Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Jackson of Peterborough Excerpts

2nd reading
Thursday 16th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, Clause 191 proposes an extremely radical change to abortion law. It was added on Report in the other place without due consideration and with only 46 minutes of Back-Bench debate. It is unnecessary, badly drafted and will harm women. We already have one of the most permissive abortion laws in the world. Even David Steel said he never intended the Abortion Act 1967 to enable termination to be treated like a form of contraception. The presumption in the Act is that deliberately ending the life of a child in the womb is a criminal offence unless it is signed off by two doctors who decide in good faith that one or more of the specified grounds are met.

The change in the law is not because there are women who cannot get abortions or because it is too difficult to get a doctor to sign off, but because of an ideological commitment to presenting abortion as a form of healthcare, like the removal of a tumour. The humanity of the baby in the womb is ignored. A wanted child is a baby and should be protected; an unwanted child is a foetus—an othering word, if ever there was one—and can be removed and disposed of. I simply do not believe the degree to which a mother wants or does not want her baby changes the moral status of the child and think we need to have a national conversation about this.

I may be in a minority in this House when I speak on this issue, but I suspect that the removal of abortion from the ambit of the criminal law for the mother is something that makes many people uncomfortable because abortion is important. I think we all instinctively know we are dealing with the termination of a human life. We cannot just allow a free for all; there must be limits. Even though prosecution of mothers for unlawful abortions is incredibly rare, the existence of a criminal law framework for abortion sends a vital message that ending the life of an unborn person is a serious matter. This is reflected in the way the law is framed, and that is what the majority of the public appear to want.

A poll of over 2,000 adults found that more than six in 10 respondents agreed that abortion should continue to remain illegal after 24 weeks; just 17% disagreed. Clause 191 disapplies the law from a woman acting in relation to her own pregnancy. No matter how she ends the life of her unborn baby, no matter how late in the pregnancy, no matter how painful for the child, no matter how distressing for whoever finds the remains, she would be beyond the reach of the law; whereas any doctor or nurse who is complicit would be committing a criminal offence. The Member for Gower gave an interview to Times Radio. She was asked whether she was comfortable with any woman ending a pregnancy at any time; she said she was. That is what Clause 191 will enable.

Janice Turner of the Times, a supporter of abortion, wrote that she was “aghast” at this “glib, careless and amoral” clause. In her words,

“it cannot be that killing a full-term baby in the birth canal is legal, but smothering it outside the womb is infanticide”.

The Times editorial also raised the issue of pills by post, which was passed in the dead of night in 2022 without proper debate, or an impact assessment, and indeed the amendment was a disorderly one which had to be amended by the department.

There can be severe complications with abortion pills, especially when they are taken late in pregnancy. These include haemorrhaging and excruciating pain. The traumatic situations in which these women have ended up is as a result of pills by post. It enables women to have dangerous, late-term abortions at home alone without any medical supervision. Yet activists are now using the failings of pills by post to push for even more extreme laws.

In conclusion, Clause 191 will only make the situation worse, increasing the number of late-term abortions, and putting more women in danger. If we really care for women, we need to reinstate in-person appointments: proper, sensitive, skilled medical assessments where experts can assess how far along a woman is, whether there are any complicating factors that put her in danger, or whether she is being coerced. We already have unfettered access to abortion: Clause 191 is an embarrassment to supporters of abortion and a stain on our reputation as a country that claims to care for pregnant women and their unborn children.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Jackson of Peterborough Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 17th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, in opposing the proposition that Clause 107 should stand part of the Bill, I will speak also to my opposition to Clauses 108 and 109. These clauses were added by the Government without any debate on Report in the other place; therefore, they have not been subjected to the detailed scrutiny that they deserve. It is only right that, as the revising Chamber, we should fulfil our duty in that respect.

I will be clear from the outset that we on these Benches do not doubt for a moment the courage, dedication and indispensable role of our emergency workers. Indeed, the previous Conservative Government legislated to bring forward the specific offence of assaulting an emergency worker through the Assaults on Emergency Workers (Offences) Act 2018. However, we must also ensure that the criminal law remains proportionate, coherent and workable, and in our view these clauses fail that test. Clauses 107, 108 and 109 introduce a series of new offences on the racial or religiously aggravated abuse of emergency workers. The Government present these measures as necessary enhancements to the law to protect emergency workers from abuse motivated by racial or religious hostility. No one disputes the seriousness of such conduct. But these clauses do not simply strengthen existing protections; they create overlapping, confusing and potentially sweeping new offences that go beyond what is necessary or desirable in a free society.

The provisions duplicate offences that are already well established in our law. Threatening, abusive or insulting behaviour motivated by racial or religious hostility is already an offence under Sections 18 and 29B of the Public Order Act 1986. I completely understand that those offences cannot be committed inside a dwelling, while the new offences in Clauses 107 and 108 can be committed inside a person’s house. That is a key difference between these offences.

Both clauses also require the conduct to be racially or religiously hostile, but, again, that aggravation is already captured by the criminal law. Section 66 of the Sentencing Code creates a statutory aggravating factor for any offence based on racial and religious hostility. Furthermore, Section 31 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1988 creates a specific offence of using words or behaviour that cause “harassment, alarm or distress” and are religiously or racially aggravated. That offence can be committed inside a dwelling, so a person who racially abuses an emergency worker inside their home can already be prosecuted under the Crime and Disorder Act 1988. It is abundantly clear that there is absolutely no need for these new offences.

Clause 107 in particular casts an extraordinarily wide net. It includes not only threatening but insulting behaviour. This is a highly subjective term that will not create clarity or certainty—but do not take my word for it. The Constitution Committee of your Lordships’ House has criticised these clauses for this precise reason. Its 11th report states:

“Clause 107 criminalises ‘insults’ and clause 108 introduces the term ‘distress’. This potentially leaves people open to criminal sanction on a subjective basis. In addition, clause 108 includes a defence for ‘reasonable conduct’, which is not defined. As a result, the precise scope of these clauses, and the criminal offences contained within them, is uncertain”.


In Clause 108, matters become even more troubling. The clause would criminalise conduct merely likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress, again with the addition of racial or religious hostility, but with penalties that do not align with the broader public order framework. Here we see threatening or abusive behaviour that is already covered elsewhere reframed in a way that risks catching behaviour far removed from the core of criminal wrongdoing. While a defendant may raise a defence, the burden-shifting mechanism in subsection (7) is unusual and risks being applied inconsistently.

It is a long-standing principle that the criminal law should be carefully calibrated, limited to what is necessary and drafted so that ordinary citizens can understand the boundaries of acceptable behaviour. The law must be strong where it matters, not sprawling and duplicative. When Parliament repeatedly layers offence upon offence, we risk incoherence, overcriminalisation and legal uncertainty, none of which helps emergency workers or the public. If the Government believe that the existing framework is insufficient, they should amend those statutes directly and not create parallel criminal regimes that overlap and contradict one another.

In conclusion, Clauses 107 and 108 are unnecessary and duplicative and risk expanding the criminal law in ways that Parliament has previously rejected. They confuse rather than clarify. They undermine coherence rather than strengthen protection. We owe emergency workers the best possible statutory safeguards, but they must be safeguards that work. These clauses do not. For that reason, and in the interests of principled and proportionate criminal law, I urge the Committee to oppose Clauses 107 and 108.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly because we have very important business in future amendments. I heartily endorse the comments of my noble friend on the Front Bench. Why were these proposals—which, after all, attract cross- party support, as indeed the 2018 legislation did—not brought forward for pre-legislative scrutiny or debate and discussion at an earlier stage in the other place? They were introduced only at a later stage. For all the reasons my noble friend gave, there would have been a proper debate about whether it is right to bring forward legislation that includes potential incarceration for up to two years for an offence. In fact, it is quite incongruent because it does not look at sexual orientation and disability, for instance, only racially biased hate crime in private dwellings. Why was it not brought forward at an earlier stage, when I think all sides of the House would have been predisposed to support it and debate it properly?

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[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

I will come back to that point in a moment. I think the noble Lord is trying to inject a slight bit of topicality into a different argument, but I respect his opportunities in trying to raise those issues.

I say at the outset that I am with the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, on this, which is why we brought this forward. I am grateful to her for standing up and supporting the objectives of the Government in her contribution. I have to say to the noble Lords, Lord Davies and Lord Jackson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, that I cannot and will not support their approach to delete these clauses from the Bill.

Emergency workers, as the noble Baroness has said, risk their safety every day to protect the public. They deserve robust protection through legislation, especially against abuse directed towards them because of their protected characteristics, which is not only harmful but erodes the principle of respect and public service, which are core values of this democracy.

As the noble Baroness rightly said, when emergency workers walk through a door of a private dwelling, they are faced with the circumstances in that private dwelling; they cannot walk away. They are there because of an emergency—perhaps medical, police or fire—and, if they face abuse in that private dwelling, then they deserve our support, just as they have our support if they face abuse on the street for a racially aggravated reason. If somebody does something at the end of their path on a street in Acacia Avenue and abuses them, they will find themselves under the course of the law on those matters.

I believe—and this is what these clauses are about—that, if the emergency worker is racially abused in the property, then they deserve that protection. It is critical for sectors such as health, fire and policing to have that legal support. We cannot leave them, as the noble Baroness rightly said, to be abused. The law must recognise this and make sure we have proper protection.

Currently, as has been mentioned, the Public Order Act 1986 and Section 31 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 provide important safeguards in public spaces. It is not acceptable to call somebody a racially abusive name in a public space, so why is it to call them that name in a place of a private dwelling? It is not acceptable, so we are going to bring those clauses into play.

The noble Lord asks why we do this. We do this because Sergeant Candice Gill of Surrey Police, supported by the deputy chief constable—and, may I just say, by the Conservative police and crime commissioner for Surrey—has campaigned for this change in the law, having personally experienced racial abuse in a private home. It is not a sort of technical matter that the noble Baroness or the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, have mentioned; it is a real issue of racial abuse in a private dwelling to a police officer—who is doing her job, serving and trying to protect and support the public, and is being racially abused with no consequence whatsoever. Sergeant Candice Gill, after whom I would be proud to call this legislation Candice’s law, is campaigning and has campaigned to make this an amendment to the Bill.

The noble Lord, Lord Jackson, asked why we brought it forward in the House of Commons as an amendment. I will tell him why: it was brought to our attention, it is an action we do not support, and it is an area where we think action needs to be taken. That is why we have brought it. I do not think it is fair that people are racially abused in homes. Sergeant Candice Gill has campaigned on this and has brought it to the attention of the Government; we brought an amendment forward in the House of Commons which is now before this House, and I believe it should have support.

Clauses 107 to 109 will close that legislative loophole. The removal of the dwelling exception will make racially or religiously aggravated abuse of an emergency worker in a private dwelling an offence. The change will ensure that offenders prosecuted under Clause 107 face a maximum sentence of two years’ imprisonment. The offence in Clause 108 will be liable to a fine not exceeding level 4. As I have said, Lisa Townsend, the Conservative police and crime commissioner for Surrey, said:

“This long-overdue change to the law would never have happened without Sgt Gill’s courage and determination”.


I think we owe this to Sergeant Gill and any other officer, health worker, fire service worker or police officer who has been racially abused in a home where they have gone to help support individuals. They deserve our support.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, for the avoidance of doubt, I think we need to put it on record that everyone deprecates racially aggravated abuse of hard-working, decent emergency workers—that is taken as read. But the noble Lord is asking us to consider legislation when we already have a situation, under Section 66 of the Sentencing Act 2020, which permits a court to consider any offence that has been racially or religiously aggravated. Section 31 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 provides for a separate offence where a person commits an offence under Sections 4, 4A or 5 of the Public Order Act.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords—

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

Much as I would love to be intervened on by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, who I believe will be supporting my amendment later on, I am intervening on the Minister, and we are not allowed to intervene on interventions.

If I may beg the Committee’s indulgence, I finally say to the Minister that the Select Committee on the Constitution specifically said:

“Clause 107 criminalises ‘insults’ and clause 108 introduces the term ‘distress’. This potentially leaves people open to criminal sanction on a subjective basis”.


Not only do we already have existing legislation, but the language in this new legislation is sufficiently loose that it will give rise, I think, to unintended consequences.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I hope the noble Lord will accept that I am not indicating that he or anybody else would accept that language, but the point is that we have to define and be clearer about the definition in relation to racially aggravated insults. The reason that we brought this forward is that, on the back of police representations from senior officers in Surrey Police—and from Sergeant Candice Gill, who was herself racially abused—and with the support of the Police and Crime Commissioner for Surrey, having examined this internally, we believe that the law needs to be clarified, which is why we have brought this legislation forward.

The noble Lord also asked me to examine why it is covering only race and religion, why we do not cover protected characteristics of sexual orientation, transgender identity and disability, and why the Government have not tabled such an amendment. He will know that the Law Commission is already examining its review of hate crime laws. It is a complex area, and it is important we get the changes right. I will tell him this: we are considering that and have given a manifesto commitment to do so, and, ensuring that we do that, we will bring forward conclusions at Report stage in this House to give effect to those manifesto commitments on sexual orientation, transgender identity and disability to extend the proposals still further. I give him notice of that now so that he does not accuse me of pulling a fast one on Report. We will do that, but we will have to bring forward the details of it in due course.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I am inordinately grateful to the Minister for giving away, but he will know, because he was a diligent and assiduous constituency MP, that many of the people who go into clinical settings—for instance, A&E—are very distressed, discombobulated and upset about their condition, do not quite know what is going on and will sometimes say things they regret. I am not saying that is right. Some of them are not culturally sensitive, for instance. That may or may not reach a criminal threshold.

My main point—if we accept the principle that we need new legislation—is that, frankly, those people are in a very difficult position, and if we have loose and opaque language in primary legislation, we will have a situation where people who are not reaching the criminal threshold, or are doing so very marginally, are criminalised and are liable to go to prison for up to two years. Surely that is not something the Government are keen to encourage.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The Government are keen to discourage racial abuse against individuals who are doing their job, and that is what Clauses 107 to 109 do. The clauses set out in legislation a broad thrust of definitions. Ultimately, in these cases, police and health workers usually have body-worn cameras on and the police will judge evidential material to determine whether they wish to refer it to the CPS. The CPS will review the incident that has led to the potential referral and determine whether it meets the evidential threshold and is worthy of prosecution. Then, if it comes before a court, it will be for that court to determine whether that criminal threshold has been crossed.

With all that, it is not a simple matter of us passing the legislation; it is also a matter of the judgment of police officers, CPS officials and ultimately a judge or jury in determining the outcome of those cases. As with most legislation, I want none of this to go to court. I want it to change the behaviour of people who are looking at a charge of using racially abusive language not on the street but in their home. I hope it sets a minimum standard, which is what this Parliament should be about, in saying that we will not tolerate this. That is why I support the inclusion of the clauses.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Jackson of Peterborough Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 17th December 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough]

352: After Clause 109, insert the following new Clause—
“Offences of causing harassment, alarm or distress: amendments(1) The Public Order Act 1986 is amended as follows.(2) In section 4A (intentional harassment, alarm or distress) omit “, alarm” in each place where it occurs (including the heading) and omit “, alarmed” in subsection (2).(3) In section 5 (harassment, alarm or distress) omit “, alarm” in each place where it occurs (including the heading).”

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to have the opportunity to contribute to Committee proceedings. My Amendment 352 is quite straightforward. It would omit the word “alarm” from the appropriate legislation, by way of a new clause. In the landmark 1976 case, Handyside v United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights established that freedom of expression under Article 10 extends to ideas that “offend, shock or disturb” the state or any sector of the population. The court emphasised that tolerance and pluralism are essential for a democratic society, and that this protection applies to both popular and unpopular expression.

The cut and thrust of debate, whether political, religious or philosophical, means being able to challenge long-standing and sometimes deeply cherished assumptions. It can be shocking and disturbing—even alarming—to have the pillars of one’s world view challenged. It can be deeply uncomfortable, but it should not be a matter for the criminal law. That is why I have tabled this amendment to the Public Order Act 1986.

My amendment would remove “alarm” from Sections 4A and 5 of the 1986 Act. Section 4A currently criminalises “words or behaviour” that are intended to cause

“another person harassment, alarm or distress”.

Section 5 criminalises

“words or behaviour … within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress”,

even where that impact is not intended or, indeed, actually caused.

It seems to me that there should be no place in the criminal law of England and Wales for criminalising a citizen on the basis that his words or behaviour cause or are deemed likely to cause alarm. Of course, the law should seek to protect the citizen from harassment and distress: these are impacts that can have untold negative effects on people. In a democratic society, freedom of speech should always be balanced with civility and kindness. But, unlike harassment or distress, being alarmed is not inherently a negative impact. Indeed, it may be positive.

For some years now, we have been warned that our planet is hurtling towards destructive and irreversible climate change—I notice the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, temporarily sitting on my Benches—such that it might not be able to support life as we know it. The science and the prescribed remedy are by no means universally accepted. I make no point about that, but I do observe that those seeking to change our economic behaviour have not flinched at alarming us about the peril we face.

Of course, if you believe that bad consequences will follow bad decisions, you will naturally warn of those dangers, as exemplified by the proponents of Project Fear during the EU referendum. If the perceived dangers are said to be catastrophic, it will inevitably alarm some people. This is seen in the expression of religious or philosophical belief. If a Christian preacher believes, as Christians do, that the Day of Judgment is approaching, in which all people will be judged for the lives they have lived in the here and now, it should come as no surprise that the preacher will seek to ring the alarm bell. If you believe that the world consumption of meat is causing the decimation of the rainforests and leading to the overproduction of carbon dioxide gases, you might well want to alarm the complacent beef eater of those catastrophic consequences in order to make the case for veganism.

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[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

Is the noble Lord saying that, when I was on the Bench here and he hissed at me that I should shut up because I was rude, that was okay because it did not alarm me? Does he remember doing that? We almost came to blows outside.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I recollect that we have always had a robust exchange of views. I did not in any sense seek to alarm the noble Baroness, but, from memory, she arrived late for a group of amendments, pontificated for a few minutes on issues that she had not heard and then—

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am going to call a halt at this point. This is remembrance of things past. We have an important amendment to discuss today, and we should focus on the amendments.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I thank the Whip. I was merely elucidating for the benefit of the Committee the context of the noble Baroness’s rather strange intervention on my remarks. I do not quite have the same recollection that she does—

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Beith) (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Lord has moved the amendment, and the opportunity is there for other Members to speak to it.

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[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

My Lords, I confess that when I woke up this morning I did not anticipate having a discussion about Thames Valley Police and a gay horse. Such is political life on the Government Front Bench. Nor did I anticipate talking about the Prime Minister’s private parts, referred to by my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti.

On a more serious note, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, for his amendment. I begin by confirming what my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti said, which is that the right to express views, even those that may be unpopular, is a vital part of our democratic society, and freedom of expression is vital. The noble Lord, Lord Jackson, the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, and my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti have argued to remove “alarm” from Sections 4A and 5 of the Public Order Act 1986. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, for giving some balance to the argument and coming to a conclusion that I share. To remove from these offences behaviour that causes alarm would mean that behaviour that frightens or unsettles someone but which does not amount to harassment or distress would no longer be covered. Why does that matter? It matters because it would narrow the scope of the law and reduce the police’s ability to intervene early in potentially volatile situations. An example was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, in relation to activity on a train, late at night, by an individual with too many beers in their body. That is a valuable cause of alarm.

I say to the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, that these provisions have been in place for many years: in fact, they were passed under the Government of Mrs Thatcher, which is not usually a thing I pray in aid when discussing legislation in this House. Removing “alarm” at this stage —this goes to the point mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey—would affect how offences operate in practice, including the thresholds that have developed through case law. It would impact on the existing legal framework, which already ensures that enforcement decisions are made proportionately and in line with human rights obligations. This includes the important right, as my noble friend said, to freedom of expression.

The balance that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, struck is the one that I would strike as well. It is a long-standing, 39 year-old piece of legislation that has held up and has been interpreted in a sensible way by those who have legal powers to use it, both police officers and the CPS. Ultimately, we should ensure that the alarm element remains.

Having said all of that, noble Lords will be aware that the Home Secretary has commissioned an independent review of public order and hate crime legislation, which the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, KC, is considering. He will consider the thresholds relating to public order and hate crime legislation, whether they remain fit for purpose, if legislative changes are required and if we could have more consistent approaches to the offence of inciting hatred. He will also consider how we ensure offence thresholds do not interfere with free speech and how we deal with the type of issues that the noble Lord has mentioned.

I believe we should stay where we are for the reasons I have outlined, but a review is ongoing. It is important that we allow that review to conclude, which it will do by spring next year. The Government will consider and respond to whatever recommendations come forward. We do not know what those recommendations might be, but they are there to be done, and that is one of the reasons the Home Secretary commissioned the review. I understand where the noble Lord is coming from, but I hope I have put a defence of why we should maintain where we are. In the light of the potential review, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I thank the Minister for his typically thoughtful and considered response. I think he would concede that this has been a very interesting and intelligent debate. I thank all noble Lords who took part, particularly my noble friend Lady Lawlor, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, who was hoping to take part in the debate but, because this Committee has overrun somewhat, was not able to be here. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley.

The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, touched upon the fact that the real meaning of alarm is a fine judgment. I take on board the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. However, it is important to look in the context of the advice and guidance that the police are given on the use of Section 4A and Section 5 of the Public Order Act. For instance, to breach Section 5, a person needs to act in either a threatening or abusive manner. He also needs to intend his words or behaviour to be threatening or abusive, or be aware that they may be threatening or abusive. I would say that alarm is a lower standard of criminality—a lower bar—than that.

According to police guidance, Section 4A is designed to deal with:

“More serious, planned and malicious incidents of insulting behaviour”.


You are more likely to be accused of a Section 4A offence in relation to a comment directed to a particular individual—for example, publicly singling out someone in a crowd. I think those are the differences, and we will have a different view as to the appropriateness of whether alarm is apposite for dealing with these offences.

Having said all that, we may come back to this. I am grateful for the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, on this—it is very unusual, but it is a seasonal phenomenon that we agree from time to time. I even agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, from time to time. On the basis of Christmas spirit and all that, and the fact that we will no doubt return to this on Report, I am happy to beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 352 withdrawn.