but that money makes a contribution to our overall finances and can be reinvested as part of the court reform programme. We have to take every opportunity to make use of new technology to ensure that the experience of the justice system—the hon. Gentleman rightly highlights that witnesses are important in many cases—is as positive as possible.
I have touched on this already, but safeguards are important. Clearly, the delegation of certain judicial powers to court and tribunal staff needs to be done sensitively and sensibly, and with appropriate safeguards. Independent, judiciary-led procedure rule committees, which govern the rules within courts and tribunals, will determine which functions court staff may exercise in each jurisdiction and what qualifications and experience they will need. Those rules will then be subject to parliamentary scrutiny. All staff authorised to exercise judicial functions will ultimately be accountable to, and subject to, the direction of the Lord Chief Justice or the Senior President of Tribunals.
I am grateful for the valuable insight that Members of the other place brought to debating and scrutinising the measures in the Bill, particularly in relation to the exercise of judicial functions. Many of them drew on their own wealth of judicial experience and expertise in considering the practical issues of implementation.
Concerns were raised in the other place about the safeguards in delegating judicial functions to authorised staff. For example, concerns were raised that certain powers, particularly those that affect the rights and freedoms of citizens, should only ever be directly discharged by the judiciary. Indeed, the right hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton raised that point.
We have listened to those concerns, and we tabled amendments in the other place that will prevent specific judicial functions from being undertaken by authorised staff, including authorising a person’s committal to prison; in most cases, authorising a person’s arrest; granting certain injunctions; making orders for repossession of residential property, where the orders are contested; and making search orders.
We tabled amendments that will require the procedure rule committees, when making rules to allow authorised staff to exercise judicial functions, to consider whether the rules should include a right to judicial reconsideration of decisions made by such staff. The amendments will also require that, if a procedure rule committee decides against the creation of such a right, the committee will have to inform the Lord Chancellor of its decision and of the reasons for it. This will ensure much greater transparency and accountability.
The measures in the Bill strike the right balance between creating a framework for the delegation of judicial functions to authorised staff, with appropriate safeguards, and giving discretion to procedure rule committees and the senior judiciary to make the arrangements work in practice.
Alex Chalk
Does my right hon. Friend agree that the principle of delegating functions to authorised staff is not, of itself, new? There has been a successful history, particularly in the magistrates courts, of delegating powers to justices’ clerks to carry out a number of functions, which even include such matters as issuing summonses or requesting pre-sentence reports. The principle is in place but, of course, the execution is vital.
Mr Gauke
My hon. Friend is right, and his experience is a benefit to the House. He knows of what he speaks. This principle is not new, but it is one where we think we can go further, to the benefit of the courts and tribunals system and of the users of that system. He is absolutely right.
A balance needs to be struck on the safeguards, and we believe we have found the right balance. Indeed, the position was strongly supported in the other place by Lord Thomas, the former Lord Chief Justice, and Lord Neuberger, a former President of the Supreme Court, both of whom have a wealth of experience in this area, having chaired procedure rule committees. The combination of Lord Thomas, Lord Neuberger and my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham, very distinguished lawyers all, is one that should reassure the House.
Lord Thomas warned on Second Reading against putting too much detail into the Bill:
“Experience has shown that detailed restrictions on procedure are a very real fetter on the administration of justice.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 20 June 2018; Vol. 791, c. 2039.]
Similarly, Lord Neuberger warned in Committee of placing
“a potential straitjacket on the ability to appoint the appropriate people to make appropriate decisions.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 10 July 2018; Vol. 792, c. 882.]
Lord Marks also warned against setting too high a bar on the qualifications of court and tribunal staff exercising judicial functions:
“It seems…that the purpose of this part of the legislation is to increase efficiency and…to everybody’s advantage…the speed of decision-making… Having a legislative requirement that all delegated decisions must be taken by qualified lawyers with a minimum experience requirement runs the risk of frustrating this objective.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 16 October 2018; Vol. 793, c. 414.]
I make those points in anticipation that this may be an issue that we debate further this afternoon, but I think the case is persuasive.
Kevin Hollinrake
Will the Bill make it easier to set up a new tribunal? I speak in the context of my role as chair of the all-party parliamentary group on fair business banking and finance, which has the idea of setting up a financial services tribunal. We are not seeing a level playing field in our courts between banks and small businesses, and we feel such a tribunal may be a solution. Will the Bill make it easier to establish such a tribunal, or will it not have any relevance in that area?
Mr Gauke
As it stands, and I do not want to encourage my hon. Friend to table amendments, the Bill will not necessarily do that. He has taken a great interest in this issue, and he has been speaking to my hon. Friend the Economic Secretary to the Treasury. I know my hon. Friend the Member for Thirsk and Malton (Kevin Hollinrake) will pursue the matter with his customary tenacity, and I do not wish to discourage him from doing so, unless he considers that the best way to manifest it is by tabling amendments to the Bill, in which case I would urge him to look elsewhere. I thank him for his intervention.
I draw the House’s attention to additional important safeguards in the Bill. It will provide a guarantee of the independence of staff and their decision making, by applying the statutory independence and immunities that currently apply to justices’ clerks to all authorised staff when exercising judicial functions. A member of staff will be able to exercise judicial functions only once authorised to do so: by the Lord Chief Justice or his nominee, for the courts; or by the Senior President of Tribunals or his delegate, for the tribunals. The Bill includes protections for authorised persons from legal proceedings, costs in legal proceedings and indemnification in respect of anything they do or do not do when exercising judicial functions in good faith.
The Bill also includes measures to enable greater flexibility in the deployment of judges across our family and county courts, the first-tier tribunal and the upper tribunal. For example, it will permit recorders to sit in the upper tribunal, enable senior employment judges to sit in the first-tier tribunal and upper tribunal and enable presidents of the employment tribunals for England, Wales and Scotland to sit in the employment appeal tribunal. This will make best use of the experience and skills of serving judges, and it will give the senior judiciary more flexibility to respond to sudden changes in demand and to manage case backlogs in particular jurisdictions. It will also allow judges to gain experience of different types of cases, which will help with career progression. The Bill also contains provisions relating to the amendment of judicial titles, which will ensure consistency and will help to avoid confusion for court users.
The measures in the Bill are an important part of our wider £1 billion reform programme, which will see our courts and tribunals modernised for the 21st century and our digital age. New online services are already providing new routes to justice for many. For example, of all applications for divorce from unrepresented citizens, more than six out of 10 are now made online, after the new service was launched in May. That amounts to more than 20,000 people in just over six months. It has saved time, cost and effort for them and the system. Reforms in the criminal justice system—from making pleas online for low-level offences, to the piloting of a new digital system to allow the police, Crown Prosecution Service, courts, judiciary and defence to have a single shared view of case information online—are making it work better for everyone, too.
The Bill is an important part of our wider reforms to make our justice system work better for those who use it and those who work in it. It also makes an important first step in the legislation that will underpin our reforms. We will introduce further courts legislation as soon as parliamentary time allows. With the appropriate safeguards in place, the Bill will allow our judiciary, courts and tribunals to operate more flexibly, responsibility and efficiently, and it will ultimately improve people’s experience of justice and put our courts and tribunals on a sound footing for the future. I commend the Bill to the House.
Yasmin Qureshi (Bolton South East) (Lab)
Before I open my speech, I wish to tell the House that today is Lancashire Day. On 27 November 1295, Lancashire sent its first Member of Parliament to attend King Edward I’s model Parliament. The day is well marked and celebrated in Lancashire.
We have been waiting for the arrival of court reform legislation ever since the Government promised in the Queen’s Speech last June a Bill to modernise the court system. One can imagine that expectations were high, but instead we were left disappointed when this wafer-thin Bill, which is both narrowly constrained and obscurely drafted, was finally published. Indeed, most of its provisions were included in the Prisons and Courts Bill that was shelved more than a year ago. That Bill devoted 38 clauses and 13 schedules to the courts and judges, whereas this Bill has just three such clauses followed by a single schedule. As Lord Judge once said of another Government move, it is
“a little too late and…quite a lot too little”.
Robert Neill
I intervene only in fairness to the distinguished legal journalist Mr Joshua Rozenberg, for that was his phrase that the noble Lord Judge was quoting.
Yasmin Qureshi
I thank the hon. Gentleman for that helpful intervention.
Rather conveniently, the Government have left out measures that would provide a legislative framework for the increased use of online technology in the courts—their justification for closing so many courts and axing so many court staff. Indeed, we know that Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service is working at pace on the introduction of online justice services: the civil money claims service was made available to the public in April 2018 and the online divorce application procedure was rolled out nationally in May this year.
Although we would, of course, not seek to refute the fact that modern technology has undoubted benefits, we do have to ensure that it is used carefully and without generating more confusion or distress around the process. It should be about investing to improve our services; it should not be a smokescreen for cuts and closures. As such, it is only right that the effects of digitisation should be researched intensely and costed to ensure the best possible outcome. The Government have not yet confirmed that that has happened and still seem intent on this path, without considering potential concerns.
We are by no means against modernisation. We all want justice to be done in the most cost-effective manner and we all believe that the court system must meet the demands of the 21st century, but there is real concern that the Government are trying to bypass necessary legislative scrutiny in this policy area. We must see a thoroughly researched digitisation programme included in primary legislation, to ensure that written and online processes are undertaken appropriately.
The Bill is a missed opportunity. It should have included clear principles to guide the future of online court procedures and a modernisation programme that could have been fully debated in the House today. Instead, we are told that more legislation will eventually follow to encompass all that. This fragmentary approach—or what has been described by one legal commentator as a “legislative drip-feed”—is deeply unsatisfactory. In May 2018, the National Audit Office published a report that concluded that delays in the introduction of primary legislation have created a significant degree of uncertainty, and that Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service “faces a daunting challenge” in delivering the technological and cultural change needed to modernise our courts and tribunals.
Since 2010, the Government have closed literally hundreds of courts and cut thousands of vital staff. Our research suggests that 80% of the courts sold so far have on average raised little more than the average UK house price. That causes concerns about long-term damage to access to justice for civil litigants and, indeed, victims of crime. It will also have an obvious and long-lasting effect on the principle of local justice. The cuts have led to an increase in the number of people forced to represent themselves, a problem further compounded by cuts to legal aid. When unrepresented members of the public turn up to seek justice as litigants in person, it increases costs and delays for everyone. As we have said in the past, it is the most vulnerable who will bear the heaviest costs—young mothers who are unable to find childcare, the elderly who find long journeys difficult, or the disabled. The court closures will prohibitively reduce access.
Will the Government pause their programme of court closures while new technologies and online courts are being tested and wait to see the full findings of their pilots to assess the impact of the changes to our courts system? Will the Lord Chancellor commit today to restarting the programme of court reforms only once the House has finally had an opportunity to fully scrutinise the plans in primary legislation? We have concerns about the Bill as it stands and will not be supporting it today, but we will table amendments in Committee.
As we heard from the Minister, clause 3 delegates judicial functions to authorised staff. This provision must be understood through the lens of a wider austerity agenda that seeks to make significant cuts. These cuts are being made through a process of court closures and through savings on judicial salaries. Other proposals include the relocation of many case-management functions, which, as we know, currently take place in court buildings, with the benefit of on-site judicial supervision.
Our concern is that decisions would move to new off-site service centres. There is an implication that, given that off-site nature, those service centres would be supervised by authorised staff, not judges. That is deeply problematic for us, not least because we would have scenarios in which authorised staff who were not subject to the training, experience, ethos and oaths that a member of the judiciary is, would be performing direct judicial functions while being employed directly by Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service.
The issue raises obvious questions about accountability and independence. It is also worth noting concerns that the people involved may be subject to administrative pressures that require the meeting of targets. Given the ideological cuts agenda driving this reform, it is vital that the Bill makes provision for safeguards to protect the standard of decision making by authorised staff, to ensure that the quality of the judicial process and the experience of those who use the court are maintained.
Although we accept that there is some scope for freeing up judges by allowing the most straightforward decisions to be delegated to authorised staff, the intended future limits to any such delegation do not appear to be in the Bill. Instead, they are supposed to be decided by the procedure rule committee. That means that if the Bill passes in its current form, there may be limited external scrutiny of how widely judicial functions are being carried out by people who are not in fact judges, but who work for Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service.
I wonder whether the Lord Chancellor is aware of the serious implications for the rule of law and the independence of our judicial decision making. In his opening speech, he touched on the fact that our judicial legal system is considered to be one of the best in the world and is used by many countries, many companies, and many litigants; it makes up about £28 billion-worth of trade. Will that be affected by this downgrading of our judiciary? We believe that such a shift would not meet the expectations held by members of the public about the level of experience and the independence of those making judicial decisions about their rights. Unless limits are placed on those who can be authorised and on what powers can be given to those authorised persons, the Bill could change the very nature of our justice system.
Mr Gauke
The hon. Lady is right to raise the importance of our judiciary, but I hope that we can reach a consensus on that. Does she not recognise that the Bill has the support of the judiciary? Senior retired judges have spoken in support of it in the other place, and it has been welcomed by the senior judiciary.
Yasmin Qureshi
I accept that the senior judiciary, some of whom are in the House of Lords, have said that the Bill is a good thing. However, practising lawyers, barristers, solicitors, the Bar Council and the Law Society have said that it is not right, and that the amendments that we will propose should be considered.
There is disagreement in the judicial community about the Bill. [Interruption.] I will just wait until the Lord Chancellor has dealt with his question. The Lord Chancellor and the practitioners here must be aware that, when judges are involved in delegated functions or non-court sitting judgments, they are making judgments on difficult issues and complex matters of law—for example, a case management hearing, or even something such as asking for an adjournment. We do not know, but, at the moment, the Bill suggests that such work could be done by delegated staff.
When someone asks for an adjournment, all kinds of complications could be involved; there could be issues relating to failure of disclosure and so on. According to the Bill as it stands, many issues would be given to a delegated person. That is one reason why we are asking for clarification about who those people will be, what powers they will be given, and, more specifically, what training they will be given. Although some senior members of the judiciary in the other place have said that the Bill is a positive development, the practitioners on the ground, at the moment, do not agree.
Robert Neill
I understand what the hon. Lady is saying, and I am not unsympathetic to her point, but, in fairness to the senior judiciary, is it not worth pointing out what was said by the two noble lords who spoke on this matter? Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, the recently retired President of the Supreme Court, counselled that it would be unsatisfactory to reduce the flexibility of these proposals, pointing out that there will be many decisions where requisite experience is required, but others where less experience is necessary. Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, the previous Lord Chief Justice, pointed out that the procedure rule committee had practitioners on it who acted independently. He said:
“Experience has shown that detailed restrictions on procedures are a very real fetter on the administration of justice.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 20 June 2018; Vol. 791, c. 2039.]
Those are very serious counsels by two very distinguished recently retired judges.
Yasmin Qureshi
I have respect for the senior judiciary, of course, but Parliament should have control over what is being delegated. Taking away judges’ positions and powers is a matter that should be debated in this House. We do not think that it is a matter for the procedure rule committee. We would have a much better idea about what it should be looking at. I think that we will disagree on this issue.
Jess Phillips (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)
Does my hon. Friend share my concern about always listening to eminent legal practitioners in the Lords? I am certain that, quite recently, they have made some mistakes.
Yasmin Qureshi
I thank my hon. Friend for her intervention. Those things do occur.
Let me go back to my earlier point. We believe that limits should be placed on those who can be authorised and on what powers can be given to those authorised persons. The Bill will change the very nature of our judicial system. We want a system that requires transparent and public scrutiny of the scope of future delegated powers by those in this House. That is important and I am surprised that hon. Members who are democratically elected wish to take away that element from the Bill.
We on the Labour Benches are seeking to push for a number of safeguards, the first of which places limits on the delegation of these judicial powers to non-judicial personnel. We intend to press for further oversight and accountability and will be laying down amendments to that effect. It should also be noted that the procedure rule committee has, for many years, undertaken some excellent work, but the delegation of judicial functions cannot be thought of as a simple procedural matter for a rule committee—rather, this is something worthy of secondary legislation in this House.
The reforms that the Government are seeking to introduce through the Bill are designed primarily to cut costs, but, as the Bill stands, there is a risk that the procedure rule committee will be placed in the difficult position of balancing pressures to save costs against maintaining fundamental rights. Amending the Bill so that the procedure rule committee must at least consider the impact on rights would provide important protections both for the rights of the citizen and for the integrity of the committee. We ask the Government to consider that any decision made by someone who has been delegated judicial functions should be open to a full reconsideration or review by a judge. That would guarantee that purely procedural matters could be dealt with more efficiently; if any decisions were deemed contentious, however, they could be reviewed by an experienced and appropriately qualified judge.
We also note that the Government’s late amendment in the other place obliged the procedure rule committee to consider making rules to determine which of the functions performed by authorised staff could be subject to a party’s right of reconsideration by a judge. However, that does not satisfy our concerns. Indeed, it is simply replicating the fundamental problem of the Bill. By placing the obligation on the rule committee, it delegates a legislative duty to the same unaccountable body. Consequently, we will be pushing ahead with our amendment, supported by the Law Society and the Bar Council, that proposes a statutory right to judicial reconsideration for any party to a decision by an authorised person. We will also seek to ensure that, in drawing up the rules on reconsideration, the rule committee must consider which functions and decisions will be clearly capable of having a material impact on the substantive rights of the parties. I reiterate that we respectfully disagree with the noble and learned Lords in the other place.
In the Ministry of Justice’s explanatory notes on delegation to staff, it is stated that decisions are unlikely to involve contested matters, yet this is not in the Bill. I remind the Lord Chancellor that case management decisions are essential judicial functions that should not necessarily be delegated. We need to ensure that the decisions that impact on the fairness of the process remain within the remit of the judges.
We also have concerns about the lack of minimum qualification for the authorised staff, particularly where staff are not legally qualified or sufficiently experienced to undertake such functions effectively. The Law Society has suggested that the requirements for qualification, training and experience should be set at three years’ post-qualification, as a solicitor, barrister or chartered legal executive for all types of functions, and that that approach should be consistent across all courts and tribunals. I know that the Lord Chancellor has disagreed with this, but I ask him again to agree with the Law Society’s recommendation that a minimum requirement of three years’ post-qualification as a solicitor, barrister or chartered legal executive is appropriate for court staff who are to be delegated judicial functions. Will he also provide assurances that provisions in the Bill that allow the delegation of judicial functions will only be considered where staff have appropriate legal qualifications?
A further omission from the Bill—this point has been made by Women’s Aid—is the provision prohibiting the cross-examination of victims of domestic violence that we all looked forward to in last year’s aborted Bill. The stark evidence from groups such as Women’s Aid is that this gap in the law is being used as a further means of control and abuse. We are concerned that such provisions are not now in the Bill. Will the Lord Chancellor tell us when the Government will bring this particular provision to Parliament so that we can deal with it and have a law in our statute book to bar people from cross-examining victims of domestic violence?
Jess Phillips
Those of us who have campaigned were expecting to see in the Bill some of the things that have been promised, such as the banning of cross-examination. Senior members of the judiciary have themselves called for that measure, but find that current legislation ties their hands. Given that it is not in this Bill, I am certain that Ministers will tell us that it will be in the domestic abuse Bill that will be brought forward. Why will women have to suffer this experience between now and whenever that legislation comes forward? Why is the provision not in this Bill?
Yasmin Qureshi
I thank my hon. Friend for her work on raising these issues. She is absolutely right. Why is the provision not in this Bill? It was in last year’s Bill, which was aborted because of the general election. It should not be that difficult to put it into a legislative framework.
Let me give an example of something that happened a few months ago in the family courts. Two spouses had an issue about the custody of their child. The female plaintiff had made allegations of domestic violence and sexual abuse against her husband, and it was obvious that the male respondent wanted to cross-examine her. However, the judge had to step in to ask the question on behalf of the male respondent. The case then went to the High Court, where the judge said that it was really not appropriate for members of the judiciary to have to intervene in such cases. The provision should already be on the statute book. We have talked about it for so long and it is not that difficult; it should be on the statute book as soon as possible.
To truly understand the impact of the Bill, we must look at it in the context of the Government’s wider austerity agenda. As it stands, the Bill has the potential to have a profound impact on our justice system. The double delegation of powers that the Government are intent on introducing is a slippery slope that, without proper controls, puts rights at risk. Without further careful scrutiny and additional safeguards, the Bill has the potential to erode long-established legal rights.
The amendments that Labour tabled in the other House were reasonable, sensible and practical, and we really cannot see why the Government cannot adopt and accept them. The Bill has limitations. The Government should listen to us and others who want to improve it, and accept our amendments, which have the support of the Law Society and the Bar Council, so that we protect our judicial system.
Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Bolton South East (Yasmin Qureshi) and my right hon. Friend the Lord Chancellor.
In this debate, there is a danger of allowing the ideal to become the enemy of the good and the deliverable. I rather share the regret of the shadow Minister that this is not a larger Bill. I was a great supporter of the Prisons and Courts Bill that was lost prior to the 2017 election, as were all Members on the Treasury Bench today. There were clauses in the Prisons and Courts Bill that I hope will be brought back soon, and the prevention of cross-examination of victims in domestic abuse cases is certainly one of them. It is important not only that that issue be resolved, but that the court-appointed advocates who undertake that work be properly remunerated, and I say that in the context of the ongoing review of legal aid. It will be necessary for those advocates to prepare the cross-examination with particular care, because such cases always require a particular degree of sensitivity.
Removing the ability of the complainant in person to cross-examine is right and proper, but proper means—proportionate with the equality of arms—must be put in place and properly funded to enable the trial to be conducted fairly. I understand the Lord Chancellor’s point that it may not be appropriate to put that in this Bill, but that is not a reason not to bring forward the fully thought through and worked out provisions at the earliest possible opportunity. That is a digression from this worthwhile Bill, which does a number of valuable things, some of which I will mention.
Reference has been made to the debates in the Lords. The Lord Chancellor was right to say that proceedings in the Lords were conducted in a particularly constructive and co-operative spirit. Maybe that was because of the very high percentage of lawyers participating in the debates in the other place. It was a civilised and careful consideration of the Bill, in which I think there was—with respect to the Opposition Front Bench—rather less attempt to politicise some of these provisions than we have heard this afternoon. Many of the measures in the Bill are important and technical reforms that require a statutory basis, and should be welcomed.
I noticed the discussion of changes to judicial titles during the debates in the other place. If I have a slight regret about this Bill, it is one that I share with the noble Lord Mackay of Clashfern about the abolition of the title of justices’ clerk. I can understand why that is proposed, but having practised in the criminal courts for 30-odd years, I have a certain affection for the title, as did Lord Mackay. But that change goes with this Bill, so maybe it is a price that has to be paid for modernity. Perhaps I am being uncharacteristically reactionary in regretting the disappearance of the title of stipendiary magistrate as well. I always thought that “Mr St John Harmsworth, stipendiary magistrate at Marlborough Street” had a greater ring to it than “Mr St John Harmsworth, district judge (magistrates courts)” might ever have done, but I suppose the change did give a certain degree of standardisation.
We have been talking about appropriate levels of qualification. There was a time when justices’ clerks did not have to be legally qualified. I do not say that was a good thing. I remember appearing quite often, as a very young barrister, at Billericay magistrates court in Essex in front of the last non-legally qualified justices’ clerk in the country. He had some sort of grandfathered rights that went back to a time when one could do 10 years as a justices’ clerk and that was regarded as giving one the qualification for appointment. [Interruption.] I see that my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk) is much shocked by these things. We had to be terribly robust in those days. I remember that I managed to persuade that justices’ clerk to dismiss a case at half time on the basis that a rice flail was not an offensive weapon per se, because it might have had a legitimate use for flailing rice. Whether that was going to happen on Basildon high street, I am not sure.
We have moved on, and the justices’ clerks are much more professional now, and much more fully integrated, so despite my regret about the loss of the title, the new one does reflect more adequately the role that they now have as legal advisers to a very important part of our system—the lay judiciary. In fact, the Justice Committee heard evidence from representatives of the Magistrates Association today regarding the updating of our previous report on the magistracy. They can play a critical role in this. I think that they broadly welcome the attempts at modernisation of practice and procedure that this Bill will assist.
Alex Chalk
Like the Chairman of the Justice Committee, I welcome these measures to modernise the process. However, this should not be allowed to distract from what remains a fundamental problem, which is that there are not enough people coming into the judiciary. We need to ensure that they are properly incentivised to do so and rewarded for doing so, because the backlog of cases in the Court of Appeal and elsewhere will not be resolved by these measures alone. Does he agree?
Robert Neill
I totally agree. These are useful, practical measures on their own, but they are by no means a solution to the problem. In fact, they are but a very small part of the solution.
I am a bit concerned by some of the Law Society’s suggestions in briefings that some of the broader programme of courts reform is posited on making savings in judicial posts and appointments of about £37.5 million. I hope that the Lord Chancellor—or the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. and learned Friend the Member for South East Cambridgeshire (Lucy Frazer), when she responds to the debate—will be able to set our minds at rest on that. We can make savings by using staff qualified at the appropriate level in what one might term purely interlocutory or procedural matters, but all the decisions on issues of substance in any case—whatever the sum involved or whatever the nature of the charge, in a criminal case—have impacts on the individuals concerned, and they should, in my judgment, be taken only by properly qualified lawyers in an open court process. That is important.
We cannot allow the valuable nature of this Bill to take away from the fact that we need an injection of resource into the criminal justice system. We are seeing a shortfall in appointments to the High Court bench on a regular basis. A number of hon. Members have talked about the integrity of our justice system and the importance of its legal standing, and the quality of the judiciary is key to that. We also see difficulties in making sufficient appointments—full time, at any rate—to the circuit bench. It is easier with recorders, I grant, because they are able to sit part time, but there is a real issue there.
There is also a real issue, as my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham knows, about morale. I think that the Lord Chancellor and the Under-Secretary of State understand that and take it on board. I do not expect them to be able to wave a magic wand and solve everything overnight, but it is important to stress these things. Technical changes are useful as far as they go, but they cannot underpin what is essentially a people-based system.
Ms Harriet Harman (Camberwell and Peckham) (Lab)
I pay tribute to the excellent work that the hon. Gentleman’s Committee does on these and many other issues. I agree that there were perhaps things in the Prisons and Courts Bill that have not found their way into this Bill. He may agree that we should, none the less, take the opportunity of this Bill to try to sort out the problem of the previous sexual history of victims in rape trials being dragged through the court and used by the defence in an irrelevant way to undermine the complainant’s evidence, sometimes when applications are not even made to introduce this material. Does he agree that this Bill is an opportunity to deal with that problem? We know that this is happening, and it undermines getting rape convictions.
Robert Neill
I very much respect the point that the right hon. and learned Lady is making, but I must say to her frankly that I am not convinced that this Bill is the appropriate vehicle for dealing with that issue, although it is a real one, simply because the Bill is very tightly drawn in scope and relates to function. What she wishes to do—I understand why she may wish to do it—would have significant impacts on the operation of the law of evidence, which is a consideration that deserves to be looked at on its own. We probably have a shared view as to what we might want to achieve, but I am not sure that this Bill would be the right one to achieve it.
We do need to look very carefully at the whole approach to the way that previous sexual conduct is dealt with in rape and other sexual offence cases, but we also have to bear in mind—I say this as somebody who prosecuted and defended in these cases—that we should not assume that these issues will never be relevant to the key issue in the case. A balance has to be struck, and very often that is a decision that can only be taken by the trial judge in the light of the submissions made by the parties. I would not want us to restrict the ability of the trial judge to make that decision, because they are best placed to do that. However, the right hon. and learned Lady’s point about failure to follow the procedures and make proper application in advance, and enforcement of those procedures by the judiciary, is an important one that we certainly ought to take forward.
Ms Harman
Can I go back to plan B, then? Even if the hon. Gentleman thinks that the Bill is not the right place to address such a considerable evidential problem—and there is controversy around this—would he not, at the very least, like to see tucked in under clause 3, “Functions of staff”, an obligation on staff to record, when an application under section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 is made, what evidence was brought forward and what the result of the application was? There is an absence of evidence about what the courts are actually doing. That enables them to say that there is not a problem, when evidence such as that brought forward by Vera Baird, the police and crime commissioner for Northumbria, says that there is a problem. Does he agree that this Bill could at least get us recording that very important information?
Robert Neill
That is a very interesting and constructive point, because we do want to have an evidence base. Again, the only caution I have is this: is it appropriate to do that through a form of statute, or is it better done through placing that requirement in the criminal procedure rules? I am going to talk about the procedure rules in a moment. Either way, there should be a means of capturing that information, and I am very sympathetic to doing so. Perhaps the right hon. and learned Lady and I could talk with others about the best way forward on achieving that, because it should certainly be possible, with modern court technology.
John Howell
May I take my hon. Friend back to where he left off? Does he agree that the threat to the use of English law around the globe comes about from the efficiency or otherwise of the judges, and that the more that judges are unable to be efficient in giving a judgment, the more there is a threat to the use of English law? Does he agree that this Bill goes a long way towards trying to sort that out?
Robert Neill
Yes, I do. That is very important, and that is why it is not surprising that experienced former judges have expressed a view on this. We have referred to the former President of the Supreme Court, Lord Neuberger, and the immediate past Lord Chief Justice, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd. I note also the observations of Lord Thomas’s predecessor, the noble Lord Judge. They all supported the thrust of this Bill in enabling more flexible deployment of judges within tribunals and the assignment of procedural matters to non-judicial court staff. They also warned about not unduly fettering the ability of the court procedure rule committees, which have on them practitioner representatives who are able to set matters in the light of their practical experience. That is absolutely right, and it in no way contradicts the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham about the need to have the requisite number of top-class members of the judiciary. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Henley (John Howell) that this is a sensible and proportionate Bill.
I want to touch on a couple of other points that relate to the issues legitimately raised by both the Law Society and the Bar Council. It is possible to meet their concerns in a proportionate way. I think it is fair to say that the Bar Council and the Law Society’s main issue, in terms of the scope of the Bill, has been the relationship to authorised staff. They make a fair point about the underlying issue of the courts modernisation programme, which I will touch on later. There was an acceptance in the other place that some types of procedure and hearing do not require a legally qualified person to deal with them.
However, we have to ensure that when the procedure committee draws up the rules around this—I welcomed the Government’s amendment, which gives greater clarity about how that will operate and makes it easier to achieve—it is not, as my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham said, placed in the invidious situation of trading off access to rights against costs. I have sympathy, therefore, for what underpinned the concern raised by the hon. Member for Bolton South East (Yasmin Qureshi), though I do not advocate the same solution. That balance cannot be allowed to be swayed unduly in terms of the transactional or the financial.
The right of reconsideration is worthy of consideration, and I hope the Government will look seriously at it. It is a question of the appropriate level at which to pitch that. Some of the matters that it is proposed be delegated are almost entirely procedural in nature. We should distinguish between delegating to a court official a procedural matter, such as granting an extension in time, which many of us probably think is not the sort of thing where the fundamental rights of a party are so affected that it requires reconsideration, and something that goes to the issue of the case, such as a summary judgment. The way forward is to give the rules committees the ability to reflect those distinctions, rather than to try to spell things out too much in statute.
It has been suggested that there should be a form of benchmark against which the rules and procedures operations are carried out. That may be worthy of consideration by Ministers, and it may be discussed in Committee. I would not want to tie people’s hands, but we could have some form of benchmark against which that is done, without falling into the trap that Lord Thomas, Lord Judge and Lord Neuberger counselled against, of overly restricting, over-legislating and tying the hands of the judges.
I take issue with the Opposition on this point. It is not right or desirable for politicians—who, by their nature in our system, are partisan animals—to seek to constrain too much the operation of the rules or procedure of the desirably and deliberately independent courts. We have to be careful about how we achieve a balance. Our job is to set the policy and legislative framework within which the courts operate, but if we get too far into the detail, we run the risk of trespassing on judicial independence, and also on efficiency.
There are good aspects to the Bill that I hope the House will take forward. I intervened on the hon. Member for Bolton South East to point out that it was Mr Joshua Rozenberg, the well-known journalist, who coined the phrase
“it is a little too late and quite a lot too little.”
In fact, to be wholly accurate, it was Lord Marks, a Liberal Democrat shadow Minister, who quoted it in the other place. It is a very good phrase, but it is harsh on the Bill. The Bill does good work within the scope that it seeks, but that does not mean we should not support the Lord Chancellor and his Ministers when they seek, as I am sure they will, to find the appropriate legislative time to bring forward measures on a number of other aspects of the former Prisons and Courts Bill, which was lost in the Dissolution.
The right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman) and I have discussed some matters of criminal and family law in domestic violence cases that it is important for us to tie up. I stress strongly that much of these reform proposals stem from the excellent reports of Lord Justice Briggs and Lord Justice Leveson. Their reports were seminal in suggesting a modernising way forward, but taking that way forward requires the underpinning of statute. I urge the Lord Chancellor, who has been very patient in listening to us all, to make it a priority to persuade the business managers to find time for the legislative vehicle that will enable the modernisation of the court procedure rules on all civil matters to be brought forward. The Leveson proposals could have statutory underpinning in the same Bill. There is a real sense of uncertainty, referred to by the Law Society and the Bar Council, about the statutory underpinning for this ambitious courts programme. That was also picked up by the National Audit Office in its inquiry.
I welcome the Bill, and I support it as a valuable and worthwhile step forward, but—I think the Lord Chancellor would be the first to accept this—it is only one part of the programme that we need to deliver. We ought to get the Bill through the House as swiftly as possible and then move on to the next step. I note that Second Reading in the Lords lasted just under two hours, which shows that we can be both erudite and remarkably brief, which is perhaps an improvement on some debates we have here.
Thangam Debbonaire (Bristol West) (Lab)
It is an honour to follow the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill), the Chair of the Justice Committee, who gave us an awful lot to think about. I agree with him that there is a great deal in the Bill that is good and that I would not wish to speak against, but I want to draw attention to a couple of its aspects about which I have concerns. As a non-lawyer, I am happy to be corrected if I have got something wrong and to be reassured by the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, the hon. and learned Member for South East Cambridgeshire (Lucy Frazer), when she makes her concluding remarks. I wish to raise a couple of areas of concern, particularly in relation to the rights of refugees and asylum seekers in the legal process, but also about the context in which these proposals are being made.
There is a sign on a wall near my constituency office in Bristol that says:
“Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.”
I am sure all Members will know that those are the words of Dr Martin Luther King, and they are as relevant now as they were when he first wrote them in his letter from Birmingham jail in 1963. I quote them because a reduction in justice for any of us is a reduction in justice for all of us. When a court closes, as is happening in many of our towns and cities, making it harder for witnesses to travel to give evidence and for members of the public to hear court proceedings; when someone gets inadequate advice from someone supposedly giving them legal advice; or when the powers of the court to act fairly and impartially are compromised anywhere in our system, it is a potential threat to justice for all of us. I know that the Lord Chancellor and the Minister would not wish to do that, so I pose my questions to ask whether we are sure we are doing everything we can to maintain the spirit of that quote.
We may be the victim of a crime or the witness to a crime. We may be accused of a crime, or we may know someone who is wrongly accused. We may have a constituent who needs our help. For all those things, we need our courts to work properly. I am truly concerned about the Bill. While it has good points, there are a couple of places where there are questions to ask.
First, I am concerned that these changes are being pushed through Parliament at a time when Members are understandably focused on other matters and when, as far as I know—the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst may correct me if I am wrong—there has not been prelegislative scrutiny. I would like to know when there will be some form of legislative scrutiny by the Justice Committee. There are provisions in the Bill that provide for regulations to be made through statutory instruments. That has been attended to in the other place, but those instruments provide for very limited scrutiny. Again, this is in a context where we will be overwhelmed by Brexit-related statutory instruments in the coming months and years.
Then there is the background of cuts to legal aid. I recognise that that is outwith the scope of the Bill, but it has an impact on the effect of the Bill. The wider context is that the justice system is under great strain. If the Lord Chancellor or the Minister has read the book “The Secret Barrister”, they will know the context I am referring to. I am also alluding particularly to refugees and asylum seekers, because I am concerned that they may be the people for whom the supposedly straightforward administrative advice that the Lord Chancellor mentioned may turn out to be more complicated and have a more far-reaching impact.
I need more reassurance from the Minister that there will not be an impact on immigration claims and appeals cases, which are sometimes already affected by perhaps less than great legal advice or legal aid cuts, and that the system will not be put under further pressure. That would mean that people who genuinely need our help, and who are entitled to sanctuary, could be failed and may be returned to places where they would face further danger. I would like some reassurance or clarification on that from the Minister, or perhaps an undertaking to look at it during the Bill’s further stages.
On legal qualifications, I refer hon. Members and the Minister to the comments of the noble and learned Baroness Butler-Sloss in the debate on the Bill in the other place. She said:
“My Lords, as a former judge of the family court, I wonder in what circumstances such judges—district judges, circuit judges or even possibly High Court judges—might need the advice of those who were not themselves qualified lawyers. I find that difficult. I see no difficulty with justices of the peace—that is perfectly obvious—but at the moment I cannot see how any family court judge, at any level, should be advised on legal issues by someone who is not legally qualified.”
She continued:
“I would be grateful to the noble and learned Lord for explaining what he sees this applying to, and in what circumstances.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 16 October 2018; Vol. 793, c. 416.]
It would be helpful if the Minister could give this Opposition Member, as well as others who may be more knowledgeable than me and certainly the non-lawyers in this place, an idea of the answer to the questions that the noble and learned Baroness asked.
When our Front Bencher in the other place withdrew the Labour amendment on qualifications, she did so reluctantly. I note that she said she was withdrawing it with “a somewhat heavy heart”. I am therefore particularly concerned that the concerns she raised in the other place may not yet have been dealt with adequately. I would like some reassurance from the Minister on that.
As I have said, I am concerned, drawing on my casework as an MP, about the potential impact on appeals in immigration and asylum cases, which may be put under strain if there is any question of administrative information being given by people who are not legally qualified. Those affected are multiply vulnerable: they are usually traumatised, they may have little English, and with the best will in the world, they may not be capable of understanding the legal advice or administrative information that they are given. This may seem a tiny, nit-picking and technical point—and perhaps I have got it wrong—but I really think it is worth checking that we have not unwittingly put asylum seekers and refugees in a position where administrative advice may have a more far-reaching consequence than I am sure the Lord Chancellor intends.
On cost cutting, in Bristol we have a well-appointed court in the centre of the city, but I understand from colleagues who represent towns and smaller cities that they have experienced court and tribunal closures, resulting in increased journey times for victims and witnesses and reduced access to visible justice. The Law Society and others have already expressed great concerns about that, and the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst mentioned the National Audit Office in that context.
Does the Minister recognise the concerns of those who see this Bill in the round—in the context of the wider cuts to court staff and court closures—about it being a move towards justice being delivered at a reduced rate? As I said, there are good things in the Bill. What is at issue is not that, but its impact and how it fits into the wider context.
The Bill does not in my view satisfactorily address the context of the cost cutting programme in courts, which is undermining access to justice and is being pushed through without proper scrutiny. I urge the Minister, if she has not already done so, to add “The Secret Barrister” to her Christmas reading list. I have not finished it, truth be told, but I will undertake to finish it if she will, because that may be useful for all of us. I am concerned that the Bill could be an attempt, in places, to cut corners and weaken safeguards, and I am concerned about delegating powers to possibly underqualified court staff without adequate training. I urge the Minister to consider Opposition Front-Bench amendments to that effect.
I urge the Government and the Minister to remember what I said at the start. I repeat those words:
“Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.”
I would like the Minister’s reassurance that she is truly convinced that this Bill does not, even in the smallest way, represent any threat to justice.
John Howell (Henley) (Con)
It is a great pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Bristol West (Thangam Debbonaire), not least because, like her, I am not a lawyer. I think the more non-lawyers who speak in this debate, the better it will be, because we bring common sense to such a debate, which I am afraid from time to time legally qualified Members do not.
I was, however, completely entranced by the description of justices’ clerks given by my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill). I thought that my opportunity had now come, because these were non-legally qualified people who had a role to play, and I thought, “This is an opportunity for me when I finish here”. Sadly, however, even that has been taken away from me.
If I may, I will just pick up on one of the things that the hon. Member for Bristol West mentioned when she talked about other things distracting us from our examination of this area. I think this is just the sort of Bill that we need to concentrate on. I do not think we should be distracted by other things, because the Bill is crucial to the management of justice and of our courts.
Thangam Debbonaire
I just wish to clarify my point about Members being distracted. I agree with the hon. Gentleman that this is exactly the sort of Bill we should be focusing on, but my concern is that Members are distracted by the wider constitutional impact of the word beginning with B, which I will not mention.
John Howell
I am sure some Members are distracted by that, but I am incredibly pleased that neither she nor I are, and that we are going to concentrate on the Bill in a very big way.
I mentioned in an intervention on the Lord Chancellor that I was actually the first Member of Parliament to go on the Industry and Parliament Trust fellowship in law. It was a particularly enlightening experience. I cannot remember the number of days that I was allocated, but I doubled the number of days I spent on it, because I spent most of the time sitting alongside judges, on the bench, listening to what they did. The number of different courts I saw was tremendous—I remember starting in the commercial courts, which I will come back to in a little while. They represented such a technological advance on all the other courts I sat in on, and that was a really good thing to see.
To go back to a point I made to my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst, the first thing that came out of that experience of sitting alongside judges was an absolute admiration for their integrity and for what they did and how they did it. The second thing was an understanding of how overworked they are. As non-lawyers, we perhaps tend to think of judges just turning up, sitting and listening to the case, and giving judgment, but the amount of preparation that goes into hearings is phenomenal. That was a good thing to see and experience, and it applied whether it was the bankruptcy court or the Court of Appeal, in which I sat on two occasions.
The point I made to my right hon. Friend the Lord Chancellor earlier was about the speed of justice. I am not a great advocate of speed in itself, but I think there is a threat to English law: not Brexit, but the ability of our courts to dispense justice on a timely basis. When I sat in with judges, I saw that they were often so preoccupied with the minor administrative elements of their role they did not have time to dispense justice in what I would consider a timely manner. That was the case whether I was sitting in a higher court or, in particular, in a tribunal—I will come on to tribunals in a moment. Efficiency in making judgments and delivering English justice is one of the hallmarks of the justice system and one that we lose at our peril. If that point alone is made, it is made well.
One issue I would like to raise, which may at first not seem immediately applicable to the Bill, is the age of judges. I believe it does apply to the Bill, because consideration is being given to other people taking on judicial functions. The point about age has also been raised in relation to the magistracy, and it also applies to lords justices and others. When the Lord Chief Justice appeared before the Justice Committee last week, we asked him about the age of justices and he explained that there were mechanisms by which they could be extended beyond the age of 70 in certain capacities. However, that is an artificial cut-off—if we were stopped from being MPs at 70, I think there would be shouts of horror. Some of us—I am nowhere near that age now—would consider that we were being cut off in the prime of our life. The same is the case with judges. They have acquired a tremendous amount of experience, principally as barristers. They have had a lot of judicial experience, and they are just coming to the point where they can use that experience in the best possible way. I therefore think it is necessary to look at extending the age at which judges retire to beyond 70. To be able to do that, we must look at the courts in a holistic way.
Robert Neill
My hon. Friend makes an important point. The coalition Government, as I am sure he will know, increased the age at which members of the public could sit as jurors to 75. It seems quite bizarre that a lay person who is fit, healthy and willing to serve can sit as a juror up to the age of 75, but people of that age cannot sit as a judge of the High Court, the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court—unlike in the United States, where they can go on for a considerable time.
John Howell
I am not sure I would like to follow the experience of the United States in this matter, but my hon. Friend makes an absolutely first-class point. There needs to be a consistent approach to the age at which we can use people or force them to retire.
There is a lot to be said for the system in the Bill that would enable people to undertake some activities undertaken by judges. As an aside, I said that I am a non-lawyer, but I am currently seeking to extend my ability to undertake arbitration—I hope that that does not cut across or invalidate what I am saying. Such an ability is an important element of the mix that needs to be taken into account when we are looking at the judicial system as a whole.
When I was involved in sitting with judges for the fellowship, I was very much aware of the difference between courts in digitalisation and technology. In the commercial court, the system was utterly brilliant. I sat with a judge who was listening to an English law case in Portuguese. The transcript of the English translation appeared almost instantaneously on his laptop on his desk in front of him. The use of technology to get information out was absolutely fantastic. As I said to the Lord Chancellor, however, employment tribunals might as well have still been using the quill pen, they were so antiquated—not the judgments being made, but how the courts were organised and delivered justice. If we want access to justice, it is absolutely essential that the process of digitalisation in courts is seen through to the end. It materially influences access to justice.
When I sat in the Court of Appeal, prisoners appealed their sentences via video link. It was clearly not a good idea to bring the prisoners into court, so video links were used all the time to great effect, enabling judgments to be made. There were some discrepancies. For example, it took some time to get the focus right for some prisoners. I understand that that was due to the camera equipment, rather than the features of the prisoners.
When I started my work as chairman of the all-party group on alternative dispute resolution, I had the opportunity to speak to Lord Briggs about his proposals for the justice system as a whole. The Bill moves us closer towards what Lord Briggs was after, but it does not take us all the way to it. For example, the digitisation of divorce is welcome, but his proposal for online courts is very valuable. I know that that is controversial among lawyers, but it is important to enabling both the delivery of justice and access to justice. I would like that process to be extended beyond the scope of the Bill, so that we can receive and transmit electronic evidence in the handling of individual court cases. Anything that can move the legal profession into the 21st century is to be welcomed.
If I may, I would like to give a plug to the Industry and Parliament Trust fellowship. Having been the first to go on it, I recommend that hon. Members absolutely do so. The experience of sitting alongside judges is absolutely first class. My first appearance in court—if I can put it that way—was in a commercial court. I went to the court with the judge. We were just about to go through the door and I said, “I shall just go and sit at the back of the court.” He said, “What do you mean? You’re sitting up next to me in the court.” It was a great shock to me—
John Howell
It was a great shock to the barristers, particularly when I sat in the planning court and the barrister was well known to me. We played a little trick on him by coming in through different doors so that he was unaware of who we were.
The point of all that is that it is a very valuable training scheme. The more that people can go on it, the more there will be an understanding of the issues raised in the Bill and of the need to bring the courts into the 21st century.
Jack Brereton (Stoke-on-Trent South) (Con)
It is an absolute pleasure to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Henley (John Howell), and I am very pleased to speak on Second Reading of the Bill, which is part of a wider programme of reforms to our judicial system. In 2016, there was a joint statement about the reform programme from the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chief Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals saying that the reforms would combine
“our respected traditions with the enabling power of technology. The vision is to modernise and upgrade our justice system so that it works even better for everyone, from judges and legal professionals, to witnesses, litigants and the vulnerable victims of crime. When they have to engage with the system, we want everyone to have available to them the finest justice system in the world.”
That is absolutely right. That is what we want from these reforms; we want a system that works for everybody and is more accessible to everybody.
I also want to bring the attention of the House to what Susan Acland-Hood, the chief executive of the Courts and Tribunals Service said about this:
“Our ambitious programme of court reform aims to bring new technology and modern ways of working to what is—and will remain—the best justice system in the world.”
That is absolutely right. We want to make our fantastic and world-renowned justice system the best in the world. She also says:
“We know our systems and processes haven’t always kept pace with the rapid technological developments…around us.”
That is the key point that is so important for our courts, our tribunal services and our justice system. They very much need to remain relevant, in time and in touch with technological change and it is important that we have that as we move forward.
The Bill is about delivering on those significant reforms to the Courts and Tribunals Service. It includes proposals to develop high-quality digital services, which are so important as we move towards a more digitised age. People are now so used to using digital technologies.
Mr Jim Cunningham (Coventry South) (Lab)
I hope that the introduction of new technology will mean speeding up casework, because for far too long there has been a large gap before something comes to court. I do not think that that is fair in terms of justice or for the individual concerned. Does the hon. Gentleman agree with me?
Jack Brereton
I absolutely agree. Like many Members, I have had a number of constituents come to me to raise concerns about the timeliness of hearings, going to court and how long it takes to get to court. That is so important. I am pleased that it is one of the key things that will, I hope, be addressed by the Bill, which will speed up that process so that we see a much more efficient system of getting into court and getting through the court process.
Unfortunately, at the moment, much of the court system is clunky and bureaucratic. Many of the processes used are over-complex and labour intensive. Another word we might use is counterintuitive, as some of the processes are not entirely logical. We need to reform the process to make it more effective and more efficient, and to deliver more for my constituents, those of the hon. Member for Coventry South (Mr Cunningham) and constituents across the country. We need to ensure that we have a system that remains relevant.
Other things will particularly be improved through digitisation. The public can now apply for non-contested divorces, respond to a jury summons, track social security appeals and issue a response to civil money claims online. The move towards more of these services being offered online is really important, and it is positive to see encouraging and positive feedback from the public about the new services that have been introduced and the work that has been done to encourage more digitisation.
The Bill will continue to build on the reforms, making better use of the skills and experiences of the cohort of judges in our criminal and judicial system. It is important that judges’ time is used to the most advantage and the greatest effect and that we direct judges to the most serious cases, where their expertise can be used to best advantage. We should be ensuring that they are freed from some of the more mundane and routine tasks that can be done by lower-level staff who will be appropriately qualified and experienced to deal with such matters. Senior judges should not be dealing with such issues.
The provisions in the Bill will move forward the process of building efficiency and effectiveness and speed up the turnover of cases, which, as I have already said, is extremely welcome to constituents up and down the country, particularly my constituents in Stoke-on-Trent South. On a number of occasions, I have had to write to the chief executive of the Courts and Tribunals Service and Ministers in the Department about speeding up some of these cases and trying to get some of them to court in a timely way. I know that Members across the House have issues with that.
The Bill is very much about how we can improve the judicial system not just for the people who use it but for the people working in it, making it a much more effective system for judges and all the other very qualified staff who work in it. I am particularly pleased to see that Stoke-on-Trent and Birmingham have been announced as the first two new locations for the Courts and Tribunals Service centres. It is fantastic to see that my own area will benefit from greatly improved services, with faster services for our constituents and better guidance to help the public and professionals understand and use the court process much more effectively. That is very important; the court process needs to be accessible to all our constituents. It should not just be for those who are well informed on these matters.
I am pleased that Stoke-on-Trent will be one of the first two locations. The Courts and Tribunals Service centres have completed the process of organisational design and job design and are commencing the internal selection process for staff to take up roles in the two projects. I want to go into a bit more detail about what that will entail. It will reshape how the Courts and Tribunals Service works, ensuring that it is a much more effective organisation in providing services that our constituents need. Our courts and tribunals will be much more focused on supporting trials and hearings, and it is so important that they do that. The roles of clerks will change. They will be able to support judges and users of courts in more ways, such as by using technology to support their core role. The courts and tribunals will also have listing officers where they do now and staff to support judges, including with more delegated powers, where that is agreed by the judiciary.
This is about making our judicial system and the Courts and Tribunals Service much easier, more accessible and more transparent, and reducing many of the complexities that have unfortunately existed in the judicial system. It is also about cutting down on some bureaucratic and administrative processes, and moving to a much more efficient service, ensuring that we have a service that is providing a first port of call for members of the public who want information on their cases. It is so important for constituents to be able to access information about cases and services as easily as possible.
The first two Courts and Tribunals Service centres, which will begin by supporting our first reformed services—divorce, probate, the single justice service, and social security and child support—will open in Stoke-on-Trent and Birmingham in January 2019. I very much look forward to that and hope that this will move forward easily now. Reforms will involve moving the location of some services in the future. The report talks about the importance of buildings and about the Courts and Tribunals Service learning lessons where we are selling off property or where property is changing, so that we take on board the views of the communities involved. Many of these buildings are important assets to their communities. Many of them are historic buildings in the heart of their communities, and I want to make Members aware of what has been experienced in Stoke-on-Trent.
The magistrates court in Fenton in my constituency was one of 93 courts in England and Wales that were identified for closure and it subsequently did close, in 2012, as part of measures to save about £41 million. As Members can imagine, that provoked a significant outcry in the community. The magistrates court was based in the former town hall in that community, which is a fantastic Victorian building. I am pleased that campaigners have been able to save the building for community use. There are significant lessons to be learned on how we dispose of these buildings and how we can bring them into effective community use. That building, which was used for many, many years as the magistrates court, is now a real hub for the community, providing spaces for local businesses and community groups, a café and an art gallery. These fantastic facilities have been brought back into use for the community because things have been done in the right way. The Department has to be congratulated, following the significant pressure that was put on it by the community, on the fact that that site is now back with the community.
Justin, a descendant of William Meath Baker, the person who built Fenton town hall, bought the town hall and is gradually restoring that building and bringing it back into use for the community. Once fully completed and restored, that building, which was built in 1888, will be a fantastic part of the community, and I hope it will continue to be used for many decades to come by the community. As we move forward with these reforms—with the digitisation and the moving of courts to different locations—it is important to take account of the places we have had previously and the changes that were made. It would be great to see former courts up and down the land that are no longer needed, because of the efficiencies that have been made, being used for community value and in productive ways for our communities.
I wish to finish by giving a few statistics about what this process will mean for the Courts and Tribunals Service. More than £1 billion will be invested in transforming the system, which will include 21st-century technology, online services and digital working, while making sure that our justice system remains the most accessible justice system possible for constituents such as mine. There is a real opportunity to make the system much more accessible to our constituents. The measures in the Bill will enable direct financial benefits of around £6 million per annum and enable wider court reforms, which will save around £200 million per annum once fully implemented. Over 65,000 people have used the pilots of new courts and tribunal services and received straightforward digital access to courts for the first time. Those statistics demonstrate the benefits of the Bill. That is why I am very pleased to support it today.
Imran Hussain (Bradford East) (Lab)
I draw hon. Members’ attention to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests, and I start by acknowledging some of the excellent contributions from Members across the House. My hon. Friend the Member for Bristol West (Thangam Debbonaire) passionately made a plea, and a very important point, on the impact on some of the most deprived and how we should always mitigate that. The hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill), the much respected Chair of the Justice Committee, made a very important point about the right to reconsideration, which I will come on to in greater depth.
Robert Neill
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way, because it gives me the chance to do justice to his hon. Friend the hon. Member for Bolton South East (Yasmin Qureshi), and to remind the House of my entries in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests, which I should have done before. The hon. Lady and I had a minor debate about whether Lord Judge or Lord Marks quoted Joshua Rozenberg. We have now worked out between us that Lord Marks quoted him in a debate on this Bill, but that Lord Judge quoted him in a debate on another occasion—so they both quoted him, and he has been quoted twice here.
Imran Hussain
I am grateful to the Chair of the Justice Committee; he has saved me some time, because my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South East (Yasmin Qureshi) asked me to clarify that matter in my speech.
I also acknowledge the contribution from the hon. Member for Henley (John Howell), who rightly made the point about a consistency in approach across the judiciary and did so very well. The hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent South (Jack Brereton) spoke passionately about making our justice system the best in the world—which it already is, although we can improve it through further and better technology.
When the Government brought the Prisons and Courts Bill to the House, they declared an intention to reform our courts and judicial system. When that Bill fell because of the Prime Minister’s ill-fated decision to call a general election, they restated their intention for reform and brought this Bill before us. In opening the debate today, the Lord Chancellor spoke about court reform, new and innovative technology, and sweeping modernisation, yet the content of the Bill does not match his words. It is devoid of any substantial change that will encourage greater access to justice, and it wilfully omits—and even seeks to avoid—debate on the huge, pressing concerns present in our courts system. When seen in the wider context of the Government’s austerity agenda and cuts to the justice system, it seems to be less about reform and more about squeezing as much money as possible from the courts.
Even at first glance, this is a minimal, even empty, Bill—a view that is vindicated upon reading it in more detail. It contains provisions to extend the redeployment of judges, to rename some of the judiciary and to allow an increased use of the delegation of judicial functions to non-judicial staff. While all those measures have value, in no way do they capture all that is needed to reform our courts and judiciary. They are measures taken by a Government intent on introducing a drip-feed of legislation in the absence of their parliamentary majority, avoiding scrutiny. Not only have they omitted anything substantial, but they have drafted the Bill to avoid some of the most pressing issues facing the justice system. It makes no mention of measures to address legal aid cuts, court closures, judicial vacancies or the protection of domestic abuse victims. It is here where the real failures of reform lie.
On legal aid cuts, access to justice has been decimated. Spending has fallen by one third from £2.5 billion to £1.6 billion per year, and the number of civil legal aid cases has fallen from more than 500,000 in the year to April 2013 to just under 150,000 in the year to April 2017. Vulnerable people are being left unable to defend themselves in areas as fundamental as housing, employment, immigration and welfare benefits, and unnecessary costs are being created for the taxpayer as cases are going to court that could have been resolved earlier. Further costs for the public purse arising from cuts are causing issues such as poor health, homelessness and debt. When people lack the money or knowledge to enforce their rights, those rights are worth nothing more than the paper they are written on, yet the Bill fails to mention legal aid or the urgent need to reverse the changes imposed by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012.
On court closures, the Bill is silent and has closed down discussion on this equally vital issue for people’s access to justice. It fails to address the significant £1 billion-plus courts reform programme that is being pushed through, as the Lord Chancellor stated earlier—but without any proper scrutiny. Since 2010, the courts and tribunals estate has changed significantly, with hundreds of courts having been closed in the name of austerity, and that has hampered people’s ability to access justice.
Many claimants and defendants must now travel miles to access justice and uphold their rights, the Government having closed their local courts, but many lack either the transport or the finances needed to do so and as a result have lost what should be their guaranteed right to justice. The Government argue that their modernisation programme reduces the need for an expansive courts estate, but we are clear that courts reform should increase access to justice, not ignore its erosion, and that any modernisation of our courts system must not be a smokescreen for cuts and closures that will cause long-term damage to access to justice.
As mentioned earlier, the Bill should have done much more to address the appalling situation of victims of domestic violence being subjected to questioning by those who assaulted them. Women’s Aid found that almost one in four of survey respondents had been cross-examined in this way. That unacceptable situation puts the victims of abuse through yet more torment and hardship, for no conceivable reason. It is cruel and barbaric. Measures to prevent it from happening and protect victims are supported by campaign groups on women’s rights and domestic violence, including Women’s Aid, but yet again such measures are absent from the Bill, despite having been in the Prisons and Courts Bill. There is no excuse for the Government’s not having included such measures in the Bill: that should shame them. I hope they can explain when such measures will be introduced to rectify the situation.
Where there is change, it is change that the Government have failed to impose with sufficient protection, and it is here that we will seek to amend the Bill. On a point of clarification, I should say that my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South East did not mean to say earlier that we opposed the Bill: we will be abstaining today and tabling amendments in Committee. We are determined to deliver change and reform to the courts and judiciary, even if through the Government’s piecemeal efforts, but we are equally determined that it not be done at the expense of the judiciary, legal protections or judicial independence.
As the Government seek to delegate judicial functions to non-judicial staff, they must be careful of their use; they must not overuse non-judicial staff or use them as substitute judges to fill the significant number of judicial vacancies, which have risen to critical levels on their watch. Judges must absolutely remain at the top of their hierarchy in the courts, and their position must not be undermined by non-judicial staff assuming more and more of their functions. Granting further powers to non-judicial staff not only risks undermining the judiciary, but runs the even more dangerous risk of delegating serious judicial functions to unqualified staff.
It is important for the Bill to contain provisions that prevent excessive delegation, protect the reputation of the judiciary, and protect claimants, prosecutors and defendants from unqualified decisions. The Government ceded amendments to impose in primary legislation some restrictions on the type of judicial functions that authorised staff can discharge, but we need a strong further commitment; I hope that the Lord Chancellor and the Minister will strengthen their stance in that regard.
There are also insufficient protections for the expertise of our judiciary. Those would be provided through the imposition of a minimum standard on staff to whom decisions are delegated. The Government argue that authorised staff will not be making substantial decisions, but in his review of efficiency in criminal proceedings Sir Brian Leveson states that even non-contested elements of cases require experience, and Lord Briggs has said in his report that even if authorised staff are legally trained and qualified, they will not benefit from years of judicial experience in delivering the quality of services that is currently delivered by judges.
It is therefore extremely important that the decisions being delegated to authorised staff are appropriate to their experience and qualifications, as the prospect of non-qualified, inexperienced staff carrying out judicial functions is all too real and worrisome. When such staff make decisions, it is also vital for those decisions to be subject to a statutory right to judicial reconsideration.
The Government state in their factsheet that the functions and responsibilities delegated to authorised staff will be uncontested, but it is easy to see how that could shift in the future to authorised staff making contested decisions, particularly in the absence of a clear definition of what delegation can be given. Justice has said that some of the functions anticipated for authorised staff, such as extending time for service and taking pleas, may well give rise to contested matters and have consequences for cases. It is therefore essential for the Government to impose a statutory right to reconsideration for decisions taken by authorised staff—a view supported by the Bar Council. In not imposing such measures when the public have a real and reasonable expectation that significant contested decisions in a court will be made by a judge—or, if not, that there will at least be a right of appeal or review before a judge—the Government are also playing fast and loose with the public’s trust in the judiciary and the rule of law.
The Government may claim that the procedure rule committees could and would impose similar safeguards in any rules that they produce, but that is simply not good enough, given that their amendments fail to offer sufficient guarantees of a right of review. We think that, and so does the Bar Council, which believes that a further amendment is necessary to abate its concern that the Government could exert pressure on the PRCs to reduce the right of reconsideration to increase the turnover of cases and clear the backlog. We are adamant that any backlog must not be cleared through the removal of a fundamental legal right of reconsideration.
Let me end by confirming that we will abstain today, but look forward to the Government’s seriously considering our amendments in Committee. The Lord Chancellor opened the debate in a spirit of collaboration. I assure him that all our amendments are very reasonable, and I am sure that he is an amiable chap who will view them in the same light. If the Government want to deliver a worthwhile Bill, they must listen to these arguments, not throw them aside. They must consider them in Committee before returning the Bill to the House.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Lucy Frazer)
It gives me great pleasure to respond to the debate on this Bill, which, as many have said, is a small but important step in our court reform programme. As the Lord Chancellor set out in his speech, our courts together with our judiciary are respected throughout the world, but our courts and tribunals need to move with the times, and we have heard some excellent points today on how this Bill will improve our efficiency. I wish to respond to some of them.
As the excellent Chair of the Select Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill), said, the Bill’s measures are important technical reforms that require a statutory base. He highlighted the importance of the judicial process in general—the importance of each case to the individual whose case it is. These are important points that the Ministry of Justice must always bear in mind.
My hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent South (Jack Brereton) was right to point out, as I have, that this is but one part of a suite of measures of court reform. I was grateful to the hon. Member for Bristol West (Thangam Debbonaire) for saying there is a great deal that is good in this Bill, and she asked a number of questions that I am happy to answer. She said it is important that there be no reduction in justice over all, and was concerned about court closures. As 41% of our courts are used at less than half their available capacity, we must think about whether it is sensible to spend more money on the court estate as opposed to other things; at present a fifth of our budget is spent on the court estate. The hon. Lady suggested that we were pushing through this legislation at a time when the House is thinking about other things. That is patently untrue; its measures were included in the Prisons and Courts Bill, which was going through this House but fell at the general election.
The hon. Lady also raised concerns that must be addressed about the immigration tribunals. I highlight to her the measures we are introducing to give court staff the ability to undertake some judicial and other functions. They are already in operation in some tribunals. In the first and upper tier tribunals, for example, there are already three tiers of staff authorised to exercise different judicial functions; the most basic functions of issuing standard directions at commencement of a case can be carried out by authorised staff members at some chambers; slightly more complex functions are undertaken by caseworkers; and the most complex of the delegated functions are generally reserved to registrars, who are legally qualified. The hon. Lady asked whether I have read “The Secret Barrister”, and I am happy to confirm that the Lord Chancellor and I read it many months ago, just as we read many other publications that affect our Department.
The hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd (Liz Saville Roberts) thought the measures were a cost-cutting exercise. They absolutely are not; we are asking ourselves how to use resources in the best way possible, how to deploy our judges as efficiently as possible, and how to ensure people get fair and swift judgment. That is not just our view; this is the view from Members across the House. As Lord Marks said in the other place,
“It seems to us relevant that the purpose of this part of the legislation is to increase efficiency and—hopefully, and to everybody’s advantage—the speed of decision-making within the court and tribunal systems, while making some cost savings in so doing.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 16 October 2018; Vol. 793, c. 414.]
There are three key clauses in this Bill. One is clause 3 on authorised functions, which allows appropriately qualified and experienced court staff in civil, family and magistrates courts and the High Court, Court of Appeal, Court of Protection and tribunals to continue to carry out uncontroversial and straightforward judicial functions under judicial supervision. My hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk) made an important point that I highlighted to the hon. Member for Bristol West: some court staff in these jurisdictions are already carrying out certain of these functions, but we are extending that to the Crown court and freeing up judges from the most routine tasks, ensuring that case preparation and management tasks are distributed at the appropriate level, or reserved to judges when that is proportionate.
As the right hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton (Sir Edward Davey) highlighted, the Bill prevents certain judicial functions—for or example, committing someone to prison or serving injunctions—from being undertaken by authorised staff. As his colleague Lord Marks said in the other place, it is right that these should not be delegated.
The hon. Member for Bolton South East (Yasmin Qureshi) suggested that there would be limited scrutiny of officers. This ignores the reality of the Bill, because their tasks will be set by the rule committee, which will be independent, judicially led and therefore best placed to determine the functions of staff. The committee will have a broad membership, including judiciary, representatives of court users and legal professionals. Lord Thomas said in the other place that
“it is important to stress the degree of control inherent in the Bill by the use of the rule committee. I was a member of and chaired…the Criminal Procedure Rule Committee, which I can assure you is a highly representative body with many representatives of the legal profession.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 20 June 2018; Vol. 791, c. 2039.]
The hon. Lady asked for three years’ post-qualification experience, but qualifications for staff giving legal advice should be set out in regulations, as they have been since 1979. Qualifications ought to depend on the functions involved, and many of the functions that staff currently exercise are straightforward and routine and do not require a legal qualification. An example would be the fixing of hearing dates. She also said that she wanted a statutory right for reconsideration, but many rule committees in the civil and judicial jurisdictions already have a right to reconsideration built in. Magistrates and family courts already have mechanisms for reviewing decisions. This is up to the rule committee, and if it decides not to create such a right, it must give its reasons to the Lord Chancellor, as the Bill states.
My hon. Friends the Members for Cheltenham and for North Dorset (Simon Hoare) talked about the independence of staff. The Bill introduces a statutory guarantee of independence from the Lord Chancellor for authorised Courts and Tribunals Service staff in all jurisdictions, and makes staff answerable to the Lord Chief Justice or the senior president of the tribunal, rather than the Lord Chancellor.
This has been a wide-ranging debate in which the technical matters of the Bill have been raised along with a large number of other matters, which I shall mention briefly. My hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst talked about the wider Bill; I should stress that the Lord Chancellor and I are keen to bring forward wider legislation in relation to courts, and we will do so as soon as parliamentary time allows. My hon. Friend the Member for Henley (John Howell) rightly advocated for the industry and parliamentary placement scheme, which the hon. Member for Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport (Luke Pollard) also raised with me in oral questions recently. It is an excellent scheme, and I encourage all those who are interested in joining it to do so.
My hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham spoke about the importance of the judiciary, and he was absolutely right to highlight that point. Our judiciary is respected throughout the world, and we need to continue to attract the best talent to it. My hon. Friend the Member for Henley mentioned the importance of digitisation. We have a number of schemes in which we are bringing digitisation to our courts. For example, people can now apply online for probate, and petition online for divorce, and we are also bringing a significant amount of technology to the social security tribunal.
I would like to end by responding to the points raised by the hon. Member for Bolton South East and the hon. Member for Bradford East (Imran Hussain) on the shadow Front Bench. They suggested that we were not addressing the bigger issues, but I would like to remind the House that we have been looking at the important question of legal aid for a number of months. We are in the middle of a legal aid review, and we are aware of the issues that are being raised. We will report on that by the end of the year. Hon. Members also raised the issue of domestic violence. As they will know, we have recently consulted on that issue, and we will be bringing in a domestic violence Bill. As they are also aware, cross-examination in the courts will be covered by that Bill.
Finally, we recently consulted on our approach to court closures, and I would like to clarify a number of matters raised today in relation to court closures and finance. The hon. Member for Bolton South East suggested that petty sums were being raised by our court closure programme, which is not true. Since 2015-16, we have recovered £122 million from the court closure programme, all of which is being reinvested in our justice system, and have spent approximately £170 million on capital maintenance.
The Ministry of Justice is committed to continuing to protect the individuals who go through our justice system, and to making their experience better, speedier, fair and just, and it is on that basis that I commend the Bill to the House.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill accordingly read a Second time.
Business without Debate
Tuesday 27th November 2018
(6 years ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Act 2018 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: HL Bill 108-R-I Marshalled list for Report (PDF) - (12 Oct 2018)
Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting)
Tuesday 4th December 2018
(6 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Act 2018 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 4 December 2018 - (4 Dec 2018)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 8 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 8 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 8 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 8 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 8 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 8 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
Before we begin, I will make a few preliminary points. Please switch all electronic devices to silent. Tea and coffee are not allowed during sittings. Today we will consider the programme motion, which was agreed by the programming sub-committee yesterday. We will then consider the motion to enable the reporting of written evidence for publication. In view of the limited time available, I hope that we can take those matters without too much debate.
Ordered,
That—
(1) the Committee shall (in addition to its first meeting at 9.25 am on Tuesday 4 December) meet—
(a) at 2.00 pm on Tuesday 4 December;
(b) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 6 December;
(2) the proceedings shall be taken in the following order: Clauses 1 to 3; the Schedule; Clause 4; new Clauses; new Schedules; remaining proceedings on the Bill;
(3) the proceedings shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at 5.00 pm on Thursday 6 December. —(Lucy Frazer.)
Ordered,
That, subject to the discretion of the Chair, any written evidence received by the Committee shall be reported to the House for publication.—(Lucy Frazer.)
The Chair
We will begin line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The selection list, which shows how the selected amendments have been grouped for debate, is available in the room. Amendments grouped together are generally on the same issue, or similar issues. Decisions on amendments will not take place in the order in which they are debated, but in the order in which they appear on the amendment paper. The selection list shows the order of debate; decisions on each amendment are taken when we come to the clause that the amendment affects. I will use my discretion to decide whether to allow a separate stand part debate on individual clauses and schedules following the debates on the relevant amendments.
Clause 1
Deployment of judges
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Lucy Frazer)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Henry.
A key element of our reforms in relation to courts is ensuring that we have a justice system that works better for everyone, which includes making the best use of our judges’ experience, expertise and time. I should make it clear that the deployment of judges is a matter for the judiciary, and the Lord Chief Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals already have far-reaching powers to ensure that the right judges are deployed on the right cases, taking account of changes in case loads of different jurisdictions. However, there are five areas in which clause 1 would amend current legislation to increase that flexibility to deploy judges where they are needed.
The first change is about the temporary appointment of deputy judges to the High Court. The Lord Chief Justice already has a statutory power to appoint a person meeting the eligibility criteria as a judge of the High Court if their appointment is urgent, temporary and there are no other reasonable steps that could be taken to fill the gap. Those temporarily appointed judges are ordinarily existing, serving judges who have been appointed to a judicial office via the independent Judicial Appointments Commission process. Current legislation allows those appointments to facilitate business in the High Court or Crown court only. Clause 1(1) would widen that so that the person appointed could sit in any court or tribunal on which an ordinarily appointed deputy judge of the High Court could be deployed, such as the county court, the family court, the first-tier tribunal and the upper tribunal.
The second change in clause 1 relates to the upper tribunal. The Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 sets out which judges are judges of the upper tribunal and may therefore hear cases there. The definition comprises a number of different types of judge, such as circuit or district judges, but does not currently include recorders. As fee-paid judges, recorders have equivalent powers to circuit judges, and may sit in the Crown court or the High Court with appropriate authorisation. Allowing recorders to sit in the upper tribunal would allow the judiciary to make more use of recorders’ experience, expertise and skill, and would provide greater flexibility to meet business need.
The third change in clause 1 relates to chamber presidents in the first-tier tribunal and the upper tribunal. Currently, there is a restriction that prevents someone from presiding over more than one chamber of the first-tier tribunal or of the upper tribunal. Subsection (4) would allow a chamber president to be appointed to more than one chamber in the same tribunal. That would enable the Senior President of Tribunals to use the existing and future complement of chamber presidents to provide continuous leadership across all chambers without having to recruit and appoint a new chamber president immediately if there were a vacancy.
The fourth change in the clause relates to senior judges of employment tribunals. Currently, there are restrictions on where senior judges of employment tribunals may be deployed. The Bill will enable the presidents of employment tribunals for England, Wales and Scotland to sit in the Employment Appeal Tribunal, which will provide additional capacity for experienced judges to hear appeals. The Bill will also enable leadership judges— the presidents and vice-presidents of the employment tribunal Scotland, and regional employment judges of the employment tribunals—to hear cases in the first- tier tribunal and the upper tribunal, making more use of their experience and skill where needed.
The final part of the clause relates to flexible deployment with respect to arbitration. The Arbitration Act 1996 currently provides for certain judges of the High Court to sit as judge-arbitrators. That allows cases falling within the relevant jurisdiction of the High Court to be resolved via arbitration with the Lord Chief Justice’s permission. The clause extends the range of High Court judges who can sit as judge-arbitrators, and would also allow the Lord Chief Justice to delegate his functions in agreeing that judges can be appointed as judge-arbitrators. That will allow, for example, judges in the chancery division of the High Court, which has seen a growth in demand for arbitration in recent years, to resolve cases in that way. Those provisions, taken together, will contribute towards a modern and responsive justice system.
Yasmin Qureshi (Bolton South East) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Henry. While we accept the necessity for the clause, we have some concerns, which we hope the Government will take on board.
We accept that there are practical arguments for expanding the flexible deployment of judges, including temporary judges appointed outside the usual Judicial Appointment Commission selection process, to a wider pool of courts and tribunals. The appointment of temporary judges as a principle, however, should be approached with caution. It is important to view flexible deployment generally through the prism of the Government’s wider reforms and cuts, and plans for savings on judicial salaries.
We are concerned about that being used regularly as opposed to on an occasional basis. [Interruption.] Sorry, the Minister was looking very confused. We are concerned about the potential for a trend of too much reliance on temporary judges. The provisions should be used only to deal with urgent matters in the case of a shortage of judges, and the deployment of judges across different sectors should not become the de facto position.
Clearly, one of the things that the Government have not mentioned is what training provisions will be provided for judges moving out of their normal area of activity. If a Crown court judge is transferred to a tribunal, for example, what kind of training would they receive to deal with issues unique to the tribunal system—for example, on issues of disability, reasonable adaption for the purpose of disability legislation, and what could be considered discriminatory under equality legislation. Those are key issues unique to employment tribunals. We want to know and ensure that there are training provisions for that.
As a consequence of the clause, civil judges might come into the criminal courts and Crown courts. What training will be provided for them to deal with specific issues that are unique to the criminal court, such as admissions of previous convictions, which can sometimes be brought in against defendants, and go against the normal rules? What about issues of disclosure? If a failure to disclose material information is ruled inadmissible, it can cause the whole case to collapse. Those are some of the things that are unique to particular courts. I have used the example of the Crown court and the employment tribunals to demonstrate that there are things that are unique to those courts. While we will not oppose the clause, we ask the Government to provide some assurance that the Lord Chief Justice and the Lord Chancellor will make proper financial provision for those judges to update their skills and to receive professional training when they go into a different area of judicial function.
Lucy Frazer
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for making some important points. She can rest assured that the temporary appointments are temporary, and they can be made only if they are urgent and temporary and if no other reasonable steps can be taken to fill the gaps. I can also assure her about training: where judges are asked to sit in a new jurisdiction, further induction will be provided in line with the directions of the senior judiciary. The Judicial College is in charge of training, and it will continue to train our judges. Judges will also attend continuation training for all jurisdictions in which they sit.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 1 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 2
Alteration of judicial titles
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Lucy Frazer
No amendments have been tabled to the clause and no issues at all were raised in the other place, or on Second Reading in this place.
In summary, the clause is part of our reform to modernise our courts to ensure that court users know who is hearing the case, and what sort of case the matter is about. The clause therefore provides for amendment of judicial titles to reflect a change in the name of the court in which those judges sit. It also ensures that the title of that office and similar offices can be changed through secondary legislation in the future.
Subsections (1) and (2) change the title of chief bankruptcy registrar to chief insolvency and companies court judge. That reflects the change in the name of the other judges of this court and of the court itself. In 2017, the name of the court dealing with bankruptcy matters was changed to the insolvency and companies court to better reflect its work. Earlier this year, the titles of the more senior judges in that court were changed to reflect the change in the name of the court. The Bill therefore changes the title of the office of the senior judge to bring it in line with other judges of the court.
Subsection (3) enables the judicial titles of other senior masters and district judges of the senior courts to be changed in future by secondary, not primary, legislation, should it be necessary to do so. Changes of title may be required, for example, because of organisational changes in the courts and tribunals. The clause will correct an anomaly that prevents some judicial titles from being amended by ministerial order. Such judicial measures, while relatively modest, will contribute towards a more modern justice system.
Yasmin Qureshi
The clause seems to be a sensible one, so the Opposition have tabled no amendments to it.
The Chair
I am pleased to hear that.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 2 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 3
Authorised court and tribunal staff: legal advice and judicial functions
Yasmin Qureshi
I beg to move amendment 2, in clause 3, page 3, line 24, leave out subsection 3 and insert—
“(3) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House.”
This amendment would require that where statutory instruments delegating judicial functions to authorised persons are brought they would be subject to the affirmative procedure.
Yasmin Qureshi
We tabled the amendment because the existing drafting of the clause appears to allow the delegation of judicial functions to authorised persons without going through an affirmative process—that is, without using secondary legislation. As the Bill stands, that would be done automatically. Bearing in mind that we have expressed concern about the whole system of the authorised person being delegated judicial functions, we believe that that should be done, if it comes to that, by means of a statutory instrument so that Parliament has a chance to discuss it. We would be able to make observations and it would not go through on the nod.
The issue of delegating judicial functions to authorised persons is important to us. At the moment, the Bill does not talk about who such people will be, what their qualifications are, what they will do, or what subjects and issues they can deal with. As the Bill is drafted and from what Ministers have said, the procedure committee is expected to make all those decisions. We do not accept that that should be the case. There are real issues that need to be determined through parliamentary discussion. These measures should be introduced through statutory instruments and not just be decided by the procedure committee as envisaged in the Bill. The procedure committee should listen to our concerns. We want more parliamentary scrutiny of this part of the legislation, through a statutory instrument.
Lucy Frazer
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Bolton South East for raising the issue and giving me the opportunity to respond, so I can satisfy her that her concerns are unfounded, I hope.
The power in clause 3(2) seems to have caused considerable confusion here and in the other place, so it might be helpful for me to explain how it works. That power does not permit the delegation of judicial functions to authorised persons—that is a matter for the procedure rules made by the independent rule committees. The power in clause 3(2) could not make such changes because it is a narrow power that is very clearly restricted to consequential, transitional, transitory or saving provisions—a concept that is well understood with many precedents. Those terms are construed strictly by the courts.
The power in clause 3(2) is needed because the procedure rules cannot be used to make all the necessary amendments to other secondary legislation—we will use regulations made under the clause to do that. The power is needed principally to amend references in secondary legislation from “justices’ clerk”, a post abolished by the Bill, to “authorised officer”. So far, we have identified more than 200 references in more than 60 pieces of secondary legislation that would need amendment, and there may be more.
The Government do not intend to use this power to amend primary legislation. Lord Keen gave an undertaking to that effect on Report in the other place. Therefore, there is no express provision for such amendments in clause 3. To accept this amendment would set an unhelpful precedent and would mean that valuable parliamentary time would have to be set aside to debate minor and consequential changes to secondary legislation. In a busy parliamentary Session, that would delay implementation of the provisions in the Bill. I hope that the hon. Lady is reassured and feels able to withdraw the amendment.
Yasmin Qureshi
Although I hear what the Minister says, we are not reassured and we will push the amendment to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Yasmin Qureshi
I beg to move amendment 3, in the schedule, page 6, line 36, at end insert—
“(aa) is a qualified solicitor, barrister or chartered legal executive with more than three years’ experience post-qualification, and”.
This amendment would stipulate that the minimum legal qualifications for authorised persons should be three years’ experience post-qualification.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 4, in the schedule, page 8, line 31, at end insert—
“() is a qualified solicitor, barrister or chartered legal executive with more than three years’ experience post-qualification, and”.
See explanatory statement to Amendment 3.
Amendment 5, in the schedule, page 11, line 12, at end insert
“and if they are a qualified solicitor, barrister or chartered legal executive with more than three years’ experience post-qualification”.
See explanatory statement to Amendment 3.
Yasmin Qureshi
As I have indicated to the Clerk, we will be dividing the Committee on these amendments.
Clause 3 delegates judicial functions to authorised staff, and we are concerned about that. Although we accept that there are some occasions where people other than judges can make decisions on cases, such as on simple procedural issues, including time extensions or requests for adjournments, if authorised people are to be given more than those powers, they must be of a certain calibre. The Bill gives no information on who these people will be, and that worries us, because it would appear that allowing jobs carried out by judges to be done by others, who are not qualified, is another attempt to cut costs and save money. If the Bill said that the authorised people were to be qualified lawyers, barristers or solicitors, or legal executives with three years’ experience or more, as in the amendments, we would be much more reassured about this part of the Bill.
Ellie Reeves (Lewisham West and Penge) (Lab)
Does my hon. Friend agree that even what might, on the face of it, be a straightforward case management conference could involve complex tactical or substantive issues? Giving such decisions to someone who is not legally qualified could have a massive impact on access to justice.
Yasmin Qureshi
My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. We know that more and more people are now representing themselves in court because of cuts to legal aid. If those making decisions—those may appear to be administrative but may be quite crucial to these people—are not legally qualified and trained, errors are more likely to occur, because we now have so many people representing themselves who are not familiar with court processes or the courts. That is on top of the fact that so many courts are now being closed, and a lot of the work is being done off-site by means of technological improvements. Many cases used to be disposed of in a physical court building, and there would be judges, lawyers and people who could assist and give advice and information. Now, with so much being done outside of court buildings and from call centres, there is even less help available.
I will give an example. When I was prosecuting, defending or in court, someone would sometimes turn up who had no legal representation. They would be really worried about what was going on. I and many of my colleagues would give informal advice; it was not legal advice, but we could point them in the right direction—we could suggest things they could try. There was somebody to give them advice or assistance; the court clerks or staff in the court were also able to direct people informally. However, with fewer and fewer people going to court, more and more things being done online, and more and more stuff being carried out in call centres, where someone does not know who they are speaking to or what qualifications or level of experience they have, it is even more important to ensure we have this safeguard.
It is okay to have laws, but if we have no mechanism to enforce them, or to ensure that they are done properly, justice is not served. Therefore, the complete lack of information in the Bill about who the authorised people will be, and even about what work they will do, is completely wrong. That is why we feel strongly about it, as we mentioned on Second Reading in the House of Commons, and in the other place. To date, the Government have taken no notice of that.
We also have to recognise that some of the authorised people will be employed directly by Her Majesty’s courts and tribunals, which raises questions about accountability and independence. They may be more subject to pressures because of administration. Again, therefore, we need something to show that the people who will do these things are qualified.
Qualified barristers, solicitors and lawyers, even when they work in the courts system, have an appropriate professional body with codes of conduct they have to abide by. If they do not abide by those codes of conduct, they could be struck off from their practice. However, if the people who carry out the work are not legally qualified, such as administrative staff or clerical officers, they will not have to think about their independent professional bodies. In fact, they will probably be more subject to pressures of administration to speed things up. If somebody asks for an adjournment, staff might say no; if somebody wants certain documents to be disclosed, they will say that that cannot be done, because they will be under pressure to speed things up and deal with cases quickly. They will not be as concerned as a barrister, a solicitor or a chartered executive about what their professional bodies will say.
We also do not know what kind of functions these people will be given. As my hon. Friend mentioned, something that seems straightforward could actually be quite complicated. I refer to disclosure issues in civil cases, as well as in the criminal courts. Disclosure is an important part of a case proceeding properly. Someone may well ask for certain information, and the person at the other end will say, “No, you don’t need it,” but we do not know. Because they do not have the legal expertise and knowledge, there is a greater chance of errors occurring and things happening that perhaps would not happen if a legally qualified person were exercising those powers.
The Government’s approach is that all these issues can be dealt with by the procedure rule committees, which are made up of judges and other practitioners. They are also under pressure and financial constraints, however, so they would also have to look at pressures and so on, and they might not be able to do things as independently as we might ask.
Alex Chalk (Cheltenham) (Con)
The hon. Lady is, of course, making important points, but we can have a degree of confidence that the judges who head up the committees, who have shown themselves to be scrupulously and fiercely independent, would continue to behave in exactly that way. Does she not agree?
Yasmin Qureshi
I have, of course, the utmost regard and respect for our judiciary, but I believe that, in the procedure committees, financial constraints and pressures sometime come into play in trying to speed things up through the courts system. The ethos is that a case should be dealt with very quickly—there is nothing wrong with that—and that there should be minimal interactions between lawyers in the court process. When the procedure committees make certain rules, such as defining who the authorised person is, what is wrong with Parliament saying that the starting point should be that those authorised persons must have been legally qualified for at least three years?
It is also important that we have an idea about what kind of things the authorised persons can do. Procedure committees can make rules, but they may be constrained by trying to get things through quickly. There may be things that they think that authorised persons can do, but, in fact, they should not, because they are not judicial. I do not see what is wrong with us, as Parliament, saying, “Look, this is the bare minimum that the procedure committees should be thinking about.” Then they can add to it.
Alex Chalk
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for giving way a second time. May I respectfully press her a little on this? On the one hand, she says that she has enormous respect for the procedure rule committees, the judges and the highly qualified people who occupy these positions, and that they would always act in a way that is consistent with justice. On the other hand, she says that, actually, they will not, because they will ensure that a desire to avoid delays trumps justice. She cannot have it both ways. If she trusts the judges, she needs to come out and say that she trusts them to act in the way that they have, in time-honoured tradition, which is by putting justice first.
Yasmin Qureshi
My observations relate to when judges are dealing with an individual case. Of course, we know that they are independent, but when someone becomes part of an administrative body, a procedure committee or an arm of the state—I mean that in a loose way, not in terms of a formal relationship—sometimes the criteria that they look at are different from when they are dealing with an individual case presented before them.
I will give an example, albeit not one that relates to judges. The Crown Prosecution Service, an organisation for which I worked for a number of years—I still have friends who work in it, even though I left years ago—has had different people serve as Director of Public Prosecutions. However, prosecutors who have been there for a long time say that, bar perhaps two DPPs who were really concerned about ensuring that the department was fully financially resourced, and who actually fought hard for it to get resources, the other DPPs did not make that sort of effort. People do act for administrative purposes.
The reality is that senior people at the top of organisations, when they are doing administration and are running institutions, look at things such as money and financial administration, try to save as much money as possible, and try to push things along as quickly as possible, because that looks good in their statistics. Because of that, we would say that what we are asking for is not too weighty. We have tabled very reasonable amendments. The people who will make some of these enormous decisions should be legally qualified and—we will come on to this later—we should consider what kind of things they can actually do. I do not think there is anything wrong with giving a steer to procedure committees. They can deal with some of the other rules, but we should have some basic minimum standards.
Lucy Frazer
I, too, propose to deal with amendments 3, 4 and 5 together, as they all relate to minimum qualifications for authorised staff. Amendments 3 and 4 require that any staff member who gives legal advice to lay justices or judges of the family court be legally qualified and have more than three years’ experience post qualification. Amendment 5 makes the same requirement of any staff carrying out judicial functions.
The staff who currently give legal advice in the magistrates court and the family courts are justices’ clerks and assistant clerks. Assistant clerks, who are also known as legal advisers, currently provide the overwhelming majority of legal advice on a day-to-day basis. To be an assistant clerk at the moment one must be a barrister in England and Wales or a solicitor of the senior courts of England and Wales, have passed the necessary exams for either of those professions, or have qualified as a legal adviser under historical rules that were in place prior to 1999.
Jess Phillips (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)
The Minister is explaining who will get to decide whether we are flexible on this in the future, bit what I do not hear—what I do not hear in any of this Bill—is how we make sure that these changes mean improvements for the people who use these courts. While the judiciary and the people carrying out these functions certainly seem to have a voice in the changes being proposed, in terms of the changes I would like to see in the family courts, the voices of those people using the courts are nowhere in this Bill.
Lucy Frazer
That is a very important point. We serve the people through justice and the court system. The people who come to the courts to get justice are the people my Department is serving. In all our reform programme, we have a user-centred focus and consistently engage with users to improve our services. All the forms we have recently produced were produced with insight from users, which is why we have an extremely high satisfaction rate for the reforms we are making.
The hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley makes an important and valid point, and I can tell her how users will benefit from this. She will have been in the House when questions were put to me about delays in the court system and about the time it is taking for certain hearings to come before the courts. We want to ensure that there are as few delays as possible and that justice is not only fair but speedily dispensed. These changes will allow functions to be operated by the appropriate people, and will enable us to get more swift, easy and quick justice for those who use our courts.
Andy Slaughter (Hammersmith) (Lab)
I am sure the Minister is sincere in her intention. My experience is that there is increasing delay. Part of that is caused by inexperience, perhaps because of the use of lay magistrates as opposed to district judges, who do not take command of the issue and do not timetable matters correctly. I am concerned about any decline in the level of experience. This is perhaps a question not of legal qualification but of experience in being able to manage and seize control of cases. I would rather see the greater control and scrutiny that the amendments would introduce.
Lucy Frazer
I am sorry if the hon. Gentleman has not experienced the appropriate level of judicial engagement or appropriate judgments in courts. I recently went to the family court in London, and I have been to courts across the country, and I have spoken to magistrates who operate in the family courts. The expertise and dedication I see is commendable. We can stand still, do nothing and just let our courts operate in the way they are operating, or we can sit back and reflect on how we can improve our court system. We are trying to do the latter through the Bill. We are trying to improve people’s experience of the courts, recognising that funds and resources are not unlimited and that we need to use them as well as we can. On listing, my Department is looking at a listing programme to ensure that lists operate as effectively as possible.
It is simply not necessary for all authorised staff exercising judicial functions to possess legal qualifications. The qualifications and experience staff need will depend on the nature of the work they carry out. Legal qualifications of the level that would be required by amendment 5 not only are far too high for the routine and straightforward case preparation tasks that we anticipate many authorised staff may carry out, but may not be the most relevant qualifications for staff in different jurisdictions. For example, it is more helpful for a registrar in the tax tribunal to be a tax professional by background than to be a legal professional. Where powers currently exist, rule committees already determine the qualifications staff need to exercise particular functions, and that works well. Such committees can focus qualification and experience requirements on what is most relevant to the work that those staff carry out.
Amendments 3, 4 and 5 would all set the bar for qualification prohibitively high and rule out a large proportion of Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service staff from giving legal advice or exercising judicial functions, even though they may have been doing either or both for a number of years.
Alex Chalk
Will the Minister be kind enough to address the issue of the approach we can expect judges to take in rule committees? It is my experience that they show themselves in court to be scrupulously fair and focused on justice. Does she agree that there is no reason to think they would abandon those principles when they sit out of court on a rule committee to make these important judgments?
Lucy Frazer
My hon. Friend makes an extremely valuable point. Rule committees are made up of members of the judiciary and legal professionals, who take their roles incredibly seriously. Lord Thomas said on Second Reading in the other place that
“it is important to stress the degree of control inherent in the Bill by the use of the rule committee. I was a member of and chaired…the Criminal Procedure Rule Committee, which I can assure you is a highly representative body with many representatives of the legal profession.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 20 June 2018; Vol. 791, c. 2039.]
It is important to note his experience of sitting on and chairing a rule committee. I actually sat on an insolvency rule committee when I was at the Bar, and I do not think anyone mentioned costs. We were concerned with ensuring that the procedures we used in court day in, day out worked well, and that they worked well for our clients, too.
A loss of expertise would render the provisions in clause 3 and the schedule unworkable. I should add that a member of staff will not be able to give legal advice or exercise judicial functions until they have been authorised to do so by the Lord Chief Justice or their nominee, or by the Senior President of Tribunals or their delegate. Authorisations are therefore ultimately the responsibility of the judiciary, who will not authorise staff unless satisfied of their competence.
The Government’s position is consistent with the approach taken over many decades and is supported by both current and former members of the senior judiciary. Lord Neuberger, former President of the Supreme Court, said that the amendments place
“a potential straitjacket on the ability to appoint the appropriate people to make appropriate decisions.”
He went further, reflecting that there
“will be many decisions”
for which the level of experience set out in the amendments
“would be appropriate, but there will be others where less experience would be adequate for the decision-making.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 10 July 2018; Vol. 792, c. 882.]
I want to reassure hon. Members that we have listened to the concerns expressed here and in the other place about linking the qualifications of staff to the judicial functions that authorised staff may carry out. That is why we added further safeguards to the Bill in the other place by restricting the functions that staff will be able to exercise. In the light of that, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames said:
“we are not persuaded that it is necessary for the authorised person exercising the remaining powers—some of which are trivial, some minor and some of more substance—to be a qualified lawyer or one of particular experience.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 16 October 2018; Vol. 793, c. 414.]
Before I close, I would like to respond to a number of the points made by the hon. Member for Bolton South East in putting forward her amendments. She has mentioned for the second time in her submissions cost-cutting. What we are doing in the Bill is trying to achieve a position whereby judges are deployed in the most effective way to bring justice to the people whom they serve. We are trying to ensure that jobs are appropriate for those who carry them out, and that they have the appropriate qualifications. The hon. Lady suggested that only barristers, solicitors and judges—that is, people who are legally qualified—understand justice. That is self-evidently wrong. A large part of our criminal justice system is the justice dispensed by magistrates, who are volunteers and are extremely able. As I have said, many people are already carrying out the functions, and carrying them out well, in courts and tribunals across the country.
The hon. Lady mentioned court closures. Of course, this is not a debate about court closures; it is a debate about who carries out functions in the courts that operate. She also suggested that call centres are having a detrimental impact on justice. Our call centres are actually improving justice, because, as can be seen from the take-up rate, people are speaking to someone who can answer their concerns much more speedily. The satisfaction of people ringing up is improved as the pick-up time is improved, because it is now dedicated people picking up the phone, rather than people in courts, who have a large number of things to do.
I hope that the hon. Lady feels able to withdraw the amendment, based on the explanations that I have put forward.
Yasmin Qureshi
I thank the Minister for her response, but our position remains the same, and we ask for a vote on the amendment.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Yasmin Qureshi
I beg to move amendment 6, in the schedule, page 11, line 32, leave out subsection 67C and insert—
“67C Right to judicial reconsideration of decision made by an authorised person
A party to any decision made by an authorised person in the execution of the person’s duty as an authorised person exercising a relevant judicial function, by virtue of section 67B(1), may apply in writing, within 14 days of the service of the order, to have the decision reconsidered by a judge of the relevant court within 14 days from the date of application.”
This amendment would grant people subject to a decision made under delegated powers to a statutory right to judicial reconsideration.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 7, in the schedule, page 19, line 21, at end insert—
“(7A) A party to any decision made by an authorised person in the execution of the person’s duty as an authorised person exercising functions of a tribunal, by virtue of this subsection, may apply in writing, within 14 days of the service of the order, to have the decision reconsidered by a judge of the relevant tribunal within 14 days from the date of the application.”
This amendment would require the Tribunal Procedure Rules to set out a procedure for applying for judicial reconsideration. It is consequential on Amendment 6.
Amendment 8, in the schedule, page 11, line 40, at end insert—
“(2A) In reaching its decision under sub-paragraph 2 above, the authority must consider whether the function is capable of having a material impact on the substantive rights of the parties.”
This amendment would require any Procedure Rules Committee making rules about the functions to which a reconsideration right would apply to consider whether the substantive rights of the parties will be materially affected.
Amendment 9, in the schedule, page 19, line 39, at end insert—
“(2A) In reaching its decision the Committee must consider whether the function is capable of having a material impact on the substantive rights of the parties.”
This amendment would require any Procedure Rules Committee making rules about the functions to which a reconsideration right would apply to consider whether the substantive rights of the parties will be materially affected.
Yasmin Qureshi
Amendments 6 and 7 have been tabled to ensure that there is a safeguard for claimants who do not accept a decision made by authorised persons. There should be a right to a statutory reconsideration, and the claimant should be able to apply in writing, within 14 days of the service of order, to have a particular decision reconsidered by a judge of the relevant court. They are strengthening provisions. As we do not know who authorised persons will be or what delegated functions will be given to them, we believe that if claimants disagree with important decisions, they should have a statutory right to reconsideration. The Bill makes no reference to that.
Amendments 8 and 9 relate to the issue of material impact. When a decision is being made on whether there a should be a reconsideration within 14 days, we ask that there be consideration of whether the function could have a material impact on the substantive rights of the parties. That means that we accept and acknowledge that one should not be able to ask for reconsideration simply because one disagrees with the decision of the authorised person; one must have a cogent reason. There must be proper grounds for requesting a reconsideration. We would define and decide what is an appropriate reason for asking for a reconsideration by assessing the limb of material impact on the substantive rights on the parties, which I think speaks for itself. That relates to decisions made by authorised persons that are material and important to the claimant, who should be able to ask for a reconsideration of that decision.
We suggest that the application in writing should be sent within 14 days of the decision, but it could be 21 days if the Government wished to change that. We think that 14 days is the minimum period that should be allowed for the reconsideration application to be made. The Government’s intention is to leave the procedure committee to decide fully what “material impact” means, whether there should even be reconsideration options for claimants, and by what processes that must be done.
We are effectively asking for safeguards for litigants. I will try not to repeat the same points, but it is important to remind the Committee of a point I made earlier, which was that a number of claimants are not legally represented because of cuts to legal aid, both civil and criminal. Many people now go to court without any legal advice, and are basically litigants in person or may have a McKenzie friend. To ensure that decisions are made properly, if there is a material impact on the substantive rights of parties, claimants should be able to ask for a reconsideration of the decision by a legally qualified judge of the court. People will have more confidence that the decision has been made properly, if it is made by a judge.
It should not be left to the procedure committee to decide, in theory, whether to allow reconsideration or to decide, off its own bat, what kind of decisions should be up for reconsideration. We ask that it determine and put into place rules on how reconsideration applications could be done.
Again, those three things are there to enhance the right of the ordinary person going into the court system and to ensure that our judicial system maintains the highest standards, as accepted throughout the whole world. For Parliament not to have democratic oversight of the matter, and not to indicate what the procedure committee should do, is a derogation of our duty to the people of this country. We are effectively looking after their interests. A judgment or decision by an authorised person should be subject to review by a judge. We accept that should not be done gratuitously, or in cases that do not warrant it, but if the decision has an impact on the rights of the person, that should be allowed. We ask the procedure committee to set out a procedure for applying for judicial reconsideration.
Alex Chalk
The hon. Lady makes a fair point; I will be interested to hear what the Minister says. How does she propose that an assessment be made about whether the decision truly had a material impact? A decision on whether to grant an adjournment or on whether to allow evidence to be admitted could in certain circumstances have a material impact, but in other circumstances might not. How would she ensure that the procedure to determine that was effective and efficient, and did not clog up the courts?
Yasmin Qureshi
We could include the criterion of the impact on someone’s rights. When we look at a case, we can work out whether an adjournment or a particular issue regarding disclosure would have an impact. The legislation should have that as a criterion in determining whether there should be judicial reconsideration. Obviously, we assume that the procedure committee would set out a procedure whereby, when a person writes to the court to ask that something be reconsidered, it goes to a judge, who works out whether this was something that impacted on the person and should therefore be subject to reconsideration. The legislation does not do any of those things.
Although we accept that some administrative functions carried out by judges can be delegated to the “authorised people” defined in the Bill, when a judicial legal function is given to other people, there should be a right to ask for reconsideration of the decision if a litigant is unhappy with it. To avoid anything flimsy, we have helpfully put in the impact aspect, so that reconsiderations are not a matter of course but are limited to appropriate cases. We would leave it to the procedure committee to make rules as to what the procedure would be.
The amendments are perfectly reasonable. The Minister mentioned that some Lords in the other place said that the provisions were okay, but if we look at the Hansard, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, Lord Pannick and others said that they had concerns, not just about the issue of 14 days’ reconsideration, but also in relation to the authorised persons. The Government have put all these things about judicial functions, delegated persons and authorised people into one clause, but concern was expressed in the other place about the need to make the legislation better. Those are my words.
We have gone further than some of the noble Lords in the other place, but we tabled the amendments not for the fun of it, but because we genuinely and sincerely believe that they would ensure that processes were carried out properly, justice was done properly, and properly qualified people would deal with issues. If there are decisions that people are unhappy with, they should have the right to ask for reconsideration within 14 days, if that is appropriate—or 21 days; I would be happy with whatever additional days the Government wished to add.
Lucy Frazer
As the hon. Member for Bolton South East has said, amendments 6, 7, 8 and 9 deal with the right of reconsideration of decisions taken by authorised staff in courts and tribunals, and amendments 6 and 7 would enable a party in a case to request that any decision made by an authorised person exercising the functions of a court or tribunal be reconsidered by a judge. It might be appropriate for there to be reconsideration of decisions, but the Government believe that the independent procedure rule committees, composed of jurisdictional experts and experienced practitioners, are best placed to decide if such a right of reconsideration is needed and if so, the form it should take.
The approach taken in the proposed amendments would impose across all jurisdictions the same blanket right of reconsideration with an arbitrary deadline of 14 days. That would not work in practice, especially for those functions that are entirely straightforward case management and preparation duties. Each jurisdiction has its own ways of working, and it is imperative that any mechanism for reviewing decisions is designed with those jurisdictional intricacies in mind.
The rule committees in the civil and tribunals jurisdictions, for example, already have included in their respective rules a specific right to judicial reconsideration for decisions made by authorised persons. The magistrates courts and the family court, however, have their own existing mechanisms for reviewing various decisions, which the amendments would cut across.
Furthermore, the amendments are unworkable. In the magistrates courts, legal advisers issue some 2.5 million local authority summonses every year. If a right of reconsideration, as laid out in the amendments, were imposed on the court, a defendant could apply to the court against the issue of the summons. That would inevitably delay the first hearing and would mean that the matter would need to be referred to a magistrate who would reconsider the decision to issue the summons alongside a legal adviser, and the outcome of that decision would need to be notified to the parties before the case could start. That would build significant delay and cost into the process.
There are already three ways for a defendant to challenge a case in which a summons has been issued in the magistrates courts. They can make an initial argument to the court hearing the case that the summons should not have been issued, contest the substantive application made by the local authority, or apply for a judicial review of the decision to issue the summons. Creating a mandatory right to judicial reconsideration is therefore unnecessary.
I have some sympathy with the intention behind the hon. Lady’s amendments, which is to ensure that the Bill contains adequate safeguards. For that reason, the Government moved amendments on the right of reconsideration that were accepted on Report in the other place. Those require the committees, when making any rules, to allow authorised staff to exercise judicial functions and consider whether the rules should include a right to judicial reconsideration of decisions made by authorised staff exercising those functions. That means the rule committees will have to consider whether each judicial function should be subject to a right to reconsideration. Additionally, the amended Bill requires that if a rule committee decides against the creation of a right of reconsideration, it must inform the Lord Chancellor of its decision and the reasons for the decision.
The measures in the Bill should also be read alongside the existing statutory provisions, which require the committees to consult such persons as they consider appropriate before they make rules. If a rule committee then chose not to include a right of reconsideration in its rules, it would have to notify the Lord Chancellor. The Lord Chancellor could then ask the committee to reconsider its decision, or, if he agreed with it, he could lay the rules in Parliament. We expect that he would set out the committee’s rationale for not including a right of reconsideration in the explanatory memorandum to accompany the statutory instrument. The Bill as amended in the other place therefore ensures much greater transparency in the decision-making process.
Alex Chalk
Those are reassuring words. Will the rule committee have the right to request when, in certain circumstances, an exercise of discretion that might otherwise be innocuous—say, for the sake of argument, granting an adjournment—could lead to a material impact on the rights of an individual, that there could be a right of review in those circumstances? Does the Minister follow? It is important that that flexibility is in place.
Lucy Frazer
I think that is right. It will be the rule committee that will set out the procedure and requirement for any reconsideration. If it considers what my hon. Friend has mentioned as an appropriate way forward, it could make those determinations.
The noble and learned Lord Thomas, the former Lord Chief Justice said:
“I support what the Government seek to do and urge a substantial degree of caution in respect of the proposal put forward by the noble Baroness”—
that is, Baroness Chakrabarti. He added that the Government’s approach provides the right balance:
“It gives discretion to a body that knows and has a lot of experience, but it contains that degree of explanatory accountability that will make sure that it does not do anything—even if we were to worry that it might—that goes outside a proper and just delegation”.—[Official Report, House of Lords, 16 October 2018; Vol. 793, c. 425-426.]
Amendments 8 and 9 relate to the right of judicial reconsideration and the substantive rights of parties to cases in the courts and tribunals. As I mentioned earlier, the amendments we made to the Bill in the other place now mean that the rule committees will, when making any rules to allow authorised staff to exercise judicial functions, have to consider whether each of those functions should be subject to a right to reconsideration. They would require that, in doing so, the rule committees should also consider whether the function in question would be capable of having a material impact on the substantive rights of the parties.
The amendments appear to have been prompted by concerns about the compatibility of the provisions in clause 3 and the schedule with the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary and article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In the circumstances, the Government believe the amendments are unnecessary. The independent procedure rule committees have for many years been making rules about practice and procedure which impact on court users. In carrying out this public function, they must ensure that the procedure rules are compatible with fundamental rights, including rights under the convention. I note that the overriding objective of the criminal procedure rules, for example, explicitly refers to these rights.
Other safeguards in the Bill will help to ensure compatibility with the right to a fair trial. Most importantly, the Bill provides that all court and tribunal staff who are authorised to exercise judicial functions will now be independent of the Lord Chancellor when doing so, and subject only to the direction of the Lord Chief Justice or their nominee or the Senior President of Tribunals or their delegate.
The Bill also provides, for the first time, protections from legal proceedings and costs in legal proceedings and indemnities for all authorised staff when carrying out judicial functions, which will further safeguard their independence. We have, of course, strengthened these safeguards by limiting the types of functions that authorised staff will be able to exercise, through the Government amendments we made to the Bill on Report in the other place.
I hope I have reassured the Committee and the hon. Member for Bolton South East that there is no issue of compatibility between the measures in the Bill and article 6 rights, the rule of law or the independence of the judiciary. The Bill strikes the right balance between ensuring appropriate safeguards and transparency of decision-making, and leaving the jurisdictional rule committees the discretion to determine the most appropriate mechanism for reviewing decisions by authorised persons. I urge the hon. Member for Bolton South East to withdraw her amendment.
Yasmin Qureshi
I thank the Minister for her response, but our position remains the same and I therefore wish to press the amendment to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The Chair
Amendments 8, 7 and 9, which have just been debated, can be moved formally by the hon. Member for Bolton South East, or she can withdraw them in the light of the last vote.
Yasmin Qureshi
I would like to move amendments 8 and 7, but not 9.
Amendment proposed: 8, in the schedule, page 11, line 40, at end insert—
“(2A) In reaching its decision under sub-paragraph 2 above, the authority must consider whether the function is capable of having a material impact on the substantive rights of the parties.”—(Yasmin Qureshi.)
This amendment would require any Procedure Rules Committee making rules about the functions to which a reconsideration right would apply to consider whether the substantive rights of the parties will be materially affected.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Lucy Frazer
I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 4, page 4, line 6, leave out subsection (8).
This amendment would remove the privilege amendment inserted by the Lords.
This is a technical and procedural amendment to remove the privilege amendment made on Third Reading in the other place. The privilege amendment recognises that provisions in the Bill may infringe the privilege of the House of Commons with regard to the control of public money, and amendment 1 will leave out subsection (8), ensuring that the imposition of any charge resulting from the Bill is properly approved. In practice, the new powers the Bill will confer and the cost arising from them will be met by the Ministry of Justice.
Amendment 1 agreed to.
Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
Lucy Frazer
Clause 4 is technical in nature but it is important to give proper effect to the measures the Committee has considered. Subsection (1) confirms the short title of the Bill. Subsections (2) and (5) set out the commencement provisions, which will enable speedy and orderly implementation of the measures in it: clause 4 will come into force on the day on which the Bill is passed; clauses 1 and 2 will come into force two months after Royal Assent; and clause 3 and the schedule will come into force on a day to be appointed by the Secretary of State in regulations.
Subsection (4) allows the commencement regulations to make transitional, transitory or savings provision and to appoint different days for different purposes or areas, which will ensure that the rule committees are able to implement the proposals as they best see fit. Subsections (6) and (7) set out the territorial extent. Subject to certain exceptions, the provisions of the Bill extend and apply to England and Wales only. Where the provisions extend beyond England and Wales, this is in relation to tribunals, for which responsibility is currently reserved to Westminster. This is not the moment for debate about devolution matters, but I stress that we have undertaken extensive consultation with the devolved Administrations in preparing the Bill, and they agree with our analysis.
Subsection (8) is the privilege amendment inserted by the House of Lords, with which I have already dealt.
Clause 4, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
New Clause 1
Review of the delegation of legal advice and judicial functions to authorised staff
“(1) Within the period of three years from the coming into force of this Act, the Lord Chancellor must arrange for a review to be undertaken on the impact of the implementation of the provisions contained within section 3 and the Schedule to this Act.
(2) A report setting out the findings of the review must be laid before both Houses of Parliament.”—(Yasmin Qureshi.)
This amendment would require the impact of the delegation of judicial functions to be reviewed within three years of it coming into force.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Yasmin Qureshi
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause asks for a review of the impact of the legislation to be carried out within three years of the start of the Act, and that this be laid before both House of Parliament. The reason for that is, as mentioned earlier and in all debates in respect of the Bill, the Opposition have serious concerns about how the Bill will work out and about its impact on our justice system—in particular on litigants who go into court not legally represented, as often happens.
With the Act, there will be a more rapid use and deployment of judges from one sector to another, and we would like the Government to consider how that is working and its impact on our traditional court system. We believe that the functions the authorised people will be given and the issue of reconsideration will have a clear impact on what happens in both our criminal and civil courts.
Lucy Frazer
As the hon. Lady mentioned, the new clause is about reviewing the impact of the authorised staff provisions within three years of the Bill coming into force.
Reviewing laws is always important. We in the Ministry of Justice do not shy away from that. The question is what the appropriate form of that review is. As the impact assessment for these measures says, we have committed to working with the rules committees and the senior judiciary to monitor the impact of any future assignment of judicial functions and responsibilities to authorised staff. This is particularly important where the Bill enables provisions to be extended to a new jurisdiction; for example, the power of authorised staff to carry out judicial functions will be new to the Crown court. We therefore expect the criminal procedure rule committee to conduct a review of the provisions as it feels appropriate, and to draw on its impartiality and expertise in doing so.
In other jurisdictions, the exercise of judicial functions by staff is already kept under review by the relevant rule committees, by the senior judiciary and by Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service, where appropriate. For example, the civil procedure rule committee has undertaken a review of a pilot scheme in which a range of functions were delegated to legal advisers in the County Court Money Claims Centre. As a result of that, the committee decided to modify and extend powers. It has also agreed to a further pilot to allow legal advisers in the county court to make unopposed final charging orders. This will run to April 2020 and, again, will be reviewed before a decision is taken to extend it.
Those reviews and this approach to implementation are illustrative of how we expect these measures to be rolled out in the future: incrementally, with the necessary monitoring, and subject to review and evaluation before any further steps are taken. The rule committees are independent of the Government and their membership includes judges, legal professionals and representatives of voluntary organisations. They are best placed not only to make the rules for authorised staff exercising judicial functions, but to conduct the reviews of these measures in the future. I hope that I have provided the hon. Member for Bolton South East with the assurances that she seeks, and that she will withdraw the new clause.
Yasmin Qureshi
I thank the Minister for her response, but the Opposition will not withdraw our new clause. I ask that the Question be put.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Bill [Lords]
Wednesday 12th December 2018
(6 years ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Act 2018 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Consideration of Bill Amendments as at 12 December 2018 - (12 Dec 2018)
15:15 - The House divided: - Ayes: 246 / Noes: 308 - Question accordingly negatived.
15:30 - The House divided: - Ayes: 243 / Noes: 312 - Question accordingly negatived.
16:19 - The House divided: - Ayes: 302 / Noes: 233 - Question accordingly agreed to.
Mr Speaker
I should inform the House that I have selected the amendments on the amendment paper—although they are starred as tabled after the usual deadline—because of the late notice of today’s business. I should also inform the House that I have today issued a provisional certificate that clause 2 of the Bill, as amended in Public Bill Committee, relates exclusively to England and Wales and is within devolved legislative competence. At the end of the Report stage on a Bill, I am required to consider the Bill as amended on Report for certification. At that point, I will issue my final certificate.
Clause 3
Authorised court and tribunal staff: legal advice and judicial functions
Yasmin Qureshi (Bolton South East) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 1, in page 3, line 28, leave out subsection 3 and insert—
“(3) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House.”
This amendment would require that where statutory instruments delegating judicial functions to authorised persons are brought they would be subject to the affirmative procedure.
Mr Speaker
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 2, in the schedule, page 6, line 36, at end insert—
“(aa) is a qualified solicitor, barrister or chartered legal executive with more than three years’ experience post-qualification, and”.
This amendment would stipulate that the minimum legal qualifications for authorised persons should be three years’ experience post-qualification.
Amendment 3, in the schedule, page 8, line 31, at end insert—
“( ) is a qualified solicitor, barrister or chartered legal executive with more than three years’ experience post-qualification, and”.
See explanatory statement to amendment 2.
Amendment 4, in the schedule, page 11, line 12, at end insert
“and if they are a qualified solicitor, barrister or chartered legal executive with more than three years’ experience post-qualification”.
See explanatory statement to amendment 2.
Amendment 5, in the schedule, page 11, line 32, leave out subsection 67C and insert—
“67C Right to judicial reconsideration of decision made by an authorised person
A party to any decision made by an authorised person in the execution of the person’s duty as an authorised person exercising a relevant judicial function, by virtue of section 67B(1), may apply in writing, within 14 days of the service of the order, to have the decision reconsidered by a judge of the relevant court within 14 days from the date of application.”
This amendment would grant people subject to a decision made under delegated powers a statutory right to judicial reconsideration.
Yasmin Qureshi
I rise to speak in support of amendment 1 and the other amendments. We are being encouraged to wave through this wafer-thin Bill, which is both narrowly constrained and obscurely drafted. This is a Bill that sneaks through changes that will change unconstitutional double delegation—that is, of legislative power to unaccountable judges sitting on procedure rule committees and of judicial powers to non-independent courts and tribunal staff.
Let us begin with clause 3, which delegates judicial functions to authorised staff. This provision must be understood in the context of a wider court reform agenda and the austerity measures that seek to make significant cuts. These efficiencies, generated through the proposed reforms, arise not only from the reduction in the size of the courts estate, but from savings on judicial salaries. Ultimately, the Bill seeks more justice on the cheap.
The Bill will ensure that judicial powers are delegated to non-independent courts and tribunal staff. The procedure rule committee is primarily made up of senior judges, who would ensure relatively little external public scrutiny of this delegation of judicial functions to non-judicial employees of Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service. That is a really important point.
The Bill provides that regulations under clause 3 must be made under the negative resolution procedure. In effect, this will allow new rules of court stipulating which judicial functions can be delegated and to whom, and the requisite qualifications or experience that an authorised person must have to take on these judicial functions, but, as the Bill stands, such a delegation will come into force without any real parliamentary scrutiny. In essence, by providing that the regulations in the Bill are to be made under the negative resolution procedure, the Government are avoiding proper scrutiny by a democratically mandated legislature here in this place.
Our amendment, which is supported by the Bar Council, would ensure more constitutionally appropriate accountability and scrutiny, through the affirmative resolution procedure, of these sweeping regulations. These regulations concern powers to make rules stipulating which judicial functions can be delegated and to whom, and the qualifications and experience required before a member of the administration can be given these judicial functions. Without careful scrutiny and additional safeguards, the Government’s drip-feed approach to court reform will erode some of our most fundamental institutions and our understanding of the rule of law.
John Howell (Henley) (Con)
Will the hon. Lady comment on whether the qualification provision will raise the bar significantly above that in current regulations for such people and whether that will put at a disadvantage people already carrying out those functions?
Yasmin Qureshi
We are talking about two different things. The authorised persons are to have delegated to them many judicial functions, and it is only appropriate that they have some experience. In those circumstances, three years’ post-qualification experience is not a big ask, obligation or burden. We are asking for the minimum, and we are being very reasonable and practical about it. We are only surprised that the Government are not taking our concerns on board and changing the rules.
Mr Jim Cunningham (Coventry South) (Lab)
One reason we need proper scrutiny is the tendency towards rationalisation of the courts, which eventually means long waiting times—that cannot be justice for anyone waiting for a trial. There have been endless cases of this now, and it is getting worse, not better. Does my hon. Friend agree that that is not fair on the victim or the perpetrator?
Yasmin Qureshi
My hon. Friend is spot on. That is one of our concerns about the Government’s proposals.
We need a process that requires transparent and public scrutiny in this House of the scope of future delegated powers. The safeguards the Opposition seek on the powers created by the Bill are not unreasonable and would not interfere with the notion of reasonable delegation of non-contentious administrative functions; they simply press for further oversight and accountability.
Our amendments providing that the authorised persons must be solicitors, barristers or chartered legal executives with more than three years’ post-qualification experience have been recommended and drafted by the Law Society and are supported by the Bar Council. In other words, all the practitioners in the country are supporting and asking for these changes, and I ask the Government, even at this late stage, to consider adopting them. In the circumstance, we believe them to be the minimal ask of the Government. It is a lower qualification threshold than what is currently required of pupil supervisors, or indeed of solicitors, to supervise an office.
It is worth remembering that authorised staff are not subject to the training, experience, ethos and oaths of professional judges, and could be performing judicial functions while also—this is really important—being employed directly by HMCTS. This raises genuine questions of independence.
Kevin Hollinrake (Thirsk and Malton) (Con)
We are talking about taxpayers’ money. Does the hon. Lady not accept that where such tasks are routine—say, straightforward case preparation—the people performing them should not need a legal qualification?
Yasmin Qureshi
These people will be performing judicial tasks and functions and so will need to be appropriately qualified, which is why we have tabled the amendments.
James Cartlidge (South Suffolk) (Con)
It is my understanding that these are mainly interlocutory functions, not actual judgments or significant judicial functions.
Yasmin Qureshi
No, as we understand it, although it is envisaged that some of these tasks will be procedural, others will be very important to people whose rights are affected. We might think, for example, that requests for adjournments are straightforward, but they are not. As practitioners and former practitioners will know, they can be complicated, because when a judge decides whether to grant one, they take into consideration a host of things, so it is important that the person be appropriately qualified.
We accept that the procedure rule committee will be able to iron out some of the questions about what are judicial and what are administrative functions, but the main thing is that these people will be carrying out judicial functions and deciding some difficult issues, and it is only appropriate that they be qualified and appropriately experienced.
Andy Slaughter (Hammersmith) (Lab)
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. We discussed this in Committee. Interlocutory case management often has a large bearing on what happens in a case; it can alter what happens in a case and it can alter cost decisions. In their own way, such decisions are as important as purely judicial decisions. The Government’s proposal might be a false economy, so I support what she is saying.
Yasmin Qureshi
I thank my hon. Friend, a former shadow Justice Minister, for his intervention, and I take his point.
We acknowledge that the relevant procedure rule committee will set out the procedural requirements for who can carry out the procedures, but we also know that these committees are predominantly made up of senior judges, so this will have implications for the independence of judicial decision making.
We also believe that such a shift will not match the expectations held by members of the public on the experience and independence of those making judicial decisions about their rights.
Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)
The hon. Lady referred to the independence of the judges. Is not the whole virtue of this proposal that the rules governing who should be delegated what functions will be made by judges, and should not be made by politicians in any circumstance? Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, the former Lord Chief Justice, observed:
“Experience has shown that detailed restrictions on procedure are a very real fetter on the administration of justice.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 20 June 2018; Vol. 791, c. 2039.]
He counselled against too much restriction of the kind that is being proposed.
Yasmin Qureshi
The procedure rule committee obviously has a place in our judicial system, and we accept that judges and others are involved in it, but everyone knows that there are times when, because of financial pressures, services are cut to the bare minimum. We believe that, to protect our judicial system, the functions concerned should be clearly set out, and those that will have an effect on someone should be decided by an authorised person with a legal qualification.
Alex Chalk (Cheltenham) (Con)
The hon. Lady is getting perilously close to suggesting that judges will do justice when they are inside a court, but will be incapable of ensuring that justice is done when they are outside a court, on the procedure rule committees. Will she make it crystal clear that judges will always, in all circumstances, want to do justice, and can be trusted to do so?
Yasmin Qureshi
We are not suggesting that judges will somehow not be independent. As I have said, I have the highest regard for our judiciary in court, although from time to time we might disagree with the decisions that judges reach. In the real world, however, there are often targets to be met and financial constraints to be considered. We are saying that when the procedure rule committee is making rules, it should be guided by Parliament.
Yasmin Qureshi
I have taken a number of interventions, and I will make some progress now. Otherwise we will be going round in circles on the same point.
The Bill provides for judicial functions to be delegated to authorised staff across the criminal, civil and family courts and tribunals. However, it also states that while those staff will be independent of the Lord Chancellor when carrying out the delegated functions, they will remain court staff, and will not take the judicial oath of independence. It is surely important for those who will be making any type of judicial decision to take that oath. They cannot be described as independent when they are employed by the court in which they will serve.
There might, for example, be economic pressures. The court might want to get rid of cases very quickly, within a certain period. The promotion prospects of those who are employed directly by the courts will, of course, be affected, and, unlike judges, they will not be governed by the oath of independence, the Bar rules and the Law Society rules. People who are making judicial decisions should be appropriately qualified, with the proper ethos and the proper rules that apply to solicitors and barristers, and to which members of the legal profession, such as me, must have regard.
Our amendment 5 would ensure that a party to any decision made by an authorised person exercising a relevant judicial function, or the function of a tribunal,
“may apply in writing, within 14 days of the service of the order, to have the decision reconsidered by a judge of the relevant court within 14 days from the date of application.”
We will be quite happy if the Government want to increase the period to 21 days, or reduce it to fewer than 14, but we want people to have a right to judicial reconsideration of a decision made by an authorised person. We cannot understand why the Government do not want to accept the amendment.
Robert Neill
I hope I shall make a better stab at my speech than I did of being a Teller earlier.
I rise to oppose these amendments, tempted though I am by the way in which they were proposed by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Bolton South East (Yasmin Qureshi), whom I respect as a fellow lawyer. However, I do have to say that she seeks to go further than is appropriate and seeks to put a needless restriction on the ability of the procedure committee in particular to come to the appropriate balance. I have very great respect for the views of both the Law Society and the Bar Council—I say that with reference to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests as a non-practising barrister and a consultant to a law firm—but ultimately the scheme envisaged by the Government is a right and balanced one, and reflects in particular the views of the senior judiciary, which I think is important because ultimately it is the judges who are best placed to decide the appropriate level of delegation. They are the people who work day to day with these staff; they see day to day the nature of the boxwork—as it is sometimes called—and the other things that come in.
For these reasons, when the matter was debated in the other place, both Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, the recently retired Lord Chief Justice, to whom I have already referred, and Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, recently retired president of the Supreme Court, counselled against an undue restriction on the operation of the civil procedure rule committee, already a well established body of the kind the Opposition seek to bring in. I think they also broadly supported the overall thrust of the Bill.
The hon. Lady referred to austerity. That is not the objective of this Bill; there has been a long-standing proposal to modernise the civil justice system. She referred to the work done by Lord Justice Briggs, for whom I have the greatest respect. The Bill is a logical follow-on from the Briggs report, and it is necessary if we are to achieve modernisation and make the courts more accessible for litigants. This is an entirely sensible Bill; that is why the judiciary has pushed for these sorts of proposals, and why Lord Thomas said that he “warmly” welcomed it. It will save some £6 million; he regards that as a realistic figure. That is important in the context of the available resources for the courts system. We all accept that the courts are under pressure, and this is a sensible way forward that does not impede the basic requirements of access to justice or fairness.
Lord Thomas said two further things that we should bear in mind. He spoke about the developments in civil procedures; the rule committee has been an important part of that over the last 15 to 20 years, so it is not as though the committee were unused to dealing with these matters. The committees bring together representatives of the legal profession. As a former practitioner, I agree with his description of that committee as
“a highly representative body with many representatives of the legal profession. Certainly, the committee will always try to reach a view by consensus—when I was a member of it for more than six years there never was a division; we always managed to agree.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 20 June 2018; Vol. 791, c. 2039.]
Most experienced practitioners will be aware of that. I think we can say the same of the criminal procedure rule committee; these are very well established bodies, and judges do not forget that they are judges when they are there.
It is a little unworthy, I say with respect, to suggest that the judiciary—we have talked about the senior judiciary chairing these bodies—would acquiesce in an inappropriate level of delegation for a purely financial consideration. They would be going against their judicial oaths. I do not think for one second that the hon. Lady really means to say that they would do that. The amendments would, however, put needless constraint on the committee’s work. That is why I quoted before and quote again Lord Thomas’s observation:
“Experience has shown that detailed restrictions on procedure are a very real fetter on the administration of justice”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 20 June 2018; Vol. 791, c. 2039.]
In the other place, he gave a number of examples that I need not give here showing why that could be counterproductive.
It is also worth considering the speech of Lord Neuberger. He pointed out the following:
“There are two protected factors: one is that nothing can be done without it being in the rules, and the second is that the Lord Chief Justice needs to give his or her authorisation to the person who makes the decision.” .”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 20 July 2018; Vol. 792, c. 887.]
Those are important safeguards.
James Cartlidge
My hon. Friend speaks with great expertise. What he is saying goes back to the point raised earlier about the possibility of the functions that are delegated having legal significance. Presumably if that was the case, they would not be delegated to start with.
Robert Neill
That is precisely right. It is inconceivable that any Lord Chief Justice would give his or her consent to a delegation that was inappropriate or would put the interests of justice at risk. I never sat as a deputy district judge—they used to be called deputy registrars in my day, so long ago was it—in civil matters, but I have many friends who do, and a great deal of what is called boxwork, with which at least some on the Treasury Bench will be familiar, was of a very administrative kind. We expect the district judges in a busy county court to deal with that, whereas it seems perfectly reasonable for many of these matters, which are often of a very interlocutory nature, to be dealt with by an experienced member of court staff who has been in the service for many years. We are not talking about the ultimate determination of the case in any of these matters. That is why Lord Neuberger referred to that safeguard or protection, and the protection that that would be laid before Parliament.
Lord Neuberger made another important observation on the attempt, as it seems to me, to fetter the discretion of the committee. He posed a rhetorical question, as perhaps senior judges and other lawyers tend to do:
“Whether it is right to provide in such clear terms, and such uncompromising general terms, for the circumstances and requirements for”
appeals—which is what he was talking about—seems to him to be questionable. He was making this point:
“Having chaired the Civil Procedure Rule Committee for three years, I can say, as has been quoted in relation to its criminal equivalent by my noble and learned friend Lord Thomas, that considerable care is given to ensure that all the requirements of justice are met. It is very rare, if ever, that I can remember a decision being arrived at which was not arrived at by consensus.”
These questions are considered, not only by the judiciary but by practitioners, including members of the solicitors’ profession and members of the Bar. Plaintiffs’ and defendants’ interests are represented on these committees, as are both ends of the profession—solicitors and barristers—and all levels of the judiciary, from the High Court bench through the circuit bench to the district bench. This is a broad-based body and, as Lord Neuberger said, these
“details should be worked out…by the rule committee”.—[Official Report, House of Lords, 10 July 2018; Vol. 792, c. 890 to 891.]
I think that that is a forceful argument for leaving the proposals as the Government intended.
Louise Haigh (Sheffield, Heeley) (Lab)
I rise briefly to speak in favour of the amendments tabled by my Front-Bench colleagues. I believe that safeguards need to be in place to ensure that people are properly qualified to make decisions and particularly that contentious decisions should be reviewed by a qualified judge. I want explicitly to address concerns about how this might transpire in the family courts. Several of my hon. Friends raised the concern in Committee that the family courts could be the most affected by potential delays and the perverse consequences of the measures in the Bill.
This is particularly relevant given the recent exposure of the case of Sammy Woodhouse. I am sure that colleagues will be well aware of her case. I know that the Minister is, and I am grateful to her for meeting Sammy and me last week. Mr Speaker also welcomed Sammy to Prime Minister’s questions last week. Her bravery in putting herself forward, in risking being held in contempt of the family court and in waiving her anonymity to speak about her experiences, so that we in this place can drive change, is inspiring. We owe it to her and to the many other survivors to ensure that we drive change and ensure that what happened to her and to too many other young women and girls never happens again.
Those young women and girls were failed by the state. They were failed by our legal system, by the police, by the Crown Prosecution Service, by local authorities and by government at every level, and now they are being failed yet again by our legal system. Our entirely permissive system, which allows anyone to make an application through the family courts, means that men who have been convicted of rape—in Sammy’s case, the father of her child, Arshid Hussain, is serving a 35-year prison sentence—can apply to the courts for access or visitation rights. Sammy’s case shocked the nation, but unfortunately it was not unique. Just yesterday, I spoke to another woman who had to respond and attend court after the man who was convicted of raping her and fathering her child had applied through the family courts from prison.
This could be prevented through a simple ban on any man convicted of fathering a child through rape applying to the family courts. I know that the Government are reluctant to bring this forward, out of concern for the convicted rapist’s article 8 right to a family life, but I am afraid that that simply is not good enough. I will always defend our human rights as enshrined in the Human Rights Act 1998 and the European convention on human rights—I say this on the day of the 70th anniversary of the universal declaration of human rights—but article 8 is a qualified right and not one that should override the rights of women and children and their safety. Surely, we should be starting from the presumption that if a child has been conceived through rape, the man should have no parental rights to that child and that we should allow such rights only in exceptional circumstances, not the other way round.
When I speak to victims of rape and survivors of child sexual exploitation in situations such as Sammy’s—women who have an almost uniformly terrible experience of the family courts—their feeling is one of betrayal and despair that every day is a battle in which they have to fight for their most basic rights. They are often forced to relive their traumatic experiences and justify themselves over and over, yet they are so often told about the rights of the men who have abused them and who can now click their fingers and drag their victims back through the courts to traumatise them all over again. Women such as Sammy, who have already given evidence, spoken out in criminal trials and been to hell and back, should not then live the rest of their lives trying to bring their children up in horrendously difficult circumstances with the threat of being dragged back through the courts once again to face the man who raped them. It may be the case that no judge would allow such access in any circumstances, but it is surely intolerable for women in this situation to have to face the man in court all over again, and I believe that we as a Parliament should make that crystal clear.
The family procedure rule committee met earlier this week to discuss the consequences of Sammy’s case and to consider amending practice direction 12C. I hope that the committee will be able to bring much greater clarity, but this is likely to be in relation to local authorities’ duty to notify in the case of a care order. That will not solve the problem, and I worry that, combined with the measures introduced in the Bill, it could bring greater uncertainty to the process and leave victims with even greater uncertainty and fear that their abusers might be able to weaponise the courts against them. As I have said, I am grateful to the Minister for meeting Sammy and me last week, but we were both really disappointed that the Government were not willing to take more immediate action to address this thoroughly intolerable situation. I hope that the Minister will be able to update the House on what action they have now considered and on the implications of the Bill for this important issue.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Lucy Frazer)
It is an honour to take this Bill through its final stages. I should like to start by addressing some of the key points raised today by the hon. Member for Bolton South East (Yasmin Qureshi). She suggested that we were sneaking the Bill through the House. However, it was introduced seven months ago. Not only that, but it forms part of the Prisons and Courts Bill, which was introduced in this House in 2017 and which fell at the general election. The provisions in this Bill have been well known for some time. They have been debated in this House, and they are not being sneaked anywhere at all. The thrust of the hon. Lady’s speech was that this is a Bill about cuts, but it is certainly not. The Bill is part of our £1 billion court reform programme.
Neil O’Brien (Harborough) (Con)
My hon. and learned Friend is making an important point. In 2010, this country faced its largest budget deficit since the second world war, and all that my constituents want is value for money from the Government. The measures that we are taking forward today may not be the most exciting or sexy things that we will do this House, but they are a key part of value-for-money government.
Lucy Frazer
My hon. Friend makes an important point that has a number of aspects. First, my Department had to make cuts in 2010 because of the poor financial situation that we inherited from the Labour party. Secondly, it is important that we deliver justice fairly to those who are part of the justice system, but as he says, we also have a duty to the taxpayer. Overlaying those two points is a third point. Notwithstanding the position we inherited and notwithstanding our duty to taxpayers, my Department is undertaking a significant reform programme that is investing in our justice system. A couple of weeks ago, the Ministry of Justice held a conference at which more than 20 countries from around the world were represented. They talked about their own reform and modernisation programmes, but ours is one of the most ambitious. We are at the forefront of innovation, and we are investing in our justice system to bring it up to date in the 21st century.
Robert Neill
Is this not also important in the context of the speech by Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd in the other place? He said that
“the operation of the criminal, civil, tribunals and family procedures rule committees has enabled us far more than any other state to keep our rules up to date.”
We need to continue to do that. That is why he stated:
“I urge the greatest caution in trying to put into primary legislation anything that restricts in this way the powers of the rule committees.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 16 October 2018; Vol. 793, c. 425.]
Lucy Frazer
That is an important point. Our justice system is renowned throughout the world, thanks to its flexibility, which is enabled by the rules committees along with the other measures that allow us to develop our jurisdiction.
The hon. Member for Bolton South East finished by suggesting that we should listen and take the amendments on board, but we have listened and made amendments. We made amendments in the other place to include safeguards and improve the Bill.
Kevin Hollinrake
The Minister makes a good point about our duty to the taxpayer. Irrespective of this nation’s financial situation, we always have a responsibility to spend the taxpayers’ money wisely. As she knows, Northallerton magistrates court in my constituency will close. She has put in place some mitigation measures to help people to continue to have access to justice, but will she ensure that those measures are in place before the closure of that court?
Lucy Frazer
My hon. Friend and, indeed, Mr Deputy Speaker have campaigned hard about the closure of their local courts, and the dispensing of local justice is important in Northallerton, as it is in Chorley. My hon. Friend makes an important point, because, following campaigning by my hon. Friend and his constituency neighbour, my hon. Friend the Member for Richmond (Yorks) (Rishi Sunak), we committed not to close the court on the basis that we would do so only when the technology was in place to ensure that we could continue to deliver justice. We need to move with the times, but we must also ensure that people get fair procedures and justice in the tribunals.
Robert Neill
My hon. and learned Friend is being most generous in giving way. Does she also recognise that modernising and simplifying procedures saves money not only for the taxpayer, but for litigants? Part of access to justice is about reducing needless costs for litigants.
Lucy Frazer
That is an important point, because when we talk about what we have saved, we often mean what has been saved at the Ministry of Justice, but the reality is that ensuring that justice is served for the people who use it is at the heart of our reforms. Many of our changes have received positive feedback. In a recent trial at the tax tribunal, people were able to access justice from remote locations and not have to go to a physical court. That was well received, because people did not have to disrupt their day by physically entering court. Of course, that will not be appropriate for everyone, but we must ensure that we use the advantages of technology in the future.
Simon Hoare (North Dorset) (Con)
I am grateful to my hon. and learned Friend the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice for giving way—[Laughter.] That bought us 32 seconds. I am interested in what she has said. Is she able to dilate—preferably at some considerable length—on the benefits that might accrue from people not having to go to court in rural areas, such as North Dorset, where public transport is scarce and where not everybody has access to a motor car? The changes could be of huge benefit to large, sparsely populated rural areas such as mine.
Lucy Frazer
My hon. Friend makes an important point, and I also represent a rural area. Interestingly, some of the greatest and most interesting innovations at our conference were from Australia, where the geography is an issue, and we can learn a lot from its procedures. Over recent years, 300,000 people have started engaging with our online services, which have been well received.
Simon Hoare
I am grateful. Can we read across from what my hon. and learned Friend says that she is making strong representations to ministerial colleagues at the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, to BT and to other providers to ensure that hotspots, blackspots, notspots—call them what you will—in rural areas that are poorly served by a reliable, speedy, robust internet will be filled to allow all our citizens to access justice and make representations using technology? With the best will in the world, if the technology is not there—I know that my hon. and learned Friend knows this—people will not be able to use it.
Lucy Frazer
My hon. Friend makes a second important point, which is that we cannot roll out and continue to use technology unless the technology actually works. I regularly talk to Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service and others about the importance of ensuring that the systems that we already have in place work well, so that the technology does not fail us when we are trying to hold court hearings.
Neil O'Brien
Further to the important point made by my hon. Friend the Member for North Dorset (Simon Hoare) about virtual and online courts and creating hassle-free access to courts for all constituents, can the Minister give us figures for the extent to which the change has helped to unclog our courts? One of the benefits of the Bill for my constituents is not just hassle-free access for them, but the fact that our courts will not be clogged up by the traffic cases and small beer that lead my constituents to wonder why serious criminals take years to be processed. Will the Minister give us some stats about the growth of virtual and online courts and what this Bill will do to those stats?
Lucy Frazer
I mentioned earlier that 300,000 people have already started engaging with our services online. They can apply for probate or divorce online, and many people are doing that. We also have our new online civil moneys claim court, which enables people to apply online and defend online. In one case in the first week after its launch, we had a settlement without people going to court at all. Technology will not only enable us to unclog our courts and get quicker hearing times, but give our constituents better access to justice because more people will be engaging with it. It will be cheaper for them to engage, and therefore more people will be able to access fairness and justice in the resolution of their claims.
I turn to the essence of the Bill and the Opposition amendments. Amendment 1 relates to clause 3(3), which provides for the use of the negative resolution procedure, which the hon. Member for Bolton South East suggested is not appropriate when dealing with the judicial functions of staff. However, the Government think that the amendment is inappropriate for several reasons. First, clause 3(3), which provides for the use of the negative resolution procedure, is not actually concerned with judicial functions. Clause 3(3) is in fact cross-referring to clause 3(2), which allows the Secretary of State to make
“consequential, transitional, transitory or saving”
provisions relating to authorised staff by way of regulations.
In reality, clause 3(3) allows us to amend references in secondary legislation to, for example, justices’ clerk—a post abolished by the Bill—to authorised officer. So far, we have identified over 200 references and over 60 pieces of secondary legislation that would need amendment, and there may be more. It is a standard clause for this type of provision. We know that that is the correct reading of the measure because the power to enable staff to carry out the judicial functions that the hon. Member for Bolton South East is concerned about is actually set out in the procedural rules made by the independent rules committees. This is clear from clause 3(1), which refers not to regulations but to procedure rules. The procedure by which the procedure rules are enacted is set out not in this Bill but in other legislation, namely the Courts Act 2003, the Civil Procedure Act 1997 and the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.
Amendments 2 to 4 relate to the qualifications of those undertaking advice or judicial functions under the Bill. Amendments 2 and 3 require that any staff member who gives legal advice to lay justices or judges of the family court must be legally qualified and have more than three years’ experience post-qualification. Amendment 4 requires the same qualifications for any staff carrying out judicial functions.
The Government absolutely agree it is important that those who undertake functions in our courts are suitably qualified. As my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill) said, and as he has said on many occasions, our justice system is renowned throughout the world, and much of that is down to the experience and quality of our judiciary. Ensuring that those who work within our justice system have the right skills is fundamental to justice.
Neil O'Brien
Members on both sides of the House would agree that we have a world-renowned judiciary. In fact, Members are profoundly nervous when we see headlines in our papers calling judges, “Enemies of the People,” which we would all disavow. These are people who, day in and day out, do things in court that could cause them to be threatened. They are taking risks on behalf of the rest of us, and it is a high-quality system. With that in mind, and given the respect in which the judiciary are held by this House, does my hon. and learned Friend agree it is important that we do not accidentally do them down in this debate? Does she agree it is not right for the shadow Attorney General to suggest, I think unintentionally, that temporary judges may be less impartial than permanent judges? All our judiciary are high quality.
Lucy Frazer
That is absolutely right. As a former barrister, I appeared regularly before experienced judges, all of whom were full of integrity, undertaking important roles.
The hon. Member for Bolton South East suggested that all judges need qualifications of some kind. Of course, we have magistrates across the country who are doing outstanding jobs in our justice system. As my hon. Friend the Member for Harborough (Neil O'Brien) mentions, temporary judges, just like full-time judges and judges who operate on a permanent basis, are recruited because of their expertise and skill. They are trained, and they carry out their roles as they should.
Kevin Hollinrake
My hon. and learned Friend mentioned the fine work done by magistrates. Is there any way we could relax the requirements in order to increase the number of cases that may be considered by magistrates? I understand that magistrates are the most cost-effective part of the justice system.
Lucy Frazer
Magistrates undertake a significant number of roles, and they have vital responsibilities. In fact, they deal with over 95% of all criminal cases, the majority of which are less serious criminal cases, but they are very important. I am pleased recently to have attended the Magistrates Association conference, where I met a number of magistrates who are doing vital work across the country.
James Cleverly (Braintree) (Con)
I declare an interest, as my wife is currently going through the process to become a magistrate. I am struck by how the role of magistrates is so little understood. There are a number of people in my professional and personal circles who might make good magistrates, but they are unaware of the process or of the importance of the role. What more could be done to highlight the significant role that magistrates play in the criminal justice system?
Lucy Frazer
I am pleased to hear that Mrs Cleverly is undertaking this important role. My hon. Friend is right that it is important, and employers do understand. The Lloyds banking group recently won an award for encouraging staff to take time off to undertake this important role, and we need to do more to encourage employers to encourage their staff to take part in this important function.
Simon Hoare
Everything I do is short, Mr Deputy Speaker.
We are all, thank God, living longer. At some point, might there be merit in reviewing the retirement age both for our judges and our magistrates? With people taking early retirement and so on, the receptacle of wisdom should not be lost to the courts, particularly taking the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Braintree (James Cleverly) on the difficulty of finding people to fill these posts.
Mr Deputy Speaker
Order. We need to move on now. I was very generous before, but magistrates have absolutely nothing to do with the Bill, as the Minister well knows.
Lucy Frazer
I am happy to come on to the three reasons why amendments 2 to 4 cannot be accepted. First, the amendments are not necessary. The functions are already being carried out, and carried out well, by those with lesser qualifications than those sought by the hon. Member for Bolton South East. The qualification requirements for legal advisers in the magistrates court and family court are currently set out in regulations made by the Lord Chancellor, as they have been since 1979, and amendments 2 and 3 would raise the qualifications bar significantly higher than the current regulations and would rule out a large proportion of Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service staff from giving legal advice in future.
James Cartlidge
There are many people in the Chamber with huge legal expertise. All I can claim is spending my year off as a junior outdoor clerk, for which the only qualifications needed were a ponytail and a cockney accent, as far as I could see. From my short experience I discovered the huge number of staff who make up our courts and keep them ticking along. They might be administrative functions, but we should not be afraid of reforming our courts to give those people greater roles that help them to make more of their career.
Lucy Frazer
My hon. Friend makes an important point. Not only is it important to ensure that the qualifications match the role, but these reforms will ensure good career progression for competent and organised staff. Similarly, in relation to amendment 4, it is already the case that some staff can exercise judicial functions in almost every jurisdiction except the Crown court. The range of functions they can carry out varies enormously, as my hon. Friend the Member for Thirsk and Malton (Kevin Hollinrake) pointed out earlier, from legally qualified legal advisers in the county court setting aside default judgments to non-legally qualified caseworkers in the lower tribunal dealing with postponement requests and issuing strikeout warnings.
Accepting amendment 4 would rule out a large proportion of those staff, who are already exercising judicial functions and who may have been doing either or both for a number of years. Such a loss of expertise would be particularly damaging and would impact on the service that Her Majesty's Courts and Tribunals Service can provide. The hon. Member for Bolton South East suggested that introducing authorised staff was damaging to justice, but I did not hear any examples of inappropriate action by any of our current staff who do not currently have those qualifications and who are already carrying out these roles.
Kevin Foster (Torbay) (Con)
The Minister is outlining well the position under the current regulations. Does she agree, therefore, that specifying the needed qualifications in primary legislation would be unwelcome when we already have a perfectly effective system that does not require such qualifications, which could then in future be changed by further primary legislation?
Lucy Frazer
That is the heart of the Government’s position, and it takes me neatly on to my second point. The Bill, as drafted, already ensures appropriate procedures are in place to ensure that parties are protected. Those points were clearly put by my hon. Friends the Members for Torbay (Kevin Foster) and for Bromley and Chislehurst—the Chair of the Select Committee on Justice always puts things clearly and cogently. The Bill rightly allows the relevant procedure rule committees to set the requirements relating to the necessary qualifications or experience of these staff in the future, depending on the functions they permit staff to carry out.
Kevin Hollinrake
This is an important point. Will my hon. and learned Friend come on to address not only the human cost if these amendments are accepted, with the potential for people in these roles at the moment to lose those jobs, but the financial costs of making those people redundant and replacing them with qualified people?
Lucy Frazer
Yes, those are important points. A large number of people already carry out these important roles and do so very well, and we would like to retain them.
Both the judicial functions that may be carried out by staff and the accompanying qualification requirements will be set out—it is just that they will be set out in the procedure rules, which are made by way of secondary legislation and are therefore subject to parliamentary scrutiny.
Neil O'Brien
Progressive politicians on both sides of the House believe in labour market progression; they believe people should be able to act up, do more, learn more, take their career further and earn more. By putting in primary legislation artificial demarcations that stop skilled people doing things they are capable of doing, we would be doing people down; we would be putting a limit on their aspirations. That is why we must reject these amendments.
Lucy Frazer
That is an important point. Some people are already carrying out these functions and doing them well, and they will be able to see a future career progression for themselves. The legal and other qualifications they should have will be set out, but they will be set out by the committees, which are judicially led and independent of Government, and include representatives of the legal professions, and court and tribunal users. As my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst said, the judges placed on those are leading the procedure rule committees and have significant expertise. It is they who are best placed to assess the appropriate level of qualification or experience for authorised staff, in the light of the functions they choose to allow those staff to exercise.
My hon. Friend rightly said that the member of staff will not be able to give legal advice or exercise judicial functions until they have been authorised to do so by the Lord Chief Justice or their nominee, or by the Senior President of Tribunals or their delegate. Authorisations are therefore ultimately the responsibility of the judiciary, and those people will not authorise staff unless they are satisfied as to their competence.
Robert Neill
My hon. and learned Friend will know, and perhaps she will confirm, that the way this works in practice is that either the Lord Chief Justice or the Senior President of Tribunals makes the authorisation. Alternatively, in the case of the civil jurisdiction, for example, this will invariably at least go to the senior presiding judge or the presiding judges of the circuit. We are talking about people who, in their administrative role, never mind their judicial capacity, will have visited and met these—
Mr Deputy Speaker
Order. Minister, come on. And you have had three speeches already, Bob, you don’t need to stretch the imagination of the Chamber.
Lucy Frazer
My hon. Friend, the Chair of the Select Committee, was making an important point. The rule committees are—
Mr Deputy Speaker
Order. Some might think it is very important—[Interruption.] Order. Would the Minister like to sit down for a moment? In fairness, I am beginning to get a little frustrated with the people who were not here for all the speeches; we had no speakers in, and now everyone wants to come in with interventions. I have only got one Member now down to speak on Third Reading, so if people really want to make a contribution, they know what to do.
Lucy Frazer
I hope that more will put in to speak on this important subject. I wish to pick up on what my hon. Friend was saying, because he cited a number of speeches from the other place, where senior members of the judiciary were highlighting the appropriateness of the Government’s position. Lord Neuberger, former President of the Supreme Court, warned that these amendments would place
“a potential straitjacket on the ability to appoint the appropriate people to make appropriate decisions.”
He went on to reflect that there “will be many decisions” for which the experience set out in the amendments
“would be appropriate, but there will be others where less experience would be adequate for the decision-making.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 10 July 2018; Vol. 792, c. 882.]
Thirdly, I come to an important point that has not yet been mentioned in the House. The amendments would limit flexibility should new routes to legal qualifications emerge. For example, one key change that we have made in the draft regulations that we published alongside the Bill is to include fellows of the Chartered Institute of Legal Executives, or those who have passed the necessary examinations to be a CILEx fellow, among those who can give legal advice. That is a progressive step, but if we were to accept amendments 2 and 3, it would be much harder to respond to such changes in the future, as we would have to amend primary, rather than secondary, legislation.
Furthermore, a legal qualification might not be the most relevant qualification for a particular judicial function. For example, it is more helpful for a registrar in the tax tribunal to be a tax professional by background, rather than a legal professional.
The hon. Member for Bolton South East raised a number of points on independence, and I wish to start by saying that I think the judiciary, whether sitting in court or in committee, has, as my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk) said when he was in his place, the highest level of independence and integrity.
The hon. Lady queried, both here and in Committee, the independence of authorised staff, implying that those with a legal qualification were more likely to be independent. Under the Bill, all court and tribunal staff who are authorised to exercise judicial functions will now be independent of the Lord Chancellor when doing so, and subject only to the direction of the Lord Chief Justice or their nominee, or the Senior President of Tribunals or their delegate.
The Bill also provides, for the first time, protections from legal proceedings and costs in legal proceedings and indemnities for all authorised staff when carrying out judicial functions, which will further safeguard their independence in decision making.
Finally, amendment 5 deals with the right of reconsideration of decisions taken by authorised staff in the courts. I wish to start by acknowledging that the hon. Lady and the Opposition have listened carefully to the points made in Committee; I note there is now no amendment dealing with decisions taken by staff in the tribunals, and I welcome that.
It is right that in some circumstances a party to proceedings may wish to have the decision reconsidered, but we remain opposed to the amendment for three reasons. First, the Bill already ensures that a right of reconsideration will be available when appropriate. We believe that the independent procedure rule committees—comprised, as I and others have said, of jurisdictional experts and experienced practitioners—are best placed to decide whether such a right of further reconsideration is needed and, if so, the form that that right should take.
Indeed, the procedure rule committees in the civil and tribunals jurisdictions have already included in their respective rules a specific right to judicial reconsideration for decisions made by authorised persons in appropriate cases. For example, the magistrates courts and the family court have their own existing mechanisms for reviewing various decisions, which amendment 5 would cut across.
Secondly, the right identified by the hon. Lady is too broad, even by her own admission. In speaking to amendments in Committee, she said that
“we accept and acknowledge that one should not be able to ask for reconsideration simply because one disagrees with the decision of the authorised person; one must have a cogent reason. There must be proper grounds for requesting a reconsideration.”—[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) [Lords] Public Bill Committee, 4 December 2018; c. 17.]
I was delighted to hear those words, because the Government have also been arguing, both here and in the other place, that a blanket right of reconsideration simply would not work in practice. Yet amendment 5 would give a party in a case an automatic right to request that any decision made by an authorised person exercising the functions of a court be reconsidered by a judge, irrespective of the merits.
Thirdly, the approach we put forward is fair and balanced. The Government listened to concerns about ensuring there were adequate safeguards in the Bill. For that reason, we moved amendments on the right of reconsideration that were accepted on Report in the other place. They effectively require the rule committee, when making rules, to allow authorised staff to exercise judicial functions to consider whether each of those functions should be subject to a right to judicial reconsideration. Where a rule committee decides against the creation of a right of reconsideration, it must inform the Lord Chancellor of its decision and the reasons for it.
The hon. Lady also referred to the Briggs report, and I would like to touch on that very briefly. The recommendations made by Lord Justice Briggs are taken from the report “Civil Courts Structure Review”, the focus of which was the courts of the civil jurisdiction. While an unqualified right of reconsideration might have been appropriate to recommend for the civil courts, given their unique way of working it would be ineffective simply to transpose this recommendation on entirely different jurisdictions.
The civil procedure rule committee has built a right of reconsideration into its rules, but this will not necessarily be appropriate for other jurisdictions. It is for each jurisdiction, with the expertise it has within the rule committee, to decide what is right.
That approach has found favour in the other place. Lord Thomas, former Lord Chief Justice and former chair of the criminal procedure rule committee, said:
“I support what the Government seek to do and urge a substantial degree of caution in respect of the proposals brought forward by the noble Baroness”—
that is, Baroness Chakrabarti. He added that the Government’s approach provides the right balance:
“It gives discretion to a body that knows and has a lot of experience, but it contains that degree of explanatory accountability that will make sure that it does not do anything—even if we were to worry that it might—that goes outside a proper and just delegation”.—[Official Report, House of Lords, 16 October 2018; Vol. 793, c. 425-26.]
The Bill strikes the right balance between ensuring appropriate safeguards and transparency of decision making, and leaving the jurisdictional rule committees the discretion to determine the most appropriate mechanism for reviewing decisions by authorised people.
Finally, I would like to respond to the very important points made by the hon. Member for Sheffield, Heeley (Louise Haigh). I was very pleased to meet her and Sammy Woodhouse a week or so ago. She raised issues that are outside the scope of the Bill, but none the less what Sammy went through was harrowing and the hon. Lady made some important points. As she knows, I committed to look very carefully at the issues she raised and I assure her that we are doing that.
As the hon. Lady mentioned, we have already taken some steps. We have, as she alluded to, asked the president of the family court to look at the practice directions and he has committed to doing that with the rule committee. My officials have spoken to the Association of Directors of Children’s Services about whether it is appropriate to send further guidance to councils on the circumstances in which they should apply to court not to give notice of hearings to parties, such as happened in the Sammy Woodhouse case. The Department will continue to look closely at those issues.
For all those reasons, this is an important Bill that will ensure that we can bring flexibility to our judges, deploy them in the most flexible way, use their resources where they are needed and not when they are not needed, and ensure that those who operate our court system do so effectively and fairly for the people they serve.
The Ministry of Justice is putting users of the court at the heart of our reforms and of our programme on court reform. The measures will not only save on cost—that is not the primary reason for them, although it is important—but ensure that cases go through the system fairly and well. For those reasons, I urge the hon. Lady to withdraw the amendment.
Yasmin Qureshi
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment proposed: 2, in the schedule, page 6, line 36, at end insert—
“(aa) is a qualified solicitor, barrister or chartered legal executive with more than three years’ experience post-qualification, and”.—(Yasmin Qureshi.)
This amendment would stipulate that the minimum legal qualifications for authorised persons should be three years’ experience post-qualification.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Sir Lindsay Hoyle)
I have now to announce the result of the deferred Division on the question relating to the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority. The Ayes were 513 and the Noes were 13, so the Question was agreed to.
Amendment proposed: 5, in the schedule, page 11, line 32, leave out subsection 67C and insert—
“67C Right to judicial reconsideration of decision made by an authorised person
A party to any decision made by an authorised person in the execution of the person’s duty as an authorised person exercising a relevant judicial function, by virtue of section 67B(1), may apply in writing, within 14 days of the service of the order, to have the decision reconsidered by a judge of the relevant court within 14 days from the date of application.”—(Yasmin Qureshi.)
This amendment would grant people subject to a decision made under delegated powers a statutory right to judicial reconsideration.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)
Consideration completed. I will now suspend the House for no more than 5 minutes in order to make a decision about certification. The Division bells will be rung two minutes before the House resumes. Following my certification, the Government will table the appropriate consent motion, copies of which will be made available in the Vote Office and will be distributed by Doorkeepers.
Madam Deputy Speaker
I can now inform the House that I have completed certification of the Bill, as required by the Standing Order. I have confirmed the view expressed in Mr Speaker’s provisional certificate issued earlier today. Copies of my final certificate will be made available in the Vote Office and on the parliamentary website.
Under Standing Order No. 83M, a consent motion is therefore required for the Bill to proceed. Copies of the motion are available in the Vote Office and on the parliamentary website, and have been made available to Members in the Chamber. Does the Minister intend to move the consent motion?
Lucy Frazer
indicated assent.
The House forthwith resolved itself into the Legislative Grand Committee (England and Wales) (Standing Order No. 83M).
[Dame Rosie Winterton in the Chair]
David Linden (Glasgow East) (SNP)
I beg to move, That the Committee sit in private.
The Second Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means (Dame Rosie Winterton)
I am afraid I cannot accept that motion because the hon. Gentleman is not a member of the Committee.
David Linden
On a point of order, Dame Rosie. I am grateful for your indulgence. Can you clarify that the reason why I cannot move that motion is that I represent a constituency in Scotland, and am rendered a second-class Member of the House by the legislative apartheid that is English votes for English laws?
The Second Deputy Chairman
The point is that the Legislative Grand Committee represents Members of Parliament from England and Wales. In no way does that imply that the hon. Gentleman is second-class.
I remind hon. Members that if there is a Division, only Members representing constituencies in England and Wales may vote.
Resolved,
That the Committee consents to Clause 2 of the Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Bill [Lords] as amended in the public bill committee.—(Lucy Frazer.)
The occupant of the Chair left the Chair to report the decision of the Committee (Standing Order No. 83M(6)).
The Deputy Speaker resumed the Chair; decision reported.
David Linden
On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. Before we return from the Legislative Grand Committee, my understanding is that, as a Member representing a Scottish constituency, while I may not be able to move a motion, I can contribute verbally. Is that correct?
Madam Deputy Speaker
I am afraid that the hon. Gentleman has rather missed his chance.
Madam Deputy Speaker
No, I am afraid you did not. I am very sorry.
Third Reading
Lucy Frazer
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
This is a small and technical Bill, but it is a key component of our £1 billion programme of reform that will see our courts and tribunals modernised for the 21st century and, importantly, make access to justice quicker and easier for all. It is also the first step in the legislation that will underpin these reforms, as we will introduce further courts legislation as soon as parliamentary time allows.
The judicial measures in the Bill will enable greater flexibility in the deployment of judges. They will allow the senior judiciary to respond more effectively to changes in demand and to make better use of the skills and experience of the existing cohort of judges. This Bill will free up judges from the most routine tasks by enabling appropriately qualified and experienced staff in courts and tribunals to carry out a wider range of judicial functions than they can at present. Through these measures, the Bill will improve the overall effectiveness and efficiency of courts and tribunals and, importantly, it will reduce delays. This will ensure that we deliver a speedier resolution of matters, which is important in benefiting those who use our courts and tribunals system.
As I have said, this is a short Bill, so I will be brief, but I would not want to finish without thanking the hon. Member for Bolton South East (Yasmin Qureshi) and other Members of this House for the constructive way in which they have engaged on these issues. I pay tribute to the noble and learned Lord Thomas, the former Lord Chief Justice, and the noble and learned Lord Neuberger, the former President of the Supreme Court—they have been widely quoted in this House—for their wise counsel in the other place and for sharing their expertise on how the measures in the Bill will operate in practice.
I thank the Clerks and other parliamentary staff for helping the proceedings on the Bill to run so smoothly, and I extend my thanks to our hard-working Bill team, our private offices, our Parliamentary Private Secretaries and the Whips. It has been an honour to take the Bill through the House, and I look forward to seeing the important measures it contains being implemented in the coming months. On that basis, I commend the Bill to the House.
Imran Hussain (Bradford East) (Lab)
I, too, thank all hon. Members who have participated in the proceedings on the Bill today and throughout its passage for the considered and learned contributions they have made. I also thank the Public Bill Office, as well as organisations such as the Law Society, the Bar Council and Justice for the expertise and support that they have provided throughout these proceedings.
From the outset, we have made clear our reservations about the measures contained in the Bill: the fact that there is no proper parliamentary scrutiny of the delegation of powers to non-judicial staff; the fact that there are no minimum qualifications and experience for staff to whom powers are delegated; and the fact that there is no statutory right to reconsideration by a judge of the decisions made by authorised staff. We have been clear that we are not opposed to the principle of reform and change to our courts system. However, we cannot support the changes in this Bill without the protections that we, the Bar Council and the Law Society, among other organisations, and legal professionals have called for. Unfortunately, on these matters, we feel that we have been ignored, and therefore we will oppose the Bill on Third Reading today.
Judges hold considerable power in our courts system. They have the power to commit individuals to prison, to detain, to repossess, to grant injunctions and to issue search orders, among many others, and it takes judges years to develop the experience and qualifications necessary to wield these powers. That is why we should not take the handling of powers given to them lightly, yet that is precisely what the Government are doing in this Bill. They are passing powers currently exercised by the judiciary to authorised court staff and, most crucially, they are doing so without sufficient scrutiny. The delegation of powers exercised by the procedure rule committees will be done under delegated legislation, with no more safeguards than using a motion under the negative procedure. This is not simply a procedural matter, as the Government have stated today, but one that has the potential to change the nature of our justice system.
Under the Bill, authorised staff will find themselves able to wield considerable power. Although some decisions might seem insignificant, no court decision is small or inconsequential. The smallest decision’s implications can reach far beyond the here and now, well into the advanced stages of a case. We can easily see authorised staff making decisions that are contested because the procedure rule committees, not Parliament, are granting them the power and functions. The Government should have accepted our amendment today to require that when statutory instruments delegating judicial functions to authorised persons are introduced, they are subject to the affirmative procedure, allowing Parliament the necessary scrutiny, but they chose not to do so.
The lack of scrutiny of delegated powers and functions is even more worrying considering the lack of qualifications and experience that the Bill requires to wield them. We rightly expect a minimum standard of our judges, and so do the public. We expect that decisions in our courts are made by those with experience and the necessary qualifications, which is why we have restrictions and a thorough vetting process for those who wish to become members of our judiciary. Justices of the peace—magistrates who do not hold a legal qualification—nevertheless have considerable life experience and are still advised by trained, experienced and qualified legal staff. The Government, however, have imposed none of these requirements of experience and qualification on authorised staff.
In the Public Bill Committee in the Lords, the Minister responsible stated that the minimum standards we sought to impose then, and sought to impose in the Public Bill Committee in this House and again earlier today, would be more restrictive than those that are currently imposed on people providing legal advice in magistrates and family courts. However, that is no excuse and there is no reason why, when authorised staff are making decisions that were previously made by trained and experienced judges, we should not be upholding a higher standard. The Government counter that the decisions being made by authorised staff will be limited and that they will not be contested, but they cannot give that guarantee here today, for even the most basic decisions—extending time for service and taking pleas—may give rise to contention.
Even if we were to provide tight restrictions in the Bill for decisions that were delegated to ensure that they were not contested, that would not alter the fact that even non-contested elements of cases require experience—a view supported by Sir Brian Leveson in his review of the efficiency of criminal proceedings. Furthermore, if staff were legally trained and qualified, they would still be without the benefit of the experience that our judges hold through their many years of service in our legal system. That is why experience is just as crucial here as qualifications, as shown by our amendments and by the support that they received from the Bar Council. There was no reason why the Government could not accept the amendments on this issue, and no reason for them not to hold authorised staff to a higher standard when they are granted the power to make decisions. Clearly, however, the Government thought otherwise of the Bar Council’s expertise.
Our final point is that the Bill fails to provide sufficient safeguards for the decisions that are made by authorised staff, with no statutory right to judicial reconsideration. Clearly, the Government have not taken heed of the warning to be vigilant when judicial powers are being exercised by non-members of the judiciary. The explanations that they have provided in their factsheets—that delegated decisions will not be contested—are insufficient, as are the safeguards provided by the procedure rule committees, which are too open to pressure to reduce the right to reconsideration to ease pressures and backlogs in the courts.
Any legal decision made in our courts must be open to review and appeal. It is a fundamental principle of the rule of law, and the decisions made by authorised staff should be no different, yet the Bill does not uphold that spirit by failing to make available a statutory right to reconsideration. In failing to provide that statutory right, the Government have undermined the expectation of the public that legal decisions will be made by a judge or can be reviewed by a judge, and they have undermined our courts and judicial system in the process.
The Bill is a poor replacement for what should have been a thorough Bill filled with real courts reform. We are disappointed that the Government have failed to take up the baton of reform and to change their punitive legal aid cuts, which have left thousands unable to exercise their right to access to justice, created barren legal aid deserts and allowed legal rights to degrade to the point where they are no longer worth the paper they are written on. They have failed to change course on a courts closure programme that forces people to travel miles, at great cost and difficulty, to get to their closest courts and uphold their rights, and they have failed to address the urgent need for protection for domestic violence victims being cross-examined and questioned in the family courts by the very same people who subjected them to the abuse.
Keith Vaz (Leicester East) (Lab)
My hon. Friend is making a powerful speech, and I agree with everything he has said. There is one other aspect that I am sure he as a constituency MP, like me and others, has faced, which is the delays experienced by our constituents in the immigration tribunal, some having to wait up to two years for a decision on whether they can bring spouses into the country. Does he agree that the Government have failed to act to clear the backlog?
Imran Hussain
My right hon. Friend is a distinguished parliamentarian and, as ever, makes a really important point. It is not within the remit of the Bill—one of the problems with the Bill is that its narrow scope prevents important issues such as the one he raises from being discussed—but I absolutely agree with him.
The Bill is a shadow of what it could and should have been and fails to provide protections and safeguards on the changes the Government have introduced. It is on these grounds—the lack of protections for courts, judges and people seeking justice—that we will oppose the Bill today.
Robert Neill
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Bradford East (Imran Hussain). We have had a constructive and civilised debate on both sides. I do not agree with all his conclusions, but none the less it has been a good debate. I particularly congratulate my hon. and learned Friend the Minister on the stellar way in which she has taken the Bill through all its stages. I am sure that it will not be the last time she does that.
I support the Bill. I would have liked a bigger Bill, and I would like not to have lost the Prisons and Courts Bill in the 2017 Dissolution, but we are where we are, and this is a valuable step forward. I particularly welcome my hon. and learned Friend’s commitment to introducing further legislation. As she and the House know, this is part of the very important courts modernisation programme, particularly on the civil side, and builds on the work of Lord Briggs of Westbourne. I know that those involved in his review are most anxious that the remaining statutory underpinnings for the updating of procedure rules and other matters be introduced as a matter of urgency, and I urge her to do that as soon as the legislative timetable permits.
I think that the Bill strikes the right balance. I would take issue with the hon. Member for Bradford East over the suggestion that the judges, exercising their oath of office on the procedure rule committees, would allow themselves to be swayed by considerations of convenience or financial matters in deciding upon the appropriate scheme of delegation. There is not a shred of evidence in the history of our modern judiciary to suggest such a thing, and it does a disservice to the judiciary. We should trust the judges.
Imran Hussain
I want to make it absolutely clear that—as I am sure the hon. Gentleman, who is Chair of the Justice Committee, will accept—no one in the Opposition is challenging in any way, shape or form the good standing of the judiciary. The point, which has been made time and again, is that certain matters are within the remit of the procedure rule committees, but there are others that this House and the other place should have scrutiny of.
Robert Neill
I thank the hon. Gentleman for what he has said, and I entirely accept the intentions behind it. We will have to differ on the question where the line should be drawn between which decisions are appropriate for Parliament to decide and which are appropriate for the judiciary, but I am grateful for the sentiments that he has expressed, which I am sure have reassured us all.
I am happy to proceed on the basis of recent advice from senior judges who have been referred to in the debate and on the basis of what is in the Bill. It will make savings, and at this point perhaps I can put in a plug to the Minister. It might be appropriate, for example, to use that £6 million-plus to restore the funding for the Family Drug and Alcohol Court National Unit. I particularly regret that we have lost some of the emphasis on problem-solving courts following the loss of the Prisons and Courts Bill. Perhaps, given that we now have a unified planning court, we could also consider the Lord Flight’s suggestion in the other place for the establishment of a unified housing court.
Having made those suggestions for what might happen in future, I will end by saying that I welcome the Bill and will support it today.
Andy Slaughter
Let me begin by saying that it was indeed a pleasure to serve on the Bill Committee, not least because of its brevity. I think that the Minister alluded to that when she described it as a small Bill. It is a small Bill, but I am afraid it is also a rather inadequate and unsatisfactory Bill. I am not going to repeat the excellent speech made by my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford East (Imran Hussain), but he was absolutely right to say that there were no adequate safeguards, and that the nature of the delegation of functions has not been specified sufficiently for us to feel certain that we can support it.
As my hon. Friend observed, the most disappointing aspect of the Bill is that it represents just the shards, or the remains, of the legislation on this subject that we were promised. We hear a great deal about the—is it the £1 billion programme of investment in digitisation in the courts? However, the Bill goes nowhere towards addressing this. Nor does it deal with the oft-raised concerns of Members about how that is being funded and about funding through court closures.
Let me give one brief example. You will understand why I picked this example, Madam Deputy Speaker. This week I asked the House of Commons Library for a list of court closures since 2010. It gave me a list of 156 courts and buildings that had been closed since then, but one figure stood out. Hammersmith magistrates court accounts for nearly 20% of the entire saving that the Government have made during that time. Some courts have been sold for £1, but Hammersmith magistrates court was sold for £43 million. Perhaps the Government are rubbing their hands and saying what a valuable contribution that is to the reform agenda.
Let me make these points to the Minister, if the Minister will listen. I will wait until I have her attention.
A couple of years ago, the Minister’s predecessor, the right hon. and learned Member for North East Hertfordshire (Sir Oliver Heald), called me in for a tête-à-tête and showed me a planning brief for what would happen to Hammersmith magistrates court after it was sold. Apparently, it was to become a mixed housing development. The Minister may like to know that it has now been sold to the developers of an 850-bedroom hotel, who are currently awaiting planning consent.
I would like the answers to two questions, not necessarily today but at some point. First, how much did the Minister’s Department spend on drawing up that detailed planning brief and marketing it for a purpose which has now gone completely by the board? Secondly, notwithstanding the large capital receipt, does she believe that it is fair recompense for a site on which, apparently, there is to be an 850-bedroom hotel? In fact, two will be built on one site. This shows the folly of the way in which the Government are conducting their programme of investment and disinvestment. When courts are closed, the detriment to communities is obvious, and in the case of Hammersmith magistrates court the closure did not take place for operational reasons; its purpose was purely to generate a capital receipt.
The Bill will no doubt be passed today, despite our assertive opposition to it, but we will return to more serious matters on a subsequent occasion. We must subject the Bill to further scrutiny, and the Government must present the House with proposals for legislation to deal with the serious questions of how that digitisation and so-called reform programme is or is not working, and what the cost to our community is of the loss of well-established and vital court facilities.
John Howell
I spoke on Second Reading and pointed out the extent to which the courts were undergoing reform. A number of Members have commented on that today and I will not go over what I said in that earlier debate again. It is understood that we are seeing a major reform process and the work of Lord Briggs on this is well understood, but to judge the effectiveness of those reforms and this Bill we must determine whether it passes two tests. First, does it make it easier and swifter to obtain justice? Secondly, does it provide better access to justice? The Bill passes both tests.
The Bill provides better access to justice by making sure that is quicker and swifter, and achieves that by freeing up judges’ time to focus on the most pressing cases. As I said on Second Reading, when I was on the Industry and Parliament Trust course I sat with judges and was able to see their enormous workload. Anything we can do to help free that up has to be a very good thing.
I echo, too, the comments of my hon. and learned Friend the Minister on the planning and housing courts. I have sat with a judge on a planning court, and I thought it achieved a tremendous amount in bringing things together. I take particular pleasure in the work Lord Thomas has done on this, as a former Lord Chief Justice and a reforming Lord Chief Justice. He went out of his way to help reform the system and I am glad he is still doing so. The comments of Lord Neuberger have also been excellent.
I assure the Minister that I support this Bill.
Julian Knight (Solihull) (Con)
I commend my hon. Friend the Member for Henley (John Howell) on his excellent speech.
It was a great pleasure to serve on this Committee. Despite the to-ing and fro-ing there was also a lot of cross-party agreement in the Committee; it must be acknowledged that there was some real working together.
The Bill opens up greater flexibility and will over time open up new technologies and the ability to deploy them in order to provide better access to justice. I had a fantastic briefing from the Ministry of Justice where officials went through all the things that will go live over the next few months and years in terms of accessing justice online. I was greatly encouraged by that. I pay tribute to my hon. and learned Friend the Minister who has piloted that and is a champion of it, and who has made real headway in that regard. It will make a real difference on the ground.
The delegation of judicial functions, as my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill) said, is a logical follow-on from the Briggs report. These changes will save £6 million. There will be greater access to justice and greater use of technology. I hope that that £6 million gets ploughed into some of the schemes my colleagues have spoken about. The Ministry of Justice does a fantastic job on what are, we must acknowledge, limited resources due to the financial situation we inherited.
I am happy to support the Bill, and full speed ahead.
Question put, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
Royal Assent
Thursday 20th December 2018
(6 years ago)
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