Cyber-security

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Tuesday 7th May 2024 Westminster Hall

[Dan Jarvis (Barnsley Central) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Bardell. May I say how good it is to see the Minister in his place? I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Preston (Sir Mark Hendrick) on securing this important debate. He is a long-standing and dedicated servant to his constituents and Lancashire more widely; any compliment about Lancashire does not come particularly easily from my side of the Pennines, but that is certainly one that my hon. Friend deserves for his very long-standing service for his constituents.

I pay tribute to the men and women who serve in the National Cyber Force, soon to be based in Samlesbury, and to those who serve across the security and intelligence services and in the cyber-security sector. They fight on the digital frontline day in and day out to detect, disrupt and deter individual and state-sponsored adversaries that threaten our cyber-security.

The cyber threat is constantly mutating and spreading. The latest crime survey for England and Wales shows a staggering 29% increase in computer misuse between 2022 and 2023. Computer misuse disrupts services, obtains information illegally and extorts individuals, meaning that personal information can be published online without consent, entire life savings can be lost due to fraud, and individuals, including children, can be blackmailed. The Government need to be increasingly ruthless in their approach to countering those threats and legislate for the challenges of today, not those of yesterday. Doing so will give cyber-security professionals the means to retain the advantage over those who seek to harm us and protect more people and organisations from cyber-crime.

Therefore, as the right hon. Member for Midlothian (Owen Thompson) rightly said, the Computer Misuse Act needs updating to reflect the challenges of the cyber age, not those of the Ceefax age. Accelerating technological change means that outdated legislation is struggling to catch up with cyber-threats posed by the likes of artificial intelligence. That is why, on this side of the House, we have already proposed criminalising the programming of chatbots that radicalise and spread terrorist material. We also welcome the Government’s announcement last month of the criminalisation, through the Criminal Justice Bill, of the creation of sexually explicit deepfakes. Outdated legislation is at best restrictive and at worst punitive for cyber-security professionals in the UK who conduct ethical hacking to expose system vulnerabilities and protect us from harmful cyber-attacks.

The National Cyber Security Centre, which is home to exceptional men and women fighting cyber-crime, has said that ethical hacking reports by individual researchers provide valuable information that organisations can use to improve the security of their systems. That is why the Opposition tabled an amendment to the Criminal Justice Bill that would reform the CMA by introducing a statutory defence for cyber-security researchers and professionals involved in ethical hacking.

Our amendment comes after the Chancellor’s commitment to implement all of Sir Patrick Vallance’s recommendations on the regulation of emerging digital technologies published alongside last spring’s Budget, which included the introduction of a statutory defence. If this Government do not deliver, the next one should. Until that happens, the legislative lag will have consequences. Half of UK businesses and 32% of charities suffered a cyber-breach or attack in the last year alone. Breaches due to vulnerabilities in cyber-security drive some of the most pernicious types of criminality. According to the accounting firm BDO, fraud doubled in 2023.

Furthermore, the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy warned in December that the Government could face a catastrophic ransomware attack at any moment. The sobering reality is that such attacks are already happening on the UK’s critical national infrastructure. Just today, it was reported that in response to a ransom not being paid, personal information illegally obtained by a ransomware attack on NHS Dumfries and Galloway has been published on the dark web—a truly despicable act that accompanies another deeply concerning development today: a hack into the Ministry of Defence’s payroll records by a malign actor.

Those are only two of the most recent examples, and they show that the threat landscape has never been more dangerous. However, progress on reforming the CMA has been buffering for three years since the Government first announced their review of the legislation. Despite two public consultations, a Home Office industry working group and several public commitments, the Government have not yet made progress and, as the Minister will know, we are fast running out of parliamentary time. Though time is in short supply, there is consensus on acting in the national interest to update the CMA, and the Opposition are keen to play our part.

I would be grateful if the Minister would answer the following questions. He will know that they are meant in the constructive spirit in which we always seek to engage on these important matters. First, will he give an assurance that the proposed legislation, as outlined in the Government’s response to the CMA consultation, will be introduced in this Parliament?

Progress on legislation requires political leadership. However, the JCNSS report on ransomware said that the leadership by a former Home Secretary did not treat it as a priority. The Minister will remember that I wrote to him in January about this matter and others identified in the JCNSS report. Can he give a further assurance that his Department and other Departments are now prioritising ransomware by confirming that they will finally respond to the consultation on unauthorised access to online accounts and personal data, which was published in September 2022?

On public sector payments to ransomware, the Deputy Prime Minister responded to me at Cabinet Office questions on 25 April by saying that that “is not something” that he would “rule out totally”. However, the Security Minister’s written answer to me on the same question on the same day was much more resolute about the policy not to pay ransoms.

[The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)]

Listen to me.

[Dan Jarvis]

I am listening to the Minister. I do not know whether the Deputy Prime Minister is; that is possibly the problem.

It would be really helpful if the Minister would say whether a new approach to the public sector paying ransoms will be included in any update to the CMA. These assurances and clarifications matter, as the Home Office is part of a cross-Government response to countering cyber-threats, joining the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, the MOD, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and the Cabinet Office in driving policy to detect, disrupt and deter cyber-criminality.

As the Minister will know, the fulcrum of such activity is the National Security Council, but he will also know that, while it has a sub-committee for economic security, there is not a dedicated equivalent for cyber-security. Has consideration been given to the creation of a dedicated sub-committee of the NSC for policy responses to intermediate and long-term cyber challenges?

Another long-term challenge, which the Minister will be familiar with, is the retention of our best and brightest in fighting cyber-crime, both in the security and intelligence services and in the cyber-security sector. Do our modern-day Alan Turings, who play a vital role in keeping our country safe, feel that the most innovative and effective work can happen in the UK under current cyber-security legislation? The answer, sadly, is likely to be no: 60% of respondents to a recent cyber-ops survey said that the CMA is a barrier to their work in threat intelligence and vulnerability research, and 16,850 cyber-defenders—the equivalent of two GCHQs—are estimated to have been lost due to outdated cyber-security laws. The Minister knows that criminals profit the most from poor retention and recruitment, so has he considered how changes to the CMA could unlock the cyber-security sector’s huge potential to protect our country’s cyber-space better?

This debate has not just been about protecting our cyber-space through effective legislation; it has been about the principle of legislation retaining the advantage over malign actors intent on harming us. I said at the start of my speech that there are exceptional men and women working to defend our cyber-security, who are very much at the cutting edge of efforts to detect, disrupt and deter myriad threats. As legislators providing the legal framework for that crucial work, we must now all play our part.

[The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)]

It is a great pleasure to see you this evening, Ms Bardell—as ever, the surprise only adds to the joy—and to respond to the hon. Member for Preston (Sir Mark Hendrick), who is quite right to have secured this debate. The challenge that he talked about and the ways of addressing it are fundamental not just to his constituents and the National Cyber Force, which he rightly paid tribute to and will be hosting in his constituency, but to the very nature of our country.

It is interesting to note that over the last 200 years, the British economy has been based on many things: the ingenuity and brilliance of our people; the rule of law and the ability to predict the future based on prior agreement; the genius of economic reforms innovated out of Edinburgh and Glasgow; and the ability to keep trade moving. For most of our existence, that trade has been maritime trade of various descriptions. It has been guaranteed not just by an extraordinary industry of sailors and shipwrights who have created the vehicles of commerce, but by the Royal Navy, which has kept the sea lanes open, the sailors safe and the goods moving.

The truth is that over the last few years, the nature of that commerce—that commercial gain and exchange—has changed. We have gone from sea lanes to e-lanes. We have gone from looking at the red ensign as a guarantee of security at sea, to looking at GCHQ and the National Cyber Security Centre as a guarantee of security on the internet and in cyber-space. Those changes have been fundamental. They have enabled us to do things that are frankly quite remarkable. Look at the change in the way communication works that our country has been through in the four years since covid struck us. With so many of our lives going online—even this place went online briefly, although we seem to have forgotten how convenient that was—many of us have been able to transform the businesses that we were working in from local or national to global.

That change has been a phenomenal blessing, but none of it would have been possible without the dedication and brilliance of some remarkable individuals who have kept us safe. Those individuals started off being headquartered solely in Cheltenham. Those of who have had the privilege to visit Cheltenham know that the extraordinary brilliance and genius of those remarkable people has been fantastic not just for our country but for many partners and allies around the world.

What we see today is that it is not just the Government who need to be kept safe. The reality is that companies and individuals guarantee that security in many different ways. What we are talking about this evening is how the wider economy is defended. That is where the Government have made some important changes, which I hope will be built on in coming years. The cyber-security force that we have created is an essential part of keeping the UK’s commercial interests safe. It is a fundamental building block of our economy not just today but for the future.

The way that has worked with the National Cyber Security Centre is essential, because the reality is that the economy of Britian is not guarded simply by the Government, and national security is not limited to the arms of the state. It is fundamentally true that many suppliers to Government and many different institutions that connect to Government are also important. More than that, every single aspect of our lives is a part of keeping our country safe. Although it is true that the Government do not provide the food, the supermarkets that feed us every day are part of our national security. Although it is true that the Government do not move the money, the banks that keep us fluid in that sense are absolutely part of our national security. It is therefore true that all those capabilities—all the cyber-defence that goes into the wider economy and into our lives—keep us all safe. Sadly, one of the things that has distressed me most in this job is discovering the level of abuse that I am afraid is now prevalent online. Hon. Members will not require me to tell them this, but we see an explosion in online bullying and abuse, and sadly we have seen an explosion in online harm that has taken not just many young people, but many people from across every walk of life, to dark places—and in some cases, very sadly, cost lives.

The cyber work that we do is about protecting not just the state, the Government or even the economy, but homes and families across the United Kingdom. That is why the work that we are doing in the reform of the Computer Misuse Act is so important, because, as the hon. Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis) and particularly as the hon. Member for Preston put it, the changes we have seen online in the last 20 or 30 years since the Act was passed are phenomenal. The Act was passed before the internet, the iPhone and social media. It is, in a modern sense, historical; it is dated and based on an era when to hold data was to hold it on a solid drive in a computer, not in the ether or on the cloud. The nature of intervention to keep cyber-defences alive and test them was very different, and the Act was drafted for that era. That is why the work of Sir Patrick Vallance and the way in which he has approached it have been so important, and it is why we have been looking so carefully at what he recommends and at how to get the best answer out.

The truth is that any decision we make is going to be difficult. It is going to raise questions about the ways in which businesses work and partner with others around the world. The right hon. Member for Midlothian (Owen Thompson) asked about ransomware and the way in which it is changing. That is where the direction that we take it so important—for example, the counter-ransomware initiative that the United Kingdom led and changed in various ways, and the approaches we have taken to ensure that we are properly structured to get its benefits. The reason I am confident that we are going in the right direction is that we are setting the agenda.

In the 18 months since I had the privilege of becoming the Security Minister, we have launched at least two actions. Forgive me as I try to remember how many were public and how many were private; hon. Members will appreciate that in this job it is probably best to get that distinction right. I will say that we have launched at least two public actions alongside partners on counter-ransomware actions. Noticeably, one from about a year ago was against various Russian targets who had decided that it was to their advantage to try to extort and exploit organisations in the United Kingdom and United States. Our reactions—the ways in which we have partnered with allies and friends—have ensured that we are able not just to defend ourselves, but to make the punishment fit the crime. We are putting in place sanctions, closing down accounts and ensuring that we have those resources in partnership with organisations like the FBI to resist those different areas.

This subject also raises some questions about the state, which were hinted at. I will go a little further into it, because this is not just about individual actors, those in the so-called troll farms or the Internet Research Agency, which was so famously used by Russia recently; it is also about states themselves. Sadly, we are seeing states trying to use these forms of exploitation as means of profit. We have seen one state in particular, North Korea, seeking to quite literally use them as a cash cow—as a way of paying for its nuclear weapons programme, extorting money out of individuals around the world to advance its own hostile interests.

This is where some of the changes we have been able to make—alongside the hon. Member for Barnsley Central, to whom I pay tribute, and with support from parties on all sides—will, I think, make a substantial difference in the years to come. Those changes include the National Security Act 2023, which, through the various different elements of co-operation with foreign states, makes criminal actions that formerly would have merely been assisting or would have been hard to define; they may not necessarily have been breaches of the Official Secrets Act, or empowering or profiting a foreign state in a direct sense and in a way that would have been criminal. The National Security Act has been essential in making sure that espionage is properly punished and that the support of hostile states is now criminalised. I am grateful for the support of the hon. Member for Barnsley Central and others, because that legislation has been an important change that has enabled us to make a difference.

We have seen various different ways in which states have used these sorts of powers. For example, I am afraid that we have seen the various different ways in which Beijing has been ordering different threats against us. I will not comment on things that are being gossiped about in different places—in main Chambers rather than in Westminster Hall—but I will say that the state-affiliated cyber group APT31 has been, and consistently remains, a threat targeted against the UK. I am afraid that we have seen that again and again, and we have had to take action to ensure that we are able to protect ourselves. This is one of those areas where the work of the National Cyber Security Centre has been so incredibly important in protecting not just the state but our wider economy—and that is where we have a wider mission, because the truth is that protecting the wider economy is about protecting not just all those areas, but families and individuals across our country.

I am proud of some of the work we have done alongside businesses, some of which are from the UK and some of which are international, which has enabled us to change some of the incentives and pressures on them. We have brought down fraud in the last year; 16% is not as far as I would like it to go, and I am sure that others in the House will recognise that there is further to go, but that is a hell of an achievement by some fantastically dedicated law enforcement professionals and their cyber partners to make sure that homes and families across the United Kingdom are safer.

We are moving further online. For instance, one can look at the national health service today, and see the amazing investment in technology and in the changing way in which we communicate with our doctors. As many of us know, the NHS app—which, I think I am right in saying, has been downloaded by about three quarters of all adults in the United Kingdom, although I will have to check that—is a fantastic way in which we can communicate across the medical professions. However, all of this means that we have wider vectors of attack, which means that it is enormously important to ensure that we are working together. That is why—I correct the hon. Member for Barnsley Central—although the National Security Council may not have a cyber element in that sense, there is a ministerial cyber board, which meets on a similar basis except that it is chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister and brings together Departments from all across Whitehall. That is an extraordinarily important place where we set the policy and make sure that it works together, because the UK Government are already doing a huge amount.

The hon. Member for Barnsley Central asked about the policy of paying ransomware. We have set out that no public body should be using state money to pay ransomware. We have set out this agenda with the national health service and have been very clear to organisations, including the British Library, that it should not be happening. That policy has been made clear. It is also clear that some ransomwares that are being used for profit are being closed down. I do not know if Members are aware of the LockBit sanctions, but they have been incredibly important; in the last few days we have not just taken over the LockBit site—a brilliant piece of work by the National Crime Agency and others, including the FBI—but exposed the people behind it. That is an extremely important way in which we are taking the fight directly to the criminals who are challenging us and making sure that the National Cyber Force, which is soon to be wonderfully homed in Preston—

[Sir Mark Hendrick]

Just next door.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Many of its people will be homed around there, I am sure, though they may work in other parts. That force is a fantastically important element in our national defence. While once we flew the white ensign to protect sea lanes, today we fly a different sign —a national cyber-security sign; and with wider British Government protection, we can protect our e-lanes of communication that keep us not just safe but free.

State Threat Prevention and Investigation Measures: 20 December 2023 to 19 March 2024

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Thursday 2nd May 2024 Written Statements

[The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)]

Section 55(1) of the National Security Act 2023 requires the Secretary of State to report to Parliament as soon as reasonably practicable after the end of every relevant three-month period on the exercise of their STPIM powers under the Act during that period.

STPIMs were introduced through the 2023 Act and came into force on 20 December 2023. There have been no STPIM cases during this first reporting period.

[HCWS439]

National Crime Agency: Dealing with Corruption

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Tuesday 30th April 2024 Written Statements

[The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)]

The National Crime Agency is the national lead agency for tackling serious and organised crime, tasked with reducing the impact it has on the UK, and thereby protecting the public from the highest-harm criminals we face. To achieve that, it manages intelligence and information that requires the highest levels of security, and provides sensitive intelligence and covert tactics to law enforcement from across the whole of the UK.

His Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary and fire and rescue services has finalised its 12th inspection of the NCA. It assessed how effectively the NCA is at dealing with corruption, and specifically the NCA’s effectiveness and efficiency in helping and working with police forces and other law enforcement agencies to identify and tackle corruption involving police officers and staff.

I have asked HMICFRS to publish the report. It will be published today and will be available online at https://hmicfrs.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/publications/national-crime-agency-vetting-and-anti-corruption-part-2 I will arrange for a copy to be placed in the Libraries of both Houses.

The inspection found the agency works well with partners to identify and tackle corrupt police officers and staff, that the agency understands the threat posed by corruption to law enforcement, and that its anti-corruption unit employs effective policies and approaches to tackle corruption. However, it found that the intelligence the agency receives could be improved, and its ACU could strengthen its approach to identifying and prioritising investigations. I expect the agency to ensure that it has dedicated sufficient resources to meet future demand, and has the procedures in place to support law enforcement on the most appropriate and serious cases.

The inspectorate also found that a new nationally co-ordinated approach to collating and assessing intelligence relating to corruption in police forces and other law enforcement agencies may strengthen our understanding of this issue and our collective ability to address it. My officials are considering the feasibility of this suggestion with the NCA and relevant partners.

Overall, the inspectorate has made five separate recommendations. These are designed to better enable the NCA to effectively support law enforcement in addressing corrupt police officers and staff, an issue that poses a significant threat to fair and effective policing, and ultimately public safety. These changes will enable the NCA to have the intelligence, resources and approaches it requires to robustly address with partners this threat to police forces and wider law enforcement.

[HCWS434]

British Nationality (Irish Citizens) Bill

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

3rd reading
Friday 26th April 2024 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)]

On behalf of the Minister for Legal Migration and the Border, my hon. Friend the Member for Corby (Tom Pursglove), let me start by thanking all Members, from across the House, particularly those who served on the Bill Committee, who have engaged in debating the Bill’s merits on Second Reading, in Committee and today on Third Reading.

As many have said, this Bill is a huge credit to the right hon. Member for Belfast East (Gavin Robinson), who has rightly championed people being able to have the right to recognition as he has set out. He has conducted himself in an exemplary manner, not only with my ministerial colleague, who speaks highly of him and has been grateful for the engagement he has had in recent weeks and months, but with Home Office officials. As others have noted, the right hon. Gentleman has been persistent, diligent and challenging where the answers have not always been forthcoming as quickly as he would have liked. He has managed to get the right answers and to get them written down, so it is a huge testament to him that the Bill has secured cross-party support.

On Second Reading, Madam Deputy Speaker noted the “good-natured and constructive debate” that had taken place. I am pleased that that has continued, although I am not surprised; in the Government’s view, this Bill is doing the right thing and will make a real difference to Irish nationals and to those who have made their homes here in the UK and want to take the next step to become British citizens.

As we sit here, I am reminded of the words of our late sovereign, Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth, when she spoke in 2011 on the occasion of her state visit to the Republic of Ireland:

“no one who looked to the future over the past centuries could have imagined the strength of the bonds that are now in place between the Governments and the people of our two nations”.

What the right hon. Gentleman is doing today is making that recognition a little clearer, fresher and more meaningful.

My hon. Friend the Minister for Legal Migration and the Border also asked me again to reflect on the unique position that Irish nationals hold within the UK. I hope the right hon. Gentleman will forgive me for straying when I reflect on not an arbitrary group of individuals, but my own family. Like many in the UK, I have family going back to what is now the Republic of Ireland but was then the island of Ireland as part of the United Kingdom. They were from Limerick, and my father exercised his rights and secured an Irish passport a number of years ago. That connection is something that many of us see not just in the living expression of our ancestry, but in the history of freedom that our citizens have secured together. We do not need to look down many of the memorials here in England before we start seeing names that are clearly from the island of Ireland and realise that our shared struggle for freedom is reflected, sadly, in the pain of loss of families across these islands.

Irish nationals already enjoy the right to work, study and vote, alongside having benefits such as access to our health service and social welfare. The common travel area arrangements for Irish nationals are now in statute under 3ZA of the Immigration Act 1971. That protects the ability of Irish nationals to enter and live in the UK without needing a grant of immigration, leave to enter or remain. That relationship is reciprocated by the Irish Government in regard to British citizens entering Ireland and this strengthens the relationship between our two countries. Indeed, the right to hold and to live both identities was also guaranteed in the Belfast/Good Friday agreement, and many people have exercised it. Indeed a member of my private office who luxuriates under the joint nationality exercises it to this day.

Irish nationals who are exercising their rights to live and work in the UK must currently undertake the naturalisation process to gain British citizenships. There are many requirements associated with naturalisation. There are many requirements associated with naturalisation, such as a period of residence—usually five years—which is replicated in the Bill. However, many immigration requirements for naturalisation are designed for those who require formal grants of leave. It is not right to fully apply those to Irish nationals seeking to obtain British citizenship. Equally, the need to demonstrate competence of language—usually English, although Welsh and Scots Gaelic are also options—and to pass the life in the United Kingdom test seems at odds with the position of Irish nationals in the United Kingdom. We are glad that they do not feature in this Bill.

This issue has been raised in the House previously by hon. Members, such as the hon. Member for East Londonderry (Mr Campbell). Likewise, it has been discussed by Lord Hay of Ballyore, who sits in the other place—as an aside, a member of my private office has decided quite extraordinarily to go and run a marathon in Donegal this weekend, for which I can only wish him good luck. They have highlighted the strong feeling about the issue, in addition to the cost of naturalisation. My hon. Friend the Member for Corby would like to express his happiness with the Bill and the improvements it makes to our statute book.

Although the Government supported the underlying principles of the Bill, full Government support was dependent on the Bill being amended. Thanks to the right hon. Member for Belfast East and the constructive approach that has characterised the Bill, those amendments were readily included. Following the actions of Committee members who scrutinised and debated the Bill, the amendments have passed and the Government are able to offer their full, unbridled and unconditional support as it completes its way through the House and moves to the other place.

The Bill as introduced to the House allowed for only people born in Ireland after 31 December 1948, having been resident in Northern Ireland for five years, to register as British citizens. The right hon. Member and the whole House will know that before that date, citizens could not have been born in the Republic of Ireland as the Republic had not been declared, so they were automatically eligible for British citizenship.

The right hon. Member will forgive me for expressing that his modest initial proposal did not recognise the idea that he and I both share: the United Kingdom is whole and integral, and therefore citizenship laws that apply in Northern Ireland, as he has suggested, should apply to the rest of the United Kingdom, except when a particular treaty—the Good Friday agreement, for example—changes elements of that. I am glad that he has welcomed—as I knew he would—the expansion of the Bill to the whole United Kingdom.

Following the amendments made in Committee, the Bill’s provisions will apply to all eligible Irish nationals of all ages who live anywhere in the United Kingdom for five years. As noted by my hon. Friend the Member for Corby on Second Reading, the amendments made in Committee have done that, first, by making the route available to Irish nationals—regardless of how they became Irish—and not just those born in Ireland. Those covered by the provisions of the Bill as it was introduced will still be included, but the amended Bill is more expansive in approach. It will give all eligible Irish nationals a more straightforward pathway to becoming a British citizen.

Secondly, it does not have a requirement that an Irish national must have been born after a certain date. Under the amended Bill, people born on or before 31 December 1948 will have the same opportunity to make use of it as people born after that date. Thirdly, qualifying residents can be from any part of the United Kingdom, not just Northern Ireland. That ensures that all eligible Irish nationals resident anywhere in the United Kingdom will be able to make use of this important piece of legislation. That reflects the important point that becoming a British citizen is about a tie to the whole United Kingdom, not just one constituent part, even were we to expect its uptake to be proportionately more in Northern Ireland. I know that the right hon. Member for Belfast East agrees strongly with that.

The Bill will add a new registration route to the British Nationality Act 1981. It seeks to insert a new section 4AA to allow any Irish national who has completed the qualifying residential period in the United Kingdom to be registered as a British citizen if they apply and meet the requirements. The requirements are a period of five years’ lawful residence without excess absences, a specific assessment of the 12 months prior to the application, and being of good character. The Secretary of State would of course retain discretion over the residential requirements, allowing him or her to treat them as having been met even when they have not, where the exceptional circumstances of a particular case merit doing so.

In keeping with other applications for British citizenship, albeit not on the face of the Bill, Irish nationals would also be expected to enrol their biometrics and successful applicants aged 18 or over would be required to attend a citizenship ceremony. It would be remiss of me not to highlight that this Bill, alongside all other residential application routes for British citizenship, is subject to the relevant sections of the Illegal Migration Act 2023 on citizenship applications. I do not need to revisit the Government’s position in this area, as agreed by Parliament in passing that Act.

A question came up from my hon. Friend the Member for Hyndburn (Sara Britcliffe) about reciprocal requests to the Irish Government. That is a matter for the Irish Government, but I have to say we have an extremely friendly relationship with the Irish Government; indeed, the elevation of the new Taoiseach in recent days was a matter for some celebration to many of us. He has been a friend for a number of years. I am sure he will serve the Irish people extremely well, and I hope that the friendship we have developed over the years may see an evolution in this area—but that is a matter for them, not for us.

My hon. Friend the Member for Corby would like to reiterate his acknowledgement that the right hon. Member for Belfast East is not in agreement with the Government over the aims of the Illegal Migration Act. However, it is necessary to ensure a consistent approach across the statute book, even if it is highly unlikely that an Irish national would ever fall foul of that Act’s provisions.

Furthermore, my hon. Friend the Member for Corby is cognisant of the discussion to be had around fees for this registration route and notes the questions and comments that were raised in Committee on that point. As Members of this House may be aware, the unit costs for border and migration services are reviewed annually, an exercise that is currently under way following the financial year end. The unit costs for the proposed route will form part of that annual review, to ensure consistency in that calculation; once that is completed, my hon. Friend will be able to engage further with the right hon. Member for Belfast East in that space.

I must make clear, as my hon. Friend the Member for Corby also did, that this is intended not to be a profitable scheme for the Government, but merely a way of recognising that there is a cost, and it would be right that that cost fell on those exercising this right and not on every citizen. This Bill has enjoyed varied and cross-party discussion and debate on its journey through the House. That discussion facilitated the amendments passed in Committee, which will expand the number of Irish nationals in the United Kingdom who may make use of the provisions to obtain British citizenship.

From early in the life cycle of this Bill, it was and continues to be the Government’s belief that a dedicated route for Irish citizens will reduce the burden for such applicants and create a more straightforward process to becoming a British citizen for our closest neighbours. The establishment of a dedicated route could potentially also allow for a lower fee to be charged, although I have already highlighted that that must be considered in line with ongoing work surrounding the border and migration services fees.

The Government are unequivocal in our support for the underlying principles of the Bill, which was first introduced by the right hon. Member for Belfast East, and we are pleased to provide our full support for the Bill as amended in Committee. My hon. Friend the Minister for Legal Migration and the Border and I would like once again to concur with and congratulate the right hon. Gentleman on his success in the ballot and on helping the Government to find a way to correct the issue in our nationality system. I personally congratulate the right hon. Gentleman and wish his important Bill well as it moves through to the other place. It will make a welcome amendment to our current legislation—one that I hope will be exercised by those who have rightly and in a most welcome fashion made their home among us and are part of our lives today.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)]

With the leave of the House, I call Gavin Robinson.

Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Wednesday 24th April 2024 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)]

I beg to move,

That the draft Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) (No. 2) Order 2024, which was laid before this House on 22 April, be approved.

I am grateful to the House for its consideration of this draft order, which will see the Terrorgram collective proscribed. The Government assess that the Terrorgram collective operates as an organisation, in accordance with the guidance on the meaning of that term found in section 121 of the Terrorism Act 2000.

The Terrorgram collective is the sixth extreme right-wing group to be proscribed, along with 75 groups proscribed for extreme Islamist or other ideologies. This is based on the level of direction provided by its leadership for the preparation of propaganda campaigns and the co-ordination between the network to advance its neo-fascist, accelerationist ideology.

Article 2 of this order adds the Terrorgram collective to the list in schedule 2 to the 2000 Act as a new entry. Having carefully considered all the evidence, the Government have concluded that the Terrorgram collective should be proscribed. While I am unable to comment on specific intelligence, I can provide the House with a summary of the group’s activities.

The Terrorgram collective is a transnational online network of neo-fascist terrorists who produce and disseminate violent propaganda, with the aim of radicalising readers and encouraging individuals to commit acts of terrorism. The message of hatred it preaches is one of extreme white supremacism. It calls not just for death and violence but for the collapse of western democracy itself, so that the collective might build a whites-only world in its place.

The Terrorgram collective has published three long-form, magazine-style publications, as well as a 24-minute documentary video. This propaganda is designed to incite violence towards perceived representatives of the establishment, ethnic minorities and other minority or religious communities. It not only celebrates the abhorrent cycle of violence and death that it means to inspire; it worships it, glorifying the collective’s genocidal peers as so-called “saints” and encouraging readers to commit similar acts. The Terrorgram collective specifically celebrated Anders Breivik, who killed eight people with a car bomb before shooting dead 69 people at a youth camp in Norway in 2011, as a so-called “saint.”

The Government have determined that the Terrorgram collective is an organisation concerned in terrorism. For example, in February 2023, a key contributor to the Terrorgram collective was arrested for allegedly plotting attacks against the Baltimore power grid. The Terrorgram collective is involved in preparing for terrorism through the dissemination of instructional material in its propaganda. It promotes and encourages terrorism through its publications, which contain violent narratives and material that glorifies previous extreme right-wing attackers and encourages those who consume the content to commit similar actions.

In October 2022, an extreme right-wing terrorist attacked a gay bar in Slovakia, resulting in the murder of two people. In his attack manifesto, the perpetrator credited Terrorgram’s publications. Since the attack, Terrorgram now glorifies him as an example to follow. The decision to proscribe Terrorgram demonstrates this Government’s commitment to defending the security of the LGBT community.

Terrorgram holds vile antisemitic views. It has published propaganda material aimed at inciting violence against Jewish communities and the state of Israel and, most recently, celebrated Hamas’s attacks on Israel, including endorsing the use of terrorism to target Israel and Jewish communities. Reporting indicates that Terrorgram has advocated for attacks on Israel’s critical national infrastructure. This proscription further demonstrates our unwavering commitment to fighting antisemitism and our unfaltering support for the Jewish community.

The safety and security of the public is paramount. It is, and always will be, this Government’s No. 1 priority. The ongoing fight to counter and contain terrorism in all its guises is an essential part of that mission, as is standing up for the values we cherish. When our collective security and values are threatened by groups such as the Terrorgram collective, we will not hesitate to act. I therefore urge Members to support this proscription.

I commend the draft order to the House.

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[Tom Tugendhat]

I welcome all the comments made, particularly by my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis). He has been a friend for many years and we have worked together on many different operations in many different parts of the world—although very few were quite as vile as this one, I am afraid; Terrorgram is a genuinely horrific organisation. He raised some interesting points about the protection of the Jewish community, and he is absolutely right. The Community Safety Trust, which he and I both support, will receive an additional £54 million in funding to continue to provide measures until 2028. As he knows, that commitment was made only a few weeks ago by the Prime Minister.

My hon. Friend also quite rightly raised the incidents of anti-Muslim hatred that Tell MAMA has recorded. He is completely correct that we have sadly seen an increase in that area as well as in antisemitism, and he will know that we have also been very clear that those organisations, mosques and schools that require extra support and protection can get it from the Home Office—indeed, many have been applying, and I have had the privilege of ensuring that they are able to get the funding they need for their own security, to prevent harm to anybody in the Muslim community as well.

I want to touch briefly on some of the areas raised by the hon. Member for Glasgow Central (Alison Thewliss), who made some interesting points about an individual. If she will forgive me, I will not speak about that individual in particular, but I will say that proscription works against organisations and is not an individual power. However, she is also aware that sanctions do work against individuals and, where we are aware that individuals are connected to such hateful organisations—certainly if they are connected to proscribed organisations, as I am confident Terrorgram will be very shortly after this debate—there is no way that somebody like that would be, in the legal term, conducive to the public good, and there is no way that they should be allowed access to the United Kingdom.

The hon. Lady also raised an interesting point about St George’s day. I must say that I have been to many St George’s day lunches, at the very generous invitation of individuals who, when I was still in uniform, used to be very kind. I can see my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley Central remembers them too. We used to get invited to lunches in various parts of the country—my latest was in West Malling—and I may say that while we sat down for lunch at midday, I do not remember when we stood up from lunch. That was a great day of celebration and a fantastic moment for all of us. What we saw yesterday was no celebration of St George’s day or English national patriotism; it was simply thuggish violence and it has no place on our streets.

On tech, the hon. Lady is absolutely right that, sadly, it is very easy to go down a rabbit hole or a tech black hole that leads to an amazing warren of hate-filled conspiracy theories. This is an area where tech companies themselves have a responsibility to play their part. I have engaged with them in many different areas, including child sexual abuse online, which she knows I have devoted a lot of time to combating. However, this is another area where she is quite right that there is more work to be done and more responsibility on those who are profiting from the attention of individuals across the world.

The last point I want to make is on the definition of extremism. My hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley Central knows very well that this is an important piece of work. There is more work to be done on the actual list, as he rightly says, but I will bring it forward as soon as we ready to do so. He will understand that we want to make sure it is as robust and complete as it possibly can be, but he will be among the first to know as soon as it is ready.

I have seen some truly harrowing material in this job, but the scenes from the attack on the gay bar in Slovakia, where innocent people were gunned down in cold blood, ranks among the absolute worst. The manifesto written by the perpetrator advocated the murder of gay people, Jewish people and black people—not for anything they have done, but for who they are. Make no mistake: this was not just an attack on the LGBT community, and the Terrorgram collective is not just a threat to our national security. This was an attack on the values and principles that define who we are, and who we are as a nation. The Terrorgram collective is a threat to our society. There is no place whatsoever for the vile ideology espoused by the Terrorgram collective. We will not tolerate it. Proscribing it is a proportionate and necessary step in our ongoing effort to tackle terrorism, protect the public and defend our values. We will never relent in showing terrorism for what it is: a poisonous, corrosive force—

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[Mr Deputy Speaker]

Minister, you can finish now.

[Tom Tugendhat]

And with that, Mr Deputy Speaker, I commend the order to the House.

[Mr Deputy Speaker]

I was rather hopeful that you would just get in under the wire, but thank you none the less.

Question put and agreed to.

Draft National Crime Agency (Directed Tasking) Order 2023

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Wednesday 24th April 2024 General Committees

[The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)]

I beg to move,

That the Committee has considered the draft National Crime Agency (Directed Tasking) Order 2023.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg. I will start with the context in which we are introducing the order. Hon. Members will no doubt know that the impact of serious and organised crime on the United Kingdom is significant and growing. Put simply, it poses a threat to our national security and prosperity.

In partnership with law enforcement and industry, the Government have taken concerted action to tackle economic crime, fraud, bribery and corruption, all of which severely harm the economy and cause significant suffering. If we are to keep pace with those threats properly and effectively, only a system-wide response will do.

To that end, the Government announced, as part of the 2023 serious and organised crime strategy, their intention to amend section 5(5) of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 to allow the director general of the National Crime Agency to direct the director of the Serious Fraud Office on matters relating to the investigation of suspected incidents of serious or complex fraud, bribery and corruption. This change will support strong, ongoing collaboration between the NCA and the SFO by enabling the director general of the NCA to direct the director of the SFO when the NCA requires the assistance, skills and expertise of the SFO, and satisfactory arrangements cannot be made under the existing voluntary tasking of the arrangement.

[Edward Timpson (Eddisbury) (Con)]

Will my right hon. Friend give way?

[Tom Tugendhat]

I would be honoured.

[Edward Timpson]

It may be that my right hon. Friend will come on to this point, so I apologise in advance if he was going to, but I am just interested to know about the process for the NCA, given the workload that already exists for the SFO, its budget, its capacity, and also the prospects of a potential successful prosecution, when deciding whether to make a direction, so as not to overload the SFO and perhaps end up with less success as a consequence.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

My hon. and learned Friend raises some good points. I will come on to them in a moment, if I may, and I will just continue for now.

With the addition of the director of the Serious Fraud Office to the list of agencies that can be subject to directed tasking, the measure will strengthen the National Crime Agency’s ability to co-ordinate a national effort against serious and organised crime. It will also place the NCA’s relationship with the SFO on the same footing as its relationship with police forces in England and Wales and the British Transport police.

This change does not impact the existing working practices and arrangements in relation to Scotland and Northern Ireland. The National Crime Agency ensures that its activity within both jurisdictions takes full account of their specific and differing legislative, operational and political requirements while respecting the primacy of the respective police forces and prosecution authorities.

The Government’s aim, as set out in the recently published serious and organised crime strategy, is to reduce serious and organised crime in the UK. We will do that by disrupting and dismantling organised crime groups operating in and against the United Kingdom.

There is no doubt that the social and economic cost of serious and organised crime to the UK is eye-watering, running to at least £47 billion a year, but, extraordinary as that figure is, it does not begin to tell the whole story—a story of lives disrupted and of unimaginable suffering caused by heinous criminality such as sexual exploitation, drug abuse and human trafficking. Beyond the enormous financial and human costs, serious and organised crime threatens the legitimacy of the state. It damages our national security and prosperity. Our mission is to reduce the impact of serious and organised crime, including fraud.

The threat from fraud has increased in volume over recent years. The Government are implementing the fraud strategy, which includes launching a national fraud squad, blocking frauds at source and empowering the public to respond. That includes committing £100 million, as part of a wider £400 million package, to tackle economic crime and improve the law enforcement response to fraud. We have also set ourselves the target of reducing fraud by 10% from 2019 levels by the end of this Parliament. To help to achieve that target, in March the Home Secretary hosted the inaugural Global Fraud Summit to galvanise the international response and strengthen collaboration.

The National Crime Agency has been crucial to our response. It leads and co-ordinates the United Kingdom law enforcement response to serious and organised crime. We have strengthened the agency’s ability to combat organised criminals, increasing its budget by 44% to more than £870 million since the start of this Parliament—[Interruption.] That includes support to Canterbury. The Serious Fraud Office is also a critical partner in the fraud system; it has recovered more than £160 million in proceeds of crime, put 16 executives behind bars and forced big business to pay more than £1 billion in fines in the last five years alone.

The order forms part of the Government’s ongoing fight against economic crime, which causes significant harm to the United Kingdom. Subject to proper safeguards, it brings the investigative capability of the Serious Fraud Office’s work within scope for direction by the director general of the National Crime Agency, akin to the arrangement that already exists in relation to police forces in England and Wales. In practice, that means that, where it is assessed that improving the intelligence picture and/or the operational delivery is required as a priority to tackle a threat, decisions on voluntary and directed taskings are taken following discussion with the national strategic tasking and co-ordination group. To answer the question asked by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Eddisbury, that will effectively be taken forward as a joint effort between the DG NCA, as he is called, and the director of the SFO.

The order provides a welcome additional power that will assist in sharing tools and expertise to fight serious and complex fraud, bribery and corruption. The relationship between the National Crime Agency and Serious Fraud Office is already extremely good, and the existing voluntary tasking arrangements are working. The order provides the mechanism for directed tasking, should it be needed, and I commend it to the Committee.

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[Tom Tugendhat]

I welcome the hon. Member’s contribution to this debate and his good grace and approach. He raised some appropriate and some slightly more challenging questions than I wanted on the £47 billion. As a loyal listener to “More or Less”, as I am sure he is, I may have to look for further guidance on this. That is the inflation-adjusted figure from £37 billion. If he will forgive me, he is not quite right to say that adding the fraud stats into that will make a different figure. It may or it may not. Of course, fraud has replaced a lot of other crime types that would have been counted in earlier figures. I assure him that I will not make him wait until 2025. I will chase the figures and come up with a better answer for him as soon as possible. I will write to him on that.

The hon. Member’s point about thresholds is a good one. That will be looked at by the director general of the NCA in consultation with the director of the SFO. Clearly, the resources can be spent in many different areas all the time. We are always looking to prioritise the most important and most high-impact investigations—not necessarily the ones with the greater financial burden, but those that have the most pernicious effect on people’s lives, directly or indirectly. Resourcing is always a challenge, so the threshold will depend on the different circumstances. There is not a blunt answer. It is a more complex approach that the director general of the NCA and the director of the SFO have to look at.

On who will pay, the costs will be discussed between the SFO and the NCA and, if need be, between the Home Secretary and the Attorney General. The Attorney General has been extremely supportive and active in making sure the SFO has the resources for investigations. I am sure that approach will continue and be followed by whoever may replace her. She has been a fantastic champion of the SFO.

I hope the Committee will support this fantastic order. It will make a difference to the NCA’s ability to direct and co-ordinate criminal investigations, and it will ensure that we have security and the protection that the British people expect against fraud. It is part of a larger effort and a wider package. It is a strengthening measure, which I commend to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Draft Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) (Amendment, Surrender and Compensation) Order 2024

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Tuesday 23rd April 2024 General Committees

[The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)]

I beg to move,

That the Committee has considered the draft Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) (Amendment, Surrender and Compensation) Order 2024.

As always, it is a very great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Rees. The order before us today amends the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988 and adds “zombie-style knives” and “zombie-style machetes” to the list of prohibited offensive weapons. I will briefly set out the context. The Government have already taken robust action to address the menace of knife crime. Zombie knives were banned in England and Wales in 2016, followed by cyclone knives in 2019. Our legislation is stronger thanks to the Offensive Weapons Act 2019 and the Online Safety Act 2023, with further new measures contained in the Criminal Justice Bill currently going through Parliament. We have taken lots of measures in the non-legislative space too, not least the bolstering of our police forces with the recruitment of 20,000 officers. The numbers in London have not quite matched that target, but I hope the new Mayor, Susan Hall, will achieve it.

Nevertheless, as the public would expect, we keep our approach under review and will not hesitate when there is a clear and compelling case for further action. That brings me to the details of the order before us today. This legislation responds to concerns expressed by the police about the availability of certain types of machetes and large outdoor knives that do not seem to have a practical use and instead appear to be designed to look menacing. While zombie-style knives and machetes are fortunately used in a relatively low number of crimes, the police tell us that they are favoured by those who want to get hold of weapons for violent crime and to glamorise violence. Their appearance also creates fear in communities affected by knife crime. These weapons, which are advertised as collection items or as tools, can be purchased for as little as £10.

[Eddie Hughes (Walsall North) (Con)]

In 2023, I joined the campaign run by the Express & Star to ensure that these types of knives were banned. Surely, just these weapons being on sale, regardless of their described purpose, speaks volumes to the fact that we should not allow them to be available to anybody?

[Tom Tugendhat]

My hon. Friend makes it absolutely clear why his campaign is right and has been taken up by the Government. He has made the case so forcefully not just on behalf of his own constituents, but on behalf of the whole country. I am delighted to be here speaking on behalf of the Minister for Crime, Policing and Fire, my right hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), who would be championing this, but sadly has been otherwise detained.

Unlike more conventional knives and machetes, these weapons have no legitimate purpose. In our conversations with manufacturers and retailers, they have been clear that in their view, these articles are not designed as tools, but as weapons. Under section 141 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, it is an offence to possess, import, manufacture, sell, hire, offer for sale or hire, expose or possess for the purposes of sale or hire, a weapon specified in an order made under that section. A number of descriptions of weapons have been specified under section 141 and are therefore prohibited, including butterfly knives, knuckledusters, telescopic truncheons and certain types of swords with curved blades, commonly known as samurai swords.

Using the order-making powers in section 141(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, the Government wish to add “zombie-style knives” and “zombie-style machetes” to the list of offensive weapons to which section 141 applies. These weapons are defined as being a bladed article with a plain cutting edge, a sharp pointed end and a blade of over eight inches in length. The length was chosen in order to exclude knives designed for legitimate purposes such as many kitchen and outdoors knives. In order to be within the scope of the ban, the article should also have one or more of the features specified in new paragraph 1A, namely: a serrated cutting edge, more than one hole in the blade, spikes, or more than two sharp points in the blade.

Although it is right that we take the firmest possible action to prevent violence and stop dangerous weapons getting into the wrong hands, we are not seeking to criminalise law-abiding citizens. We are confident that the description of

“zombie-style knife or zombie-style machete”

does not include tools traditionally used in agriculture, farming, gardening or outdoor activities, nor indeed does it include my infantry sword.

We have included in the legislation defences to cover a range of circumstances, including where the article in question is of historical importance; made by hand; possessed, sold or imported for religious purposes; or was given as a gift by a Sikh to another person at a religious ceremony or other ceremonial event. Antiques are already exempt from section 141 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. We are also providing a defence for blunt items to protect the legitimate fantasy knives market, and we have taken the opportunity to extend this defence to curved swords.

There are a couple of further points to mention before I finish. First, parts 3 and 4 of the instrument provide for a surrender and compensation scheme through which owners of weapons in scope of the ban will be able to surrender them. Secondly, regarding territorial scope, the statutory instrument will apply only to England and Wales. We very much hope that the devolved Administrations in Northern Ireland and Scotland will take similar action to ensure that these dangerous knives are prohibited across the United Kingdom. To this effect, officials have engaged the Governments in Northern Ireland and Scotland.

If these dangerous knives remain available, there is a risk that they will be used in violent crime or to intimidate or cause fear. That is not a risk this Government are prepared to tolerate, nor is it one that my hon. Friend the Member for Walsall North would accept. As we have shown again and again, we will always act to protect our communities and keep the public safe. That is why we are introducing this order, which I commend to the Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

I thank the hon. Member for Nottingham North for his speech and for the tone with which he has approached the debate. He has been a good friend for many years and has championed many aspects of this work. It has been very much a cross-party effort, and I am grateful for his approach.

I am also grateful that the hon. Gentleman highlighted the pain that, sadly, families face in so many areas. I am sure he welcomes, as I do, the fall in violent crime in the United Kingdom over the past year: it is down 14%, which is a huge achievement not just for the Home Office, but for police forces across our country. That fall in England and Wales is a tremendous achievement that we should welcome.

The hon. Gentleman asked a fair question about ninja swords. While concerns have been raised, and while those types of swords have been used in crime, we have looked carefully at whether to extend the ban to a wider range of swords. Ninja swords that have the features set out in legislation will of course be banned, but those that do not have such features will not be. We have focused our action to date on the types of weapon that the National Police Chiefs’ Council has raised as being of particular concern, namely zombie-style weapons. However, we will keep the legislation under review and will be looking at what more we can do in the area if the police tell us that they have evidence that such swords are increasingly being used in crime.

We need to strike the right balance. Large sections of the public own modern swords as collectable items, and many of my former comrades own their regimental swords and keep them at home. They are not bladed weapons in the usual sense, but blunt ceremonial items. They are prized by members of the family, and many of them have been in the family for generations. We need to ensure that we craft the law in the right way to prevent harm and remove the danger that too many families have sadly faced, but that at the same time we respect people’s right to keep ceremonial or public items that are not of concern to the police. That is an important balance to strike, and we are listening very carefully to the police.

The hon. Gentleman is right that the compensation is £10 per item. A person claiming that the value of their item is higher will have to provide evidence, and the Home Office will assess their claim. That is why there may be a slight discrepancy. I am happy to write to the hon. Gentleman if he would like me to go through the details.

Question put and agreed to.

Oral Answers to Questions

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Monday 15th April 2024 Commons Chamber

[Tim Loughton (East Worthing and Shoreham) (Con)]

3. What recent assessment he has made with Cabinet colleagues of the level of the security threat from China.

[The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)]

I thank my hon. Friend enormously for raising this question. Let me be clear that the hostile activity we have seen from Chinese authorities and state-affiliated groups poses a serious threat to the security and wellbeing of the British people and to our partners and allies across the world. The Deputy Prime Minister came to this Chamber last month to speak about the pattern of malign activity, including the targeting of our parliamentarians and two malicious cyber-campaigns by Chinese state-affiliated actors. We must never be afraid to stand up for ourselves and to call out this kind of activity that has targeted both my hon. Friend and me.

[Tim Loughton]

Mr Speaker, may I add my personal condolences to you on the loss of your father?

I say to my right hon. Friend that we had the scandal of the hacking of MPs’ email accounts back in March and we subsequently learnt that the FBI informed our Government—as well as foreign Governments who had legislators who were affected—about these incidents two years ago. Why has it taken two years for us to be told about a serious security breach? Will he now, with his colleagues in Cabinet, make sure that China is absolutely treated and labelled as a threat, not just an “epoque-defining systemic challenge”, and everything is done urgently to put China in the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme?

[Tom Tugendhat]

My hon. Friend, who has given this House and our country exceptional service over many years, and who will sadly be standing down at the next election, has again made some strong points. On the first, he knows the language that I use and he has heard the words I have said. The reality is that we face threats from around the world, and many of them sadly are emerging out of Beijing today. We know it, we have seen it, and many of us in this House feel it. It is not something we are shying away from. The reality, however, is that there are many different ways of answering it. He has raised an important aspect on FIRS, which of course is being looked at, but he will have heard the words of the Deputy Prime Minister in this Chamber only a few weeks ago and how clearly he made himself heard.

[Sir Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

I am sorry, but I am not convinced by the Government’s attitude on this. When the Deputy Prime Minister came to see us a few weeks ago, he did not say anything new; he announced things about events that happened two years ago. The Security Minister himself knows of attempts by the Chinese Government to undermine the work of the Foreign Affairs Committee of this House. Why are we only ever told about things that happened years ago? If we are to take these issues seriously, we surely have to have an up-to-date and present account of the activities of the Chinese state.

[Tom Tugendhat]

The hon. Member will well know that, when there is a reason to act quickly and draw something to the attention of the House, we do, as was the case with Christine Lee, which he will remember involved the payment of money to a certain Member of this House. The reason we took that action was because we needed to expose it fast.

[Mr Speaker]

I call the shadow Minister.

[Dan Jarvis (Barnsley Central) (Lab)]

The Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner said last year that our policing and security services were technologically vulnerable because of their use of Chinese-made equipment, including CCTV, drones and body cameras. Can the Minister say whether the digital asbestos of Chinese-made technology is still used in our policing and security infrastructure—yes or no?

[Tom Tugendhat]

My friend the hon. Member will know well that the work of Fraser Sampson before he retired or ended his mandate last year has been fantastically important to many of us in making sure “digital asbestos” —I approve of the term—is got out of our institutions. This is something that is ongoing. It has got out of the most secure sites already, but there are other areas where there is work to do, because an awful lot of sites bought technology that would now be problematic. It is not just static sites; there is potential that some electric vehicles could be easily turned into mobile intelligence-gathering platforms by hostile states, so it is about looking not simply at the past, but at the future.

[Henry Smith (Crawley) (Con)]

4. What recent progress his Department has made on returning illegal migrants to their home country.

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[Dr Lisa Cameron (East Kilbride, Strathaven and Lesmahagow) (Con)]

T7. This Government champion fantastic animal welfare standards. My constituents would like to see alternatives to animal testing wherever possible, and would be keen to hear a vital update from the Department.

[The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)]

Given that interest is about to switch in this House to a different matter, I will be brief. I promise to write to my hon. Friend on this, but she should know that this Government have already doubled spending on finding alternatives to animal testing. We will continue to make sure that the inspection regime is as strict as possible, to make sure that when animals need to be used, the conditions are as humane as possible.

[Justin Madders (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab)]

T5. Will the Home Secretary tell us what level of auditing there will be of the hundreds of millions of pounds being sent to Rwanda? In particular, will he guarantee that no UK taxpayers’ cash will, either directly or indirectly, be used to fund the M23 militia in the Democratic Republic of the Congo?

Investigatory Powers (Amendment)Bill [Lords]

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 25th March 2024 Commons Chamber

[Dan Jarvis]

I know that the hon. Member takes these matters incredibly seriously, and he has raised an important point. To be absolutely fair to the Minister and to his Department, I know that this is a matter that the Government have considered very carefully, and that there has been an extensive process of consultation with a range of tech companies—I have met a number of them myself—but I think it only fair to conclude that while of course there are important contributions to be made by tech companies to this debate, these are ultimately matters for the Government and the House to determine. Having said that, new clause 2 would provide a helpful and constructive mechanism for the Government, and we have tabled it in a genuine attempt to be helpful and to monitor very closely the significant challenges that our national security faces from serious and organised crime as a consequence of rapid developments in technology.

[The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for the spirit in which he has addressed this issue, and he deserves a proper response. There is a valid concern that this is a process of engagement with tech companies, and there needs to be a partnership. I will be frank with him: I do not support new clause 2, for the very simple reason that the way in which this interaction takes place has evolved a lot, even in the two years that I have been in post. I suspect that during the four or five years that this House will supervise the Bill, under the next Government and in the five years beyond that, the interaction will evolve again.

What concerns me is that we could write into law a system of oversight and regulation that does not properly address the way in which tech companies are involved in this area. Therefore, the best answer is to have a more iterative process, which I have no doubt the fantastic civil servants with whom I have the privilege to work will adapt. Whoever takes over from me in 20 or 30 years’ time will no doubt want to iterate that as well.

[Dan Jarvis]

I am grateful to the Minister for clarification on the response to new clause 2. He understands that we have tabled it because we genuinely think that it is a mechanism that—let us be honest about it—would not be particularly onerous for the Government, and would be helpful in focusing minds across Government. I completely agree with the point he made about his civil servants, who have been excellent throughout the passage of the Bill. We just happen to differ on this issue, because the Opposition think that the new clause would provide a useful forum for the Government to consider the challenges. He is absolutely right about the rapid evolution of technology, and we think it would be no bad thing to condense Government thinking into a report that would be issued on an annual basis.

[Dan Jarvis]

That is a very important point, and I completely agree. These are complex and difficult matters of public policy, and I completely understand that none of this is easy from the Minister’s perspective. However, if the right hon. Gentleman does not mind my saying so, his point strengthens the case for new clause 2, because we think it would provide a useful mechanism for the Government to track the development of these important matters, but also provide a mechanism for Members of this House to hold the Government to account on them. I am very grateful for the points he has made.

Before turning to amendment 24 on BPDs, which stands in my name, I would be very grateful if the Minister could say whether any progress has been made on arrangements to notify the Investigatory Powers Commissioner when adding new BPDs to existing category authorisations. It might not be in the Bill, but we think that even a reference to it in the IPC’s annual inspection would be helpful progress on this matter. The Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham and I have discussed that, and I would be grateful if the Minister could said something about it.

I acknowledge the amendments on BPDs that were tabled by the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East (Stuart C. McDonald). Both of our parties have concerns about the definition of “low or no expectation of privacy” for BPDs, which we debated in a pretty constructive fashion on Second Reading and in Committee. However, Labour does not oppose the concept of “low or no expectation of privacy” for BPDs, which is why we will not support amendment 7, which was tabled by the SNP spokesman. Instead, amendment 24, which stands in my name, seeks further clarification on how “low or no expectation of privacy” will be applied to BPDs, with the aim that the parameters must be as clear as possible for the House to understand.

In Committee, the Minister used the Panama papers as an example of leaked and widely republished material being defined as a BPD with a low or no expectation of privacy. I understand why the Minister chose to use that example, but most other leaked documents containing personal information do not attract anywhere near the same level of media attention. Again, I would be grateful if the Minister took this opportunity to provide another example of information from a leak without widescale press coverage that would be suitable for the designation of a bulk personal data set with a low or no expectation of privacy.

[Tom Tugendhat]

As always, the hon. Gentleman is quite right to highlight the areas I touched on. The important thing about the Panama papers was that they changed. They would have enjoyed a high level of privacy, but with republication they became “low/no”. It would not be right to say that any leaked document enjoys “low/no”, but the law should reflect the reality of the data that is currently being held. When data goes from being secret to being effectively public, it would be absurd to hold the intelligence services to a different standard from that which would apply to any of us, who would be able to access it on a website.

[Dan Jarvis]

That is a very useful clarification, and I thank the Minister for it.

--- Later in debate ---

Amendments 21 and 23 get to one of those points that irritates me. It is like a war of attrition with this Government—they cannot be seen to back down on anything or allow anyone else any victory, no matter how small. The code of practice says that once the designated Secretary of State has authorised something, the Prime Minister “should” be informed of any decision made under the alternative approval process as soon as reasonably practicable. It does not say “will” be.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I very much hope the right hon. Gentleman has brought Lord West’s smelling salts with him, because I would like to clarify the concession that Lord West got in the Lords here in the Commons. I can happily commit to strengthening the language on notification requirements in the code of practice, when it is formally brought forward in due course, to require that the Prime Minister “will” be notified of any decisions under the alternative process, rather than “should” be.

[Mr Jones]

I welcome that, but can I hear it again and pin the Minister down a little more? I am sure it is a massive victory, but is he giving a solemn pledge to the House that the code of practice will remove the word “should” and insert the word “will”? Is that what he is agreeing to?

[Tom Tugendhat]

Yes.

[Mr Jones]

Victory at last—there is such power in changing one word. The Minister has given a solemn undertaking on the Floor of the House that the code of practice will change the word “should” to “will”. A small victory for the ISC, but I am sure my colleagues will take it in the spirit in which it is offered. I say to the Minister gently that we could have agreed that the other day when we met, but no doubt the issue that we will be voting on tonight was concentrating his mind.

With that great victory under my belt and those of the members of the ISC, I turn to other amendments. New clause 3, in the name of the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden, deals with

“cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment”.

I understand why he has proposed the new clause. It is always worthwhile debating the issues, which run through the entire Bill. Am I assured that there are processes in place that protect our civil liberties? Yes, I am. However, there are occasions when things can go wrong or people ignore them. I think they have been strengthened greatly, but the right hon. Gentleman refers to an important point. I was on the Committee in 2017 when we did the inquiry into detention and rendition. That took a long time, but it was a good report given where it got to. It unearthed things that were not pleasant but had been done in our names as a democracy.

One conclusion the Committee came to was that in its view the UK tolerated actions and took others that were regarded as inexcusable. Well, they were inexcusable, because as the report outlined, we passed on information to allies who then used it. I think things have changed, and to give Members an example of how the ISC can improve things, we called for a review of the consolidated guidance surrounding the way that security operatives should operate regarding issues of rendition or torture. That led to the Fulford principles, which I think have moved on and tightened up the rules and guidance for members of our security services. That was a big movement forward.

I do not think the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden will push the new clause to a vote, but it reinforces the point that if we have a situation whereby, again, we get information that is passed to one of our allies, we must ensure that those principles are upheld. Am I confident that they are upheld now? I think I am, but how did we get to that pretty damning report in 2017? We got there because those principles and the guidance in place were not followed. We must be vigilant about that, and over the years the right hon. Gentleman has done not only this House but the country a service through his tenacity on these subjects.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jones]

I agree, but that then places an unnecessary burden on the system. The current process with the Secretary of State, the judicial commissioner and the Prime Minister is robust enough to ensure that people are not doing this to find out what someone ordered on Amazon Prime this weekend or to look at their Tesco account, so I think those assurances are fine.

New clause 4 would

“remove the ability of the Secretary of State to authorise the interception of the communications of, or the obtaining of communications intended for, or private information belonging to, Members of Parliament.”

Again, it is good to have this debate, but I would support such a measure for the reasons I have outlined.

The other change in the Bill concerns bulk data. The right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings covered the original investigatory powers in detail, but there are now big data sets held not only by public authorities but by others, and that has made it more important that our security services are able to access them. Whenever we do this, however, it means more intrusion, so let me deal with the issue of oversight in the Bill, and with the broader, more intrusive powers to obtain internet connection records for the discovery of targets.

Again, that is something that I and other ISC members totally support, but the authorisation process is internal. One stance that the ISC has taken throughout all this is that if we are to give more powers to our security services, there must be a balance. There will not be a situation whereby what people have seen can be identified, but this power will drag in a lot of people who, as the right hon. Gentleman said earlier, are completely innocent. As I said, there is a need for such a power, but we thought there should be more oversight from the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. Therefore, the points I made about amendment 15 are important.

The Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office does a great job of ensuring public support for what we do, but, again, there is an issue around bulk datasets. Some of the examples that were given to ISC members—thanks must go to the Minister, who arranged a meeting for the Committee to be briefed on this—make sense when it comes to the issue of low or no reasonable expectation of privacy. It is burdensome, for example, to access the electoral register, but today the Government have said that somehow that is a secret document. Well, that is not the case under this Bill, in which case it is important that the security services should be able to use it, rather than having to go through the warrantry process. That goes to the point, which my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley Central raised earlier on, about the definition of “low expectation”.

Another perfectly legitimate reason that the security services need these measures is related to testing new AI models of learning. They need access to these new big datasets, which are out there and which companies use, and the Bill will allow them to have it without going through the warrantry system. If intelligence is going to be on the front foot when it comes to AI, we will have to have these big datasets that will teach the systems how to do it.

The problem comes back my hon. Friend’s question of what is deemed a low or no reasonable expectation of privacy. That is something we have considered throughout this process. One thing the ISC has considered is adding to the existing categories. One suggestion we put forward was that, when the agencies do this, they should have to email the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to notify them that they have done it.

[Tom Tugendhat]

rose—

[Mr Jones]

I hope the Minister is not going to intervene again. My legs might get wobbly if I have to sit down again. I might even need some smelling salts. He has explained the internal system, which I am quite satisfied with, but as I said to him and his civil servants—I think other members of the ISC have also said this—it is not us that he has to convince, but the public.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I thank the right hon. Member for giving way. I just want to assure him that I have taken on board his points. I went back to the agencies and assured myself of the challenge that he had raised and found what I think is a better answer than the one we looked at when we were chatting. I wrote to Sir Brian Leveson and I am delighted to say that he responded, confirming that he will pay specific oversight to this regime in the early years until he is content that it operates in the way that the ISC, the Government and the British public would expect. IPCO has taken on this responsibility, which, I think, answers the question more succinctly than it would be if it were included in the Bill.

[Mr Jones]

Well, I shall take that as half a victory.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Take them where you can get them!

[Mr Jones]

May I just get some clarity? That is a perfectly legitimate way of doing it, and it will mean not interfering with the existing system, which was the concern of both the services and the Minister. I understand that this not as simple as an email being sent. Will that mean that there will be a section looking at this issue in the first annual report? If that is the case, we could at least say to the public that it is actually being considered and the promise is being followed up.

[Tom Tugendhat]

The right hon. Member will understand that IPCO is operationally independent, so I will not instruct the office or speak for Sir Brian, who has been unbelievably rapid and helpful in his response today. I am sure that he will have heard the comments that the right hon. Member made and, no doubt, will want to draw attention to any areas where he has any doubts at all.

[Mr Jones]

That would be helpful. That would give reassurance to the public and provide a test of how the system works. As I have said, I am comfortable with the process of authorisation, but the public must be comfortable with it as well.

[Mr Jones]

I understand where the right hon. Gentleman is coming from. Our original idea about having an email was explained when I met the Minister and his civil servants. I think that that would really cut across some of the processes that we have in place. The suggestion that has been made would be one way of doing it, but IPCO already has the powers to look at such things. The only problem with doing that is that we would then have to set up someone in the agencies to produce another report. I do not want to do anything that holds up their work, and I think that that might do it.

Possibly the Minister’s suggestion of how Sir Brian Leveson is going to do it will give the public some reassurance. Let us not forget that Sir Brian has the power to take action if things are not being done correctly. If we read his reports, we can see that he is not fearful of doing these things. A fair compromise has been put forward. I think we have one and a half victories so far—

[Tom Tugendhat]

I think it’s two.

--- Later in debate ---

Turning to communications data and the way that will be dealt with, and the additional bodies that will have access to some powers that have previously only been in the hands of a very few, could the Minister clarify that in respect of local authorities, this will not be a permissive power? There are times when local government in its regulatory role will be working with the police, dealing with very serious and organised crime—I am thinking of licensing, trading standards and so on, for example. Where serious criminals can be involved in matters that pertain to the functions of local authorities, I accept that there are some cases in which they should have those quite extensive powers, but one would not want to think that every parish council in the land would enjoy the same legal powers as the SIS or MI5.

[Tom Tugendhat]

rose—

[Sir John Hayes]

The Minister is going to satisfy me immediately, it seems.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I will satisfy my right hon. Friend immediately and, I hope, save him time in his speech. Local authority trading standards teams are responsible for a range of legislation where enforcement requires investigation and may need to draw on communications data. The idea is that the powers in this Bill will be in keeping with those powers, not for them to be expansive, so my right hon. Friend is right: it is for serious crimes, as has already been set out.

[Sir John Hayes]

That is excellent—it helps, because the schedule associated with that part of the Bill does not make that explicit. I hope that the Minister, having given that binding assurance to the House, will reinforce it in the explanatory notes associated with the Act and in the code attached to it.

[Tom Tugendhat]

indicated assent.

[Sir John Hayes]

I am seeing the Minister nodding. He might want to say a word or two more when he sums up.

[Sir John Hayes]

The Minister may want to intervene on me again to do exactly what the right hon. Gentleman has suggested.

[Tom Tugendhat]

On the grounds that it will save me time when I wrap up at the end of the debate, I will make it clear now. His Majesty’s Treasury is responsible for civil enforcement of financial sanctions regulations, and some information that is essential to carrying out its civil enforcement functions is now communications data, such as the timestamp on online banking transactions. His Majesty’s Treasury cannot currently use its information powers to compel that information to be provided by a telecoms operator, so to go back to the statement I made earlier, local authority trading standards teams are responsible for a range for legislation where enforcement requires investigation and may need to draw on communications data.

[Sir John Hayes]

That is very helpful and, I think, goes a fair way towards what I want to achieve. The Minister has therefore made clear that the power will not be permissive. If he uses those very words—forgive me for putting them into his mouth, Madam Deputy Speaker—that would also help. These are going to be rarely used, particular powers associated with regulatory or legal functions of local authorities, not permissively available to those local authorities at their whim. That is clear as crystal, is it not?

[Tom Tugendhat]

If my right hon. Friend will forgive me, I will use the words I am using. Those powers will be used as infrequently as we all hope they will be, but they will be used in keeping with the law as described. If the frequency increases, it will be because of the need to act; I am very cautious about saying that these crimes will disappear, and therefore the frequency will change. I am not willing to predict that criminality now.

[Sir John Hayes]

I entirely understand. I used the example myself of trading standards: in Lincolnshire, we have an issue with the sale of illegal cigarettes that has become not a trivial matter, but one of organised crime. It is not restricted to my county or locality: it is a national problem, and it is of course an example of where a local authority, working closely with the police, might well need to use those powers. By the way, those local authorities will be working with other agencies too: because money laundering is involved, His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs might be involved, and so on and so forth. That is a good example of where those powers might be useful in catching very serious criminals indeed, but the word I wanted the Minister to use is that these powers are not permissive. He will understand what I mean by that, and I cannot see why that would present any problem at all, given the reasonable, sensible man he is.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I apologise to my right hon. Friend. These powers are not permissive in the sense that they are expansive: they are permissive only in the sense applied to them by this law, with the restriction of the powers that local authorities already have. They are not to be used in any way other than as set out very clearly in the Bill.

[Sir John Hayes]

I think that is helpful. The Minister will remember that when we debated the original Bill that became the Investigatory Powers Act, one or two newspapers used the term “the snoopers’ charter”, and images were used of local authorities using those powers to investigate people’s rubbish to make sure they were recycling properly, for example. I do not want to add unnecessary levity to our consideration tonight, because we are dealing with very serious matters indeed, but the Minister will understand how that kind of misunderstanding—indeed, misinformation—could do far more harm than good.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Again, just to clarify for my right hon. Friend, this Bill offers no greater expansion than his own Bill did in 2016. In the same way he ensured that Bill was no snoopers’ charter, I assure him that this one is not either.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

rose—

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir John Hayes]

Yes, exactly. The right hon. Gentleman has put it very clearly, and the sense of what the Minister has said has reassured me that it is not the Government’s intention to extend those powers beyond the very strict legal limits associated with the kind of organised crime that he and I have both cited. For me, that is considerable progress. The right hon. Gentleman spoke earlier about half a win; I think that is three quarters of a win, at least. For that reason, I feel that I can move on to my next request of the Minister.

We spoke earlier about IPCO, and its role and association with Government. As the Minister will know and as the right hon. Member for North Durham referred to, this legislation provides for a report to be made available to the ISC on an annual basis. There has been some concern that that report might be rather different from the one that is made available to Ministers and others, and my anxiety is that it should not be different. All that it should exclude is current operational matters; nothing else should be excluded from what my Committee considers, and clearly, it needs to be the same as what IPCO gets. We cannot have three or four different reports.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I can give my right hon. Friend that assurance.

[Sir John Hayes]

That is a 100% win. It is not half a win or three quarters of a win; it is just a win. So we are making huge progress tonight, partly due to the diligence of the members of the ISC and other Members of this House, including the official Opposition, but largely due to the reasonableness of the Minister. He is a listening figure, and he is growing in stature and reputation as a result. I am delighted that the Minister has agreed to the fourth of my requirements.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jim Shannon]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his intervention. I share those concerns, but I wish to put on the record my concern for my constituents in relation to how the changes are interpreted and how they will affect people.

I will give the last sentence of the quotation from the Computer & Communications Industry Association:

“They could risk deterring investment in improving service for UK consumers and contribute to a sense that the UK is not a safe market in which to invest.”

Those are the four tech companies, and the questions are on the record—I put them in Hansard—so that perhaps the Minister can give me an answer. Will he outline what mitigations are in place for the matters affecting those four companies in order to secure the tech industry’s place in the fabric of our lives in the United Kingdom?

I am pleased that the Minister has accepted amendment 23, which was tabled by the right hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones). The Democratic Unionist party was minded to support that amendment, but, because it has been accepted, we will not need to do so.

While I am aware of valid concerns, I am also aware of the need for this Bill, which the gallant Minister will know about better than most in the House. He served in Northern Ireland, so he understands the implications for us in Northern Ireland and the lives that we have led for some years. I was a part-time soldier in the Ulster Defence Regiment and in the Territorial Army for 14 and a half years. I have been a recipient of security intelligence and know how it can save lives. I am here today because of intelligence, which found out what the IRA’s intentions were. That is a fact. That has affected not just me; over the years, the intelligence services have saved the lives of other hon. and gallant Members. I have many friends who served and who are alive today because of the intelligence service or the Security Service. I had many other friends who unfortunately are not alive today; I remember them as well, so I do.

We must remember that the whole objective of the Bill is to keep us safe, to keep us secure and to ensure that our lives with our families can continue. I do hope that a balance has been struck, as the Minister outlined, because freedom is a prize worthy of getting it right. I know that the Minister wants to get it right, and I want it to be right. Madam Deputy Speaker, you want it to be right as well. Let us do it and get it right tonight.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Right hon. and hon. Members will be delighted to hear that, having answered colleagues as we went along, I have only a few short words to conclude. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear!”] I know how to keep them happy.

Amendments 3 to 6 to clause 14 concern the restoration of specified public authorities’ general information powers to secure the disclosure of communications data from a telecommunications operator by compulsion. I pay tribute and thanks to my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes). I hope that Members will have noticed that I have listened carefully to Members across the House, and I believe that this Bill has been pulled together carefully alongside the Intelligence and Security Committee. It is a slight shame I cannot thank the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis) in person, who is sadly at a funeral today. He has played an important role in contributing to and leading the engagement of which I have had the advantage in preparing this Bill.

Let me quickly touch on one or two points. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright) spoke about notices. It is important to note that the notices do not block innovation. They do not stop a technical patch or infringe on companies’ ability to update their systems. All they do is make sure that the existing level of access remains while that is being looked at. That is a reasonable element to ensure that the British people are kept safe by the British law enforcement authorities.

[Sir Jeremy Wright]

I understand what my right hon. Friend is saying, but the practical consequence of issuing such a notice is that the development of the product about which concern has been expressed has to stop. Therefore, the infringement on commercial liberty, in practice, is exactly what I have described, is it not?

[Tom Tugendhat]

If my right hon. and learned Friend will forgive me, I will be able discuss that in a more secure environment, but I can only say, “Not necessarily.” I will be able to describe why that is in a different environment, but I cannot do it here.

The reason for not accepting amendments 22 and 23 —I understand the points made by right hon. and hon. Friends and Members across the House—is that we are talking about a very limited number of people. One Secretary of State is already used to do the initial request. The second person on the triple lock is a judicial commissioner—a judge. The third therefore has to be one of the four Secretaries of State left. Therefore, it is important that we make sure that it is somebody in whom the Prime Minister has confidence. Given that we are about to have a new Government—I hope the new Conservative Government, but still a new one—it is entirely possible that there will be a new Cabinet and that the routine explanation will not be satisfactory. As routine duties do not have legal clarity, we will not use them.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

The Minister has used that argument before about new Secretaries of State, and it is complete nonsense, is it not? It would not happen on day one unless the Prime Minister suddenly got covid or was indisposed. By the time this came in, those three people would be there anyway. His argument is pretty weak.

[Tom Tugendhat]

The right hon. Member has made his point and I have made mine; I am afraid I will leave it there rather than continue. The ways in which we have been able to engage on the Bill has been incredibly supportive and helpful.

The removal of clause 15 from the Bill would prevent the intelligence agencies and the National Crime Agency from detecting some national security and serious crime threats, and those intent on committing child sexual exportation and abuse. Given the robust oversight of the regime in general, and the internet connection records in particular, we simply do not believe that this is in the best interests of the British public. Removal would benefit only those who threaten our safety and serve to make the work of the intelligence services and the NCA significantly harder as they seek to protect us and bring paedophiles to justice. The Investigatory Powers Commissioner already has the necessary powers to inspect and report on all parts of the CD regime. If the Investigatory Powers Commissioner wishes is to focus attention on condition D of the internet connection record, they have the power to do so. With those clarifications, I commend the Bill to the House.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

I beg to move, That the Bill be read the Third time.

I pay huge tribute to all the contributions from across this House, and particularly to my hon. Friend the Member for North Cornwall (Scott Mann), who whipped this through in exemplary fashion and will be delighted that since my appointment he has not had to take a Minister’s place on a Bill. He will also be grateful, along with me, to Lord Sharpe in the other place who has led on this Bill brilliantly, and taken us through with exemplary speed. I thank the hon. Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis), who has been a great friend for many years. We have now completed a Bill together, which really does bring us that bit closer. I also say an enormous thanks to Phoebe, Fintan, Francesca, James, Emer, Lucy x 2, Megan, Sophie, and Tom Ball, whose exemplary work in the Bill Committee has been fantastic.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

It is gratifying that we will get this Bill on the statute book, because it will give our security services the necessary powers to keep us all safe. I add my thanks to the staff of the Committee on which I and other Members served, and like the Minister I thank the civil servants who I have engaged with throughout the passage of the Bill. I also thank my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis) for his engagement on the Bill. The right hon. Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis) would have liked to have been here today. He has played an integral part not just in speaking about the Bill, but in his work on the ISC. As I said earlier, unfortunately he is at the funeral of Lord Cormack; the House will understand his reason.

As I said, the Bill will improve our abilities. Perhaps the Minister would also like to put on record his thanks to the ISC, which he forgot to do. It might have been a painful process at times, but can I give him some advice, possibly for the future? He may well have been able to solve some of these issues earlier in our discussions, and avoided keeping his colleagues here on a Monday night—[Interruption.] The Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities says from a sedentary position that that was impossible, but the Minister has agreed to our amendments.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I was going to do so!

[Mr Jones]

The Minister says that he was going to, but if he had done that last week we could perhaps have had very short discussions tonight.

Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Monday 25th March 2024 Written Statements

[The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)]

Section 19(1) of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 requires the Secretary of State for the Home Department, my right hon. Friend the Member for Braintree (James Cleverly), to report to Parliament as soon as reasonably practicable after the end of every relevant three-month period on the exercise of their TPIM powers under the Act during that period.

The level of information provided will always be subject to slight variations based on operational advice.