Victoria Atkins
Main Page: Victoria Atkins (Conservative - Louth and Horncastle)Department Debates - View all Victoria Atkins's debates with the Home Office
(8 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberSection 6 of the Human Rights Act requires public authorities to have regard to the Act in any event, so I wonder what advantage the hon. and learned Gentleman thinks referring to the Act in the Bill will have.
I am grateful for that intervention, because it drives us back to the point of the privacy clause, which we debated in Committee and which has been debated elsewhere. It is important for three reasons. First, this is a statement of principle about the important interests and duties running through the Act, and it is important to have that statement in the Act. It avoids inconsistency and reminds decision makers of the importance of taking into account privacy, the integrity of data, human rights and so on in all cases, so this is a matter of principle.
The second reason why our new clause is important is that of practical considerations. I worked with the Police Service of Northern Ireland for five years in relation to its compliance with the Human Rights Act. Having structures and decision making written into everything it did helped it to reach better decisions, and I am sure it is the same for other police forces and for public authorities. Never underestimate the practical application that such a clause has in real time for people in public authorities trying to do their job. The third reason—I will come back to this in a minute—is that our new clause gives real teeth to the test that the judicial commissioners apply, because there would be a link between the privacy clause and the test.
I rise to speak in support of amendment 146, which stands in my name and those of fellow members of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. The Committee conducted legislative scrutiny of the Bill and published our report—a unanimous report—on 2 June. Like previous speakers in this debate and everyone in their right mind, we wanted to make sure that the Government and, acting on behalf of the Government, the security services have the right intercept powers to keep us safe, while at the same time respecting privacy and not invading it abusively. I thank the members of the Committee who worked on that scrutiny, the legal adviser to the Committee, Professor Murray Hunt, the Committee staff and those who gave evidence.
Because I hope to catch your eye when we debate the next group of amendments, Mr Deputy Speaker, I shall speak briefly to amendment 146, echoing the points made by the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry), who speaks on behalf of the Scottish National party. The amendment is about the role of the judicial commissioners. In essence, the commissioners are doing two things. First, they approve warrants issued by those who have the power to issue warrants—a very important role. A warrant that is not approved is a dead duck; it has to be stopped there and then. The role played by the commissioners in the approval process is set out in clause 21 and subsequent clauses. Secondly, the commissioners have an oversight and reporting function, which is set out in clause 194. They review and oversee the authorisation of warrants; they report to the Prime Minister and that report has to be published to Parliament.
It is a problem to have the same person both carrying out approval of a warrant and overseeing their approval of the warrant. The purpose of having all these measures in the Bill is to get them right. I pay tribute to the Home Secretary for her determination to understand and respond to the concerns. I hope that she will respond to the concern I am setting out now. I am not sure it is necessary to have two separate organisations, as the SNP proposes in its amendment; but I am absolutely sure that there has to be some separation of functions. Oversight of oneself is not realistic oversight.
Will the right hon. and learned Lady give way?
The Joint Committee on the draft Bill debated this matter in some detail. We concluded that it is better for judicial commissioners to have experience on both sides of the fence, as it were, just as at the criminal Bar barristers tend to prosecute and defend, so that they have knowledge of both sides. Secondly, the Committee was optimistic that it would help to attract judges of the right calibre to apply to be auditors.
It might well be useful for commissioners to have experience of both functions, but not at the same time and not using the same team of staff. I think ours is a relatively modest but important proposal. I am sure the hon. Lady can see that the arrangement could be clarified to create some sort of Chinese wall between the two functions. We are not suggesting that the functions be performed by separate organisations, but the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West may be about to persuade us all that separate organisations are needed.
I will certainly meet the Minister halfway, because I will not call a vote on my provisions, or vote against him on this aspect of the Bill. Obviously, I would like to get my own way, but I appreciate that this is about compromise, and both Ministers have been very good at compromising over the course of the Bill.
On error reporting and notification, it is worth noting the views expressed in sections 613 to 622 of the report by the Joint Committee on the draft Investigatory Powers Bill. I will not read them all out—you would not like that, Mr Deputy Speaker—but I would like to pull a few highlights out. The report states:
“Clause 171 provides that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner must inform a person about any ‘serious error’ when the Investigatory Powers Tribunal agrees the error is serious”,
and when that is in the public interest. But why would it ever be in the public interest to inform somebody that the error was serious? I cannot imagine that it would ever be in the public interest to do so, so they would never be informed.
The report also noted that the Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law felt that the approach in the draft Bill to error reporting was a matter of profound concern. Similarly, the Interception of Communications Commissioner’s Office believed the provisions in the clause were weaker than the current well-established powers. The requirement that an error should cause significant prejudice or harm was also criticised for setting a very high bar. In addition, the test was criticised by the Law Society of Scotland, Privacy International, the Interception of Communications Commissioner’s Office and Amnesty International UK for being poorly defined.
I will be grateful to my hon. Friend if he can answer this question; it may negate the need for me to make a speech on this point. I have looked very carefully at new clause 16 and, indeed, new clause 1, and I cannot find any reference to “error” in them. New clause 16 seems to be a general clause of notification to anyone who is subject to a warrant. Is that correct?
I certainly do not take any credit for being good at drafting new clauses. New clause 16 may not mention “error”, but I think it is mentioned in amendments 189 to 195, with which it should be considered. In “A Question of Trust”, David Anderson, QC, recommended that the judicial commissioners be given the power to report errors to individuals. I appreciate that the Minister has moved towards my point of view.
In conclusion, the Joint Committee made two recommendations. The first was that referral to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal was unnecessary and cumbersome and created a brake on the notification of errors. The second was that the error-reporting threshold should be reviewed so that it was more specific and defined.
It is a great pleasure to speak on Report, particularly as the heirs of Walsingham and Egerton are on the Treasury Bench sitting in judgment over a Bill that will shape our civil liberties. In their day, Walsingham broke the code, and Egerton tried Mary, Queen of Scots. The techniques that they used are still in active use today, but they have been updated. It is a question no longer of codes on paper, smuggled out in brandy bottles, but of codes hidden in computer messages, apps and other forms of communication. That is why I welcome the Bill, which updates historical practice for the present day. It is essential that we put this into statute, because for the first time we are putting into a Bill what we actually mean. For years, the state has used interpretations of legal practice rather than setting out, and debating properly, what it should do. That is why I particularly welcome the joint approach to the Bill. The hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) has been instrumental in bringing a co-operative mood to the House, and I am grateful to him for doing so.
The Bill balances privacy against other considerations. As my hon. and learned Friend the Member for South East Cambridgeshire (Lucy Frazer) pointed out, privacy is a fundamental right of all British citizens, and one that we have enjoyed for many years. But that privacy is only worth anything if we can live in safety, not just from the obvious risk of terrorism but from the risks of child abuse, drug smuggling and other forms of violence against the people of this country. I am grateful for the fact that the Government have balanced that privacy against those threats.
I will leave it there, because there are many more amendments to come. I could address some of them in detail, and perhaps I will be called to speak again.
I had the privilege of being a member of the Joint Committee and of the Bill Committee, so I feel as though I have lived with this Bill for many months. I will be happy to see it become law when that happens. This Bill is vital in the modern age, and it is above party politics. It is about doing the right thing for our country and for our constituents.
The Joint Committee and the Bill Committee scrutinised the Bill intensively, and I think we considered something like 1,000 amendments in the Bill Committee. I am happy to say that we managed, nevertheless, to find some areas of agreement, namely that it was necessary to introduce a Bill to set out the investigatory powers of the security services and law enforcement agencies, and to update the scrutiny and transparency of those powers and the people who use them. It is a credit to everyone, on both sides of the House, who supports the principle of the Bill.
I welcome, as others have done, new clause 5 and Government amendment 30, which will put all related criminal offences in the Bill. That will create transparency by making the misuse of these powers absolutely obvious. I want to look at two proposed new clauses that have not received the same level of scrutiny as the Bill has enjoyed; I shall endeavour to change that in the next couple of minutes. New clause 1— the notifying criminals clause, as someone remarked to me—raises grave concerns about our impact on fighting crime and terror. I am conscious that the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael), who tabled the new clause, is not his place. For anyone who has not read it, it would require the police and security services to notify, within 30 days of a warrant ending, anyone who has been investigated. There is no requirement for an error to have occurred, or anything of that nature. The only requirement is that someone’s data have been investigated.
On the point about a time limit of three months, is my hon. Friend aware that in 58% of requests for communications data in child abuse investigations, the data are more than six months old?
Very much so. That shows the time sensitivity of many investigations, and I am grateful to my hon. Friend for bringing it up. We know from evidence sessions in both Committees that 100% of counter-terrorism cases and 90% of serious organised crime cases involve communications data evidence. We are talking about very serious cases indeed. My concern about new clause 1 is that it in no way removes the risk that high-level criminals and terror suspects will be told that they have been investigated by law enforcement and the security services. Such people are more likely to be the subject of warrants because of their criminality, so we would be handing the investigations to those criminals on a plate.
The level of encryption available in public today is such that new clause 1 would allow criminals to hide the deeds that they had formerly left unhidden, and therefore it would expose the country to even greater threat.
That is exactly right. My hon. Friend makes the point that I was about to make, in fact.
Not at all. [Interruption.] It has never stopped me before. The new clause will help criminals to evade investigation, arrest and prosecution. Serious organised crime gangs and terrorists talk to each other. They compare notes on investigative activities, whether ongoing or not. It will not necessarily be the first, second or third notification that starts to hint at the methodology of the police; it may be the 20th, but none the less those hints about patterns of behaviour will begin to emerge in the criminal world. Why on earth would this House pass legislation that would give serious organised crime gangs and terrorist gangs such an advantage?
The hon. Lady is making a powerful point, but she is talking about a fear of what may be to come. Is she aware that already in Northern Ireland, a chief dissident republican has had the case against him dropped because the judge ordered that the security service had to unveil its surveillance techniques? If that is the case already, imagine what would happen if every dissident republican and every terrorist in the country got notification.
I am extremely grateful for that intervention, which shows powerfully just how important this is. I am conscious of the time, so I will make just one more point about new clause 1. Subsection (1)(e) sets out that people are to be told if they have been informed on by covert human intelligence sources. That means informants, in everyday language. The new clause, if passed, would help criminal gangs to find out who is informing on them—and, presumably, to do great harm to those informants, because no criminal likes a grass.
I am conscious that new clause 16 mirrors much of new clause 1. It does not, in fairness, contain the reference to CHISs, but the fact is that it will have a similarly devastating effect on law enforcement and security service operations in this country.
It seems to me that the reason for these amendments is the sense that there is not sufficient accountability in the secret services and other bodies. To that end, would the hon. Lady support new clause 2, proposed by the Intelligence and Security Committee, which would ensure that there could be proper investigation by a commissioner of anything that we felt required it?
I hesitate to do the job of my Front-Bench colleagues, and I know that the Solicitor General will respond to that point.
I will finish by saying that the amendments and new clauses on privacy proposed by the Government reflect the fact that the scrutiny of the Bill has worked thus far and has been a worthwhile exercise. I hope that new clauses 1 and 16 will not trouble this House, because the Bill as it stands is much stronger for the many months of scrutiny it has received.