Interest Rate Swap Products

Mark Garnier Excerpts

Thursday 21st June 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)]

I, too, would like to add my name to the long list of people who will be congratulating my hon. Friend the Member for Aberconwy (Guto Bebb) on securing not only the debate, but a great deal of support from the outside world and a community that has been badly affected by these events.

I suspect that we are now at the beginning of what will amount to yet another large mis-selling scandal. I completely endorse the comment of my hon. Friend the Member for Aberconwy that the last thing we need is the spectacle of bus loads of ambulance-chasing lawyers charging across the countryside looking for businesses that have been mis-sold these products. It is incredibly important that we try to resolve the problem before members of the legal profession take advantage of it as an opportunity to feather their nests. These events come at a time when small businesses are struggling to make sales and win orders and contracts. It is a time when the banking system is adding yet another problem to small businesses. It is something we need to try to resolve.

These products, which really amount to caps and collars, should have been relatively straightforward products. They should not be dissimilar to a fixed rate mortgage. Rather than being like a fixed rate mortgage stating that the customer will pay 3% or 5% for five years, for example, they should have stated that the customer would pay between no less than 3% and no more than 8% over a five-year period or whatever. In that respect, such a product would have been a very straightforward cap and collar.

The problem is that the products were written before this period of super-low interest rates. Of course, interest rates have since fallen well below the collar, so the products are not actually cap and collar products; they are cap and noose products. Rather than holding the interest rate at the lower level, the noose has the effect of bouncing the interest rate up, thereby creating a higher rate than the customer would otherwise have expected and, in some cases, than they would have paid at the rate of interest in the first place.

The result is that these products are far more complex than they would normally have been. I declare a history of serving as a compliance officer for an FSA-regulated firm before being elected to this place. We used to spend a huge amount of time ensuring that we classified our clients properly to make sure that the products that were sold were aligned with the abilities. I fear that what is happening here is that we have a misalignment of customer classification. There are salesmen who are not experts in the products and do not know a huge amount about them, and they are selling them to customers who are clearly not experts in the products at all. Under these circumstances, a huge problem is brewing.

The Chair of the Treasury Committee mentioned the fact that in yesterday’s Sub-Committee meeting we met Adair Turner, who assured us that he would go to great lengths to investigate the whole process. Subsequently, I asked Martin Wheatley, the other witness and director of the FSA’s conduct business unit, whether the authority will be looking into the whole business of misclassifying clients as well as salesmen, and he said that without a shadow of doubt it will be specifically doing so, so I sincerely hope that we will reach a speedy resolution on that issue.

[Ian Swales]

The hon. Gentleman makes the powerful point that we do not expect small business owners to be experts, but that their accountants are not often experts, either. The people whom they deal with who will most often be experts are their bankers, so where does he feel that small business owners should get their independent financial advice from?

[Mark Garnier]

That is an incredibly important point. We live in an ever-increasingly complex world, and banks are competing against each other to come up with more and more sophisticated products that appear to be user-friendly, such as simple fixed rate mortgages. But as products become more complex there are more hidden elements in the contracts that people sign, such as in the one under discussion, whereby in a completely unforeseen period of super-low interest rates, business owners have to pay what amounts to a fee to buy themselves out of the contract’s residual value.

People then get into very complex calculations to try to understand what is going on, and the economic value of, and internal rate of return on, the contract. That is when things go way above the pay grade of most people, apart from those specialists sitting in dealing rooms in Canary Wharf who really understand such stuff. So, as part of the banking review and the Financial Services Bill that is passing through Parliament, we need to look very carefully at the classification of customers and of salespersons in order to get back to the fundamental point that we have to match products to a customer’s ability to deal with them.

[George Eustice (Camborne and Redruth) (Con)]

I have seen cases in which, through a process of legal discovery, a very clear e-mail trail has shown banks wilfully deciding not to explain the disadvantages of such products and, sometimes, a complete mismatch between the length of their loans and the length of the product they were selling. Does my hon. Friend agree that this is not just about people not understanding the situation, but about an intention in many cases by people not to inform customers because they wanted the business for their own bank?

[Mark Garnier]

The hon. Member—

[Mr Geoffrey Cox (Torridge and West Devon) (Con)]

Hon. Friend.

[Mark Garnier]

My hon. Friend has almost been reading my speech, because I am about to finish on that point.

There are mismatches of terms and objectives, and on this issue I have a fundamental problem with the banks. A bank manager used to be a customer’s friend, whom they could turn to for financial advice, who would look after them and who, much more importantly, had their interests at heart. The problem is that banks are now simply salesmen looking for another product to sell, and it does not quite matter to them what holistic package is being sold as long as an individual product is.

I simply do not understand why the banks are failing to get the message that they are breathtakingly unpopular. They have really made a pig’s ear of our economy and financial system, so why do they continue to do so—in the face of the public opinion? It does not make any sense, so I make this appeal to the banks: please take a look at this issue. If you have created what should be a collar and cap arrangement, but it turns out to be a cap and noose arrangement, negotiate with your customer, help them out, stop feeding solicitors lots of money and try to resolve it in order to get back to a situation where bank managers are people we can trust.

Banking Reform

Mark Garnier Excerpts

Thursday 14th June 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his statement today, and also for these measures, which go a long way in dealing with the “too big to fail” problem, and in some ways deal with the “too small to start” problem. He will be aware that in the last 100 years, only one ab initio banking licence has been granted. Part of the problem is a reluctance on the part of officials at the FSA to grant new banking licences. Will he look again at the issue of competition in the Prudential Regulatory Authority, in order to try to help challenger banks enter the marketplace?

[Mr Hoban]

My hon. Friend makes a good point. As I have said, the Bank and the FSA are looking at prudential and conduct requirements to ensure that they are proportionate. However, the other thing I would say is that the implicit guarantee enjoyed by our bigger banks distorts competition. Our reforms tackle that, helping to create a more level playing field for new entrants and enabling them to compete properly with established players.

Static Caravans (VAT)

Mark Garnier Excerpts

Thursday 26th April 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Stuart]

I will give way to my other colleagues shortly, but let me first respond to my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster and Fleetwood (Eric Ollerenshaw).

The Finance Act 1972 introduced zero rating of certain caravans. The notes on clauses relating to what was then group 10 of schedule 4 referred to relief for

“houses and other domestic accommodation”,

and stated:

“The caravans in the Group are akin to houses; they are too large to be towed on the road, and are usually permanently attached to the land.”

The deliberate intention of the law, which was debated in the House—with no anomaly, no forgotten section, and no category of products that had been missed—was to treat caravans, other than those towed by cars, as “other domestic accommodation” in the same way as houses.

[Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)]

In my constituency, many people view static caravans as second homes. Is there not a case for the Treasury to treat them as second homes, subject to stamp duty, rather than making them subject to VAT like mobile caravans?

[Mr Stuart]

That would be consistent, because the qualities of a mobile caravan are completely different from those of a static caravan or a house. What are static caravans used for? They are second homes. Someone who buys a £240,000 cottage in one of the rural areas represented by my colleagues, which often means pricing out local workers, will pay tax of 1%, whereas it is proposed that someone who buys a static caravan for £24,000, a tenth of that amount, should pay 20%— 20 times as much—on a home that is used for precisely the same purposes. That is not getting rid of an anomaly, as Treasury civil servants originally suggested; it is creating an anomaly.

Financial Services Bill

Mark Garnier Excerpts

Monday 23rd April 2012 Commons Chamber

[Chris Leslie]

There might well be a case for that, but we are talking about people’s homes and the roofs over their heads. Repossessions can seriously hurt people, especially if they were unable to anticipate the situation because of a shock or unpredicted changes to their interest rates. As I have said, this point in the cycle is the right time to make this sort of change. It is about preparedness and information for home owners, and I feel strongly that we ought to have that in statute. If the Minister does not agree, this is certainly one of the issues on which we want to test the will of the House.

[Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Chris Leslie]

I will give way, but there are a number of other amendments I have to talk about.

[Mark Garnier]

I am incredibly grateful to the hon. Gentleman. He talks about an incredibly significant problem in this country: the £1.2 trillion-worth of mortgage debt for all the people of this land. What he is describing is a steepening in the yield curve, but that could also be the result of an increase in deposit rates, so what could be taken away with one hand could be a result of giving with the other hand. What I am really struggling with in the new clause is how he envisages mortgage lenders being able to deliver the warning, given the fact that he defines a shock in interest rates as something that cannot be predicted. Moreover, how does he envisage this working in practice?

[Chris Leslie]

The hon. Gentleman might know that in annual pension statements, for example, in the key facts documents a number of scenarios are put forward for what the pension might be worth under a range of growth options, such as annual growth of 3%, 5% or 9%. All I am seeking to do is ask the Financial Conduct Authority to consider a way of giving a range of scenarios and helping to provide information for customers, which would not be impossible. That is why I think that that is necessary for mortgages. I hope that hon. Members on both sides of the House will support what is a pretty modest change. It is something that I know we are all concerned about. The Government definitely need to go away and look at the issue again.

Amendment 37, which also stands in my name, relates to the Consumer Financial Education Body, which we now call the Money Advice Service. We are seeking to amend the Bill so that it specifically targets

“proactive and easily accessible advice to those encountering economic disadvantage, financial exclusion or financial exploitation.”

In our view, it is vital that the Money Advice Service focuses as much effort as possible on the vulnerable and those susceptible to problems, whether as a result of misinformation or choices made in financial investments. We know already, from examples in our surgeries, that those on the lowest incomes—the most vulnerable in society—need to be better protected in legislation, and that is why the new clause has been tabled.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Mudie]

One can see many scenarios. I have seen many political philanthropists since I have been a Member of Parliament. I worry because they come to the House as politicians, but seem not to want to do anything or take any responsibility. They have offloaded power to quangos and agencies, and gave independence to the Bank. The real question is why are the Chancellor and the Treasury sitting back and watching their ground—sensitive economic ground—being given away to a quango, an unelected bunch of people? Under the Bill, those people can take the remit and the guidance on it, which the Treasury sets, and say to the Treasury, “We don’t agree with you,” and that is that. That is the situation we are reaching on accountability and responsibility despite the worry about giving away powers.

On amendment 23, some hon. Members were hard on my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham East, although it is not as if he cannot defend himself. The Government’s original proposition, which was put out for consultation, included macro-prudential tools, which, as hon. Members have said, are highly sensitive and powerful. One aspect of the proposal they have given up because of its sensitivity—I am going by what has been in the papers in the past few days—is the ability to interfere in the mortgage market on loan-to-value and similar matters. What happens if the unelected Financial Policy Committee starts leaning against the wind in a way that affects large numbers of people, and there is no way of talking to it or affecting its position?

The Government’s original proposal was that decisions on macro-prudential tools would go upstairs to the Committee Corridor as statutory instruments—secondary legislation—for a 90-minute debate on a measure that would not be amendable. All hon. Members know what happens upstairs. The Minister talks for an hour, the shadow Minister talks for 25 minutes and we all go home, with the measure voted through by the Government majority. That happens with Governments of all parties. The way secondary legislation is dealt with in Parliament is an absolute disgrace. We can excuse a lot of it, but matters as important as the ones we are discussing, it is scandalous.

To be fair to the Chancellor, I raised the proposal with him when he first introduced it and asked him to look at it again because of its undemocratic nature. I am pleased that the line has softened, but there is more talking and work to be done. If hon. Members are asked to give away powers that affect our constituents so directly, it is important for us to be absolutely sure that we have had the opportunity to at least have our say in the strongest possible terms and ones that might allow the regulator to think about what has been said, although it is not for us to take its take its job.

A Government Member attacked my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham East and asked him whether he would interfere with a regulator. We had that situation when the Treasury Committee discussed the retail distribution review with the chief executive of the FSA. We said to him, “This Committee feels strongly about this matter. We’ve had a lot of press about it and a lot of pressure, and we’d like you to think again.” He replied, “No, we won’t think again, unless you give me evidence.” The Treasury Select Committee giving evidence to the chief executive of the FSA—what arrogance! My hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham East is doing the Government a favour. They might not agree with the detail of the amendment, but the spirit is that we give the House every opportunity to comment on, think about and be aware of the powers we give to individuals that might affect our constituents.

[Mark Garnier]

It is a great pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Leeds East (Mr Mudie), with whom I serve on the Treasury Committee. It is interesting that I am the fourth consecutive Committee member to speak.

The House will not be surprised to hear that I rise to speak to new clause 1, tabled in the name of my hon. Friend the Committee Chairman, under whom it has been a great pleasure to serve. He is a very forensic Chairman of a Committee doing some extraordinarily good work at a time when it could not be more important—when we are facing some of the most fundamental problems in the economic world and when it is incredibly important that we do something significant about financial regulation. There is no doubt that something needs to be done. We have had a problem with a system of financial regulation that failed to address the problems with the banks, and the Bill travels a huge distance in trying to resolve those problems and come up with a robust new regulatory framework.

Having been a compliance officer under not one but three regulatory regimes—the Securities and Futures Authority, the Financial Services Authority and the Securities and Investment Board—and, prior to that, a regulated dealer on the floor of the stock exchange under the old stock exchange rules, I have had a fair degree of practical experience of financial regulation. Furthermore, in the past 18 months or so, I have, with the rest of the Committee, spent a huge amount of time scrutinising and studying the draft recommendations for the Bill. I also spent some 50 hours, in the Bill Committee, with the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie), who waxed lyrical and at great length—and with great intelligence, I might add; and here we are on the Floor of the House talking about the matter yet again.

A number of things in the Bill are not ideal, but the one surgical cut that would have the most effect would be new clause 1. The Bill contains perhaps the single most fundamental change that we will see in financial regulation—the creation of the Financial Policy Committee. We have heard a lot about the FPC. One of the criticisms is that it could make profound changes to our financial system in trying to deal with financial instabilities, with bubbles that seem to be growing and all the rest of it. We can speculate ad nauseam about the type of interventions that could be made, but the one that people talk about a great deal is where the FPC may, with one of its tools of direction or recommendation, direct banks to change the loan-to-value ratios on mortgages. That could have far-reaching effects for our constituents.

[Mr Hoban]

May I make it clear that the FPC has ruled out intervening on loan-to-value ratios? It is important that we do not let this hare continue to run much longer.

[Mark Garnier]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that clarification. Interestingly enough, though, it is perhaps one of the powers that the FPC should have kept. Although it could have profound effects for people moving and so on, it is incredibly important not to lose sight of what others issues the FPC is there to address. In the past, as bubbles have grown, Members have sometimes been reluctant to take away the punch bowl before the party is over. Sometimes, when we allow bubbles to get bigger than they should be, the result is a financial crisis of the kind that we have seen. There are many things, on an analysis of the financial crisis, that could have happened, but one of them was allowing a colossal asset bubble to grow against uncontrolled lending. If a Member of Parliament or the Chancellor of the Exchequer had turned around in 2007 and said, “We’re going to stop that,” there would have been an absolute outcry. However, if the FPC had done that, it would have been acting without the worry about what would happen at the next general election, and perhaps we would have avoided the problem. It is for that sort of intervention that the FPC is being created.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

What happens when the FPC gets things wrong? How will it be held responsible for the decisions it makes?

[Mark Garnier]

I am grateful for my hon. Friend’s intervention, because that is exactly the point I am coming to. What is the accountability of the FPC? Ultimately, it has to come down, in some way, to the court of the Bank of England making an intervention to assess what is going on.

As we have discussed, the FPC will have far-reaching powers to intervene, some of which we may never know about. Some might be restricted to a 30-year rule, so we might hear about them in the future, although an awful lot may well be published. However, it is incredibly important that we look at what the Bank of England does to supervise. Currently, the court of the Bank of England is responsible for administrative matters, as we have heard—it is responsible for pay and rations. What we on the Treasury Committee want is the Bank to have a proper board—probably with a new name that reflects its updated role, although I do not think that will happen. We recommended that it should have a majority of external members who must have the relevant skills and experience, and the Treasury Committee wants the court of the Bank to be able to conduct—this is an important point—retrospective internal reviews of policy decisions of the Bank. The Bank’s response envisages limiting that to commissioning external reviews or conducting internal reviews only of the decision-making process of the Bank.

The creation of the FPC—on which my hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart) intervened on me—makes this governance issue incredibly important. As we have heard, the Monetary Policy Committee has just two tools: quantitative easing and interest rates, which it uses openly and publicly. We see detailed minutes of the meetings, followed up by evidence sessions by the Treasury Committee, which is also part of an incredibly important scrutiny process, which is fully transparent and very simple. However, as we have heard, the FPC has a large range of tools at its disposal, which means that it might not be able to give a full and open account to the Treasury Committee or publish entirely transparent minutes. Moreover, as I have said, it might be years before we know what intervention has been made. That is why we need an organisation that can intervene to look at what the FPC is doing and take on a strong governance responsibility.

That is why the court of the Bank of England needs to be able to look at the merits of the FPC’s policies and not just the method. The Bank’s board must not be restricted to finding out whether the wrong decisions were made but in the right way. That is why I would be incredibly grateful if the Minister gave serious consideration to new clause 1.

[John McDonnell]

I am not part of the charmed circle of the Treasury Committee, but I wish to add my congratulations to the hon. Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie) and the members of the Committee on the work they have undertaken in examining the Bill as it has gone through the House.

I have tabled amendments 46, 47, 49 and 50, which seek to enhance the Treasury Committee’s role in the appointments of the Governor and deputy Governors of the Bank of England, and the chair and chief executive of the Financial Conduct Authority. I have done so because the background to this legislation is perhaps the most catastrophic failure of the Bank of England and the financial regulatory authorities that we have seen in 70 years. Their failure to predict or intervene effectively to ensure that the financial crisis was averted or dealt with adequately, speedily and effectively is there for all to behold. It has brought this country to its financial knees and into a recession that is turning into a depression, which is something we have not seen since the 1930s. The reasons for that have been evidenced today. New clause 1 would address part of the issue—namely, the lack of transparency of the old regime—but another element was the lack of accountability.

This legislation will create, in the Governor of the Bank of England, one of the most important roles in the country. The Financial Times editorial of Thursday 19 April stated:

“The central bank governor is not just some technocrat, but the most powerful unelected official in the country. His role has become more political since the crisis, not less, and will be even more sensitive when the BoE acquires new powers to avert financial crises. The next governor must win public acceptance and possess sharply honed political antennas. This might be harder for a foreigner.”

That last comment refers to the speculation about some of the candidates that the Government are considering.

In today’s Financial Times, the shadow Chancellor sets out his concerns about the range of powers and responsibilities that the new Governor will have, stating that only a superman or superwoman need apply, because the job will be so influential and will have such a wide range of roles and responsibilities. The Treasury Committee appreciated that fact very early on in the game, in its consideration of the new legislation. That is why, way back in November, it recommended that it should have a role in the appointment of this significant post. The Chancellor of the Exchequer argued against that proposition. I find it extraordinary that the Treasury Committee won the right to have a veto over the appointment of the chair of the Office for Budget Responsibility, yet failed to win a role in the appointment of the much more significant post of the Governor of the Bank of England. Indeed, it has no role in the appointment of the deputy governors, and no effective role in the appointment of the Financial Conduct Authority proposed in the Bill.

I genuinely thought that the Government were about to shift their stance on this matter, because, back in November 2011, the Treasury Committee stated strongly that it was not persuaded by the Chancellor’s refusal to grant it a role in the appointment. It went on:

“The power of veto with respect to the OBR was given to ensure the independence and accountability of that body. The Governor of the Bank’s independence from Government is crucial for his or her credibility. Given the vast responsibilities of the Governor, the case for this Committee to have a power of veto over the appointment or dismissal of the Governor is even stronger than it is with respect to the OBR. We therefore recommend that, in order to safeguard his or her independence, the Treasury Committee is given a statutory power of veto over the appointment and dismissal of the Governor of the Bank of England.”

I wholeheartedly supported that view. The Chancellor’s argument was that the Treasury Committee could not have such a role because the Governor was exercising an Executive function and should therefore be a Government appointee. That is an absolutely specious argument.

The legislation to give independence to the Bank of England went through the House, although I never supported it. That means that the Governor has more than an Executive function. The Bank is not an Executive arm of the Government. The Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Government cannot have it both ways. If they support the independence of the Bank of England from the Government, they must establish some other form of accountability to Parliament. If they do not believe that it is independent, and that it is simply an Executive arm of the Government, the Governor will be appointed directly by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Even if that is the Government’s argument, the Chancellor of the Exchequer is still accountable to the House, so there must be some role that the House can play in advising him on the appointment of this important post.

My amendments would simply reassert the role of the Treasury Committee and thus Parliament itself in this vital range of decisions about appointments to key elements of the new structure proposed by the Government. Let me be frank. I agree with everything said about the role of the Treasury Committee Chairman and I agree that he needs to be called “right honourable” and the all the rest of it, but sometimes people are born great and sometimes people avoid greatness being thrust upon them. I do not know what negotiations went on, and it might well be that the negotiations were along the lines of, “We will not push for a veto on appointment as long as we can get some transparency and thus at least some element of accountability for that post to the Committee itself.” If that was the tenor of the negotiations with the Government—I happily allow the Treasury Committee Chairman to intervene to clarify it—I am afraid that the deal is not good enough.

What needs to be said very clearly by this House is that these are such significant appointments—particularly the Governor of the Bank of England but also the head of the Financial Services Authority in view of its key role in seeking to avoid further crises and in regulating this country’s financial services—that this House must have at least some say over the calibre of these persons.

Finance (No. 4) Bill

Mark Garnier Excerpts

Thursday 19th April 2012 Commons Chamber

[Graham Evans (Weaver Vale) (Con)]

I pay tribute to my hon. Friends the Members for Stourbridge (Margot James) and for Ipswich (Ben Gummer), who have eloquently made many of the points that I intended to make. I do not want to repeat them.

First and foremost, the Bill makes it clear that the Government are sticking to the plan to deal with the mess left by Labour and eliminate the structural deficit. That is essential for market confidence in the future of our economy and wealth creation.

Secondly, the Bill is clearly on the side of working people and pensioners. It is pro-business and helps people who want to do better for themselves and their families. It cuts tax for 24 million ordinary families across the country, including 2.5 million in the north-west. Thanks to the Budget, most basic rate taxpayers will keep an extra £220 of their salary every year. That represents the largest real personal tax cut for people on average earnings in more than a decade. I appreciate that £220 might not seem like that much to the Labour leader, sat in his multi-million pound home in Primrose Hill, but for people struggling to get by in Cheshire, £220 is a real help. The Bill therefore helps working people.

[Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that over the period of the changes to the tax-free allowance, the total contribution will be more than £500 for the average individual?

[Graham Evans]

I am most grateful to my hon. Friend for making that good point, with which I agree. It is a good Budget for working people on basic rate tax.

--- Later in debate ---

[Katy Clark]

Government Members keep trying to return to that point. As I have said, the freeze applied to all allowances, and it is not comparable to what we are debating. This is a specific debate about long-term Government policy towards pensioners and the long-term cumulative effect that this change will have.

As I say, this is the wrong time to come forward with changes of this nature. We heard a well-informed contribution from the hon. Member for Banff and Buchan (Dr Whiteford) on the situation faced by pensioners who rely on private savings. I suspect that many of us as constituency MPs have had a considerable number of representations from individuals who have planned their pension and retirement savings over many years on the assumption that higher rates of interest would apply, enabling them to live off the savings they had made over a long period. I very much hope that in 2013, when these changes come into force, the economic situation will be different, but I suspect that those pensioners will be in a similar position. That is another powerful reason why now is an incredibly bad time to make changes of this kind. In my view, they should have been introduced with far greater notice.

The Government should know that pensioners are being disproportionately affected by the policies they are pursuing. We hear a great deal from Government Members about their ambitious deficit reduction plan—so far, of course, we have only seen the deficit increase. What we are seeing locally, and I suspect they will be seeing it, too—[Interruption.] Government Members are well aware that they are borrowing more and that the deficit is going up. In their constituencies as well as mine, however, local people will be experiencing the start of draconian cuts in public services, which will have and are already having a disproportionate effect on those in retirement. Even before the current economic difficulties, we were all aware of the struggle councils were having in trying to provide the social services required for our changing demographic and our ageing population.

[Mark Garnier]

The hon. Lady really must get the point about the deficit right. The deficit has been reduced from more than £150 billion when this Government first came to power to, I think, £132 billion this year. She may be getting confused between deficit and debt, and Government debt is going up, but it is going up because we have such catastrophic public finances as a result of the previous Government.

[Katy Clark]

The hon. Gentleman is well aware that borrowing is going up. As I was saying, despite the fact that the Government are failing and have consistently failed to meet their own targets, the reality is that the cuts in public spending they have already made—and they propose more for the coming years—are having a disproportionate effect on the pensioner community.

--- Later in debate ---

[Cathy Jamieson]

My hon. Friend makes a significant point and that is part of the fairness test, which I do not think has been met. The Centre for Social Justice has been very critical of this aspect of the Government’s plans, which it argues could

“threaten a new wave of family instability and breakdown…which flies in the face of their commitment to ‘shared parenting’.”

[Mark Garnier]

I am not entirely unsympathetic to a great many of the hon. Lady’s points, but what she is describing has a great deal to do with the complexity of the tax system as a whole. That tax system doubled in complexity under her Government.

[Cathy Jamieson]

With respect to the hon. Gentleman—he said he had some sympathy with my points, so I do not want to be entirely negative in response—we will not solve the complexities of the taxation system by adding even more complexities that are unfair to families and will affect children negatively.

Let me put one final issue on the record. People who are not in work and who receive child benefit for a child under 12 receive national insurance credits to enable them to build up entitlement to state pensions. The Government’s original announcement led to concerns about the impact on future pension entitlements of women, in particular, if families stopped claiming child benefit. The Government said from the outset that no one would miss out on national insurance credits as a result of the child benefit changes, but it is unclear how they proposed to ensure that. Under the latest proposals, people who are entitled to child benefit and families affected by this charge may elect not to receive it, but a claim for child benefit will still need to be made in order to receive national insurance credits. Information published by HMRC confirms that.

I am extremely conscious of the time so I will not say anything more, other than that I think that everybody should listen carefully to the debate and to the points that have been made. When Members consider how to vote, they should consider both the principles involved of support for families with children as well as the layers of complexity and confusion there will be if the proposal goes through.

Finance (No. 4) Bill

Mark Garnier Excerpts

Wednesday 18th April 2012 Commons Chamber

How will the proposed regulation be monitored? Are we going to see hordes of VAT inspectors armed with thermometers swooping down on bakers’ customers as they leave the shop and sticking their thermometers in their pies to see whether they are hotter than the ambient temperature?

[Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)]

My hon. Friend may be interested to hear that the written evidence given to the Treasury Committee by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales states that these VAT changes are broadly sensible reforms

“but will still leave plenty of anomalies”.

[Gordon Henderson]

I can only agree with that:

I accept that there is an argument for trying to address the current situation whereby some shops sell hot pies without charging VAT but others, such as my local chippy, have to charge VAT on the hot pies that they sell. However, the Government’s proposal is not an answer. Nor, sadly, is the Opposition’s new clause 1, which is why I cannot support it. I very much hope that the hon. Member for Pontypridd (Owen Smith) will withdraw it, and that he and his colleagues will support new clause 5, which I believe would achieve the Government’s objectives while protecting businesses such as that run by my friend.

Budget Resolutions and Economic Situation

Mark Garnier Excerpts

Friday 23rd March 2012 Commons Chamber

[Gregg McClymont]

There is no doubt, and the hon. Gentleman is right to say, that not everything in the garden was rosy by 2010. That does not take away from the current Government their responsibility to stimulate the economy. On any metric, growth of 0.8% this year and next year is only very limited growth. On current estimates we will not return to 2007 GPD levels till 2013. That slump will be the longest since the 19th century—six years to get back to a previous level of GDP. That is indeed a slump, and this is a stagnation Budget.

[Mark Garnier]

Does that not illustrate the fact that such an appalling mess was made by the previous Government that it resulted in such a long and deep recession?

[Gregg McClymont]

As the hon. Gentleman knows, whatever the situation when this Government took office, they are now, by their own estimates, going to borrow £150 billion more than they estimated, so they are adding debt upon debt, with no growth to show for it.

Financial Services Bill

Mark Garnier Excerpts

Monday 6th February 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)]

It is a great pleasure to speak in this debate, partly because in a previous existence I spent a number of years on two occasions as a compliance officer under three different regulatory regimes, and also because I am the third of the three Treasury Committee musketeers who did not go on the trip to Shanghai and who were left behind to hold the fort.

What is abundantly clear—I do not need to repeat it—is the utter uselessness of the current regulatory regime and how the FSA operates. That can be illustrated by the exchange of words between my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the shadow Chancellor about the operation of the day-to-day running of the tripartite regime. Only last week we heard from Hector Sants, the chief executive officer of the FSA, that while he was a managing director of wholesale and institutional markets at the FSA, he had no discussions whatever about the Royal Bank of Scotland’s investment bank. Lord Turner went on to add that the FSA was singularly incapable of meeting the expectations placed on it given the breadth of its regulatory responsibility. Given that, the need for a new regime is unquestionable. I am certainly satisfied, in the broadest sense, that the Bill makes great progress, not least in response to Lord Turner’s comments. We are dividing up regulation between the Financial Conduct Authority, which will be charged with protecting the consumer, the Prudential Regulation Authority, which will look after the nuts and bolts of the system, and the Financial Policy Committee, which has been set up to look at systemic risks.

As the third member of the Treasury Committee to speak in this debate, I fear I might repeat some of the points that have been made. If I do so, it will be to reinforce those points. One thing that has not been talked about, however, is the speed and complexity of the Bill. It is complex and has very far-reaching implications for the long-term security of our financial system as well as for the competitiveness of this country. It is worth remembering that financial services employ more than 1 million people in the UK and raise more than £50 billion a year in tax revenue.

The Bill seeks to amend three previous Acts. The Treasury Committee recommended that the Government start afresh with a new Bill dedicated to addressing all the myriad points discussed since the financial crisis and, indeed, before. The Governor of the Bank of England agrees; he said to a meeting of the Committee last year that

“our first preference had been to have a clean, new Bill, spelling out the new system rather than just amend FSMA.”

He continued, and on this point I wholeheartedly agree:

“We are losing the simplicity and the ability to have a cleaner debate about the…framework.”

The more complex a system, the easier it is for it to go wrong and the more difficult it is to find out why it went wrong in the first place and to repair it.

One of the most profound elements of the Bill is the creation of the FPC, and we have heard a lot about that this afternoon. The FPC is charged with making sure that systemic risks do not emerge and that bubbles, such as credit bubbles, are not allowed to develop. That is unprecedented in our financial system and will have far-reaching implications. The interim FPC, as we have heard, has been in place for some time and the Treasury Committee has spoken with its members about how it is moving along, but its final format is yet to be set in stone.

At the FPC’s disposal will be a range of macro-prudential tools that it can use to control the financial system and markets, and I was pleased to hear the Chancellor say that we would be able to debate the matter on the Floor of the House and decide which tools will be available. The tools will fall into two categories, however. Those in the first category, which will be debated in the House, will be the tools of direction and might include such things as loan-to-value ratios for mortgages, liquidity requirements and capital ratios for banks, which could be directed on to the system via the PRA or the FCA. The measures in the second category, which have not really been talked about this afternoon, will be powers of recommendation and they can be absolutely anything. The actions of the FPC, however, will have the most effect not just on our economy but on our society.

Let me take one of the simplest cases by way of an example. The FPC, in its wisdom, might decide that a credit-fuelled asset bubble is emerging so it wants to tighten up loan-to-value ratios on mortgages. Instead of a 10% or 15% deposit on a house purchase, it will direct that lenders move to a 30% deposit. That is all very simple and fair enough. However, those who are affected first and most deeply will almost certainly be first-time buyers who will suddenly find they do not have the deposits to make a house purchase. People who have only recently bought a property and who therefore probably have relatively low equity might find that they are now not in a position to move house, which will have implications for the mobility of our work force. For a property developer, the tightening of the loan-to-value ratio alone might influence a decision not to develop their land bank. The tightening of that potential supply could lead to exactly the opposite effect on house prices to that which is desired. I hope that illustrates that the implications of such a simple move are widespread and can, indeed, be unpredictable.

As we have heard, the FPC will have a financial stability objective, which will develop from recommendations by the Treasury. The FPC will need to monitor indicators of financial stability, but we do not yet know what those will be. Nor do we know at what levels they will start triggering intervention. The interim FPC has given us a guide, but it gives little indication as to what will actually happen. Were it to publish its dashboard of limits in relation to where it does intervene, the markets would, to a certain extent, be self-correcting. However, there will be occasions on which it will not want to publish because it wants to be discreet or even secretive about its interventions. Under those circumstances, the Treasury Committee will find it difficult to scrutinise such secret interventions.

That brings me to my next point, which is incredibly important, on the governance of the Bank of England. Let me address the good news first: the Treasury Committee very much welcomes the move to a single eight-year term for the Governor of the Bank of England, as opposed to two five-year terms. However, that raises the possibility of a Governor crossing Governments of two flavours, and we on the Treasury Committee think it would make sense if Parliament, through the Treasury Committee, had a power of veto over the Governor’s appointment. The Chancellor took the unprecedented and extremely welcome move, after the election, of giving the Treasury Committee a power of veto over the appointment of the chairman of the Office for Budget Responsibility. Now we have seen how well that works in practice, we think the Governor’s appointment is another occasion for which such a power of veto would be appropriate.

More widely, the Treasury Committee is concerned about the governance of the Bank of England. I welcome the Chancellor’s comment about the new oversight committee, but currently the court is responsible for essentially administrative matters—pay and rations. We want the Bank to have a proper board with a new name that reflects its updated role. We recommend that the board should have a majority of external members, as we have heard from my hon. Friend the Member for Bury St Edmunds (Mr Ruffley), who must have more relevant skills and experience. The Treasury Committee wants the board to be able to conduct retrospective internal reviews of the Bank’s policy decisions. In its response to these calls, the Bank envisages limiting that power to commissioning external reviews or conducting internal reviews only of the decision-making processes of the Bank.

The creation of the FPC makes this governance issue particularly important. As we know, the MPC uses just two tools—quantitative easing and interest rates—and the minutes of its meetings are published so we know exactly what is going on, which is a very good thing. The FPC, however, has many measures at its disposal, both directive and recommendational—potentially an infinite range. By their nature, those measures might on occasion be implemented in a secret way, which means that the FPC might not be able to give a full and open account to the Treasury Committee or to publish entirely transparent minutes. Moreover, it might be years or even decades before we know that an intervention has taken place or even that an intervention has become necessary. That is why the governing body of the Bank needs to be able to look at the merits of the FPC’s policies and not just at the methods. The Bank’s board must not be restricted to finding out whether the wrong decision was made, but in the right way.

Crisis management is a crucial area about which much has been said this afternoon. I certainly welcome the creation of a new power of direction for the Chancellor over the Bank in a crisis, which was recommended by the Treasury Committee. The Bill requires that the Governor must formally notify the Chancellor in the event of public funds being at a material risk. The Chancellor cannot direct the Bank unless there is a threat to financial stability as well as a threat to public funds, and the scope of the power of direction is narrowly defined. The arrangements for crisis management are something that could be discussed in Committee, but clarity is vital. For me, the answer to this simple question is crucial. If I see an unhappy bunch of customers outside a bank in Kidderminster high street, who should I telephone? I think the Bill answers that question.

I have voiced a number of concerns from the Treasury Committee and they include my personal feelings. However, I welcome the aims and thrusts of the Bill and the fact that the Government have moved some way towards the Treasury Committee’s recommendations. Let me finish on this point: the financial services industry is incredibly important to this country in terms both of employment and of economic and fiscal contribution. It represents around 11% of gross domestic product, but it is already under widespread attack, including from the press and politicians. Over the next few months there will be a change to the regulatory regime, which we are debating today, followed by a change in the banking regulations, all mixed in with a plethora of new rules from Europe. It is vital that we sort out the current regulatory framework to ensure that we can spot and resolve the crises of the future, but it is just as important that we provide a stable regulatory platform to allow all the firms and individuals involved in this industry to continue to be profitable, to plan for the future with confidence and to be sure of regulatory stability.

[Several hon. Members]

rose—

--- Later in debate ---

[Mark Field (Cities of London and Westminster) (Con)]

To be frank, I still regard too much of this legislation as deficient, and I shall touch on some specific concerns, but it would be remiss not to give the Treasury significant credit for some of the work it has done. The extensive and broadly constructive pre-legislative consultation by the Joint Committee is a positive step. The outstanding and ongoing contribution of the Treasury Committee will help to focus the Government’s mind on some of the key institutional pitfalls. There is also an increasing recognition by the Treasury that this is an area of public policy where political judgments will need to be made, and that ultimately the buck must stop with it, not with the Bank of England, however good a Governor we may have.

My general dissatisfaction relates first and foremost to the inevitable guillotine in this House, which means that the high-level sophisticated scrutiny will have to come from the other place, and I fear that that shows our House in a poor light. It is not that we lack collective experience in this crucial field, but the wish of Governments, throughout my 11 years in the House, to get legislation through by whipped votes means that we continue to fail to hold the Executive to account, particularly on such important pieces of legislation.

This is probably the only area where I have some sympathy with the shadow Chancellor. The genesis of the Bill was perhaps a rather simplistic political analysis surrounding the financial collapse of 2007-08. It was not really the tripartite system of regulation that was at the heart of those concerns, but an old-fashioned debt and credit bubble and the global imbalance between the east and the west. It is important that we recognise that, because the result was not simply the failing of banks, bankers and Labour politicians; the simplistic analysis also fails to answer the core question that has dogged regulators ever since the financial crisis began: “When the crash came, who was in charge?” The risk is that we will replace an unsatisfactory tripartite system with a potentially even more complex four-way system. I think that there is a risk that that will come to pass, although I do not buy into the shadow Chancellor’s entire analysis. In truth, the new FCA will have too few people of the requisite expertise and sound judgment. Unsurprisingly, it remains very unloved and unrespected by too many professionals in the City, and I am afraid that that matters, given the important role that it will have.

Let me touch on some of the more substantial political issues that the press have not focused very much on. There is an overall concern about how prescriptive the new regime will be, and to what extent the Bill will recalibrate things in a way that will have unintended and potentially damaging consequences for the industry, the UK and the consumer. I will give a few examples. On the warning notice publicity, the Bill will change the current position whereby enforcement action becomes public only at the end of the process, after the firm has decided whether to go to tribunal, and before that stage has had two opportunities to make representations. The new approach means that there will be negative publicity at the stage of the warning notice—the first notice—and the firm will have no right to make representations before that. The reality is that, essentially, the Daily Mail test means that all the damage to the firm’s reputation will be done before any due process has been gone through. The argument in favour of the change is that this is similar to a criminal case, but that misses the important difference between the cases, and represents a worrying trend in the thinking, to the effect that everyone in the industry is somehow a would-be criminal.

[Mark Garnier]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Mark Field]

I am afraid that I will not.

Product regulation and financial promotion powers are another issue. There are powers to intervene earlier in the product life cycle and ban financial promotions. There is an argument that the FSA already has the power to do this. The big political point is the balance between market and regulatory failure. All the debate has been about how the powers are needed to prevent market failure and how the regulator will be far more involved in product design and in the business. It is difficult to argue with the concept, but the position that there is no moral hazard in going down this route is arguably naive, and fails to recognise that the regulators never have perfect vision.

The cost of regulation is in many ways the dog that has not barked. There is nothing in the Bill to apply more financial discipline to either the PRA or the FCA, so the cost-benefit analysis does not apply to the rules that they have in place. We must also ask how the new regulators will work together. The Bill sets out certain principles for the memorandum of understanding between the PRA and the FCA, which is perhaps all that can be expected. However, that leaves on trust a lot of the detail of how the new organisations will work together. That is a key practical issue for firms if this is not to lead to new and inconsistent regulation.

One good example relates to threshold conditions. The Bill provides the PRA and the FCA with the power to make threshold condition codes, which will elaborate on the conditions and how they will apply to different classes of firm. Those codes will be binding. What will happen if the two regulators take inconsistent approaches on, for example, explaining what they mean by the suitability condition? The last thing anyone wants is the development of an industry engaged in arbitrage between the two inconsistent approaches to regulation for different parts of the industry. That is a particular worry for dual- regulated firms, and firms left under the FCA, such as fund managers, are concerned that they could suffer from more heavy-handed regulation, rather than the more senatorial style that it is assumed the PRA will adopt.

Will there be enough of the secondary framework to be able to consider the new structure properly? That is a general question, and one example is whether investment firms are within the PRA’s scope. Firms do not yet know, and things keep changing. For example, the Government agree that the risks posed by investment firms and the concerns arising from last autumn’s MF Global failure should continue to be subject to scrutiny by the authorities, which might change the boundary. The point about MF Global is that it did not take proprietary positions, and so would have fallen on the FCA side. The argument is that the organisation has caused great systemic problems, and so surely should have been regulated by the PRA.

That question has now been partly—but only partly— addressed, through the draft designation order published on the Treasury’s website, setting out the criteria that the PRA will apply when considering whether it should designate individual firms as “dealing in investments as principal” for PRA regulation. Has enough thought been given to that issue, however? There is a parallel debate about large hedge fund managers, who deal only as agents, and therefore stay on the FCA side, yet arguably pose a systemic risk themselves. It is hard to look at the new framework in the round until all such details are sorted out.

I shall conclude soon, because I appreciate that other Members have more to say. Indeed, there is so much more that I could say myself. One issue that has been widely discussed is the competition objective, which was especially well dealt with in the Joint Committee’s report. The point often missed is that the whole discussion is about competition within the market, and whether that itself should be an objective or principle to which the FCA ought to be compelled to have regard. It is not about the more fundamental issue of the competitiveness of the UK as a financial services centre, important though that is. That says something about the new approach to the industry.

I fear that we risk throwing the out baby with the bathwater. Why should the UK not have regard to the competitiveness of one of its most important industries, subject to the other important goals of market stability and consumer protection? Rebalancing the economy is all well and good, but it should not mean undermining the vital importance of the City and of financial services to the UK as a whole.

Fuel Prices

Mark Garnier Excerpts

Tuesday 15th November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)]

Speaking as somebody whose combined family mileage approaches 50,000 miles a year, and as a Member who represents a semi-rural constituency, I am acutely aware of the burden placed on local households by fuel prices. The cost of fuel does not just affect those who use cars; it affects everyone through food prices and prices on the high street, and it affects those who use public transport.

Some argue that if we want to move towards a more sustainable economy, high fuel prices will encourage a greener outlook. I do not disagree with that. However, when we are doing everything we can to improve our economic prospects, now is not the time to allow rising fuel prices to limit the mobility of our work force and hinder manufacturers and retailers through increased transport costs.

[Mr Mark Spencer (Sherwood) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that young people in particular feel the pressure of high fuel prices when they are trying to find their first job, which is often low paid? Does he also agree that the cost of insurance adds a burden to young people who have to get to and from employment?

[Mark Garnier]

My hon. Friend raises a very good point. The cost of car insurance is unbelievably high for young people. That is a particular problem when they are trying to get on the job ladder. We should certainly be doing everything we can to help young people.

The price of oil, as we have heard, is determined by commodity markets as well as by the sterling-dollar exchange rate. The only way to control pump prices is therefore through fuel duty. However, the country has incredibly little room for manoeuvre. I am convinced that helping economic growth through tax breaks works, especially when those tax breaks are targeted at specific areas such as fuel duty.

A cut in the price of fuel at the pump would reduce manufacturing and distribution costs, increase the mobility of our work force, increase household disposable income and lessen, overall, the headwind facing our economic recovery. Taking into account the work that we are trying to do in Kidderminster to promote advanced manufacturing and help boost the retail industry, I would welcome any reduction in costs, including fuel and transport costs. However, given where our economy is, any reduction in fuel revenue would have to be met by an increase in revenue elsewhere. Everything that the Government do has to be fiscally neutral. We simply do not have the resources available to cut fuel duty significantly without putting in jeopardy our low borrowing rates, which mean that we are in greater control of our own destiny than some of our European neighbours.

Although I support the efforts that the Government have already made in cutting 1p off the fuel duty in March and suspending the fuel duty escalator—a reduction of £1.9 billion in fuel duty—I urge them to see whether more can be done to help. The rising price of oil leads to increased profit for the oil companies from existing oilfields, as we have heard, and that extra profit gives the Government more opportunities to look again at tackling the high pump price of fuel, either through encouraging price reductions by the oil companies or through the tax system.

What has recently been causing a great deal of anguish among my constituents is that it costs more to run a car in Wyre Forest than in nearby Dudley. The average of 134.8p per litre of unleaded is about 6p higher than in Dudley, just 10 miles up the road. I have written to the petrol companies to see whether they can explain why they want my constituents to pay more for their petrol than people in nearby Dudley or Wolverhampton. Just one has taken the trouble to reply, to say that it has received my letter, but I have had no other replies, and certainly no explanation as yet.

It is right that we are debating the overall cost of fuel duty to our economy, and it is right that we are looking for ways of reducing that burden. However, I want the oil companies to explain why they see fit to charge my constituents in Wyre Forest more for their motoring. Can they justify subsidising more urban areas, not just in the black country but in the country as a whole, at the expense of our semi-rural and rural communities? Can they please let us all know when they intend to remove that rural surcharge on fuel?

Oral Answers to Questions

Mark Garnier Excerpts

Tuesday 1st November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Osborne]

This morning’s GDP numbers are a positive step, but of course the British economy has a difficult road to travel from the very high debts—the record debts—that we inherited. That is made more difficult by the international situation, as people can plainly see today, but we are determined to make that journey to the growth and prosperity that this country was so lacking under the previous Government.

[Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)]

6. What recent discussions he has had on social impact bonds.

[The Chief Secretary to the Treasury (Danny Alexander)]

Important work is going on within both the social investment sector and government to develop and test social impact bond models, and we meet regularly with colleagues to discuss the progress that the Government are making in growing the social investment market, including through social impact bonds.

[Mark Garnier]

My right hon. Friend will be well aware of the exciting potential that social impact bonds have, not only in offering financial support for the third sector, but in securing genuine savings for the Government. Will he or one of his Ministers meet me and representatives from the Social Finance investment bank to explore ways in which the Treasury can help to maximise the potential of this nascent financial instrument?

[Danny Alexander]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right about the enormous potential of this sector, and I congratulate him on his work and the close interest he has taken in this subject. The Exchequer Secretary to the Treasury would be very happy to meet both him and representatives of the Social Finance investment bank.