Investigatory Powers Bill

Owen Paterson Excerpts

Tuesday 15th March 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mr Owen Paterson (North Shropshire) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Walthamstow (Stella Creasy) and her interesting comments.

The Home Secretary and the shadow Home Secretary both, quite correctly, began by paying tribute to the prison officer from Northern Ireland who died today after a cowardly attack on 4 March. We should remember article 2 of the European convention on human rights:

“Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law.”

I respect the hideous difficulties Ministers have had in drafting the Bill, bringing together the conflicts between liberty and security. I fully understand that there are calls for improved scrutiny associated with greater powers. However, we must take great care to avoid damaging the effectiveness of operational decision making which protects our citizens. Effective operations rely on the capacity for operational agility in the face of ruthless and innovative opponents. After a decision has been made, I am firmly in favour of a more rigorous and rapid review process.

First, I would like to state that I regarded signing warrants as a key responsibility when I took over as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Sadly, there were elements in the republican community who would not accept the settlement we had inherited from the previous Labour Government and were determined to pursue their aims by terrorism. We rapidly reequipped various agencies at considerable public expense. I was fully aware that our security services, facing a deterioration in the security situation and a raised threat level, could operate efficiently only if decisions were made rapidly from the top. I made clear that I was always to be disturbed at any time if an urgent decision was required. The vast majority of warrants were signed in an orderly manner, in regular slots built into my diary; those slots were a priority. I was occasionally woken up very early in the morning and asked to make an extremely urgent decision. I am deeply concerned that the proposal to have a dual lock, involving endorsement by a commissioner, will bring an element of delay and confusion to effective operational decisions. I understand that there are calls for more accountability and scrutiny of these vital but necessarily confidential decisions, but I believe very strongly that only a democratically elected Secretary of State, who is ultimately accountable to the House of Commons, should make such decisions.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that the definition of “urgent” needs to be one for a Minister, not a judge, and that therefore there should be no possibility of later applications for judicial review of what is urgent?

[Mr Paterson]

Yes, I entirely agree that the whole decision should be in the hands of the democratically elected Secretary of State, responsible here, but by all means let there be the most rigorous and rapid review afterwards by a learned judge.

[Andy Burnham]

I am listening to the right hon. Gentleman’s remarks, and I did similar things as a Minister, but is it not the case that a politician’s mind will always turn to the question, “What if I don’t sign this?”, and the public embarrassment that might come from not signing? Is not the further judicial check a helpful double lock so that a politician need not worry that a failure to agree might lead to public embarrassment?

[Mr Paterson]

No, I think the politician’s personal feelings are wholly irrelevant. They are responsible to the public and the House and have to report on those decisions, and it is they who should be exclusively responsible for these very difficult, subjective decisions.

During my time, I had real respect for the thoroughness with which warrants were prepared, but on occasion I refused them, and there was a clear decision-making procedure. I was also acutely aware that my decisions would be subject to review after the event, and I respected the review process. As shadow Secretary of State, I spent three years visiting Northern Ireland every week, and I built up a level of knowledge that was really useful when I took over as Secretary of State. Some decisions had to be made in imperfect conditions with imperfect information. That is the nature of working with intelligence to protect the public. A decision sometimes required a personal judgment about what was in the public interest, not just a legal interpretation.

[Alex Chalk (Cheltenham) (Con)]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that the point made by the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) was a fair one: it is very difficult for the House properly to scrutinise what was the thought process and evidence base because so much of it will be considered in the national interest and so will not be transparent to us in the Chamber?

[Mr Paterson]

No, I was fully aware that I had to come regularly to the House to answer questions and that I could be called before the Select Committee. There were various methods by which the House could scrutinise my decisions.

The key thing is that the public demand for more scrutiny, which I fully appreciate, should not interfere with operational agility and thereby put the public at risk. The current system works and could, with amendments, offer much greater scrutiny. I am in favour of a more rigorous and rapid review process. The proposal in the Bill is that a warrant could be issued in emergencies but would be reviewed within three days. This could be made applicable to all warrants, and I would welcome that, but other practical and operational issues do not appear to have been considered.

It is not clear in the Bill what the procedure would be should a commissioner refuse a decision by the Secretary of State. There is potential for even further delay and confusion in clause 21(5), under which the Secretary of State may go to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. Under the current arrangement, it is quite clear who is responsible: the Secretary of State, accountable to Parliament. Under the proposed system, with possible delays and divided decision making, it is not clear who is ultimately responsible should something go horribly wrong, with devastating consequences for the public. Should a terrorist operation be tragically successful because of delay and differences of opinion under the proposed dual lock, who would be legally responsible? Who would the relatives hold to account and potentially sue? The Secretary of State will be accountable to the House of Commons, but to whom will the judicial commissioners and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner ultimately be accountable?

The impossible position in which distinguished lawyers will be placed is highlighted in clause 196(5) and (6). Lawyers and judges are trained to interpret the law meticulously, but these subsections require very subjective political decisions. Subsection (5) provides:

“In exercising functions under this Act, a Judicial Commissioner must not act in a way…contrary to the public interest or prejudicial to…(a) national security, (b) the prevention or detection of serious crime, or (c) the economic well-being of the United Kingdom.”

Subsection (6) reads:

“A Judicial Commissioner must, in particular, ensure that the Commissioner does not…(a) jeopardise the success of an intelligence or security operation or a law enforcement operation, (b) compromise the safety or security of those involved, or (c) unduly impede the operational effectiveness of an intelligence service, a police force, a government department or Her Majesty’s forces.”

No law book can possibly guide a distinguished lawyer on these questions, which ultimately require a political judgment. In order for these criteria to be met, the Secretary of State should clearly be accountable here, in order to guarantee our security services’ operational agility and the ability to react swiftly and at short notice.

According to the principle of the separation of powers, it is clear that lawyers should not make operational executive decisions that might require some personal judgment. Montesquieu himself said:

“When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty…Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and executive”.

Lawyers should be brought in after the decision, in order to review the process by which the decision was arrived at. The Bill effectively brings judges into the Executive, giving them the difficult role of being both scrutineers and Executive decision makers. These roles require very different skills, and according to the separation of powers, they should be kept separate for good reason.

The further important deep flaw in the Bill applies particularly to Northern Ireland. It was illustrated in a high-profile case last October when members of the notorious Duffy family were accused of a number of terrorist offences arising out of a security services surveillance operation. The trial collapsed when the judge ordered disclosure of the tracking devices, and the case has been strongly made that as a result of this trial’s collapse, the public are at risk because of a judge’s insistence on total transparency procedure. In practical terms, this is unworkable in the current circumstances in Northern Ireland. The demand for transparent disclosure of the technology used, as required by this judge, would have compromised the methodology that keeps the public safe. It would also have educated terrorists on how to avoid detection in the future.

I am concerned, too, about clause 194(3)(e), which requires the Prime Minister to consult the First Minister and deputy First Minister before appointing an Investigatory Powers Commissioner or a judicial commissioner. I was the first Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to have responsibility, following the devolution of justice and policing to local politicians, and it was always clearly understood that the Secretary of State maintained responsibility for matters of national security; the Police Service of Northern Ireland and the security services reported to him on those matters.

I draw the attention of Ministers to the wise words of the Joint Committee, when it said:

“We are aware that particular sensitivities around these issues may apply in Northern Ireland. The Government will need to reflect on these sensitivities as this legislation progresses.”

That can be found in paragraph 419. Will the Government please commit to that?

Sadly, very few Members of either the House of Commons or the House of Lords have direct experience of this issue. Law-abiding British citizens are under threat from dangerous terrorists every day. I am acutely aware that deaths and injuries have been prevented not just thanks to the supreme professionalism of our security services, but thanks to the current swift decision-making process, which gives them critical operational agility. It will be tragic if this is lost because so few Members of Parliament understand the very real benefits of the current process. I am therefore opposed to the dual lock proposals in the Bill, and I hope they will be removed in Committee. The signing of warrants should remain the exclusive responsibility of the Secretary of State, accountable to Parliament, and the review process by distinguished members of the judiciary should be carried out sooner, more frequently and more thoroughly after the decision has been made.