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Written StatementsToday I have laid before Parliament the Government’s response to the House of Lords Select Committee on the constitution’s report on the Justice and Security Bill, which was published on 15 June. We have sought to respond promptly in order to help inform the upcoming debates on the Bill.
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Commons Chamber2. What recent representations he has received on the implementation of decisions of the European Court of Human Rights.
I am very grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend for that detailed reply. He will know that there is concern, certainly on the Government Benches, that the European Court of Human Rights gives insufficient weight to the decisions of national courts, and that in addition, given the backlog of more than 150,000 cases, the Court is not devoting its entire time and attention to truly serious abuses of human rights. In that context, what are the Government doing to ensure that votes of national Parliaments and decisions by national courts are better taken into account by the European Court?
I agree entirely with my hon. Friend. We addressed that during our chairmanship of the Council of Europe. We had a conference at Brighton of all 47 member states and produced the Brighton declaration. Our considerable achievement there was not very widely reported because, not surprisingly, the media regarded it as a footnote to the Abu Qatada case which was in the newspapers at the time. Forty-seven countries agreed that we should have a greater margin of appreciation, to use the jargon, and that more regard should be paid to those decisions of the courts of nation states which had obviously addressed their obligations under the convention. That will have a considerable impact on future cases.
Is it not long overdue that the Government move to ensure that the courts of the United Kingdom, rather than the European Court, have supremacy in the area of human rights, including protection of Christian liberties and freedoms?
We are taken to the Court much less than other members and we lose only about 2%. Sometimes that 2% includes cases where there is widespread support here for the decision, such as the holding of DNA and other information belonging to people who have never been convicted of a criminal offence, which was a recent judgment. The convention still has a very important role to play across Europe. It is hugely significant in the 47 member states and it enables standards to be applied in places all the way from Russia, Turkey and Azerbaijan across to us and Iceland. We have always been subject to the rule of law. We have always bound ourselves under the convention to accept the judgments. These are the standards that we all agreed upon after the second world war, which were not challenged in this country till 10 or 15 years ago, when some judgments here began to annoy sections of the media.
Will my right hon. and learned Friend take this opportunity to congratulate Mr Paul Mahoney on his election as the UK judge to the European Court of Human Rights, and does he share my satisfaction that the new judge is committed to ensuring that the principles of subsidiarity are held high in the Court—for example, in relation to the right of individual countries to decide issues relating to national religion?
I personally disapprove of a parliamentary vote on the appointment of judges, but that is the system that has prevailed there since 1947. Fortunately, the British put forward three excellently qualified candidates for the judgeship, so I congratulate Mr Mahoney on his election and I am sure he will make a very considerable contribution.
I am sure the Justice Secretary will agree that it would be inappropriate for him as a member of the Executive or me as a Member of the legislature to interfere with the appointment of judges in the UK. In the light of that and of his last answer, what are his views not on the vote but on the political interference that appears to have taken place with the appointment of the UK representative to the European Court of Human Rights?
The Council of Europe works on the basis that the Parliamentary Assembly votes from a shortlist of three people provided by the member state, and now steps are taken to ensure that all three come up to certain standards, which I am glad to say the British nominees quite easily did. It sounds as though the right hon. Gentleman and I would not start from here, and I agree that normally politicians should not vote on which judge ought to be appointed to any judicial post, but they did and Mr Mahoney, I am sure, will prove an excellent choice.
3. What recent assessment he has made of arrangements for handling sensitive information from the intelligence services in court proceedings.
The Government have introduced the Justice and Security Bill to introduce a process by which such material may be considered by the courts in civil cases in future. The Bill is currently being considered and scrutinised in the House of Lords.
I thank the Secretary of State for his reply. Does he agree that if we do not make reforms in this area we run the risk of allowing a substantial industry to develop in expensive legal claims, which we are forced to pay out of court because the Government are unable to defend themselves in open court?
The Bill stems from our recent experience in the so-called Guantanamo Bay cases, when a very large sum of money was paid out to satisfy claims and legal costs when the security and intelligence services insisted that they had an adequate defence. An increasing number of those cases are coming along, and it is not for me to pre-judge any of them, but I should like the judge to be able to hear all the evidence in the circumstances that are possible—closed material proceedings—so that we as citizens obtain some judgment in the end about the merits or otherwise of the complaint. We certainly must not encourage people to go along for both the political publicity and the potential funds that might flow from bringing a claim that they know cannot be defended.
On what basis has the Justice Secretary decided not to allow closed material proceedings at inquests? Surely if there is a highly sensitive piece of intelligence that would help to explain the cause of someone’s death, the coroner should be able to see that information, albeit on a protected basis.
We canvassed that proposal in the consultation, and I have considerable sympathy with the right hon. Gentleman’s view, but we have responded to the consultation, in which there were strong feelings against the procedure being applied to inquests—despite the support that we had from coroners’ associations.
The argument is that the coroner cannot consider such material in closed material proceedings because it means that the family, the press and other interested parties will not be able to hear what the spies have to say, and that is the basis on which we have introduced the Bill—we are a listening Government. But I did canvass the measure that the right hon. Gentleman proposes.
4. What discussions he has had with the Secretary of State for the Home Department on providing high-quality services for women within the criminal justice system following the election of police and crime commissioners.
6. What progress he has made on his proposals to reform the probation system.
On 27 March, in the consultation document “Punishment and Reform: Effective Probation Services”, the Government published proposals to deliver more effective and efficient probation services. Alongside that, we published proposals to deliver more credible and effective community sentences. We are currently considering the responses to the consultation, which closed on 22 June. We intend to publish the Government response later in the year.
I thank the Secretary of State for his response. Under a marketisation of the probation service, how can he assure the House that fragmentation of the service will not put the public at risk? What safeguards are in place to ensure that cherry-picking by private sector providers of individuals on probation does not occur?
I am somewhat astonished by the reaction of some Opposition Members. We are following the policy first laid out in the Offender Management Act 2007. The probation trusts have now all been set up and we are introducing principles to bring some competition and diversity of provider. There are very good people who can provide some aspects of the probation service. We believe that that will both enhance the quality of the service and achieve better value for money and better outcomes. Plenty of people in the probation service welcome our proposals; indeed, some are surprised by their modesty.
At a recent multi-agency public protection arrangements, or MAPPA, meeting that I sat in on, a probation officer reported that his client was having problems meeting a curfew of 7 o’clock at night. When the officer was asked what he was doing to deal with the curfew’s being breached, he said that he had changed the curfew to 9 o’clock to aid compliance. Will the Secretary of State tell me what he is going to do to stop such outrages, which make a complete mockery of the probation system and the criminal justice system?
I cannot comment on an individual case, although I am sure that my hon. Friend did when he had the pleasure of listening to that exchange. We are seeking to make both the probation service and community sentences more effective, by which I mean more punitive when necessary but also more effective in controlling the behaviour of the offender.
We have taken powers to extend the hours of curfew. We intend to make more use of tagging to enforce curfews, among other things. We are testing more effective equipment and consulting on how best to use tags and modern technology effectively.
I am now looking for stunning succinctness. I call Mr Elfyn Llwyd.
I shall try to stun you, Mr Speaker.
The Secretary of State knows that the relationship between probation officer and offender is crucial to the rehabilitation process. How will he assure the House that opening up to the private sector will not undermine that crucial relationship?
In all these things, I take the view that the status of the person involved—whether they are classified as public sector or private sector, or who exactly they work for or which union they belong to—is a slightly subordinate issue. This is a rather sterile debate of a few decades ago about whether there should be private sector or public sector provision. What matters is the quality of what is done, the quality of the person, the relationships they develop, and what is available to them to make a community sentence more effective.
7. What recent assessment he has made of the effectiveness of the system for recovery of criminal fines.
T1. If he will make a statement on his departmental responsibilities.
Yesterday, the Government published their response to the consultation entitled “Getting it Right for Victims and Witnesses”. For too long, many victims have felt themselves to be an afterthought for the criminal justice system. Our reforms will ensure that victims and witnesses get the support they need when they need it. Our proposals include an aim to raise an additional £50 million from offenders to be spent on victims’ services. Responsibility for commissioning most victims’ services will eventually go to democratically accountable police and crime commissioners, ensuring that decisions about service provision respond to local need. We will reform criminal injuries compensation so that it is focused on victims of serious crime and is sustainable, and there will be a new victims code making it clear what victims can expect from the criminal justice system and ensuring that they are treated with dignity and respect.
A UK prisoner is litigating in the European Court of Human Rights asserting his right to vote. When does the Secretary of State expect that decision to be handed down by the Court, and does he expect the House of Commons to be able to vote on the issue of votes for prisoners?
There has been repeated litigation involving several member states that do not allow prisoners to vote, as we have never done. The most recent litigation was Scoppola v. the Italian Government, in which our Attorney-General intervened on behalf of the British Government to argue that Parliament was more responsible for this issue than the Court. The Government will respond to that judgment, which went against a blanket ban, in due course.
There are 6,500 prisoners who have been ordered by trial judges to serve indeterminate sentences for public protection. It is important for public safety that they be released only after a proper risk assessment, but more than 3,500 are waiting for appropriate programmes and a risk assessment. Does the Justice Secretary have any plans to increase the number of programmes and assessments to address this issue?
This system, which we are getting rid of, as the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate (Mr Blunt) reminded us earlier, has put a tremendous load on the prison service in terms of programme design, availability of suitable places and the Parole Board system. We are addressing that and trying to reduce the delays, but it will take us some time to get through the system. Of course, some will remain indeterminately imprisoned, but we want as many as possible to finish their proper sentence, to get them out and to put behind us this rather shameful chapter in the history of sentencing in this country.
As is normal, the Justice Secretary did not answer the question I asked. Let me try another. His ministerial colleague said that there were no immediate plans to change the release test. Yesterday, Lord McNally said that the Government may use Executive action to release those serving IPPs, and would also change the balance of judgment to be made by the Parole Board to free up prison places. Those two actions could lead to prisoners who are currently serving IPPs being released without due regard to public safety. Which Minister should we believe, and is it really worth taking a risk with public safety to reduce prison numbers?
I will check what Lord McNally actually said. We are not contemplating either of those steps at the moment. We are putting extra resources into programmes and into addressing the problems that the Parole Board is faced with. We are quite determined not to take risks with public safety, but indeterminate sentences really were one of the worst ways of trying to do that, as they left a grave sense of injustice and difficulty coping with the proper assessment of people, for open-ended release.
T2. My right hon. and learned Friend recently announced extra financial support of £50 million to be provided for victims of crime, with offenders being forced to make the financial contribution. I strongly welcome that, but could see no information on the Department’s website about when the scheme will start. Can he help with that?
T9. Many countries outside the UK have legal systems that are based on ours, and this is particularly true in the Commonwealth. What has my right hon. and learned Friend done to market the legal services in the UK to those countries?
We are making a considerable effort to market British legal services, both within the Commonwealth and across the wider world, in many important emerging markets and elsewhere. I am glad to say that we are working closely with the Bar Council and the Law Society in doing so. Legal services in this country are held in the highest regard in the world—our judges are more trusted and our system is more effective than most others—and they contribute 1.3% to the GDP of this country. Legal services are second only to financial services in the City of London, and are something we should promote and support.
T6. Is the Minister able to put a figure on how much the repeated failure of Applied Language Solutions to provide interpreters in court proceedings has cost the taxpayer through delayed proceedings?
On 4 September, the European Court of Human Rights will hear the case of Nadia Eweida v. the United Kingdom Government. I understand that the Government are resisting the case. Miss Eweida is the lady who effectively lost her job with British Airways for wearing a cross, a symbol of her religion, at work. Is it any part of the British Government’s policy to support the denial of people’s religious rights at work? If not, will we reconsider our position on that case?
I will consult the Attorney-General, who is no doubt preparing the Government’s defence in this case. This is obviously a hugely difficult issue; the case has gone through the courts here and is now going to be heard in Strasbourg. Whatever one’s feelings about the narrow facts of the individual case, there are wider issues about the enforcement of religious rights in employment, and I have no doubt that they will be properly canvassed. I will consult my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General.
Will the Justice Secretary confirm that, despite Ministers’ claims to the contrary, judges will be left with no option under the proposals in the Justice and Security Bill but to grant closed material proceedings?
I disagree. It is certainly my intention—this is the way in which the Bill is drafted—that there will be closed material proceedings only when the judge is satisfied that there would be a risk to national security if the evidence were to be given in open court. We are not taking into secrecy or excluding from the court any evidence that is heard in court at the moment. For the first time, we are creating an opportunity for the judge to consider intelligence evidence, but that will happen only in those cases in which the judge is satisfied that national security is involved.
I am sure that Ministers would agree that causing death by dangerous driving is a serious offence, particularly when drivers are under the influence of alcohol or drugs, yet it is not regarded as serious by the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority. I have had two constituency cases in which the families have suffered not only the appalling loss of a family member but huge financial loss. Unlike the families of manslaughter and murder victims, they are not eligible for any compensation.
Compensation is for criminal offences, and it depends on the severity of the injury. We are concentrating on the most severe injuries that can be suffered. It would be very nice to extend it to all road traffic cases, particularly those that cause outrage or particular damage, but it would be impossible to ask the taxpayer to pay compensation in such cases.
Last week, I had the opportunity to have an excellent meeting with the courageous and very impressive chief crown prosecutor of Greater Manchester, Mr Nazir Afzal. He has given his full personal backing to the pilot of Clare’s law, which will identify serial perpetrators of domestic violence and is due to be launched in Greater Manchester in the next few weeks. Will the Minister ensure that criminal justice systems across the country support those pilots so that we can protect people from domestic violence?
The failure to bring criminal prosecutions against those who have wrought such havoc to our banking system continues to cause huge public concern. Has my right hon. and learned Friend had any discussions with ministerial colleagues about how the proposed fresh investigations will be properly supported and resourced?
On reading what I have of these cases, it seems to me quite plain that possible crimes are involved in what has been described. I am glad to say that the Serious Fraud Office is, I am assured, investigating. It is properly a matter for it and not in the end a matter for Ministers whether anybody is prosecuted for anything. I think we are all reassured to know that this is being inquired into, as anybody guilty of crime must be brought to justice.
There is evidence in the south-west of companies setting up internal companies to pursue debt—in effect, two companies pursue the same debt. The Office of Fair Trading describes this as an unfair practice and the direction guidance says that such practice constitutes harassment when two bailiffs chase the same debt. There are clearly Chinese walls in this practice; is it going to be looked at as part of the regulation review?
I congratulate my hon. Friend’s constituent on his birthday yesterday. The argument for retaining a retirement age of 70 for judges of all kinds—I agree that this is a mere stripling for most occupations—is that, unlike me and most other people in their 70s, they cannot be removed from office: they are there for life, and can be removed only for quite serious bad behaviour. If we let everybody go on until whatever age, we will get into difficulties and politicians or somebody else will have to start appraising their performance, as they cannot be dismissed peremptorily. That is what has made us hold back from raising the compulsory retirement age for magistrates and judges at every level.
On 15 May, I asked the Minister when he was going to respond to the recommendations of the Justice Select Committee on the presumption of death in guardianship, which were published on 22 February. He responded, “Shortly”. May I please ask the question again?
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Written StatementsThe Government will, today, publish their response to the consultation “Getting it right for Victims and Witnesses” which began on 30 January and ended on 22 April 2012.
When I published the consultation document I observed that victims too often feel themselves to be an afterthought for the criminal justice system. Despite improvements over the last two decades, the system has continued to fall short—whether in relation to helping victims recover in the aftermath of a crime, supporting them through the stresses of investigation and trial, or providing the right services, funded as far as possible by offenders rather than the taxpayer.
That is why I set out a package of proposals to remedy these weaknesses, and deliver a more intelligent and coherent service for victims. My plans included increasing spending on victims’ services, with extra money coming from offenders themselves; reforming the criminal injuries compensation scheme so that it is focused on seriously injured victims of serious crime, and strengthening victims, rights so that victims feel less like accessories to the system, kept in the dark about their case, or expected to sit next to families of perpetrators in court.
The consultation elicited over 350 written responses, which we have carefully considered. They have helped us refine our proposals. We are taking forward a package of reforms that will, I believe, meet the whole range of ambitions I set out in the consultation document.
The response I am publishing today includes summaries of the comments received on our proposals and it sets out the policies we will now take forward. The reforms are wide ranging.
First, I intend to proceed with plans to make improvements to the support available for victims, raising up to an additional £50 million from the perpetrators of crime through the victim surcharge and other financial impositions. The way in which support for victims is purchased will also be subject to reform. We will move to a mixed model of national and local commissioning. The budget for the bulk of services will be devolved at local level to police and crime commissioners who will decide which services are needed in their communities. For some specialist support services, including rape support centres and support to those bereaved by homicide, my Department will continue to commission services nationally. Police and crime commissioner (PCC) elections will be taking place this November. The decision on when funding for victims services will transfer to PCCs will be made in due course but we would not envisage this happening any later than April 2015.
Secondly, our system of criminal injuries compensation will be reformed so it is properly focused on victims of the most serious crimes. The revised scheme will, for the first time, be placed on a sustainable footing. There will be an end to payments for minor injuries, and to those with serious criminal convictions.
There will be a revised victims’ code, setting out more clearly what victims can expect from the criminal justice system and ensuring that victims are treated always with dignity and respect. We will consult on a new draft code next year.
These reforms will also, among other things, aim to increase the use of restorative justice and of the victim personal statement. Both can help victims to cope and recover, both have a valuable role to play in the criminal justice process.
We will also put in place the first statutory compensation scheme for British victims of terrorist atrocities abroad. It will see Britons who are targeted in future terrorist attacks overseas compensated in the same way as domestic victims of terrorism.
In the light of the major reforms that the Government are announcing today to improve services for victims and introduce greater local accountability, the Government will consider how best to ensure that victims’ interests are well represented and review the role of the victims’ commissioner while the new framework for victims is established.
I will lay the following secondary legislation before Parliament today:
The draft Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 2012. This replaces the 2008 scheme. It provides compensation to victims of violent crime in Great Britain, including bereaved relatives.
The draft Victims of Overseas Terrorism Compensation Scheme 2012. This is a new scheme to compensate British, EU and EEA nationals resident in the UK who may be injured or have a relative killed in a future act of overseas terrorism designated as such by the Foreign Secretary for the purposes of the scheme.
The Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Surcharge) Order 2012. This will increase the victim surcharge payable by an adult on a fine and extend the surcharge to conditional discharges, community sentences and custodial sentences including suspended sentences. Similar provision will be made in respect of juveniles.
Copies of the draft schemes and their associated documents will be deposited in the Libraries of both Houses.
Copies are available in the vote office and the printed paper office. The response to the consultation can be found on the Ministry of Justice website at: www.justice.gov.uk.
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Written StatementsI have today laid before Parliament the Government’s memorandum to the Justice Committee on post-legislative scrutiny of the Fraud Act 2006. Copies are available in the Vote Office and the Printed Paper Office.
The Fraud Act 2006 reformed the law on fraud and created a general offence of fraud that can be committed in three ways: by false representation, by failing to disclose information and by abuse of a position of trust.
These reforms have been implemented, in line with the stated objectives of the Act, as detailed in the memorandum.
The memorandum also reviews the use of the common law offence of conspiracy to defraud and concludes that this remains a useful tool in prosecutors’ armouries.
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Ministerial CorrectionsI am sorry for the delay in responding to the right hon. Member. 24 of the 27 cases referred to concern material related to national security.
The correct answer should have been:
I am sorry for the delay in responding to the right hon. Member. 26 of the 27 cases referred to concern material related to national security.
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Written StatementsThe Government have decided not to exercise their right to opt out of the draft Directive on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and the free movement of such data under Protocol 19 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (the Schengen protocol).
The Government have taken this decision in accordance with the commitment in the coalition agreement, which states that we will approach legislation in the area of criminal justice on a case-by-case basis, with a view to maximising our country’s security, protecting Britain’s civil liberties and preserving the integrity of our criminal justice system.
The Government believe that our national interests are best served by participating in this Directive so that we are party to the common framework governing data sharing for policing and criminal justice across the EU. By participating, we can best build trust across member states for the necessary sharing of data to protect our citizens and make the strongest case possible for this to be done within a framework of appropriate and proportionate rules.
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Commons ChamberI beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
I am confident that everybody in this Chamber agrees that freedom of expression is the cornerstone of our democracy. In an open society, people should be at liberty to debate a subject without fear or favour, whether the matter be political, scientific, academic or anything else. That is how power is held to account, abuses of authority are uncovered and truth is advanced. But freedom of speech does not mean that people should be able to ride roughshod over the reputations of others without regard to the facts. Life and career can be destroyed by false allegations that go unanswered. The issue for our defamation laws is ultimately one of striking the right balance between protection of freedom of expression on the one hand and protection of reputation on the other.
I share the mounting concern of recent years that our defamation laws are becoming out of date, costly and over-complicated, and that they are at risk of damaging freedom of speech without affording proper protection. No one can be satisfied with a situation where the threat of lengthy and costly proceedings has sometimes been used to frustrate robust scientific and academic debate, to impede responsible investigative journalism and to undermine the good work undertaken by many non-governmental organisations. The practice of issuing gagging writs has been resorted to by many people over the years. I once had the privilege of receiving one myself from Mr Robert Maxwell, but we must make sure that the practice is not encouraged to spread further. Nor can it be a matter of pride when powerful interests overseas with tenuous connection to this country use the threat of British libel laws to suppress domestic criticism in cases of so-called libel tourism.
Turning to what is the most innovative and difficult part of the Bill, I am also very concerned that our current libel regime is not well suited to dealing with the internet and modern technology. Legitimate criticism sometimes goes unheard because the liability of website operators, as providers of the platform on which vast amounts of information is published by users, puts them in the impossible position of having to decide when to defend or censor information. Meanwhile, individuals can be the subject of scurrilous rumour and allegation on the web with little meaningful remedy against the person responsible. We need to refocus and modernise the system so that it offers effective protection, whether offline or online, both for freedom of speech and the reputation of those who have been defamed.
Those are the main reasons for the introduction of the Defamation Bill. It fulfils the commitment in the coalition agreement to review the law of libel while protecting legitimate free speech. It also, of course, draws heavily on the draft Bill published last year. I do not want to tempt fate, but I must say that I think that thus far producing a draft Bill and consulting has proved to be a very good way of proceeding on what could otherwise have been an extremely contentious issue.
The draft Bill benefited from detailed, and very helpful, scrutiny by a lot of interested people. We were particularly helped by the Joint Committee, and I am grateful to all who contributed to it, especially my old friend and colleague Lord Mawhinney and his fellow Lords for their extremely helpful contribution, which we have reflected in the Bill.
On the subject of that Committee, may I say that it was my experience—which I think was shared by others who served on it—that the attitude of the Minister, Lord McNally, especially in answering questions and being very open about what was in his mind and in the mind of the Department, was very useful? Such openness brings results.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for those comments, because it is one of the ironies of this Bill starting in the Commons that the member of my ministerial team who has devoted the most time to producing it is unable to introduce it. My ministerial colleague, my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Mr Djanogly), will wind up this debate, and both he and I would acknowledge that our noble and right hon. Friend Lord McNally played a leading part in the whole consultation and scrutiny process.
Before I discuss the detail of the Bill, let me say that parliamentary debate always elicits a broad spectrum of opinion, and defamation reform is no exception. At one end of the range of views are still some who would like this country to move towards the United States’ model, with free expression always trumping other considerations and with little or no legal redress for those who have been defamed. I find that idea unattractive and think that the current process of American electioneering shows the dangers. The well-financed production of untrue or dubious personal allegations can be taken to great length if there is no adequate protection. At the other end of the range are a few people who think, particularly in light of recent media excesses, that we should teach newspapers a valuable lesson by encouraging anyone whose feelings have been hurt to sue them. I am not sorry to say that the Bill will disappoint those with either extreme of opinion, which I hope will be echoed very little by hon. Members on any Benches in this House.
I agree that no one wants to see the Americanisation of our libel and slander laws. However, the right hon. and learned Gentleman referred to Lord Mawhinney’s report and chairmanship of the Joint Committee. Lord Mawhinney made it very clear that access to justice was critical for the ordinary citizen. Does the Secretary of State agree with me that raising the “substantial harm” test raises the bar so high that the ordinary citizen will never go into the libel courts to defend themselves?
No; I shall try to address that issue throughout my remarks. The package that we have produced is aimed at reducing costs and producing more effective remedies for a wide range of people, as well as at reducing the burdensome cost for those trying to defend themselves against actions. I shall keep making remarks that address the hon. Gentleman’s concerns, because I am anxious to ensure that we are not making things more expensive or difficult for any litigant.
Our intention is to correct the worst excesses of our current system in which, particularly for the powerful and wealthy, the law makes it rather too easy to menace responsible publishers with libel proceedings. However, we do not want sensible mainstream reform to come at the cost of giving further licence to parts of the media to publish whatever they like without regard for the truth. Equally, we want to ensure—this is relevant to the point made by the hon. Member for North Antrim (Ian Paisley)—that it is possible for ordinary people to get a remedy, but only where their reputation has been seriously harmed. We do not want to open the floodgates to endless litigation in our courtrooms by people whose feelings have been hurt but who have not suffered any particular damage. Of course, the Bill is only part of the story. No doubt the conclusions of Lord Justice Leveson’s inquiry will inform broader reforms to press regulation in due course.
It seems that a person would be able to take action only if a single statement caused serious harm to their reputation, but it is usually the case that people find themselves being mercilessly bullied, harassed and hounded by newspapers over a long period. There might not be a single statement that would definitively destroy their reputation, but they nevertheless find themselves being dragged through the mud without there being any individual act meriting the kind of action that the reforms would allow. In those circumstances, what kind of defence would an individual have against a £100-million organisation that is committed to shredding their reputation?
I think the law of libel offers equal protection in both situations. One single statement can be very defamatory, but so can a series of statements as my hon. Friend rightly says. That has always been the case and I do not think that anyone has ever drawn such a distinction in the law of defamation. The test will be applied to the total conduct of which the plaintiff is complaining and against which he is seeking a remedy. I have alongside me my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor-General, who used to practise privately in this particular field. He seems to agree with my judgment on this matter, so I think we can put that fear to rest.
Let me deal with the point made by the hon. Member for North Antrim, because the next part of what I have to say is very relevant here. As I have said, alongside the Bill we are seeking to bring about a significant reduction in the sometimes punitive costs in libel cases by introducing a series of procedural changes. Those changes come on top of the Jackson reforms—this involves the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012—to the no win, no fee conditional fee arrangements. The reforms will reduce the burden on both plaintiffs and defendants and help to reduce overall legal bills, without preventing claimants with strong cases from finding lawyers to represent them.
Our first priority has been to reform the law so that trivial and unfounded actions for defamation do not succeed. Clause 1 therefore raises the bar, by a modest extent, for a statement to be defamatory by proposing that it must have caused or be
“likely to cause serious harm to the reputation of the claimant.”
That was carefully considered in consultation by a lot of respondents. Whereas the draft Bill sought views on a test of substantial harm, which was intended to reflect current law, the new clause drew on the views of the Joint Committee on the draft Bill and the balance of opinions received in the consultation by nudging the threshold up by a modest extent. It will be for the courts to determine, in the light of the individual circumstances of a case, whether the test has been met. However, we hope it will give more confidence to defendants in, for example, the sorts of cases brought against non-governmental organisations and scientists in recent years.
Alongside a stronger test, we also want to simplify and clarify the defences available to those accused of libel. As they stand, the defences are sometimes unnecessarily complicated and too narrowly focused on cases relating to mainstream journalism, rather than the online world, NGOs, academics, scientists and so forth.
Everyone wants a vigorous press commenting robustly on matters of public interest. Too much of our press, however, has sought to earn a living in recent years by destroying people’s reputations. Will the Secretary of State reassure the House that his new defences of “honest opinion” and “in the public interest” will not allow the likes of the Murdoch press to drive a coach and horses through any person’s private life?
I agree with some of what my hon. Friend says. No doubt we all get infuriated by much of what appears in the newspapers. I personally find that much of the popular press express views that I regard as ridiculous, right-wing and extremely annoying to my view of political debate, but it is important in a democracy that people such as me are subjected to that. Our test of whether we live in a society where free speech is allowed is whether we allow free speech to people with whom we disagree. That can involve matters of taste. Some of what my hon. Friend complains about concerns the ridiculous offshoots of the celebrity culture in which we now live. We can all freely express opinions about these things, but I would be hesitant indeed if any Government came to the House to legislate on such matters. In my judgment, if our press wish to be scurrilous and irresponsible, up to a point they are entitled to be so.
Is the Secretary of State’s position, then, that an ordinary citizen who has had an untruth published about them should have no remedy unless they can prove that it has caused substantial harm to their reputation?
It must be a serious matter causing serious harm to their reputation. Most Members have things printed about them twice a week that cause them annoyance and which they would vehemently start arguing about if they had the opportunity to do so in front of readers. It is serious matters that must be subject to the serious process of defamation law in the pursuit of a remedy—a financial remedy, an apology or whatever—in a court of law.
Will the Secretary of State say a little more about this matter? He will understand that once the law is codified, judges will interpret what he has said. Does he recognise that for ordinary members of the public—for example, someone running a small business to whom harm can be caused if a local paper runs a particular story—what is serious is quite different from what is serious for celebrities and those in public life?
I agree. I stress that it will be for the courts to determine what amounts to serious harm in an individual case, but I agree that someone whose business is damaged—albeit by a local allegation in a local newspaper—could almost certainly demonstrate serious harm. Any citizen against whom a serious and unfounded allegation of personal misconduct is made will probably be able to demonstrate that it has done serious harm to his reputation. The hurdle is raised a little, but I trust that it will not bar any plaintiff who has had serious problems as a result of a publication.
I was moving on to deal with the defences. Clauses 2 and 3 replace the common law defences of justification and fair comment with new statutory defences of truth and honest opinion. These are areas where the law has become increasingly complicated and technical over the years. In our opinion, the revised approach should simplify the situation, ensuring that the defences are available without so many endless and costly disputes over detail and interpretation. Alongside the new defences of truth and honest opinion, we are introducing, for the first time, a statutory defence of responsible publication in the public interest. This is based on the common law defence that has been developed by the courts in recent years following the case of Reynolds v. Times Newspapers but expressed in clear and flexible terms. It provides a defence where the defendant can show that the allegedly defamatory statement is, or forms part of, a statement on a matter of public interest, and that he or she acted responsibly in publishing it.
The relevant clause identifies specific factors to which the court may have regard in deciding whether the defendant has acted responsibly, based on current case law. However, we do not want those to be interpreted as a checklist or a set of hurdles for defendants to overcome, and the list is intended to set out factors in an illustrative, non-exhaustive way so courts will retain flexibility. It is not our intention to change the Reynolds defence; we have sought to set it out in statutory form in a way that we hope will help.
I am listening carefully to what the Lord Chancellor is saying about the dangers of the non-exhaustive list setting a series of hurdles. Does he not think that a catch-all clause allowing the courts to look at all the circumstances of the case would cure that potential mischief?
As I said, we are not intending to fetter, as it were, the discretion of the court in the end to apply reasonable judgment to the particular circumstances of a particular case; this is meant to be illustrative. This is work that we have set out, and we will reflect on my hon. Friend’s point as we continue to scrutinise the legislation as it goes through this House.
Finally in this area of defences, we are extending the circumstances in which absolute and qualified privilege can be asserted. The defence of privilege is based on the principle that there are certain situations in which it is for the public benefit that a person should be able to speak or write freely, and that this should override or qualify the protection normally given by the law to reputation.
Clause 7 extends privilege to summaries of material as well as to reports and copies; broadens the international scope of the circumstances in which privilege applies; and clarifies that qualified privilege extends to reports of scientific and academic conferences and of press conferences. In a further important step forward for the protection of scientists and academics, clause 6 creates a defence of qualified privilege for peer-reviewed material in scientific and academic journals, as recommended by the Joint Committee on the draft Bill. The clause defines key elements of the peer-review process to ensure that publications with appropriate procedures will now be given the protection of this new defence.
All told then, I would argue to the House that the Bill is introducing sensible reform to protect freedom of expression by raising the bar for a claim and bolstering the defences available, with specific benefit for scientists and journalists. But we want to go further in some of the main areas of public concern, in particular by addressing libel tourism, which has sometimes caused damage to this country’s reputation around the world, as we are normally regarded as advocates of freedom of expression, in particular. Relatively few foreign libel cases ultimately end up in a British courtroom, but I am concerned by the use of threatened proceedings by wealthy foreigners and public figures to stifle investigation and reporting. Clause 9 addresses the issue in a measured and proportionate way, although it has had to be drafted to avoid any conflict with European law. It clarifies that a court will not hear a case against someone who is not domiciled in the UK or an EU member state unless satisfied that England and Wales is clearly the most appropriate place to bring an action. It should help ensure that powerful interests around the world will not so easily be able to use British justice to gag their critics —a move that I hope will be welcomed across the House.
I appreciate the Secretary of State’s generosity in giving way on this point. He said that our courts are becoming—or could become—a laughing stock as regards libel tourism. Does he not agree that if someone is libelled or slandered by a British person or a British publication, the victim of that libel or slander has the right to seek remedy in this jurisdiction given that they have been victimised by that publication? Indeed, the accusation of libel tourism amounts only to about a dozen cases over past years and it really is not as big a problem as some people are suggesting.
I did not say that I thought our courts would be a laughing stock; I think that our libel and defamation laws are rather good and that is no doubt one reason people try to access them. We are trying to improve them. I do not think that our standards of justice are being hurt, but different societies will form slightly different judgments of where the balance lies between freedom of expression and giving a remedy to people who are defamed. I have already said that the United States of America, which resembles this country in some ways, takes a very different view of what is actionable and defamatory if it is produced in that country.
The problem arises when people come to this country because our system is more generous to their point of view to bring cases that have little or nothing to do with the United Kingdom. I give the example of a Saudi business man, say, threatening an American publication with an action because of an article that has had tiny circulation in the United Kingdom. That is a hypothetical case, but the Saudi would be using the nature of British law to threaten a publication in an entirely different jurisdiction. That is the evil we are trying to address. We are not trying to stop British publications being sued by anybody who can come here and show that we are the right jurisdiction.
I again appreciate the Secretary of State’s generosity. The Saudi gentleman does not exist, as the Minister has said, so let us consider the cases that do exist. A governor of the state of California sued a British newspaper because it carried inaccuracies about him and sued the publisher of a British book that claimed he was a Nazi sympathiser. Other prominent individuals come to this country who have been seriously slandered by publications; surely they have the right to seek a remedy here.
If anybody is defamed by a publication in this country or wants to act against a defendant who is domiciled in this country, they will be able to bring an action. I do not regard that as libel tourism. The problem arises when two people in the same country start suing each other because half a dozen copies of some foreign language publication have in theory been available on some bookstall in London and this jurisdiction is chosen to try to get a remedy. I hope that what we have done will ensure that people with powerful interests around the world will not so easily be able to use our courts.
Can the Secretary of State confirm that the Saudi business man almost certainly exists? The Rachel Ehrenfeld case was heard in this country when there was no connection other than the 23 copies of her book that were sold, yet it resulted in the passage of the Libel Terrorism Protection Act in New York. It is a mark of shame against this country that New York state thought it necessary to pass an Act specifically aimed against this country.
I made my remark about the case being hypothetical to avoid being drawn into arguments about that case, which is rather familiar to people who know this subject. There are arguments about how far the plaintiff had connections with this country and a reputation here, but as it happens I was producing the example of a Saudi and an American purely hypothetically and I do not think I should get drawn into the merits of a past case. My hon. Friend, who is an expert in this field, rapidly understood why those particular nationalities had leapt to my mind when I gave the example.
Alongside these adjustments in the law to help support freedom of expression, I want to ensure that effective remedies are available for those defamed. Often what most concerns claimants is not financial compensation, but meaningful public clarification that a story was wrong. We have therefore included provisions in clause 12 extending existing powers to enable the court to order publication of a summary of its judgment. Parties will be encouraged to reach agreement, where possible, on the contents of the summary and issues such as where, when and how it is to be published. However, in the absence of agreement, the court will be empowered to settle the wording of the summary and give directions on those other matters.
In addition to protecting freedom of expression and reputation, the Bill seeks to modernise the law. Our biggest difficulty has been in relation to the web, the internet and so on. Currently, website operators are in principle liable as publishers for everything that appears on their site, even though the content is often determined by their users, but most operators are not in a position to know whether the material posted by their users is defamatory or not, and very often, faced with a complaint, they will immediately remove material. The Government want a libel regime for the internet that makes it possible for people to protect their reputations effectively, but which ensures that information online cannot be easily censored by casual threats of litigation against website operators.
Will the Secretary of State give way?
I broadly support the Bill, especially clause 5, which the right hon. and learned Gentleman is explaining. Can he give any comfort to the parents of Georgia Varley, a Liverpool youngster who was tragically killed and whose family and friends set up an RIP website, which trolls then used to abuse and disparage her death in a sickening and vile way? Can he outline specifically the proposals to tackle such abuse by internet trolls who hide behind the anonymity of a computer to abuse those remembered on RIP websites?
I cannot possibly comment on an individual case and individual possible action. I anticipate that the difficulty may be that the defaming of a deceased person always gives rise to questions of whether any action is possible. Trolling is an extremely unpleasant, curious activity which some very nasty people appear to be going into. There have already been quite a lot of prosecutions for trolling, but we think the public are entitled to proper protection against it.
Our proposed approach, under clause 5, will provide website operators with a defence against libel, provided they follow a procedure to put complainants in touch with the author of allegedly defamatory material. This will strengthen freedom of expression by ensuring that material is not taken down without the author being given an opportunity to defend it. Conversely, it will strengthen protections by enabling people who have had their reputation seriously harmed online to take action against the real author and bring proceedings against them if the matter cannot be resolved by other means.
This is indeed a complex issue. Can the Justice Secretary confirm that this is an optional defence and that web operators would be entitled not to follow those regulations and not to use the defence, and that they would still be covered by the defences available under the e-commerce directive if they so chose?
That is entirely correct, but of course those web operators would also be vulnerable to possible action because they had not availed themselves of the process, which would give them one way of proceeding if they chose to do so. We are not replacing other remedies which might well be available against a publisher who took no steps to inform the defamed person of where the defamatory matter was coming from.
It will be very important to ensure that these measures—clause 5 and those associated with it—do not inadvertently expose genuine whistleblowers, and we are committed to getting the detail right to minimise that risk. We will continue to consider that and eventually some of it will have to be covered by regulation.
Concern has also been expressed about the impact of the current law on secondary publishers more generally, including booksellers and newsagents. In accordance with our aim of ensuring that secondary publishers are not unfairly targeted and action is taken against the primary publisher wherever possible, clause 10 removes the possibility of an action for defamation being brought against a secondary publisher except where it is not reasonably practicable for the claimant to bring the action against the author, editor or commercial publisher of the material.
A further related proposal to modernise the libel regime is the introduction of a so-called single publication rule. Information online can be copied instantly, stored indefinitely and accessed long after physical forms of publication, yet the current regime allows additional claims for such cases of “republishing”. The proposed rule seeks to reconcile the need to protect individuals from repeatedly having to face the same defamatory comments with the need to avoid open-ended liability for publishers when old material is accessed years later, which has the potential severely to inhibit freedom of expression. Therefore, the Bill includes a provision that will prevent an action being brought in relation to publication by the same publisher of the same, or substantially the same, material after a one-year limitation period has passed.
Agreeing a libel regime fit for the realities of the 21st century is not straightforward, but these steps constitute sensible reform to ensure that freedom of expression and protection of reputation are possible both online and offline. Modernisation, however, must also extend to the cost and length of libel cases, which are increased in current law by the presumption of jury trial. I am normally a strong defender of the principle of jury trial in criminal cases and always have been—I assure my right hon. and hon. Friends and everyone else that my political arteries have not suddenly hardened and affected my views on that.
In practice, jury trials have been infrequently used in libel cases in recent years and the majority of cases are now heard by judges alone. I believe that it makes sense to recognise that reality in law by discontinuing the presumption of jury trial, which in this case has become a kind of noble fiction that creates real practical problems for one or other of the parties. It greatly increases the cost and time taken in defamation proceedings, which can be done deliberately to advantage one or other of the parties in negotiations and bargaining. Many basic legal issues that could otherwise quickly be sorted out by a judge sitting alone, such as deciding the meaning that allegedly defamatory material can have, cannot be resolved until full trial, whether or not a jury is ultimately used. That causes unnecessary delay and expense, to everyone’s detriment.
Recognising that judges should normally rule on libel cases is also part of the wider package of procedural proposals, to which I referred a few minutes ago, that we are taking forward alongside the Bill to help reduce costs and encourage settlements. It goes hand in hand with a new preliminary procedure that we are developing to resolve key issues, such as meaning, at as early a stage as possible. Of course, there might remain occasions when jury trial is appropriate, so the Bill retains the court’s discretion to order that when it considers it appropriate to do so.
A great deal of the argument in defamation action often turns on preliminary points, such as whether a particular statement is capable of having the meaning that one of the parties attributes to it. It is much easier if a judge can deal with those preliminary matters so that the whole thing does not have to go to a full trial. Also, there is absolutely no doubt that a great deal has to be done to explain to a jury what this particularly difficult area of law is all about. The whole thing takes longer—it has to when 12 lay men and women are hearing it—which adds to the expense. Not only does that add to the costs and delays when somebody is involved in an action, as I have said, but because they sometimes threaten bringing claims before they go to court, once we start getting into the costs that might be involved in a jury trial the threat is made much more substantial by holding all this—
Yes. I have been listening to the right hon. and learned Gentleman with great interest and respect for the best part of a quarter of a century, as he knows, but the Secretary of State is a compulsive “swiveller”. Whenever he is intervened on by one of his right hon. or hon. Friends, he invariably swivels round. But the rest of the House does not want to lose him; we are hanging on his every word.
I, like my right hon. and learned Friend, am hoist with two petards: one is my belief in the principle of jury trial; the other is the practicalities that he quite rightly outlines. What I want to understand in his description of the Bill is under what circumstances a jury trial will be triggered. What are the criteria that will trigger a jury trial instead of a judge-only trial?
The decision is deliberately left to discretion, so in the end an experienced judge will have to decide whether a case is suitable, but one can conceive of a few exceptional cases whereby the whole thing depends on a question of the veracity of two teams of hard-swearing witnesses, and whereby the judge is persuaded that, because of the particular nature of the case, he would be helped by the judgment of a range of men and women, from a variety of backgrounds, who would bring their collective wisdom to deciding which side to believe.
That is simply one off-the-cuff example which comes to my mind, but if the whole thing turned on an elaborate argument about the application of the defamation laws to the particular circumstances of the publication of a scientific journal, for example, that would be a wholly unsuitable case to leave to a jury, and the whole thing would take longer and cost a lot more, even if the jury got it right in the end. That is the problem we are trying to address.
Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that the proposal could assist with earlier settlement, not just with reducing the length or cost of a hearing?
I agree strongly with that extremely good point. The more these things can be dealt with by way of a preliminary judgment by a judge, the more settlements we will get, because sometimes the whole thing really turns on one point, which can be dealt with much more quickly if a jury is not involved.
I think I had better conclude, because I have taken—as I usually do—quite long enough.
This Bill is, in our opinion, a sound piece of modernising reform that we have approached in a balanced way. We have sought in particular to defend the interests of free debate. Accordingly, the Bill contains a range of measures which will greatly strengthen the environment for open and robust scientific and academic debate, including measures to apply across the piece, such as the introduction of the serious harm test, the simplification and clarification of defences and a single publication rule, together with specific ones, such as the extension of qualified privilege to peer-reviewed material and to reports of scientific and academic conferences.
I believe that this package of measures rebalances the law in a fair and effective way so that free speech is not unjustifiably impeded and debate about issues of public importance is able to thrive, while still providing appropriate remedies for those who have been defamed. It also updates the law for the first time to address properly the most pressing challenges raised by the internet and social media in relation to defamation. I commend it as a sound, reforming Bill.
I tempted fate earlier, and the Solicitor-General, my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough (Mr Garnier) and I will tempt fate again, because we believe that the process of producing a draft Bill and getting this far has produced a quite extraordinary degree of consensus that I, for one, would not have thought possible to achieve when we first embarked on modernising the law on defamation. So little interest has been attracted abroad that even the media, which one would have thought would be obsessed with the issue, are paying little attention to the debate.
There is still a debate to be had, and this House will demonstrate its usefulness in scrutinising the legislation, just as the Joint Committee on the draft Bill has shown what can be achieved in consultation so far, but I hope that in the end we will continue to command cross-party support in our efforts to address long-standing weaknesses in our defamation regime, and I commend the Bill to the House.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for raising that concern. I am afraid that many colleagues will be familiar with the type of bullying, harassment and intimidation that he talks about, which ultimately leads to people considering taking their own lives. When the Government drafted the Bill, they were keen to address a void that has not previously been filled. Clause 5 will allow websites to have action taken against them, but websites will be given greater protection from being sued if they help to identify those posting defamatory messages. It is hoped that that will lead to greater responsibility among both those who operate websites and those who post messages. People will know that they when they put a post on a website, it is possible that their details will be passed on to a potential claimant bringing an action.
Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that it would be helpful in that context to look at what else can be done about bullying, as opposed to defamation? The House should bear in mind section 127 of the Communications Act 2003, which creates an offence of sending or causing to be sent
“by means of a public electronic communications network a message or other matter that is”
genuinely
“offensive or of an indecent, obscene or menacing character”.
That gives rise to many prosecutions, but the right hon. Gentleman is probably right that it does not give rise to many defamation actions. It must be looked at in the round. We agree that people abusing the internet to abuse people to whom they happen to have taken a dislike is an increasing problem.
A chilling effect can sometimes be a good thing. A prosecution brought against someone involved in such behaviour can lead to others not doing the same thing for fear of prosecution. The Justice Secretary is right to remind the authorities, who might be watching the debate or might read of it, that they have tools at their disposal to bring criminal prosecutions.
Subsections of clause 5 set out the circumstances in which the defence could be defeated. This is a key area in which technological developments have outstripped our laws. As has been said, a duty will be placed on internet service providers to identify internet trolls without victims needing to resort to costly legal action. The Opposition welcome that development, but the detail will be provided in regulations that we have not seen. It is important that this well intentioned clause does not inadvertently lead to a website being required to disclose the identity of a whistleblower when they are the source of a post on a website, or to websites being easily censored by casual threats of litigation against their operators.
(12 years, 5 months ago)
Written StatementsMy right hon. and noble friend the Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Wallace of Tankerness) made the following written ministerial statement:
Today (Tuesday 29 May 2012) my right hon. and learned friend, the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice is laying before Parliament the Government’s response to the consultation on justice and security which was published on 19 October, as well as a response to the report by the Joint Committee on Human Rights on the same issue. I have also introduced the Justice and Security Bill which aims to deal with three main problems which have arisen with judicial and parliamentary scrutiny of the security and intelligence agencies.
First, a number of civil cases are not being heard in our courts because they hinge on national security sensitive evidence which the courts recognise cannot be disclosed openly. At present the Government’s only option is to try to settle these cases—often for large sums of money—even where the case has no merit.
Secondly, a damaging form of legal tourism has developed which allows someone fighting a case outside the UK to apply to a court in London to force disclosure of intelligence information held by the British, sometimes provided by our allies. This is seriously undermining confidence among our key allies, including the US.
Thirdly, parliamentary oversight of the intelligence community has been criticised as having too limited a remit.
There were 90 responses to our consultation, and the Government are grateful for the wide-ranging views we received. Many respondents recognised the underlying problems that they are trying to address. However, there was considerable concern that plans on closed material procedures (CMPs) were drawn up in a way that was excessively broad in scope and risked undermining this country’s proud tradition of civil liberties.
The Government’s position has always been that protecting the public should not come at the expense of our freedom. So, we have listened carefully to the views of those responding, including the work of the JCHR. We have extensively revised the measures in order to put beyond doubt that they are proportionate, targeted and include strong safeguards. On our central proposal to introduce CMPs we have now ensured that the judge has a more central role, and will be able to grant a CMP only in relation to civil cases involving national security evidence—not crime or international relations. Inquests have been excluded, and we were never intending to make CMPs available in the criminal courts. The Bill ensures that no evidence currently heard in open court will be heard in secret in future, but that claims such as mistreatment or complicity in torture brought against the intelligence and security services which cannot currently be heard, can be heard.
Closed Material Procedures
The Government are strongly committed to open and transparent justice. However, courts have long accepted that highly sensitive intelligence material—for example, the names of security agents or information about the techniques used by the intelligence agencies—cannot be disclosed in open court. Under current rules, the only way of protecting this sort of material is to remove it from the courtroom entirely by applying for public interest immunity (PII). A problem arises in a tiny number of cases which hinge on secret intelligence material, where—if a PII application is successful—all, or most, of the material central to the case is excluded from consideration. The result is that these cases are not heard in court at all, meaning that cases have to be settled with no independent judgment on very serious allegations.
The settlement of the civil damages claims brought by former Guantanamo Bay detainees is an example of the inadequacies of the PII system. The evidence the Government needed to rely on in order to defend themselves was highly secret intelligence material, which could not be released in open court. The only option would have been to claim PII for the material. This process could have taken up to three years to complete, but there would still have been no judgment on the claims made: if a PII claim was successful the very material the Government needed to rely upon to defend their actions would have been excluded. The Government’s only practical option was therefore to settle the claims, for significant sums, without admitting liability.
The Government are therefore bringing forward proposals to allow this material to be heard in court in what is known as a “Closed Material Procedure” (CMP) which provides the safeguards needed to ensure that sensitive material can be taken into account by the court, while ensuring that the damage to national security that would arise if it were openly disclosed can be prevented. CMPs are already available in a number of other areas of the civil law, in these cases the CMP would work as follows:
the Minister must first consider whether to make a claim for public interest immunity or whether to advise another to do so;
the Minister would then apply to a judge who will determine whether the CMP can go ahead on the grounds that there was some material relevant to the case, the disclosure of which would damage national security;
even where a CMP is granted, all evidence currently heard in open court would continue to be heard in open court, including all allegations against the state;
only the particular pieces of national security evidence would be heard in closed court, and in relation to these pieces of material the judge will decide whether a summary of the evidence must be made available to the other party for the proceedings to be fair. And, in all cases, a special advocate will have access to material on behalf of the claimant that would currently be precluded. The overall effect for the claimant will be that they receive at least as much information as they would following a PII exercise;
as recommended by the JCHR, judicial reviews of naturalisation and exclusion cases will be heard by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC).
Many respondents to the consultation on these proposals made the point that closed material procedures are a departure from the tried and tested fundamentals of open justice. I entirely agree with them in principle—no Government propose measures in this area lightly. But CMPs are already available in a number of areas of law for the good reason that where the courts have recognised that the best option of hearing evidence in open is not available, they provide a fairer outcome than the alternative which is no justice at all. This is recognised by both the domestic and international courts. Lord Woolf finding for example that,
“it is possible.. .to.. .achieve justice” in a CMP (M v SSHD).
Norwich Pharmacal
The Bill also aims to ensure the protection of our intelligence sharing relationships and our domestically generated intelligence through reform of what is known as the “Norwich Pharmacal” jurisdiction—which has recently been used to allow someone fighting a case outside the UK to apply to a court in London for access to intelligence information held by the British, sometimes provided by our allies.
The aim of a Norwich Pharmacal application is to force a third party to disclose information which the claimant feels may be relevant to a case they are bringing elsewhere. Although developed in the intellectual property sphere, in the last three years there have been no fewer than nine attempts to use this jurisdiction in relation to secret intelligence which either belongs to the UK Government, or which our allies have shared with us. No other country in the world has such a jurisdiction. Indeed, there is not even a parallel jurisdiction in Scotland.
As the purpose of the proceedings is solely to gain disclosure of material, the Government do not have the option to withdraw from or settle these proceedings. If disclosure is ordered, and the Government do not succeed in an application for PII, the Government must release secret intelligence into the public domain.
We expect our allies to protect intelligence material we share with them from disclosure, and they expect the same from us. The inadequacies in our current ability to properly protect classified information provided by foreign Governments has already seriously undermined confidence among our key allies, including the US. Robust legislative measures are essential to restore confidence among our allies, which is vital to our national security.
Therefore the Government intend to make the following changes to the Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction:
For agency held material—The Government intend to legislate to exempt material held by or originating from one of the agencies from disclosure under a Norwich Pharmacal application.
For national security or international relations material—The Government also intend to legislate to allow a Minister to sign a certificate in Norwich Pharmacal cases to protect non-agency material which would cause damage to national security or international relations if disclosed. That certificate can be reviewed on judicial review principles. If upheld, the information could not be disclosed.
These measures have no impact on claims that the Government, or the security and intelligence agencies, have been directly involved in wrongdoing, nor do they prevent someone enforcing their convention rights.
Oversight
Finally, and very importantly, the Bill will improve parliamentary oversight of the security and intelligence agencies, most notably giving the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) the power to oversee the agencies’ operations, not just their administration, expenditure and policies—as is the case now. The ISC will be given a wider remit, and will in future report to Parliament as well as the Prime Minister. Parliament will be given the power to vote to reject the ISC’s membership. The power to withhold information from the ISC moves from the heads of the intelligence and security agencies to the Secretary of State responsible for that agency.
The Bill deals with issues of profound importance which go to the heart of our democratic values. The proposals it brings forward aim to improve executive accountability, equip our civil court system to handle sensitive intelligence material, and improve parliamentary scrutiny of the security and intelligence community.
(12 years, 6 months ago)
Written StatementsThe Government have today introduced legislation to enable the filming and broadcast of selected court proceedings in England and Wales.
As a first step, we plan to allow filming of judgments and legal arguments in the Court of Appeal. Cases in the Court of Appeal normally deal with complex issues of law or evidence, and victims and witnesses rarely appear in order to provide new evidence. Given the complexity of legal issues in Court of Appeal cases, we believe that allowing advocates’ arguments to be filmed in addition to judgments would be more likely to improve public understanding of the criminal justice system than judgments alone.
We are clear that this should not be at the expense of the proper administration of justice, and that protecting the interests of victims and witnesses must remain paramount. Existing reporting restrictions will continue to apply and we have no intention of allowing victims, witnesses, defendants or jurors to be filmed. However, we believe that television has a role to play in opening up the criminal justice system, and are therefore removing the ban on cameras in courts to allow broadcasting in certain limited circumstances.
The Government hope to see broadcasting extended to judges’ sentencing remarks in the Crown Court in due course, and we are working with the judiciary to achieve this.
A paper has been deposited in the Libraries of both Houses, providing more detail on our proposals to allow broadcasting of selected court proceedings.
(12 years, 6 months ago)
Written StatementsThe judiciary play a critical role in the administration of justice. It is therefore vital that we select candidates for judicial office on merit, through fair and open competition, from the widest range of eligible candidates. However, despite progress, the composition of our judiciary still does not adequately reflect the society it serves.
This issue matters for obvious reasons of fairness, efficiency and enhancing public confidence in the justice system. That is why in November last year I published a consultation which proposed a number of initiatives that aimed to address issues that had been identified with the current system of appointing judges. We have considered carefully the responses received to our consultation and are particularly grateful to the House of Lords Constitution Committee for their own inquiry into judicial appointments, which ran concurrent to our own consultation, as it provided important additional insight and suggestions surrounding our policy proposals.
We propose to take forward a number of the proposals, and these will be included in the Crime and Courts Bill, which has been introduced today. The proposals being taken forward include the introduction of part-time working to the High Court, Court of Appeal and the UK Supreme Court, as well as provisions that will enable the application of the positive action provisions to judicial appointments. These proposals will definitely not undermine the principle that all appointments will be made on merit.
The overall effect of these changes will be to achieve the proper balance between executive, judicial and independent responsibilities; improve clarity, transparency and openness; create a more diverse judiciary that is reflective of society; and deliver speed and quality of service to applicants, the courts and tribunals and value for money to the taxpayer, ensuring that our judiciary, which is already a byword for integrity, independence and excellence, evolves into a modern, outward-facing institution that is fit for the 21st century and beyond.
The House of Lords Constitution Committee report from their inquiry into judicial appointments made reference to a majority of our consultation proposals and the comments of the Committee have been referenced within our consultation response, which will be published tomorrow. However, their report also made comment on a number of issues that were not included within our consultation and as such I will be bringing forward a Command Paper towards the end of May to respond to these additional recommendations.
Our response to consultation is available online at: http://www.justice.gov.uk/consultations/closed-with-response.