(1 year, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberI thank my hon. Friend the Member for Bridgend (Dr Wallis) for securing this debate and for his continued interest in this issue. This is not the first time he has raised it with me—in fact, the first time he raised it with me was many years ago—but it is perhaps the first time that I may be able to assist.
In my role as Security Minister, I see evidence every day of the scale of the threat from cyber-crime that affects our citizens, businesses and Government services. There were an estimated 690,000 incidents of computer misuse in England and Wales in the year to September 2022, of which 577,000 were related to unauthorised access to personal information. I have seen the effects of criminals targeting businesses and individuals online—the businesses that suffer financial losses because of ransomware attack and their inability to carry on their businesses, and the individuals who lose personal information, including highly personal information, and can suffer harassment and blackmail because of it.
It is because of such criminal activity that protecting the country in cyber-space is such a key priority for the Government. It is essential that we ensure the UK has the powers and legislation to allow our law enforcement agencies to take action to tackle this threat. The Computer Misuse Act dates from 1990, before almost anybody had an email address—certainly before I did. Today, we could not only research the law online, but one of the large language model artificial intelligences we now see frequently used online could actually draft large parts of it too.
That is why this Government have launched a call for information, asking for different views on whether the 1990 Act and the powers used by law enforcement agencies to investigate the offences in that Act need to be enhanced.
In February, we launched a consultation in which we set out proposals for new powers for law enforcement agencies to improve their ability to take action to tackle crime online. Those proposals include a power to allow law enforcement agencies to take control of domains and internet protocol addresses to help tackle a wide range of offences, including fraud; a power to require the preservation of computer data; and a power to take action against a person possessing or using data obtained by another person through a CMA offence. In the consultation, we committed to further considering the question raised by my hon. Friend of whether the Act needs to be amended to provide defences to CMA offences.
As the Government set out in our response to the pro-innovation regulation of technologies review by Sir Patrick Vallance, the Home Office is taking forward work to consider the merits and risks of introducing changes to the Act in relation to the defences. That is a complex issue that requires significant further discussion with a wide range of stakeholders. The Computer Misuse Act is based fundamentally on the principle that the owner of the system is responsible for the operation of the system and its data, and bears the cost in securing it. It is right that they have the protection of the law from those who obtain or attempt to obtain unauthorised access to computers and their data.
It is important that we consult those who actually own the systems for their views on that. In particular, we need to ensure that any changes that we make to the Act support the continued improvement to the UK’s cyber-security while ensuring that system owners continue to have the right to determine who may access their systems and data. That in itself feeds into the growth agenda. System owners need to know that the Government take unauthorised access to their systems seriously and will support them in tackling those who attempt to commit such offences.
Let me clear about some of the issues that we need to address in relation to introducing defences. The proposals would potentially allow a defence for the unauthorised access by a person to another person’s property—in this case, their computer systems and data—without their knowledge or consent. We will therefore need to define what constitutes legitimate cyber-security activity, where a defence might be applicable and under what circumstances, and how such unauthorised access can be kept to a minimum.
We will also need to consider who should be allowed to undertake such activity, what professional standards they will need to comply with, and what reporting or oversight will be needed. Of course, we must make no changes that would prevent law enforcement agencies from investigating, prosecuting and pursuing those who commit cyber-crimes. I am sure Members would agree that, in the light of those issues, any changes must be considered very carefully indeed.
As we set out in the consultation, we have committed to working with law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, the cyber-security industry and system owners to consider proposals and reach a consensus on the best way forward. That work is under way, and the Government would welcome any contributions from those with an interest in this area.
Question put and agreed to.
(1 year, 5 months ago)
Written StatementsThe Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) 2002 contains a comprehensive package of measures designed to make the recovery of unlawfully held assets more effective. The operation of certain powers within POCA are subject to guidance in various codes of practice issued by the Home Secretary, the Attorney General and the Advocate General for Northern Ireland, the Department of Justice Northern Ireland and Scottish Ministers.
Three existing codes of practice need to be updated and one new code of practice made, to reflect possible changes made to POCA by the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency (ECCT) Bill, which subject to being passed by Parliament and receiving Royal Assent will amend and insert new civil forfeiture powers into POCA, to increase the recovery of crypto-assets.
It is intended that the new civil forfeiture crypto-asset powers will be replicated in schedule 1 to the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA) and Schedule 6 to the Terrorism Act 2000 (TACT). The equivalent code of practice also needs to be updated.
POCA and TACT provide that before a code of practice is issued, I must consider any representations made, modify the codes as appropriate, and subsequently lay the codes before Parliament for approval.
I intend to consult on changes to the following codes of practice:
Code of practice issued under section 47S of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002—Search, Seizure and Detention of Property (England and Wales).
Code of practice issued under section 195S of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002—Search, Seizure and Detention of Property (Northern Ireland).
Code of practice issued under the proposed section 303Z25 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (as inserted by schedule 7 to the ECCT Bill) - Recovery of Crypto-assets and Related Items: Search Powers (NEW CODE).
Code of practice issued under section 377 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002—Investigations.
Code of practice for officers acting under schedule 1 to the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and
Security Act 2001—amended through powers under Schedule 14 to TACT.
In tandem the Attorney General’s Office will also launch a consultation on its equivalent code of practice.
I will arrange for a copy of the consultation document and the five draft codes to be placed in the Libraries of both Houses.
Following this consultation, I intend to lay a statutory instrument to issue these updated codes of practice under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA) to reflect changes as a result of both the Economic Crime, Transparency and Enforcement Act, and the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill.
[HCWS682]
(1 year, 5 months ago)
Written StatementsSection 19(1) of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIM) Act 2011 (the Act) requires the Secretary of State to report to Parliament as soon as reasonably practicable after the end of every relevant three-month period on the exercise of their TPIM powers under the Act during that period. TPIM notices in force—as of 28 February 2023 2 Number of new TPIM notices served—during this period 0 TPIM notices in respect of British citizens—as of 28 February 2023 2 TPIM notices extended—during the reporting period 0 TPIM notices revoked—during the reporting period 0 TPIM notices expired—during reporting period 0 TPIM notices revived—during the reporting period 0 Variations made to measures specified in TPIM notices—during the reporting period 3 Applications to vary measures specified in TPIM notices refused—during the reporting period 1 The number of subjects relocated under TPIM legislation—during this the reporting period 1
The level of information provided will always be subject to slight variations based on operational advice.
The TPIM Review Group (TRG) keeps every TPIM notice under regular and formal review. TRG meetings were held on 25 and 31 January 2023.
On 21 December 2022 Mr Justice Chamberlain published his judgment in the review of the TPIM notice against TPIM subject TL. Mr Justice Chamberlain found that the Secretary of State for the Home Department’s decision to impose a TPIM notice on TL was both necessary and proportionate. This judgment can be found here: www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2022/3322.html.
[HCWS673]
(1 year, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe fraud strategy will be published very shortly, and it will set out how the Government will work with industry to remove the vulnerabilities that fraudsters exploit.
Over 70% of scams originate online, showing that tech and social media companies are not only significant to enabling fraud but key to preventing it. Given that tech and social media companies are currently driving the problem, will my right hon. Friend compel their sector to be part of the solution by going after frauds and fraudsters on their own platforms, as well as upping all our defences in the upcoming national fraud strategy?
I know that my hon. Friend is well versed in this subject. I read the article that he and my hon. Friend the Member for Cheadle (Mary Robinson) recently wrote. It is a very good piece, which I recommend to the House. The article referred to the increase in scam adverts on social media, and I agree with him that social media companies must take greater responsibility for the safety of their users online by stopping more of these frauds at source. The Online Safety Bill is a welcome first step towards that goal, but it is right that we continue to consider what more can be done.
Fraud now accounts for nearly half of all crimes, yet very few of those crimes are investigated and only 0.1% of them go to court. While it is welcome that we will eventually get this fraud strategy, what more are the Government doing to ensure that the police have the resources and expertise to tackle crimes of fraud and that the criminal justice system speeds up so that many more such cases get not only investigated but heard in court?
The hon. Member makes the case for me, and I am grateful to him for doing so. The reality is that we are seeing an explosion of fraud, not just in this country but around the world, and we have to deal with it. That is why bringing together the intelligence resources, the policing elements and the will is so important. I was in Manchester on Thursday where I met the chief constable and others who are doing so much to tackle fraud, not just connected to the garment industry where I was on Cheetham Hill, but linked to human trafficking and, sadly, to state threats and even terrorist financing.
As I outlined in my statement to the House on 20 February, we are taking increasing steps to address the threat from Iran—but, I should make clear, not to address the welcome we extend towards the Iranian people. Today of all days, we should say, “Nowruz etan Pyrouz.”
There are three—if not seven—cut-outs of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps operating here in the UK, silencing critics of the ayatollah, inciting hate, celebrating terrorists and recruiting for a terrorist state. The Government know that this House wants the IRGC proscribed, but in the immediate term, will they please protect us from transnational repression by shutting down these cut-outs of the Iranian state? I also ask the Home Secretary or the Security Minister to meet Vahid Beheshti, who is on day 26 of a hunger strike outside the Foreign Office because he wants the IRGC proscribed. I am seriously concerned about his health, and it would help if the Government were to meet him.
I would be very happy to meet him and, indeed, anybody else who takes the threat of the IRGC in this country as seriously as we do. We have had this work ongoing for a number of months now, and my hon. Friend will be aware that asking for actions to be taken means we must be legally compliant with the responses. That is where we are getting to; we are increasingly at the point where we are taking more and more action against the IRGC. So may I say, in the words of Omar Khayyam, in his poem for new year:
“No words about last winter can bring cheer;
don’t speak of yesterday—rejoice today.”?
I thank the Minister very much for that. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is involved in all sorts of unspeakable activities in Iran—abuse of people, persecution of Christians and other ethnic minorities, and attacks on women—but here in the United Kingdom it is also involved in subversive activities through the buildings it has. I think that everybody in this House wants to see it proscribed, so can the Minister give us some indication of when that will happen?
The hon. Gentleman knows very well, sadly, that we cannot discuss individual proscriptions, so I will not go down that route. However, he has been a voice for freedom of religion and belief in this country and around the world for many years. He will be aware of the brutality not only against women and the LGBT community in Iran, but against people of faith, Baha’i, Jews and Christians, who have seen their lives destroyed by an extraordinarily brutal regime. This Thursday is the beginning of Ramadan, and I am sure everybody in this House wishes every Muslim in our community Ramadan kareem and the blessings of the season. The reality is that this is a time for communities to come together, yet in Tehran it is time for the regime to ignore the Islamic faith and to tear people apart.
The hon. Member will well know that the work we have been doing against the Iranian threat in the United Kingdom has not diminished—in fact, it has increased in recent months. He is right to talk about cultural centres. Sadly, the Islamic Centre of England is not alone. Indeed, the work of the IRGC is not limited to those Iranian proxy organisations. We have to ensure that we have the resources and the attitude, and that is exactly what this Government are pulling together and exactly what we are deploying against this vile threat that has taken over a country and is now threatening ours.
My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. What we have seen from the Iranian regime, sadly, is that overlap of crime, state threats and the use of terrorism to threaten the British people and our allies around the world. This Government will absolutely not allow those to flourish, and will stand extremely firmly against any such threats in this country.
Indecent exposure and non-contact sexual offending can be gateway offences to very much more serious offending against women and girls, as in the cases of Libby Squire in Hull and of Wayne Couzens, as we heard in his sentencing last week. When are the Government going to act on these early warning signs?
Far-right Islamophobic Danish politician Rasmus Paludan has said he is going to travel from Denmark to Wakefield for the sole purpose of burning a Koran in a public place. Mr Paludan was previously jailed in Denmark for his hateful and racist statements. He is a dangerous man who should not be allowed into this country. Can the Home Secretary assure me and my community that the Government are taking action to prevent this?
I inform the House that Mr Paludan has been added to the warnings index. Therefore, his travel to the United Kingdom would not be conducive to the public good, and he will not be allowed access.
(1 year, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberI want to update the House on steps that the Home Secretary and I have been taking to address the concerning activities of the Iranian regime and its operatives in the United Kingdom.
The United Kingdom is committed to defending our freedoms—values that define us and make us who we are—and none is more fundamental than freedom of the press. The Iranian regime’s violent oppression of its own citizens and repeated violations of human rights have shown us who the supreme leader and his enforcers really are. It has murdered its own people and made hostages of others, and the protests that began in September 2022 show that it does not have the support of the Iranian people.
In recent months, the Iranian regime has publicly called for the capture or killing of those holding it to account. That includes very real and specific threats towards UK-based journalists working for Iran International, a prominent Persian-language news channel, and their families. The Home Secretary and I absolutely condemn this outrageous violation of our sovereignty and the attempted violation of the human rights of those journalists. In response, we have put in place an extremely robust range of security measures, including armed policing. However, because of the severity of the threat and the particularities of the site, counter-terrorism policing have advised Iran International to move to a more secure location in the United Kingdom. Until its studio is ready, it has chosen to continue its broadcasting from existing studios in the United States—I assure the House that this measure will be temporary. Until then, I have asked officials to help find a temporary location for Iran International’s UK operations, and we will make sure that its permanent new studio in the United Kingdom is secure. I spoke to counter-terrorism policing this morning to confirm that.
Let me be clear: freedom of the press is at the heart of our freedoms. Tehran’s efforts to silence Iran International are a direct attack on our freedoms, and an attempt to undermine our sovereignty. They will fail. Democracy is as much about journalists and civic activists as it is about politicians. The media must be free to work without fear, which is why this Government have already set up the Defending Democracy Taskforce, and why we will be taking further action in response to these threats. I am not alone in saying this: earlier this afternoon, I spoke to my counterparts in France, Germany and the United States. They all agreed, and spoke of incidents that have targeted individuals in their own countries. When I spoke to Iran International over the weekend, it praised our police; it is right to do so, because only last week, the vigilance of our officers resulted in an individual being charged with a terrorism offence after being arrested near the broadcaster’s office.
None the less, this is clearly an appalling situation. The Government, police, agencies and our allies are working together to ensure that Iran International’s operations will resume, and these threats will not silence us, nor them. I know that this House will wish to express its support for that principle too.
As of last week, we had responded to 15 credible threats to kill or kidnap British or UK-based individuals by the Iranian regime since the start of 2022. Between 2020 and 2022, Iran tried to collect intelligence on UK-based Israeli and Jewish individuals. We believe this information was a preparation for future lethal operations. In 2021, UK police asked partners to share information on Iran-based Mohammed Mehdi Mozayyani, a member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps who worked to conduct a lethal operation against Iranian dissidents here in the United Kingdom. We know that the Iranian intelligence services work with organised criminal gangs, and I can assure the House and the public that we will go after anyone working with them.
Our partners in Europe and the United States face similar threats, and we are working together to keep our people safe. My call this afternoon with other allies was about co-ordinating action that we will take to protect ourselves and ensure a unified response to these threats. We are strongest when we work with our allies around the world, and the Iranian regime should be in no doubt that we are absolutely united.
Let me be clear that this is a persistent threat. It is not carried out by rogue elements, but is a conscious strategy of the Iranian regime. Our Government will act. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary has already summoned the Iranian chargé d’affaires, and we will be looking at further sanctions on those linked to the Iranian regime. We already have around 300 sanctions in place against Iran, including of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in its entirety.
Today, alongside international partners, eight further individuals were sanctioned, but our response will not end there. Today I have instructed the Home Office to lead work on countering Iranian state threats, making use of the full breadth and expertise of the Government and our extraordinary and courageous police, security and intelligence agencies. We will target the full spectrum of threats we see coming from Tehran. I will be asking our security agencies to explore what more we can do with our allies to tackle threats of violence, but we will also address the wider threat to economic security from illicit finance and the threat from malign interference in our democratic society.
At home, the Charity Commission will soon report on its statutory inquiry into the Islamic Centre of England, which is accused of having links to the Iranian regime. We must ensure that our police and intelligence agencies have the power to crack down on state threats such as those from Iran, which is why urge the House to back the National Security Bill, which is going through Parliament at the moment.
The relationship we have with Iran is not the one we want; it is not the one we chose. We have a deep respect for Iran’s rich history and for the Iranian people. From the “Shahnameh” to the works of Saadi, the wealth of the nation has been in the words of her people. They taught ethics and governance and the importance of law, but today the tyrants in Tehran have betrayed those great pillars of Persian civilisation and are trying to silence those words and their own people, but they will not be silenced. To the brave Iranian journalists and community here in the United Kingdom, I say that this country, this Government and this whole House stands in solidarity with you against the oppression that you face. Mr Deputy Speaker, let me directly address the Iranian regime, which is responsible for these heinous crimes. We will hold you to account for your blatant violation of our laws and values. We will expose your crimes against the British people and against the Iranian people. We will expose your actions around the world. We will work with our allies to hold you to account, personally. We will act to keep our country safe. I commend this statement to the House.
I am grateful to the Minister for advance sight of his statement. As he has already said, press freedom is fundamental to any liberal democracy, and it is a right that we are all committed to defending across this House. We should all be appalled that Iran International has felt the need to close its office here in the UK following police advice after a series of threats made against its brave journalists.
The UK has a proud history of supporting those who speak truth to power. Since 2017, Iran International has operated successfully here in the UK. In recent weeks, it has shone a spotlight on the Iranian regime’s violent repression of those protesting the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini and of those taking to the streets calling for civil liberties to be upheld. For that, they have been targeted by the regime, and, unbelievably, deemed to be a threat to Iran’s national security, with threats that agents of the organisation would be pursued.
As the Minister knows, in November’s annual threat assessment, the director general of MI5, Ken McCallum, stated that Iran had sought to murder or kidnap individuals in the UK on at least 10 occasions. Just this week, the head of Counter Terrorism Policing in the UK stated that there had been five more plots since then, saying that they had disrupted
“15 plots since the start of 2022 to either kidnap or even kill British or UK-based individuals perceived as enemies of the regime.”
I know that across this House we are united in our outrage that any foreign Government would think that they could conduct activity in this way within the borders of another country. As a democracy, we have to send the strongest possible message that we, our policing and security services, and the British public, will not tolerate it. I have met with representatives from Iran International. As the Minister said, they have spoken highly of UK counter-terrorism policing and our security services. I want to put my thanks to them on the record for the work that they undertake every day.
However, I have asked the Government five times in this Chamber since October why we are not going further to deploy sanctions and proscription powers against those acting on behalf of Iran. In response to my question at the last Home Office questions earlier this month, the Minister spoke of his desire to see the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps proscribed, so why are they not, either through the use of existing terrorism powers or new state threats equivalent powers? He has not mentioned it at all in his statement today. That means the IRGC are still free to organise and establish support here in the UK. We have to put a stop to that.
There are people appointed to posts here in the UK who are representatives of the supreme leader himself. Why are they still here? The Minister talked of instructing his Department today to lead work. Although the threat from Iran has escalated, it has not come from out of the blue. Why have we found ourselves ill-prepared to respond to the threat? The United States proscribed the IRGC as a terrorist organisation in 2019. Activity from Iran has been a feature of the annual threat assessment for some years. There were warnings in the 2021 integrated review, as well as in the Intelligence and Security Committee report of March 2022, which said:
“There also exists a continuing threat of state-sponsored assassination, attacks and abductions of those perceived as dissidents.”
Again, in November of last year, we had the starkest warnings from the director general of MI5. The ISC’s annual report published last year said:
“In November 2021, the Committee announced that it will be undertaking an Inquiry into national security issues relating to Iran.”
I understand that the ISC still has not been able to progress that report, and so I would welcome an explanation from the Minister as to why requested information has not been forthcoming to Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee, with an assurance that it is being addressed as a priority.
The UK must always be a safe place for journalists to speak truth to power. The rest of the world is watching. We cannot ever allow authoritarian tyranny to be exported to the UK and conducted on behalf of other hostile states within our borders. I ask the Minister: when will we see the sanctions? Can he provide us with a timeline? He has talked about co-ordinated responses, but those can be slow. When will we see proscription? We have to get this done. We are looking to table amendments to the National Security Bill; will the Minister support them? We very much stand ready to work with the Government in making this happen.
I thank the hon. Lady for her comments. She is absolutely right to press me on those issues, because it is absolutely true that this has been ongoing. She is also aware that proscription is a legal instrument, and that therefore there is a natural element of discussion. We do not comment on whether we are going to proscribe; we wait until we have the actions ready to do it. She will understand that we will wait until we have full advice.
What we need to be doing is exactly what we are doing, which is sanctioning individuals. I announced eight further sanctions today. We have spoken about various different actions we have taken, and I am grateful that the hon. Member has quite rightly praised the work of the police and the intelligence services, which have done a phenomenal job in keeping us safe. I am afraid that it is not true to say that nothing has happened since the IR. Since then, MI5, Counter Terrorism Policing and many other agencies of the state have been working tirelessly to keep this country safe, and to defend our values and freedoms.
I call the chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee.
I can confirm what is in the public domain, which is that the committee is undertaking a study of Iran and its security implications, and I will just say that I am cautiously optimistic that various causes of delay in the supply of evidence and the progress of that work are within sight of being overcome.
I would like to add my congratulations to the police and security authorities on the announced foiling of 15 credible threats. What I would like to know, without any prejudice to our future inquiries, is whether the Minister is in a position to tell us anything about the origins of the people making those 15 threats. Were they home-grown, or were they people who had come here from Iran? He does hint at the involvement of criminal gangs, which suggests a franchise. How are people able, in this country, to pose such threats? They know who they are, so it should not be difficult for him, either now or in a subsequent announcement, to give an analysis to this House.
I hope my right hon. Friend will invite me to his committee, where I will be able to answer these questions more fully. He will understand that I cannot address them on the Floor of the House. His reading of the question, however, is interesting and, as usual, very well informed.
I thank the Minister for his statement and for advance sight of it, as well as for the way in which he has approached this very serious issue this afternoon.
We in the SNP are alarmed and deeply disturbed by the serious threats to UK-based journalists by the Iranian regime, and we condemn in the strongest possible terms the horrifying threats to journalists, their family members and all others involved. We owe a great debt of gratitude to the brave independent Iranian journalists, particularly those from Iran International, who have shone a light on the recent protest movements and shown the world the continuous and shocking human rights abuses by the Iranian security forces and the Iranian regime. We commend their courage in continuing to do so in the face of threats that have come in a place where they should expect to feel safe.
It is very welcome that the Minister is talking about more sanctions today, and I appreciate what he said about not announcing the proscription of organisations such as the IRGC on the Floor of the House, but I would strongly urge him to consider doing so and to consider doing so quickly. This is the source of great uncertainty and great fear for many Iranians who are living in the UK, including those who have come to visit my surgeries, and he may remember that I raised the case of a constituent a few weeks ago. Those Iranians I have spoken to in Glasgow are scared. They do not know where they are safe, and that should not be the situation for anybody who has come to live in these islands. They should be able to go about their lives in Glasgow or anywhere else without fearing who might be coming to get them, and without having to look over their shoulder whether out in the streets or even in universities, where they do not feel as though they can be quite as safe as they should be.
Could I also ask the Minister what approach he is taking with colleagues in the Home Office to the issuing of visas for those who fear that if they return to Iran they will be persecuted, for those—perhaps if they are on a student visa that may run out—who are in limbo at the moment and are not certain as to what their future will be, and for visitors? What is the further approach to those who may actually pose a risk to people in the UK in getting visas for here?
I thank the hon. Member for the tone in which she has approached this. She is absolutely right, of course, that anybody in the United Kingdom—whether they are in Gloucester or in Glasgow—should be absolutely as safe as any UK citizen. She is right that, sadly, some are being targeted. While I hear her words on proscription, it is worth noting that the National Security Bill we have brought in does allow us to exercise almost all the powers of proscription against state threats, which will be enormously helpful. I know that she has in the past been very supportive of various elements of that, so I hope we will be able to continue enjoying the support of her and her party.
The hon. Member raises the question of visas, and she is absolutely right to do so. I will not comment on individual cases for obvious reasons, but as she knows, the UK Government and the British people have been exceptionally generous to those in need of sanctuary in the United Kingdom, and I am absolutely certain that that policy will continue.
My right hon. Friend will be aware that Iran has one of the worst media freedom records in the world. When the Government press the Government of Iran over the outrageous threats made against Iran International, will they also raise the question of the continuing persecution of family members of BBC Persian service staff who are still living in Iran? Does my right hon. Friend also agree that the threats against Iran International in this country are a further demonstration of the need for the cross-Government National Committee for the Safety of Journalists, and will he continue to give that committee every support to ensure that media freedom in the UK is fully protected?
I thank my right hon. Friend for his comments. When he was Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, he was exemplary in supporting media freedom around the world. I completely agree with his comments on BBC Persian, which offers an extraordinary window—not just for the Persian but for the Iranian people—into the truth that is quite rightly highlighted by their broadcasts, and allows those of us who are lucky enough to watch BBC Persian here in the UK to understand what is going on in Tehran and across Iran. I absolutely agree with my right hon. Friend and I give that same commitment.
I thank the Minister for his statement and for his work to ensure that Iran International returns to the UK before too long. Until a few days ago, it was broadcasting from Chiswick business park in my constituency, and I visited last year. It is beyond contemptible that the Iranian Government have attempted to export their crackdown on free speech and the freedom of the press, and to endanger not only the journalists but the other workers in the business park and local people. Iran International and I are hugely grateful for the steps the Metropolitan police have taken to ensure the safety of journalists and the wider public, but what are the Government doing to ensure that journalists in my constituency and across the country are never again forced to leave their workplace to protect the rest of the public?
May I first pay tribute to the hon. Lady and her constituents for their work supporting Iran International? She will be aware of the site and its peculiarities, and therefore the nature of finding an alternative venue. That is exactly what we and the Metropolitan police are doing to ensure that the interregnum is as short as possible.
It is absolutely clear that we have more to do to protect journalists in this country, which is why the Prime Minister asked me to set up the defending democracy taskforce. The hon. Lady will understand that there has been only a slight moment between the taskforce being established and today, so we will be coming up with further options shortly.
I welcome my right hon. Friend’s statement. In a recent Inter-Parliamentary Union meeting, I heard from journalists working with the BBC Persian service that they have also been threatened, as have their families in Iran. This is totally unacceptable, as the freedom of the press is fundamental in this country. Will my right hon. Friend assure the House that he is working closely with our security services to counter the threats and protect these brave journalists and their families in Iran?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right that those in Iran deserve the same protection. It is absolutely wrong to target the families of journalists who happen to be still in that country, and for people to be punished for merely speaking the truth; it is quite a tragic violation not just of international norms, but of the culture that Iran gave us over many thousands of years. The words of Saadi that we are all banī ādam—all sons of Adam—and therefore all have the same rights, are in stark opposition to the actions of the vile regime in Tehran.
The UK must always act to ensure press freedom and the safety of journalists, who have played a pivotal role in publicising human rights abuses in Iran and across the globe. Our intelligence services do an extraordinary job, but in the light of the Intelligence and Security Committee’s recent complaints about the agencies not meeting their own deadlines, which has delayed the Committee’s inquiry into the security threats posed by Iran, what discussions has the Security Minister had with the heads of MI5, MI6 and GCHQ to ensure that there are no further delays to the Committee’s work?
I spoke to the head of MI5 only this afternoon; I will leave it to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs to answer for the other two agencies. It is incredibly important to make sure appropriate information is available quickly and in a timely fashion for the Intelligence and Security Committee, and I know it is conducting a very important inquiry—indeed I believe witnesses will be appearing before it in a week or two.
My right hon. Friend said: “We know that the Iranian intelligence services work with organised criminal gangs.” Mindful of the fact that Colonel Gaddafi’s terrorists used to work quite closely with the Provisional IRA, is my right hon. Friend able to say whether there are indications that such links are happening between Iranian terrorists and home-grown terrorists?
My right hon. Friend will understand that I would rather answer that question before the Committee on which he sits than comment on the Floor of the House, but he will be aware that there are, very sadly, many different connections between criminal enterprises and terrorist groups and indeed hostile states. That is why countering state threats is about not just defending ourselves against hostile adversaries but ensuring that we are free from fraud and the abuse of crime in our communities.
I thank the Minister for his statement and completely agree with the sentiments expressed by him and the shadow Minister with regard to the violation of our sovereignty: these are very serious matters indeed. I want to ask about a slightly wider but connected point: I understand that he will be limited in what he can say, but may I seek his assurance that his Department remains hypervigilant with respect to the activities of other states who may also seek to conduct operations against UK-based personnel?
Yes, is the answer. The reality is that state-based threats have increased in the last few years, and we know the obvious sources of such aggression—sadly, they have been written all too large on the global map. However, other states that are not so well-advertised have also been exploiting our freedoms and liberties to further their ends, and we will stop them.
Earlier this month I met with BBC Persian journalists to hear about the challenges they face in reporting on the Iranian regime’s horrific human rights abuses, and around the world journalists are increasingly under threat for seeking to tell the truth and it is shocking that this is now the case in the UK. Is the Minister satisfied that the steps he has outlined today will protect press freedoms so that this situation is not repeated and UK-based journalists such as Iran International are able to operate safely and freely? When does he expect his taskforce to report back on extra security measures to be put in place?
I welcome that question. No, I am not satisfied; the reality is that there is more to do. That is exactly why the Prime Minister asked me to set up the taskforce; the Prime Minister himself is not satisfied. We will be coming forward with a series of options in respect of the integrated review, and from there a decision will have to be taken by the Government, and it will be a wider call. But the hon. Gentleman can be assured that the entire Government—including the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary—are absolutely committed.
I send my solidarity and support to all BBC Persian journalists, who continue to speak truth to power in the face of adversity. The UK must act to ensure the safety of journalists, who have played a vital role in publicising human rights offences in Iran. The National Union of Journalists has called on police and Government to act swiftly and robustly, with assassination attempts and threats against UK-based journalists. What are the Government doing to protect press freedoms?
The hon. Lady is absolutely right that there is more we can do, and I am very glad the NUJ is supporting this. The NUJ has formerly worked extremely closely with groups like Reporters Without Borders, which has done enormously important work in defending journalism around the world. This Government are absolutely committed not just to supporting journalists here at home, but to making sure journalists can be free around the world, which is why the Government, and in former years the Foreign Office, have supported various different projects for journalistic freedom around the world.
I thank the Minister for his statement and, as always, for his and our Government’s determination to maintain freedom and protect safety. I would be grateful if he assured us of the Government’s commitment, which I am sure they hold, to supporting a free press in countries where freedom of religion or belief is regularly and violently violated. We are seeing serious repercussions for those who speak out about injustice in countries where freedom of religion or belief is a concern, with Iran being a priority concern. The regime in Iran is violent, brutal, bloodthirsty and guilty of some of the worst crimes in the world. What assessment has the Minister made of the crackdown on media reporting and freedom of religion and belief?
The hon. Gentleman will understand that I answer for the Home Office, not the Foreign Office, so I will not give an assessment of Iran other than to say that that brutal regime has murdered LGBTQ communities. It has murdered Jews. It has murdered Muslims. It has murdered Christians. It has murdered Baha’is. It has murdered, frankly, pretty much anybody it can get its hands on. Tragically, it has conducted a regime of terror against women who refuse to be told what to wear. It is a regime that has violated so many principles not just of international law, as I said, but of Persian culture. It is an absolute abomination and this Government stand in full solidarity with those who are defending their human rights and we absolutely stand for freedom of religion and belief.
The Minister referred to the Charity Commission’s inquiry into the Islamic Centre of England and its links with the Iranian regime, but he will also be aware of wider concerns about other cultural centres across the UK, including in Manchester, allegedly having links to the regime and allegedly controlled by Khamenei. Would the Government consider a wider investigation of those outposts—those cultural centres—so that we can get to the bottom of this and get to the truth?
The hon. Member will understand that I am not going to list all those that are linked to the Khamenei authority, but he can be assured that the Islamic Centre of England is not the only one that I am aware of.
(1 year, 6 months ago)
Written StatementsThe Government are reviewing the Computer Misuse Act 1990 (CMA/the Act) and this statement provides an update on the progress of the review.
It is essential that the UK has the right legislative framework to allow us to tackle the harms posed to our citizens, businesses and Government services online. As part of this, we initiated a review of the CMA, and following a call for information on the CMA, we have been considering the proposals made in response. A number of proposals were put forward, both for changes to the Act itself, and for additional powers to allow law enforcement agencies to more effectively tackle the offences covered by the Act.
We will issue a formal consultation today to seek views on a number of proposals made during the consultation, including:
Considering the development of a new power to allow law enforcement agencies to take control of domains and internet protocol (IP) addresses where these are being used by criminals to support a wide range of criminality, including fraud and CMA offences.
Developing a power to require the preservation of computer data, ahead of its seizure, to prevent it being deleted where it may be needed for an investigation. While requests from law enforcement agencies for preservation are generally met, the UK does not have an explicit power to require such preservation, and having such a power would make the legal position clear.
Considering whether a power to take action against a person possessing or using data obtained by another person through a CMA offence, such as through accessing a computer system to obtain personal data, would be of benefit, subject to appropriate safeguards being in place. Currently, the CMA covers unauthorised access to computer, but the unauthorised taking or copying of data is not covered by the Theft Act so it is difficult to take action in these cases.
In addition, a number of other issues were raised during the call for information, relating to the levels of sentencing, statutory defences to the CMA offences, improvements to the ability to report vulnerabilities, and whether the UK has sufficient legislation to cover extra-territorial threats. As part of our work to improve the cybersecurity of the UK, we will work with a wide range of stakeholders with a policy interest in these areas, to ensure that any proposals that we take forward will deliver enhanced protection of the UK in cyberspace.
A copy of this consultation will be placed in the Libraries of both Houses and published on gov.uk.
[HCWS546]
(1 year, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe director general of MI5 recently outlined that, since January 2022, there have been at least 10 Iranian threats to kidnap or even kill UK-based individuals. The level of the Iranian threat is kept under constant review. The Home Secretary and I are working with our partners across Government to ensure that all tools at our disposal are used to protect individuals in the UK against any threats from the Iranian state.
It has been patently obvious for years that the whole Iranian Government are rotten. Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps leaders are allowed to travel to the UK and store their stolen wealth almost with impunity. The people of Iran are fighting back. Why do we not stop their abusers stealing the wealth of the country and sanction more than just 50 people at the top of the organisation?
The hon. Member is absolutely correct: the IRGC is a vicious organisation and its first victims are the Iranian people, who have been brutalised and murdered by that despotic regime for far too long. I hope he will be encouraged by the actions the UK Government are taking at the moment in looking into various of these areas, and also by the work being done by some of our partners. It is interesting to note that, of the so-called E3+3, Germany and France appear to be looking at proscribing the IRGC, as the United States has already done. It seems that not only is there international agreement on the point the hon. Member raises, but that action is absolutely ready to go.
As part of the sanctions the Government are imposing on this evil regime, will they please shut down the Islamic centre in Maida Vale, which is the voice of the supreme leader in this country? It should not have charitable status and should be shut down.
My right hon. Friend has raised an extremely important issue, of which I am acutely aware and which has not gone without notice.
The Minister seemed to say in response to the original question from my hon. Friend the Member for Ealing, Southall (Mr Sharma) that we were considering proscribing the IRGC. Is that the case?
The Government always keep all areas under review, and speculation has certainly been in that direction. What we have already done is sanction various different elements. Any further action will no doubt be announced as soon as it is ready, and we will see as soon as that can be done.
Clearly, the threat from the IRGC to people in this country—be they opposition journalists reporting on what is going on in Iran at the moment or UK citizens—is paramount. Foreign Office Ministers have responded to all the urgent questions the Speaker has granted and the debates we have had, but will my right hon. Friend now take the obvious step, which is supported by all political parties in the Chamber, and proscribe the IRGC in its entirety?
My hon. Friend will know that it is not me he has to persuade in this matter and that there are many areas where I would like to go. I can assure him that the Government are absolutely listening to exactly what he is saying. The Home Secretary and I are as one on this.
The Minister has been explicit, as have others, about the threat we face in the UK from the Iranian regime. I really welcome what he has said, and we stand ready to work with him on this issue, but the truth is that we have not seen anything like the sanctions and immigration controls that have been deployed against Russia being deployed against Iran. Will the Government go further and be clear? Will they proscribe the IRGC using either existing terror laws or new state threat variations to drive out this threat and keep people safe?
The hon. Lady knows very well that the Government have already sanctioned many individuals inside the Iranian regime and have taken action on individuals who may have had access around Europe and indeed into the United Kingdom. Those people have been either controlled or not allowed permission to travel. She should also be aware that our embassy in Iran is keeping us closely informed of how the sanctions are playing out and making sure that we target appropriately individuals who are a threat to the United Kingdom.
It is completely wrong that any foreign state should be able to threaten anybody in the United Kingdom. Anybody in the UK should have the same protection and be afforded the same rights as anybody else. The action we have taken to protect some journalists in the UK, which was highlighted only recently by some of our agencies, is absolutely vital to the security of our whole society.
My right hon. Friend is right to ask the question, because fraud has been a blight on too many communities. I assure him that the fraud strategy that many of us have been working on for a number of months is coming out very soon.
The biggest criminal in Europe, with the most blood on his hands, is Vladimir Putin. We have frozen his Russian state assets in the UK; will the Home Secretary support my Bill tomorrow to allow us to seize those assets and give them to the Ukrainian people, so that they can rebuild their country?
Going from freezing to seizing, as the hon. Gentleman knows, is a slightly difficult procedure under our laws, due to the rights that people have. We have looked at that matter with partners, particularly in common law jurisdictions, and I hope to have further conversations on the subject with the United States when I go there tomorrow.
My constituents remain concerned about the victims of people-smuggling gangs. Can my right hon. Friend advise how many people smugglers have been caught and arrested under the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, and confirm that the Government will continue to act with vigour against people smuggling and illegal immigration?
(1 year, 6 months ago)
Written StatementsSection 19(1) of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIM) Act 2011 (the Act) requires the Secretary of State to report to Parliament as soon as reasonably practicable after the end of every relevant three-month period on the exercise of her TPIM powers under the Act during that period. TPIM notices in force (as of 30 November 2022) 2 Number of new TPIM notices served (during this period) 1 TPIM notices in respect of British citizens (as of 30 November 2022) 2 TPIM notices extended (during the reporting period) 0 TPIM notices revoked (during the reporting period) 0 TPIM notices expired (during reporting period) 0 TPIM notices revived (during the reporting period) 0 Variations made to measures specified in TPIM notices (during the reporting period) 1 Applications to vary measures specified in TPIM notices refused (during the reporting period) 1 The number of subjects relocated under TPIM legislation (during this the reporting stage) 1
The level of information provided will always be subject to slight variations based on operational advice.
The TPIM Review Group (TRG) keeps every TPIM notice under regular and formal review. TRG meetings were held on 19 and 26 October 2022.
On 4 October 2022 one individual pleaded guilty to one count of breaching the residence measure of the TPIM notice. The individual was sentenced to a four week night-time curfew and a fine of £100.
[HCWS543]
(1 year, 6 months ago)
General CommitteesI beg to move,
That the Committee has considered the draft Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (Codes of Practice) (Revision of Code H) Order 2023.
It is a pleasure to work under your chairmanship, Mr Bone.
Following the horrific terrorist attack at Fishmongers’ Hall in November 2019, the then Home Secretary commissioned the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall KC, to review the multi-agency public protection arrangements—commonly referred to as MAPPA—used to supervise terrorist and terrorist-risk offenders on licence in the community. The Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, which I will subsequently refer to as the 2022 Act, established three new powers for counter-terrorism policing: a personal search power, a premises search power, and a power of urgent arrest. Those powers were established in response to recommendations made by Mr Hall KC following his review of MAPPA.
The order relates to the new power of urgent arrest, which has been inserted into the Terrorism Act 2000 - new section 43B of that Act - by the 2022 Act. The new arrest power came into force on 28 June last year. The Government have also taken this opportunity to make a small number of updates to the code to reflect changes previously made by primary legislation, including ensuring relevant terminology within the code is up to date.
As was set out by the Government during the passage of the 2022 Act, the new power of urgent arrest applies across the UK. The power enables the police to arrest without warrant a terrorist or terrorism-connected offender who has been released on licence and is suspected to have breached their licence conditions when it is considered necessary, for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a terrorism risk, to detain the offender until a recall decision is made.
Section 66 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act1984—normally referred to as PACE—requires the Secretary of State to issue codes of practice in connection with the exercise by police officers of statutory powers to arrest a person and the detention, treatment, questioning and identification of persons by police officers. We have prepared a revised PACE code H, which relates to the detention and treatment of people arrested under the Terrorism Act 2000 and applies across England and Wales. The order seeks Parliament’s approval to bring the revised code of practice into force. The primary update to PACE code H is the incorporation of the new urgent arrest power provided for by section 43B of the Terrorism Act 2000.
A terrorist offender who is detained under new section 43B must, unless recalled to prison or otherwise detained under any other power, be released if a decision is made not to revoke their licence and accordingly the offender is not recalled to prison. A terrorist offender must also be released from police detention if a recall decision has not been made by the end of the relevant period, which in relation to terrorist offenders who have been released on licence under the law of England and Wales is six hours beginning with the time of the arrest.
The Government have updated PACE code H to reflect that new arrest power, including ensuring that there is clarity for the police on the length of time for which the terrorist offender on licence can be detained and their rights upon first being detained, including to have one named person informed of their whereabouts and their right to consult and communicate privately with a solicitor. The revised PACE code H also reflects that there is no requirement to caution a terrorist offender on licence who is arrested under section 43B as they will not have been arrested on suspicion of committing a criminal offence and so will not be questioned or interviewed by the police under caution while being detained under this power.
The Government plan to collect data from police forces on the use of that targeted power, as we routinely do for other police arrest powers, and to make this data publicly available through future statistical publications. The Government have also updated PACE code H to reflect other changes already made to primary legislation by the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019—I will subsequently refer to it as the 2019 Act. That Act amended provisions in schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act 2000 to specify on the face of the legislation that on first being detained a detainee must be informed of their rights to inform a named person of their detention and consult a solicitor. The 2019 Act replaced provisions in schedule 8 that would enable a senior officer, in certain exceptional circumstances, to direct that the detainee has to consult their solicitor in the sight and hearing of another officer with one whereby a senior officer can, in those exceptional circumstances, require the detainee to consult a different solicitor of the detainee’s choosing.
I am extremely grateful to the Minister for giving way. We are considering a very interesting provision of the Act. Can he explain to the Committee what are those certain exceptional circumstances that would mean that a senior officer could, rather than say that a detainee had to consult in sight and hearing of another officer, direct that the detainee had to consult a different solicitor. [Interruption.]
Thank you for your instruction, Mr Bone. I will stay in order if ever I am in your presence, as always, and as you always are, and Mrs Bone would be as well.
Interference with or harm to evidence of a serious offence and the alerting of persons who are suspected to have committed a serious offence, who have not yet been arrested, are among the circumstances in which the provision would be invoked. They would come under the Terrorism Act 2000. Under that Act, a police officer of at least the rank of superintendent may direct that the detainee consults a different solicitor if that officer has reasonable grounds for believing that any of a number of specified consequences, which I have just outlined, will occur unless that direction is given.
To carry on—unless you have anything further to say, Mr Bone—
You are extremely generous, Mr Bone.
The 2019 Act also amended section 41 of, and schedule 7 to, the Terrorism Act 2000 to give effect to a recommendation made by a former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation that the detention clock should be suspended in the case of detainees who are admitted to hospital. Finally, the 2019 Act created powers to stop, question, search and detain a person at UK ports and the Northern Ireland border area for the purpose of determining whether the person appears to be someone who is, or has been, engaged in hostile state activity.
This is important legislation. Years ago, when I was shadow Home Affairs Minister, I remember dealing with PACE, and it is a very intricate. The Minister has read his speech very well, but quite quickly. Would he say that the order represents a tightening up, or is it a loosening? What is the essence of the order, and will it help our police to detain terrorists and deal with them effectively?
I would say very simply that the order is an updating. Some of the laws have changed because we have left the European Union, and some of the areas covered have changed because of the nature of how we collect evidence. The order is an updating to ensure that the law is still relevant and appropriate to the challenges that we face. Sadly, terrorism has not gone away despite the few years since the hon. Gentleman was first elected to the House or, indeed, was a shadow Home Office Minister.
When revising PACE code H, the Government have also made other minor, non-discretionary updates to ensure terminology contained within it is up-to-date and reflects wider legislative changes. The revised code makes a clarification to refer to retained EU law to reflect the effect of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, updates the wording regarding offences having a terrorist connection to reflect changes made by the Sentencing Act 2020, and updates a reference to the relevant department to the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office.
In the course of revising the code, we have consulted key stakeholders, including Counter Terrorism Policing, the National Police Chiefs’ Council, the College of Policing and the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, all of whom are supportive of the approach being taken.
While powers such as the section 43B urgent arrest power in the Terrorism Act 2000 apply UK-wide, our revised PACE code H applies in England and Wales. We have, of course, liaised with the Scottish Government and Northern Ireland Executive on our proposed revisions, and they intend to update their respective equivalent guidelines and code of practice correspondingly in due course.
The revised code promotes the fundamental principles to be observed by the police and helps preserve the effectiveness of, and public confidence in, the use of arrest powers under the Terrorism Act 2000. I very much hope that Committee members will support the revisions to PACE code H, and I commend the order to the Committee.
I am very grateful to the hon. Lady for her support. She kindly asked me to write to her and I will do so, because there is a relatively detailed set of elements to consider. As she rightly said, the statistical basis of such arrests under the legislation and checking them against future and comparable areas of law and law enforcement are important. Those statistics will be published, and I am sure that hon. Lady will keep a close eye on them, as will I.
Question put and agreed.
(1 year, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 1—Disclosure of information in the public interest likely to be relevant to the investigation of economic crime—
‘(1) It is a defence to an action based on the disclosure or publication of information for the defendant to show that—
(a) the disclosure or publication complained of was likely to be relevant to the investigation of an economic crime, and
(b) the defendant reasonably believed that the disclosure or publication complained of was likely to be relevant to the investigation of an economic crime.
(2) Subject to subsection (3), in determining whether the defendant has shown the matters mentioned in subsection (1), the court must have regard to all the circumstances of the case.
(3) In determining whether it was reasonable for the defendant to believe that the disclosure or publication complained of was likely to be relevant to the investigation of an economic crime, the court must make such allowance for editorial judgement as it considers appropriate.
(4) For the avoidance of doubt, the defence under this section may be relied upon irrespective of whether the statement complained of is a statement of fact or a statement of opinion.”
New clause 2—Economic crime: power to strike out statement of case for abuse of process—
The court may strike out the whole or part of any statement of case which can be reasonably understood as having the purpose of concealing, or preventing disclosure or publication of, any information likely to be relevant to the investigation of an economic crime.”
New clause 3—Home Office review of the Tier 1 (Investor) visa scheme: publication—
Within a day of the passage of this Act, the Secretary of State must publish in full the findings of the Home Office review of the Tier 1 (Investor) visa scheme which relate to economic crime.”
New clause 4—Offence of failure to prevent fraud, false accounting or money laundering—
‘(1) A relevant commercial organisation (“C”) is guilty of an offence under this section where—
(a) a person (“A”) associated with C commits a fraud, false accounting or an act of money laundering, or aids and abets a fraud, false accounting or act of money laundering, intending—
(i) to confer a business advantage on C, or
(ii) to confer a benefit on a person to whom A provides services on behalf of C, and
(b) fails to prevent the activity set out in paragraph (a).
(2) C does not commit an offence where C can prove that the conduct detailed in subsection (1)(a) was intended to cause harm to C.
(3) It is a defence for C to prove that, at the relevant time, C had in place procedures that were reasonable in all the circumstances and which were designed to prevent persons associated with C from undertaking the conduct detailed in subsection (1)(a).
(4) For the purposes of this section “relevant commercial organisation” means—
(a) for the offence as it relates to false accounting and fraud, “relevant commercial organisations” are defined as—
(i) a body which is incorporated under the law of any part of the United Kingdom and which carries on a business (whether there or elsewhere),
(ii) any other body corporate (wherever incorporated) which carries on a business, or part of a business, in any part of the United Kingdom,
(iii) a partnership which is formed under the law of any part of the United Kingdom and which carries on a business (whether there or elsewhere), or
(iv) any other partnership (wherever formed) which carries on a business, or part of a business, in any part of the United Kingdom, and
(v) for the purposes of this section, a trade or profession is a business;
(b) for the offence as it relates to money laundering, “relevant commercial organisations” are defined as—
(i) credit institutions;
(ii) financial institutions;
(iii) auditors, insolvency practitioners, external accountants and tax advisers;
(iv) independent legal professionals;
(v) trust or company service providers;
(vi) estate agents and letting agents;
(vii) high value dealers;
(viii) casinos;
(ix) art market participants;
(x) cryptoasset exchange providers;
(xi) custodian wallet providers.”
This new clause introduces a new criminal corporate offence for failure to prevent fraud, false accounting and money laundering, by aligning it with other corporate criminal offences.
New clause 5—Identification doctrine—
‘(1) A body corporate commits an offence of fraud, money laundering, false accounting, bribery and tax evasion where the offence is committed with the consent, connivance or neglect of a senior manager.
(2) An individual is a “senior manager” of an entity if the individual—
(a) plays a significant role in—
(i) the making of decisions about how the entity’s relevant activities are to be managed or organised, or
(ii) the managing or organising of the entity’s relevant activities, or
(b) is the Chief Executive or Chief Financial Officer of the body corporate.
(3) A body corporate also commits an offence if, acting within the scope of their authority—
(a) one or more senior managers engage in conduct, whether by act or omission, such that, if it had been the conduct of only one representative, that representative would have been a party to the offence; and
(b) the senior manager who is responsible for the aspect of the organization’s activities that is relevant to the offence — or the senior managers collectively — fail to take all reasonable steps to prevent that offence being committed.”
This new clause reforms the “identification doctrine”, so that a body corporate commits an economic crime offence where the offence is committed with the consent, connivance or neglect of a senior manager or senior managers.
New clause 6—Failure to prevent fraud, false accounting or money laundering: individual liability—
‘(1) A person (“S”) commits an offence if—
(a) at a time when S is a senior manager or corporate officer of a corporate body (“C”), S—
(i) takes, or agrees to the taking of, a decision by or on behalf of the corporate body as to the way in which the business of the corporate body is conducted, and
(ii) fails to take any steps that S could take to prevent such a decision being taken;
(b) at the time of the decision, S is aware of a risk that the implementation of the decision may lead to the commission of an offence of money laundering, fraud, false accounting, bribery or tax evasion; and
(c) the implementation of the decision causes C to commit such an offence.
(2) For the purposes of this section—
(a) an individual is a “senior manager” of a corporate body if the individual plays a significant role in—
(i) the making of decisions about how the entity’s relevant activities are to be managed or organised, or
(ii) the actual managing or organising of the entity’s relevant activities;
(b) “officer”, in relation to a body corporate, means—
(i) a director, manager, associate, secretary or other similar officer, or
(ii) a person purporting to act in any such capacity;
(c) in paragraph (b)(i) “director”, in relation to a body corporate whose affairs are managed by its members, means a member of the body corporate.
(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—
(a) on summary conviction—
(i) in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months (or 6 months, if the offence was committed before the commencement of section 154(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003) or a fine, or both;
(ii) in Scotland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or both;
(iii) in Northern Ireland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or both;
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 7 years or a fine, or both.”
This new clause introduces direct criminal liability for corporate officers who take a decision, or fail to take a decision, that knowingly results in an offence being committed.
New clause 7—Whistleblowing: economic crime—
‘(1) Whistleblowing is defined for the purposes of this section as any disclosure of information suggesting that, in the reasonable opinion of the whistleblower, an economic crime—
(a) has occurred,
(b) is occurring, or
(c) is likely to occur.
(2) The Secretary of State must, within twelve months of the date of Royal Assent to this Act, set up an office to receive reports of whistleblowing as defined in subsection (1) to be known as the Office for Whistleblowers.
(3) The Office for Whistleblowers must—
(a) protect whistleblowers from detriment resulting from their whistleblowing,
(b) ensure that disclosures by whistleblowers are investigated, and
(c) escalate information and evidence of wrongdoing outside of its remit to another appropriate authority.
(4) The objectives of the Office for Whistleblowers are—
(a) to encourage and support whistleblowers to make whistleblowing reports,
(b) to provide an independent, confidential and safe environment for making and receiving whistleblowing information,
(c) to provide information and advice on whistleblowing, and
(d) to act on evidence of detriment to the whistleblower in line with guidance set out by the Secretary of State in regulations.
(5) The Office for Whistleblowers must report annually to Parliament on the exercise of its duties, objectives and functions.”
New clause 21—Civil recovery: costs of proceedings—
After section 313 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 insert—
“313A Costs orders
(1) This section applies to proceedings brought by an enforcement authority under part 5 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 where the property in respect of which the proceedings have been brought has been obtained through economic crime.
(2) The court may not make an order that any costs of proceedings relating to a case to which this section applies (including appeal proceedings) are payable by an enforcement authority to a respondent or a specified responsible officer in respect of the involvement of the respondent or the officer in those proceedings, unless—
(a) the authority acted unreasonably in making or opposing the application to which the proceedings relate, or in supporting or opposing the making of the order to which the proceedings relate, or
(b) the authority acted dishonestly or improperly in the course of the proceedings.”
This new clause extends the cap on adverse costs introduced by the first Economic Crime Act (Transparency and Enforcement) 2022 for Unexplained Wealth Orders, to all civil recovery orders.
New clause 23—Review of measures to prevent proceeds of economic crime entering the UK economy—
Within six months of the passage of this Act, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament the report of a review of what further regulatory measures could be taken to prevent the circulation in the UK economy of the proceeds of economic crime controlled by individuals or entities subject to sanctions.”
This new clause creates an obligation for the Secretary of State to report to Parliament on the merits of further regulatory measures for preventing the circulation in the economy of the proceeds of economic crime controlled by individuals or entities subject to sanctions.
New clause 25—Report into effectiveness of Act in addressing economic crime involving sanctioned individuals—
‘(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of this Act being passed, lay before Parliament a report of a review into the effectiveness of the measures in this Act in addressing economic crime involving designated persons.
(2) The report must consider the case for further legislation to make provision for the seizing of assets of a designated person where there is evidence that the designated person has been involved in economic crime.
(3) In this section, “designated persons” has the meaning given in section 9 of the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018.”
New clause 27—Compensation for Victims of Economic Crime—
‘(1) The Secretary of State must, no later than 90 days from the date on which this Act comes into force, publish and lay before Parliament a strategy for the potential establishment of a fund for the compensation of victims of economic crime.
(2) The strategy may include provisions on the management and disposal of any assets realised by the government, or any body with law enforcement responsibilities in relation to economic crime, under relevant UK legislation.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to prepare and publish a strategy on the potential establishment of a fund to provide compensation to victims of economic crime.
New clause 30—Assets of Iranian officials obtained through economic crime—
Within six months of the passage of this Act, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament the report of a review of regulatory measures to prevent the circulation in the UK economy of assets of Iranian officials which have been obtained through economic crime.”
New clause 31—Fund for the purposes of tackling economic crime—
In the Companies Act 2006, after Part 29 insert—
Part 29A
Economic Crime
993A Fund for the purposes of tackling economic crime
‘(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations establish a fund for the purposes of tackling economic crime.
(2) The regulations must specify the purposes for which the fund may be used, including funding the activities of law enforcement agencies in tackling economic crime.””
New clause 32—Review of definition of cryptoassets—
Within 18 months of the passage of this Act, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament the report of a review of the adequacy of the definitions of cryptoassets contained in this Act.”
New clause 33—Economic Crime Committee of Parliament—
‘(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations establish a body to be known as the Economic Crime Committee of Parliament (in this section referred to as “the ECC”).
(2) The ECC will consist of nine members who are to be drawn both from the members of the House of Commons and from the members of the House of Lords.
(3) Each member of the ECC is to be appointed by the House of Parliament from which the member is to be drawn.
(4) The ECC will have the power to meet confidentially.
(5) The ECC may examine or otherwise oversee any regulatory, enforcement or supervision agencies involved in work related, but not limited to—
(a) tax avoidance and evasion by corporations;
(b) illicit finance;
(c) anti-money laundering supervision;
(d) tackling fraud;
(e) kleptocracy and corruption; and
(f) whistleblower protection.”
This new clause would oblige the Secretary of State to establish an Economic Crime Committee of parliament to examine and oversee regulatory, enforcement and supervisory action against economic crime.
New clause 39—Duty to report on economic crime resourcing and performance—
‘(1) The Director General of the National Crime Agency must—
(a) prepare a report on the resourcing and staffing of its work to counter economic crime, and its performance tackling economic crime, and
(b) send it to the Secretary of State as soon as practicable after this section comes into force.
(2) The Director General must prepare and send to the Secretary of State further reports on these topics annually.
(3) Each report must include, in particular—
(a) a report of the total annual budget and number of staff allocated to economic crime for each unit within the National Crime Agency,
(b) a report of the number of investigations, arrests, prosecutions and convictions relating to economic crime for each unit within the National Crime Agency, and
(c) a report of other relevant data including, but not limited to, cases per year broken down by both type and outcome; number of restraint or confiscation orders obtained; and value of assets confiscated.
(4) Reporting under subsection (3) must provide a breakdown between domestic economic crime and international economic crime. Reporting on international economic crime under subsections (3)(b) and (3)(c) must provide a breakdown by the income classification of the countries affected.
(5) The Director General must publish every report under this section—
(a) as soon as practicable after they send it to the Secretary of State, and
(b) in such manner as they consider appropriate.”
Section 6 of the Crime and Courts Act 2006 currently places a duty on the Director General of the National Crime Agency to make arrangements for publishing information about the exercise of NCA functions and other matters relating to the NCA, and publish information in accordance with those arrangements. This new clause inserts a new section that places a specific duty on the Director General to prepare an annual report on the NCA’s resourcing and performance relating to economic crime. The section stipulates the minimum information that the Director General must include in the report.
New clause 40—Report into options for corporate liability for economic crime—
‘(1) The Secretary of State must produce a report on corporate criminal liability for economic crime offences.
(2) The report must consider the merits of different models for corporate liability in respect of economic crime, including but not limited to—
(a) the respondeat superior model; and
(b) the failure to prevent model, insofar as it has not already been introduced by the enactment of this Act.
(3) The report must be laid before Parliament within six months of this Act being passed.
(4) In this section—
“the respondeat superior model” means a model for corporate criminal liability in which an entity is guilty of an offence if an employee or agent commits an economic crime offence—
(a) in the course of their employment or agency, or
(b) with an intent to benefit that entity;
“the failure to prevent model” means a model for corporate criminal liability in which an entity is guilty of an offence if a person associated with that entity commits an economic crime offence, intending—
(a) to confer a business advantage on that entity, or
(b) to confer a benefit on a person or other entity to whom the associated person provides services on behalf of the entity with which it is associated, except that the entity shall not be liable where the conduct was intended to cause harm to that entity,
unless the entity can prove that it had in place such prevention procedures as were reasonable in the circumstances, or that it was reasonable not to have any such procedures in place;
a person is “associated with” an entity if they are a person who performs services for or on behalf of that entity, including in, but not limited to, the capacity of an employee, agent or subsidiary.”
Government amendments 44 to 49, 57 and 58 to 100.
It is a pleasure to see you in your place, Mr Deputy Speaker, and it is the first time I have had the privilege of speaking under your chairmanship on these matters. It is also a pleasure to see so many of the usual faces on this matter. Many of us have gone over these questions in Committee and, actually, in the many years beforehand in various different ways, so it is an enormous privilege to be here. It is particularly a privilege to be speaking after the Minister my hon. Friend the Member for Thirsk and Malton (Kevin Hollinrake) did such a brilliant job yesterday. I am only picking up where he left off, so I am afraid the second act will not be nearly as compelling as the first.
All those who participated in the Bill Committee gave enormous insights into various different perceptions of how we should be thinking about economic crime and corporate transparency. We have had many interesting debates, and I thank enormously those who have taken part in the various different ways. The fact that we have a two-day debate on Report speaks pretty clearly about the significant size and complexity of this Bill.
Yesterday, we debated parts 1 to 3, which cover Companies House reform and corporate transparency. Today, we turn our attention to parts 4 to 6. The clauses in part 4 create new powers that allow law enforcement to more quickly and easily seize and recover cryptoassets. The creation of the civil forfeiture power for cryptoassets will mitigate the risk posed by those who cannot be criminally prosecuted, but who use their funds to further criminality or for terrorist purposes. This did not prove to be particularly contentious in Committee.
In part 5 of the Bill, we are making it easier for businesses to share information more effectively with each other and with law enforcement to prevent and detect economic crime. We are also creating new exemptions to reduce unnecessary reporting by businesses carrying out transactions on behalf of their customers. We are also giving frontline legal services regulators enhanced enforcement powers to support them as they uphold the economic crime agenda within their regulated community.
I will briefly summarise the amendments we have tabled relating to parts 4, 5 and 6 of the Bill. Many of them address the debate that took place in Committee and will ensure that the Bill works as intended. I should acknowledge that the amendments are perhaps slightly greater in number than we would have liked. The vast majority—amendments 51 and 57 to 100—are minor technical or consequential amendments to ensure that the detail of the cryptoasset measures will work effectively and can be used as soon as possible. That reflects the technical detail of the subject area and the need to make the changes work for each of the jurisdictions of England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland that are covered by the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.
I now turn to the more substantive Government amendments. New clause 14 allows the Solicitors Regulation Authority to proactively request information from its regulated community for the purpose of monitoring compliance with the economic crime regime. It will enable the SRA to monitor and detect breaches of the rules and legislation related to economic crime, including offences related to money laundering, terrorist financing and sanctions.
Government amendments 44 to 47 to clauses 171 and 172 concern information orders. They seek to clarify the cases in which the information order power can be used and to provide clarity to operational partners about how they should be used. They will ensure that the power can be used only for the criminal intelligence functions of the National Crime Agency, and that when assessing a request for information from a foreign intelligence unit, the NCA must be satisfied that the information would support the FIU’s intelligence function.
On the SRA, will the Bill address the strategic lawsuits against public participation that we have been discussing for the last couple of days, or does it purely concern money laundering and other offences unrelated to SLAPPs?
The Bill is concerned only with economic crime and corporate transparency, and the regulations will cover only that. Many Ministers, including the Lord Chancellor, have spoken about SLAPPs—I will touch on them later—but the reality is that they require a separate jurisdiction and a separate Bill.
Government amendments 48 and 49 concern information sharing. In Committee, Opposition Members rightly pointed out that our proposed definition of large accountancy firms did not include insolvency practitioners, auditors and tax advisers. I thank them for that. These amendments will rectify that omission by expanding the scope of the indirect information sharing clauses to include those sectors.
In addition to the Government amendments, several other amendments on a broad range of topics will be debated today. As in Committee, I look forward to what I anticipate will be a lively but extremely well-considered debate. The contributions of all hon. Members who participated in earlier debates have helped to shape the Bill into an effective tool to tackle illicit finance and ensure that the UK is a great place to do legitimate business.
I know that there are places where hon. Members would like the Bill to go further and do more. Indeed, I am as keen as many of them to solve some of the outstanding problems that we all wish to address, but we need to ensure that those ambitions are delivered in the most effective way and that we use the appropriate legislative vehicles to ensure that they have the desired outcome. Limiting the scope to just economic crime can, in several cases, create more problems than it solves, and I assure right hon. and hon. Members that I have strenuously tested what can be effectively delivered within the scope of the Bill.
Will the Minister expand on that interesting point? How would any of the amendments on SLAPPs, a duty to prevent or seizing assets limit what could be done in future?
The question is at what stage do we bring a Bill forward—do we wait for it to be perfect or do we bring forward what we can get at a certain point? The right hon. Lady raises some interesting points. She knows my views on SLAPPS; indeed, in a former incarnation, I may have expressed them extremely clearly. She knows that we share views on asset seizures too. I should point out, however, that no common law jurisdiction has successfully solved the question of asset seizures, although many of us have tried and, indeed, some of us are in conversation with others to try to work out ways of doing it—forfeiture and seizure are not quite the same thing.
Will my right hon. Friend give way?
Yes, because my right hon. Friend touched on asset seizures and tempted me. Of course, Canada has enacted an Act of Parliament that provides for freezing orders to be translated into seizing orders at the request of the Attorney General of Canada.
My hon. Friend is absolutely right, but he is also no doubt aware that there is much discussion in the Canadian legal community about whether those orders will be challenged in different ways and how exactly they will work. There is still a serious debate about the nature of translating from forfeiture to seizure.
My right hon. Friend is generous in giving way again. All this law is new: our unexplained wealth orders were new, and they have been questioned in the courts, so that is not the question. The question is whether we have the guts to stand up and move on this issue, as the whole western world wants to see.
My hon. Friend is absolutely right, but I note that some hon. Members cheering would also cheer the provisions of the European convention on human rights that guarantee the right to private property and many of the areas that cause the difficulties that the UK has and Canada does not.
I do not deny that there is an enormous question for debate here and that many hon. Members would like to move quickly to seizure on many areas, but sadly, that may take a bit longer. One thing on which we all agree is that the UK’s place as a rule-of-law jurisdiction and as a home for justice, not just to ourselves but to many others around the world, is essential to our prosperity and to liberties around the world. It is therefore important to ensure that we correctly transfer from forfeiture to seizure, and recognise the rights and limits that we should respect.
I salute the Minister’s leadership on much of this agenda when he was a brilliant Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee. He will not, however, want to go down in history as the Minister for mañana. In his responses to the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr Djanogly), he has said that the timing is not right and we must wait for future Bills. Can he put our minds at rest and give us a sense of when we might expect a Bill to come forward to address the concerns of the hon. Member for Huntingdon?
The right hon. Gentleman is extremely kind about my former work and, typically, slightly less so about my current employ. He can be assured that, no doubt, it will be temporary, as it is for all occupants.
That matter has seized my attention and has been of some interest to me in further discussions in different areas. I will not put a time on it, because it is not my ministerial responsibility; the right hon. Gentleman will know from his time in Government that talking across other Ministers’ briefs does not always help to advance the case. I assure him, however, that it has come up frequently in conversation with an intent to bring something forward. As I said, the Lord Chancellor has spoken about it to highlight that it is an area where various elements of change are necessary, so I look forward to hearing the proposals as they come forward. I certainly do not think that the matter can wait. We have sadly seen SLAPPs used against such inspiring examples as Eliot Higgins and Catherine Belton, who have stood up for justice in this country and around the world.
I will not, because I am going to close.
Despite all the areas that we could have gone into, and would like to go into at a different time, the Bill is closely focused on economic crime and corporate transparency for the purpose of passing a series of measures that are essential to ensure that we keep our country safe and our economic jurisdictions clean.
We on the Opposition Benches have been clear that the Bill is long overdue. It has been painful to witness London becoming the world’s laundromat for dirty money with the National Crime Agency calculating that £100 billion of illicit finance flows through the UK every single year. Add to that the Government’s abject failure to properly scrutinise the issuing of golden visas to Russian oligarchs—seven now-sanctioned Russians were awarded such visas even after the invasion of Crimea in 2014—and we see a pattern emerging of Ministers failing to treat economic crime with the seriousness it deserves.
This legislation, which is finally wending its way towards the statute book five years after it was promised—and, let us face it, was only brought forward in response to Putin’s invasion—is a step in the right direction that we on these Benches support. However, it still falls short in a number of areas, as I will cover in my remarks.
I was going to spare the blushes of the Minister for Security, my right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat) and the Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, my hon. Friend the Member for Thirsk and Malton (Kevin Hollinrake), but my hon. Friend has said it for me, and he is right. They know that what I am saying does not just have force, but that they agree with it. That will no doubt carry great weight—
What I am enormously enjoying in this Session is the way in which Bills are being picked up and put down by different Ministers. When they are on the Front Bench, they do one thing; when they are on the Back Benches, they say another—sadly, that is the nature of our current political system. It is taking a little while, I admit, for many of us to realise quite how long it can take to get things through in government. Those who have been in government for many years are sharing their knowledge very generously.
Well, my right hon. Friend must speak for himself. I will tell the House a story: I remember when the present Secretary of State for Defence, my right hon. Friend the Member for Wyre and Preston North (Mr Wallace), held the office of Minister for Security, which my right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling now enjoys. We used to have cross-governmental committee meetings—this was during the Government of my right hon. Friend the Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May)—and I remember having a very fierce argument with a very senior permanent secretary at the Treasury about this very issue. I will not name them, because that would be wrong, but they told me that there was concern about the proliferation of criminal offences in this area because somehow it would add more of a regulatory burden to business. I disagreed hotly with that civil servant then, and I disagree hotly now.
The Minister for Security now has a great opportunity. It is a great privilege as a Minister to get on with a job that others would have wished to finish. We have passed the parcel to him, and he can open it and enjoy the gifts within.
One Minister is on his phone and the other—the hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton—is sitting at the back of the Chamber having a gab. This is not ideal, but perhaps the Minister has already heard what I have to say and does not want to hear it again.
“O, wad some Power the giftie gie us
To see oursels as others see us!”
It is not, and it certainly will not be the last. It could be if the Minister accepted the amendments, but he is not going to do that, and he will keep hearing this speech until he does: that is the truth of the matter.
As other Members have said, there is a precedent for a “failure to prevent” measure. It is in the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 and the Bribery Act 2010, so the concept already exists, and there is no reason why it cannot be applied today. Even if the Government are saying, “We want to extend it to other areas”, that should not limit us today, when the Bill gives us the opportunity.
I also support new clauses 4, 5 and 6. The right hon. and learned Member for South Swindon made an important point about what senior managers have to do, which is also relevant to the Online Safety Bill. I rather like the definition of an offence committed with
“the consent, connivance or neglect of a senior manager.”
All those things contribute to economic crime. This is, if you will, a sin of omission, and we should take the opportunity to tighten up these loopholes. It is one thing to know about something that is happening, it is another thing to look the other way, and it is another thing not to do your job properly and allow that something to happen. This would cover all those eventualities.
New clause 7, in the name of the hon. Member for Cheadle (Mary Robinson) deals with whistleblowing. It is an excellent new clause which would enhance the Bill and offer protection to the very people who flag up these economic crimes. Whenever I think about whistleblowing, I remember a little cartoon that I saw many years ago showing a man sitting at a computer terminal in an office with a sign above his head saying, “Congratulations Frank, whistleblower of the month.” I understand that the cartoonist was Bill Proud. Every time I think about that, I think about the lack of protection offered to whistleblowers, and how much more the Government could be doing to ensure that those who do speak up are protected.
The organisation Protect says that it has offered advice on whistleblowing to 2,500 people a year, and that of those who have contacted it about their experiences, 65% have suffered some kind of detriment as a result of their whistleblowing. There is no incentive for many people to speak out when they see something wrong. They feel that they will lose their job or their promotion and will have to work somewhere else, and also that this might follow them around if they are seeking references for a new job. There is a real problem here, and the Government could, if they wished, deal with it in the Bill: it would make sense for them to do so.
I also support the cost cap suggested in new clause 21. Bill Browder spoke about this issue very powerfully during the Public Bill Committee evidence sessions. The balance is completely skewed to the side of the criminals and away from the Government, and away from the prosecutors and the agencies who want to take on these crimes but simply cannot afford to do so. Bill Browder said:
“What I have learned is that the law enforcement agencies effectively refuse to open criminal cases unless they are 100% sure that they can win without any tough fight on the other side.”––[Official Report, Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Public Bill Committee, 25 October 2022; c. 65.]
And what we have learned, even just this week, is that the other side can afford anything that allows them to support their case. Indeed, that was made clear in the exchanges on the urgent question on the Wagner Group earlier today. The other side are very well set up financially: they can afford the very best lawyers, while the prosecutors sit there with nothing in their armoury to take on these oligarchs and kleptocrats. That is not acceptable, and a cost cap such as the one suggested in new clause 21 would go some way to addressing it.
Bill Browder has also talked powerfully about the Magnitsky case. He produced a load of evidence about money that been stolen and laundered, being put through various accounts. He had traced all the money, some of which had ended up in the United Kingdom. When he presented the case to prosecutors, to the National Crime Agency and to various other agencies, they all refused to take it on. A crime has been committed, and we know who committed it and where the money ended up, but prosecutors here do nothing about it because it would cost them money that they might never see again. As a result, crimes go unprosecuted in the United Kingdom. It is unacceptable that, by failing to take on new clause 21 and other such measures that would cap costs, the Government are allowing this to continue.
I would support further measures on sanctions. Further to the urgent question, monitoring of sanctions and their effectiveness needs to be a lot tighter. Any sensible sanctions scheme would not have waivers for warlords.
I very much support the new clauses on the proceeds of crime and compensation for victims, for the people of Ukraine and indeed for the people of Iran, as has been suggested by the hon. Member for Oxford West and Abingdon (Layla Moran). Those measures are important. There are schemes such as the financial services compensation scheme, but in many cases that does not fully compensate, or compensate at all, those victims of economic crime. Appropriate compensation should be given, given the real and devastating effect that financial crime can have on our constituents. People who feel that they have been duped will carry that around for a long time, so compensation is important, and there is real need for finance both to fight the war in Ukraine and to rebuild that country thereafter.
I shall be very brief, because I took a lot of time in the House yesterday. I strongly support many of the new clauses being moved by Back Benchers across the Chamber today. If I can just say something about politics, this heartens me and shows that there are ways in which we can work together to pursue the national interest across the political divide. It breathes a bit of confidence and life back into the political process that we have all chosen to join in our careers, so I commend those individual Back Benchers who have put themselves forward and who are speaking today.
The proposals from the hon. Member for Cheadle (Mary Robinson) on strengthening the support for whistleblowing are hugely important. Whistleblowers are an essential part of our armoury in the fight against money laundering and fraud, and we know that, despite all the legal rights, they are not protected. People lose their jobs, their families get destroyed and they are left penniless. Therefore, the establishment of a capability that will do nothing other than protect and promote whistleblowers in the crucial work they do is really important, and I hope that it will be adopted.
The importance of legislating to tackle the abuse of our legal system by oligarchs and others, which the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) has just talked about so eloquently, is also really important. I want to be blunt about this and say to those on the Government Front Bench that, if they do not accept this new clause, they will not get a Bill during this Parliament. I bet that is right, so for heaven’s sake let us use this opportunity to get this bit of legislation in. It does not cover everything we would like it to cover, but it will have an impact. It will also give us the experience to see whether we have got the legislation right. I am sure that all the lawyers who helped to draft these new clauses put their best brains into them, but if they have not got them right, we will be able to learn those lessons when we come to extend these measures beyond economic crime.
The right hon. and learned Member for South Swindon (Sir Robert Buckland) made an excellent contribution on the reform of criminal corporate liability, and I want to say something about that. It is not that we want to suddenly bang up a whole load of lawyers, accountants, companies, service providers and all those people who we know are the ones that facilitate or collude with much of the economic crime that takes place. Only the best preventive mechanism that we can think of will force a change of behaviour, and we are not doing that on the back of hope; we are doing it on the back of reality. We know from the Bribery Act 2010 and from the regulations on tax evasion and on health and safety at work that putting this sort of liability on individuals and corporations is the only way to transform behaviour. Last week’s amendment to the Online Safety Bill by the Conservative rebels showed the mood of the House, and I would urge Ministers to think about that. The mood of the House is to use this effective tool to try to transform behaviour in all spheres of life, whether in relation to online harms or to economic crime.
I hope that we will hear from the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr Djanogly) soon on the issue of “freeze not seize”. I know he is going to make a number of propositions, and I hope he will not mind if I say something about this. We have been working with an extensive group of lawyers to see whether we can move to a position where we do not just freeze the assets but seize them in order to repurpose them and, particularly in the current context, use them to support the reconstruction of Ukraine. We have finally got a chink in the armour in that regard, but let me say something else first. The lawyers we have talked to work with non-governmental organisations in this field, and the advice they give is always going to be slightly different from the advice that comes from the lawyers working in the Government service. I think we bring a new perspective, and I urge Ministers to listen to what we have to say. The chink is worth examining at this stage, even if we do not go for the further propositions, to show that we mean it when we say that we want to seize this money.
If the right hon. Lady can come up with a way to seize assets and use them for the purposes we have been discussing—notably for the reconstruction of Ukraine, but for other purposes, too—I am all ears. I have had long conversations with the representatives of Governments around the world, and I am yet to hear an idea that works. If she has one, I am happy to hear it.
This is not our idea. It comes from a recent seminar we held with lawyers who support the Royal United Services Institute and Spotlight on Corruption. I will leave it to the hon. Member for Huntingdon to expand on it, but I think it is a very interesting chink that we can exploit, although it is not the total answer.
A draft Bill is being prepared by another group of lawyers, but I do not think we can add it to this Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill. I am sceptical that we will find a chance to introduce the draft Bill in this Parliament, but I assure the Minister that we will pursue it after this Bill has passed. I just hope the Government examine the chink we have identified and run with it.
New clause 21 on cost caps, which stands in my name, is part of the way in which we could better fund the enforcement agencies in their fight against economic crime while also preventing economic criminals from exploiting our legal system. At the moment, we have a “loser pays” law, which has two consequences. First, when our enforcement agencies embark on litigation and lose, there is a massive cost to the public purse. We saw that with the unexplained wealth order against Kazakhstan’s Nazarbayeva family. Subsequent investigative journalism suggested that the family told mistruths to the court, but that has never been rectified. Nevertheless, the costs vary from £1.5 million to £2 million.
The SFO took a similar case against Serco involving prisoners who were—I have forgotten the word.
I thank the Minister. I am having a senior moment.
The SFO had clearly prepared the case badly, but there was a discovery point that got the litigation thrown out of court, and a huge sum was claimed in costs. The cost to the public purse is enormous.
My apologies, Madam Deputy Speaker. For some reason I was under the impression that the hon. Member for Aberavon (Stephen Kinnock) would be speaking first.
Order. I think I should explain, for the benefit of Hansard, that the shadow Minister will be coming back on Third Reading. It is customary to go straight to the Minister, given that he moved the motion for the lead new clause.
I thought that we were to have the joy and the privilege of hearing from the hon. Member for Aberavon, who can never say too much in this Chamber, or indeed anywhere else—which is lucky, because he very rarely says too little.
It is a huge pleasure to have been here this afternoon. Members in all parts of the House have made extremely powerful points, but I will touch on just a few of them, because many have been covered at length and in detail on numerous other occasions. If Members will forgive me, I will deal straight away with a few of the matters that I think require immediate attention.
I thank my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for South Swindon (Sir Robert Buckland) for tabling new clause 6 and for the way in which he has approached the area of corporate criminal liability, in which he and I agree that reform is required. That is why the Government commissioned a review by the Law Commission, which my right hon. and learned Friend cited and which showed a definite need to clamp down on economic crime conducted by commercial organisations. We have been working closely across Government and with prosecutors in carefully considering its recommendations and how improvements can best be made. It is vital that any reform can be used by law enforcement agencies, does not duplicate what already exists and avoids placing unnecessary burdens on legitimate businesses, but we must also operate within the constraints of the Bill.
I share my right hon. and learned Friend’s passion for change. I am immensely grateful for his thoughtful input, and I greatly value my engagement with him, and with other Members, on this issue. I can assure him that the Government intend to address the need for a “failure to prevent” offence in the other place, and I would welcome further discussion with him about the most effective way in which that can be done.
I am extremely grateful for what my right hon. Friend has said, but may I gently press him on the issues of “failure to prevent”, fraud, money laundering and false accounting offences—I accept that they may well have to be separate—and a further discussion on the identification doctrine? If so, I will not need to press my new clauses to a vote.
My right hon. and learned Friend is certainly more learned than me, and I will certainly be listening to his views. There are a number of areas that I am sure we will be able to discuss, and I am sure we will reach a conclusion that is acceptable to all sides.
I am grateful for the assurance that an amendment will be introduced in another place, but may I also have an assurance that it will cover both corporations and individual directors?
The right hon. Lady knows very well that I would find it impossible not to listen to her. I look forward to seeing how we can return to this issue. The Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, my hon. Friend the Member for Thirsk and Malton (Kevin Hollinrake), will no doubt wish to have a strong input as well, so I shall say no more at this stage.
Let me now touch on the question of whistleblowers, and pay enormous tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Cheadle (Mary Robinson), who has been a friend of many of us for a number of years since she was first elected and who has championed, consistently and clearly, the need for an office for whistleblowers. She is absolutely right: what the country needs is an office for whistleblowers, and what we need to do is ensure that we have the updates to the legislation that she so correctly highlighted. The establishment of such an office would, however, be a significant undertaking. It would have major financial applications owing to its size, it would require significant staffing, and, as matters stand, it might duplicate the role of regulators without the same level of sector expertise. I know that my hon. Friend had the opportunity to meet my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State earlier this week to discuss her new clause and plans for the review, which I understand will be set out soon, I hope that the meeting was constructive.
I have indeed had a meeting with the Under-Secretary to discuss this. There is a long way to go on it and I am steadfast about setting up the office for whistleblowers. However, the conversations have been constructive, I am grateful to Ministers and I will not be pressing my new clause to a vote.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that and to the Under-Secretary for having had those conversations. He knows my support for her interest in this important matter.
Clearly, many amendments have been tabled today. The last point I wish to make before we move on to Third Reading is that the Government listened an awful lot on this Bill. Many of us, including myself and the Under-Secretary, who have been taking it through this place, have been listening extremely carefully, for many reasons. One of those reasons is that we picked this up, as many people do, a long way down its process of drafting and through its progress through this House. No doubt there are areas where all of us could tweak, adjust, test and push, but we think that the Bill offers major progress on the situation where we began; I am delighted that that point was shared across this House. So although there are areas where we could have further discussion—I am sure the other place will have criticisms and comment, and we will have improvements and additions—we feel that this Bill, as it stands, is a vast improvement on where we are. Although there is progress to be made, and there always will be, we believe that the Bill marks a useful point of progress for our country in fighting economic crime.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 14 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 3
Home Office review of the Tier 1 (Investor) visa scheme: publication
“Home Office review of the Tier 1 (Investor) visa scheme: publication
Within a day of the passage of this Act, the Secretary of State must publish in full the findings of the Home Office review of the Tier 1 (Investor) visa scheme which relate to economic crime.” —(Layla Moran.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
I will briefly thank a few people on my behalf and on behalf of the Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, my hon. Friend the Member for Thirsk and Malton (Kevin Hollinrake). I must thank my noble friend Lord Callanan, the Minister for Business, Energy and Corporate Responsibility, who continues to do so much to support the Bill and has been a great help. I also thank the Home Office Minister, Lord Sharpe of Epsom, who is a fantastic asset to our Department.
I thank my right hon. Friend the Member for East Hampshire (Damian Hinds) and my hon. Friend the Member for Sutton and Cheam (Paul Scully), who helped so much to prepare the Bill. Furthermore, I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Watford (Dean Russell), who ably shepherded the Bill through its early parliamentary stages, and the Lord Commissioner of His Majesty’s Treasury, my hon. Friend the Member for North Cornwall (Scott Mann), and his team for their excellent assistance, particularly when he courageously stood in and answered on behalf of the Department in a brief moment of surprise—mostly to him. I also thank the Home Secretary and the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy for their contributions.
I thank the Minister for his positive response to the amendments tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for South Swindon (Sir Robert Buckland) and others in relation to the reform of corporate criminal responsibility. That is welcome. Will he take on board the importance of including in that the reform of the identification principle, which is a major bar to corporate prosecutions? The Justice Committee has called for that more than once in its recent reports, and it is supported by the current and previous Directors of Public Prosecutions and the current and previous Directors of the Serious Fraud Office.
I thank my hon. Friend the Chair of the Justice Committee. As he knows, this is an area of great interest and for further discussion, which we are indeed looking at taking forward.
I finish by saying an enormous thank you to the Bill team, who are in the Box today—Tom Ball and the rest of the clan—who have done a fantastic job on Burns night, of all times. Because it is a time for us to find that we are no longer wee and tim’rous beasties, but are instead going to look for that fair trojan of the human race, the “puddin’-race”—forgive me—I look forward very much to being freed of the Dispatch Box and skipping off to the whisky and the haggis. On that, Mr Deputy Speaker, thank you.
Lucky Minister. I call the shadow Minister.