Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 24th May 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 4 in this group, in my name and those of the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton. I have also added my name to Amendment 2 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and I have some thoughts on Amendments 1, 3 and 5 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead. Amendment 84, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, is partly duplicative of mine, but focuses specifically on international anti-trafficking provisions. In as far as it adds the EU anti-trafficking directive to the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, I support it; however, I think we should settle on a single, holistic list of obligations that, crucially, includes the precious refugee convention and its principles of non-penalisation, non-discrimination and non-refoulement, which the Government seem so intent on violating by this obscenity of a Bill.

I turn briefly to the amendments in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. I thank him for his explanation earlier. Contrary to the explanatory statement for Amendment 1, I cannot quite agree that this does anything for so-called legal certainty. To the contrary, it seems a rather circular amendment, in defining “illegal migration” according to the conditions for removal in the Government’s own Clause 2. As the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, suggested in her very pithy intervention, as a matter of international law, someone who qualifies for protection under the 1951 convention can never have been illegal.

Noble Lords who have come to the Committee sensibly armed with copies of the Bill might care to compare its Short and Long Titles. It has become quite fashionable in recent years for Short Titles to become creatures of political spin, but parliamentary counsel guard the Long Titles—so crucial for scope, for example —rather more jealously. While the Short Title is the Illegal Migration Bill, and our graveyard humour alights on the adjective accurately describing the second noun, the Long Title refers instead to

“persons who have entered or arrived in breach of immigration control”.

As the refugee convention was effectively the world’s apology for the Holocaust and the insufficient and inconsistent protection given to those attempting to escape the Nazis, the convention always contemplated some genuine refugees having to escape persecution and enter places of safety by clandestine means and in breach of ordinary controls.

That is why

“in breach of immigration control”

is accurate and appropriate for the Long Title and “Illegal Migration” is not appropriate in the context of refugees, who, as a matter of declaratory law, will always have been refugees, even before they were given their status—hence the excellent point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher.

The probing Amendment 3 from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, helps to draw attention to contradictions in the Government’s public positions around the ECHR compatibility of the Bill. As the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, pointed out, the Section 19(1)(b) statement on the tin indicates one thing—that no statement that the Bill is compatible can be made—but aspects of the ECHR memorandum of ingredients suggest another. However, the medicine prescribed by the noble and learned Lord and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, is far too weak a remedy. When a Government are so intent on violating rights to protection from torture, slavery and death, allowing the same Government to issue guidance on interpreting their offending legislation is like handing burglars the keys to the house. Therefore, the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, is right to seek to remove Clause 1(5), which seeks to disapply Section 3 of the Human Rights Act, which, as we have heard, requires that legislation be interpreted compatibly with the European convention so far as possible. That is why I added my name to her Amendment 2.

Amendment 4 in the names of the quartet of the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, and myself goes further. It does not just remove subsection (5); it replaces the whole of Clause 1 with the requirement that this legislation shall not require violation of any of the key international legal obligations that we fear would otherwise be violated by it, namely the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights, the 1951 UN refugee convention, the 1961 UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the 2005 Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings. I am very proud to stand with noble Lords from four corners of the Committee whose experience includes high-level legal adjudication, law enforcement, and Home Office ministerial duty. What brings the senior judge, police officer, Conservative former Immigration Minister, and human rights lawyer together around the amendment is our desire that the United Kingdom remains committed to the international rule of law.

As we heard, last week, alongside other European leaders, the Prime Minister signed the Reykjavík declaration. It begins:

“We, Heads of State and Government, have gathered in Reykjavík on 16 and 17 May 2023 to stand united against Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and to give further priority and direction to the Council of Europe’s work … We reaffirm our deep and abiding commitment to the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) as the ultimate guarantors of human rights across our continent, alongside our domestic democratic and judicial systems. We reaffirm our primary obligation under the Convention to secure to everyone within our jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, as well as our unconditional obligation to abide by the final judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in any case to which we are Parties”.


Mr Sunak said:

“We remain a proud European nation. And we must work together to defend the values we all hold so dear … Because we know what we can achieve together. Just look at this Council’s extraordinary legacy: protecting human rights, abolishing the death penalty in Europe, supporting media freedom and championing democracy across Central and Eastern Europe after the Cold War”.


Those fine words from the Prime Minister must not be contradicted by the Home Secretary’s illegal Bill.

Noble Lords will no doubt explore the many violations of our common and constitutional law tradition, as well as international law, via the anxious scrutiny of this Committee. At the very least, the Bill violates Articles 2, 3, 4 and 14 of the European convention in failing to protect victims of torture and trafficking and those at risk of death, and in allowing the Government to pick and choose which refugees from different countries it finds palatable from time to time. The Bill fails to protect stateless people and children in the context of its provisions on removal, detention, accommodation and age assessment. In the words of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, it amounts to

“an asylum ban—extinguishing the right to seek refugee protection in the United Kingdom for those who arrive irregularly, no matter how genuine and compelling their claim may be”.

This must be one of the strongest condemnations of a democratic and rights-respecting nation ever uttered by the commissioner.

If Ministers seek to argue that the Bill does not violate these various linchpin treaties, many of which the United Kingdom played a leading role in negotiating, they should have no problem with the requirement that the Bill be read in that way by Ministers, officials and the courts. If, instead, Ministers wish to argue that it is time to renegotiate these obligations, fair enough. Let them try to do so with such reserves of soft power as they think we have left. In the meantime, in contrast with Russia and other pariah states, let them respect the law.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness. I support her Amendment 4 for the following reason. If I was a person in a country far from here who faced torture and very serious discrimination, possibly for his or her political views or opposition to the Government, or possibly for their sexual orientation which is an issue in quite a number of these cases, I might look up what the United Kingdom stands for in international law before I make my decision as to whether to seek asylum in the United Kingdom or some other country. And what would I read? With a couple of clicks on the internet, I would read exactly what is set out, or aspired to, in Amendment 4 tabled by the noble Baroness. In my view, that is the principled position to take.

I also understand completely—I think—the views expressed by my noble and learned friend Lord Hope when, if I can be permitted to use a little bit of transatlantic language, he pointed out certain uncertainties about the Bill in the speech with which he opened the first debate.

I want to challenge the Minister to do something he has failed to do—I say this with respect, because he is known for his clarity in this House. I challenge him to return to the very first page of the whole Bill, where the statement under Section 19(1)(b) of the Human Rights Act is set out. The first sentence reads:

“I am unable to make a statement that, in my view, the provisions of the Illegal Migration Bill are compatible with the Convention rights, but the Government nevertheless wishes … to proceed with the Bill”.


Does that mean, “I don’t know if the provisions of the Bill are compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights”? Does it mean, “I know that it is not compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights”? Or does it mean that some parts of it are compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights and others are not?

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[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

The noble and learned Lord is absolutely right; it has no legal effect. Can I put this another way? The Minister can make a Section 19(1)(b) statement and the court can find that the Act is compatible. The Minister can make Section 19(1)(a) statement and the court can find that it is not.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

Does the noble Lord not agree that the Section 19(1)(b) statement on this Bill is very different from the Section 19(1)(b) statement on the Communications Bill? I am sure that he has looked at it. Secretary of State Tessa Jowell made the following statement:

“I am unable (but only because of Clause 309) to make a statement that, in my view, the provisions of the Communications Bill are compatible with the Convention rights”.


By making that statement, Tessa Jowell made it clear that in a massive Bill there was only one clause that she could not make such a statement about. In effect, she stated that everything apart from Clause 309 was compliant with the Human Rights Act. That is how it was understood; we can all read the debates. Is it not incumbent upon the Government, when they make a statement as vague as that on this Bill, to explain what is and what is not compatible with the Human Rights Act?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

The noble Lord is making a political point. It may be good politics or bad politics, but whether the Government want to do that or not, my focus is on Section 19 of the Human Rights Act, which is very clear:

“A Minister of the Crown in charge of a Bill in either House of Parliament must, before Second Reading … (a) make a statement to the effect that in his view the provisions of the Bill are compatible with the Convention rights … or (b) make a statement to the effect that although he is unable to make a statement of compatibility the government nevertheless wishes the House to proceed with the Bill”.


We could have a nice debate about whether the statement in the Communications Act 2003 was consistent with Section 19, but that is not my point. My point today is simply that we cannot legitimately criticise the Minister for making precisely the statement that Parliament told him to make in Section (19)(1)(b) if he cannot make a Section 19(1)(a) statement.

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[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I am reluctant to give the noble Lord a private lecture on this, but I will set out a very short answer. I will be blunt but, I hope, legally accurate. The short answer to the noble Lord’s question is yes; we could do it. International treaties are not part of our domestic law. As far as our domestic courts are concerned—please let me finish and I will give way—if we were to legislate completely contrary to an international treaty, our domestic courts would have to abide by the Act of Parliament, because that is domestic law. Of course, that would put the UK in breach of the international treaty. It is not something I would recommend, but the noble Lord asked me a direct question about how the two interrelate, and that is a necessary consequence of being a dualist state. International treaties are not part of domestic law, unless and until they are incorporated.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

This could develop into a really interesting argument, I am afraid—between lawyers. The noble Lord just referred to the dualist theory, which of course is very important, but, in reality, international treaties are not usually entered into legislation because they are made under the royal prerogative. But that does not make them any less binding.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I started my remarks by saying that international treaties are extremely important and that we should always legislate consistently with our international obligations, except in the most unforeseen and unusual circumstances. But that is not the question I was asked by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay. We are a dualist state. That is why we should object to these amendments, which seek to incorporate treaties by the back door.

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[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I am very grateful to the noble Baroness. I was indeed about to mention her in my next sentence. Let me address that point and repeat what I said earlier. The phrase “illegal migration” in the Short Title of the Bill refers to the fact that the act of entering otherwise than in accordance with immigration controls was criminalised by an Act passed by this House and the other place in 2022. That is why it is correct to describe such people as “illegal migrants”—because they did not enter in accordance with immigration controls. That is the long and the short of it. The interpretation of Article 31 is irrelevant as regards that point of certainty.

I turn now to Amendment 2, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford. This amendment seeks to strike out subsection (5), which disapplies Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998. The disapplication of Section 3 will ensure that the Bill’s provisions will be interpreted to meet the legislative intent of Parliament, rather than the strained interpretations imposed by the courts to achieve compatibility with convention rights. As my noble and learned friend Lord Wolfson, King’s Counsel, pointed out, Section 3 is an unusual provision in UK law and there is, in principle, no reason why it cannot be excluded in cases like this.

It is our view that Parliament and the Government are better suited to address the sensitive policy issues involved in this legislation. It is therefore only right that Section 3, which requires the court to interpret the provisions to achieve compatibility with convention rights, must be disapplied so that courts interpret the law in accordance with the purpose of the Bill. Through this, we are ensuring that the balance between our domestic institutions is right and that Parliament’s intent is clear to the courts.

As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, explained, Amendment 3 flows from the recent report of the Constitution Committee. I am very grateful to that committee for its scrutiny of the Bill. We are studying its report carefully and will respond in full ahead of Report. As for the genesis of the amendment, the noble and learned Lord explained that the Constitution Committee considered that more explanation was needed around the Section 19(1)(b) statement that I made on the introduction of the Bill in this House.

Notwithstanding that the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, quoted from my Second Reading speech on this issue, I reiterate the point I made at that stage: a Section 19(1)(b) statement means not that the provisions of the Bill are incompatible with the convention rights, only that we cannot be certain that they are compatible. The assertion suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, in his speech a moment ago, that the statement amounts to a concession that measures in the Bill are incompatible, is not the case. The purpose of Section 19, as my noble friend Lord Wolfson set out, is that it is a statement that the provisions of the Bill are incompatible with convention rights and we cannot be certain that they are compatible. It is of course a measure in a piece of legislation passed by the last Labour Government and therefore something that the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, would no doubt place great weight on. Those are the terms that we find in Section 19 of the Human Rights Act.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

Does the Minister not think that it might at least be a courtesy to the Committee to set out which of the provisions, in his view and that of the Home Secretary, are or are not compatible with the convention? That would help us to determine the quality of the legislation that is proposed.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I will come to address the issues of the broad applicability of the Section 19(1)(b) statement. There is no requirement in the Act for a statement to identify any particular section. Indeed, I do not want to wade into the waters that were nearly ventured into during the interventions on my noble friend Lord Wolfson’s speech about whether the Section 19(1)(b) statement in relation to the Communications Bill, as it then was, was in accordance with the statute.

In any event, I return to the principle of Section 19(1)(b) statements. It is right to say that they have been made by Governments of all stripes, not least in the Communications Bill, as we heard earlier in the debate, but also by the coalition Government and by Nick Clegg in the House of Lords Reform Bill 2012. As my noble friend Lord Wolfson rightly indicated, issuing a Section 19(1)(b) statement is a legitimate choice given to Ministers under the Human Rights Act. Why else would the Act provide for such a course?

As I have said, previous Governments have issued such statements, and clearly that has not caused our international reputation to collapse. More broadly, I encourage the Committee to approach questions of international reputation with a proper perspective. The world can be in no doubt that we are defenders of rights and liberty, the most obvious example being our leading support for Ukraine.

Requiring guidance to be approved by Parliament on how the Bill’s provisions are to be interpreted within the meaning of the Human Rights Act is unnecessary. On 7 March the Government published a memorandum addressing issues arising under the ECHR, and a supplementary memorandum was published in April in relation to the government amendments tabled for Report in the Commons. These memoranda set out a provision-by-provision ECHR analysis, so I submit that the Government’s position is clear, and the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, will find the answers to his questions about what sits behind the Section 19(1)(b) statement in those memoranda.

It will undoubtedly be necessary to provide Home Office staff, immigration officers and others with appropriate guidance to support the implementation of the Bill. It would not be appropriate for such routine operational guidance on the implementation of a particular Act to be subject to parliamentary approval.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 24th May 2023 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

6: Clause 2, page 3, line 26, leave out “7 March 2023” and insert “the date on which this section comes into force”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment ensures the duty to deport in Clause 2 does not apply retrospectively to those who entered or arrived in the United Kingdom before the Bill comes into force.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment 6, which stands in my name. There are some other amendments associated with it. I am very grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Chakrabarti, and my noble and learned friend Lord Etherton for putting their names to Amendment 6. I am also grateful to the many well-known organisations that have made representations on these matters, including Justice and a number of others; some of them will recognise their views in what I am about to say.

These amendments are about a tension between what is fair and proportionate and what is unfair and disproportionate. Despite the fact that all those who have signed this amendment are lawyers, I do not use those terms in a narrow legal sense but as ordinary language, which I invite your Lordships to use as the template for your judgment.

I suggest that the Government are attempting to negate the legality of the exercise of rights permitted by UK law long after those rights have been exercised, and that to do so is unfair and disproportionate. We had a little discussion about strangeness in judgments that were allegedly made. In relation to these amendments, the only organisation that is doing something strange is the Government, because they are doing something that is very unusual and that falls straight into the literal definition of strange, although it is not unprecedented. The whole issue is about proportionality, as I have said, and Governments unfortunately do strange things fairly often.

These amendments deal with parts of the Bill that are retrospective in effect. Retrospectivity is contrary to the legal certainty of which we are proud and other principles that underpin our law. The amendments deal with Clauses 2, 4, 5, 15 and 21. Clause 2(3) means that the duty to deport would apply to an individual who entered or arrived in the United Kingdom on or after 7 March this year. The normal course of events is that a Bill comes into force when it is passed—at that moment when we hear that it has had Royal Assent and has gone through any other provisions contained in it as to when it comes into force. But this one is retrospective.

Clause 4(7) would disapply asylum or human rights claims which were made on or after 7 March 2023 but were simply awaiting a decision. There you are, awaiting a decision and, suddenly, the possibility of a decision is simply removed from you by the diktat of government.

Clause 5(12) and (14) would extend the removal provisions applied to those who had made an asylum or human rights claim on or after 7 March 2023 but were awaiting a decision. Clause 15(4) would give the Home Secretary retrospective power over the accommodation of unaccompanied migrant children—a very dramatic piece of retrospectivity.

Clause 21(8) to (10) would allow the Home Secretary retrospectively to revoke limited relief to remain, granted lawfully, to victims of modern slavery and human trafficking, thereby undermining commitments made by Theresa May—she was referred to earlier—when she was Prime Minister. They were very carefully considered, and rightly much vaunted, provisions to protect people from modern slavery and human trafficking.

I think we have already heard today, and I have certainly heard it at other times, that the modern slavery provisions have been abused. Yes, to an extent they have, but I would challenge anyone who has experience in the law to find any provision of a comparable nature that has not been abused and misused. That is what courts are there for: to deal with the misuse and abuse of such provisions.

The point about legal certainty is that it requires that individuals know what their rights are and how they can be implemented and enforced. This is especially important at a time when, as we have heard repeatedly from the Minister, the Government have decided that the UK’s international law obligations are dispensable and that the fundamental rights of individuals can be cast aside. The importance of legal certainty, and having very rare retrospectivity in our legal system and our common-law traditions, has been stressed repeatedly by the senior courts.

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Both amendments would remove clarity from the Bill, which will make matters clear to those to whom the provisions apply. The Bill aims to deter and prevent. A start date of the Bill’s First Reading is not only clear but fair and proportionate. Those coming to this country in breach of immigration control rules—often from France—know where they stand and what provisions will apply to them after 7 March. More importantly, the people of this country, who want the borders controlled, will see that no matter how protracted the gap between First Reading and the Bill becoming law, the arrangements under it will apply from 7 March.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

The noble Baroness has had quite a lot to say today about the wishes of the people of this country. Would she like to tell us what her evidence is that the wish of the people of this country is that people should be retrospectively affected by legislation of which they plainly had no awareness at the time when it had its First Reading?

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord for his question. As far as I can see, the Bill was published on 7 March. It was very well publicised at the time. It is designed to deter—

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

In Calais?

[Baroness Lawlor]

I think the noble Lord is not aware of the very good access to news which people coming to this country have—and which people traffickers have. It was no surprise that this Bill had its First Reading on 7 March.

I conclude on a point made earlier. This is not a Bill against asylum seekers; it is a measure to deter and prevent those coming to this country by unsafe and unlawful routes.

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[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I will certainly place a copy in the Library of the House. I hope that suffices. I am sure that my private office can work out who is here and is participating.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

Before the noble Lord stands up again, I feel I should bring this debate to a close. I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate, particularly those who supported the amendments in my name. A number of other very interesting issues have been raised. I have no doubt that we will be returning to a number of them on Report; I certainly will.

The reasons given by the Minister for what he recognises is the exceptional course of retrospectivity—I am using his words—involved conjecture: a conjecture that a very small change in the numbers, for whatever reason, of people coming on boats shows that the retrospectivity is working. I have been a Silk for 39 years. Along with the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, we have probably met more criminals than the rest of this Committee added together. My observation would be a rather less naive one than that made by the Minister. Criminals are infinitely adaptable. If the Government think that the boats are being stopped, it is not evidence that fewer people are coming into this country, because there are different ways and means of doing it.

From what we have heard today—maybe on Report we will hear something different—I really believe that the case for exceptionality is far from proved. I take the view, therefore, that we will have to come back to these subjects. I urge the Government to meet noble Lords who have spoken in these debates before Report so that we can see whether there is some common ground we can find that will make this a better Bill rather than a battleground in your Lordships’ House. For the time being, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 6.

Amendment 6 withdrawn.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 5th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

Certain things will happen when the Bill goes through; the system described within it will take effect. I assure the noble Lord that this is something that the Home Office expects to happen—that is, that returns will be effected in accordance with the duty imposed on the Secretary of State.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

If the impact assessment is to be provided in a timely way—or if not—will the Minister ensure that it contains an estimate or assessment of the number of people who would have been granted asylum but will not be because they are excluded as a result of the blanket effects of the Bill?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

It is not for me to dictate what is in the impact assessment. The department will provide the impact assessment in due course—

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords—

[Lord Cormack (Con)]

My Lords—

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[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I will come back to the noble Lords in due course, but I need to make progress.

The broken asylum system costs the UK £3 billion a year, and that is rising. There seems to be an impression that, without the Bill, those costs will not continue to rise at an alarming rate year on year. Doing nothing is not an option.

In conclusion, I agree with the noble Lord that returns agreements have a place, and we will seek to negotiate these where appropriate. By their nature, any such negotiations involve two parties. The UK cannot compel other countries to enter into such agreements; they are a two-way process. Moreover, it will not enhance such negotiations to require their status to be set out in a three-monthly report to be laid before Parliament.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords—

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I ask the noble Lord to bear with me for a moment.

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[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

May we return to something that the noble Lord said a few moments ago? He said that it is not for him to dictate what appears in an impact assessment. If it is not for a Minister—either this Minister or one of his noble or honourable friends, either in this place or another—to dictate what appears in an impact assessment, for whom is it to determine what appears in one?

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[Lord Dubs (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord. I will endeavour not to repeat some of the arguments that have already been put forward; it is a challenge that most of us have failed, and I will probably fail it too.

In the Bill, there is an unprecedented step that it would make any asylum application made by someone who arrives irregularly in the UK permanently inadmissible. If declared inadmissible, they cannot subsequently enter the UK’s asylum process. That means that they are out of the system for ever, simply because of the method by which they have arrived in this country. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees said that the Bill

“would amount to an asylum ban”,

as it would the extinguish

“the right to seek refugee protection in the United Kingdom for those who arrive irregularly, no matter how compelling their claim may be”.

The UNHCR goes on to say that, if other countries followed suit, we would see an end to refugee protection. That is a pretty dismal comment, but I have no reason to doubt that the UNHCR is accurate in its assessment. I repeat something which should be beyond argument: the UNHCR knows about the 1951 convention, and surely the UNHCR must be seen as the guardian of that convention. So if the Government are going to disagree with the UNHCR, they have to be on pretty firm grounds before they do so.

I will not repeat the conditions stated in Clause 2—we are familiar with them—but I will note that, even if people cannot be removed from the UK, their claims will still be permanently inadmissible. That is a significant change from the current inadmissibility scheme put in place after the UK’s exit from the EU as it also left the Dublin system. Under this scheme, if the UK Government believe that somebody did claim or could or should have claimed asylum in another country, their asylum claim could be potentially deemed inadmissible. However, the current scheme requires another country to have agreed to take the person before the inadmissibility decision can be made. The Home Office guidance on the inadmissibility procedures says that getting an agreement should take a maximum of six months in most cases. We are in a situation where there can be no progress for those individuals, except in this very negative sense.

The Home Office’s own statistics—I rely on the Refugee Council for some of this information—show how rare an occurrence this is. Between January 2021 and the end of December 2022

“of 18,494 applications that were potentially inadmissible only 83 inadmissibility decisions have been served”,

with only 21 removals. As a result, nearly 10,000 people have had their claims subsequently admitted into the UK’s asylum system following an unnecessary delay.

This Bill changes the current inadmissibility system by removing the requirement to have a removal agreement in place with another country before an inadmissibility decision can be reached. Instead, it makes any claim automatically and permanently inadmissible. It does not give the Home Secretary any discretion to consider the claim, and indeed the noble Lord in the previous speech challenged the Home Secretary’s lack of discretion in these procedures.

The Bill does very little to make it likely that more people will be able to be removed. Clause 5 allows people from 32 countries designated as safe countries whose asylum applications have been ruled inadmissible to be returned to their home country. Nationals of all other countries outside this list cannot be returned to their home country. This includes someone whose claim is highly likely to be successful, such as an Afghan or a Syrian, or someone whose claim could potentially be refused if it was actually processed. Instead, they can be removed only to one of the 57 third countries listed in Schedule 1 to the Bill. However, the agreement with Rwanda is the only removal agreement that the UK has in place that includes third country nationals, and the legal and tactical challenges faced by that scheme are well documented. Even if it becomes operational, it will not be possible to remove the thousands of people whose claims are deemed inadmissible to Rwanda.

We are in a real difficulty with this situation. The Home Office has yet to set out how many people it believes will be impacted by the Bill, as we have already discussed. However, given the current 0.7% success rate of removing people under the inadmissibility process, the Refugee Council estimates that at the end of the third year of the Bill between 161,000 and 192,000 people will have had their asylum claims deemed inadmissible but not yet have been removed. They will be unable to have their asylum claims processed, and therefore unable to work, and will be reliant on Home Office support and accommodation indefinitely, which is predicted to cost between £5 billion and £6 billion in the first three years. They will be stuck in a permanent limbo. I hope the Minister can explain how they can get out of that limbo, unless the Government suddenly produce a range of countries with which return agreements have been agreed.

This is a pretty miserable clause in a miserable Bill. I believe that this amendment could go some little way towards making the Bill somewhat less bad than it is.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I have signed some amendments which were tabled by my noble and learned friend Lord Etherton, who has asked me to apologise for his absence today. I am not going to speak to those in any detail because, as is typical of my noble and learned friend, the explanatory statements which he has added to those amendments say it all, and make them very easy to understand.

What concerns me about this debate is that it has a degree of abstraction which perhaps conceals what really lies in front of the debates we are having. Recently, I went to a meeting to discuss asylum and refugee status in one of our cities. Present at that meeting was a woman in her 30s, with three children, who is living in a hostel in that city. She has now been waiting for 10 years—with her children, some born after her arrival here—to know the result of her wish to be treated as an asylum seeker.

The Minister earlier today—it seems like many hours ago but it is probably only about two and a half—referred, when he was answering an intervention, to an emergency having occurred. If that is an emergency—because this Government have been in place for well over 10 years—then it makes the creation of a baby elephant seem like the speed of sound. It has happened on their watch. Why? In truth—and it is long before the Minister became involved in these issues and became a valued Member of your Lordships’ House—they did not do what they needed to do to anticipate what was going to happen. That is why cases such as that of the woman I referred to took place.

In another city, I met a young man, now in his mid-20s, who had arrived in the United Kingdom illegally in the back of a lorry. He climbed out of the lorry and had nowhere to go. He slept in a doorway and the next day he did what he was told was a good thing to do and went to the local police station and asked the police for help. As it happens, they were very sympathetically disposed to him. He was then about 17 and a half. He was refused permission to remain in this country and he was refused asylum. He appealed and his appeal was allowed. I am delighted to say that the reason he came to see me was that he is about to start a career as a barrister. This is obviously a very good thing for anyone to do, as I would say, and I know a number of noble and learned friends, including the Minister, will agree with me when I say that. I am trying to discourage him, as a sort of mentor, from doing only asylum work because there is so much more to do as a barrister. I may be winning that battle. That is the actuality we are dealing with in these cases.

What we are facing here, to use the Minister’s words, is apparently an emergency to oust the use of judicial review. Before I got up to speak, we heard three really superb speeches. I do not want to repeat everything that was said but I agree with it all. All those speeches demonstrated, I suggest, that the ouster of judicial review, as has been the approach of the courts and indeed of Parliament over the decades, should happen only very rarely. It is not unheard of, but it should happen only very rarely when the necessity to oust judicial review is demonstrated and, above all, when it is fair and proportional to do so. Surely the ouster of judicial review is neither fair nor proportional in a situation in which we find many cases coming before the courts but it is not the fault of the real people who want to go to those courts. Let us not forget that a very large number of that cohort are allowed asylum and refugee status when they go to the courts. This is not an unworthy cohort going to court for the sake of it; people often win their cases. Do we in your Lordships’ House, with so many experienced people, particularly those who have seen the courts in action, really want to oust that activity of the courts?

Let us look at the figures for a moment. I know that there are many cases in tribunals. I have never had the advantage of serving as a member of the asylum et cetera tribunal or Upper Tribunal but I have had the privilege of serving as a deputy judge in the Administrative Court for many years, dealing with many asylum cases. I think everybody imagines—I wish to disabuse the non-lawyers in the Committee—that these cases are all run into the ground by long-winded lawyers such as myself who try to make the cases run for ever and ever in order to enhance our fees; the sort of Daily Mail “sidebar of shame” view of what lawyers do.

Let me tell your Lordships what happens in the Administrative Court. A judge turns up for a day’s sitting and often starts with paper applications. About 11% of the cases have already been filtered out as being totally without merit and do not even come before the judge doing the paper applications—the paper apps, as they are called. The judge then spends the day in his or her judge’s room dealing with the paper apps, usually dealing with about 12 in a day—maybe a few less, maybe a few more. They take therefore very little time at all.

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[Lord Horam (Con)]

My Lords, before we move on to the interesting dinnertime discussion, I just want to raise a point as a non-lawyer about Amendment 20, in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. Its purpose is to

“enable an application for judicial review to be made while the applicant is in the UK”.

We had a very interesting point from the noble Lord, Lord German, about what he described, fairly accurately, as Daily Mail sidebar accusations about the nature of judicial review. It was very helpful to have that short seminar from the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, on what actually happens in the Administrative Courts and how it is not a question of lawyers making lots of money out of rather dodgy cases. I think he is right. Although I have never been to the Administrative Court, but I am sure he reflected that very faithfully.

Surely, however, if this amendment is passed, it will drive a coach and horses through the main purpose of this Bill, which is to deter people from crossing the channel in small boats. If you then give them the opportunity when arriving in this country in a small boat of immediately seeking judicial review, and that is in the Bill designed to stop them coming across the channel, will that not destroy the whole purpose of the Bill? I merely put that question as a non-lawyer; it seems to me inimical to the very heart of the Bill, whatever one’s view.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way, but I just want to ask him this question. Would he be happy about legislation being passed that meant that people who had a justifiable claim to asylum were never allowed to pursue that claim to asylum—that is, a justifiable claim under international and existing United Kingdom law?

[Lord Horam (Con)]

No, I am just saying that if the amendment were accepted, it would be entirely inimical to the purpose of the Bill.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 5th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I also have various other amendments in this group. I feel I should speak very slowly in the hope that those who have the other amendments in this group arrive in time to introduce them.

Amendment 30 relates to Clause 5, which is one of the removal provisions. A number of noble and learned Lords, all learned in the sense that one generally understands it—I can see one of them in her place—have put a good deal of work into the other amendments in this group. I do not want to pre-empt what they and my noble friend Lord Paddick will say, so I will leave that support unspoken.

Clause 5(4)(b) places the Secretary of State above the law and above the courts, because the first hurdle to making a protection or a human rights claim is that

“the Secretary of State considers there are exceptional circumstances”

preventing removal to a particular country. This amendment is intended to probe what is meant by “exceptional circumstances”. I hope the Minister can expand on this. We have examples in subsection (5) which are about particular countries and not individuals. I suspect that they may include situations which are the subject of many other amendments in this group, and if so we should spell that out and not make it a matter of discretion. I am questioning the Secretary of State’s discretion, as I understand it—reasoned discretion, one hopes—or consideration that there are exceptional circumstances which prevent removal to a particular country.

It was only when I was preparing for today that I paused on the word “prevent”. Does it really mean preventing removal, which to my mind conjures up pictures of protestors preventing take-off of a plane carrying a particular individual? Or does it mean that removal is inappropriate or risky because of the reception—in the broadest sense—at the other end; or that there are circumstances which mean that removal would be unsafe? If it is about treatment at the other end, I am not sure that “prevent” is the right term.

I very much support the amendments—which we will hear about in a moment— extending the list of countries and parts of countries which are dangerous to return people to.

My amendments are directed at, and opposing, the notion that an individual can be safe in a part of a country if he is not safe in another part of the same country. Not every country is in a tidy unity, but where there are laws, they tend to apply overall. Where there are prejudices in a country, those who may be a threat to an individual will be free to travel between different parts of the country. Those are Amendments 52A to 52D, Amendment 52G and Amendment 53A.

Amendments 52B and 52D challenge the proposition in Clause 6(1) of removal if “in general” there is no serious risk of persecution or that removal will not “in general” contravene obligations under the human rights convention. What is meant by “in general”? I do not understand the term in this context. It is not fair to call it a lazy term, because I appreciate the vast amount of work that goes into drafting any Bill—however much one dislikes it—but it is not a very imaginative way to describe a situation. If you cannot give an example, you should not be trying to use generalised terminology. This seems to be another demonstration of the Government clutching at anything they can to deny obligations to asylum seekers. I beg to move Amendment 30.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I apologise for my slightly late arrival in the first minute of this debate. I rise because I am the signatory of a number of amendments tabled by my noble and learned friend Lord Etherton, and because I have some amendments in my own name: Amendments 33A, 34 and 35.

The aim of all these amendments is to ensure that something happens which I feel should not cause any differences with the Government. I think it may be a matter of interpretation or a matter of adding a few words to the Bill. Principally, it relates to the treatment in third countries of people who fall within the LGBTQ group. Section 80B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 provides that a state is a safe third state in relation to a claimant if

“the claimant’s life and liberty are not threatened in that State by reason of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion”.

I focus on the words

“member of a particular social group”.

I am sure the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, will acknowledge that the definition of a “particular social group” has been to the courts. Indeed, government guidance has been issued which accepts that being a member of the LGBTQ+ community, subject to the facts being established—obviously, there is a consideration of the facts in every case—entitles that person to protection from Section 80B, as I quoted. The purpose of these amendments, therefore, is to ensure that people who are seeking asylum because they are a member of that social group—or another definable social group—do not lose the full protection of the law by reason of the content of Schedule 1 to this Bill, and the provisions of Clause 5 in particular.

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[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, in relation to the first part of the question asked by the noble Lord, it is true that there are certain countries designated for men only, and so forth, in the existing schedule. The Government do not consider that that is an appropriate precedent to extend at this stage. Circumstances change and countries change, so it is much better to deal with this on an individual basis. It is probably the case, one would have thought as a matter of common sense, that, if it arises, the Government’s travel advice to particular countries, to raise one particular point, is likely to be a highly material fact, when they come to consider the risk of serious and irreversible harm.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

I am grateful to the Minister for the answer he gave to a point I raised earlier. I ask him whether, before Report, he will talk to some of those organisations which have been the secondary referrals for people who have tried to make claims that they would be in danger in unspecified other countries. They face the extreme inconsistency of quality legal advice in different parts of the country, and they often obtain quality legal advice only when some well-meaning social worker or other person refers them to the Children’s Society or some other organisation, which has a proper team of lawyers, who are able to give informed advice. Around the country, where the people we are talking about tend to be dispersed, the knowledge of this part of the law is thin.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 7th June 2023 Lords Chamber

With over 100 million people displaced in the world, we need a strategy to tackle the root causes, not legislation which will do nothing to end the desperate journeys of people who are desperate to make better and safer lives for themselves and their families.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I will not repeat what has already been said. I agree with most of what has been said in the preceding speeches, particularly the remarks made by my noble friend Lord Kerr about the inadequacy of Schedule 1, and all the examples that have been given, including those given very clearly by my noble friend Lord Alton, of cases which create real dangers of injustice which are plainly contrary to the international conventions to which this country subscribes. Instead, I want to obtain confirmation from the Minister of some short propositions which relate to Clause 6 of the Bill.

Clause 6 provides that the Secretary of State may amend Schedule 1 in certain circumstances. Can the Minister confirm that if a cogent application is made to the Secretary of State to amend Schedule 1 in particular ways and he refuses, that would immediately open the gate for judicial review proceedings? I foresee a menu of 57 opportunities in Schedule 1 for 57 applications for judicial review—perhaps a few fewer—being made by well-known and well-funded NGOs for amendments to be made to that schedule because of circumstances in those countries.

Further, would not the Secretary of State face considerable obstacles if such judicial review applications were made? First, there is the weakness of the standard of proof that is set by the Government for themselves—“if satisfied”, whatever that means. Secondly, in Clause 6(1)(a), which was referred to earlier, the Secretary of State can add a country or territory if satisfied that

“there is in general in that country or territory, or part, no serious risk of persecution”.

Does that not contradict certain other legal provisions which, for example, provide guarantees of safety to a group of people we discussed earlier this week—the cohort of LGBTQ+ people who might be affected?

Thirdly, Clause 6(1)(b) states:

“removal of persons to that country or territory, or part, pursuant to the duty in section 2(1) will not in general contravene the United Kingdom’s obligations”.

Is that not pathetically weak, and contradictory to other legislation? I again take the LGBTQ+ cohort as my example.

If that analysis of Clause 6(1) and Schedule 1 is not entirely coherent, surely it is enough to persuade the Government that they should really reconsider the drafting of Clause 6 and the contents of Schedule 1. If they insist on keeping Schedule 1, it should, from the start of the Bill coming into effect, reflect all the dangers in all countries in which there are dangers for certain groups of people who could not be described as people “in general”. This is ineffective, and I am sure it will put substantial fees into the hands of my learned friends, but that is not what this place should be trying to do.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I support these amendments and the speeches that were just given. I want to make two points only. First, it is extraordinary to me that Schedule 1 shows a list of countries with which this country has no agreement. I cannot understand how one can put into primary legislation a list of countries with which the Government hope to have an agreement, when that is not yet happening.

Secondly, I spoke earlier, at greater length, about the unaccompanied child who comes to the age of 18. Your Lordships have only to think of a child of 10, and we know that some children of 10 have come through. With any luck, a child of 10 will not be kept in Home Office accommodation; he or she is likely to go into the care of a local authority under the Children Acts and will very likely be fostered. It is comparatively easy to be fostered at 10. The child would have spent eight years at an English school, would have grown into speaking English, probably forgetting his or her own language to some extent, and will be settled.

Immediately after the age of 18—subject to the Home Office’s inordinate delays in removing people, but assuming that it achieves something better in the future—he or she can be removed and will go to a country. At the moment, there is only one, unless the child is Albanian, when they would have gone back earlier. That child aged 18, just grown up, will find him or herself in a country the language of which they probably do not speak and he or she will know absolutely nothing. I hope your Lordships agree with me that that, quite simply, is cruel.

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[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her question, but I cannot answer it today at the Dispatch Box. My respectful reply is that this issue does not arise for the reasons I have given. The Bill does not envisage, at the moment, returning people to such countries. The general position is that we can continue discussing the provisions on legal requirements, trafficking, unaccompanied children and so forth, but this part of the Bill is an essential part of the Bill. I therefore beg to move—

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

I am most grateful to the Minister and have great respect for his legal analysis. However, I will correct him on the point I made about judicial review. I was not saying that a judicial review could be taken in which the order would be for the Minister to amend the law. The Minister cannot amend the law; we in this Parliament amend the law. The application would be for a judicial review of the refusal of the Minister to take steps to amend the law. That is quite a different matter, and I do not apprehend any difficulty in making such an application for judicial review.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, if I misunderstood his point. I respectfully continue to beg to differ as to both the likelihood of such judicial proceedings or the relevance of such judicial proceedings to today’s stand part debate. So, if your Lordships permit me, I beg to move—

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 12th June 2023 Lords Chamber

These measures will leave victims in destitution, unable to escape the abuses that they have been subject to. They will drive more men, women, children, young people and families into destitution. Frankly, it is a shocking change in public policy and shamefully undermines a policy of which we were all so proud.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Alton unfortunately cannot be with us today and has asked me to speak to a number of amendments in his name which I have signed—and one which I have not because there was no room left. I will be very happy to do so. I pay tribute to the enormous work he has put into this Bill on the issues that have arisen, including those mentioned so eloquently by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker.

At the beginning of his contribution, the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, mentioned the absence of an impact assessment and our ongoing interest in whether it will arrive in due course and, if so, whether it will be too late to have any impact. If ever there was a series of amendments for which the impact assessment’s absence has importance, it is this. I hope to demonstrate why in a few moments.

I will highlight the potentially devastating impact that the Bill will have on not only survivors of modern slavery but our ability as a country proudly to bring to justice those who are guilty of modern slavery offences. There is a paramount public interest here and internationally in those cases being prosecuted. If you ask a prosecutor how best to prepare a case, the answers are very simple. First, you need co-operative witnesses; for that, you need witnesses to feel safe to provide the evidence. That is when they will come to court, where they will be protected by judges behind screens or by other special arrangements and produce an overwhelming prosecution case. Anything that any Government do to inhibit the prosecution of modern slavery cases is not just regrettable but a manifestly dishonourable disgrace.

The amendments seek to put in the Bill obligations on the Secretary of State to carry out and present before Parliament and an appointed Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner reports and assessments on the potential impacts of this Bill in relation to equality, human rights and compliance. Furthermore, they require detailed information pertaining to each country or territory listed in Schedule 1 to be laid before Parliament in relation to the practical implications, including but not limited to the effect on modern slavery prosecutions.

One is entitled to assume—I ask the Minister to confirm that this assumption is accurate in this case—that, in the preparation of the list in Schedule 1, the Government have carried out due diligence on the 57 countries listed as safe territories to which a person may be removed. Was the placing of a country on the list in Schedule 1 preceded by consultation? Who should that consultation have been with? Let us start with the ambassadors and high commissioners representing the United Kingdom in those countries.

We all know that the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office is well staffed with people here in London who are experts in and who man desks on those countries. Were they consulted before the names of those countries were added to the list in Schedule 1? I ask this question because, having been through the list with a fine-toothed comb looking at every single country on it, I cannot accept that whatever inquiries were made could really be described as diligent. Due diligence in the world in which many of us who work in the professions operate is an absolute given in every instance. I will give your Lordships some examples before I turn to my reductio ad absurdum—if I can be allowed that phrase—of this point.

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[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

The Minister is making a very bold proposition when he says that Article 30 gives the Government an excuse to ignore ECAT. Can he give us examples of public order events which justify that bold, and in my view unjustifiable, statement?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

It was Article 13(3). The events which the Government say warrant the grounds of public order which prevent observance of the 30-day reflection and recovery period are the conditions which I identified earlier in relation to the pressure placed on public services and the threat to life arising from the dangerous channel crossings.

I do not propose to address all the amendments individually, suffice to say that where the Secretary of State is satisfied that an individual is participating in an investigation or criminal proceedings relating to their alleged exploitation, and considers it necessary for them to be present in the UK to provide that co-operation, and considers that their co-operation outweighs any significant risk of harm to the public they may pose, that individual will be exempt from the disqualification. This allows the Government to protect against the threat to public order arising from the current circumstances relating to illegal entry into the UK, while also ensuring that investigations can be progressed to bring perpetrators to justice. By one means or another, the amendments seek to negate, or at least roll back, the intended effect of the provisions in Clause 21 and subsequent clauses.

--- Later in debate ---

The provisions in Clause 21 are a necessary and core part of this Bill if it is to achieve its purpose of deterring illegal entry into the UK. We recognise the exceptional nature of these provisions, but the way to acknowledge that is to include a sunset clause in the Bill, as we have done. This does not put barriers in the way of the successful implementation of the Bill. The sooner we can stop the boats, the sooner we can review the necessity of these provisions. On that basis, I commend Clause 21 to the Committee and invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

Before the Minister sits down, will he do the usual thing, which is to answer reasonable questions that were asked of him, particularly the question I asked about the due diligence carried out in preparation of Schedule 1 and how advice was obtained as to whether it was right to put almost entirely unqualified entries into that schedule?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I had in mind the sage words of the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, in the House last week. As the noble Lord will recall, the origins of Schedule 1 were canvassed at length by the Committee in the previous group. The countries listed in the schedule are an amalgam of previous pieces of legislation where the safety of those countries has been established in that legislation.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 12th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Cashman (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to the amendments in this group. In so doing, I refer your Lordships to my entries in the register of interests, particularly as patron of the AIDS and HIV charity, the Terrence Higgins Trust.

I particularly support the amendments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, who brilliantly explained the reasoning behind them. As he says in his explanatory statement to Amendment 105, the current wording of Clause 38(5)(c) is too wide and would preclude

“a human rights claim pursuant to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights”,

which the Government are suddenly clinging on to. It would also preclude a protection claim pursuant to the refugee convention. I am not a lawyer, so I will not dwell too much on those matters; however, I support the argument that what is proposed in this clause is not in conformity with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg and not in accordance with the jurisprudence of the United Kingdom.

At the heart of this provision is the removal to the so-called safe countries in Schedule 1. As your Lordships will know, I am not alone in my concerns; they were discussed with great concern on the first and third days in Committee and today. Indeed, the Minister, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, tried to reassure me and others that the list was really an amalgam and that the countries, where people who might be subject to discrimination because they belong to a particular social group will be going, might perhaps say, “We don’t want them”. That is a wonderful hypothetical answer, but my reply is: what if a person who is HIV positive is sent to a country, such as Uganda, where that person, if they are lesbian, gay or bisexual, would have to say to their medical practitioner that they are lesbian, gay or bisexual? That medical practitioner, if they did not reveal that information to the Government, would face two years’ imprisonment, while the person receiving treatment themselves could be criminalised. That is just one country from a huge range of countries, not only around the world but particularly within the Commonwealth. Some 80% of the countries of the Commonwealth currently criminalise people because of their sexual orientation and gender identity.

Because of the lateness, I will now take my place. But for the reason I have just cited, and many more, I heartily and unreservedly support these amendments, particularly those of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak in support of both my noble and learned friends, who sit to my right in the Chamber. I am particularly grateful, as I think the whole Committee is, to my noble and learned friend Lord Etherton for the very clear exposition he gave of the law and of the consequences of these provisions which change the law.

I will put my very short analysis of this into “faults” and “conclusions”. Clause 38 is word soup, full of tautology and contradictions—the sort of thing that makes fortunes for lawyers if they can get in front of judges, like my noble and learned friends in the very senior courts, and make esoteric arguments based on an analysis of the text. The word soup is most certainly not a consommé clarified by the use of egg whites, so that you can see through it to the bottom of the bowl. It is more like a sort of mad minestrone, into which the draftsman has thrown every word vegetable that he or she could find.

Let us look at Clause 38(3), where the “serious harm condition” is in inverted commas. I was taught at school never to use inverted commas, if you could avoid it, because they show a weakness in your argument, unless it is a quotation that someone said. It says:

“The ‘serious harm condition’ is that P would, before the end of the relevant period, face a real, imminent and foreseeable risk”.


Supposing we missed out the words “real, imminent and”, what difference would it make if it simply read,

“before the end of the relevant period, face a … foreseeable risk of serious and irreversible harm”?

If one missed out the words “and irreversible”, would it mean less if it read:

“The ‘serious harm condition’ is that P would, before the end of the relevant period, face a … foreseeable risk of serious … harm if removed from the United Kingdom”?


What are they trying to gain by the word soup—the possibility of making bizarre submissions in front of the senior courts in which my noble and learned friends sat?

After those comments, if you were asked, “What does all this mean?” by a lay man who might be up at 10.10 pm looking at parliamentary TV or parliamentlive.tv and fascinated by every word in this debate, you would say to him, “Just go and have a look at Clause 38(5)(c)”, which refers to

“where the standard of healthcare available to P in the relevant country or territory is lower than is available to P in the United Kingdom”.

They—or at least those who were well informed enough to be sitting up at 10.10 pm, watching parliamentary TV—would immediately say, “This is deliberate discrimination against gay men”. What else is this for?

We should be ashamed of ourselves if, at least when it comes to Report, we allow this kind of provision to remain in the Bill and do not help my noble and learned friends to pass their amendments. But I hope that we do not have to reach that stage, because this word soup should seem as ridiculous to our noble friends the Ministers as it does to some of us.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, this has been an interesting, if not bewildering, debate—at least to us non-lawyers. My lay interpretation of the provisions we debated in this group is that they highlight the danger of asylum seekers being removed to countries where they could come to harm by making the level of proof required to suspend removal so high, and by making the evidence required to prevent their removal so compelling—within impossibly short timescales—as to make the likelihood of a successful claim diminishingly small. If it turns out that it is not diminishingly small enough, the provisions allow the Secretary of State to redefine what “serious and irreversible harm” means to make sure that the tap is turned off almost completely.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, questioned whether such an approach is compatible with existing law. It is quite clear what the Government are trying to do here: make it impossible for anyone to resist removal from this country under the provisions of the Bill. That is why we do not believe that Clauses 37 to 42 should stand part of the Bill.

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[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I can be relatively brief. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, for introducing her amendments so powerfully and with such knowledge. I agree with her that there is a curious disparity between Clauses 52 and 53, and my proposition is that they should be swept away and should not stand part of the Bill. As she said, the Home Office getting its act together and making decent decisions in the first place would be how to reduce the workload and what the Government seem to think is the overreach of the courts—I do not agree that it is overreach. If you get things right first time, you would not need to keep attacking the courts.

Clause 52 is a straightforward ban on domestic courts granting interim remedies to stop the removal of a person from the UK. We are familiar with this “courts are enemies of the people” stuff. The interim remedies are valuable because they allow the courts to maintain the status quo while a claim is considered. When the harm in question is a violation of human rights, the ability to freeze the situation is valuable. Denying the courts the ability to use interim remedies when justice demands it undermines the guarantees of Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR. Clause 52 should be removed, and I am glad to say that the JCHR agrees.

Clause 53 is a different animal altogether. It is really rather peculiar, and it takes a strange and circuitous route to block interim measures from Strasbourg, by giving a Minister discretion to decide whether or not to disapply the duty on the Home Secretary to remove the person. Given the negotiations under way over the procedure for deciding interim measures, as reported in the press and alluded to by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, this clause appears to be more politics than law. It is strange, given that the Prime Minister was recently in Reykjavik, at the summit of the Council of Europe—and given that the JCHR’s recent report says:

“We welcome the Prime Minister’s recent reaffirmation of his ‘deep and abiding’ commitment to the ECHR”


and the European Court of Human Rights, made at that very recent summit.

Then, the Government propose in Clause 53 to give Ministers permission to act in direct violation of the UK’s obligations under the ECHR. Talk about right hand and left hand: it is not only incoherent but provocative. That does not seem wise, if the aim is open and good-faith negotiation on possible procedural reform. It is very reminiscent of the way the Government went about dealing—or rather, not dealing—with Brussels over the Brexit negotiations: always aiming to antagonise, then turning around and saying that they are punishing us.

Clause 53 is irresponsible and it is not going to progress any negotiations, in so far as they are necessary, and given the small number of interim measures issued by the Strasbourg court, it seems to be taking a sledgehammer to crack a nut. Not only is Clause 53 likely to hinder discussions on procedural reform, if that is necessary; it makes broader conflict with the European Court of Human Rights all but inevitable. If there is dissatisfaction with the procedures in Strasbourg, the solution is to pursue reform at the European level—and there have been many instances of discussions in the Council of Europe about the processes of the convention and the court. It is not even saying, “We will never obey interim measures”; it gives the Minister the discretion to refuse to comply with our obligations by obeying interim measures. Surely, the UK’s interests are better served by remaining, in the Foreign Secretary’s words, a “serious player” on the world stage, rather than undermining its own influence in this way. I therefore believe that Clauses 52 and 53 should not stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

I want to make a brief contribution on Clause 53. We cannot ask the Minister to comment on the impact assessment, because it is yet to be born, but we have the advantage of the report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford. At paragraph 12, on page 121 of that report, in its recommendations and conclusions, it says that

“clause 53 gives Ministers legislative permission to act in direct violation of the UK obligations under the ECHR. Where a Minister chooses to ignore an interim measure and therefore breach Article 34 of the ECHR, clause 53 also prevents the courts from having regard to interim measures when considering proceedings under this Bill. This clause therefore permits deliberate breaches of our obligation to comply with interim measures of the ECtHR. Clause 53 must be removed from the Bill”.

That is the conclusion of an all-party Joint Committee of both Houses of this Parliament, and I trust that, in his response to the debate, the Minister will respond and give us his reasons for not accepting that carefully considered conclusion of the committee in one of the largest reports it has ever produced—and in the time when they could have produced 20 impact assessments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I am grateful for that short intervention. I am now not sure whether I am intervening on the noble Baroness’s speech or she is intervening on mine but she made a couple of points. I do not know whether she has seen my notes because I was going to come to the state practice point in a moment. Frankly, I should not really give this away but that point is probably the best point against the arguments that I am running. I am a little surprised that the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, did not mention it but I shall do so; it is the best point. I am not speaking for the Government so I am not going to divine what is in the mind of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, or that of the Minister who will respond; they can speak for themselves and I will speak for myself.

What I was saying is twofold. First, I was not saying that there are no circumstances in which you cannot justify a Rule 39 order. I thought I had made it clear that, if you can justify it properly under Article 34 in the particular circumstances of the case—such as a death penalty case—and there are proper natural justice provisions, it could be justified. That is my first point.

My second point is that the mere fact that states abide by Rule 39 indications will not, I suggest, be enough for state practice as a matter of international law. The fact that a court tells me to do X and I do it does not show that I accept that the court has jurisdiction to tell me to do it. I might choose to do it because I do not want to pick a fight with the court. One has to find a more detailed and forthright statement that is sufficiently unambiguous, and then look at that coupled with everything else.

I have delayed the Committee long enough. On this point, I direct the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, to Policy Exchange, on which she is absolutely right. The point made by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, was picked up and dealt with by Professor Ekins in that report.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords—

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

Before I give way, may I make one other short point? I respectfully suggest that state practice cannot give a court jurisdiction when it does not have it. All state practice can do is go to the interpretation of a treaty. It does not go to the creation of a power or a jurisdiction; that point may not be one to discuss as the clock strikes midnight, but now is a good time for me to give way to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. I draw his attention to the current, as of today, UK Visas and Immigration guidance, Judicial Reviews, Injunctions and Applications to the European Court of Human Rights. Where it deals with Rule 39, it says that

“a Rule 39 indication is similar to an Administrative Court … injunction but is”,

to state the obvious, made by the European Court of Human Rights. It goes on:

“Where you have been notified that a rule 39 indication has been made, you must … defer removal immediately”


and,

“where the person is detained, make sure this development is considered in relation to any decision to continue with detention”.

In other words, in their current guidance on the subjects that we are concerned with, the Government regard these Rule 39 rulings as binding. That is what the guidance tells the members of the public who have bothered to look at the Government’s own website this evening, as I have.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 14th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I wish to speak to my Amendment 129 on refugee family reunion. I am grateful for the support of my noble friend Lord Paddick, the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle.

Refugee family reunion does exist as a safe and legal route but it needs to be expanded. I was proud to steer a Private Member’s Bill on that subject; it passed through this House and is currently in the other place. I picked up the baton from my noble friend Lady Hamwee, who has worked on this issue for many years.

The problem at the moment is not only that the safe routes available to refugees are extremely limited; last year, refugee settlement provided in collaboration with the UNHCR decreased by 39% and the issuing of refugee family reunion visas decreased by nearly a quarter—the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham referred to this. In the year ending March 2022, 6,000 family reunion visas were issued. In the year ending March 2023, there were only 4,600—a reduction of 23%. The Bill misses an opportunity for the UK to curb the number of irregular arrivals by creating more routes to safety and—I would like it to fulfil this opportunity—to allow more family members to join those who have reached safety in this country, including by letting separated refugee children be joined by their closest family members.

Last year, the Nationality and Borders Act restricted access to family reunion for refugees arriving in the UK irregularly. Of course, it has failed to replace the Dublin regulations since we left the EU. The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, referred to the hole that exists for international co-operation; we might refer to that later today. Although those restrictions from last year’s Act are beginning to take effect only now, preliminary research from Refugee Legal Support has already found evidence of children who would previously have been eligible for reunification being stranded in Europe and crossing the channel dangerously.

Australia provides an example of the longer-term impact of this sort of restriction. In 2014, Australia reintroduced temporary protection visas—which do not confer family reunion rights—and has seen an increase in the number of women and children arriving via dangerous journeys. We should remember that 90% of those arriving on family reunion visas in this country are women and children. I am sure I do not need to convince noble Lords of the importance of family reunion for refugees’ integration into their new communities. Surely that should be our aim. If we have allowed people the legal right to settle here, and in some cases be on a path to citizenship, surely we should want to do anything that fosters integration and the physical, emotional and psychological adjustment of people.

Refugees separated from their families can, understandably, experience serious mental health difficulties, compounding the trauma that they have already experienced. This means that they are less able to focus on activities which are essential to integration, such as learning English, building new relationships in the community, and working, which is another topic that we will talk about today. In the other place, the Conservative MP Tim Loughton tabled a new clause seeking to expand eligibility for refugee family reunion, and I applaud him for that. It did not get pushed to a vote.

The problem is that current family reunion entitlements are too restrictive. I have mentioned that refugee children are not allowed to sponsor family members within the Immigration Rules, and we have also had the creation of those bespoke pathways, such as the Afghan route, which do not confer protection status, meaning that some resettled people in the UK have no eligibility for refugee family reunion because they do not have the necessary status to sponsor family. All those with protection needs must have access to refugee family reunion. This pathway should be expanded to allow children to sponsor their parents and siblings and adult refugees to sponsor parents who are dependent on them.

We referred on Monday to the Immigration Minister, Robert Jenrick, announcing on 8 June that the differentiation policy, which under last year’s Act decides whether someone is a group 1 or group 2 refugee, would be paused, and that those previously given group 2 status would have their entitlements increased. However, the announcement says only that the policy will be paused. The power to differentiate will still be on the statute book. Can the Minister explain exactly where that leaves us, and the Government’s intention on how to go forward on this? Will they bring forward an amendment to the Nationality and Borders Act to delete group 2 refugees?

This Bill does not deal directly with refugee family reunion, and my amendment is designed to fill that hole. However, the Bill would dramatically reduce the number of people eligible for this route, as we have discussed, because it makes asylum applications from people who travel irregularly permanently inadmissible. They would never be granted protection status and would therefore never be able to sponsor family members. I propose expanding the Immigration Rules to allow refugee children to sponsor parents and siblings, refugees to sponsor their dependent parents, and Afghans settled via pathways 1 and 3 of the ACRS to be able to act as sponsors for the purposes of refugee family reunion.

I am afraid to say that research from the Refugee Council and Oxfam has found evidence of refugees turning to smugglers after realising that there were no legal routes available to bring their loved ones to join them. A lack of access to family reunification does appear to be a key driver of dangerous journeys. As many as half of those seeking to cross the channel from northern France have family links to the UK.

Finally, our Justice and Home Affairs Committee, chaired by my noble friend Lady Hamwee, published a report in February called All Families Matter: An Inquiry into Family Migration. One of its recommendations was:

“The Government should harmonise which relatives are, or are not, eligible for entry and stay across”


various

“immigration pathways and the Government should be transparent about the reasons for any differences”,

because there is variation in the definition of a family.

I am afraid that the Government’s response had me rather puzzled; it appears to be a bit circular. They say:

“We do not think it is … right … to fully harmonise the conditions … There are clear differences between immigration routes relating to family members. Given the broad and diverse offer for family members across the immigration system, it is right that requirements vary according to the nature and purpose of their stay in the UK”.


I felt that that was a bit circular or tautological—I am not sure which is the right description. They say that, because it varies at the moment, it is right that we carry on with the variations. I do not think that any reasons or explanation were given; it was just stating why we go all round the houses.

I urge support for Amendment 129 and suggest that it is an extremely valuable part of the provisions on safe and legal routes; it is a subset, if you like, of everything we are debating this morning. The problem is that the current provisions are far from being sensibly expanded to the benefit of the families—the settled refugees and their families—and our society as a whole. One thing that we often hear from the Conservative Party is that it is party of the family. Many of us would dispute that; but if it is, it should support not only the maintenance but the expansion of refugee family reunion, which is currently going in the wrong direction.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I have added my name to Amendments 130 and 131, but I speak in support of all the amendments in this group.

There have been some very good and persuasive speeches, but I refer particularly—and I am sure that others will understand why—to the speech made by the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope. Why? For more than one reason. First, the noble Lord was the Immigration Minister at a time of particular attrition in Bosnia, as he referred to, and he has a great deal of knowledge on that matter. Secondly, he has had the courage to make his speech from the Conservative Back Benches in your Lordships’ House, and I particularly look forward to the Minister dealing, line by line as it were, with every point made by the noble Lord.

Thirdly, my belief is that, somehow or other, the Bill is a visceral part of the attempt to win votes beyond the red wall. However, the Government only have to look at the noble Lord’s history to find somebody who has within his blood and bones the red wall: he cut his teeth in the north-east of England; he represented part of another great city in the north-east of England; and he represented his party in Europe, on behalf of areas beyond the red wall. So, if the Government are listening to those whom they are aspiring to gain votes from, perhaps he, above all, is the person they should be listening to at the moment. I hope he will forgive me, because praise from me may not be altogether familiar or welcome.

I hope that everybody in this House wants to stop the boats. My question is: do we want to stop the boats by means within international law and treaties, or by means that are in breach of those international laws and treaties that we have signed? As I pointed out in a debate I think the day before yesterday—although it might just have been early yesterday—the Home Office website, at least when I was speaking very early yesterday morning, still had on its immigration pages inferences that we have to obey international law on immigration and asylum.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 14th June 2023 Lords Chamber

That is the tension in tone and competence in these various departments that I wanted to highlight in Amendment 139. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 139 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. I have put my name to Amendments 134 and 135 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and I will leave it to him to speak to them if he wishes to do so at any length. I support these amendments to ensure that we have accountability and review, and I do so on a probing basis.

I think the Minister who will reply to this debate, the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, has been in the Chamber when the noble Lord, Lord Murray of Blidworth, has been subjected to a considerable amount of attrition on the Bill—which he has treated with commendable control and self-restraint. Few have been provoked as much as he has in this Chamber in recent years. That said, I think the noble Lord, Lord Murray, would confirm in his private conversations with the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, that there is real concern in your Lordships’ House and in certain well-informed sectors in the country about the consequences of the Bill.

In the recent past we have had reviews—I and my noble friend Lord Anderson have been part of this in relation to terrorism—which have reported to Parliament in relation to controversial pieces of legislation that cause great concern, particularly to Members of the other place. I understand that, having been one. I simply ask the Government to take into account that such reviews are necessary in some form and to provide for accountability and review of the consequences of the Bill, if it becomes an Act of Parliament.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

My Lords, I disagree with the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. She made her case for transferring this responsibility from the Home Office to the Foreign Office on grounds of efficiency and good administration. In my totally unbiased view, it is of course the case that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office is a model of efficiency and good administration. But on practical grounds, I really do not agree with this.

There is a Foreign Office role. The role of the treaty section is monitoring, ratification procedures and quality control over the treaties that we sign. There is a role for legal advisers, referred to by the noble Baroness, monitoring the Government’s respect for their treaty obligations and, if necessary, reminding other departments of the obligations that we have taken on.

There could be a role for our posts abroad. I strongly support the proposal in Amendment 130 for the safe passage visa. It would be very good if our posts abroad were allowed, say, to filter out applications that are clearly not unfounded and to assist applicants with the electronic application system. That would be very good, but the trend in the Home Office, which the noble Baroness in my view correctly described, to move more and more to being a department of the interior, with a bit of homeland security, would be increased if responsibility for carrying out our treaty obligations in respect of asylum seekers were transferred to another department.

Moreover, the Foreign Office really is not equipped to take on the enhanced teams required to deal with 178,000 applicants in the asylum queue. So, although I understand the noble Baroness’s motives and applaud her praise for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, I am against this proposal.

--- Later in debate ---

I hope the Government may be able to look at the potential economic argument. Not allowing these people to work is, for a Conservative Government, very odd.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, at an earlier stage in our debates on the Bill, I referred to the fact that I am a member of the Woolf Institute’s Commission on the Integration of Refugees, which is declared in the register of interests.

I and some other Members of both Houses of Parliament have had the advantage of going to a number of meetings where those with lived experience of applying for asylum and achieving it have told us about their experience. Unanimously, they say that being unable to work while there has been work obviously available for them has been the most dispiriting experience. It is the thing that has driven them—most of them young people with considerable skills, and some with professional and technological qualifications—near to total despair. It seems entirely unreasonable that they should not be able to work when, as my noble friend has said, there is clearly work available and the pull factor has been shown to be non-existent.

The other thing that people with lived experience have mentioned is the lack of availability of higher education in particular in some areas. I invite Ministers to take account of that issue too.

[The Lord Bishop of Durham]

My Lords, I support Amendment 133 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford. My right reverend friend the Bishop of Chelmsford has added her name to it. She regrets that she cannot be here today; she is actually working with the Woolf Institute’s independent commission on refugee integration. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and other noble Lords who have eloquently made the case for the amendment already.

As it stands, the Bill makes the case for a right to work for some asylum seekers more important than ever. Of course, it is a theme that has come up already. There is little prospect of potential removals being able to keep pace with the large population of asylum seekers who will be deemed inadmissible in the future, and currently we have a huge backlog. We risk the creation of a permanent underclass. Apart from the deleterious effects, that drives some of those people into the grey and black economies because they are not allowed to work openly.

In principle, there may be a grain of evidence on the pull factors but not very much at all, as has been noted already. Allowing a subset of asylum seekers to work does not undermine the duty on the Secretary of State to remove people or open up any path to citizenship or leave to remain. If the Government are able to deliver on their own timelines for processing people and deeming that they are refugees, or should be removed, not a single person will ever attain the right to work under the amendment. We ought to consider the amendment as nothing more than a failsafe aimed only at those who have been here far too long without the ability to support themselves easily and who wish to work and contribute to their own welfare, that of their local community and sometimes that of their family, back in the land they have come from, who are sometimes in semi-hiding.

I think of a friend of mine—I will share a bit of the story, but I do not want to identify them in any way—who has been given the right to work because their claim was not dealt with within 12 months. Because of the inefficiency of the system, it took nearly 12 months after that for them to be told they had the right to work. They are now working in the care sector, way below the level of qualifications and experience they have in their life; they could potentially offer huge amounts to this country. They fled because of persecution. What do they do with most of their money? They pay tax and so on, but they send most of it back to the home country to support their family who are in semi-hiding. It enables their dignity to feel able to support their family, as well as taking part in the life of the community and feeling they are contributing to a country that, they still hope, will welcome them.

This is entirely in line with Conservative economic arguments. It is in line with everything in the universal credit system about encouraging people into work and supporting themselves. Please, it is time to agree to this.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Stowell of Beeston (Con)]

I cannot, and I am not here to get into a detailed discussion about that. I am simply trying to make this point. Noble Lords are raising the issue of productivity and the economy as a justification for accepting this right now in the Bill. As I said to the Committee earlier, there is some value and legitimacy, in principle, to some of the arguments being made. For instance, I would support the right reverend Prelate’s argument about ensuring that people who come to this country and are waiting for their application to be processed are able to make their contribution. However, we need to get to a position where the current rate of asylum seekers in the system is not that with which we are currently dealing.

Some noble Lords are arguing to be able to do both at the same time. Of course, I absolutely agree that the Home Office must be much better than it currently is at processing these things. I am not disagreeing with any of this. Unlike those noble Lords, however, I am saying that, for that kind of change to be accepted by the country at large, we have to take steps to get there. If you look at the bigger issue of immigration, part of what we are trying to do is to create a system that is acceptable and works for the country as a whole, and that everybody can have confidence in, so that they can feel much more in line with what the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, would like everyone to feel and believe regarding the changes she wishes to see. We cannot do it all at the same time.

That is what I am trying to do. I am not trying to argue about pull or push factors; just that the Bill is about an immediate issue that the Government are rightly trying to respond to—

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords—

[Baroness Stowell of Beeston (Con)]

I will finish my point and then I will give way. I think that some of the matters that noble Lords are advancing should not be dealt with at this time. I give way to the noble Lord.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

I am extremely grateful to the noble Baroness for giving way. I wonder whether she will answer the next question with a yes or no, because I am confused by some of the things I have heard from her. If a job is available and an asylum seeker is the only person available who can realistically fill it, does she agree that, after three months or so, the asylum seeker should be allowed to take that job?

[Baroness Stowell of Beeston (Con)]

At the moment, if somebody is still awaiting a decision on their asylum status or their status as a citizen or resident of the country, they are not eligible for employment—no.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords—

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

Surely noble Lords can speak only if they have been present throughout the debate from the very beginning.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

The noble Lord is absolutely right—that is correct.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

The noble Lord may be referring to my having to rush out urgently—I needed to get a glass of water. I shall catch up with the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, which I missed with great regret, but I was back for the next one.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

I do not want to be unkind, but the rest of us manage to persuade the door- keepers to bring us glasses of water.

[Baroness Stowell of Beeston (Con)]

May I? Forgive me, I am normally somebody who is a stickler for us keeping to the Companion—absolutely, for sure. However, if the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, can contribute to this debate having not even been here at the beginning, when my noble friend was here at the beginning and nipped out to get a glass of water, I think we can hear from my noble friend. If the noble Lord is minded to object, I would hope he would have objected to his noble colleague speaking.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I am sorry if the noble Baroness misunderstood my first comment. It was in response to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I hope that the noble Baroness will not mind my using her as an excuse but, on reflection, I think that I was unkind to the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, and I wish to apologise to the House.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, shall I move on to Amendment 150? In fact, it takes us back to the previous group; I have no idea why it comes into this group. It would provide that the Act should not come into force until at least 28 days—I propose—after the Secretary of State has published a statement confirming the number of persons who, for a period of six months or more, have been awaiting final determination of their claim for asylum; and that, for not less than six months, that number has been not more than 20,000.

That may be a little circular and rambling but, basically, it proposes that we should get to a steady state in dealing with asylum applications. The periods may not be ones that noble Lords agree with, but I propose a figure of 20,000 people, which is not a negligible number of people. This amendment seeks to be realistic and provide a bit of—to our minds—common sense to the context of what we are debating.

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger, and my noble friend Lord Paddick—who probably had no option but to sign it. This is a serious amendment that follows on from the serious points made about the operations of the Home Office. It is the backlog that is the problem. So much of this debate has suggested, implicitly or explicitly, that the position that we are in is somehow the fault of those who are seeking asylum, which is not an easy thing to take on.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 28th June 2023 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

6: Clause 2, page 3, line 26, leave out “7 March 2023” and insert “the date on which this section comes into force”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment ensures the duty to deport in Clause 2 does not apply retrospectively to those who entered or arrived in the United Kingdom before the Bill comes into force.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, five of the amendments in this group have my name and the names of noble and noble and learned friends on them. They are designed to remove retrospectivity in relation to the duty to deport. I, and certainly two of my noble friends, have had the advantage of a meeting with the Attorney-General and officials in recent days to discuss this, and I hope I am not being too optimistic in hoping that we will hear something at least partly welcome from the Minister at the end of this debate. I shall be very disappointed if that does not happen.

Retrospectivity is the enemy of legal certainty. Legal certainty is a basic tenet of common law and of our statutory law. In order to save time, I am not going to cite various very eminent judges who have spoken on this subject. I will simply give the names of Lord Bingham, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, and the great public lawyer the late Sir John Laws. I remind your Lordships that the House of Lords Constitution Committee has emphasised that retrospective legislation should be passed in very exceptional circumstances only. The proof of very exceptional circumstances should require more than mere assertion: it should require clear evidence. The fact that the retrospectivity asked for, as in this situation, may affect a relatively small cohort of people is no mitigation for the wrong of unnecessary retrospectivity.

The Government are not offering evidence. They are offering a refrain, and the refrain is: “Stop the boats”. But they have failed to offer any convincing evidence at all as to how the present circumstances are so exceptional as to justify the Bill’s wide-ranging retrospective powers. This is wholly unacceptable, given that the proposals represent a widespread retroactive overhaul of our asylum law, founded simply on a deterrent effect—“Stop the boats”—which is unproved.

Again, for the purposes of brevity, I will not deliver the whole speech I would have wished to—and will break the habits of a lifetime thereby. But I remind your Lordships that the deterrent effect is hardly borne out by the Government’s own figures for migrants detected crossing the channel in June 2023, the very month we are in. I was surprised they did not appear in the impact statement, because they were available before it. According to those figures, up to that point, 3,506 migrants were detected crossing the channel in June this year, compared with 3,139 in June last year—some 400 more, and 1,500 more than in June 2021. If one looks at the figures for April, May and June 2023 together, the evidence that this retrospective element is stopping the boats is a fairy tale, but one of those nasty fairy tales that keeps the victims of it awake at night because of the uncertainty of what will happen to them.

Furthermore, the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 addressed the same public policy issue and was not retrospective. As Dame Priti Patel MP, the then Home Secretary, said in the Second Reading debate on that legislation, the intention was that:

“Anyone who arrives in the UK via a safe third country may have their claim declined and be returned to a country they arrived from or a third safe country”. [Official Report, Commons, 19/7/21; col. 717.]


In other words, the policy intention was the same, but although there was a little bit of retrospectivity in that legislation, the vast majority of its provisions were not retrospective.

At the conclusion of Committee on this Bill, the Minister admitted that announcing that it applied from 7 March 2023

“may not have had a decisive impact”. [Official Report, 24/5/23; col. 967.]

Well, the evidence suggests that it has not had a decisive effect at all. At best it is equivocal, which cannot be a basis for proper retrospectivity. The evidence does not justify such broad and sweeping legislation, which seeks to apply penalties to those who cross the channel to claim asylum, being retrospective in its entirety. It would set a dangerous precedent whereby the Government could legislate retrospectively, based on no more than conjecture and anecdote.

I respectfully suggest, even at this stage of the Bill, that a dangerous precedent is being set, that we should be deadly serious about the fact that we are dealing with the law and with sound and historic legal practice, and that this is not a situation in which the case for retrospectivity is anywhere near made out.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, as the noble Lord has said, brevity does not mean half-heartedness today and these Benches whole-heartedly support the noble Lord’s amendments to which my name has been added. It is not only an academic, philosophical, juris- prudential matter; retrospectivity applied to this Bill will be cited as a precedent for the future and would have an impact in the real world for individuals.

As we have heard, the Nationality and Borders Act is not retrospective. Indeed, the two classes of asylum seekers for which it provided have not even been brought into effect. Ironically, the situation and the figures that have been cited have supported our points that it will not have the deterrent effect that has been claimed. It is a very thin claim. The weather in the case of the channel crossings, and TikTok’s policy in the case of Albania, did have an effect. That puts all of us in our place.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

As the noble Lord will recall, during our exchange I made clear that not all of those 16 agreements are in the public domain, so I am not going to provide him with the list he seeks.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I am very disappointed at the Minister’s response, for two reasons. First, despite being asked to produce evidence to show that retrospectivity has some factual basis for its inclusion, he has failed to answer that challenge, and he must have done so deliberately. I am afraid that leads me to be very suspicious about whether there is any such evidence whatever of a credible nature.

The second reason I am very disappointed in the Minister is that he knows perfectly well that it would be open to him to suggest a date other than the date of the commencement of the Act: for example, the day when this Bill does pass, which could be within days, or even today. That would, of course, be an element of retrospectivity, but it would be a considerable mitigation of what is provided in the Bill.

Given that discussions have taken place on these issues, I am very surprised that he has simply remained his intransigent self on this issue. The notion that a glut of small boats will be crossing the channel if the period between March and, say, now is not the subject of retrospectivity, is, frankly, absurd, ridiculous and completely lacking in any kind of credibility. I ask him to think about that; I am perfectly prepared not to press the amendment if he stands up and says he is prepared to consider that issue seriously and enter into discussions with other Ministers. Otherwise, I will test the opinion of the House.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Griffiths, told us during the last vote about the views of all the members of the Council of Europe and specifically mentioned Hungary questioning what the UK is doing—Hungary.

My name is on the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, on behalf of everyone on these Benches. The survivors of modern slavery should be protected and supported, not just because it is the right thing to do and the UK was lauded for it but to help the prosecution of criminals, of which we hear very little. The Bill indicates the extent to which the Government fail to put themselves in the shoes of victims and survivors, including those who have been trafficked here—who therefore have not come under their own steam—and particularly regarding the need for survivors to be in the UK to assist prosecutions. I could go on, but I will not.

The noble Lord, Lord Alton, is right that we need an independent anti-slavery commissioner in post. How long has it been—a year and how many months? A considerable number of criteria should be assessed, but we are where we are. We maintain our opposition to how slavery and trafficking are dealt with. I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, on his filleting of the Bill. We will be with him.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, my name is on Amendment 96, along with those of my noble and learned friend Lady Butler-Sloss, who spoke earlier and with whom I agree, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. It attempts to remove Clause 21(5) and (6). Those subsections mean that a person will be removed from this country unless it is “necessary” and there are “compelling circumstances” to show that it is necessary for the person to be present in this country for the dreadful crimes that we are talking about to be prosecuted. Was the Director of Public Prosecutions asked about the effect of this provision on the likely success of prosecutions? If this clause required it to be advisable for the person to be present for the purposes of the investigation and prosecution, I would be in favour of it, but it goes much further than that and is contrary to all good prosecution practice.

I confess that I have met a lot of organised criminals in my time—as a barrister. I have also met an awful lot of victims in my time, as a barrister and occasionally as a Member of this House and the other place. It is not a level playing field. If the Crown Prosecution Service were asked what was advisable, like anybody who has ever prosecuted a semi-serious case and done cases where some witnesses were abroad, as I have, it would say that it is always advisable to have the witness in court, on a local screen or interviewed in a statutory way if at all possible, not to have them on the other side of the globe somewhere—they are unlikely to turn up and will be intimidated by the process.

Let me briefly compare the criminal we are talking about with the victim. The criminal is familiar with the legal system. He—it is usually a he—is often charming. He is often wealthy and can hire lawyers who may even be Members of your Lordships’ House. He is malign, lethal and cocky in the face of the legal system. Those are the characteristics of serious organised criminals. As for the victim, what is she going to be like? She will be frightened. She is likely to be poor. She will be vulnerable and terrified of the legal system and, to use an Orwellian word, will feel like an “unperson”. Do we really want that?

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

My Lords, throughout the passage of the Bill here and in the other place, many people have raised serious concerns about it, and about its impact on victims of modern slavery. I fear sounding like a broken record, but I said at Second Reading and in Committee that the Bill should exclude those who are subject to abuse through the heinous crime of modern slavery. I echo the words of the former Prime Minister, Theresa May. When discussing the Bill in the other place, she said that it has always been important to separate modern slavery from immigration status. My position remains unchanged.

I would prefer that modern slavery was out of this Bill entirely. For that reason, I shall support the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. They get right to the heart of the matter as they seek to amend the Bill to ensure that potential and recognised victims of human trafficking will not be detained or removed before they can apply to the NRM and have their application considered. In the spirit of those amendments, I have tabled Amendments 102A and 105A to remove Clauses 23 and 24 respectively.

In Committee, the Minister tried to reassure us that the agreement with Rwanda covers ensuring that

“any special needs that may arise as a result of a relocated person being a victim of modern slavery are accommodated”.—[Official Report, 12/6/23; col. 1704.]

The impact assessment published on Monday was more tentative, saying there could be

“a perceived welfare loss for the individuals relocated to a third country who would otherwise be granted support in the UK although this may be mitigated to the extent that the support provided in a third country is comparable”.

This is classic British understatement. We all know that there will be loss of support. The Salvation Army has described the Bill as “potentially devastating”. The US State Department’s 2023 Trafficking in Persons Report, published since Committee, lists Rwanda as a tier 2 country, whereas the UK is a tier 1 country, and said that Rwanda did not refer any victims to services. So, I am far from reassured.

The impact assessment says that one of the strategic objectives of the Bill is “to protect the vulnerable”, but it is proposing mass detention of modern slavery victims under Clause 10 and removing their rights, under the European Convention on Human Rights and the Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings, to a recovery period and support. I find myself in agreement once more with the former Prime Minister Theresa May, who described the Bill as

“a slap in the face for those of us who actually care about the victims of modern slavery”. —[Official Report, Commons, 26/4/23; col. 808.]

The Government are arguing that this is a Bill of short-term pain for long-term gain. For victims, it will be short-term and long-term pain. The JCHR’s Legislative Scrutiny: Illegal Migration Bill concluded that the Bill not only breaches international obligations but

“may also result in the increase in trafficking and slavery”.

With this in mind, I find myself extremely disappointed that an analysis of the potential number of victims affected by the Bill was not covered in the impact assessment. Particularly at such a late stage in the passage of such significant, flagship legislation, it is troubling that we do not have to hand the most basic information in order to make reasonable determinations, based on the evidence, about the efficacy of the Government’s proposals.

As I said in the previous debate in this House, as someone who introduced a Bill in the Northern Ireland Assembly to reduce trafficking and slavery, I cannot support the inclusion of modern slavery victims in this Bill, so I shall be supporting the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt.

However, your Lordships are wise enough to take a belt-and-braces approach to this Bill, so I am also supporting the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Randall. They would mitigate some of the concerns about the lack of support by ensuring that victims of modern slavery exploited in the UK will still be able to access the support they need to recover. Why? It is simply the right thing to do.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

The NRM process requires the gathering of evidence and input from the party, so it is not down entirely to Home Office resourcing issues.

The appointment of the new Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner is at an advanced stage, and I am sure that once appointed they will want to monitor closely the impact of these provisions.

In relation to my noble friend’s amendments, I repeat the assurance that my right honourable friend the Immigration Minister made in the other place: namely that we will consider additional protections through statutory guidance for those who have experienced exploitation in the United Kingdom. We are continuing to develop such guidance and in doing so will adopt an appropriate balance between protecting victims of modern slavery and delivering the intent of this Bill.

As regards Amendment 103, the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, quite properly raises the issue of how the modern slavery provisions in the Bill sit with the continued operation of the relevant EU directives in Northern Ireland. As I have said in earlier debates in Committee, the provisions in the Bill are compatible with the Windsor Framework. In particular, in the context of this amendment we do not consider that the 2011 anti-trafficking directive falls within the scope of Article 2 of the Windsor Framework.

Amendments 96, 102 and 105, tabled respectively by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, the noble Baroness, Lady Bryan, and the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, relate to the presumption that it is not necessary for a person to remain in the United Kingdom to co-operate with an investigation. As I outlined to the Committee, remote participation is now the norm in the workplace, and the criminal justice system is no different. It is simply no longer the case that a victim of crime needs to be in face-to-face contact with the police or others to assist with an investigation. In some cases, victims may even feel safer providing virtual or video-recorded evidence. I assure noble Lords that we are working to ensure that the relevant technology, interpreters and intermediaries are available where needed.

We have provided for statutory guidance to support decision-making by caseworkers when determining if there are compelling circumstances why the presumption should be set aside in a particular case, but there is no evidence as to why, in the majority of cases, such co-operation cannot continue by email, messaging and video conferencing. The presumption in Clauses 21(5), 23(5) and 24(5) is therefore perfectly proper and should be retained.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I would be really grateful if the Minister could answer the question I asked him as to whether the Director of Public Prosecutions had been consulted about the effect on modern slavery and trafficking cases if the victim was not merely in another studio in another building in London or Manchester but in a country thousands of miles away, with no facilities to encourage or even compel them to give evidence.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I do not know whether the DPP has been consulted on that point but I will certainly find out and write to the noble Lord.

Amendment 112, put forward by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, would prevent the public order disqualification provided for in the 2022 Act being applied to a person whose positive reasonable grounds decision was based on exploitation which had occurred before they were 18. It is, in our view, entirely appropriate for the public order disqualification provided for in that Act to be capable of applying to all relevant individuals, including those exploited as children. In this regard, it is important to note that the public order disqualification in the 2022 Act applies only to specified persons, such as those who have been convicted of a serious criminal offence. In such cases, the age at which the exploitation took place is, I submit, irrelevant to the threat to public order an individual now poses, and we cannot tie our hands on this matter on the basis of the time at which exploitation took place.

The modern slavery measures in the Bill, alongside the others, are intended to deal with the immediate and pressing public risk arising from the exceptional circumstances relating to illegal entry into the UK. We need to take bold action and now. This Bill will not achieve its objective if removals are put on hold for over 500 days awaiting a conclusive grounds decision. As I indicated at the start, these amendments will quite simply wreck the Bill. I hope therefore that the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, will be content to withdraw his Amendment 12. If he is not, I invite the House to reject it.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

17: Clause 4, page 6, line 37, leave out from first “claim” to end of line 40 and insert “are only to claims made on or after the date on which this section comes into force.”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment ensures that protection or human rights claims made before the Bill comes into force cannot be declared inadmissible under the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

22: Clause 5, page 8, line 31, leave out from first “claim” to end of line 34 and insert “are only to claims made on or after the date on which this section comes into force.”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment ensures that the removal provisions in Clause 5 only apply to those who make protection or human rights claims after the Bill comes into force.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 3rd July 2023 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

66: Clause 11, page 18, line 2, at beginning insert—
“17A(A1) This paragraph is subject to section 11(7) of the Illegal Migration Act 2023.”Member’s explanatory statement
This relates to the amendment in the name of Lord Carlile of Berriew to Clause 11, page 21, line 15.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 66 to 76, which stand in my name, and in support of Amendments 77 to 79. The substance of my amendments is in Amendment 76. What I apprehend will happen, if the matter is brought to the opinion of the House, is that we will vote on Amendment 66 and, if it is carried, Amendments 67 to 76 will be moved formally. That seems the correct procedure to me; I have not been contradicted in that.

The amendments I have tabled are designed to confirm that the lawfulness of immigration detention is not simply put in the hands of Ministers but remains subject to the principles established in common law. All the amendments in this group would reinstate the existing Hardial Singh principles and be consistent with the conclusion and recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights at paragraph 202 of its report. What did it say? It said:

“The common law approach to immigration detention, established in the case of Hardial Singh, currently operates to ensure that immigration detention complies with Article 5 ECHR”.


Before we possibly hear criticism from some quarters of the House about the use of the European Convention on Human Rights, I remind your Lordships, as a parenthesis, that it has recently been cited by the Government in support of their case in the High Court. They cannot have it both ways; they have had it the way of wanting to support the convention in court. The Joint Committee goes on:

“This recognises that it must be for the courts to determine the legal boundaries of administrative detention … We are extremely concerned that this change would result in an immigration detention system that is not consistent with Article 5 ECHR. The Bill should be amended to ensure that there is independent, judicial oversight of individual liberty and compliance with Article 5”.


What are the Hardial Singh principles? Before I come to them, I will cite a dictum from my noble friend Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, who—very sadly for the rest of us on this side of the House—retired recently. In 2012, in the case of Lumba v Secretary of State for the Home Department in what was then the House of Lords, rather than the Supreme Court, he stated:

“Freedom from executive detention is arguably the most fundamental right of all”.


That has been adopted, repeated and uncontradicted.

The four limbs of Hardial Singh, which were created by my noble and learned friend Lord Woolf in his judgment in that case, have been identified and described in more detail by Lord Dyson as four propositions governing the legality of Immigration Act detention emerging from Hardial Singh:

“i) The Secretary of State must intend to deport the person and can only use the power to detain for that purpose;


ii) The deportee may only be detained for a period that is reasonable in all the circumstances;


iii) If, before the expiry of the reasonable period, it becomes apparent that the Secretary of State will not be able to effect deportation within that reasonable period, he should not seek to exercise the power of detention;


iv) The Secretary of State should act with … reasonable diligence and expedition”.


Those are magnificent principles, created after repeated cases following our common-law tradition of creating sound precedent when there is not statutory law in place that is lawful.

The court makes its own judgment when applying the Hardial Singh principles and is not limited to reviewing the jurisdiction that has been exercised by a Secretary of State. It can examine “incidental questions of fact”, some of which

“the court may recognise that the Home Secretary is better placed to decide than itself, and the court will no doubt take such account of the Home Secretary’s views as may seem proper”.

Those are the words of Lord Justice Toulson in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department in 2007.

That is the legal basis for these amendments. I will now leave the world of reality and the law and take a short trip into cloud-cuckoo-land. If any of your Lordships wishes to have a quick cup of tea, they can hear a shorter version of this by simply going into iPlayer and listening to last weekend’s edition of “Dead Ringers” on Radio 4, which tore this Bill to pieces in about 35 seconds. We keep hearing from the Minister something that is not based on reality. He seems to have forgotten that the Government lost a case in the Court of Appeal last week. We hear their plea in mitigation that it was a 2:1 decision, but every day in this House we have majority and minority votes. Verdicts of juries by 11 to one or 10 to two are no less verdicts of juries than verdicts by 12 to zero, so that argument has no power whatever.

Above all, we in this House are entitled to expect the Government to obey the law. They cannot send anyone to Rwanda; it is unlawful. The Court of Appeal found that the risk of unlawful refoulement from Rwanda meant that the Rwanda scheme was unsustainable. Furthermore, when the statistics for June—which I mentioned in the House last week—were recalculated yesterday, they showed that the number of people coming on small boats has reached record levels. So it is not exactly the deterrent that the Minister has been calling for repeatedly, unless they are going to change their approach and say, “Come to Britain in your small boats; it’s the quickest way of getting to Rwanda and to the two-star hotel accommodation that is being supplied there”.

We are not in a realistic situation, because they can send nobody to Rwanda at the moment. The appeal to the Supreme Court will not be heard and adjudged upon before October at the earliest. We will probably be into the next Session of Parliament. It is a little bit of an insult to this Parliament that the Government have not obeyed the law as found in that case, withdrawn this Bill and said, “We’ll start again when we have a decision from the Supreme Court”.

We have to be careful that we are the antidote to oblique motives. There are oblique motives based on the assumption, and not on any good grounds, that the Government will be able to send people to Rwanda—maybe they will, maybe they will not, but at the moment they have lost. My request and submission to your Lordships is that the only decent thing this House can do—Members on all sides, and I hope that the lawyers will not contradict this—is support the Hardial Singh principles and back Amendments 66 to 79.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My noble friend is right, in that it is one of the Hardial Singh principles that, if there is no reasonable prospect of removal, that person should not be detained. But I cannot agree with him that the policy of deterrence is not right, because it is clearly the Government’s intention to remove any illegal entrants to a safe third country. In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, I add that the Court of Appeal unanimously agreed with that being lawful as a matter of principle.

We recognise that circumstances can change. Where that is the case, detention must be reviewed. If it is considered that the anticipated period of detention is not reasonably necessary, the individual will be bailed. This reflects the existing legal and policy position on the use of detention.

It remains the Government’s view that the provisions in Clause 11 provide an appropriate balance between the respective roles of the Home Secretary and the courts. Accordingly, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I express my gratitude to the noble Viscount and others who have spoken on the Bill, including the noble Lord, Lord German. I now come to this place for my daily dose of disappointment. It seems to me that the Minister is deliberately missing the point. He cannot be failing to see it, and I very much regret having to say that.

Who do noble Lords trust to make these decisions: a Minister or the courts? I will tell them something about the latter, in case they have never seen any of these cases in court. Judges sit day after day in the Administrative Court, hearing case after case involving asylum and refugees, and they make decision after decision about whether a period of detention is too long, too robust or unreasonable in some other way. They have built up a corpus of law which has become reliable and admired not just in this place but throughout our jurisdiction and the common law world.

Make your choice. I am going to test the opinion of the House.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

My Lords, can the noble Lord explain why our courts, and our officials acting under their duties, reach such different decisions from the courts and officials on the continent? Why do we reject only 25% of claims for asylum, whereas France rejects 75%?

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, this is Report and that intervention is not appropriate, I am afraid.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

Whether it is appropriate or not—and I tend to agree with the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, on that subject—it seems to me that the noble Lord who just intervened has made a very selective judgment without analysing the continental cases that have taken place. I have given a fair description of what happens in our jurisdiction; it is the one that I regard well, and I hope that your Lordships will too.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

67: Clause 11, page 19, line 6, after “to” insert “section 11(7) of the Illegal Migration Act 2023,”
Member's explanatory statement
This relates to the amendment in the name of Lord Carlile of Berriew to Clause 11, page 21, line 15.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 3rd July 2023 Lords Chamber

That is where I will end my speech in moving this amendment, which goes to an essential principle of English law: that everyone who comes under the auspices of English law should have the right to have legal representation and advice at the earliest possible opportunity. The Bill does not give them that; this amendment does. I beg to move.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Bach, who moved this amendment with great skill. I am not going to make a long speech in support of him, because he does not need it. My observation, from refugees and asylum seekers whom I have met in a particular role during the last year, is that many complain that the legal advice they were able to obtain locally, wherever they were placed, was often not accurate, and they had to go through a second round of legal advice.

It is essential that people have access to competent, accurate and correct legal advice, or at least legal advice that might be correct, to enable them to challenge the case made against them. Many of the cohort of people we are talking about are numbed by the experience they have had. They did not expect to be treated as they have been by the United Kingdom. Perhaps, as the Government claim, one might argue that there are some good reasons for their being treated in that way, but to deprive them of the most basic legal advice will cause offence not only to lawyers in your Lordships’ House but to many others.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lady Ludford has put her name to the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bach, which he explained very fully, and these Benches support. One often hears that immigration law is too complex for non-lawyers to understand—I have long held the view that it should not be—but, frankly, it is too complex for many lawyers as well. You need to be a specialist, and that is recognised by the system, but one still hears some horror stories.

The realities of legal advice for anyone in detention in the immigration system have long been bleak. There may be advice sessions but they are 30 minutes long, and it takes a long time for the client to be brought to meet the solicitor, which eats into the 30 minutes. Even with the most articulate client, it can take quite a long time to take instructions. I was a practising solicitor for many years and this cohort, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said, consists of individuals whose English may be inadequate. Interpretation is therefore required, which is cumbersome and difficult for everyone. In any event, they have a story that takes support to tell, and that requires a lot in the telling.

Given the relentless speed of the processes under the Bill, this amendment is very necessary. The Government have recognised that legal aid has a place here, given what they have done so far in the Bill and the consultation on the rates. Raising concerns about legal aid became even more relevant with last week’s impact assessment, which drew attention to the problems of accessing legal aid and legal aid services, especially outside London and the south-east. We are very happy to support this amendment.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

3rd reading
Monday 10th July 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I very much echo what the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, has just said. I want to draw attention to the fact that the last-minute publication of the child rights impact assessment, which required the intervention of my noble friend Lord Kennedy of Southwark, meant that we were unable to pay due attention to it during the Bill’s passage—despite children being among the Bill’s main victims. Therefore, I will say a few words now.

The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child makes clear that a child rights impact assessment should be built in

“as early as possible in the development of policy”.

The fact that it arrived so late and reads more like a repetitive post hoc justification of the Bill’s measures than a serious analysis of their implications for the rights and best interests of the child suggests that it was not. Noble Lords from across this House and the Children’s Commissioner have called for the assessment since the Bill’s introduction. The commissioner has now made clear that the assessment “does not allay” her

“concerns about the impact of this Bill on children”.

With particular reference to detention and the use of force, she notes that it

“relies on overly optimistic assumptions about what might come to pass to reach conclusions about the positive effect on children, while ignoring or overlooking the clear, evidenced and tangible negative impacts it will have”.

While the Home Office’s use of the DfE template is welcome, it serves to expose the lack of evidence to support its assessment of the impact on children’s rights and its failure to consult externally. From the perspective of process and outcome this is a travesty of a child rights impact assessment. I hope that we remember that when it comes to the process of ping-pong on amendments affecting children.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

From these Benches, I echo the remarks made by the Minister about our late and lamented noble and learned friend Lord Brown, who is sorely missed and who was often an inspiration to us all, even when we did not entirely agree with him, because he always inspired conceptual thinking.

I thank the Minister—and I do mean this by the way—for his patience while under fire, even though I mostly disagreed with his responses when they came. However, behind and underneath that carapace of patience has been a failure to understand that the Government set out to do something that is neither possible nor legal. We were told that the Bill would stop the boats as a deterrent. However, we know that the boats were fuller than ever in June. We were told that sending asylum seekers and refugees to Rwanda would be a deterrent. However, sending them to Rwanda is illegal—I use the word advisedly—under the laws of this country, at least until the matter has been relitigated in the Supreme Court. In the Minister’s consultations with the Home Secretary, the Government should give serious consideration to pausing this Bill until that hearing has taken place. It seems extraordinary to me, as a long-time parliamentarian in both Houses, for this Parliament to be asked to pass a Bill which requires something unlawful to be done. I have a basic opposition to that.

I will say one other thing. Some of us are already receiving messages from various well-informed members of the media about changes the Government intend to make to this Bill. It would be helpful if we were informed at approximately the same time as the media so that we can make a considered judgment as to what we do during ping-pong and so that we can carry out the role which, I believe, we have performed effectively hitherto.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments
Wednesday 12th July 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, with the leave of the House, I will speak also to Motions F and G.

Motion B deals with the retrospective application of the duty to make arrangements for removal. We have reflected on the arguments put forward on this issue by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, on Report. We have brought forward Amendments 22A and 22Q in lieu. Noble Lords will recall that the Lords amendments sought to move the operative date of the Clause 2 duty from 7 March this year to the date of that clause’s commencement. We believe that such a change carries a significant risk of there being a surge in channel crossings—a fire sale, if you will—as we approach the commencement date. To guard against this, the amendments in lieu instead provide for the duty to remove to apply to a person who enters the United Kingdom unlawfully from the date of this Bill’s Royal Assent.

We will keep this under review ahead of the Bill’s implementation, as we have included a reserve power to change the new operative date by regulations. This could, for example, enable us to focus the initial implementation of the Bill on those who arrived here illegally via small boats rather than by other means. I should stress that the 7 March date will continue to apply for the purpose of the power conferred on the Secretary of State to provide accommodation for unaccompanied children and for the purpose of the ban on re-entry, settlement and citizenship. I trust that this compromise approach will meet with the approval of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile.

Motion F relates to Lords Amendment 9, moved on Report by the noble Lord, Lord German. This relates to the issue of the inadmissibility of asylum and human rights claims within the UK system. It remains the Government’s contention that declaring such claims to be admissible is a core part of the scheme provided for in the Bill. The Court of Appeal unanimously confirmed that removing asylum seekers to a safe country for their asylum claims to be processed is entirely consistent with the refugee convention, including Article 31—a point that I mentioned a moment ago. This amendment would simply encourage people to game the system, drawing things out in an attempt to reach a six-month cut-off date. This amendment was rejected by the Commons by a strong majority of 76. Given that, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord German, will be content to agree to Motion F.

Finally, Motion G relates to Lords Amendment 23, put forward by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton. The United Kingdom is a stout defender of LGBT communities across the globe. Our commitment to this cause remains unwavering. So, although I understand and sympathise with the noble and learned Lord’s desire to protect LGBT people who would face persecution were they to be sent to one of the countries listed in the amendment, I remain strongly of the view that the amendment is unnecessary as the Bill already delivers the protections that he seeks.

We are committed to the principle of non-refoulement, as a Jamaican national who makes a protection claim will not be returned to Jamaica. Were they to be fearful of being at real risk of suffering serious and irreversible harm, and were they to be removed to a specified third country, they would be able to make a serious harm suspensive claim. As I have previously indicated, in considering such a claim, the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of HJ (Iran) would be applied such that if the open expression of a person’s sexual orientation would prevent them from living in the specified third country without being at real risk of serious and irreversible harm, they would meet the threshold for a serious harm suspensive claim.

I hope the noble and learned Lord has been able to reflect on my assurances and on the outcome of the vote yesterday in the other place, and that he now feels able to support Motion G. I beg to move.

Motion B1 (as an amendment to Motion B)

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

Moved by

At end insert “, and do propose Amendment 22R as an amendment to Amendment 22B—

22R: After subsection (1) insert—“(1A) Regulations under subsection (1) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.””

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I hope I will be allowed a moment when referring to my Motion B1 and Amendment 22R on page 5 of the Marshalled List to pay a very short tribute to the staff of the Public Bill Office. I was treated very kindly by a very tolerant member of staff there when I was being completely dysfunctional late last night and early this morning. They have been put under enormous pressure, and I think we should appreciate that. It may have felt to them like bullying, I am afraid.

I do not know why we have been forced to consider these amendments today, or indeed before the Summer Recess. The very earliest this Bill could ever be used would be after the Supreme Court decision in October, or whenever that is given; we do not know the exact date. Indeed, that may not be the end of the litigation in any event. I do not understand why we were not left to consider this in the sittings in September. I hope we will not be put in this position again.

I now turn to my Motion. This is where I express my genuine gratitude to the Government—to the Minister and others, including the Chief Whip—because they have made, in my view, a correct and noble concession to the objections that this House voted for in an amendment I moved on retrospectivity, pointing out as I did at the time that retrospectivity, though not a “never”, is frowned on in our law.

My Motion on page 5 of the Marshalled List—which I will not test the opinion of the House on tonight—mitigates the rigour of the exception that has been created in the Government’s amendments. They say they have abandoned retrospectivity, to put it crudely, but they have retained a regulatory power to abandon retrospectivity. I am not going to force the issue tonight, but I ask the Government to reflect on the constitutionality of that approach, because it makes me feel decidedly uncomfortable. I do not want to dilute my thanks for the acceptance in principle of what I moved a few days ago.

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, I draw attention to my interests as laid out in the register. These Benches are supportive of the discomfiture, which the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, just referred to, to find that eventual clarification. We also support Motion G1 in this group.

My Motion F1 would mean that if an individual has been made inadmissible under this legislation and has not been removed to a safe country after six months, their claim will be processed within the UK system. The Ministers in both Chambers, in response to my amendment at an earlier stage, said—it has been repeated here—that people might game the system or that it would incentivise people to make spurious claims so as to extend their time in the United Kingdom in order to reach the magic six months.

In response to this concern, the current form of Motion F1 would pause the calculation of six months during any suspensive claim as set out in the Bill. It is also important to be mindful that the Bill in itself is claimed by Ministers to prevent people from making last-minute legal challenges to stop removals. My Motion totally disincentivises people from making spurious claims.

The Minister in the other place said that my earlier amendment would undermine the Bill. It does not. It would simply provide a backstop that protects the taxpayers of this country from indefinitely supporting people existing in the UK in limbo.

The Government’s own impact assessment on the Bill assumes that people will be detained for 40 days before removal. In this Chamber, we have heard constantly from the Minister that it will be not months but weeks or days when people are removed. On that basis, the ability to make a claim after six months should not be a problem, because it is totally in line with the Government’s expectations of their very own Bill.

Without this amendment, the Home Secretary is setting herself up for an extremely challenging time. There will be no way of resolving the foreseeable challenge of not having anywhere to remove people who arrive in the United Kingdom on irregular routes. Whether that is resolved in the future, the Government express the desire that they will be able to make this happen. If you believe, in the Government’s own words, that the Bill can be “workable”, then it is entirely financially prudent for us in this Chamber to try and insist that, in the current climate, the Government should be prudent with their spending of the public purse in using taxpayers’ money to support people indefinitely and without a returns agreement—because six months will have passed.

In addition to the financial considerations, it does not seem to me to be particularly in line with a Conservative mindset to enforce that people remain in the United Kingdom without being able to contribute, use their skills or participate in society. If these people cannot be removed after a reasonable amount of time, their claim should be processed, so that they either get on with their lives in the United Kingdom or be removed to their country of origin.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, on getting a concession from the Government and understand the point he made with his Motion, which I understand he will not move. I am pleased that it has been accommodated.

The noble Lord, Lord German, explained his amendment extremely well; it provides a backstop for the taxpayer to stop people going into legal limbo, being a burden on the taxpayer indefinitely and getting into the grey area which so many in this situation are in right now. As he said, it is totally in line with the Government’s expectations of the Bill, so if the noble Lord chooses to press his Motion F1 then we will support it.

My noble friend Lord Cashman summed up the support for Motion G1, in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton. If he chooses to move it, we will support him. As my noble friend said, it reinforces the principle of protection for LGBT people. In the words of the noble and learned Lord, Schedule 1 should not provide a veneer of respectability to certain countries that are currently on it, so we would support him.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, as I indicated earlier, I ask the Government to consider leaving to Parliament the final decision on any regulations reintroducing retrospectivity. That said, for the reasons I gave earlier, I beg leave to withdraw Motion B1.

Motion B1 withdrawn.