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Each debate is chaired by an MP from the Panel of Chairs, rather than the Speaker or Deputy Speaker. A Government Minister will give the final speech, and no votes may be called on the debate topic.
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Dan Jarvis (Barnsley Central) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Bardell. May I say how good it is to see the Minister in his place? I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Preston (Sir Mark Hendrick) on securing this important debate. He is a long-standing and dedicated servant to his constituents and Lancashire more widely; any compliment about Lancashire does not come particularly easily from my side of the Pennines, but that is certainly one that my hon. Friend deserves for his very long-standing service for his constituents.
I pay tribute to the men and women who serve in the National Cyber Force, soon to be based in Samlesbury, and to those who serve across the security and intelligence services and in the cyber-security sector. They fight on the digital frontline day in and day out to detect, disrupt and deter individual and state-sponsored adversaries that threaten our cyber-security.
The cyber threat is constantly mutating and spreading. The latest crime survey for England and Wales shows a staggering 29% increase in computer misuse between 2022 and 2023. Computer misuse disrupts services, obtains information illegally and extorts individuals, meaning that personal information can be published online without consent, entire life savings can be lost due to fraud, and individuals, including children, can be blackmailed. The Government need to be increasingly ruthless in their approach to countering those threats and legislate for the challenges of today, not those of yesterday. Doing so will give cyber-security professionals the means to retain the advantage over those who seek to harm us and protect more people and organisations from cyber-crime.
Therefore, as the right hon. Member for Midlothian (Owen Thompson) rightly said, the Computer Misuse Act needs updating to reflect the challenges of the cyber age, not those of the Ceefax age. Accelerating technological change means that outdated legislation is struggling to catch up with cyber-threats posed by the likes of artificial intelligence. That is why, on this side of the House, we have already proposed criminalising the programming of chatbots that radicalise and spread terrorist material. We also welcome the Government’s announcement last month of the criminalisation, through the Criminal Justice Bill, of the creation of sexually explicit deepfakes. Outdated legislation is at best restrictive and at worst punitive for cyber-security professionals in the UK who conduct ethical hacking to expose system vulnerabilities and protect us from harmful cyber-attacks.
The National Cyber Security Centre, which is home to exceptional men and women fighting cyber-crime, has said that ethical hacking reports by individual researchers provide valuable information that organisations can use to improve the security of their systems. That is why the Opposition tabled an amendment to the Criminal Justice Bill that would reform the CMA by introducing a statutory defence for cyber-security researchers and professionals involved in ethical hacking.
Our amendment comes after the Chancellor’s commitment to implement all of Sir Patrick Vallance’s recommendations on the regulation of emerging digital technologies published alongside last spring’s Budget, which included the introduction of a statutory defence. If this Government do not deliver, the next one should. Until that happens, the legislative lag will have consequences. Half of UK businesses and 32% of charities suffered a cyber-breach or attack in the last year alone. Breaches due to vulnerabilities in cyber-security drive some of the most pernicious types of criminality. According to the accounting firm BDO, fraud doubled in 2023.
Furthermore, the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy warned in December that the Government could face a catastrophic ransomware attack at any moment. The sobering reality is that such attacks are already happening on the UK’s critical national infrastructure. Just today, it was reported that in response to a ransom not being paid, personal information illegally obtained by a ransomware attack on NHS Dumfries and Galloway has been published on the dark web—a truly despicable act that accompanies another deeply concerning development today: a hack into the Ministry of Defence’s payroll records by a malign actor.
Those are only two of the most recent examples, and they show that the threat landscape has never been more dangerous. However, progress on reforming the CMA has been buffering for three years since the Government first announced their review of the legislation. Despite two public consultations, a Home Office industry working group and several public commitments, the Government have not yet made progress and, as the Minister will know, we are fast running out of parliamentary time. Though time is in short supply, there is consensus on acting in the national interest to update the CMA, and the Opposition are keen to play our part.
I would be grateful if the Minister would answer the following questions. He will know that they are meant in the constructive spirit in which we always seek to engage on these important matters. First, will he give an assurance that the proposed legislation, as outlined in the Government’s response to the CMA consultation, will be introduced in this Parliament?
Progress on legislation requires political leadership. However, the JCNSS report on ransomware said that the leadership by a former Home Secretary did not treat it as a priority. The Minister will remember that I wrote to him in January about this matter and others identified in the JCNSS report. Can he give a further assurance that his Department and other Departments are now prioritising ransomware by confirming that they will finally respond to the consultation on unauthorised access to online accounts and personal data, which was published in September 2022?
On public sector payments to ransomware, the Deputy Prime Minister responded to me at Cabinet Office questions on 25 April by saying that that “is not something” that he would “rule out totally”. However, the Security Minister’s written answer to me on the same question on the same day was much more resolute about the policy not to pay ransoms.
Dan Jarvis
I am listening to the Minister. I do not know whether the Deputy Prime Minister is; that is possibly the problem.
It would be really helpful if the Minister would say whether a new approach to the public sector paying ransoms will be included in any update to the CMA. These assurances and clarifications matter, as the Home Office is part of a cross-Government response to countering cyber-threats, joining the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, the MOD, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and the Cabinet Office in driving policy to detect, disrupt and deter cyber-criminality.
As the Minister will know, the fulcrum of such activity is the National Security Council, but he will also know that, while it has a sub-committee for economic security, there is not a dedicated equivalent for cyber-security. Has consideration been given to the creation of a dedicated sub-committee of the NSC for policy responses to intermediate and long-term cyber challenges?
Another long-term challenge, which the Minister will be familiar with, is the retention of our best and brightest in fighting cyber-crime, both in the security and intelligence services and in the cyber-security sector. Do our modern-day Alan Turings, who play a vital role in keeping our country safe, feel that the most innovative and effective work can happen in the UK under current cyber-security legislation? The answer, sadly, is likely to be no: 60% of respondents to a recent cyber-ops survey said that the CMA is a barrier to their work in threat intelligence and vulnerability research, and 16,850 cyber-defenders—the equivalent of two GCHQs—are estimated to have been lost due to outdated cyber-security laws. The Minister knows that criminals profit the most from poor retention and recruitment, so has he considered how changes to the CMA could unlock the cyber-security sector’s huge potential to protect our country’s cyber-space better?
This debate has not just been about protecting our cyber-space through effective legislation; it has been about the principle of legislation retaining the advantage over malign actors intent on harming us. I said at the start of my speech that there are exceptional men and women working to defend our cyber-security, who are very much at the cutting edge of efforts to detect, disrupt and deter myriad threats. As legislators providing the legal framework for that crucial work, we must now all play our part.
The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)
It is a great pleasure to see you this evening, Ms Bardell—as ever, the surprise only adds to the joy—and to respond to the hon. Member for Preston (Sir Mark Hendrick), who is quite right to have secured this debate. The challenge that he talked about and the ways of addressing it are fundamental not just to his constituents and the National Cyber Force, which he rightly paid tribute to and will be hosting in his constituency, but to the very nature of our country.
It is interesting to note that over the last 200 years, the British economy has been based on many things: the ingenuity and brilliance of our people; the rule of law and the ability to predict the future based on prior agreement; the genius of economic reforms innovated out of Edinburgh and Glasgow; and the ability to keep trade moving. For most of our existence, that trade has been maritime trade of various descriptions. It has been guaranteed not just by an extraordinary industry of sailors and shipwrights who have created the vehicles of commerce, but by the Royal Navy, which has kept the sea lanes open, the sailors safe and the goods moving.
The truth is that over the last few years, the nature of that commerce—that commercial gain and exchange—has changed. We have gone from sea lanes to e-lanes. We have gone from looking at the red ensign as a guarantee of security at sea, to looking at GCHQ and the National Cyber Security Centre as a guarantee of security on the internet and in cyber-space. Those changes have been fundamental. They have enabled us to do things that are frankly quite remarkable. Look at the change in the way communication works that our country has been through in the four years since covid struck us. With so many of our lives going online—even this place went online briefly, although we seem to have forgotten how convenient that was—many of us have been able to transform the businesses that we were working in from local or national to global.
That change has been a phenomenal blessing, but none of it would have been possible without the dedication and brilliance of some remarkable individuals who have kept us safe. Those individuals started off being headquartered solely in Cheltenham. Those of who have had the privilege to visit Cheltenham know that the extraordinary brilliance and genius of those remarkable people has been fantastic not just for our country but for many partners and allies around the world.
What we see today is that it is not just the Government who need to be kept safe. The reality is that companies and individuals guarantee that security in many different ways. What we are talking about this evening is how the wider economy is defended. That is where the Government have made some important changes, which I hope will be built on in coming years. The cyber-security force that we have created is an essential part of keeping the UK’s commercial interests safe. It is a fundamental building block of our economy not just today but for the future.
The way that has worked with the National Cyber Security Centre is essential, because the reality is that the economy of Britian is not guarded simply by the Government, and national security is not limited to the arms of the state. It is fundamentally true that many suppliers to Government and many different institutions that connect to Government are also important. More than that, every single aspect of our lives is a part of keeping our country safe. Although it is true that the Government do not provide the food, the supermarkets that feed us every day are part of our national security. Although it is true that the Government do not move the money, the banks that keep us fluid in that sense are absolutely part of our national security. It is therefore true that all those capabilities—all the cyber-defence that goes into the wider economy and into our lives—keep us all safe. Sadly, one of the things that has distressed me most in this job is discovering the level of abuse that I am afraid is now prevalent online. Hon. Members will not require me to tell them this, but we see an explosion in online bullying and abuse, and sadly we have seen an explosion in online harm that has taken not just many young people, but many people from across every walk of life, to dark places—and in some cases, very sadly, cost lives.
The cyber work that we do is about protecting not just the state, the Government or even the economy, but homes and families across the United Kingdom. That is why the work that we are doing in the reform of the Computer Misuse Act is so important, because, as the hon. Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis) and particularly as the hon. Member for Preston put it, the changes we have seen online in the last 20 or 30 years since the Act was passed are phenomenal. The Act was passed before the internet, the iPhone and social media. It is, in a modern sense, historical; it is dated and based on an era when to hold data was to hold it on a solid drive in a computer, not in the ether or on the cloud. The nature of intervention to keep cyber-defences alive and test them was very different, and the Act was drafted for that era. That is why the work of Sir Patrick Vallance and the way in which he has approached it have been so important, and it is why we have been looking so carefully at what he recommends and at how to get the best answer out.
The truth is that any decision we make is going to be difficult. It is going to raise questions about the ways in which businesses work and partner with others around the world. The right hon. Member for Midlothian (Owen Thompson) asked about ransomware and the way in which it is changing. That is where the direction that we take it so important—for example, the counter-ransomware initiative that the United Kingdom led and changed in various ways, and the approaches we have taken to ensure that we are properly structured to get its benefits. The reason I am confident that we are going in the right direction is that we are setting the agenda.
In the 18 months since I had the privilege of becoming the Security Minister, we have launched at least two actions. Forgive me as I try to remember how many were public and how many were private; hon. Members will appreciate that in this job it is probably best to get that distinction right. I will say that we have launched at least two public actions alongside partners on counter-ransomware actions. Noticeably, one from about a year ago was against various Russian targets who had decided that it was to their advantage to try to extort and exploit organisations in the United Kingdom and United States. Our reactions—the ways in which we have partnered with allies and friends—have ensured that we are able not just to defend ourselves, but to make the punishment fit the crime. We are putting in place sanctions, closing down accounts and ensuring that we have those resources in partnership with organisations like the FBI to resist those different areas.
This subject also raises some questions about the state, which were hinted at. I will go a little further into it, because this is not just about individual actors, those in the so-called troll farms or the Internet Research Agency, which was so famously used by Russia recently; it is also about states themselves. Sadly, we are seeing states trying to use these forms of exploitation as means of profit. We have seen one state in particular, North Korea, seeking to quite literally use them as a cash cow—as a way of paying for its nuclear weapons programme, extorting money out of individuals around the world to advance its own hostile interests.
This is where some of the changes we have been able to make—alongside the hon. Member for Barnsley Central, to whom I pay tribute, and with support from parties on all sides—will, I think, make a substantial difference in the years to come. Those changes include the National Security Act 2023, which, through the various different elements of co-operation with foreign states, makes criminal actions that formerly would have merely been assisting or would have been hard to define; they may not necessarily have been breaches of the Official Secrets Act, or empowering or profiting a foreign state in a direct sense and in a way that would have been criminal. The National Security Act has been essential in making sure that espionage is properly punished and that the support of hostile states is now criminalised. I am grateful for the support of the hon. Member for Barnsley Central and others, because that legislation has been an important change that has enabled us to make a difference.
We have seen various different ways in which states have used these sorts of powers. For example, I am afraid that we have seen the various different ways in which Beijing has been ordering different threats against us. I will not comment on things that are being gossiped about in different places—in main Chambers rather than in Westminster Hall—but I will say that the state-affiliated cyber group APT31 has been, and consistently remains, a threat targeted against the UK. I am afraid that we have seen that again and again, and we have had to take action to ensure that we are able to protect ourselves. This is one of those areas where the work of the National Cyber Security Centre has been so incredibly important in protecting not just the state but our wider economy—and that is where we have a wider mission, because the truth is that protecting the wider economy is about protecting not just all those areas, but families and individuals across our country.
I am proud of some of the work we have done alongside businesses, some of which are from the UK and some of which are international, which has enabled us to change some of the incentives and pressures on them. We have brought down fraud in the last year; 16% is not as far as I would like it to go, and I am sure that others in the House will recognise that there is further to go, but that is a hell of an achievement by some fantastically dedicated law enforcement professionals and their cyber partners to make sure that homes and families across the United Kingdom are safer.
We are moving further online. For instance, one can look at the national health service today, and see the amazing investment in technology and in the changing way in which we communicate with our doctors. As many of us know, the NHS app—which, I think I am right in saying, has been downloaded by about three quarters of all adults in the United Kingdom, although I will have to check that—is a fantastic way in which we can communicate across the medical professions. However, all of this means that we have wider vectors of attack, which means that it is enormously important to ensure that we are working together. That is why—I correct the hon. Member for Barnsley Central—although the National Security Council may not have a cyber element in that sense, there is a ministerial cyber board, which meets on a similar basis except that it is chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister and brings together Departments from all across Whitehall. That is an extraordinarily important place where we set the policy and make sure that it works together, because the UK Government are already doing a huge amount.
The hon. Member for Barnsley Central asked about the policy of paying ransomware. We have set out that no public body should be using state money to pay ransomware. We have set out this agenda with the national health service and have been very clear to organisations, including the British Library, that it should not be happening. That policy has been made clear. It is also clear that some ransomwares that are being used for profit are being closed down. I do not know if Members are aware of the LockBit sanctions, but they have been incredibly important; in the last few days we have not just taken over the LockBit site—a brilliant piece of work by the National Crime Agency and others, including the FBI—but exposed the people behind it. That is an extremely important way in which we are taking the fight directly to the criminals who are challenging us and making sure that the National Cyber Force, which is soon to be wonderfully homed in Preston—
Tom Tugendhat
Many of its people will be homed around there, I am sure, though they may work in other parts. That force is a fantastically important element in our national defence. While once we flew the white ensign to protect sea lanes, today we fly a different sign —a national cyber-security sign; and with wider British Government protection, we can protect our e-lanes of communication that keep us not just safe but free.