Illegal Migration Bill

Baroness Butler-Sloss Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 7th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I will not repeat what has already been said. I agree with most of what has been said in the preceding speeches, particularly the remarks made by my noble friend Lord Kerr about the inadequacy of Schedule 1, and all the examples that have been given, including those given very clearly by my noble friend Lord Alton, of cases which create real dangers of injustice which are plainly contrary to the international conventions to which this country subscribes. Instead, I want to obtain confirmation from the Minister of some short propositions which relate to Clause 6 of the Bill.

Clause 6 provides that the Secretary of State may amend Schedule 1 in certain circumstances. Can the Minister confirm that if a cogent application is made to the Secretary of State to amend Schedule 1 in particular ways and he refuses, that would immediately open the gate for judicial review proceedings? I foresee a menu of 57 opportunities in Schedule 1 for 57 applications for judicial review—perhaps a few fewer—being made by well-known and well-funded NGOs for amendments to be made to that schedule because of circumstances in those countries.

Further, would not the Secretary of State face considerable obstacles if such judicial review applications were made? First, there is the weakness of the standard of proof that is set by the Government for themselves—“if satisfied”, whatever that means. Secondly, in Clause 6(1)(a), which was referred to earlier, the Secretary of State can add a country or territory if satisfied that

“there is in general in that country or territory, or part, no serious risk of persecution”.

Does that not contradict certain other legal provisions which, for example, provide guarantees of safety to a group of people we discussed earlier this week—the cohort of LGBTQ+ people who might be affected?

Thirdly, Clause 6(1)(b) states:

“removal of persons to that country or territory, or part, pursuant to the duty in section 2(1) will not in general contravene the United Kingdom’s obligations”.

Is that not pathetically weak, and contradictory to other legislation? I again take the LGBTQ+ cohort as my example.

If that analysis of Clause 6(1) and Schedule 1 is not entirely coherent, surely it is enough to persuade the Government that they should really reconsider the drafting of Clause 6 and the contents of Schedule 1. If they insist on keeping Schedule 1, it should, from the start of the Bill coming into effect, reflect all the dangers in all countries in which there are dangers for certain groups of people who could not be described as people “in general”. This is ineffective, and I am sure it will put substantial fees into the hands of my learned friends, but that is not what this place should be trying to do.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I support these amendments and the speeches that were just given. I want to make two points only. First, it is extraordinary to me that Schedule 1 shows a list of countries with which this country has no agreement. I cannot understand how one can put into primary legislation a list of countries with which the Government hope to have an agreement, when that is not yet happening.

Secondly, I spoke earlier, at greater length, about the unaccompanied child who comes to the age of 18. Your Lordships have only to think of a child of 10, and we know that some children of 10 have come through. With any luck, a child of 10 will not be kept in Home Office accommodation; he or she is likely to go into the care of a local authority under the Children Acts and will very likely be fostered. It is comparatively easy to be fostered at 10. The child would have spent eight years at an English school, would have grown into speaking English, probably forgetting his or her own language to some extent, and will be settled.

Immediately after the age of 18—subject to the Home Office’s inordinate delays in removing people, but assuming that it achieves something better in the future—he or she can be removed and will go to a country. At the moment, there is only one, unless the child is Albanian, when they would have gone back earlier. That child aged 18, just grown up, will find him or herself in a country the language of which they probably do not speak and he or she will know absolutely nothing. I hope your Lordships agree with me that that, quite simply, is cruel.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I return to the terminology in general. I had tabled amendments in the last group on Monday night, which was a very big group. I could not find a polite way of describing drafting that I regarded as very poor. I resorted to saying that I thought it was

“not a very imaginative way to describe a situation”.

The Minister responding said that the term “in general” is

“not new: it is the test set out”

in legislation of 2002. He continued:

“Including a country in Schedule 1 simply requires the Secretary of State to be satisfied that it is considered generally safe”.


He then said that “the individual”—and noble Lords are absolutely right to remind us that we are talking about individuals, not amorphous cohorts of people—

“would still have the opportunity to challenge their removal”.

Later in the debate, when a similar point came up again, the Minister said:

“This is going to be a matter for the judicial process—through the appeal process, the legal advice and the legal representation that these people have. If they can show serious and irreversible harm, then they will not be sent to these places”.—[Official Report, 5/6/23; cols. 1216-35.]


Having criticised the terminology in general, given that the opportunities to challenge Home Office decisions in 2002 were considerably more than are presented in the Bill, I would like a detailed understanding of the Minister’s explanation of using the processes available.