Luke Pollard
Main Page: Luke Pollard (Labour (Co-op) - Plymouth Sutton and Devonport)Department Debates - View all Luke Pollard's debates with the Ministry of Defence
(1 day, 14 hours ago)
Commons ChamberAs the Defence Secretary has said, the cost of the agreement represents less than 0.2% of the annual MOD budget. This has secured unrestricted access to and use of the base on Diego Garcia, control over movement of all persons and good on the base, and control of all communications and electronic systems. It is a good deal.
I do not know that I agree with the Minister that this is a good deal, although I am curious about the £30 billion. Does it count towards the new NATO target of 3.5%, or the additional 1.5% on top of that? As we have to inform the Mauritian Government before we do anything particularly useful from that base, should that cost actually be counted in the defence numbers at all?
Let me squash the hon. Gentleman’s last comment, which is wrong: we do not have to inform Mauritius before taking any military action. Under the treaty, we have to provide notification after the event. I have explained this 13 times in written answers to Members on the Conservative Front Bench, but I am afraid that they still do not get it. That underlines why they could not do a deal after 11 rounds of negotiation, whereas this Government did it after two rounds, securing the future of that vital base for UK and US operations.
Is it not the case that our closest allies—the United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and even India—have all welcomed this deal, precisely because they recognise the irreplaceable role of Diego Garcia in global security? What does the Minister think is going on with the Opposition, who think they know more about global security than the security services, the White House and the Pentagon?
This is important, because the future of Diego Garcia is absolutely vital. Having accepted the principle that sovereignty could be secured only by a negotiated settlement—that was the decision taken by the last Government—it is right that we secured a deal, and right that we protect the base for operations for more than 100 years. The deal is good value for the UK taxpayer, because it secures the most valuable piece of military real estate on the planet, and keeps it under UK control for the next century and beyond.
Following the disgraceful criminal vandalism that we saw at RAF Brize Norton, we immediately implemented a series of enhanced security measures at that air base and at other defence sites to ensure the safety of personnel, assets and operations. The strategic defence review highlighted Brize Norton as being in need of investment after the hollowing out of our armed forces over the previous 14 years. We have directed that a wider review be carried out at pace, to assess and ensure protective security at all defence sites. Phase 1 of that review was completed this weekend, and I will make further, wider announcements in due course.
To what extent is the Ministry of Defence working with other Government agencies to ensure a joined-up response to emerging threats to military equipment and infrastructure?
Counter-terrorism police are still investigating the incident at RAF Brize Norton, and it is right that we allow them the space to complete that investigation. The wider review looks at security at not just RAF Brize Norton, but all defence sites. We are looking with colleagues across Government at what investment is needed, and at how we can work with others to secure the safety of sites to ensure that the UK maintains operational security for all its assets.
Almost by definition, RAF sites have to have very long perimeter fences, so it is understandable that they could be overcome at one point or another. Why were they apparently not fitted with sensors, at least, so that any intrusion would have sounded the alarm?
I do not want to pre-empt the findings of all the reviews, but the right hon. Gentleman is right that our air bases tend to cover a large area. The perimeter fences we inherited on many of our air bases were not designed to keep everyone out with large things, but to be a perimeter defence. In the ongoing security work, we are looking at how technological solutions and changes in guarding might contribute to enhanced security, given the increased threat that we face.
The strategic defence review sets out that the UK will harness new technology through dynamic networks of crewed, uncrewed and autonomous systems. We will always comply with the relevant regulatory framework and international humanitarian law. I can tell my hon. Friend that IHL compliance is absolutely essential as we look to use more artificial intelligence enabled weapons systems in the future.
The strategic defence review rightly emphasises the importance of autonomous weapons systems in augmenting the UK’s defence capabilities, but it also notes:
“The UK’s competitors are unlikely to adhere to common ethical standards in developing and using”
those technologies. What specific measures are the Government taking to help prevent and mitigate the potential harms of autonomous capabilities, both in the UK and abroad?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right: we maintain responsible AI systems in the face of adversaries perhaps using AI in malign ways. The UK will adhere to our legal obligations and the values of the society that we serve. Through the UN and other processes, we are actively engaging in international dialogue on responsible AI, lethal autonomy and related strategic challenges, but all our activities will be in compliance with international humanitarian law.
All actions of the UK Government are in compliance with international humanitarian law. We want to see an immediate ceasefire in Gaza. We have fewer than five personnel from Israel on non-combat academic courses currently, but we keep all our training under review.
I thank my hon. Friend for raising that. Excalibur will be an incredible autonomous asset. The strategic defence review sets out that crewed, uncrewed and autonomous systems will be standard across our armed forces, and at the heart of the review is investment in the people who will be manufacturing and standing behind those systems. That is why, when the defence investment plan comes out later this year, there will be more opportunities for small and medium-sized enterprises, primes and businesses right across the country to invest in our uncrewed and autonomous future in a hybrid military.
Last week, I asked the Chief Secretary to the Treasury what happened to the £4 billion earmarked for autonomous systems, including in Plymouth. That line was in the Chancellor’s spending review speech, but not delivered on the day. The Chief Secretary did not know. Can the Secretary of State confirm that this funding exists, and will he accept an invitation to Turnchapel Wharf, where exciting marine autonomy is being developed?
Do the Government know if the US Government are still providing technical military intelligence support, such as electronic or imagery intelligence for Ukraine? If that were cut off by President Trump, would the Americans effectively restrict our British military technical intelligence support to Ukraine?
The hon. Member will understand that we cannot talk about sharing military intelligence on the Floor of the House, but as he and I have an interest in this, I would be happy to have a conversation with him.
The strategic defence review, published this month, clearly states:
“The foundation of the UK’s approach to deterrence remains a minimum, credible, independent UK nuclear deterrent, assigned to the defence of NATO… The UK’s nuclear weapons are operationally independent.”
Somehow, in the last 29 days, the UK Government have decided that they no longer see their Trident nuclear missiles as a minimum credible deterrent. Why was that major change in policy not announced in the SDR?
The Government have made it very clear that our support for our independent nuclear deterrent is solid and is not changing. We are investing in new submarines, we are investing in the base in Faslane, we are investing in new nuclear reactors in Derby, and we are backing the people who keep our country safe with that guarantor of our security, the nuclear deterrent.
Since 14 June, an F-35B from the Prince of Wales carrier strike group has been stranded on the runway at the Thiruvananthapuram civilian airport in India. What steps are the Government taking to recover the plane, how much longer will that take, and how will the Government ensure the security of protected technologies on the jet while it is in the hangar and out of view?
We continue to work with our Indian friends who provided first-class support when the F-35B was unable to return to the Prince of Wales when on a flight mission, and I am certain that the security of the jet is in good hands because Royal Air Force crew are with it at all times.
We are proud to be investing in Operation Renovator, our contribution to helping injured Ukrainian soldiers to recover and return to the fight to guarantee the safety of their nation, and we will continue to support that operation and our Ukrainian friends for as long as it takes.
Infantry regiments cite difficulty in recruiting in their traditional communities and recruitment grounds. Further to the exchange between the Secretary of State and the hon. Member for Epsom and Ewell (Helen Maguire), may I ask what more can be done to encourage, specifically, young British men to join the Army?
Last year 165,000 young people tried to join the British Army. We hired 9,500 of them, but 84% left because the process was too long. We have a superb “attract feature”, but we need to be better at converting, and we are making progress in that regard, although there is more to be done. I am happy to meet the right hon. Gentleman if he has any ideas that might support that.
Sadly, we have all seen the devastation caused by modern missiles. Germany is preparing to receive the Arrow 3 missile defence system, ordered just two years ago, which can intercept intercontinental missiles at 2,500 km. What plans have the Government to equip this country similarly?