Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Cameron of Lochiel Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 17th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, I have listened to this rather short debate against the particular backdrop of the Government’s increasingly unsettling approach to public order—a direction of travel that raises real concerns on these Benches. The current stance seems to involve simply doubling down on the pattern set by the previous Administration, which, in our view, risks overpolicing protest, overburdening an already stretched justice system, diverting resources from serious crime and threatening legitimate speech.

In that context, we have sympathy with this proposal. However, I have some concerns about changing a standard legal formula in public order and anti-social behaviour law. It is widely embedded in guidance and operational policy; in removing it, there is a risk of creating uncertainty and confusion within the police, local authorities and the courts. At the same time, it is equally clear that the concepts of alarm and distress have, in practice, been stretched far beyond what Parliament ever intended. Some people are very easily alarmed or distressed by noisy but peaceful demonstrations, or simply by views with which they profoundly disagree. These cannot be a sound basis for criminal liability.

There is a real risk that an overbroad test inhibits free expression, penalises vulnerability and hands too much discretion to those who are most intolerant of difference. If the Government will not support this amendment, will the Minister explain how they intend to ensure that public order powers are not used to criminalise mere annoyance, eccentricity or disagreement, but are focused on genuinely threatening, abusive and harassing behaviour?

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

I thank my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough for tabling Amendment 352. It is welcome to see such a cross-party collection of noble Lords supporting it: the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, are not names always seen together on an amendment.

The amendment proposes to remove “alarm” from Sections 4A and 5 of the 1986 Act, as we have heard. As others have said, alarm is a word that denotes impression, mood and temperament. It is a word that allows the criminal law to stray beyond the prevention of genuine disorder and into the policing of irritation, discomfort or unease. Several legal cases have shown where this can lead. In a case called DPP v Orum in 1989, a conviction was upheld under Section 5 for shouting abuse at police officers. The court accepted that even trained officers, accustomed as they might be to a degree of verbal abuse, could none the less be persons likely to be caused “harassment, alarm or distress”. Although that may be understandable up to a point, it demonstrates how low the threshold has been set. If professionals whose job it is to face confrontation can be alarmed by rude language, one begins to wonder who cannot be.

Another case is called Norwood v DPP in 2003, in which a man was convicted for displaying a poster saying “Islam out of Britain” in his window. The reasoning again rested partly on the likelihood of causing alarm. Whatever one thinks of the views expressed—many of us would deplore them—the case illustrates how “alarm” can operate as a gateway through which deeply subjective reactions become the basis for criminal liability. It seems that these cases represent symptoms of a statutory provision that has no clear boundary. “Alarm” does not mean “fear of violence”—it does not require intimidation; it does not even require serious upset. It has been stretched to cover being offended, unsettled or merely uncomfortable. I suggest that is not a sound basis for criminal liability.

As others have said, the law retains and contains safeguards where genuine harm arises: “harassment” would remain in the wording of the statute, “distress” would remain in the wording of the provision, and Section 4 remains available for

“Fear or provocation of violence”.


Other statutes address stalking, threats and coercive conduct. My noble friend’s amendment would remove nothing that is truly necessary to protect the public. It would restore a measure of seriousness to public order law. Criminal offences should address conduct that is objectively wrongful, not speech or behaviour that happens to alarm someone whose threshold for alarm may be very low. This amendment has our wholehearted support, and I hope that it has the support of the Minister too.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

My Lords, I confess that when I woke up this morning I did not anticipate having a discussion about Thames Valley Police and a gay horse. Such is political life on the Government Front Bench. Nor did I anticipate talking about the Prime Minister’s private parts, referred to by my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti.

On a more serious note, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, for his amendment. I begin by confirming what my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti said, which is that the right to express views, even those that may be unpopular, is a vital part of our democratic society, and freedom of expression is vital. The noble Lord, Lord Jackson, the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, and my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti have argued to remove “alarm” from Sections 4A and 5 of the Public Order Act 1986. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, for giving some balance to the argument and coming to a conclusion that I share. To remove from these offences behaviour that causes alarm would mean that behaviour that frightens or unsettles someone but which does not amount to harassment or distress would no longer be covered. Why does that matter? It matters because it would narrow the scope of the law and reduce the police’s ability to intervene early in potentially volatile situations. An example was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, in relation to activity on a train, late at night, by an individual with too many beers in their body. That is a valuable cause of alarm.

I say to the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, that these provisions have been in place for many years: in fact, they were passed under the Government of Mrs Thatcher, which is not usually a thing I pray in aid when discussing legislation in this House. Removing “alarm” at this stage —this goes to the point mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey—would affect how offences operate in practice, including the thresholds that have developed through case law. It would impact on the existing legal framework, which already ensures that enforcement decisions are made proportionately and in line with human rights obligations. This includes the important right, as my noble friend said, to freedom of expression.

The balance that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, struck is the one that I would strike as well. It is a long-standing, 39 year-old piece of legislation that has held up and has been interpreted in a sensible way by those who have legal powers to use it, both police officers and the CPS. Ultimately, we should ensure that the alarm element remains.

Having said all of that, noble Lords will be aware that the Home Secretary has commissioned an independent review of public order and hate crime legislation, which the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, KC, is considering. He will consider the thresholds relating to public order and hate crime legislation, whether they remain fit for purpose, if legislative changes are required and if we could have more consistent approaches to the offence of inciting hatred. He will also consider how we ensure offence thresholds do not interfere with free speech and how we deal with the type of issues that the noble Lord has mentioned.

I believe we should stay where we are for the reasons I have outlined, but a review is ongoing. It is important that we allow that review to conclude, which it will do by spring next year. The Government will consider and respond to whatever recommendations come forward. We do not know what those recommendations might be, but they are there to be done, and that is one of the reasons the Home Secretary commissioned the review. I understand where the noble Lord is coming from, but I hope I have put a defence of why we should maintain where we are. In the light of the potential review, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, I entirely agree with everything that has been said about the need to highlight this appalling practice and, so far as possible, bring it to an end. But if one’s chosen means is the fettering of the discretion of a sentencer, one has to be extraordinarily careful about definitions. There, I rather echo what has just been said.

I understand how difficult this is, but, for example, the definition in Amendment 353 would mean that if there is an incident motivated by the perpetrator’s perception that an individual has shamed the perpetrator, the sentencing judge would be required to treat that as an aggravating factor. That could be two young lads outside a nightclub; one of them has shown a compromising picture of the other, and the other feels shamed or that he may be shamed if he shows it. That is how the violence begins. Violence is always bad and it always has to be punished, but of all the possible motivations for violence, is that really one that we are going to single out as a mandatory aggravating factor?

I must admit that I slightly wonder whether the best way to achieve the spotlight that the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, so rightly wants to place on this is by amending the sentencing guidelines. I thought that inherent in a lot of what she said was perhaps the implication that there ought to be a specific offence, rather as we managed to do with non-fatal strangulation and suffocation. If we are to adopt this means, imperfect and relatively low profile as it may be, we must be very careful about the words. As the Minister knows better than any of us, it is very easy to legislate for what one has in mind, but the unintended consequences are also there, and the law of unintended consequences is, I am afraid, one of the strongest on the statute book.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Sugg for bringing this matter to the Committee and for her eloquent elaboration of the rationale behind her amendments. I also thank other noble Lords for speaking, particularly those who recounted the moving stories of specific women who have been victims of this abuse.

It is safe to say that this is an issue that unites us all; no one wants to see any form of abuse perpetrated against women and girls, but honour-based abuse is perhaps one of the most pernicious forms of abuse. Due to its specific character and profile, it can all too often be swept under the carpet, hidden by communities that perpetrate it and ignored by authorities that should put a stop to it. I welcome in particular the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, for making the important point that this is an international criminal phenomenon. It is very easy to see it within a UK bubble, but it is incredibly important to remind ourselves of that context.

The many victims of honour-based abuse are left without justice because of fears of inflaming what are termed community tensions. That is borne out by the facts. Only 95 prosecutions were brought forward for honour-based abuse cases in the year 2024-25, and of those cases only 46 led to convictions. The reason behind these appallingly low conviction rates is the persistent failure to recognise the unique characteristics of honour-based abuse—the fact that it often involves numerous perpetrators, many of whom are family members or members of an extended community, acting collectively to abuse and in many cases, as we have heard, murder the victim.

It is important to recognise that there has been a concerted effort more recently to better recognise and respond to honour-based abuse. The Government should be commended for committing—on 26 August, I think—to legislating for a statutory definition and the publication of multiagency guidance on how to deal most appropriately with such abuse.

Again in August this year, the College of Policing, as referenced by my noble friend Lord Blencathra, launched a new advice note to police forces to support officers in their efforts to identify and tackle these forms of abuse. That followed the recommendations that emerged from the Tees Valley super-complaint, which was an important investigation for many reasons but especially because it found that police forces generally tended to include the risk of honour-based abuse only in their domestic abuse policies, not in other policies, thereby leading to an incoherent approach. The investigation also found that police forces generally lacked the cultural awareness to recognise the wider religious and cultural drivers behind this form of violence, and that this had led to police officers failing to recognise the wider risks of honour-based abuse after victims reported it.

I commend and fully support Amendments 353 and 355 by my noble friend Lady Sugg. They simply attempt to put into the Bill two of the measures that the Government have already committed to: a statutory definition informed by the actual experiences and the reality of the victims, and a comprehensive set of multiagency guidance. That is an important step and the Government should be commended for committing to it, but it will be of no use if the Government do not speedily implement these measures.

I echo the sense of urgency expressed by noble Lords from across the Chamber. I believe that the Bill is the legislative vehicle for these changes, and if they are not included in this Bill then there will likely not be another opportunity for quite some time. I urge the Minister to bring forward amendments on Report to make good on the Government’s promise to the victims of what can only be termed the most horrific patterns of abuse and violence.