Investigatory Powers Bill

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Report: 2nd sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 7th June 2016 Commons Chamber

[Seema Kennedy]

I am afraid that I have to disagree with the hon. and learned Lady. Again, as I mentioned in an intervention, these bulk powers are absolutely crucial for our security and intelligence agencies. Let us remember that they are the only agencies that are allowed to use these powers. The reason is that some of these things are unknown. I do not want to sound like Donald Rumsfeld, but there are unknowns out there, and bulk powers are the way to deal with them.

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

My hon. Friend is making an extremely powerfully argument. Of course, one of the elements we constantly remind ourselves of when looking for terrorism or for these forms of abuse is that we are looking for a needle in a haystack. That is true, but without the haystack there is no possibility of even starting the search. These bulk powers are essential for building up that network in order to be able to search.

[Seema Kennedy]

I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention; he speaks with great experience.

Bulk powers are not novel. The powers already exist, but they are being given better oversight, scrutiny and transparency here. Some Opposition Members have spoken about the lack of necessity for these powers, but the necessity arises from an absolute obligation on our intelligence services to be as flexible and nimble as our enemies. Other Members, including my hon. Friend the Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Wendy Morton), have set out the operational necessity of bulk data collection. It is about collecting information on overseas targets and providing that first sift of information—like a haystack, as my hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat) mentioned—so that it is possible to drill down to the necessary data and discover new threats from people who were previously unknown and identify patterns of behaviour. That would then exclude innocent citizens and facilitate more targeted searches.

The effectiveness of collecting bulk data is borne out by the fact that it has been used in every major counter-terrorism operation in the past decade. It has prevented 95% of cyber-attacks and disrupted 50 paedophiles. It is clear that the UK does not undertake mass surveillance, first because of the existing legal framework in which the intelligence services already operate, and secondly because of resource constraints. I know that the Bill Committee heard evidence about that.

I want to speak briefly about the wrong hands argument to which the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) referred. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) quite rightly said that if we worried about the wrong hands everywhere, we would never pass any legislation. Only the security and intelligence agencies will be given the powers set out in the Bill. Those are people who have an interest in disrupting plots and bringing suspects to justice. Very little evidence is being brought forward to suggest that they are motivated by prying into innocent citizens’ private lives or that they use information wrongly. Millions of us, including all of us sitting here, handle sensitive data every day and are subject to rules, and to a large extent we obey that. Are we honestly saying that intelligence agents, having gone through rigorous vetting and appraisal, are less trustworthy than our bank managers, our GPs’ receptionists and our council officials?

The safeguards in the Bill pertaining to bulk powers are manifold and robust: the Secretary of State has to authorise bulk warrants; there is a double-lock authorisation procedure; the warrants are time-limited; there is a code of practice for the security and intelligence agencies on handling the data; and of course there is the review, which right hon. and hon. Members have expanded on at great length.

In conclusion, the proposed amendments would remove from the Bill the powers that are necessary for our security services to react to the evolving dangers that face our constituents today, here and now. Our security services do that while respecting our nation’s values. For that reason, I will oppose the amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen McPartland (Stevenage) (Con)]

I will speak to the amendments that stand in my name, amendments 153 to 160, which would remove clauses throughout the Bill that allow for the modification of bulk warrants. I will not press them because, like the rest of my amendments, they are probing amendments designed to tease out information from Ministers and ensure that there is further debate in the other place.

As I said in yesterday’s debate, I am not a lawyer, but in my humble opinion, major modifications of a warrant have the potential to completely change the key components of that warrant. I would like to understand at what point it becomes reasonable for a new warrant to be drafted.

I listened carefully to the Minister for Security yesterday and he said clearly to the House:

“I entirely accept the point that it would be completely unacceptable to have a robust system for issuing warrants and a less robust system for modifying them. Warranting has to be consistent throughout, and there can be no back-door way of weakening the process. That is not what the Government intend and not what we would allow.”—[Official Report, 6 June 2016; Vol. 611, c. 982.]

That is very reassuring and greatly welcome. I look forward to seeing how the robust system for modifications will be introduced as the Bill progresses. I accept that the Government have tabled a number of amendments to try to help in this area and, as I said, I will not press any of my amendments to a vote.

On a final point, I am not a particular fan of the bulk powers in the Bill. I have listened with great interest to the debates today and yesterday, and to the points that the Chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee has made about how bulk powers are used at the moment. In my view, surveillance should be targeted and the subjects of that activity clearly identified. That may well be naive in some senses, and I appreciate that there may be some areas where we require bulk powers, to identify the haystack, as has been said. But the carte blanche on bulk powers should not be the first resort; it should always be the last resort.

There has been a lot of talk about postbags, and whether the country is at war and so on. The debate in general has been very conciliatory and Members on all sides have tried to get a Bill that, at the start of this Parliament, was very difficult to a place where most people can stomach most elements of it. I am still not in a position where I feel I can support it, but, realistically, a lot of people now feel it has been greatly improved and there is a lot of trust in the Minister for Security and the Solicitor General because of their work in listening to people and accepting amendments.

I am also very grateful that the Home Secretary has tried to alleviate concerns and agreed to an independent review of the bulk powers in the Bill, led by David Anderson, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. I look forward to his recommendations and what comes forward from them.

[Tom Tugendhat]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Madam Deputy Speaker, particularly as you are appropriately attired in something that may indeed be collecting bulk data.

We are talking about amendments that would fundamentally undermine the very Bill that we have come to support, and would change the very tone of the debate. I speak very much in support of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), who has gone through various aspects in quite significant detail, explaining to us time and again why the controls over the collection of bulk data are entirely appropriate. I also speak in support of the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer), who has been through the Bill with the eye he has as a former Director of Public Prosecutions, seeing both the loopholes and the potential abuses, and covering them off.

I also speak in support of the Solicitor General, who has done exactly the same for us, and the Minister for Security, who has brought forward a Bill that answers the very questions that this state must always ask itself: how we guard our citizens and keep them safe while also keeping them free. This Bill does exactly that.

My first encounter with bulk data collection came in the constituency of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield, where the Defence School of Languages was sited. I was going through vast amounts of Arabic text. Although I was doing so in a most junior and rather ineffective manner, I learned how it was done properly. I was only a student; the masters have learned from that great Scots mathematician John Napier, who in the 17th century developed the logarithm, and whose lesson to us all, through mathematics, is how to build the pattern, understand the shape and break the code. That is why bulk data matter. We cannot build patterns without data and without volume, and we cannot make shapes without substance.

The bulk data are not themselves intelligence. As an intelligence officer in Her Majesty’s armed forces I was very proud to work on intelligence. It is not the raw product. It is what is analysed, what is useful and what decisions can be made from. That is not the bulk or the mass—the intelligence is the product. I am sorry to say that there appears to be a slight misunderstanding as to what is the intrusion. The intrusion is surely not the clay from which the form is made, but only the detail on the individual that could be used against them. The Bill does not allow that without the tightest of safeguards, both from former judges and from serving Ministers.

[Joanna Cherry]

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that once the bulk data are collected by warrant there is an intermediate stage in which they are analysed in the way that he describes, but there is absolutely no legal regulation of how that analysis is carried out? That is our objection. How can I make it any clearer?

[Tom Tugendhat]

The hon. and learned Lady speaks with her usual eloquence, but I am afraid I am going to refer her to schedule 4, part 1, which is a table containing a list of authorities and officers. The people who analyse are listed there. They are inspectors and superintendents of the Prison Service; lieutenant commanders and commanders of the Royal Navy; majors and, as in my case, very junior lieutenant colonels of the Army; squadron leaders and wing commanders; general duties officers of grade 4 and above; and Secret Intelligence Service officers.

There is a list—a catalogue—in schedule 4 of people in our country, men and women across these islands, whom we have trusted with the intelligence procurement for our nation to keep us safe. It is they who will be doing the analysis, under supervision. It is only when they have got something that is worth taking that they will be allowed to use it. That is the provision we are talking about and the type of supervision. People will not be allowed simply to collect and analyse. They will be allowed to collect and analyse only under warrant. That is absolutely essential.

[Joanna Cherry]

I repeat again: does the hon. Gentleman accept that no warrant is required to carry out the initial computer analysis? Does he understand that that is what those of us who were on the Bill Committee and who have worked on the Bill for months uncovered? Unlike some of his colleagues, who shout from a sedentary position that we do not understand this, we do understand it—we have been analysing it for months. Does he understand that there is no regulation by warrant of the analysis carried out by the individuals that he describes? That is the nub of the matter.

[Tom Tugendhat]

The hon. and learned Lady is, I am afraid, picking on a hole in the Bill that is simply not there. [Interruption.] It is not there because the collection of bulk data is entirely categorised by the Bill. The Bill supervises entirely the ability to collect bulk data. The analysis is then done by trusted officers of the state. To accuse them of anything other than the highest forms of integrity would be an extraordinary statement to make in the House.

[Gavin Newlands (Paisley and Renfrewshire North) (SNP)]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Tom Tugendhat]

No, I am afraid I will not. I have given way enough.

It would be baffling to look at that list and accuse people of such integrity of having anything other than the best intentions. The important thing, however, is that we not only trust them, but supervise them. We trust but verify, as the old diplomatic phrase goes. The verification comes from the commissioners, which were listed yesterday, with their explanations, which the right hon. Member for Knowsley (Mr Howarth) was talking about yesterday. The supervision also comes from the Minister, and ultimately and eventually from the House.

I am therefore reassured that the Bill is not a snoopers charter or a grubby attempt to procure the information of the private citizens of these islands. On the contrary, this is an extremely effective Bill. It has been through months of discussion, and hours of detailed and deliberate interrogation. It has satisfied the extremely demanding standards of the Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee, and the exemplary work of the former Director of Public Prosecutions, the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras, whom I am pleased to see on the Opposition Front Bench.

The Bill comes to the House as a nigh-on complete work. Even so, the Government have considered and accepted amendments and further changes. We have not only a final but a polished copy of a Bill that is designed to do exactly what this country vitally needs. It does exactly what the Government are here to do. It keeps the people of these islands safe, whatever their background, origins, occupation or duties.

Fundamentally, it also protects the freedoms that we enjoy. Those freedoms are not, as the Americans put it, free. They are fought for every day, by the people on the list in schedule 4 that I have identified—our armed forces and our intelligence services. That is why I am so proud to be here today to speak up for the intelligence services who have asked for those powers; for the armed forces who require them; for the police who use them; and most importantly for the Government and, in this case, the official Opposition, who have so carefully crafted a legal document that will hold water today and for long into the future.

[Mr John Hayes]

What an interesting and important debate we have had. This group of amendments addresses bulk powers. It is right that we should consider these matters in considerable detail because, as has been said by Members from across the Chamber, they are matters of profound importance and public concern. The public want to be assured that the safeguards we put in place for these vital powers are right, adequate, properly considered and properly reviewed. Many hon. Members have contributed to the debate. Tellingly, the hon. Member for Belfast East (Gavin Robinson), my hon. Friend the Member for South Ribble (Seema Kennedy) and the hon. Member for Fermanagh and South Tyrone (Tom Elliott) spoke with personal experience of terror.

We all know the scale and nature of the threat we face, but though we know it, that does not mean that it should not be explored again and again in this House. For to explore it is to realise what we need to counter it. That is precisely what was done in speeches by hon. Members from all sides of the House. The threat is real, imminent and unprecedented in character. Our opponents are increasingly adaptable and flexible. Although their aims may be barbarically archaic, their means are up to date. They are entirely modern. They are prepared to use every device and every kind of communications medium to go about their wicked work, which is precisely why the Bill does what it does, why bulk powers matter and why the amendments that stand in the name of the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry), which I will deal with in a moment, are not ones I can accept—that will not come as any surprise to her, by the way.

An argument has been made that the operational case for bulk powers needs to be fleshed out more fully. Hon. Members will know that the Government did just that when they published the operational case for bulk. That informed the Committee consideration, which has been referred to several times during our short debate today, and has been a helpful way of establishing why bulk powers really count.

We are dealing with powers that have played a significant part in every major counter-terrorism investigation over the past decade, including in each of the seven terror attacks disrupted since November 2014. These powers enabled over 90% of the UK’s targeted military operations during the campaign in south Afghanistan, and they have been essential to identifying 95% of the cyberattacks on people and businesses in the UK discovered by the security and intelligence agencies over the past six months. My hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat) is right to say that this is about real life operational necessity. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Fareham (Suella Fernandes) on the role she played both on the Joint Committee and the Bill Committee. The threat she described so vividly is, as she said, worldwide and of a kind that would allow us to do nothing other than take the necessary steps to counter it in the defence of our freedoms.

I was perhaps a little unkind to the hon. Member for Glasgow North East (Anne McLaughlin) who spoke for the Scottish National party, although I make no apology for reprising what I said. Frankly, her contribution missed the point. The point is not whether the powers are necessary; it is whether we can put in place sufficient safeguards to ensure that they are used only when, how and where they should be. That was the point made by the Chair of the ISC and by the ISC when it had the chance to consider these matters. As the Chair of the ISC said, it then also had a chance to reconsider them, having been given further information of a secure kind—that is its function after all—and its members were persuaded that the powers were indeed necessary. It is right to have an informed, thoughtful debate about safeguards, checks and balances, and constraints, but we cannot have a grown-up debate about whether the powers count, because they are not new; they are existing powers. The Bill simply introduces additional safeguards, which I would have thought any reasonable Member would welcome.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Report: 1st sitting: House of Commons
Monday 6th June 2016 Commons Chamber

I will not press the issue too far, but there is a problem with using a judicial position to carry out oversight. I hesitate to say this, because I think that everybody who has spoken so far—with the possible exception of the right hon. Member for Chelmsford (Sir Simon Burns)—is a lawyer, but having served on the Intelligence and Security Committee for the last 10 years, my experience is that there is a sense in which—this is not a specific criticism of the commissioner himself—a long and distinguished legal career has certain consequences, one of which is that people are not used to having to explain themselves. Judges judge and give their verdict, but they do that without any explanation. There is a serious problem in that commissioners who were previously members of the judiciary are reluctant to explain issues that have been raised with them or issues of concern because that is not the habit they have evolved over a lifetime’s experience in the judiciary.

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

rose—

[Mr Howarth]

Having mentioned lawyers, I guess I have to give way to one.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I am no lawyer, but having sat at the table of a judge for many years, I can tell the right hon. Gentleman that judges are well used to explaining their judgments. Indeed, if one reads their judgments, one will normally find an explanation so detailed that it would torture the mind, so I would not be at all surprised to hear that the commissioners will be very ready to give an explanation.

[Mr Howarth]

I have to say to the hon. Gentleman that that is not my experience. The right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield, who chairs our Committee, gave a specific example of where someone was unwilling not only to explain themselves but even to engage with the Committee. That is why I support new clause 2, which gives the Intelligence and Security Committee the ability to refer a matter to the commissioner and to at least give them a nudge in the right direction in terms of concerns that need to be looked at.

I do not share the complete pessimism of the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West. The Bill has moved an incredibly long distance since the original draft Bill. There is some way to go, but we may hear further concessions today or tomorrow. However, I would be grateful if the issues I have raised could be addressed by the Minister when he replies.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Hammond (Wimbledon) (Con)]

I understand that you would like Members to be brief, Mr Deputy Speaker. I am not a lawyer and I was not a member of the Bill Committee, so I will be brief.

On Second Reading, I spoke about an issue that has not yet been discussed today: economic cybercrime, which I have spoken about frequently in this House. The Government’s amendments enhance our ability to attack it. Constituents write to us as Members of Parliament; my hon. and learned Friend the Member for South East Cambridgeshire (Lucy Frazer) has mentioned the huge number of privacy-related issues that have been raised, including the need to ensure that, if the Government were to interfere with the right to privacy, there would be proper oversight, safeguards and transparency. I do not need to re-rehearse her arguments, but I say to the Government and my right hon. Friend the Minister for Security that while new clause 5 may not be as perfect as those lawyers present would like it to be, it goes a long way towards satisfying the public.

I want to address two aspects of new clause 5. First, our constituents are interested in the issues covered by subsections (2)(a) and (4)(c). The onus is now on the need to consider less intrusive means and proportionality. That is an obligation. Notwithstanding my hon. and learned Friend’s comments about the need to understand the exact penalties for misuse, those two particular subsections go a long way to putting in place some protection.

Secondly, on economic cybercrime, we often talk about huge attacks on bank systems. New clause 5(2)(b) and (4)(b) relate to not just the public interest in detecting serious crimes, but the integrity and security of telecommunication systems and postal services. The reality is that there is a huge amount of low-level cybercrime that then moves into more serious economic cybercrime. By addressing the issue in the Bill, we are making a statement of intent. Given that there are so many e-commerce transactions today, it is hugely important that we protect and maintain the integrity of telecommunication systems, in the widest sense of the term, and postal services.

Whatever else may be, those of us who are not lawyers —we are not entirely sure what the difference is between new clause 21(2)(a) and (b), and new clause 5(4)(d) and (e), but I am looking forward to my right hon. and learned Friend explaining it—say “Well done” to the Government. New clause 5(2)(b) and 5(4)(b) protect all e-commerce, and putting the emphasis on maintaining the integrity of services, particularly telecoms services, will take away some of the public’s criticisms about the snoopers’ charter. The key points about subsections (2)(b) and (4)(b) are extraordinarily important, and I am pleased to see them in the Bill.

[Tom Tugendhat]

It is a great pleasure to speak on Report, particularly as the heirs of Walsingham and Egerton are on the Treasury Bench sitting in judgment over a Bill that will shape our civil liberties. In their day, Walsingham broke the code, and Egerton tried Mary, Queen of Scots. The techniques that they used are still in active use today, but they have been updated. It is a question no longer of codes on paper, smuggled out in brandy bottles, but of codes hidden in computer messages, apps and other forms of communication. That is why I welcome the Bill, which updates historical practice for the present day. It is essential that we put this into statute, because for the first time we are putting into a Bill what we actually mean. For years, the state has used interpretations of legal practice rather than setting out, and debating properly, what it should do. That is why I particularly welcome the joint approach to the Bill. The hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) has been instrumental in bringing a co-operative mood to the House, and I am grateful to him for doing so.

The Bill balances privacy against other considerations. As my hon. and learned Friend the Member for South East Cambridgeshire (Lucy Frazer) pointed out, privacy is a fundamental right of all British citizens, and one that we have enjoyed for many years. But that privacy is only worth anything if we can live in safety, not just from the obvious risk of terrorism but from the risks of child abuse, drug smuggling and other forms of violence against the people of this country. I am grateful for the fact that the Government have balanced that privacy against those threats.

I will leave it there, because there are many more amendments to come. I could address some of them in detail, and perhaps I will be called to speak again.

[Victoria Atkins]

I had the privilege of being a member of the Joint Committee and of the Bill Committee, so I feel as though I have lived with this Bill for many months. I will be happy to see it become law when that happens. This Bill is vital in the modern age, and it is above party politics. It is about doing the right thing for our country and for our constituents.

The Joint Committee and the Bill Committee scrutinised the Bill intensively, and I think we considered something like 1,000 amendments in the Bill Committee. I am happy to say that we managed, nevertheless, to find some areas of agreement, namely that it was necessary to introduce a Bill to set out the investigatory powers of the security services and law enforcement agencies, and to update the scrutiny and transparency of those powers and the people who use them. It is a credit to everyone, on both sides of the House, who supports the principle of the Bill.

I welcome, as others have done, new clause 5 and Government amendment 30, which will put all related criminal offences in the Bill. That will create transparency by making the misuse of these powers absolutely obvious. I want to look at two proposed new clauses that have not received the same level of scrutiny as the Bill has enjoyed; I shall endeavour to change that in the next couple of minutes. New clause 1— the notifying criminals clause, as someone remarked to me—raises grave concerns about our impact on fighting crime and terror. I am conscious that the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael), who tabled the new clause, is not his place. For anyone who has not read it, it would require the police and security services to notify, within 30 days of a warrant ending, anyone who has been investigated. There is no requirement for an error to have occurred, or anything of that nature. The only requirement is that someone’s data have been investigated.

[Victoria Atkins]

Very much so. That shows the time sensitivity of many investigations, and I am grateful to my hon. Friend for bringing it up. We know from evidence sessions in both Committees that 100% of counter-terrorism cases and 90% of serious organised crime cases involve communications data evidence. We are talking about very serious cases indeed. My concern about new clause 1 is that it in no way removes the risk that high-level criminals and terror suspects will be told that they have been investigated by law enforcement and the security services. Such people are more likely to be the subject of warrants because of their criminality, so we would be handing the investigations to those criminals on a plate.

[Tom Tugendhat]

The level of encryption available in public today is such that new clause 1 would allow criminals to hide the deeds that they had formerly left unhidden, and therefore it would expose the country to even greater threat.

[Victoria Atkins]

That is exactly right. My hon. Friend makes the point that I was about to make, in fact.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Oh, sorry.

[Victoria Atkins]

Not at all. [Interruption.] It has never stopped me before. The new clause will help criminals to evade investigation, arrest and prosecution. Serious organised crime gangs and terrorists talk to each other. They compare notes on investigative activities, whether ongoing or not. It will not necessarily be the first, second or third notification that starts to hint at the methodology of the police; it may be the 20th, but none the less those hints about patterns of behaviour will begin to emerge in the criminal world. Why on earth would this House pass legislation that would give serious organised crime gangs and terrorist gangs such an advantage?

Oral Answers to Questions

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Monday 11th April 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mike Penning]

I had those sorts of discussions when I was at the Department for Transport, and we continue to have them. Unlicensed, unauthorised and unsafe vehicles on the roads are a menace, and the police should use all the powers they have.

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

T8. The Investigatory Powers Bill, which is going through the House, provides important capabilities, along with new safeguards, to tackle cybercrime. Will Ministers update the House on how the changing nature of crime is being fought by the Bill?

[Mr John Hayes]

The motives of terrorists, paedophiles and people traffickers may differ, but their means are the same, and they take advantage of the internet. The Bill will provide the police and security services with powers that are necessary to keep us safe. Powerful new measures, steely determination and an iron will mark all that we do.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Tuesday 15th March 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mrs May]

I thank my hon. Friend for his comments. It is important that we have the balance right. Many people have said, “Just have judicial authorisation”, and some people still believe that the authorisation should be made by the Secretary of State. By having both, we do not lose democratic accountability, but we add the independent judicial authorisation.

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

Will the Home Secretary give way?

--- Later in debate ---

[Andy Burnham]

I think the Home Secretary has indicated that there would be, because her decision would be subject to the double lock, including judicial approval. My point is, why should the Prime Minister be only consulted by the Home Secretary as part of that process? It seems to me that there is a role for the Prime Minister finally to approve any such warrant, and I believe the Bill could be strengthened in that regard.

There is also the question of journalists. The National Union of Journalists believes that the Bill weakens existing provisions. Clause 68, which makes the only reference to journalists in the entire Bill, sets out a judicial process for the revelation of a source. Its concern is that journalists are wide open to other powers in the Bill. Given the degree of trust people need to raise concerns via the political, legal or media route, and given the importance of that to democracy, I think the Government need to do further work in this area to win the trust and support of those crucial professions.

Our second area of concern relates to the thresholds for use of the powers. The Bill creates a range of powers that vary in intrusiveness, from use of communications data and internet connection records at one end to intercept, equipment interference and bulk powers at the other end. There is a real concern that the thresholds for them are either too low or too vague.

Let us take internet connection records. The Home Secretary has previously described ICRs as “the modern equivalent” of the “itemised phone bill”, and the Government intend them to be made available on the same basis—that is, for the detection or prevention of any crime. The Joint Committee noted, however, that this is not a helpful description or comparison. ICRs will reveal much more about somebody than an itemised phone bill. They are closer to an itinerary, revealing places that people have visited.

The question for the House is this: is it acceptable for this level of personal information to be accessed in connection with any crime—antisocial behaviour or motoring offences, for instance? I do not believe it is, and I think a higher hurdle is needed. This is a critical point that the Government will need to answer if they are to secure wider public support for their Bill. People have legitimate fears that if ICRs become the common currency in law enforcement, much more information will be circulating about them, with the potential for it to be misused.

The Government need to tell us more about why they need this new power and they need to set a stricter test for its use—in connection with the prevention or detection of more serious crime or a serious incident such as a missing person, for instance. That is what I think the hurdle should be: serious crime rather than any crime, and I would welcome hearing the Home Secretary’s response on that point.

At the other end of the scale, the justification for using the most intrusive powers in the Bill is on grounds of “national security” or, as the Home Secretary said, “economic well-being”. While I understand the need for operational flexibility, there is a long-standing concern that those tests are far too broad. There is a feeling that “national security” has been used to cover a multitude of sins in the past. Let us remember that official papers from the domestic building workers’ strike in English market towns in 1972 are still being withheld on grounds of “national security”! How on earth could that possibly be justified?

[Tom Tugendhat]

The right hon. Gentleman is bringing up a point that relates to proportionality, but it strikes me as odd that he has rammed it home so strongly when the Bill itself mentions proportionality and the oversight of the Information Commissioner includes looking at proportionality. The right hon. Gentleman is going on and on about it, but it is actually in the Bill.

[Andy Burnham]

I do not believe it is. I put it to the hon. Gentleman that national security is a very broad term that is not defined in the Bill. The Joint Committee encouraged the Government to define it in order to give people greater security. As I have just said, activities have been carried out in the past under the banner of national security that I think he would struggle to justify as such.

The problem with the “economic well-being” test is that it potentially opens up a much wider range of activities to the most intrusive powers. The Bill states that matters of economic well-being must be only “relevant” to national security, not directly connected to it, as the Home Secretary seems to imply. This raises the issue of what extra activities the Government want to cover under this banner that are not covered by national security. A cyber-attack on the City of London has been mentioned, but surely that would already be covered by national security provisions.

Let me put two suggestions to the Home Secretary. First, I suggest that she accept the Joint Committee’s invitation to define “national security” more explicitly. Alongside terrorism and serious crime, it could include attacks on the country’s critical or commercial infrastructure. Secondly, if she were to do that, the economic well-being test could be dropped altogether. That would build reassurance among Opposition Members that there could be no targeting in future of law-abiding trades unionists, as we have seen happening in the past.

The third area of concern is with ICRs themselves—both their content and their use.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andy Burnham]

My hon. Friend has put it very well. It is a fact that trade unionists and other campaigners have been subject, over time, to inappropriate use of investigatory powers. If the Conservatives do not understand that, they need to go away and look into the issues. They need to get at the full truth about Orgreave and Shrewsbury, so that they can understand why some people who do not share their political views on life have a different feeling about legislation of this kind. If they did go away and do that, they would probably find that they could reassure people, and that there would be more public support for the Bill.

[Tom Tugendhat]

rose—

[Andy Burnham]

I am going to make some more progress now.

As I understand it, the intention of the authorities in building internet connection records is to list domains visited, but not uniform resource locators. There would not be a web-browsing history, as the Home Secretary said. The ICRs would show the “front doors” of sites that had been visited online, but not where people went when they were inside. That will give some reassurance to people who fear something more extensive, but the definition of ICRs in clause 54 remains extremely vague and broad. I see nothing that would prevent them from becoming much more detailed and intrusive over time, as technology evolves. The draft code of practice gives an illustration of what would be included, but it does not build confidence, as it acknowledges that information may vary from provider to provider.

It would help everyone if the Government set out a much stricter definition of what can and cannot be included in ICRs, and, in particular, specified that they can include domains but not URLs. The current confusion about ICRs is unhelpful and clouds the debate about the Bill. It needs to be cleared up.

As for the use of ICRs, schedule 4 sets out far too broad a range of public bodies that will be able to access them. It seems to me that the net has been cast much too widely. Is it really necessary for the Food Standards Agency and the Gambling Commission to have powers to access an individual’s internet connection record? I will be testing the Government on that. If there were a suspicion of serious criminality in respect of the food chain or a betting syndicate, surely it would be better to refer it to the police at that point. I must say to the Home Secretary that we shall want to see a much reduced list before this part of the Bill becomes acceptable to us.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andy Burnham]

I thank the hon. and learned Lady for the law tutorial. Her point may be one for Committee rather than Second Reading. However, I did refer to it earlier. The Bill uses the word “relevant”; it does not use the words “directly linked to national security”. She pulls a face, but I am sure that I speak for every Labour Member when I say that there is no room for ambiguity when it comes to these matters. The Government must be absolutely clear about what they mean. We have seen trade unionists targeted in the past on the basis of similar justifications, and we will not allow it to happen again.

[Tom Tugendhat]

The right hon. Gentleman wants the Home Secretary to draft a law that envisages every new provision, every change in technology, every change in crime and every change in threat over the next 50 or 100 years. The Home Secretary cannot do that and nor can the right hon. Gentleman, which is why the Home Secretary has instead introduced a system of oversight, proportionality and judicial checks and balances, in order to provide the flexibility that is necessary for our nation to have security in a changing world.

[Andy Burnham]

I disagree. I am making a legitimate point about which we feel strongly. I am saying that the most intrusive powers in the Bill should be strictly limited to national security. The hon. Gentleman has a different view, but I believe that serious crime and national security should be the strictly limited grounds on which the most intrusive warrants are applied for. I hope that he will approach the issue in a spirit similar to the one in which I have approached it: I hope that he will look into the concern that I have raised in more detail and try to understand why Labour Members feel so strongly about it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Owen Paterson (North Shropshire) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Walthamstow (Stella Creasy) and her interesting comments.

The Home Secretary and the shadow Home Secretary both, quite correctly, began by paying tribute to the prison officer from Northern Ireland who died today after a cowardly attack on 4 March. We should remember article 2 of the European convention on human rights:

“Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law.”

I respect the hideous difficulties Ministers have had in drafting the Bill, bringing together the conflicts between liberty and security. I fully understand that there are calls for improved scrutiny associated with greater powers. However, we must take great care to avoid damaging the effectiveness of operational decision making which protects our citizens. Effective operations rely on the capacity for operational agility in the face of ruthless and innovative opponents. After a decision has been made, I am firmly in favour of a more rigorous and rapid review process.

First, I would like to state that I regarded signing warrants as a key responsibility when I took over as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Sadly, there were elements in the republican community who would not accept the settlement we had inherited from the previous Labour Government and were determined to pursue their aims by terrorism. We rapidly reequipped various agencies at considerable public expense. I was fully aware that our security services, facing a deterioration in the security situation and a raised threat level, could operate efficiently only if decisions were made rapidly from the top. I made clear that I was always to be disturbed at any time if an urgent decision was required. The vast majority of warrants were signed in an orderly manner, in regular slots built into my diary; those slots were a priority. I was occasionally woken up very early in the morning and asked to make an extremely urgent decision. I am deeply concerned that the proposal to have a dual lock, involving endorsement by a commissioner, will bring an element of delay and confusion to effective operational decisions. I understand that there are calls for more accountability and scrutiny of these vital but necessarily confidential decisions, but I believe very strongly that only a democratically elected Secretary of State, who is ultimately accountable to the House of Commons, should make such decisions.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that the definition of “urgent” needs to be one for a Minister, not a judge, and that therefore there should be no possibility of later applications for judicial review of what is urgent?

[Mr Paterson]

Yes, I entirely agree that the whole decision should be in the hands of the democratically elected Secretary of State, responsible here, but by all means let there be the most rigorous and rapid review afterwards by a learned judge.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

This debate is very much about striking a balance between privacy and security, as I understand very well. Indeed, my father wrote the book on privacy, and it is now in its third edition—if anybody would like it, it is selling for about £200. However, I have spent much of my life working on the latter.

Security is very much at the heart of what I hope our Government are bringing to the nation—not just economic security but national security. This Bill goes a long way towards achieving that. I am extremely pleased, however, that it is grounded not just in that principle but in the principle of proportionality. Indeed, proportionality is mentioned 54 times in this Bill; it is very much at its heart. I am sorry that the right hon. Member for Leigh (Andy Burnham) missed that point.

The question of proportionality relates to the bulk data powers, which are about not simply collecting data on targets but protection. One of the points that has largely been missed, although my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk) raised it strongly, is that our agencies do much more than just look after our security in the offensive sense—they also look after it defensively. GCHQ has done a huge amount to protect our country from cybercrime. Indeed, 95% of all cyber-attacks in the United Kingdom have been defended against on the basis of bulk data.

In an important speech at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology only last week, the head of GCHQ, Mr Robert Hannigan, commented on the need to provide proper encryption to our society in order to allow the free economic trade that we have enjoyed for so long. He also clearly stated that he was not in favour of “backdoors”, which were mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Salisbury (John Glen), because they are not a protection but a threat. He said:

“I am not in favour of banning encryption just to avoid doubt. Nor am I asking for mandatory backdoors. I am puzzled by the caricatures in the current debate, where almost every attempt to tackle the misuse of encryption by criminals and terrorists is seen as a ‘backdoor’. It is an over-used metaphor, or at least mis-applied in many cases, and I think it illustrates the confusion of the ethical debate in what is a highly-charged and technically complex area.”

Having used the powers in the former investigatory powers Acts for operations in Afghanistan targeting those who were placing bombs to try to kill fellow British servicemen, I am glad that this Bill is updating those provisions. I am also glad to see that the former Director of Public Prosecutions, who has wide experience in this field, will respond for the Opposition. His experience does credit to this House, and I am delighted to see him here.

If I may be allowed just one minor criticism, it is that the word “urgent” must be tightened. The Secretary of State must be the sole decider of what is an urgent request and an urgent need, and not a judge later on, because only she or he can have that knowledge.

Donald Trump

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Monday 18th January 2016 Westminster Hall

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

It is a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Roger.

I find myself standing here and, for the first time ever, agreeing wholeheartedly with the hon. Member for Newport West (Paul Flynn). None of us can be as surprised about that as I am, but I was even more surprised to hear him warmly quoting the words of President Bush—admittedly, President Bush the father and not the son.

Today is one of the times this year when we will mark the 500th anniversary of a book called “Utopia”, by Saint Thomas More, who was tried and executed not so far from this place. In it he envisaged a new future and a new ideal, writing from his heart about the liberties of thought and faith that he hoped what he called Englishmen—those whom Mr Hannan refers to as the “Anglosphere”—would express across the globe. Yet today a report has come out showing that the liberties Thomas More hoped for and desired are in trouble.

An online journal called “Spiked” has gone around various universities and found that freedom of speech is being challenged. In our colleges, so-called “safe spaces”, which might also be known as “spaces of censorship”, now cover some 39% of universities. That is a threat to freedom of thought not only in those universities. We can see that this debate is being covered by many of our friends from the fourth estate, and it is worth remembering that they, too, are part of the democratic process. Although we who stand here and speak in the Chamber might sometimes not like it, their role in holding us to account is equally as important as our role to speak the truth.

With that cry for freedom and liberty, I speak in favour of considering the motion, but rejecting exclusion, because liberty is not something that we can take in portion or in part. It comes as one and as a whole. As the first amendment to the US constitution makes clear, freedom of expression is essential for a free people. That is why, although I may not like what has been said and although I am absolutely sure that I would not support it, it is no place for me or this House to criticise a man running for elected office in a foreign country. We might not wish him here, we might not like him here, but we should not vote against his ability to speak or his right to travel when we, too, value the same rights of liberty.

[Anne McLaughlin (Glasgow North East) (SNP)]

rose—

[Tom Tugendhat]

Are you looking to intervene?

[Sir Roger Gale (in the Chair)]

No, I am not. I call Anne McLaughlin.

[Anne McLaughlin]

To be clear, did the hon. Gentleman say that it was not our place to criticise? Surely that would be a curtailment of freedom of speech for those of us who are opposed to what Donald Trump said. I am pretty sure that the hon. Gentleman said that we do not have the right to criticise.

[Tom Tugendhat]

The hon. Lady is quite right: we have the right to criticise. However, I do not think that we should exercise that right on people who are running for elected office in foreign countries. It is for the American people to judge Donald Trump and to hold him to account. It is bad politics and bad judgment to intervene in the electoral processes of other countries and I would wish to do it as little as possible.

[Tulip Siddiq]

The London mayoral candidate from the Labour party, my right hon. Friend the Member for Tooting (Sadiq Khan), is of Muslim origin. Under Donald Trump, he would not be allowed to travel to America. Will the hon. Gentleman comment on that?

[Tom Tugendhat]

I am delighted to comment on that, on the grounds that the United States makes wonderful provision for the balance of powers. The hon. Lady’s failure to understand that the President of the United States is neither a sovereign nor a despot, but is balanced by Congress and the courts, is a failure to understand the United States. Despite—let’s face it—having had one or two incumbents of the White House who might not have been Mensa candidates, the country has yet succeeded all the way through to today as a bastion of liberty and of economic success.

Today is also Martin Luther King Day and it is worth remembering that he, too, relied on those rights and freedoms. He, too, relied on those rights while he was campaigning to desegregate the University of Alabama. When those students bravely marched in on 11 June 1963, the prevailing opinion was that they should shut up and that their right to freedom of speech should be curtailed. I think that Donald Trump is crazy and has no valid points to make, but I will not be the one to silence his voice.

When I think about what more we should do, I say that we should stand aside and wait for an American to come forward as the great Joseph Welch, the chief counsel for the US army, did. In the 1954 trials, he looked at Senator McCarthy and asked, “Have you no shame, sir? At long last, have you left no sense of decency?” For someone to say that to Trump is surely better than for us to legislate on the freedom of expression or of travel of a citizen of that great country, the United States.

Serious and Organised Crime: Prüm Convention

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Tuesday 8th December 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mrs May]

No. I have to explain to my hon. Friend that we are able to determine the database, and that how we hold that database and the information that is held on it are matters for national decision. Articles 2(1) and (3) of the principal Prüm decision say that we need to inform the general secretariat about which profiles will be made available for searching under Prüm, while article 5 makes it clear that the follow-up process to a hit is subject to national law, not EU law.

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend is making a very persuasive case. I ask for a moment of clarity regarding the expansion of judicial engagement into areas that have formerly been for the court of Parliament, which has been a form of mission creep that can be seen in various areas. Will my right hon. Friend make very clear the precise remit of the UK courts on this matter, so that when it comes to a judicial review—as I am sure, sadly, it will—or a trial in front of the Supreme Court, it will be able to look back at the words my right hon. Friend has spoken from the Dispatch Box today. It would then be able to see the will of Parliament in the decision and not the interpretation that is chosen at that particular moment.

[Mrs May]

I am happy to confirm that I am willing to comment on the application of the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice and how it affects our position. As for the legislation that we are bringing forward, if my hon. Friend looks at the command paper, he will see that we are making clear those areas where national laws apply. As I tried to explain earlier, the Prüm decisions are all about the exchange of data, not the manner in which the data are held here in the UK. Article 72 of the treaties makes it clear that how we deal with DNA for our own security is a matter for member states, not for European jurisdiction. As a further safeguard, we will ensure that if a person was a minor when the DNA or fingerprints were taken, demographic details could be released only if a formal judicial request for assistance were made.

Finally, I referred earlier to an oversight board and I will establish an independent oversight board to ensure that Prüm operates in a just and effective manner. Both the biometrics and information commissioners will have seats on that board, and so will the Scottish Police Authority and the other bodies from Scotland and Northern Ireland that I have mentioned.

It was on account of all those clear and stringent safeguards that the National DNA Ethics board felt that it could write to me in support of our decision to recommend participating in this system. I therefore hope that those who I accept have principled civil liberties concerns will listen to its views.

Costs are associated with implementing this capability. When the Labour Government initially signed us up to Prüm, they estimated that it would cost about £31 million —about £49 million in today’s prices. That was without providing any safeguards and without ensuring that Scotland and Northern Ireland would benefit fully and be fully involved. I have looked at this very carefully and am pleased to tell the House that at the same time as ensuring that the operational benefits are nationwide and that UK citizens get the protections they deserve, the Government will need to spend only £13 million. The money spent implementing Prüm will be recouped many times over in savings that the police will make through using it.

Hon. Members will have read about Zdenko Turtak, who earlier this year attacked and raped a woman, leaving her for dead in Beeston. In investigating this crime, the West Yorkshire police had only the victim’s statement and the attacker’s DNA on which to proceed. Suspecting that the assailant might have not been British, they submitted forms to Interpol and had the DNA profile searched against profiles held in other European countries. It took over two and a half months for a match finally to be reported by Slovakia. During that time, the police pursued over 1,400 separate lines of inquiry at a cost of £250,000. If the United Kingdom and Slovakia had been connected through the Prüm system, that initial hit, instead of taking two and a half months, would have taken 15 minutes. Just think of the time and money that that would have saved the police, not to mention the benefit to the victim of knowing that her attacker would be brought to justice.

Policing

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Wednesday 4th November 2015 Commons Chamber

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

I am very proud to be the second Kent Member to speak in this important debate, because we in Kent are very proud of our extremely effective police force. It has faced some of the greatest challenges with which our nation has struggled—a few months ago the chief constable, Alan Pughsley, said that some 900 migrants were coming into the country each month—and it has to deal with the immediacy that being a front-line county in our great kingdom involves.

I am extremely proud of Alan Pughsley’s work. He has done something remarkable: he has managed to increase the proportion of warranted officers on the frontline to 92%, which is the highest percentage for six years. That is a phenomenal achievement. Kent has some 3,000 warranted officers and 352 police community support officers, and they do a fantastic job. When I hear Opposition Mems bad-mouthing them or accusing them of failing in their duties, I feel offended for them, because they are performing their duties amazingly.

The officers in my constituency have done fantastically well too. The West Kent divisional commander is Chief Superintendent Julia Chapman, whose team has done fantastic work in West Malling, Tonbridge and Edenbridge. She is ably supported by two district commanders, Chief Inspectors Gill Ellis and Roscoe Walford. Sadly, Chief Inspector Ellis is moving on. I send her every good wish for her future career, but I am very sorry that she is not staying in Tonbridge, where she has done such fantastic work.

One of the PCSOs has done fantastically well in West Malling. Phillip Harrison has been the PCSO on duty on Remembrance Sunday for at least three years—probably more—and he will be there again this Sunday. Very quietly, like so many PCSOs, he will be carrying out his duties armed only with his strength of character and his personality, and he will do that phenomenally well.

[Anna Turley]

I am delighted to hear the hon. Gentleman pay tribute to PCSOs, because I genuinely think that creating them was one of the best things that we did as a Labour Government. I am sure he shares my despair and horror at the fact that so many of their jobs have been cut, because they do very important work and often free up regular officers to carry out much more serious and heavy duties. I appreciate his support for a Labour Government policy.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I am happy to welcome Labour policies when they work, and PCSOs do work. They are a brilliant innovation. I particularly welcome the efforts of my right hon. Friend the Minister for Policing, Crime and Criminal Justice in supporting them, and the amount of work that he has personally done in ensuring that they have every opportunity not only to serve in their current roles but to be promoted to warrant service if they wish—and, indeed, many do.

I am very grateful that PCSO Harrison will be there. These individuals across Kent—this whole team—have in the last year seen a reduction in crime of 6%. I know that that is not down to them alone; it is down to a network, and that network starts in Kent and spreads to the whole of the United Kingdom. That co-operation, which is led very much by the chief constable, has done an amazing amount to ensure the people of Kent are safe. Chief Constable Pughsley has ensured that we have been innovative in introducing new technologies, and I am grateful that my right hon. Friend the Member for Ashford (Damian Green) has mentioned some of them. I would just like to raise one of them. In January, Kent Police introduced TrackMyCrime which I hope many other police forces will be introducing soon. It has seen the time taken for a crime report fall dramatically. It has also increased the satisfaction of those reporting crime. It is fantastic to say—or, rather, it is a mixed blessing—that 3,000 have been victims of crime and have used it; it is sad that there have been that many victims, but it is great that that many have used it, and the satisfaction levels have been very good.

The presence of police is not just about individuals, nor just about bricks and mortar, although I do know we all take very seriously the important decisions that will be taken over the location of police stations over coming years. The police station in Tonbridge and that in West Malling are extremely important. I welcome the work done in outreach—many policemen are now operating in our communities from council offices and, indeed, from supermarkets and mobile police stations, but it is not just about that; it is also about the work done across our whole nation.

That is why I am going to take a few moments to welcome the Bill introduced to this House earlier today. The draft Investigatory Powers Bill is absolutely essential. It is essential for ensuring that the intelligence the police need to do their job is available to them. It is essential to ensure that our intelligence services can co-operate effectively with the police so that we have the kind of integrated defence network we need to ensure that our communities are safe, not only from terrorism, violent crime and indeed child pornography and paedophilia, but also from more run-of-the-mill crimes that sadly blight the lives of so many of our constituents. I am delighted that the Bill is now before the House and will soon, I hope, become an Act.

Finally, I very much welcome the democratisation of police forces that we have seen under this Government. I know I am probably the only one in Kent who says this, but I welcome the new police and crime commissioner. That is not a universal statement in Kent—there are divergent opinions—but at least we know in Kent now who is taking the decisions.

[Damian Green]

Indeed, we do know who is making the decisions and we can hold the PCC to account. That is particularly important in that before the current PCC became the PCC she chaired the police authority so she was doing roughly the same job only with no public accountability. There cannot be a better example of the democratic improvement of having PCCs.

[Tom Tugendhat]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right and speaks for me, because that is exactly what I was going to say.

Knowing now who actually takes the decisions on police priorities, the location of police stations, the use of resources and the priority of innovation, it is essential that when we get to the PCC elections—in 2016 in my area—we focus on who we want. These decisions are no longer for anonymous apparatchiks who hold secret sway over our policing; they are for people who are empowered with a huge burden of responsibility, and I greatly welcome the quality of candidates who are stepping forward on the Conservative side. I hope very much there will be excellent candidates from the other sides as well, because we need the best candidates for this job—not party political, but the best candidates. I am delighted to say that we have put forward some of those.

The growth in interest in technology should continue. It is not a process that is going to stop; in fact, it will accelerate as the criminals exploit ever-greater technological innovation, whether through secret messaging on WhatsApp or Facebook Messenger, through exploiting online banking to commit greater fraud or through phishing—in the internet sense—for greater riches. It is therefore absolutely right that our police step into that world and that our security services help them. I welcome the work being done in this area by the Minister for Policing, Crime and Criminal Justice and, in particular, by my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary.

Refugee Crisis in Europe

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Tuesday 8th September 2015 Commons Chamber

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

I stand here proudly as the grandson of a refugee who came here in the 1920s. When my great uncle came as a Jewish refugee from Austria later in the late 1930s, the nation’s security was in such question that he was interned, as was every other adult Jew leaving Austria or Germany. I therefore welcome the Government’s efforts to take the nation’s security seriously while not damaging the right of refugees to come. It is right that, as we have done in the past, we balance our security with our generosity.

It is also right that we treat the cause, and not just the symptom, so I welcome the Government’s position. It is easy to say we should take more individuals, in theirs ones and twos, tens and even thousands, but unless we address the cause, we will be talking about millions, not thousands. Only 3% of the population has so far left the region, leaving 97%, and it is right that Britain has made the single largest contribution per capita in helping those people. That 97% is being helped by Britain. That is what we are doing for Italy and Greece. We are stopping the migration by supporting those in the region.

More than that, we are helping Syria. It is not enough to take the fittest, the strongest, the cleverest and the richest—those able to make the trip—and to integrate them into our societies to have them as our professors, our doctors and our lawyers. They would undoubtedly contribute handsomely to our future, but they should not be stolen like that.

Civil wars tend to last between seven and 12 years. Tragically, we are already four years into this one, but that means—I hope this is true—that we are approaching the final stages. I cannot tell the House whether that is guaranteed or not—nobody can—but we all hope very much that the war will end and soon. At that point we will want the people nearby to be able to go back and rebuild their society.

That is why I call on Her Majesty’s Government to do one more thing than they are already doing: to use the good offices of the Foreign Office and the efforts of the Minister for the middle east, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth East (Mr Ellwood), who has done much already on this, to talk to our allies in the region—the Jordanians, the Turks, the Lebanese and the Iraqis—and to extract financial support from our Gulf allies and the other wealthy nations so that the camps can be used not just as refuges, but as lily pads from which we can jump back into Syria with economic development. If we can turn the camps—as others have in other parts of the world—into zones of industry and economic growth for refugees in exile, they can re-import their labour, their ideas and that drive back into Syria, so that instead of needing to have a Marshall plan lasting 30 or 50 years to support Syria, it will rebuild itself in half that time.

It is possible. The Government are making the right noises and doing exactly the right things. I would encourage them to go further and harder on that path, but I am very grateful for the work of the Home Secretary and the Prime Minister.

Reports into Investigatory Powers

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Thursday 25th June 2015 Commons Chamber

[Emily Thornberry (Islington South and Finsbury) (Lab)]

I may speak very quickly to get through everything I want to say, Madam Deputy Speaker.

I will refer to the reports by the ISC and the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, not the two later reports, which we have not really had an opportunity to read or consider properly. The report by David Anderson, QC, aptly entitled “A Question of Trust”, has rightly been complimented in the House for its thoroughness and rigour. Perhaps we should give a warning to those who might want to read it, though—do not drop it on your foot. Anderson’s recommendation that the law on investigatory powers should be made both comprehensive and comprehensible has also been widely endorsed, and it is surely right. If it is unintelligible to a lay reader, it will seem esoteric and inaccessible to all and will therefore not inspire public confidence.

I would like to focus on the main bone of contention, which is who should have authority to grant permission for access to the content of people’s private communications. The ISC’s report, for all its strengths, offers an insider’s view. The Home Secretary no doubt found much more to agree with in that report than in others, not least because she found herself extensively quoted in it. After hearing evidence that, in my view, was heavily weighted towards Ministers and officials from the security services, the ISC came down squarely on the side of the status quo. It concluded that the current system of ministerial authorisation of interception warrants should be maintained. I listened with some interest to the comments of the right hon. Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mark Field) on that issue.

The Committee appears to have reached its conclusion based almost wholly on the recommendations of Ministers themselves, with the concerns of civil liberties groups being given comparatively short shrift. In concluding that Ministers were better equipped than judges to make decisions on warrants, the Committee relied on arguments some of which, in my view, were based on flawed logic. I will give one example. It argued that,

“Ministers are able to take into account the wider context of each warrant application and the risks involved, whereas judges can only decide whether a warrant application is legally compliant.”

The example that the Committee provided by way of support for that rather extraordinary claim was the diplomatic fracas following the allegations in 2013 that the US National Security Agency had tapped the German Chancellor’s phone. The ISC’s less than subtle implication was that whereas a Minister would have the wisdom to reject such an application, judges would be too clueless to understand the requirements of international diplomacy and could not possibly be trusted to understand the diplomatic implications of such a decision.

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

Does the hon. Lady not accept that Ministers and judges have a different role? The report recognises that the role of a Minister is to represent Her Majesty’s Government across a broad swathe of areas, including international policy, and the role of a judge is to adjudicate on a question of law.

[Emily Thornberry]

Yes, of course, but it underestimates the subtle role that judges have come to play in recent years. For example, the development of administrative law has meant that judges have to be able to balance a number of factors. Are we essentially saying that the only way for Ministers to have some form of oversight of the security services is by giving permission for intercepts? There must be greater oversight than that. For example, if there was a suggestion that—I am plucking an idea from the air—we should tap the phone of the President of France, are we saying that the Home Secretary would not be aware of it if there were a system of applying to the court? If that is our current system, we need to examine it carefully. We need to ensure that our Ministers have some form of oversight of the security services, but that does not preclude the need for judges as a back-up. Surely Ministers would welcome the idea that they can not only make their own judgment but have it backed up with the authority of a judge.

The caricature of judges as being completely out of the world does not bear up, in my experience. I have to declare an interest at this point—I am married to a judge, and there have been times when my husband has been duty judge. Although the phone has not necessarily been passed to him while he has been in the bath, it is quite right that judges are flexible and can move quickly to make decisions as and when necessary.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

rose—

[Emily Thornberry]

I have already given way to the hon. Gentleman, and I want to try to keep to your strictures, Madam Deputy Speaker. I am not doing very well—I have only three minutes left if I am to do so. I suspect that I might not, but I will go as fast as I can.

Judges do not live in a vacuum. Their job requires them to have some form of judgment. There have been great challenges to the establishment, and the public have great scepticism about not only politics but all sorts of pillars of the establishment. I find it interesting that the judiciary is one of the few areas that are not challenged in the same way. Whenever a difficult issue needs to be decided on or there has been a crisis, it does not take people long to call for a full judicial inquiry. When we are talking about trust in the highly contentious field of investigatory powers, it seems to me that it would be a mistake for Ministers not to call for the back-up of the judiciary. When we are considering a radical overhaul of the legislative and regulatory framework, we need to be bold.

There is great sense in David Anderson’s report. He talks about the establishment of a new body, which is the backbone of his recommendations, not just one of many proposals that he has put forward. It is absolutely essential, and last time we discussed the matter in this place I was a little alarmed to hear the Home Secretary refer to it as being only one of many recommendations. Actually, the body features in about 50 of the recommendations, so I hope that it is not pushed aside as being a peripheral issue. Clearly, it is not.

Transparency is another important part of David Anderson’s report. The new commission would not only take on responsibility for approving warrants but would incorporate the retrospective audit functions currently exercised by the interception of communications commissioner and the intelligence services commissioner. Those officers currently fit into what I see as a deeply foggy regulatory arrangement, which in many ways is reminiscent of Wall Street before the crash, when not a single one of the half a dozen or so agencies that were given the job of regulating and supervising the banks seemed to be able to exert its authority sufficiently or even know what was going on under its nose, let alone have the power to stop it.

The Home Secretary said to the ISC at that stage that it was important for the decision to be taken by somebody who is democratically accountable to the public. I understand that, but the reality is that thousands of warrants for interception are issued under RIPA. We do not know what proportion of applications the Home Secretary does not approve when they appear on her desk, because both she and successive Governments have refused to say. The current Home Secretary admitted in evidence to the ISC that the proportion of applications she approves is very high. That is not surprising, given that reviewing such applications takes up such a significant proportion of her day and it is not as though she does not have lots of other things to do. She relies heavily on the judgment of her officials—we would, of course, expect her to do so—but we have to be careful that it is not a rubber-stamping exercise. I am sure it is not, but we have to be mindful about what it looks like when we are considering a question of trust. Let us look at the reality before deciding whether a change would be a bad thing.

Taken together, David Anderson’s proposals represent a radical overhaul of the existing framework. I do not believe they are the worse for that. When looking at the report, we must go back and say to ourselves that, in the end, we need a radical overhaul. We need to bring the public with us. We need to be unafraid to bring in additional expertise. A clearer framework in which we can have traditional oversight of such sensitive things as intercepts must be a good thing.