Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (Temporary Class Drug) Order 2026

Lord Cameron of Lochiel Excerpts

Tuesday 14th July 2026 Grand Committee

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

This instrument, laid before Parliament on 10 June, takes urgent action to control a new and very dangerous class of synthetic opioid. In the space of little over a year, orphines have been involved in at least 22 deaths in the United Kingdom, and 14 of those deaths were sadly between December and March. The UK is not alone in this respect: between 2024 and April this year, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime received 206 reports from numerous countries of drug samples that contained orphine compounds.

I am particularly grateful to the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs for prioritising an assessment of these deeply harmful substances. Its report was published on 30 April, and the dangers we face here are encapsulated in the following line from that report:

“the risk to the population from these recently emerging compounds is sufficiently great that urgent steps are required to protect public health”.

The Government have heard that message loud and clear, and we are acting at pace. We enacted a temporary class drug order, TCDO, to control these drugs, less than six weeks after the council produced its report. The TCDO covers seven orphines: three that have tragically been involved in those deaths here in the UK, and four that the EU Drugs Agency has notified as being present in EU drug markets.

This is the first TCDO in 10 years, so I will take a moment to remind noble Lords about what these orders do. A temporary class drug order makes it a specific offence to produce, supply or offer to supply these seven orphines; to export or import them; or to possess them when there is also an intention to supply. Doing any of these things can result in up to 14 years in prison, the same as for a class B drug.

The TCDO also provides that the substances should be treated as if they were in Schedule 1 to the Misuse of Drugs Regulations 2001. Scheduling here covers the circumstances in which a controlled substance can be used legitimately, and the procedures that must be followed in doing so. Schedule 1 covers substances with no known medical uses, which is the case with these seven drugs. Anyone who needs to make legitimate use of them, for example in research, would need to apply to the Home Office to obtain a licence.

This instrument uses the made affirmative procedure. This reflects a balance between the requirement to put in place urgent measures to safeguard public health and the need for proper parliamentary scrutiny of measures, which expand the scope of criminal law. Under the provisions of the Misuse of Drugs Act, the TCDO must be approved by both Houses of Parliament within 40 days of it being made. I know noble Lords will be pleased to note that the other place, the House of Commons, approved it last night, and I hope this House will do so by Friday’s deadline.

My colleague Sarah Jones MP, the Minister for Policing and Crime, also accepted the further recommendation from the advisory council that the TCDO be followed by a permanent control, which would make orphines class A drugs. This would cover not only these seven substances but also two “generic definitions” of orphines. The purpose of those is to make it harder for criminals to circumvent the controls by making slight tweaks to the chemical composition of what they sell. Noble Lords will doubtless agree with colleagues on the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee that the class A control should come into force swiftly. So, although I am not able to give a precise timetable today, I can confirm that we will act as soon as possible.

Self-evidently, the devastation that harmful drugs inflict on our society is intolerable, and it demands a response commensurate with the scale of the threat. The order before the Committee today stands as further evidence of the Government’s commitment to mounting such a response. I beg to move.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for bringing the order before the Committee. It is a simple and uncontroversial order, and I am pleased to support it. As the Minister established, the purpose of this legislation is to make a temporary class drug order under Section 2A of the 1971 Act in respect of seven substances that fall under the category of orphines, which are a class of synthetic opioids that have been recommended for control by the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs. Given the reports that the UN Office on Drugs and Crime have received regarding the presence of orphine compounds in drug samples and their links to deaths, the Government are absolutely right to seek to control these substances.

However, I seek a couple of clarifications. As its title suggests, this order makes a temporary class drug order for the listed substances. I note that Section 2A of the 1971 Act states that TCDOs expire within one year of the order being made, which means that the Government will need to come forward within one year with a new Order in Council under Section 2 of the Act that lists these substances as controlled drugs. If the Government do not do that, these substances will cease to be controlled, so will the Minister confirm that the Government will bring forward a new order within that timeframe?

As a linked query, it is interesting that the Government have sought to make a TCDO now rather than simply to bring in an Order in Council. Why make a temporary order and then a permanent order later? There is an argument for the Government to have added these substances straight away to Schedule 2 to the 1971 Act. If we accept that they cause enough harm to justify a temporary order, surely they should be controlled permanently in the first place. I would be grateful if the Minister could explain the rationale for their approach.

Other than that, as I said at the start, I am more than happy to support the Government in their endeavours on this order.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, for his broad support for the order. As he said, it is quite sensible that we do this, but he asked two legitimate questions. In answer to his first question, we are mindful that the TCDO lasts for just one year and we will lay a permanent control before Parliament as soon as possible, as the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee has urged us to do. I cannot give the noble Lord a timescale for that but, self-evidently, with the expiry of the order, we want to get that done and make sure that it is covered as a whole.

As the noble Lord said, we could have brought in an urgent, permanent class A control, which the advisory council has suggested is preferable. However, controlling new substances as class A, B or C drugs takes some time, and rightly so. Such controls expand the scope of the criminal law and amend primary legislation, and it is right that Parliament has the opportunity to scrutinise them. That is precisely why the legislation also allows for these temporary class drug orders. They do everything that class A, B or C controls do, except that the maximum sentences are not as long as for class A drugs.

I say with due respect to my colleagues in the Privy Council, of which I am a member, that the need for the relevant order to be made at the Privy Council adds some weeks to the process, and there is no real need for that at the moment. In the previous Session of Parliament, the Government supported a Bill sponsored by the honourable Member for Gloucester which would have removed this requirement. For the moment, we think that we can put the controls in place, mindful of the expiry, and revisit that in due course. We will look at the longer-term procedure more slowly, but the purpose of this order is to make sure that we put some definitive controls in place on the seven new opioids that have, sadly, caused deaths in the past year. I hope that that answers the noble Lord’s questions.

National Crime Agency: Reform Party Funding

Lord Cameron of Lochiel Excerpts

Tuesday 14th July 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

One of the Rycroft recommendations is that we standardise political finance reporting, and the Government have accepted that. Accepting that means that we have given the Electoral Commission powers to prescribe standardised reporting formats. We are continuing to work with the Electoral Commission on a number of other areas. I will reflect on what the noble Lord has said.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, the Labour Together episode has already been mentioned. Not only did that organisation fail to declare donations but it paid to have journalists investigated. Does the Minister agree that it would be inappropriate for anyone involved in these scandals to be given a senior role in government?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Ultimately, who gets senior roles in government is a matter for the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister will make a judgment on that and, with due respect, I do not think he will be taking advice from the Conservative Front Bench on whom he appoints.

Violence Against Retail Workers

Lord Cameron of Lochiel Excerpts

Tuesday 14th July 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, if the Government are truly committed to tackling retail crime, such as shop theft and violence against retail workers, they need to improve enforcement and policing. Have the Government given any consideration to hotspot policing, whereby more officers are deployed to areas with particularly high rates of crime and greater use is made of stop and search?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Yes, we have. We have highlighted particular areas through the policing assessment of shop theft, and we have identified a number of areas where we have been able to put in resource to do that. We have also, dare I say, increased the number of police officers on the beat. We have a commitment to increase that by a significant number. We have managed 3,100 in the 18 months or so that we have been in office, and we intend to increase that. With our police reforms, we intend to give additional support to look at what the priorities are at a local level, with smaller police forces more focused on neighbourhood policing. I look forward to the noble Lord’s support on those measures.

European Entry and Exit System

Lord Cameron of Lochiel Excerpts

Thursday 9th July 2026 Lords Chamber

For passengers travelling to Schengen countries by air, EES registration will take place at their destination. It will not take place in UK airports, and queues in EU member states are for those states to manage. However, this Government continue to engage with the Commission and relevant member states to advocate for the pragmatic use of the EES flexibilities allowed to avoid delays for passengers. We are also engaging with our European partners on the use of technology, such as the EES app, to move elements of registration away from the border. We continue to encourage travellers to check with their travel operator before departing so that they know when to arrive and are aware of any possible impacts on their journey”.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, there have clearly been serious issues across Europe this year in relation to the new European entry system and it is no secret that implementation has been poor. However, the European Union seems to be under the impression that the new entry and exit system is working well. What discussions have the Government had with the European Union about improving the system?

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

The Government are in constant dialogue with the European Union. We are working closely with European member states to ensure that the juxtaposed ports have the right technology and processes to enable travel to be as smooth as possible for UK citizens. This has included providing £3.5 million in funding to each of the three ports to help make their changes to infrastructure. We will continue to discuss with European partners how we can ensure that we have as smooth an operation as possible in the interests of both the European Union and British travellers.

UK Migration

Lord Cameron of Lochiel Excerpts

Thursday 9th July 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I will certainly look at the report my noble friend has cited. I also want to place on record my thanks to and recognition of the value of all those who contribute to the National Health Service. As my noble friend has said, many of them originally came to this country as non-British nationals and are now naturalised Britons. Their contributions should never be underestimated. However, that does not take away from the fact that we need to ensure that those Britons who are currently unemployed and who aspire to work in the health service can also do so. One of the objectives of the Government’s migration programme is to ensure that we build up the skills and talent of people of British heritage who were born in the United Kingdom.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, it has recently been revealed that, despite the previous Government placing restrictions on dependants for those on health and social care visas, people are still bringing in huge numbers of dependants. Some 12 such visas were issued to nationals of Cameroon, who were able to bring 180 people with them. I do not say this to make any great political point, but I am sure the Minister agrees that this is not how the system is supposed to operate. In the light of that, do the Government have any plans to rectify this situation?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for raising this issue. We have seen some reports on the issue of dependants of health and social care visa holders remaining exempt from the surcharge, and on such visa holders bringing in family members. We are looking at this, but some aspects of the stories currently in the press are incorrect, and it is incorrect to link dependant visas granted in a given year with worker visas granted in the same period. I will look at the issue the noble Lord has mentioned and send him a note; but, while he himself has not been inaccurate, there are some inaccuracies in the reporting of this.

Rochdale Grooming Gang: Offender Deportation

Lord Cameron of Lochiel Excerpts

Wednesday 8th July 2026 Lords Chamber

Under this Government, removals of foreign national offenders are up 36%, with nearly 10,000 returned since we entered office. The fact that that has not so far been possible for an individual responsible for such heinous crimes as Shabir Ahmed’s is unacceptable. I can assure the House that we have not given up, and we will not. While the original intentions of the legislation in question mean that we ought to proceed with care, the nature of the offending in this case demands that we explore all options, and that is what we are doing. In the meantime, we will of course do everything in our power to keep the public safe”.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, when this Urgent Question was asked by my honourable friend Katie Lam in the other place on Monday, the Minister responding, Alex Norris, said:

“I could not be clearer that all options are on the table at this stage”.—[Official Report, Commons, 6/7/26; col. 28.]


With respect, the only option that should be on the table is the deportation of Shabir Ahmed. There is no justification whatever for him to remain in the country after the despicable crimes he has committed. If the Government say that they cannot deport him because of the law then they must change the law. The Opposition have said we will support that change, so why will the Government not commit to bringing forward the necessary amendment to the Immigration Act 1971 as a matter of urgency?

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

The crimes which led to the imprisonment of the individual concerned were despicable and horrendous. I say again to the noble Lord that we are urgently looking at these matters and will bring potential urgent action on them. We are examining this in detail and nothing is ruled out at all. I will keep the noble Lord updated on this matter. It is not acceptable that this individual is protected. For information, in the last 12 months we have deported 187 foreign national offenders for rape offences and 392 foreign national offenders for sexual offences. However, as the noble Lord mentioned, the 1971 Act places a restriction on this individual, and we are urgently examining that issue.

Counterterrorism: AI and Facial Recognition

Lord Cameron of Lochiel Excerpts

Wednesday 1st July 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Baroness makes a valid point about the difference between terrorism and what I will term other crime. As she knows, facial recognition technology is sometimes used for things such as identifying missing persons who have not been involved in crime at all. There needs to be a clear framework for this. As she knows, the consultation paper raised a number of questions. We are trying to resolve and respond to those and to look at the great analysis that we had in responses. We will bring forward proposals, which she will have an opportunity to test when we bring forward the police reform Bill.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, it has been reported that the newly created PoliceAI centre will roll out large-scale pilots in up to 10 police forces to help officers triage, disclose and summarise digital evidence. Can the Minister inform your Lordships’ House as to what impact the police reform Bill, and specifically the proposed mergers of police forces, will have on these plans for a more enhanced role for AI in policing?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

At the moment, as the noble Lord knows, the Government’s policy objective is to reduce the number of police forces. We have asked the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, to look at that. Ministers have not yet had his final report with his proposals for the size of police forces. In the police reform Bill, we are trying to establish national responsibilities on crime, counterterrorism, training, and procurement. As part of our consultation, we are looking at what we need to do on a framework for facial recognition technology. As the noble Lord rightly said, we have put in £140 million, including £11 million on 40 new live facial recognition units, and we have looked at retrospective facial recognition. We are trying, in a very long-term plan, to get national capability, better resource and better efficiency for taxpayers, while at the same time recognising, as I know he does, that facial recognition is an extremely important tool for identifying known criminals, people who have broken licence terms and people who are missing, and for intelligence-led policing that can ensure that we know exactly who we are looking for and why.

National Security (State Threats) Bill

Lord Cameron of Lochiel Excerpts

Report stage & 3rd reading
Tuesday 30th June 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, from these Benches, I reiterate the thanks of all of us to the Minister and his team, both in the House and in the Home Office, and his Bill team generally, for the enormous help that we have had and for engaging with us. From our point of view, we have achieved some significant improvements to the Bill. We believe that the purpose of Bill, of which the noble Lord spoke, has been achieved with great speed and, generally speaking, in good humour. We are therefore happy that the Bill do now pass.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, I echo the thanks given by the Minister to the officials of the House for their actions this evening in moving us so quickly to this point. I thank the Minister for, as ever, a courteous, sometimes robust, debate across the Dispatch Box. We have had two intense days debating this Bill. As I said last week, these Benches have always supported the principles of the Bill and supported its passage through Parliament. There are some unfinished areas to which the Minister alluded. We hope to return to those in due course when a new Bill—a wider national security Bill—comes before Parliament. With those brief comments, I too hope that this Bill do now pass.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, from the Cross Benches, on behalf of my noble friend Lord Anderson of Ipswich, myself and my other noble friends, we too would echo the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, and of the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, in thanking the Minister for engaging with us. He has been willing to have long private discussions outside of the House to try to find a way forward, to do what he has rightly said is the aim and objective of everyone in this House: to do everything we can to enhance the security of this country against the many threats that we face.

Going forward to the new Bill, which I am sure will already be in preparation, I hope that we will have learned one or two things from this experience. I know that the Minister shares my passion for good governance and pre-legislative scrutiny, for the involvement of Select Committees and for the chance to adequately debate measures as and when they come to the House. I thank him for his courtesy. It is always a pleasure to work with a Minister who not only knows his subject but is passionate about it. We thank him for that and, indeed, his team of officials as well.

National Security (State Threats) Bill

Lord Cameron of Lochiel Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 30th June 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I regret that I was unable to take part on Second Reading owing to a long-standing family commitment, but I am very grateful on behalf of both the Liberal Democrats and many others for the Minister’s engagement with us before Second Reading and since. It has been extremely helpful, and his Bill team have been extremely helpful. The fact that most of the issues we face are now resolved owes a great deal to that commitment.

As was made clear at Second Reading, we support the aim of the Bill, in the light of the advice given to the Government by Jonathan Hall KC that further legislation is needed to enable appropriate action to respond to damaging activity by foreign state actors, as opposed to private bodies, that is prejudicial to the United Kingdom’s security and national interests.

We also understand the urgency of the Bill and the reason why it has been taken, effectively, as emergency legislation. However, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Alton, that the degree of hurry and the haste overall have, sadly, reduced the amount of scrutiny we have been able to give it. The speed does not obviate the need for Parliament, and this House in particular, to give the Bill as much scrutiny as it can in the limited time available. But we do so in the light of the Government’s commitment, given in the King’s Speech, and to which my noble friend Lady Ludford referred, to introduce legislation to tackle the growing threat from foreign state entities and their proxies and to improve the country’s defences against cyber security threats. The Minister has mentioned those again in recent days, and we therefore accept that this Bill is not the end of the story in relation to those commitments, and that its structure requires further development to respond adequately to these ongoing, complex and ever-changing threats.

In this group I will add only briefly to my noble friend Lady Doocey’s careful and comprehensive explanation in her speech on Amendment 5—to which the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and I have added our names—of the dangers of artificial intelligence and superintelligence. Such developments would enable artificial intelligence and superintelligence systems to exacerbate foreign power and foreign state threats. Were Amendment 5 to be passed, they would be specifically subject to the National Security Act. The amendment addresses the particular threat of hostile or potentially hostile foreign state actors and their proxies developing and exploiting these new systems, which are capable, as my noble friend Lady Doocey said, of wreaking untold damage to our national infrastructure and our economic and military interests.

The extent and forms of such damage, the scope of the threats proposed and the potential shape of future attacks are unforeseen and unforeseeable today—and therein lies a great part of their danger. The dangers outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Beamish, to our academic life and our universities are all exacerbated by the growth of AI and ASI alongside them. The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, in a lighter moment, said that the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, had frightened her; well, she has frightened us all, and rightly.

Until this morning, we found the Government’s response to this amendment slightly inadequate. However, following our meeting yesterday with the Minister, the Government have given a strong indication that they recognise the development by foreign powers of highly advanced AI systems that pose risks to our cyber security and our national security. The Government will therefore seek and take into account the views of the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation as to whether amendments to our legislation are necessary to redefine power threat activity accordingly.

That undertaking goes a long way towards meeting our objective. However, I am keen to see—and I hope the Government will add to this—the involvement of others going wider than the independent reviewer. For all that he is widely respected, his term is in any case due to end shortly. But real expert input in this area is necessary, and the Government need to take advantage of it. I would be keen to know that the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament is to be consulted on this issue, and it should have the remit to consult with wider experts on AI development as needed.

As to the need for further legislation on this issue, we need look no further than the statement issued by our Five Eyes allies, including the leaders of our National Cyber Security Centre, on 22 June—only last week. The statement was headed, “The AI shift in cyber risk: why leaders must act now”. It made the urgency clear:

“While AI will help us improve cyber defence over time, it also accelerates the speed, scale, and sophistication of cyber threats.


Frontier AI models are anticipated to exceed current industry expectations, fundamentally transforming both offensive and defensive cyber capabilities. The timeline is not years, it is months”.


This is a threat to take seriously, and we underestimate it at our peril.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. We all agree that the Bill is needed. As we said at Second Reading, the Opposition support the principles behind the Bill and the creation of a designation regime to tackle state threats, most importantly the IRGC. We do, however, feel the need to again make criticisms of how we have reached this point.

When the Government introduced the Bill three weeks ago, the usual channels agreed to fast-track it in both Houses. Part of that agreement was that the Government would work with the Opposition in a constructive manner to ensure that the Bill is the best it can be. My honourable friend Alicia Kearns MP had meetings with officials in the Home Office, informing them of her concerns about gaps in the Bill. My noble friend Lord Davies of Gower sent to the Minister two letters confirming those concerns, the first on 10 June and the second on 17 June. We gave the Government as much advance notice as possible of the amendments we would table, to give them enough time to consider the proposals and reach a reasonable compromise.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Northover (LD)]

My Lords, I speak briefly in support of my noble friend Lord Marks. He has put the case extremely effectively, taking from the amendment tabled by my honourable friend in the other place. Generally speaking, this is an area where there has been much cross-party working by the right honourable Andrew Mitchell, the noble Baroness, Lady Hodge, my noble friend Lady Kramer, and others. I therefore hope that noble Lords will be helpful in responding to this. The Panama papers, and many other sources, have revealed much information that would already have been in the public domain had beneficial ownership been clearer. Therefore, I hope the Minister will join me in supporting this amendment.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group concern offences relating to the support and assistance of designated bodies. The noble Lord, Lord Walney, has not spoken to his amendments. In this regard, it is worth commenting that these Benches have a lot of sympathy with the principle behind the noble Lord’s amendments—he spoke at Second Reading last week—namely, the fact that a designated body, as a media organ, should not be a potential avenue by which criminals avoid prosecution. It is an issue worthy of consideration. It would be interesting if the Minister could confirm whether the offences proposed by the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Walney, would already be captured by the Bill as drafted.

Amendment 9, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, would make it an offence to conceal beneficial ownership relating to a designated organisation. Again, we on these Benches support the principle behind this amendment. The use, funnelling or concealment of funds to support a designated body should undoubtedly be an offence that is captured by the Bill, and I hope that the Minister can provide assurances that this will be the case. I look forward to his response.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful for the contributions from the noble Lords, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames and Lord Cameron of Lochiel. The noble Lord, Lord Walney, is not in his place, but his amendments have been referred to. I confirm to the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, that the conduct captured in the amendments is already appropriately provided for by the existing provisions in the Bill. Had the noble Lord, Lord Walney, spoken to them, I would have gone into more detail, but that is the principle of the response to date.

I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, for his Amendment 9, which intends to specify the concealment of beneficial ownership, and the establishment and maintenance of that concealment of finance and assets related to a designated body, as material assistance. The Government take corruption in all its forms very seriously. We welcome the noble Lord’s focus on this important issue, and the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, for the objectives that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has outlined.

On the noble Lord’s concerns about beneficial ownership, the Government have a strong record on reducing illicit finance, including working with overseas territories and Crown dependencies to do so. The register of overseas entities requires overseas entities that own UK property to register verified information on their beneficial owners with Companies House and to update that information. The Government also produce an annual progress report to Parliament on Companies House reforms, including updates to the register of overseas entities.

The “Assisting a designated body” offence is not limited to financial benefits; providing access to services is already explicitly covered by subsection (3) of the new Section 17B offence. Establishing or running an arrangement to look after a designated body’s assets is a service. Those who do so professionally are often called trust or company service providers. This reflects that there are no specific financial measures in the Bill but they can be applied in all environments. Therefore, the activity that the amendment seeks to address is already within the scope of the new offence.

The amendment is unnecessary in a positive way, in that the Bill is already covering this area, and although the noble Lord has drawn specific attention to this matter, I can explicitly confirm the extent of the provisions of the Bill, and we anticipate that a key utility for this power will be to call out and bear down on the very front companies the noble Lord has referred to which are carrying out foreign power threat activities as proxies for hostile powers. If the noble Lord looks at the Explanatory Notes to the Bill, he will see that that is very clear. I know he will have looked at those in detail, but I reaffirm for other Members of the Committee that the Explanatory Notes are very clear on that point.

If I may, I will follow up in writing to the noble Lord to give some further detail to him and his colleagues regarding the work that the Government are doing to prevent the misuse of beneficial ownership structures and financing of designated bodies more broadly. When I do that, I will place a copy of the letter in the Libraries of both Houses to ensure that all Members have access to my correspondence in due course. It is a matter for the noble Lord, but I think that we have covered these matters. It was very important that he raised them, but I respectfully ask him not to push his amendment; given that his is the last amendment standing in this group, I hope he will withdraw it and allow us to deal with matters by correspondence.

National Security (State Threats) Bill

Lord Cameron of Lochiel Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 23rd June 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, I begin by thanking all noble Lords from across your Lordships’ House who have contributed to this thoughtful and stimulating debate. It is a great privilege to give the closing speech for the Opposition Benches, having heard from many noble Lords with a huge amount of expertise and experience in the legal, security and ISC sectors.

Before reflecting on the specific provisions in the Bill we would like to see refined, it is worth outlining the context in which your Lordships have received this legislation. The Opposition Benches have long recognised the growing threat posed by hostile state actors and their proxies, and we wholeheartedly support the aim of strengthening the tools available to protect the UK’s national security. Of course, we support the general principles of the Bill and concur with the motivations behind it.

I accept that the Bill goes beyond the IRGC. The noble Lord, Lord Alton, gave a long list of both threats and, sadly, events in the UK in recent years. The Bill rightly should cover state threats in general, but the IRGC is obviously and rightly the first target of the Bill. It is undeniable that the legislative provisions here should have been brought before Parliament long before now.

For many months, noble Lords from across your Lordships’ House have repeatedly called for stronger action against the IRGC, most recently in the Committee and Report stages of the Crime and Policing Bill, where time and again calls were made from many different quarters for proscription of the IRGC or an equivalent. Those calls were resisted, amendments were opposed, arguments were dismissed; the opinion of the House was tested but ignored. Yet we now find ourselves considering a Bill whose principal and primary purpose is to establish a legislative framework through which organisations such as the IRGC may be designated. That raises the question: if the Government accept the need for such a framework, why has action not been taken sooner? The threats posed by the Iranian regime and the IRGC did not suddenly emerge in recent weeks. Had the Government listened to arguments that were made in this Chamber months ago, Parliament would not now be scrutinising significant national security legislation to such compressed timescales. That matters because legislation must be more than well intentioned, it must be effective; where Parliament identifies legislative gaps or ambiguities, it is our duty to address them.

It is in that spirit that we approach this Bill, and it is in that spirit that I wish to address and emphasise a few of the concerns that my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower raised. The first is the prohibited purpose test. As it stands, Clause 2 enables hostile state proxies to receive greater protection than terrorist organisations, because it imposes a greater a burden on the prosecution than the Terrorism Act 2000. Pausing there, the point has been made most powerfully by the noble Lords, Lord Barrow and Lord Carlile, that we should not expect to simply cut and paste the Terrorism Act into this Bill. I acknowledge that, but the Terrorism Act remains the blueprint, and throughout Jonathan Hall’s report, he uses the phrase “equivalent to powers in the Terrorism Act” again and again. I appreciate the need for subtlety, which the noble Lord, Lord Carlile called for, but, while the threats may be different, these are analogous statutory regimes. They are equivalents. The regime in this Bill should not be weaker than the Terrorism Act and any differences should have a clear rationale.

Returning to Clause 2, there are two conditions for the offence of supporting a designated body. They are inviting support for or expressing a belief that is supportive of a designated body and—this is the additional part—a requirement that support was given for a prohibited purpose that was prejudicial to the safety of the UK. The additional requirement that prosecutors must prove conduct as well as the defendant’s prohibited purpose creates an additional evidential burden. It makes it harder to prosecute and harder to secure a conviction, as well as adding another layer of bureaucracy in a process that should be fair but streamlined. As I have said, much of this Bill has been drafted with Section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000 as the blueprint, yet there is no similar provision in the Terrorism Act.

Turning secondly to preparatory conduct, there is a gap in the Bill as drafted in the prevention and prosecution of hostile activity before actual harm takes place. The purpose of national security legislation is to punish hostile activity and prevent it occurring. The Bill focuses primarily on completed acts of support, assistance or financial benefit to a designated body, and that leaves a gap, because it may be entirely feasible that law enforcement agencies are aware of an individual actively preparing to assist a designated organisation but lack the power to intervene until further steps have been taken. That is particularly concerning given the nature of modern hostile state activity, which often relies on recruitment, facilitation, planning and preparation long before any substantive offence is committed.

Parliament has long recognised that challenge in other areas of national security. The Terrorism Act contains a range of preparatory and precursor offences, and it reflects the principle that intervention at the earliest possible stage is often necessary to protect the public and safeguard national security. If the Government believe that designated organisations pose a sufficient threat to warrant the creation of this new designation regime, it is difficult to understand why similar preventive principles should not apply. In the other place, the Government said that the Bill had been deliberately drafted as a targeted and narrowly focused piece of legislation. Ministers stated that the Bill was intended to be narrow, but did not explain why this gap remains. The Bill being narrow does not necessarily mean it is complete. I hope that the Minister will clarify this point, because national security legislation is most effective when it enables disruption and prevention, as well as prosecution after the event.

Thirdly, on uniforms and insignia, the Bill creates an inconsistency with existing national security legislation by failing to address uniforms and insignia associated with designated organisations. It has been established in Parliament that support for dangerous organisations is not demonstrated solely through direct assistance or financial support. We know that uniforms and insignia can be used to demonstrate allegiance to a hostile organisation, they can intimidate communities and political opponents, and they can promote and legitimise dangerous organisations. Section 13 of the Terrorism Act makes it an offence to wear clothing or display articles in circumstances that arouse reasonable suspicion that an individual is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation, yet no equivalent provision appears in this Bill. That creates the illogical situation whereby Parliament can determine that an organisation presents a sufficient threat to warrant designation, but public displays of support for the same organisation remain lawful. The Government’s argument is essentially that designated organisations are different from terrorist organisations, but this again does not answer the central question. Why should organisations deemed sufficiently dangerous to be designated under this legislation be subject to weaker restrictions than terrorist organisations?

In closing, I reiterate that the concerns that my noble friend Lord Davies and I have raised are not objections to the principles of the Bill: rather, they are attempts to ensure that the framework we establish is as effective as possible. Legitimate questions have been raised during the course of this debate about the operation of particular provisions and the gaps that remain in the legislation. Narrowness is not a substitute for completeness. If there are weaknesses that can be addressed, Parliament must address them now. We should not leave them to be discovered later, in the course of prosecutions under this legislation. I thank the Government for finally bringing forward legislation in this area, but the task before your Lordships is not simply to welcome the Bill but to improve it. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.