Online Fraud Charter
Tom Tugendhat Excerpts(2 years, 4 months ago)
Written StatementsRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)
Today, I am pleased to inform the House that we are publishing the online fraud charter.
A key deliverable in the Government’s fraud strategy—https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/fraud-strategy
—the online fraud charter contains a series of ambitious commitments from several of the largest tech companies in the world. These commitments reflect a landmark moment in our fight against fraud and will target some of the most harmful and pervasive frauds that occur online. This includes stronger action to make sure people are who they say they are on marketplaces and on dating apps. It will ensure that signatory companies make fraud easier to report online. When content or users are found to be fraudulent, immediate and decisive enforcement action will be taken.
Further detail will be published online but the charter will contain actions focusing on:
Blocking frauds from occurring in the first place
Improved reporting structures and faster takedowns of harmful content and users
Making sure advertisers are who they say they are
Greater collaboration with law enforcement and other partners to drive further intelligence sharing, transparency, public communications and horizon scanning.
Tech companies have made strong progress in the last several years in combating fraud and, with the Online Safety Act 2023 in the process of coming fully into operation, change will be a statutory responsibility. However, those that have signed this charter have shown their willingness to work faster and in a more targeted fashion than regulation will require. I commend their constructive engagement and their ambition in agreeing to these commitments. I am pleased to see them taking responsibility to protect their users from fraud.
We are taking the fight to the fraudsters, targeting the criminals that try to exploit us when we are online. Today, my right hon. Friend the Minister for Media, Tourism and Creative Industries has also announced the publication of the Online Advertising Taskforce action plan, which brings together initiatives from industry and Government to tackle illegal online advertising and increase protections for children. Through both of today’s announcements, the Government and industry will implement significant steps to make sure that the British public are protected online. The online fraud charter will be published on the Joint Fraud Taskforce gov.uk page— https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/joint-fraud-taskforce.
[HCWS82]
Draft Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 (Port Examination Code of Practice) Regulations 2023
Draft National Security Act 2023 (Video Recording with Sound of Interviews and Associated Code of Practice) Regulations 2023
Draft National Security Act 2023 (Consequential Amendments of Primary Legislation) Regulations 2023
Tom Tugendhat Excerpts(2 years, 4 months ago)
General CommitteesRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)
I beg to move,
That the Committee has considered the draft Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 (Port Examination Code of Practice) Regulations 2023.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to consider the draft National Security Act 2023 (Video Recording with Sound of Interviews and Associated Code of Practice) Regulations 2023 and the draft National Security Act 2023 (Consequential Amendments of Primary Legislation) Regulations 2023.
Tom Tugendhat
It is a pleasure to serve under your extremely efficient chairmanship, Mr Twigg, and to see my very old friend, the hon. Member for Barnsley Central, who is scrutinising my work again in the way that only he can.
All three of these statutory instruments were laid before the House on 16 October, and relate to measures in the National Security Act, which received Royal Assent in July. It is the most significant piece of legislation for tackling the increase in state-based threats to our nation in a century. It brings together vital new measures to protect the British public, modernise counter-espionage laws and address the evolving threat to our national security. In essence, it provides our world-class law enforcement and intelligence agencies with new and updated tools to do their critical work. It is essential that we bring the powers in the Act into force to protect this country, and these instruments are an important part of making that happen. Once they are approved and come into force, we can also bring into force parts 1 to 3 of the Act. These statutory instruments support the powers created by the primary legislation, and do not create new powers or make changes to primary legislation that has already been agreed by Parliament. They ensure that the legislation can be implemented effectively and proportionately.
The first instrument, the draft National Security Act 2023 (Video Recording with Sound of Interviews and Associated Code of Practice) Regulations 2023, will create a new code of practice governing the video recording of individuals arrested under the Act. Schedule 6 of the Act requires that any interview by a constable of a person detained using the arrest powers in section 27 be video recorded with sound, and that video recording be carried out in accordance with the code of practice. That is the same requirement as for anyone interviewed following an arrest made under equivalent terrorism legislation. The code of practice is based closely on the terrorism equivalent, and provides guidance on how interviews should be conducted, including on the sealing of video recordings, on taking breaks during interviews, and on conducting interviews with deaf people or those who do not understand English.
The second instrument, the draft Counter-terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 (Port Examination Code of Practice) Regulations 2023, updates the code of practice that governs the exercise of the port examination power in schedule 3 of the Act. That power allows accredited counter-terrorism police officers to stop and examine a person at a port or border area to determine whether they are, or have been, involved in malign activity on behalf of a state.
The amendments to the code of practice simply reflect a change made by the National Security Act. It requires a counter-terrorism police officer of at least the rank of superintendent to authorise the retention of copies of confidential business material, instead of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. That change brings the process into line with the equivalent power in terrorism legislation, which has proven effective and avoids undue burdens on the system.
The Government carried out a statutory public consultation on the changes to this code and the creation of the video recordings code between 20 July and 31 August. The majority of consultees acknowledged that the codes were key to ensuring that police officers have clear guidance on their new powers, and that the powers are used in a way that is both fair and proportionate. However, where appropriate, we made further minor changes to meet the concerns of some consultees. For example, following feedback from Police Scotland on the video recording code, we made minor amendments to ensure that it is consistent with Scottish policing practice and procedure. The full response to the consultation can be found on gov.uk.
On the topic of codes of practice, there will be a debate tomorrow in which the Minister for Crime, Policing and Fire will discuss another instrument regarding six codes of practice under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 that are created or amended as a consequence of the powers in the National Security Act. I will not go into detail on those codes of practice—that is a matter for my right hon. Friend—but it is worth noting that they too went through a statutory consultation, which can be found on gov.uk.
Finally, the National Security Act 2023 (Consequential Amendments of Primary Legislation) Regulations 2023 makes consequential amendments to primary legislation using the power in section 95 of the National Security Act. While some consequential amendments are made through schedule 18 to the Act, the power in section 95 allows any further amendments to be made as a consequence of the provisions in the National Security Act. Consequential amendments are a customary part of any new legislation, and are required to ensure that existing legislation is up to date and reflects changes brought about by the National Security Act. They are not substantive amendments, but simply consequential to the creation of the National Security Act.
Several amendments concern the Official Secrets Acts 1911, 1920 and 1939, which the National Security Act replaces and repeals. References to those Acts in other legislation are updated to reference the relevant provisions in the National Security Act or, where appropriate, are repealed entirely. This includes references to the prohibited places regime in the Official Secrets Act 1911 and the preparatory conduct offence under section 7 of the Official Secrets Act 1920, both of which have been updated and replaced by the National Security Act. Other amendments made through this instrument account for other powers and offences created in the National Security Act. For example, amendments to the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 account for search and seizure powers created by schedule 2 to the National Security Act.
I hope I have made it clear that these regulations are simply supportive of primary legislation that has already been agreed by Parliament, and passing them is an important step to bringing that primary legislation into force. I therefore commend the regulations to the Committee.
Tom Tugendhat
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Barnsley Central and the hon. Member for Glasgow Central for their comments. On the Modern Slavery Act, the amendments are consequential to the primary legislation, so they are entirely in keeping with what was voted through in Parliament. I know the hon. Member for Barnsley Central is aware of that, but I will write to him on the statutory guidance to make the changes clear. I am grateful for his kind words on what I have been up to recently; I will chase up that letter on the last Delegated Legislation Committee, and will make sure that he gets it as soon as possible.
The consultations were carried out in the usual way. There is an open process: we announce that we are looking at an issue, and Members from devolved Administrations, local authorities, policing authorities or whatever bodies are relevant to the consultation are invited to comment. Others can comment as they see fit. Consultation began on 20 July and closed on 31 August. We did not have a huge number of comments, but we had some welcome interactions with Police Scotland and policing authorities in Scotland, which were useful in ensuring that we got the answers right.
Question put and agreed to.
DRAFT NATIONAL SECURITY ACT 2023 (VIDEO RECORDING WITH SOUND OF INTERVIEWS AND ASSOCIATED CODE OF PRACTICE) REGULATIONS 2023
Resolved,
That the Committee has considered the draft National Security Act 2023 (Video Recording with Sound of Interviews and Associated Code of Practice) Regulations 2023.—(Tom Tudgendhat.)
DRAFT NATIONAL SECURITY ACT 2023 (CONSEQUENTIAL AMENDMENTS OF PRIMARY LEGISLATION) REGULATIONS 2023
Resolved,
That the Committee has considered the draft National Security Act 2023 (Consequential Amendments of Primary Legislation) Regulations 2023.—(Tom Tugendhat.)
Ban on SIM Farms: Government Response to Consultation
Tom Tugendhat Excerpts(2 years, 4 months ago)
Written StatementsRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)
I am today publishing a response to the consultation on the banning of SIM farms in the UK and introducing legislation that would criminalise the possession and supply of SIM farms used for fraud.
In May 2023, we consulted on a potential ban on SIM farms, defined as devices that can make calls and texts and hold more than four SIM cards at one time. We are grateful to those who took time to respond to the consultation.
Responses to the consultation support the Government’s approach to addressing the issue of SIM farm equipment being used to perpetrate fraud. Respondents agreed that the ban will raise the barrier to entry for those engaging in illegal activities, making it more difficult for them to obtain and exploit SIM farms for fraud.
This consultation has informed legislation that we have brought forward in the Criminal Justice Bill, creating a new criminal offence to supply or possess a SIM farm, subject to certain exemptions for legitimate use and where adequate due diligence has been undertaken. The offence will carry a penalty of an unlimited fine.
The provisions include measures to extend the offence to any other telecommunications device or other article where there is a significant risk of it being used for fraud.
This new offence will give police additional tools to disrupt criminals and make it more difficult to access and abuse SIM farms and similar technologies for fraud.
The response (CP 978) has been laid before the House and is available on www.gov.uk.
[HCWS70]
Oral Answers to Questions
Tom Tugendhat Excerpts(2 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Cat Smith (Lancaster and Fleetwood) (Lab)
The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)
It is a great pleasure to tell the hon. Lady that the Defending Democracy Taskforce, which was set up under the National Security Council, has been operating for about a year and is working closely with parliamentary authorities, devolved Administrations and local authorities around the country, alongside intelligence agencies, the police and opposite numbers from various parties. It has already updated many individuals across the House on different ways in which we can improve our own security and make sure that this country’s democracy is safer. The fundamental way to protect our democracy is to get involved, so I urge anyone watching to join a party—any party, but particularly the Conservative party—and get involved in politics, to keep the United Kingdom Government working for the people of the United Kingdom.
Cat Smith
Given the huge importance of preventing foreign interference in our democracy, does the Minister agree that, for the purposes of transparency, Lord Cameron should declare all previous contacts with, and moneys earned from, foreign Governments after he left the office of Prime Minister and before he was appointed Foreign Secretary?
Tom Tugendhat
The hon. Lady raises an interesting point on how we keep our politics accountable. Rules are set out by this House, the other place, the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority and various other people on how we account for expenses, money raised and various forms of connection. She is right that those records must be kept up to date. The Prime Minister expects every Minister to do that, and I am very confident that the new Foreign Secretary—whom I congratulate—has done so.
Tom Tugendhat
This is the first time that I have faced the hon. Gentleman across the Dispatch Box—last time we were side by side, so this is a bit of change. He raises some interesting and important points. The National Security and Investment Act was passed a little over a year ago, and the Deputy Prime Minister himself chairs the body that advises on it. That is incredibly important because, as we know, foreign ownership and control is a vital area of foreign influence in our Government and society. That is why we are looking not just at that, but at how the foreign media today are not just traditional media—some of whom we see represented up in the Press Gallery; some of them are even waving. Social media is now so important too. It is worth noting the recent Ofcom report that about a third of under-25s get their news from TikTok, which as we know has its algorithm written by individuals under the control of a foreign state—one that is not always friendly.
Wendy Chamberlain (North East Fife) (LD)
Mrs Sheryll Murray (South East Cornwall) (Con)
The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)
My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. That is exactly why we are having an emergency meeting of the Defending Democracy Taskforce tomorrow to assess these issues. The incidents that we have seen in this country since 7 October—absolutely hateful incidents—have left some people feeling unable to make the arguments that their constituents would expect them to make because they feel vulnerable or they feel threatened. That is why I have been engaging on a protective security review not just for the Government, but for all Members of this House, and for other elected officials around our country. It is completely wrong for our democracy to be silenced by anyone, and it certainly should not be silenced by cowards.
Peter Grant (Glenrothes) (SNP)
Draft Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (Risk of Being Drawn into Terrorism) (Revised Guidance) Regulations 2023
Tom Tugendhat Excerpts(2 years, 4 months ago)
General CommitteesRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)
I beg to move,
That the Committee has considered the draft Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (Risk of Being Drawn into Terrorism) (Revised Guidance) Regulations 2023.
It is a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Vickers. This is the first time I have served under the chairmanship of the representative of my uncle and aunt, so it is a great privilege.
The draft statutory instrument was laid before Parliament on 7 September 2023. It relates to Prevent, which is one of the pillars of Contest, the United Kingdom’s counter-terrorism strategy.
If I may quote Sir William Shawcross, who earlier this year published an independent review of Prevent:
“Prevent has a noble ambition”.
Its aim is to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. The Prevent programme literally saves lives. It helps to tackle the causes of radicalisation and assists people to disengage from terrorist ideologies. In simple terms, Prevent is an early intervention programme that works to keep us all safe. I am a passionate advocate of this preventive approach.
To offer early interventions to those in need, Prevent needs the help of certain frontline sectors that are well placed to support communities to reject dangerous ideologies, or to recognise when someone they know could be susceptible to radicalisation. That is why we have the Prevent duty, which is set out in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. It requires frontline actors, including education, healthcare, local authorities, criminal justice agencies and the police, to support Prevent’s ambition. It sits alongside other long-established duties on professionals to protect people from a range of harms, such as involvement in gangs or sexual exploitation.
The Prevent duty guidance, which is the reason for today’s debate, exists to ensure that those working in frontline sectors have the information they need to support Prevent’s mission effectively. The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act specifies the authorities to have regard to that guidance.
I recognise, of course, that Prevent’s mission is not easy. The process of radicalisation is complex, and unique to the individual. A multitude of factors can lead someone to subscribe to extremist ideology or to commit terrorist atrocities. Factors often include exposure to radicalising influences, real and perceived grievances, and an individual’s susceptibility. The Prevent duty helps to ensure that people who are susceptible to radicalisation are offered timely interventions before it becomes too late.
Hamas’s brutal terrorist attack and extremist exploitation of the conflict in Israel and Gaza serve as stark reminders as to what happens when extremism is allowed to fester. The disturbing escalation we have witnessed in extremist rhetoric, both online and offline, aims to raise tensions, divide communities and fuel hatred. Delivering Prevent in the best way possible is vital to strengthen our united front against those insidious influences.
As Members will no doubt be aware, the independent review of Prevent was published on 8 February 2023. Within the review, Sir William Shawcross made 34 recommendations, all of which were accepted by the then Home Secretary and are well under way to being completed. We expect to deliver 29 of the 34 recommendations by February 2024, and the rest shortly thereafter.
The updated Prevent duty guidance, which is the subject of this draft statutory instrument, was issued on 7 September. It responds to several of Sir William’s recommendations. First, the guidance has updated Prevent’s first objective to make it clear that Prevent should
“tackle the ideological causes of terrorism”.
The ideological component of terrorism is what sets it apart from other acts of serious violence and it is on that that Prevent, as fundamentally a counter-terrorism initiative, must be focused.
Secondly, the guidance sets out requirements more clearly articulating the need for high-quality training so that radicalisation risks can be more effectively identified and managed. This will be supported by free Prevent duty training from the Home Office and a new face-to-face awareness training course. Updated training on gov.uk has already been provided for public sector staff subject to the Prevent duty.
Thirdly, the guidance provides professionals with an updated threat picture and introduces the details of the strategic security threat check, which helps Prevent recognise and respond to threats proportionately. In addition to responding to the independent review of Prevent’s recommendations, the guidance will assist statutory partners to understand how best to comply with the duty. It includes details of the capabilities they should have to be able to effectively identify and appropriately manage risk. It also advises on how they can help create an environment where the ideologies used to radicalise people into terrorism are challenged and not permitted to flourish. However, importantly the guidance does not confer any new functions on statutory bodies and reflects current best practice from across the sector.
I acknowledge the excellent work that many professionals already undertake. Every day, our agencies and law enforcement officers work tirelessly to stop those who wish to do us harm. Since March 2017, they have disrupted 39 late-stage plots in the United Kingdom. Our statutory partners are also crucial in that work, and I am immensely grateful for the valuable contribution they make to help keep our country safe by facilitating early interventions for those susceptible to radicalisation. It is in recognition of that, and to ensure close consultation, that a range of key governmental partners were engaged throughout the development of the updated guidance. I am pleased to report that their feedback has been positive.
Subject to the approval of this House, this statutory instrument will bring the new guidance into effect on 31 December 2023, replacing the outdated guidance from 2015. Officials are already working closely with key partners to roll out the guidance, and they stand ready to support its implementation. As I have made clear, Prevent is a vital component of our response to terrorism, but it is a joint effort. With this new guidance, the safety net is strengthened and the country will be safer, which is why I commend it to the Committee.
Tom Tugendhat
I thank all hon. Members on all sides for the tone in which the debate has been conducted. The hon. Member for Barnsley Central is absolutely right that the first time we met I was sent out to shadow him. I very much hoped I would not have to take his job because we were in a combat theatre. This time, sadly, he is gunning for mine. I assure him I will resist just as hard as we resisted together nearly 20 years ago.
It is a great pleasure to work with the hon. Gentleman on this. As many will know, trust between individuals is what makes this Parliament work when it works at its best. We oppose each other on various areas—or rather, he opposes me as I try to do the best for the Government of the country—but the co-operation we have had has improved our ability to co-operate on things that matter. This is something that matters.
I want to pick up on the points the hon. Member—
Tom Tugendhat
I apologise to the right hon. Member who is sitting at the back and ask him to forgive me. He is an old friend and, again, he has raised some interesting matters.
As a friend of Jo Cox and a friend of David Amess, I appreciate the equality of terror in all its horror, in all its pain and in all its agony. I do not think that any of us in this place require a lesson in that. I hear point made by the right hon. Member for North Durham, but I would just say that the services, the intelligence agencies and the police fully appreciate that. The right hon. Member will also know that his words about professionalism in the Prevent space are absolutely right. We have heard frankly disgraceful commentary about the professionalism of our Prevent individuals, who are conducting these services, which completely ignores the fact—and it is a fact—that Prevent is about making sure that all British citizens are treated equally. It is about making sure that there is no soft racism of cultural misunderstanding that tolerates the extremism in one community rather than another, because “that’s normal for them”. No—all British citizens deserve the protection of the British state. They deserve protection from violence used against them, but they also deserve protection from the radicalisation of their children or themselves. That is what Prevent is about. It is about equality; it is about the rights of British citizens; and it is about the right of every citizen and individual in the United Kingdom to be safe.
The hon. Member for Barnsley Central made some interesting points. The point about mental health is valid and true; we are working with the Department of Health and Social Care on that. It is a complicated area, because while it is extremely likely that an individual who seeks to do harm through terrorism may well be suffering from a form of mental illness, that does not undermine the fact that their ideology is radicalising them towards violence. I am afraid that the overlap between mental health and terrorism does not negate either side. The reality is that both can exist at the same time, and we must address both at the same time.
The hon. Member’s point about the recent protests was also extremely valid. One of the things that has shocked me most—I use the term appropriately, I think—is the number of people the police have identified and want to talk to about incidents of racism, antisemitism and vile hatred who fill positions of responsibility in our society. That is completely unacceptable. The normalisation of antisemitism that we have seen on the streets is utterly unacceptable. It is wrong and deeply harmful. Not only is it harmful in the fear that it spreads in parts of the communities that we are lucky enough to represent, but it is wrong because it normalises in the minds of young people attitudes and actions that could easily lead to their causing greater harm and pain. We are absolutely committed to this, and I know that the Prevent professionals working in this space are fully aware of the dangers that we face.
A lot of the engagement on the AI question that the hon. Member spoke about is covered in different ways in the Online Safety Act 2023. The work that has just been done by the Prime Minister at Bletchley Park—the hon. Member will know what a remarkable achievement it was to get all those countries around the table for the AI safety summit—was an extraordinary effort that started to address some of the questions he spoke about. I am delighted to have the hon. Gentleman’ support on that, because it will evolve. The reality is that artificial intelligence is an extraordinary process. It is not just an event, but a process by which the acceleration of algorithms produces information and consequences much faster than many other systems have allowed. We are seeing extremism operating in a very different environment. We are also seeing a very different environment in which the information flowing into algorithms and producing artificial intelligence is changing the way in which different people understand things. This is a question about not just the process, but the input.
The last point I want to make is on the question about mixed, unstable or unclear ideology. In response to the right hon. Member for North Durham, the reality is that while there is extreme right-wing terrorism, it is not in any way ignored; in fact, it is addressed very clearly by our policing and Prevent professionals. Sadly, a huge amount of it is emerging at the moment from the Muslim community. It is a real problem, and we are addressing it. To protect young men and women in the Islamic community, we need to be sure that we support them in a way that would support everybody in the United Kingdom and attack those centres of radicalisation. It also means that we must look at other areas where they are emerging. The question about incel violence—involuntary celibate violence, or mixed, unstable or unclear violence—is also emerging. Sadly, it has grown at different points. It is still a smaller percentage of the events that we see, but sadly it is far too present even now.
Question put and agreed to.
Resolved,
That the Committee has considered the draft Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (Risk of Being Drawn into Terrorism) (Revised Guidance) Regulations 2023.
Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill
Tom Tugendhat Excerpts(2 years, 4 months ago)
Written StatementsRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)
The Government introduced the Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill in the House of Lords yesterday, as committed to in the King’s Speech at the start of this parliamentary Session.
Building on the recent statutory report published by the Home Secretary on the operation of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IPA) since it came into force— https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/report-on-the-operation-of-the-investigatory-powers-act-2016 —this Bill will make urgent and targeted amendments to the IPA to ensure that our security and intelligence agencies have the right tools at their disposal to keep the country safe.
The key elements of the Bill include:
Making changes to the bulk personal dataset regime, which will improve the security and intelligence agencies’ ability to respond with greater agility and speed to existing and emerging threats to national security.
Expanding the oversight regime to support the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to effectively carry out their role, including putting more of their functions on a statutory basis. This will maintain the robust, transparent, and world-leading safeguards in the investigatory powers regime.
Reforming the notices regimes, which will help the UK anticipate the risk to public safety posed by the rolling out of technology by multinational companies that precludes lawful access to data. This would reduce the risk of the most serious offences, such as child sexual exploitation and abuse or terrorism, going undetected.
Updating the conditions for use of internet connections records to ensure that these can be used effectively to target the most serious types of criminal activity and national security threats without a corresponding increase in levels of intrusion.
Increasing the resilience of the warrantry authorisation processes which will allow for greater operational agility for security and intelligence agencies, as well as for the National Crime Agency, in its investigations and support it to tackle the most serious national security and organised crime threats.
These new measures will:
Update the IPA to reflect that the world has changed significantly since 2016. Technology has rapidly advanced, and the type of threats the UK faces continue to evolve.
Enable the security and intelligence agencies to keep pace with a range of evolving threats, against a backdrop of accelerating technological advancements that provide new opportunities for terrorists, hostile state actors, child abusers and criminal gangs.
Ensure that the security and intelligence agencies can develop the necessary tools and capabilities to rapidly identify intelligence insights from vast quantities of data, allowing them to better understand and respond to threats to the UK.
These limited and targeted reforms to the IPA do not create new powers but, instead, recalibrate elements of the current regime to ensure that it remains fit for purpose to respond to modern threats.
This Bill has been developed in close partnership with the security and intelligence agencies, law enforcement agencies and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office. The measures being taken forward have also been driven by the recommendations made in the Home Secretary’s review and the independent review by Lord Anderson KBE KC which was published in June 2023: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/independent-review-of-the-investigatory-powers-act-2016--2
[HCWS24]
Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures: 1 June 2023 to 31 August 2023
Tom Tugendhat Excerpts(2 years, 5 months ago)
Written StatementsRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)
Section 19(1) of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIM) Act 2011 (the Act) requires the Secretary of State to report to Parliament as soon as reasonably practicable after the end of every relevant three-month period on the exercise of their TPIM powers under the Act during that period. TPIM notices in force—as of 31 August 2023 0 Number of new TPIM notices served—during this period 0 TPIM notices in respect of British citizens—as of 31 August 2023 0 TPIM notices extended—during the reporting period 0 TPIM notices revoked—during the reporting period 1 TPIM notices expired—during reporting period 0 TPIM notices revived—during the reporting period 0 Variations made to measures specified in TPIM notices—during the reporting period 0 Applications to vary measures specified in TPIM notices refused—during the reporting period 0 The number of subjects relocated under TPIM legislation—during this the reporting period 1
The level of information provided will always be subject to slight variations based on operational advice.
The TPIM Review Group (TRG) keeps every TPIM notice under regular and formal review. A TRG meeting was held on 10 August 2023.
[HCWS1058]
Oral Answers to Questions
Tom Tugendhat Excerpts(2 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)
Last week, Nigel Farage publicised the cancellation of his bank account under the politically exposed persons regulation, but he is only the latest of a number of people to have had their lives wrecked by that regulation. Recently, Lords in the other place tried to correct the policy, but with only partial success, because, I understand, of pushback from the Home Office and the security services. Will the Minister explain why that is and what he will do about it?
The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)
I am delighted to be asked a question. Yesterday, the Treasury and the Home Office came together and agreed various things that were announced in the House of Lords: the PEPs agreement. Such a closure on political grounds, if that is indeed what has happened—after all, we have only the allegation of it at this point—should, therefore, be completely unacceptable. PEPs is there to prevent the corrupt use of banking facilities by politicians in corrupt regimes. It is not there to silence individuals who may hold views with which we may or may not agree.
National Security Bill
Tom Tugendhat ExcerptsMonday 26th June 2023
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate National Security Act 2023 View all National Security Act 2023 Debates Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Commons Consideration of Lords Message as at 26 June 2023 - (26 Jun 2023)
The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)
I beg to move, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 22B.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)
With this it will be convenient to discuss Lords amendment 122B, Government motion to disagree, and Government amendment (a) in lieu of Lords amendment 122B.
Tom Tugendhat
It is a pleasure to bring the National Security Bill back to this House. I must once again highlight the importance of the Bill’s achieving Royal Assent in a timely manner. Our police and intelligence services need the tools and powers that it contains; the longer they go without, the greater the risk to national security.
Maria Eagle (Garston and Halewood) (Lab)
Why doesn’t the Minister just accept the Lords amendments, then, so that we can move straight to getting the Bill on the statute book?
Tom Tugendhat
The right hon. Lady will be delighted to hear the rest of my speech, in which I answer her wonderful questions.
As this House will be aware, the Intelligence and Security Committee memorandum of understanding can already be revised by agreement, which is one of the points that the right hon. Lady is raising. We do not believe that primary legislation is an appropriate mechanism for making amendments to the MOU. However, we recognise the strength of feeling on the issue, and in a spirit of compromise we have tabled amendment (a) in lieu of Lords amendment 122B. The Government’s amendment will achieve a similar result and will create a duty on the Prime Minister and the Intelligence and Security Committee to progress a review of the MOU within six months of the provision’s coming into force.
Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)
That is fine, but the ISC has been raising this issue for the past two years. It takes two to tango. Unfortunately, the only reason we have this Lords amendment is a sense of frustration—certainly among members of the ISC, but also among a lot of Members of this House.
Tom Tugendhat
I assure the right hon. Gentleman that I have heard him. I hope that the amendment will now satisfy the ISC with respect to its concerns. I am sure that hon. Members across the House will support Government amendment (a) in lieu.
I turn to Lords amendment 22B, which would require political parties to make an annual return to the Electoral Commission, setting out the details of donations from foreign powers. It would also create a duty on political parties to write an annual policy statement to ensure the identification of donations from foreign powers. I understand the intention behind the amendment, and I share the strength of feeling behind it.
The Government are very much alive to the risk that foreign interference presents. I am pleased that we have already taken action to address it, and I am pleased with the support that we have received on both sides of the House for our reforms to Companies House, which will deliver more reliably accurate information on the companies register, providing greater powers for Companies House to query and challenge the information it receives. The Government are also legislating, via the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill, to enhance data sharing between Companies House and public authorities, including the Electoral Commission. This will help the enforcement of the rules on donations by providing greater confidence in the accuracy of the data held at Companies House.
Liam Byrne (Birmingham, Hodge Hill) (Lab)
The Minister is one of the House’s experts on the malign influence of foreign money in this country and the creation of Londongrad, so he knows all too well that money from foreign powers is coming into the bank accounts of UK citizens and then moving almost immediately—sometimes even overnight—into the coffers of political parties in this country. That creates a risk to the integrity of our political system. He must surely accept that the drafting of the Bill does not yet provide sufficient safeguards against that risk.
Tom Tugendhat
The right hon. Gentleman flatters me, which is always a way to succeed in this place, but he will forgive me if I carry on, because I will address some of those points. He will see that I have considered them, and that there are some areas in which there may be some conversation.
Our reforms build on the updates to electoral law in the Elections Act 2022, which have closed loopholes on foreign third-party campaign spending. They also include other measures to ensure that our democracy will remain secure. The National Security Bill will give our agencies more tools to tackle foreign interference. The new offence of foreign interference includes manipulating whether or how any person participates in political processes. The Bill also provides for substantially higher maximum penalties where a foreign power is involved in the commission of existing electoral offences of the nature that the right hon. Gentleman describes. That includes those relating to making political donations, including via third parties.
In addition, the Bill’s foreign influence registration scheme, which the right hon. Gentleman and I both championed on the Foreign Affairs Committee, will increase the transparency of foreign political influence activities. The enhanced tier of FIRS, as we are calling it, allows us to list foreign powers that act against the safety and interests of the United Kingdom. A designation would require a person acting within the United Kingdom at the direction of a specified power or entity to register with the scheme.
Although I understand the aims of Lords amendment 22B, I do not follow its approach. The legal framework in this area is exceptionally clear: any person accepting a donation from a foreign power, whether made directly or indirectly, is already breaking the law. As such, the result of this amendment would be for political parties to submit a blank return to the Electoral Commission once a year. As I am sure colleagues would agree, this would do little to improve transparency or enhance our electoral security.
Secondly, as the Government have set out previously, Lords amendment 22B does nothing to enhance the ability of political parties to investigate donations of the nature that the right hon. Gentleman describes. Political parties do not have the financial investigative capabilities of the banks or security services. They rightly cannot access people’s personal financial records and do not have the means to trace layers of financial transactions. They cannot themselves undertake sophisticated forensic accounting. There is little to be gained by increasing pressure on political parties to identify impermissible donations without improving their ability to do so.
Thirdly, political parties are not global corporations. There are more than 380 registered political parties, many of which are predominantly made up of volunteers. Lords amendment 22B could be disproportionately burdensome for smaller political parties, disincentivising them from accepting donations and, in turn, harming grassroots democracy.
Finally, the requirement to publish an annual policy statement lacks utility. In previous debates on this matter, hon. and right hon. Members highlighted concerns that parties do not have to evaluate a donation and its perceived risk. This is not true. I reiterate that political parties are already required by law to take all reasonable steps to verify the identity of a donor and whether they are permissible. Failure to ensure that permissibility requirements are met is an offence under existing law. As such, parties are already required to have systems in place to mitigate the acceptance of such funds.
As to the political point: just because you can, does not mean you should. Political judgment should always apply to donations.
Liam Byrne
I thank the Minister for giving way once again. He is being characteristically generous.
We may as well test the argument he is rehearsing against facts that are now known. Mr Mohamed Amersi, for example, has given something like £775,000 to political causes in this country. The Financial Times has reported that a considerable fraction of Mr Amersi’s profits are made from trade in Russia. How does this Bill safeguard against profits made in a country such as Russia finding their way into this country’s political system and infecting it?
Tom Tugendhat
The right hon. Gentleman, as he will understand, raises an individual about whom I will not comment. The Government will not take a position of that nature on an individual based on such comments. I will not address him specifically.
What I will say is that there have been reports of foreign donations getting into political parties—that is true. What is also true is that political parties have a responsibility to check the sources of their donations, and all British citizens have the right to donate. If a specific accusation has not been reported to the Electoral Commission and investigated, and if a person has not been found guilty, the right hon. Gentleman will understand that I cannot make any further comment.
Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)
I thank the Minister for his opening contribution as these two additions to the National Security Bill return to the Commons once again.
The Minister has made the case for Government amendment (a) in lieu of Lords amendment 122B. I have a great deal of respect for him, as he knows, but this amendment in lieu, tabled in the name of the Home Secretary, essentially says that this House and the other House have a point, that the Government want to give themselves maximum wiggle room to be able to avoid doing anything about addressing the point by tabling an amendment in lieu that is much wishier and much washier than the clarity of our Lords amendment.
Lords amendment 122B, tabled by my noble Friend Lord Coaker, would have introduced a duty to update the Intelligence and Security Committee’s memorandum of understanding, rather than a requirement to consider whether the MOU needs updating. What does that actually mean? Is there a proposed framework or a timetable for deliberations? The Lords amendment was not tabled for fun; it was tabled because the Intelligence and Security Committee performs a vital function, but its ability to perform that function is being eroded.
The Lords amendment followed a recommendation made by the ISC in its 2021-22 annual report, which looked back to the Committee’s origins, when the then Security Minister told Parliament that it was
“the intention of the Government that the ISC should have oversight of substantively all of central Government’s intelligence and security activities to be realised now and in the future.”––[Official Report, Justice and Security Public Bill Committee, 31 March 2013; c. 98.]
Sir Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)
I want to make a few brief comments about both the amendments before us. Let me start with Lords amendment 22B and the Government motion to disagree with it. I find it very difficult to disagree with this amendment. I was a member of the Committee on Standards in Public Life when the 2021 report that has been referred to was produced, and I am a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee now. Both those Committees, as the House has heard this evening, take the view that further measures are required to protect our democracy from the influx of inappropriate foreign money, and I think both would say that the amendment is the bare minimum of what needs to happen.
Lords amendment 22B does two things. It says, first, that a political party should be able to identify donations from a foreign power and, secondly, that it should be transparent with the Electoral Commission about such donations. It is worth stressing that the donations we are talking about are those from a foreign power—not necessarily from an individual, but from a state, perhaps funnelled through an individual. It is surely important to recognise the significance of such donations—potentially, at least—on our democratic process. It seems to me that there are two scenarios here. Either there are hardly any such donations in British politics, in which case the work involved to identify and deal with them appropriately is hardly likely to be onerous, even for smaller parties; or there are substantial numbers of such donations, in which case the case for greater transparency is overwhelming.
Let me turn to Lords amendment 122B and Government amendment (a) in lieu. It is worth being honest: there is very little difference between the Government amendment in lieu and the amendment from the other place, but both, as others have said, are operating on the margins of the real issue. The real issue is that there needs to be the capacity for the Intelligence and Security Committee’s remit, and the memorandum of understanding that relates to it, to adapt as the processes and structures of Government adapt. If that is not the case, all the consequences flow that have been described so well by my Committee colleagues, which I do not need and have not got time to repeat.
My last point relates to a deficiency in both Lords amendment 122B and the Government’s amendment in lieu. Both say that the consideration or the review—depending on which version we choose—of the memorandum of understanding must begin within six months of the passage of the Bill. The problem with that, it seems to me, is that it is far from inconceivable that the Government may make a machinery of government change or a process change beyond that six-month point. It does not seem sensible to artificially limit the capacity for having that review or consideration of the memorandum beyond that point. For that reason, I am afraid, I do not think that either the Lords amendment that we have received or the Government’s amendment in lieu are sensible responses to the challenge we face. In my view, both are flawed.
Tom Tugendhat
I thank all Members of the House for their comments this evening—there have been some important contributions. I pay particular tribute to the hon. Member for Halifax (Holly Lynch), who has been not only a powerful critic, but a very able debater and participant in improving the Bill and getting it into a position where I think it is ready to be enacted. As she and the House are very well aware, this is a Bill that is somewhat overdue. It updates the powers that our fantastic intelligence services require in order to keep this whole nation safe. We have, sadly, seen various different efforts by nations and—as my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes) put it—some non-state actors to use our freedoms against us. It is very welcome that the House has worked so helpfully in bringing the Bill together to make sure that we are as protected as possible.
I now turn to some of the areas in which criticism has been raised, and I understand that criticism. As a former Committee Chair myself, I start by praising the Intelligence and Security Committee. My right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis) has regularly been in my office of late, and indeed in the past. We have worked extremely closely on many other areas, so I am delighted that he has raised his challenges. I will seek to answer them, because he understands as well as I do that parliamentary scrutiny is not just essential for the country, but for good government. The areas that he challenges us on are incredibly important.
It is also very good to see the hon. Member for Bristol North West (Darren Jones) in his place. There are other Committees that have responsibility for some of the areas we are discussing today, and as Chair of the Business and Trade Committee, he is charged with overseeing some of the areas that require some understanding of the nature of business in our society today. That, I am afraid, does include some classified information, so the Government are committed to finding ways in which we can make sure that not only the Intelligence and Security Committee, but relevant departmental Committees, can have appropriate oversight. I repeat what I have said separately to him and to my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East: this issue is extremely important to me, and I know that the whole Government share my view.
I will now turn to the question of foreign donations, and the reason why I do not think that Lords amendment 22B quite works. As the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill (Liam Byrne) has put it in the past, I do not resile from saying that the nature of foreign donations to this country is certainly not something to be taken lightly. When it is found, it is a crime, and a crime that must be punished. We should be very clear that interfering in our democracy is completely unacceptable, and I am very pleased that working with others in this House, we have made some progress in different areas through the defending democracy taskforce. I thank all Members of this House for that, and I particularly thank Mr Speaker for his assistance in making sure that we are in a better position today and will, I hope, be in an even better position in a few months’ time as various elements come forward.
May I say that there are differences between charities or businesses and political parties? One of those important differences is that charities and businesses, quite correctly, do not have to make public their donations. They do not have the obligation that political parties have to state exactly who is funding them. Political parties do have that obligation, and that is one reason why there is a difference. Transparency is provided not only by the political parties checking who is permissible and therefore who is actually giving the money, but by their making that donation public so that the media, who scrutinise us all, scrutinise those who donate and seek to influence or promote ideas by supporting any of us. I think that is an important difference that we should recognise.
May I, however, add that there is clearly a question on scrutiny? I say again that this amendment does not address that question, because any lawful political party should give a nil return, according to the amendment. I do not think that quite answers the questions that right hon. and hon. Members are asking, but I do understand the question of scrutiny that has been raised across this House, and I can assure Members that I am listening.
Question put, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 22B.
Chinese "Overseas Police Service Stations"
Tom Tugendhat Excerpts(2 years, 9 months ago)
Written StatementsRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)
Last November, I committed to update the House on the response to media reporting of unofficial Chinese “police service stations.” The Minister for Crime, Policing and Fire reiterated this commitment in April.
Reports by the non-governmental organisation Safeguard Defenders claimed that there were three Chinese “police service stations” in the UK—in Croydon, Glasgow and Hendon. Further allegations have been made about an additional site in Belfast.
These reports alleged that, while these “police service stations” are officially set up in countries across the world to conduct administrative tasks to support Chinese nationals residing abroad, they are also used to monitor and harass diaspora communities and, in some cases, to coerce people to return to China outside of legitimate channels.
The police have visited each of the locations identified by Safeguard Defenders, and carefully looked into these allegations to consider whether any laws have been broken and whether any further action should be taken. I can confirm that they have not, to date, identified any evidence of illegal activity on behalf of the Chinese state across these sites. We assess that police and public scrutiny have had a suppressive impact on any administrative functions that these sites may have had.
However, these “police service stations” were established without our permission and their presence, regardless of whatever low-level administrative activity they were performing, will have worried and intimidated those who have left China and sought safety and freedom here in the UK. This is unacceptable.
The Chinese authorities regularly criticise others for what they see as interference in their internal affairs, yet they felt able to open unattributed sites without consulting the UK Government. It is alleged that this was a pattern repeated around the world.
The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office has told the Chinese embassy that any functions related to such “police service stations” in the UK are unacceptable and that they must not operate in any form. The Chinese embassy has subsequently responded that all such stations have closed permanently. Any further allegations will be swiftly investigated, in line with UK law.
I hope that this clarifies what we know about these alleged “police service stations” and the action that we have taken. The 2023 Integrated Review Refresh makes it clear that we want to engage and partner with China on key issues where it is in our national interest to do so. However, the UK will always put national security first.
Let me be clear: any attempt by any foreign power to intimidate, harass or harm individuals or communities in the UK will not be tolerated. This is an insidious threat to our democracy and fundamental human rights. That is why I asked the Defending Democracy Taskforce to review the UK’s approach to trans-national repression to ensure that we have a robust and joined-up response across Government and law enforcement. Understanding and combating this kind of interference is a key pillar of our taskforce’s efforts.
The National Security Bill, now in its final stages, represents the biggest overhaul of state threats legislation in a generation, and will drastically improve our tools to deal with the full range of state threat activity, regardless of where it originates. The Bill contains provisions that will leave those seeking to coerce, including through threats of violence, for, or with the intention to benefit, a foreign state liable to prosecution in a way that they currently are not. Those convicted could face up to 14 years in prison. I urge Parliament to quickly pass the Bill so that its powers can be used to clamp down on foreign interference and trans-national repression.
I look forward to working closely with this House to further protect our democracy.
[HCWS822]