Wednesday 17th December 2025
(1 day, 14 hours ago)
Lords ChamberCrime and Policing Bill 2024-26 View all Crime and Policing Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 111(Corrected)-VII(b) Amendments for Committee (Supplementary to the Seventh Marshalled List) - (17 Dec 2025)
“Offences of causing harassment, alarm or distress: amendments(1) The Public Order Act 1986 is amended as follows.(2) In section 4A (intentional harassment, alarm or distress) omit “, alarm” in each place where it occurs (including the heading) and omit “, alarmed” in subsection (2).(3) In section 5 (harassment, alarm or distress) omit “, alarm” in each place where it occurs (including the heading).”
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to have the opportunity to contribute to Committee proceedings. My Amendment 352 is quite straightforward. It would omit the word “alarm” from the appropriate legislation, by way of a new clause. In the landmark 1976 case, Handyside v United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights established that freedom of expression under Article 10 extends to ideas that “offend, shock or disturb” the state or any sector of the population. The court emphasised that tolerance and pluralism are essential for a democratic society, and that this protection applies to both popular and unpopular expression.
The cut and thrust of debate, whether political, religious or philosophical, means being able to challenge long-standing and sometimes deeply cherished assumptions. It can be shocking and disturbing—even alarming—to have the pillars of one’s world view challenged. It can be deeply uncomfortable, but it should not be a matter for the criminal law. That is why I have tabled this amendment to the Public Order Act 1986.
My amendment would remove “alarm” from Sections 4A and 5 of the 1986 Act. Section 4A currently criminalises “words or behaviour” that are intended to cause
“another person harassment, alarm or distress”.
Section 5 criminalises
“words or behaviour … within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress”,
even where that impact is not intended or, indeed, actually caused.
It seems to me that there should be no place in the criminal law of England and Wales for criminalising a citizen on the basis that his words or behaviour cause or are deemed likely to cause alarm. Of course, the law should seek to protect the citizen from harassment and distress: these are impacts that can have untold negative effects on people. In a democratic society, freedom of speech should always be balanced with civility and kindness. But, unlike harassment or distress, being alarmed is not inherently a negative impact. Indeed, it may be positive.
For some years now, we have been warned that our planet is hurtling towards destructive and irreversible climate change—I notice the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, temporarily sitting on my Benches—such that it might not be able to support life as we know it. The science and the prescribed remedy are by no means universally accepted. I make no point about that, but I do observe that those seeking to change our economic behaviour have not flinched at alarming us about the peril we face.
Of course, if you believe that bad consequences will follow bad decisions, you will naturally warn of those dangers, as exemplified by the proponents of Project Fear during the EU referendum. If the perceived dangers are said to be catastrophic, it will inevitably alarm some people. This is seen in the expression of religious or philosophical belief. If a Christian preacher believes, as Christians do, that the Day of Judgment is approaching, in which all people will be judged for the lives they have lived in the here and now, it should come as no surprise that the preacher will seek to ring the alarm bell. If you believe that the world consumption of meat is causing the decimation of the rainforests and leading to the overproduction of carbon dioxide gases, you might well want to alarm the complacent beef eater of those catastrophic consequences in order to make the case for veganism.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
Is the noble Lord saying that, when I was on the Bench here and he hissed at me that I should shut up because I was rude, that was okay because it did not alarm me? Does he remember doing that? We almost came to blows outside.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
I recollect that we have always had a robust exchange of views. I did not in any sense seek to alarm the noble Baroness, but, from memory, she arrived late for a group of amendments, pontificated for a few minutes on issues that she had not heard and then—
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
My Lords, I am going to call a halt at this point. This is remembrance of things past. We have an important amendment to discuss today, and we should focus on the amendments.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
I thank the Whip. I was merely elucidating for the benefit of the Committee the context of the noble Baroness’s rather strange intervention on my remarks. I do not quite have the same recollection that she does—
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Beith) (LD)
My Lords, the noble Lord has moved the amendment, and the opportunity is there for other Members to speak to it.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, I of course wish the Committee a very happy Christmas when that moment comes, but it was not just in seasonal spirit that I signed the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough. As he indicated, free expression is a two-way street, and I suggest that it is a two-way street in at least two ways: first, because all democrats, of whichever side of the aisle, ought to guard it jealously, and, secondly, because it must be applied with an even hand, even to people, ideas and causes with which we seriously disagree.
Before entering your Lordships’ House, I worked for 15 years at Liberty, the National Council for Civil Liberties. In that time, I saw the concept of behaviour causing or even just likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress used and abused to arrest and even prosecute people in a way that I believe all Members of the Committee would consider abusive, certainly when applied to people like us or causes with which we agree.
“Alarm” and arguably even “distress”, as opposed to a reasonable fear of a threat or of harm, are very broad. Harassment is a course of conduct and therefore a bit more objective and less broad. Sections 4A and 5 of the Public Order Act 1986 obviously create two specific criminal offences, but the rubric of “harassment, alarm or distress” also now forms the linchpin of anti-social behaviour, with its quasi-civil and criminal orders and the even broader approach that police guidance and police websites take to the concept of anti-social behaviour. However, that matter was discussed earlier in Committee.
The two offences that the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, has identified have, in my direct experience over many years, been applied broadly, indiscriminately and, ironically, in a discriminatory way to, for example, peaceful protesters and to anti-monarchists for wearing republican slogans on their T-shirts when a member of the Royal Family is in town. The noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, gave other examples of words that can offend or cause alarm and distress, as opposed to fear or the threat of real harm. I gave the example of the anti-monarchist who was not just arrested but, I believe, charged for the T-shirt in question, but there are also cases of youngsters being charged, certainly being arrested, for being cheeky with the police. I think this cannot just be blamed on the police when these concepts on the public order statute book are just too vague and too broad.
To attempt to leaven the spirit yet again the week before Christmas, I am reminded that today at PMQs, and not for the first time, the leader of the Opposition made reference, if euphemistically, to the Prime Minister’s private parts. Of course, that sort of thing would never happen in your Lordships’ House, but whatever noble Lords think of that approach to parliamentary debate, people on our streets, ordinary people, have been arrested and charged for less. Can that really be right? I think not.
Baroness Lawlor (Con)
My Lords, I will say a few words in support of the amendment. I agree with the difficulty of categorising alarm in the same manner as harassment and distress. Harassment and distress can be objectively measured or distress objectively assessed, but when it comes to alarm, I think what noble Lords have said so far is that it may cause a shock to hear somebody in your group saying something so different to anything you could imagine being said.
I can give an example of a representative image or a representation which may be designed to shock. I was a supporter of Brexit in a very remain constituency, Cambridge. We usually invite people at the end of term, and I had a Vote Leave poster in my window, but as they were coming to a party to celebrate the end of term, I said to my husband that I would take it down because I did not want to upset them. Afterwards, none of them ever could imagine that I might support leave. When I told them, they said, “We had no idea. We couldn’t have imagined we knew anybody in Cambridge who voted leave”. I suppose you could say that I was trying not to spoil their day because people take these matters very seriously, but you could say that alarm could be equated to an instance of thoughtlessness, bad manners or a deliberate intention to shock, as some people will do, but it is not a matter to criminalise. For those reasons, I support removing “alarm” from Sections 4A and 5 but would leave harassment and distress because they can more objectively be measured.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, for raising a point that really had not occurred to me in years of gazing at Sections 4A and 5 of the Public Order Act. I also thank the noble Lord for his reference to the Handyside case, quite correctly observing that freedom of speech means nothing if it does not include the freedom to offend, shock and disturb. But, of course, Handyside was about ideas that offend, shock and disturb. Sections 4A and 5 are not talking about ideas; as the noble Lord said, they refer to threats, abuse and insult.
Outside the rarefied walls of academe, the cases in which Sections 4A and 5 are applied are to the objectionable drunk, on a train or in a doorway, who yells at somebody and can cause, in the words of the statute, distress or alarm. I agree with the noble Lord that they are not very different. In fact, he said it would be otiose to have both “distress” and “alarm” in the sections, but surely there is a shade of difference between the two. If there is some lasting upset, we could call that distress, but if it is a question of frightening or unsettling somebody by yelling an insult in their ear, that is probably closer to alarm. Although I agree with the noble Lord and the noble Baroness about the evils of overzealous prosecutors, I suggest that there is some purpose to these two very similar words both appearing in these two sections.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, I have listened to this rather short debate against the particular backdrop of the Government’s increasingly unsettling approach to public order—a direction of travel that raises real concerns on these Benches. The current stance seems to involve simply doubling down on the pattern set by the previous Administration, which, in our view, risks overpolicing protest, overburdening an already stretched justice system, diverting resources from serious crime and threatening legitimate speech.
In that context, we have sympathy with this proposal. However, I have some concerns about changing a standard legal formula in public order and anti-social behaviour law. It is widely embedded in guidance and operational policy; in removing it, there is a risk of creating uncertainty and confusion within the police, local authorities and the courts. At the same time, it is equally clear that the concepts of alarm and distress have, in practice, been stretched far beyond what Parliament ever intended. Some people are very easily alarmed or distressed by noisy but peaceful demonstrations, or simply by views with which they profoundly disagree. These cannot be a sound basis for criminal liability.
There is a real risk that an overbroad test inhibits free expression, penalises vulnerability and hands too much discretion to those who are most intolerant of difference. If the Government will not support this amendment, will the Minister explain how they intend to ensure that public order powers are not used to criminalise mere annoyance, eccentricity or disagreement, but are focused on genuinely threatening, abusive and harassing behaviour?
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
I thank my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough for tabling Amendment 352. It is welcome to see such a cross-party collection of noble Lords supporting it: the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, are not names always seen together on an amendment.
The amendment proposes to remove “alarm” from Sections 4A and 5 of the 1986 Act, as we have heard. As others have said, alarm is a word that denotes impression, mood and temperament. It is a word that allows the criminal law to stray beyond the prevention of genuine disorder and into the policing of irritation, discomfort or unease. Several legal cases have shown where this can lead. In a case called DPP v Orum in 1989, a conviction was upheld under Section 5 for shouting abuse at police officers. The court accepted that even trained officers, accustomed as they might be to a degree of verbal abuse, could none the less be persons likely to be caused “harassment, alarm or distress”. Although that may be understandable up to a point, it demonstrates how low the threshold has been set. If professionals whose job it is to face confrontation can be alarmed by rude language, one begins to wonder who cannot be.
Another case is called Norwood v DPP in 2003, in which a man was convicted for displaying a poster saying “Islam out of Britain” in his window. The reasoning again rested partly on the likelihood of causing alarm. Whatever one thinks of the views expressed—many of us would deplore them—the case illustrates how “alarm” can operate as a gateway through which deeply subjective reactions become the basis for criminal liability. It seems that these cases represent symptoms of a statutory provision that has no clear boundary. “Alarm” does not mean “fear of violence”—it does not require intimidation; it does not even require serious upset. It has been stretched to cover being offended, unsettled or merely uncomfortable. I suggest that is not a sound basis for criminal liability.
As others have said, the law retains and contains safeguards where genuine harm arises: “harassment” would remain in the wording of the statute, “distress” would remain in the wording of the provision, and Section 4 remains available for
“Fear or provocation of violence”.
Other statutes address stalking, threats and coercive conduct. My noble friend’s amendment would remove nothing that is truly necessary to protect the public. It would restore a measure of seriousness to public order law. Criminal offences should address conduct that is objectively wrongful, not speech or behaviour that happens to alarm someone whose threshold for alarm may be very low. This amendment has our wholehearted support, and I hope that it has the support of the Minister too.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
My Lords, I confess that when I woke up this morning I did not anticipate having a discussion about Thames Valley Police and a gay horse. Such is political life on the Government Front Bench. Nor did I anticipate talking about the Prime Minister’s private parts, referred to by my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti.
On a more serious note, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, for his amendment. I begin by confirming what my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti said, which is that the right to express views, even those that may be unpopular, is a vital part of our democratic society, and freedom of expression is vital. The noble Lord, Lord Jackson, the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, and my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti have argued to remove “alarm” from Sections 4A and 5 of the Public Order Act 1986. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, for giving some balance to the argument and coming to a conclusion that I share. To remove from these offences behaviour that causes alarm would mean that behaviour that frightens or unsettles someone but which does not amount to harassment or distress would no longer be covered. Why does that matter? It matters because it would narrow the scope of the law and reduce the police’s ability to intervene early in potentially volatile situations. An example was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, in relation to activity on a train, late at night, by an individual with too many beers in their body. That is a valuable cause of alarm.
I say to the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, that these provisions have been in place for many years: in fact, they were passed under the Government of Mrs Thatcher, which is not usually a thing I pray in aid when discussing legislation in this House. Removing “alarm” at this stage —this goes to the point mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey—would affect how offences operate in practice, including the thresholds that have developed through case law. It would impact on the existing legal framework, which already ensures that enforcement decisions are made proportionately and in line with human rights obligations. This includes the important right, as my noble friend said, to freedom of expression.
The balance that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, struck is the one that I would strike as well. It is a long-standing, 39 year-old piece of legislation that has held up and has been interpreted in a sensible way by those who have legal powers to use it, both police officers and the CPS. Ultimately, we should ensure that the alarm element remains.
Having said all of that, noble Lords will be aware that the Home Secretary has commissioned an independent review of public order and hate crime legislation, which the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, KC, is considering. He will consider the thresholds relating to public order and hate crime legislation, whether they remain fit for purpose, if legislative changes are required and if we could have more consistent approaches to the offence of inciting hatred. He will also consider how we ensure offence thresholds do not interfere with free speech and how we deal with the type of issues that the noble Lord has mentioned.
I believe we should stay where we are for the reasons I have outlined, but a review is ongoing. It is important that we allow that review to conclude, which it will do by spring next year. The Government will consider and respond to whatever recommendations come forward. We do not know what those recommendations might be, but they are there to be done, and that is one of the reasons the Home Secretary commissioned the review. I understand where the noble Lord is coming from, but I hope I have put a defence of why we should maintain where we are. In the light of the potential review, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
I thank the Minister for his typically thoughtful and considered response. I think he would concede that this has been a very interesting and intelligent debate. I thank all noble Lords who took part, particularly my noble friend Lady Lawlor, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, who was hoping to take part in the debate but, because this Committee has overrun somewhat, was not able to be here. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley.
The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, touched upon the fact that the real meaning of alarm is a fine judgment. I take on board the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. However, it is important to look in the context of the advice and guidance that the police are given on the use of Section 4A and Section 5 of the Public Order Act. For instance, to breach Section 5, a person needs to act in either a threatening or abusive manner. He also needs to intend his words or behaviour to be threatening or abusive, or be aware that they may be threatening or abusive. I would say that alarm is a lower standard of criminality—a lower bar—than that.
According to police guidance, Section 4A is designed to deal with:
“More serious, planned and malicious incidents of insulting behaviour”.
You are more likely to be accused of a Section 4A offence in relation to a comment directed to a particular individual—for example, publicly singling out someone in a crowd. I think those are the differences, and we will have a different view as to the appropriateness of whether alarm is apposite for dealing with these offences.
Having said all that, we may come back to this. I am grateful for the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, on this—it is very unusual, but it is a seasonal phenomenon that we agree from time to time. I even agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, from time to time. On the basis of Christmas spirit and all that, and the fact that we will no doubt return to this on Report, I am happy to beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Sugg
“Interpretation: sections (Honour as an aggravating factor in sentencing) and (Duty to issue statutory multi-agency guidance)For the purposes of criminal law “Honour-based abuse” means an incident or pattern of violence, threats of violence, intimidation, coercion, control or abuse (including but not limited to psychological, physical, sexual, economic, spiritual, faith-related or emotional abuse) motivated by the perpetrator’s perception that an individual has shamed, or may shame, the perpetrator, the family, or community, or has otherwise broken, or may break, the perceived norms of the community’s accepted behaviours, including by speaking out about the abuse, and where the perception of shame may also prevent a victim from accessing support or help.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides a statutory definition of “Honour-Based Abuse”. It defines the term as an incident or pattern of abuse motivated by a perception that a person has brought or may bring shame or dishonour upon a family or community. The definition is intended to capture the range of behaviours that can constitute such abuse, including physical, psychological, sexual, economic, or other forms of coercive control.
Baroness Sugg (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to the amendments in my name in this group. Amendments 353 and 355, co-signed by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester and the noble Baronesses, Lady Doocey and Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, relate to a statutory definition of honour-based abuse and a duty to issue multi-agency statutory guidance.
Honour-based abuse is a form of domestic abuse motivated by an abuser’s perception that a person has brought, or may bring, dishonour or shame to themselves, their family or their community. It can take many forms and is often complex to identify, but it centres on controlling individuals to compel them to behave in certain ways or subscribe to certain beliefs. For some, the concept of honour is prized above the safety and well-being of individuals, and to compromise a family’s honour is to bring dishonour and shame. In extreme cases, this is used to justify abuse, disownment or physical harm. Honour-based abuse is not a cultural tradition or religious practice. It is a form of abuse that can occur within any community, regardless of faith or background.
Despite increased reporting to the national honour-based abuse helpline, commissioned by the Home Office, it remains the least prosecuted form of violence against women and girls. Across agencies, it is inconsistently recognised, poorly understood and inadequately responded to. Without clarity, front-line professionals are unsure how to spot the signs, and victims can slip through the cracks.
The need for change is starkly illustrated by the story of Fawziyah Javed. Fawziyah was a lawyer; she understood the importance of evidence and tried to protect herself and her unborn child. She repeatedly sought help, reporting to health professionals, contacting the police and gathering evidence against her abusers, but her situation was not taken seriously. Her case exposes a persistent and systemic failure to recognise honour-based abuse within statutory systems. Multiple perpetrators were involved, but they were overlooked because investigations often focused on a single individual, reflecting approaches designed for intimate-partner domestic abuse rather than the extended, collective and coercive nature of honour-based abuse.
In late August 2021, when Fawziyah made a second report to the police, the risks she faced had still not been recognised. On 2 September 2021, Fawziyah, aged 31, and 17 weeks pregnant with a baby boy, was tragically murdered when her husband pushed her from Arthur’s Seat in Edinburgh. Immediately after this, as was shown in the Channel 4 documentary “The Push: Murder on the Cliff”, he did not call 999; the first call he made was to his own father. This illustrates the family-involved dynamics of honour-based abuse, which are too often overlooked by statutory systems.
Fawziyah’s mother, Yasmin Javed, has led the campaign to ensure that her daughter’s legacy drives meaningful change, and has permitted me to share Fawziyah’s story. Yasmin’s courage and advocacy ensures that survivors’ voices are heard and their experiences are recognised. She believes strongly that the lack of understanding of honour-based abuse and the absence of a universal statutory definition meant that Fawziyah’s experience and the perpetrators were missed.
Fawziyah’s story demonstrates why we urgently need a statutory definition and accompanying guidance, not just for the police and prosecutors but for teachers, social workers, healthcare professionals and everyone who has an opportunity to identify abuse early before it escalates. It will help professionals understand its complex dynamics and act decisively to protect victims.
In August, the Government announced six new measures to tackle honour-based abuse, including legislating, at the earliest opportunity, to introduce a statutory definition and multi-agency guidance. I am very pleased that we are on the same page on that.
Turning to the definition itself, Amendment 353 puts forward a suggested definition that has been developed over a number of years. It is not my definition but the product of sustained work by the sector, legal experts and, most importantly, survivors with lived experience. From 2022, survivors worked with the University of Nottingham to develop a survivor-informed definition. This work identified serious limitations in existing non-statutory definitions and provided a framework that captures the collective and coercive nature of this abuse. Building on this survivor-informed foundation, barrister Naomi Wiseman, drawing on extensive experience in this field, led further work with violence against women and girls sector partners to draft a statutory definition. Through multiple iterations, consensus was reached upon a definition that reflects the complexity of honour-based abuse.
To date, this work has engaged survivors, over 60 organisations and specialist legal expertise. It combines lived experience with professional knowledge to bring clarity, consistency and stronger protections. This process has been truly sector-wide and survivor-led. Survivors’ voices have shaped every iteration, ensuring that the definition reflects the realities of honour-based abuse. I wish to put on the record my sincere thanks to all those involved, particularly the survivors. Their dedication and insight, born from personal experience and gaps in professional responses, has ensured that future victims can be recognised, protected and believed in the ways that they were not.
This survivor-led process has required significant time, expertise and emotional labour, often carried out amid ongoing abuse, ostracism and bereavement. Every consultation involves survivors and bereaved families retelling painful and traumatic experiences. They do this out of a sense of duty, so that their survival can mean something for the many who are not able to speak out. Dame Nicole Jacobs, the Domestic Abuse Commissioner, has welcomed this work. She said: “I recognise the significant progress that has been made to date and emphasise the importance of grounding any definition in survivor experience. I support the ongoing work led by survivors, the specialist sector and Karma Nirvana to ensure the definition is effective”.
Of course, we all want a definition that works, and I therefore welcome the debate to come, so we can agree a definition that is fit for purpose—one that respects survivors’ lived experience and treats their contribution with the seriousness that it deserves. I am grateful to the noble Baroness the Minister and Home Office officials for their engagement to date. I know that work is ongoing on a revised definition, and I hope that we can work together, with survivors, experts and the sector, to return on Report with a workable, legally sound definition that reflects survivors’ experiences, strengthens protection and supports effective multi-agency working.
Timing matters here. For years, survivors, the sector and front-line professionals have called for a statutory definition, and this Bill is the vehicle through which change must be delivered—it really cannot wait any longer. The CPS and police are revising their guidance, which is due mid-next year, and they need a statutory definition in place to do so effectively. The success of this reform will also depend on the rollout of clear, comprehensive communication and training, a commitment that I am pleased to say that the Government have already made for next year. We need the definition to make that effective. For too long, perpetrators have escaped accountability, while victims have been failed. The time to act is now.
I turn to Amendment 354 in my name, co-signed by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester and the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws; the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, has tabled a similar amendment in this group. Amendment 354 would recognise honour as an aggravating factor in sentencing. It would ensure earlier identification of honour-based abuse in investigations and prosecutions, and that sentences properly reflect the gravity of the offending. Safeguarding would be strengthened for victims facing risk from multiple perpetrators, and it would also act as a stronger deterrent.
The murder of Somaiya Begum, a 20-year-old biomedical student, exposed a critical gap in the criminal justice system. Despite an active forced marriage protection order, Somaiya was murdered by a family member. Evidence at trial demonstrated the role of family pressures and honour dynamics, yet the court concluded:
“It is not possible to identify a motive for this dreadful attack”.
In his defence statement, the defendant explicitly relied on notions of honour to shift blame on to other family members. Despite this, the judge did not recognise honour in sentencing. This demonstrates how the absence of formal recognition allows key motivations to be overlooked, weakening justice and accountability.
Somaiya’s case and other cases such as the terrible murder of Banaz Mahmod, to which I know the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, will refer, illustrate several wider systemic failures. Yesterday would have been Banaz’s 40th birthday—and I pay tribute to Banaz’s sister, Payzee Mahmod, who has been a tireless advocate for changes to the law in Banaz’s memory, and whom I have worked closely with on this campaign. I also want to acknowledge Banaz’s sister Bekhal, who is calling for change in this area too.
When we do not recognise the aggravation of honour in the perpetration of these crimes, there are multiple consequences. First, there is the erasure of victims; when honour motivations are not named, survivors and families feel unseen and invalidated, deepening mistrust in the justice system and perpetuating silence. Secondly, there is unreliable data: judgments rarely reference honour, creating the false impression that such cases are infrequent or absent, despite evidence to the contrary. Thirdly, there are low prosecution rates: between April 2024 and March 2025, only 95 honour-based prosecutions were brought, with fewer than half resulting in conviction. Supporting this amendment would address these failures, improve data, strengthen accountability and ensure that courts formally acknowledge honour-based motivations, giving survivors and families the recognition and justice that they deserve.
Given that we are a little later than planned, many noble Lords who were going to speak in favour of these amendments are sadly no longer in their place. That includes the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, who, given her long experience, fully supports these amendments, in particular making honour-based abuse an aggravating feature, to send a clear message to communities and sentencing judges.
I pass on my sincere thanks to the Minister for the meeting to discuss this issue with not just her but three Ministers and officials across both departments. I am also very grateful for her own suggestion that she speak to the sector and survivor representatives ahead of this debate to hear from them directly. I listened with interest to the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, earlier in response to the Urgent Question on the VAWG strategy, and I look forward to reading that strategy tomorrow, given his reference a number of times to honour-based abuse.
I appreciate that the Government are clearly working to make progress on this, and I have two questions for the Minister. Will she commit to continuing to work with the sector to bring forward amendments on an agreed definition and guidance for Report? Secondly, while I heard the Minister’s explanation on Monday on existing aggravating factors and sentencing practice, we know from reviewing sentencing remarks in cases of clear honour-based abuse that, in practice, these factors are inconsistently applied and often fail to capture the collective, coercive and family or community-driven nature of the abuse. In that context, could the Minister set out the Government’s position on formally recognising honour-based abuse as an aggravating factor in sentencing?
In conclusion, I pay tribute again to the tireless work and bravery of survivors. Without them the progress on this work to date would not be possible. I would also like to thank Karma Nirvana, whose incredible work supports victims and survivors, brings the sector together collaboratively and campaigns for these life-saving changes alongside over 60 leading organisations. I am deeply grateful to the survivors and sector representatives who attended a briefing for noble Lords here last month. They reminded us plainly that honour-based abuse remains an invisible crime, with invisible perpetrators and, tragically, invisible victims. They told us that making progress on these amendments will save lives, prevent immeasurable harm and deliver recognition and justice for those who deserve it. Fawziyah, Somaiya, Banaz and so many others cannot speak for themselves, but through the courage of their families and advocates, we have the opportunity to act. In their names, I beg to move.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, for moving her amendment. This group also includes Amendment 356 in my name and in the name of the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb and Lady Blower, whose support I greatly appreciate. I also thank Southall Black Sisters for their tireless campaigning in this vital area.
I echo the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, in paying tribute to Banaz Mahmod and to the extraordinary courage of her sisters, Bekhal and Payzee, whose tireless campaigning has kept the spotlight on honour-based abuse in the hope that Banaz’s legacy will drive real and lasting change. Banaz was just 20 when she was murdered by her father, uncle and five male cousins. Her crime? Leaving her abusive husband and having a boyfriend she wished to marry. Her family convened a council of war to plan her killing, claiming that her wish for divorce and choice of partner brought shame on the family and the wider community. She did everything that we tell victims to do. On five separate occasions, she reported rape, violence and threats to kill—even an attempt on her life by her own father. She named those who would later murder her, yet she was not believed or protected. Her murder is not an isolated tragedy but emblematic of wider patterns of institutional failure to identify and respond to honour-based abuse.
That is why I have I have also added my name to Amendments 353 and 355, calling for a statutory definition to be brought forward as quickly as possible, alongside guidance, so that the thousands of incidents of such abuse reported in the UK each year are treated with the gravity they deserve. I too urge the Government not to miss the opportunity presented by the Bill, and I hope that the Minister will provide that reassurance.
Amendment 356 would make honour a statutory aggravating factor in sentencing. A similar amendment in the other place limited this to murder, but here it is deliberately broader. This would ensure that any offence committed in the name of honour is explicitly treated as aggravated in sentencing. It shares the aim of Amendment 354 but, in the absence of an existing statutory definition, it defines the aggravating factor independently, focusing instead on the perpetrator’s conduct and mirroring existing language from racial and religious aggravation laws. This approach would allow the aggravating factor to take effect immediately, while consultations on the definition take place between the Government and the sector.
Critically, Amendment 356 also recognises the frequent involvement of multiple perpetrators and colluders. In Banaz’s case, police estimated that around 50 men were involved, either in the killing or in shielding those responsible. This recognition is vital for improving how agencies identify and respond to such abuse.
I have reflected on the comments made during Monday’s Committee about the concept of honour already being adequately covered in legislation. I do not want to anticipate the Minister’s response, but I imagine she will say that judges are already familiar with the concept of honour and that evidence of its presence will already result in a stiffer sentence.
Baroness Gohir (CB)
My Lords, I declare my interest of CEO of the Muslim Women’s Network UK. We have a helpline and we deal with honour-based abuse cases.
While I support in principle the introduction of a statutory definition of honour-based abuse, it is essential that the Home Office concludes its work on the definition. I am part of the advisory group on this, alongside many other stakeholders. We must ensure that a final version is workable and fair, and includes statutory guidance, as recommended in Amendment 355.
However, I oppose the definition that has been put forward, although I appreciate that the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, has suggested it to create debate and discussion. I have a number of concerns. While I appreciate that a number of organisations have put their names to the proposed definition, I suspect that many have not gone through it line by line, as we do in here, and probably just accepted it at face value without thinking about whether it is applicable in law.
First, the definition lists types of abuse that could be motivated by shame. However, I note that stalking and harassment, which are specific offences under the law, are not mentioned and could be motivated by honour, particularly when a victim has escaped from the family or partner and attempts are made to track down, contact and bring back the person. Also, non-fatal strangulation and suffocation are not included in the list, and I would like to see them included.
Secondly, what does the wording actually mean when it refers to
“the perceived norms of the community’s accepted behaviours”
and the community being “shamed”? What do we mean by “the community”, “perceived norms” and “accepted behaviours”? This has to be legally clear for it to be applied. What community are we referring to? The use of this word has not been challenged for decades; we just blindly accept that terminology.
Let us take Birmingham, the city where I live. It has a population of more than 1 million. More than 500,000 are from a minority ethnic background; let us delve deeper into this population. Around 190,000 are from a Pakistani background, 20,000 are Arab, 66,000 are of Indian heritage and 17,000 are of Somali heritage —I could go on with that breakdown. If somebody commits an honour-based abuse crime in Birmingham, are we then suggesting that all those communities—for example, the 190,000 Pakistani community, including myself—are shamed by that crime? Well, that is not true: we would be stereotyping the whole community, and the communities are so diverse.
Even if we amended the wording to “the perpetrator and/or their family feeling they have been shamed or will lose honour and respect within their community”, tens or hundreds of thousands of people will not know who they are. A more accurate description, in my opinion, would be to cite “perpetrators’ perception of being dishonoured among their family and their social circle and their kinship group”.
By using this description, the honour-based abuse definition could even have a wider application. While this type of abuse is mostly associated with minority ethnic communities, honour-based abuse can occur in other contexts, even if to a much lesser extent. For example, it can happen in white, non-minority contexts too, particularly with the rise of toxic masculinity and the manosphere. Violence could be justified as “She embarrassed me”, and “She shamed me”. Then, abuse is committed for that reason. It could also be applied to gang-related contexts where violence is sometimes used to restore and protect honour.
I now turn to “accepted behaviours”. How will this be interpreted in law? This wording opens up the definition to subjective interpretation, risking inconsistent application. Legal risks could include prosecutors struggling to prove a motive beyond reasonable doubt. The defence could argue alternative motivations such as control, jealousy and anger. We must also ensure that those applying a legal definition are provided with clear guidance when any form of abuse is motivated by honour and shame: otherwise, automatic assumptions cannot be made that abuse is motivated by shame and honour just because the perpetrator is from a particular background, for example from a south Asian background. Evidence will be needed to justify why that motivation is linked to honour. As accepted behaviours may vary, it would be wise to list some key ones if it is not possible to provide an exhaustive list.
The very last part of the definition talks about the perception of shame preventing a victim accessing support and help. If honour-based abuse is going to be used as an aggravating factor to increase sentencing, this part needs to be strengthened further. This section needs to be linked to the behaviour of the perpetrator. Instead, it should be framed as where the perpetrator exploits concepts of shame and honour through threats, intimidation, coercion or blackmail, to prevent or deter the victim from seeking support, protection or assistance. An example of this is using intimate images to prevent a victim from speaking out by threatening to share those images.
Putting all of that together, I propose the following definition, some of which could be put in guidance. Honour-based abuse is an incident or pattern of abuse where the perpetrator is motivated by their belief that the victim has caused or may cause them and/or their family to lose honour or respect within their social circle or kinship group because of behaviours that are perceived to bring shame to them that may include: choosing one’s own partner; refusing a forced marriage, female genital mutilation or other harmful practices; having premarital sex, a relationship or pregnancy outside marriage; having interfaith, interethnic, intercaste relationships; ending a marriage or seeking divorce; having LGBTQ+ identity or relationships; seeking education or employment against family wishes; not dressing or having an appearance according to family expectations; having friends of the opposite sex; refusing family control over decisions; disclosing abuse and seeking help; and acts of betrayal within gang-related relationships.
Types of abuse may include: physical or sexual abuse; violent or threatening behaviour; stalking and harassment; non-fatal strangulation or suffocation; controlling or coercive behaviour; economic abuse; spiritual or faith-related abuse; psychological and emotional abuse; isolation; harmful cultural practices such as forced marriage; and intimate image abuse, especially in relation to silencing victims. The definition is long, some of it could be in guidance, and it would need tweaking.
I turn to Amendment 354, which proposes making honour-based abuse an aggravating factor for sentencing purposes. I would support the amendment once we have defined honour-based abuse. I too acknowledge the long-standing campaign called Banaz’s law to get this very law passed. Banaz Mahmod was murdered by her family in an honour killing in 2006. Her sister, Bekhal Mahmod, has been campaigning to have honour-based abuse become a statutory aggravating factor in sentencing. She is supported by Southall Black Sisters in her campaign, and I hope the Government will join us in acknowledging its campaign and hard work. I look forward to hearing from the Minister whether the Government are committed to adding a definition of honour-based abuse to this Bill.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I completely agree with all these proposed new clauses, which are long overdue. I congratulate my noble friend Lady Sugg on her excellent exposition and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, on her strong support.
I want first to criticise the term “honour-based abuse”, since there is nothing honourable about it. The term was invented by the perpetrators to make their actions seem more honourable than they were. In reality, these acts are abusive and destructive, involve the horrible murders of girls and women, and are morally wrong and thoroughly evil. I understand that, in an ideal world, we would have different terminology; however, as we are not, we probably cannot change the name now, since it is widely used and understood, including in law. Still, calling it what it is helps us refute the false framing that protects abusers as if they were doing something decent instead of evil.
What is the extent of the problem in the United Kingdom? It is estimated that at least 12 so-called honour killings occur in the UK each year, which averages out to at least one woman or girl murdered per month. The exact number is not known, as these crimes are often hidden and underreported. The figures provided by excellent charities such as Karma Nirvana are expert estimations; I congratulate them on the superb work they do, and I wish Karma Nirvana well in developing its national e-learning modules. The actual number of cases is widely believed to be much higher, because, as I said, many go unreported or are misidentified by authorities. Some police forces simply do not want to add that label, for the same misguided reasons that they covered up the rape of children in certain communities.
This is not a cultural problem to be tolerated or explained away. Since at least one girl or woman is murdered every month in this country, we can imagine that many thousands of other abuses, less than murder, are occurring. They can include physical assault, emotional and psychological control, forced marriage, female genital mutilation, and sexual violence—up to murder itself. Victims are often isolated and silenced by those closest to them. The abuse can be carried out, as we have heard from noble Baronesses, by multiple family members or by members of the wider community. The honour-based abuse includes violence, murder, threats, intimidation, coercion and other forms of abuse carried out to protect or defend the perceived honour of a family or community.
Honour-based abuse is not a private family dispute; it is a serious human rights violation. It strips people of their autonomy, their choice and their safety. As it is hidden, many victims never reach out for help. When they do, they need responses that are informed, compassionate and co-ordinated, and they need to be taken seriously by the police, education authorities and the health service.
Despite some excellent initiatives being taken by the charities and the Home Office, I feel we are still talking about it sotto voce. We all need to denounce aspects of honour-based abuse for the evil that it is and not tolerate excuses—that it is mandated by some people with a perverted misinterpretation of religion and practised by ignorant people.
I turn to my Amendment 355A. The College of Policing already provides extensive guidance on how to identify honour-based abuse. Officers are advised to look for a wide range of indicators: control of movement, restrictions on communication, coercive family behaviour, fear, anxiety, unexplained absences, threats of being taken abroad and the collective involvement of extended family members. I have just read out a small selection; I believe that the college has about 15 different indicators that tell police officers, “These are things you can look for that might add up collectively to honour-based abuse”. If one wants a definition, one can look at the College of Policing indicators and the suggestions from the noble Baroness, Lady Gohir—and there you have a definition of all the factors that could encompass honour-based abuse. The college’s guidance is detailed, thoughtful and clearly written; it recognises that honour-based abuse is not a single incident but a pattern that is often hidden, often escalating and often involving multiple perpetrators acting together.
However, after setting out all these excellent warning signs, the guidance stops short of the critical next step. It tells the professionals what to look for but gives them no instruction on how to record what they have found. There is no requirement to flag up an incident as honour-based abuse. There is no standardised data field, no multi-agency reporting framework and no clarity on whether a case should be logged as domestic abuse, forced marriage, coercive control, child safeguarding or all the above. In short, the system trains police officers to recognise honour-based abuse but then leaves them with no mechanism to ensure the system itself recognises it.
Baroness Cash (Con)
My Lords, I support all the amendments in this important group. I am conscious of time, and it is late, but I really wanted to come back to a few things that the noble Baroness, Lady Gohir, said. I hope that I have not misunderstood, but I confess to feeling a little confused.
It is very clear in the history of our criminal legislation in this country that introducing previous offences regarding violence against women and girls has had a significant impact and made a difference—for example, coercive and controlling behaviour; stalking, which, of course, does not apply just to women or girls; and female genital mutilation. In all cases, reporting, prosecutions and convictions increased, so the protections have been manifest.
The same applies here. I support wholeheartedly this group of amendments and am very grateful for the indication from the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, that there have been conversations. I trust that we are pushing at an open door on this. I declare an interest: as well as being a barrister, I spent many years running a behavioural science business. The naming of offences is extremely important in order for people to feel able to come forward. There is a wealth of behavioural science. I hope that a few of my points will reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Gohir, on some of the points she mentioned around the definition, because the reasons why we introduce these offences matter so very much. Honour abuse is so often defined as a family dispute, a cultural issue or something that is too sensitive for others to name. It does not matter which culture we are talking about or which motivation. The noble Baroness is absolutely right about that.
Something in behavioural science tells us, as we know from a wealth of research, that the cognitive availability, the salience of being able to name something, changes the outcome. Kahneman, Cialdini and others talk about how we need injunctive norms in society. It is why the criminal justice system operates so effectively. It tells communities and individuals, “This behaviour is not tolerated”. In the United Kingdom, domestic abuse reforms have consistently shown that explicitly naming conduct, whether it is coercive control, stalking or honour-based abuse—or, as it should really be called, honour-based excuse—shifts police practice, community practice and public understanding. It does not legitimise it. On the contrary, it shows that naming it in a prohibitive framework delegitimises it, collapses ambiguity and increases protection from all parts of the community around those victims. Public health research also shows that people seek help much more readily and quickly when they know that their experience matches a recognised category in law. The stigma is reduced and having recognition and validation of harm increases disclosure.
Naming something operates as a community-level intervention as well. We break pluralistic ignorance when we name a phenomenon such as honour-based abuse. Some noble Lords may know about a study carried out at Harvard University by the famous psychologists Prentice and Miller, who looked at students’ attitudes towards a culture of drinking. They all thought it was accepted by everyone else. The majority did not like it. They continued to go along with it because they did not realise that others felt the same as they did and that the majority view was not to support it. By doing that study and revealing that, Prentice and Miller empowered the students to take a stance and change their own behaviours. That is now well-established psychological research. That is why communities and individuals such as the very tragic victims that we have heard about today and their families, who continue to work, need this legislation and these offences to be named in the way that we are seeking.
It also increases bystander activation. People will get more involved and will understand that there is safety and support around them when they intervene as third parties. People are much more likely to act when they can say, “This is illegal, this feels wrong, this is wrong”. Teachers, GPs, neighbours and extended family members then all have the infrastructure within which to act.
The law functions in a very important way—sometimes, it feels, almost in a magical way. Maybe as a lawyer I would say that, but it does signal to everyone a focal point. It creates a place around which we can all convene and focus. It co-ordinates action where previously things might have gone unsaid and there may have been fear about raising an issue and talking about it. Families and professionals often know that something is wrong but fear acting alone. A statutory definition removes that hesitation and makes it clear where the authority and the power lie.
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, I rise, mercifully briefly, to come at this from a slightly different direction. Four years ago, when I was a member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, we had a debate in the assembly specifically about honour-based abuse in the part-session in September 2021. The point I want to raise is that this is not a UK-only phenomenon but an international phenomenon, and I am putting forward the idea that there is something to be gained from looking at the experience and examples of attempts to deal with honour-based abuse in different jurisdictions. The report that the debate was about looked at the incidence of honour-based abuse and how it is being dealt with in countries such as Switzerland, Belgium, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Austria and the Netherlands. That was four years ago, so I suspect things have moved on since then. All I ask is that the Government are conscious of that when they are looking at the current state of international knowledge and the degree to which we can benefit from that.
Honour-based abuse comes underneath the Istanbul convention, which we have finally signed up to. Within that, there is an organisation called the Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, which has the acronym GREVIO. It has been in existence for about 15 years. I have just checked, and I am ashamed to say that, at the moment, while there is a lot of international representation on this body, there is not a single UK representative, nor has there ever been. I suggest that looking at what this committee does—because it focuses very much on this area—and seeing whether we could not potentially nominate somebody who could go and participate in that and learn from it would be a very good idea.
The only other thing I would say is in the context of the research that the rapporteur for this, who was a representative from Monaco, did. She spoke quite extensively to Nazir Afzal—somebody who I suspect the Minister knows—a prosecutor from the north of England who has been particularly heavily involved in this. One of the things he said really struck me. The report says:
“The crimes were strongly linked to cultural factors”,
particularly factors
“which strengthened … male power and aimed to prevent women from making choices”.
What really struck me was this:
“A 21-year-old man born and raised in England had told him that a man was like a piece of gold which you could clean if you dropped it in the mud, whereas a woman was like a piece of silk, which would be stained forever”.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 356, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. First, I would like to apologise for my intervention earlier. I am afraid I am getting very grumpy, and the Christmas Recess has arrived just in time.
All the amendments in this group have validity, and it might be worth trying to combine them on Report, because this is such an important issue. When serious crimes are committed in the name of so-called honour, the law should recognise that for what it is: a particularly severe and controlling form of abuse. This amendment is to ensure that our justice system understands the dynamics at play in so-called honour-based abuse—abuse that is often collective, prolonged and enforced through fear and the threat of extreme violence.
The case of Banaz Mahmod illustrates this with devastating clarity. Despite reporting rape, violence and repeated threats to her life, and naming those responsible, she was not protected. After her murder, a police watchdog investigation found serious institutional failings, including a failure to grasp the specific risks posed by so-called honour-based abuse.
This amendment reflects the Women and Equalities Committee’s recommendation to explicitly recognise so-called honour in sentencing guidelines to ensure an understanding of such abuse. Recognising so-called honour as an aggravating factor in sentencing would send a clear and necessary signal that crimes motivated by perceived shame or dishonour are deliberate acts of gender-based violence.
This amendment is also supported by victims, survivors, specialist organisations, including Southall Black Sisters, and Banaz’s sister, who has campaigned tirelessly and at huge personal risk. However, there is one thing about all these amendments that I feel is totally wrong and we need to rethink, and that is the fact that I have been saying “so-called honour”. This has nothing to do with honour. This is dishonour, and that is what we should call it.
Lord Hampton (CB)
My Lords, I have added my name to Amendments 353 and 355, which were so powerfully introduced by the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg. I express due deference to the thought-provoking input from my noble friend Lady Gohir.
I am a teacher and, before one is accepted as a teacher, one has to do five days of observation in various schools, just to see whether you like the look of it. On my first day of observation at a school in Hackney, we were at the staff briefing at the beginning of the day and we were reminded to be sensitive to the fact that that week was the anniversary of one student’s mother and sister having been killed by their father and brother. That was my first experience of honour-based abuse, and a pretty stark lesson in the responsibilities that school staff shoulder.
Schools are uniquely placed to spot abuse. Dirty collars can be a sign of neglect, expensive trainers can be a sign of grooming and unexpected holidays could be FGM: the list goes on. Schools are often the first place where honour-based abuse is visible, through changes in behaviour, attendance or disclosure. Yet, without a clear definition, warning signs are too often missed.
Because honour-based abuse differs from other safeguarding risks, it is frequently collective, hidden and fast-escalating. Generic safeguarding guidance does not equip schools to recognise or respond safely. Inconsistent understanding creates dangerous inconsistencies in response, leaving children’s safety dependent on where they go to school. Statutory guidance would set a clear national standard. A lack of clarity leads to hesitation and harmful mistakes, including inappropriate family contact or mediation. A statutory framework gives staff confidence to act decisively and safely.
Early identification in schools can prevent serious harm and tragic loss of life, but only if honour-based abuse is properly defined and schools are properly trained, supported and embedded in a clear multi-agency safeguarding and response. It seems logical. I hope the Government agree.
Baroness Lawlor (Con)
My Lords, I support the general aims of these amendments. I am broadly sympathetic to the group and I agree with the need to address the problem of honour-based abuse specifically. I understand that it will be a difficult matter, and not simple, to define it tightly. Some honour-based offences are criminal offences, as we know: they involve murder. We have heard already about the murder of Banaz Mahmod in 2006 in Handsworth, in Birmingham, where she was strangled and her body put in a suitcase. For that crime, the perpetrators were found and convicted.
There is also voter impersonation, which I think we could be stronger on because it involves controlling and coercive behaviour. I have been told by members of one community in particular in an area of London with which I am very familiar that they are not allowed to go to the polls and they are not allowed to vote. The women there will laugh at you and tell you that their husbands vote for them. They are just not allowed to go to the polls. In fact, grown women who are married are not allowed to go out except when accompanied by their husband, an uncle or their husband’s brother. That, to my mind, is pretty specific coercive or controlling behaviour for grown women.
We have the law to deal with clear breaches of the law, but I agree that it is difficult to define abusive and coercive behaviour that is not immediately an offence within the law. I therefore support the desire to define it and the need to recognise that this controlling behaviour does exist. It does not fall within an easily definable way of dealing with it, but we must address it. There are reasons to address it, for instance, with grown-up people past the age of 18 who are obliged to wear a certain sort of dress to conform to community norms that will set them apart from their community, or with women I have spoken to who are not allowed to continue their education. This is not for reasons of finance or because money is needed from a job. They have to stay at home, quite often because there is a coercive husband at home who does not want his wife to go out for any reason, unless or until there are children whom she may take to school or bring to the hospital. Any thought of continuing studies after a certain age is absolutely ruled out.
These are not easy things to deal with. They fall within that difficult area of family arrangements and the rightful place we award the family in arranging its affairs internally. But unless we are going to become a society where different groups of people remain segregated socially, educationally and in terms of the very law, and we allow borderline abuse to continue in the family setting because we do not have a definition of it, which denies basic freedoms to certain groups of girls and, indeed, young women, and can often lead to far worse things, we should try to tackle it. I support these amendments for that reason. We need some definition and some guidance, and we need to cover them within the abuse framework.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)
My Lords, I entirely agree with everything that has been said about the need to highlight this appalling practice and, so far as possible, bring it to an end. But if one’s chosen means is the fettering of the discretion of a sentencer, one has to be extraordinarily careful about definitions. There, I rather echo what has just been said.
I understand how difficult this is, but, for example, the definition in Amendment 353 would mean that if there is an incident motivated by the perpetrator’s perception that an individual has shamed the perpetrator, the sentencing judge would be required to treat that as an aggravating factor. That could be two young lads outside a nightclub; one of them has shown a compromising picture of the other, and the other feels shamed or that he may be shamed if he shows it. That is how the violence begins. Violence is always bad and it always has to be punished, but of all the possible motivations for violence, is that really one that we are going to single out as a mandatory aggravating factor?
I must admit that I slightly wonder whether the best way to achieve the spotlight that the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, so rightly wants to place on this is by amending the sentencing guidelines. I thought that inherent in a lot of what she said was perhaps the implication that there ought to be a specific offence, rather as we managed to do with non-fatal strangulation and suffocation. If we are to adopt this means, imperfect and relatively low profile as it may be, we must be very careful about the words. As the Minister knows better than any of us, it is very easy to legislate for what one has in mind, but the unintended consequences are also there, and the law of unintended consequences is, I am afraid, one of the strongest on the statute book.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Sugg for bringing this matter to the Committee and for her eloquent elaboration of the rationale behind her amendments. I also thank other noble Lords for speaking, particularly those who recounted the moving stories of specific women who have been victims of this abuse.
It is safe to say that this is an issue that unites us all; no one wants to see any form of abuse perpetrated against women and girls, but honour-based abuse is perhaps one of the most pernicious forms of abuse. Due to its specific character and profile, it can all too often be swept under the carpet, hidden by communities that perpetrate it and ignored by authorities that should put a stop to it. I welcome in particular the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, for making the important point that this is an international criminal phenomenon. It is very easy to see it within a UK bubble, but it is incredibly important to remind ourselves of that context.
The many victims of honour-based abuse are left without justice because of fears of inflaming what are termed community tensions. That is borne out by the facts. Only 95 prosecutions were brought forward for honour-based abuse cases in the year 2024-25, and of those cases only 46 led to convictions. The reason behind these appallingly low conviction rates is the persistent failure to recognise the unique characteristics of honour-based abuse—the fact that it often involves numerous perpetrators, many of whom are family members or members of an extended community, acting collectively to abuse and in many cases, as we have heard, murder the victim.
It is important to recognise that there has been a concerted effort more recently to better recognise and respond to honour-based abuse. The Government should be commended for committing—on 26 August, I think—to legislating for a statutory definition and the publication of multiagency guidance on how to deal most appropriately with such abuse.
Again in August this year, the College of Policing, as referenced by my noble friend Lord Blencathra, launched a new advice note to police forces to support officers in their efforts to identify and tackle these forms of abuse. That followed the recommendations that emerged from the Tees Valley super-complaint, which was an important investigation for many reasons but especially because it found that police forces generally tended to include the risk of honour-based abuse only in their domestic abuse policies, not in other policies, thereby leading to an incoherent approach. The investigation also found that police forces generally lacked the cultural awareness to recognise the wider religious and cultural drivers behind this form of violence, and that this had led to police officers failing to recognise the wider risks of honour-based abuse after victims reported it.
I commend and fully support Amendments 353 and 355 by my noble friend Lady Sugg. They simply attempt to put into the Bill two of the measures that the Government have already committed to: a statutory definition informed by the actual experiences and the reality of the victims, and a comprehensive set of multiagency guidance. That is an important step and the Government should be commended for committing to it, but it will be of no use if the Government do not speedily implement these measures.
I echo the sense of urgency expressed by noble Lords from across the Chamber. I believe that the Bill is the legislative vehicle for these changes, and if they are not included in this Bill then there will likely not be another opportunity for quite some time. I urge the Minister to bring forward amendments on Report to make good on the Government’s promise to the victims of what can only be termed the most horrific patterns of abuse and violence.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Sugg and Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for tabling Amendments 353, 354, 355, 355A and 356. I thank all noble Lords for what has been a powerful, moving and interesting debate on this subject. Honour-based abuse is a dreadful thing. I add my voice to those who want to thank all the survivors for their courage and determination in speaking out.
I remember that, when I received judicial training, we were told that we as judges should refer to these horrible crimes as so-called honour-based abuse to make it clear—as was noted by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra—that there is nothing to do with honour about them. That said, the Government have listened to the preferences of survivors and the specialist sector, and for this reason I will refer to it only as honour-based abuse. I can see the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, nodding her head.
The amendments seek to ensure that front-line professionals such as the police, social workers and teachers properly understand and spot this abuse and accurately record and store this information. We absolutely share that objective. As your Lordships will be aware, the Government have already committed, as the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, has reminded us, to introducing multi-agency statutory guidance on honour-based abuse, alongside a statutory definition. We recognise that doing so is a vital step towards providing a clear framework for professionals with statutory safeguarding responsibilities as to how they should identify honour-based abuse. To that end, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, for meeting me last week to discuss Amendments 353 and 355. I thank Natasha Rattu of Karma Nirvana, whom I met this morning.
I congratulate your Lordships on the strength of feeling about getting this measure on the statute book as soon as possible. The Government agree that swift action is needed to ensure that professionals have a strong foundation for tackling honour-based abuse, but I would just say that this is an extremely nuanced and complex form of abuse. We need to ensure that the range of abuse experienced is captured and that we do not build in any unintended consequences, to use the phrase used powerfully by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. To that extent, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Gohir, and we are happy to work with her to ensure that we have covered all eventualities.
We must do this once and we must get it right. We owe that to the victims and survivors who have suffered. I am not able today to give a timeline for this commitment or say whether this Bill will be used as a suitable legislative vehicle, but I assure your Lordships that we are getting on with this work and are doing so quickly. My speaking note said “at pace”, but I asked the officials to take it out because it tends not to gain favour in this House. We are doing it quickly, and I can confidently commit to the Government updating the noble Baronesses and the noble Lord on the progress of this work ahead of Report. I hope that provides reassurance to various Members who raised the question of timeliness.
I now turn to Amendment 355A, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, which makes the important point that we need to ensure that data collection and storage by statutory agencies is consistent and accurate. The Home Office already requires all police forces to share data on criminal offences that have been flagged as related to honour-based abuse. This is published annually. But I agree with the sentiment of his amendment and can confirm that, in developing the multi-agency statutory guidance, the Government will consider how to ensure that data in relation to suspected and confirmed criminal offences related to honour-based abuse is properly recorded and stored by front-line agencies.
Amendments 354 and 356 seek to add honour-based abuse as a statutory aggravating factor. As your Lordships are aware, doing so would require courts to treat such offences as having increased seriousness because of the presence of this factor. We completely agree that in principle this is a good thing but, as both noble Baronesses correctly anticipated, we do not believe that creating a statutory aggravating factor is either necessary or desirable.
The reason we think it is not necessary is that the specific elements that make honour-based abuse so serious are already covered in the sentencing guidelines. Judges are already required to treat the fact that an offence involved an abuse of trust or that the victim was vulnerable as aggravating factors. In cases where the abuse is part of a domestic relationship, there is the entire overarching guideline specifying additional factors, which explicitly mentions honour-based abuse. These amendments would therefore unnecessarily duplicate existing guidelines, which the courts are required by law to follow.
I said it was neither necessary nor desirable; I turn now to why it is not desirable. I also speak from experience when I say that the workload of a Crown Court judge is an extremely heavy one, in large part due to the backlog in the Crown Courts inherited by this Government. Adding to the list of statutory aggravating factors significantly adds to the workload of judges when sentencing. For every new aggravating factor, the list of items that a judge needs to state that they have considered, and their sentencing remarks, get longer and longer. I therefore feel strongly that we ought not continually to increase this list, especially when existing guidelines already apply.
The noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, alluded to the fact that I had said this in relation to another group of amendments earlier in the week. These two proposed aggravating factors are the sixth and seventh time that new aggravating factors have been debated in this Committee so far, and I know that there are more proposals for different aggravating factors yet to come. As I hope your Lordships will appreciate, our judges already have a huge undertaking as part of the sentencing process. We wish to avoid unnecessarily burdening them or the process any further, because to do so would risk lengthening individual sentencing hearings, just at the time when we are trying to reduce the backlog in the interests of the very victims we are discussing, among others.
That said, the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, makes a powerful case and I would welcome further discussion with her as to how we can achieve the objectives, even if not necessarily by adding a further statutory factor—I mention both noble Baronesses in that context. This Government’s priority is to strengthen identification and response through robust statutory guidance and a clear definition, ensuring that professionals have the tools they need to tackle this complex form of abuse effectively. So, on the understanding that we will consider Amendments 353 and 355, which I know are the top priority for the key stakeholders, ahead of Report, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Sugg (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for taking part in this debate. As I said, it is slightly later than hoped but really is much appreciated. I am grateful for the Minister’s reply and, as I said earlier, her openness to engage on these issues.
On the aggravating factor, I will consider carefully what the Minister had to say and look forward to having ongoing conversations on that. On the definition and statutory guidance, I very much agree that we must ensure that it is fit for prosecution, but we also need to make sure it works for interventions to protect earlier, ideally before any crime is committed. The definition really needs to be survivor-grounded: it needs to reflect their lived experiences and must recognise the impact of multiple perpetrators, the presence of community dynamics, layered coercion and collective control.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Gohir, for her contribution. I know that everyone involved in developing the definition and, crucially, survivors themselves are very keen to engage directly with her.
We have been discussing this for many years. The definition and the guidance are the crucial amendments, as they would act as the foundation for the systemic changes we need to see, and this Bill really is the right place to do that. I very much hope that the Government will bring back a revised definition and guidance amendment on Report that is agreed by the sector and survivors. I will do all I can to help on that. If that is not the case, I reserve the right to return to this again, but, on that basis, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Morris of Bolton) (Con)
I cannot call Amendment 355A, as it is an amendment to Amendment 355.