Reports into Investigatory Powers

Emily Thornberry Excerpts

Thursday 25th June 2015 Commons Chamber

[Yvette Cooper (Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford) (Lab)]

I thank the Home Secretary for her thoughtful speech and for scheduling the debate so swiftly after the publication of David Anderson’s report. I called for the debate in response to the statement two weeks ago and it has been swiftly delivered.

I should also apologise to the House, as I already have to the Home Secretary and to you, Mr Speaker, for the fact that I cannot be here for the closing speeches. It is my daughter’s school graduation, so I hope the House will forgive me for being there instead.

This will be a good debate and it is an opportunity to debate the right legal framework to protect our liberty and security in the digital age. I join the Home Secretary in paying tribute to the quiet heroism of our intelligence services, agents and counter-terror police. Their work is necessarily secret and their successes are rarely reported, but their success is measured, bluntly, by a lack of column inches and TV headlines. We are rightly all proud of them.

There is also no doubt that as the world becomes increasingly connected and as we increasingly rely on smartphones, tablets and other technology to communicate and organise our lives, that has repercussions for the fight against terrorism and serious and organised crime. David Anderson’s report contains the startling fact that in 1975 there were 1 billion connected places, that by 2010 there were 5 billion connected people and that by 2020 there will be 50 billion connected devices.

Our lives are increasingly online, and with that opportunity come great challenges. For example, we know that Twitter is a lot of fun for many people, including many Members of this House—although, perhaps, not yet the Home Secretary—but it has also been used to connect extremists and recruiters with young people in the United Kingdom, including the young girls who left for Syria from Bethnal Green earlier this year. New devices, mail services and apps are used to help us all keep in touch, build amazing new businesses and organise our lives, but also by some to commit crimes and abuse. Online crime has risen exponentially and we have also seen awful cases of online child abuse that we are still failing to address as a country.

We have also seen growing problems with organised cyber-attacks for major companies, infrastructure and the Government. The operations of the police and intelligence agencies need to be able to keep up with these new forms of crime and national security threats, but at the same time the checks and balances, safeguards and oversight that are needed must keep up with new technology. We have a long and proud tradition in Britain of having those checks, balances and safeguards for our liberty and our privacy. We must ensure that action by the state is proportionate, so those checks and balances must keep up with the fast-moving changing technology.

We have argued for some time that the legal framework is out of date. The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act is, in David Anderson’s words,

“incomprehensible to all but a tiny band of initiates”

and in the long run that means that it is “intolerable”. Its interaction with previous legislation, including the Telecommunications Act 1984, is baffling, too, and even after being briefed on some of the work that the agencies do and having studied the legislation over seven years—often with a wet towel wrapped around my head, which was the only thing that enabled me to get my head around it even temporarily—I still find it hard to be clear about what is possible and what is not under the law as it stands and about the extent of existing safeguards. That is unsustainable as a framework for legitimacy for the vital work the agencies do, which is why we have called for some time for a review of RIPA, why we argued for it in the debates last summer and why we have welcomed the Government’s agreement to ask David Anderson to produce this report.

The report is extremely thorough and ranges from ideas of privacy in ancient Babylonia to what Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg, the founder of a rather different kind of empire, thinks of the topic. It provides us with an opportunity for Parliament, civil society, the intelligence community, law enforcement, communication providers and, crucially, the public properly to consider the powers and safeguards we need.

As David Anderson recently said:

“The threat that I see of not accepting my recommendations, or recommendations along these lines is that people become disenchanted with the whole business of intelligence gathering. They believe some of the wilder allegations…that the state is reading into people’s emails the whole time when patently it isn’t. If this sense of disillusionment and disenchantment is perpetuated and spreads further then I think both law enforcement and intelligence lose the public confidence that they actually need if they are going to do an effective job.”

[Emily Thornberry (Islington South and Finsbury) (Lab)]

My right hon. Friend is making a good and comprehensive speech. Is it not appropriate that David Anderson’s report is entitled “A Question of Trust”? Surely that is one of the most important things in bringing the public with us on this issue.

[Yvette Cooper]

My hon. Friend is exactly right. There is strong support for the work of the intelligence agencies and the work they do in Britain, which has historically always been the case, but we should never take that for granted. It would not be fair on the intelligence agencies to take it for granted, so maintaining that sense of trust and confidence across the whole of society and not simply across the majority of people is extremely important for the work that they do. If we are to protect both our liberty and security in a democracy, we need to achieve consent for and understanding of the law and it is not just those who are concerned about surveillance who value greater clarity. It is also an essential mission of our intelligence agencies as part of defending democracy and protecting liberty and security.

The Home Secretary has been clear that there is no doubt that investigatory powers are vital in confronting terrorism, child abuse and other serious and organised crime. During the Home Secretary’s statement two weeks ago, I mentioned the awful case cited in David Anderson’s report in which communications data were used, rightly, to stop the abuse of three children who were all less than four years old. There are other cases. For example, Operation Overt dealt with the largest and most serious terrorist plot we have ever faced. Between 2008 and 2010, 10 individuals were convicted of plotting to blow up multiple transatlantic airliners. A key part of the evidence that brought the plotters to justice was coded conversations by email between the conspirators and extremists abroad in which they discussed the preparation for their attacks and the selection of targets.

It is clear from the review and other evidence that the powers passed through the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 last summer are essential and must be renewed, and will need to be renewed in good time before the sunset clause at the end of next year. It is also right, however, that we ensure that the legal framework that governs them is updated so that it properly reflects the needs of security and the need for safeguards.

In 2012, the Home Secretary made proposals in the draft Communications Data Bill that would have gone much further than the current legislation. I argued at the time that there were serious problems with the Bill, because it put too much power in the hands of the Home Secretary. The Joint Committee set up to scrutinise the draft Bill also, rightly, raised substantial concerns. David Anderson’s report makes it clear that he does not think that the draft Bill was the right approach. He noted that the first clause was “excessively broad”. The important question of IP addresses, which was encompassed in the draft Bill, has now been dealt with in other legislation. On weblogs, which the Home Office said at the time it wanted to pursue, David Anderson concluded that he

“was not presented with a detailed or unified case”

on the viability, practicalities or legal considerations.

On perhaps the most significant and the most controversial measure in the draft Bill—requiring internet service providers to hold huge amounts of third-party data—he commented:

“I did not get the sense that this was judged to be the priority that it once was, even within law enforcement”,

and he concluded:

“Accordingly…there should be no question of progressing this element of the old draft Bill until such time as a compelling operational case has been made, there has been full consultation with CSPs and the various legal and technical issues have been fully bottomed out. None of those conditions appears to me to be currently satisfied.”

Experts have also expressed substantial concerns about encryption and the cost and proportionality of the proposals.

Where David Anderson and the agencies confirm that there is a problem is in ensuring that companies whose headquarters are overseas comply with UK law, particularly for data and communications that involve those who are living and operating in the UK and those who pose threats to the UK. The Home Secretary referred to the report by Nigel Sheinwald, whose work is vital because, as the agencies and the Home Secretary recognise, UK law is only part of the answer; legal and diplomatic arrangements with other countries are immensely important. In fact, there is a growing range of views that the proposals in the draft Communications Data Bill were not the right way to deal with that genuine and significant problem in relation to companies based overseas.

On that basis, I ask the Home Secretary to confirm that she has dropped the original draft Communications Data Bill and is starting with a fresh approach. I think it would help our debate in this place and the development of future proposals that should balance the appropriate powers and the appropriate safeguards. Will she confirm that that draft Bill has been dropped and a new approach will be taken?

--- Later in debate ---

[Emily Thornberry (Islington South and Finsbury) (Lab)]

I may speak very quickly to get through everything I want to say, Madam Deputy Speaker.

I will refer to the reports by the ISC and the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, not the two later reports, which we have not really had an opportunity to read or consider properly. The report by David Anderson, QC, aptly entitled “A Question of Trust”, has rightly been complimented in the House for its thoroughness and rigour. Perhaps we should give a warning to those who might want to read it, though—do not drop it on your foot. Anderson’s recommendation that the law on investigatory powers should be made both comprehensive and comprehensible has also been widely endorsed, and it is surely right. If it is unintelligible to a lay reader, it will seem esoteric and inaccessible to all and will therefore not inspire public confidence.

I would like to focus on the main bone of contention, which is who should have authority to grant permission for access to the content of people’s private communications. The ISC’s report, for all its strengths, offers an insider’s view. The Home Secretary no doubt found much more to agree with in that report than in others, not least because she found herself extensively quoted in it. After hearing evidence that, in my view, was heavily weighted towards Ministers and officials from the security services, the ISC came down squarely on the side of the status quo. It concluded that the current system of ministerial authorisation of interception warrants should be maintained. I listened with some interest to the comments of the right hon. Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mark Field) on that issue.

The Committee appears to have reached its conclusion based almost wholly on the recommendations of Ministers themselves, with the concerns of civil liberties groups being given comparatively short shrift. In concluding that Ministers were better equipped than judges to make decisions on warrants, the Committee relied on arguments some of which, in my view, were based on flawed logic. I will give one example. It argued that,

“Ministers are able to take into account the wider context of each warrant application and the risks involved, whereas judges can only decide whether a warrant application is legally compliant.”

The example that the Committee provided by way of support for that rather extraordinary claim was the diplomatic fracas following the allegations in 2013 that the US National Security Agency had tapped the German Chancellor’s phone. The ISC’s less than subtle implication was that whereas a Minister would have the wisdom to reject such an application, judges would be too clueless to understand the requirements of international diplomacy and could not possibly be trusted to understand the diplomatic implications of such a decision.

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

Does the hon. Lady not accept that Ministers and judges have a different role? The report recognises that the role of a Minister is to represent Her Majesty’s Government across a broad swathe of areas, including international policy, and the role of a judge is to adjudicate on a question of law.

[Emily Thornberry]

Yes, of course, but it underestimates the subtle role that judges have come to play in recent years. For example, the development of administrative law has meant that judges have to be able to balance a number of factors. Are we essentially saying that the only way for Ministers to have some form of oversight of the security services is by giving permission for intercepts? There must be greater oversight than that. For example, if there was a suggestion that—I am plucking an idea from the air—we should tap the phone of the President of France, are we saying that the Home Secretary would not be aware of it if there were a system of applying to the court? If that is our current system, we need to examine it carefully. We need to ensure that our Ministers have some form of oversight of the security services, but that does not preclude the need for judges as a back-up. Surely Ministers would welcome the idea that they can not only make their own judgment but have it backed up with the authority of a judge.

The caricature of judges as being completely out of the world does not bear up, in my experience. I have to declare an interest at this point—I am married to a judge, and there have been times when my husband has been duty judge. Although the phone has not necessarily been passed to him while he has been in the bath, it is quite right that judges are flexible and can move quickly to make decisions as and when necessary.

[Tom Tugendhat]

rose—

[Emily Thornberry]

I have already given way to the hon. Gentleman, and I want to try to keep to your strictures, Madam Deputy Speaker. I am not doing very well—I have only three minutes left if I am to do so. I suspect that I might not, but I will go as fast as I can.

Judges do not live in a vacuum. Their job requires them to have some form of judgment. There have been great challenges to the establishment, and the public have great scepticism about not only politics but all sorts of pillars of the establishment. I find it interesting that the judiciary is one of the few areas that are not challenged in the same way. Whenever a difficult issue needs to be decided on or there has been a crisis, it does not take people long to call for a full judicial inquiry. When we are talking about trust in the highly contentious field of investigatory powers, it seems to me that it would be a mistake for Ministers not to call for the back-up of the judiciary. When we are considering a radical overhaul of the legislative and regulatory framework, we need to be bold.

There is great sense in David Anderson’s report. He talks about the establishment of a new body, which is the backbone of his recommendations, not just one of many proposals that he has put forward. It is absolutely essential, and last time we discussed the matter in this place I was a little alarmed to hear the Home Secretary refer to it as being only one of many recommendations. Actually, the body features in about 50 of the recommendations, so I hope that it is not pushed aside as being a peripheral issue. Clearly, it is not.

Transparency is another important part of David Anderson’s report. The new commission would not only take on responsibility for approving warrants but would incorporate the retrospective audit functions currently exercised by the interception of communications commissioner and the intelligence services commissioner. Those officers currently fit into what I see as a deeply foggy regulatory arrangement, which in many ways is reminiscent of Wall Street before the crash, when not a single one of the half a dozen or so agencies that were given the job of regulating and supervising the banks seemed to be able to exert its authority sufficiently or even know what was going on under its nose, let alone have the power to stop it.

The Home Secretary said to the ISC at that stage that it was important for the decision to be taken by somebody who is democratically accountable to the public. I understand that, but the reality is that thousands of warrants for interception are issued under RIPA. We do not know what proportion of applications the Home Secretary does not approve when they appear on her desk, because both she and successive Governments have refused to say. The current Home Secretary admitted in evidence to the ISC that the proportion of applications she approves is very high. That is not surprising, given that reviewing such applications takes up such a significant proportion of her day and it is not as though she does not have lots of other things to do. She relies heavily on the judgment of her officials—we would, of course, expect her to do so—but we have to be careful that it is not a rubber-stamping exercise. I am sure it is not, but we have to be mindful about what it looks like when we are considering a question of trust. Let us look at the reality before deciding whether a change would be a bad thing.

Taken together, David Anderson’s proposals represent a radical overhaul of the existing framework. I do not believe they are the worse for that. When looking at the report, we must go back and say to ourselves that, in the end, we need a radical overhaul. We need to bring the public with us. We need to be unafraid to bring in additional expertise. A clearer framework in which we can have traditional oversight of such sensitive things as intercepts must be a good thing.