(3 months, 4 weeks ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I will say a very few words that may help the debate. I wholly support the government amendments spoken to by the noble and learned Lord; they clarify the Bill in a way that was required.
I will just go back to something the noble and learned Lord said about what I had said at Second Reading about the Human Rights Act consequences. I referred to the opinion that had been given to us—again, very late in the day, like most representations in this matter—written by my noble friend Lord Macdonald of River Glaven. I am sure we all understand why he is not taking part in these debates; he feels that professionally he cannot because he gave an opinion, a view that I think all practitioners here would support. He said in that opinion that the convention rights arguments with which he was presented in his instructions were “arguable”—that was his word. That is not the highest level of certainty that those of us who have written a lot of opinions would ever put at the end of an opinion if we felt sure. They may be arguable, but they are not strong, and the Government are perfectly entitled to act as they are in that regard.
Then there is the question of retrospectivity. The answer to that is very simple. The Bill would be absolutely pointless if it were not retrospective, because it was created to right a wrong that nobody expected, and it is simply restoring to people the legal rights which they already had. I hope that we will not spend an awful lot of time in other stages of the Bill talking about retrospectivity.
I note that the Civil Justice Council’s new review—I agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said about its terms of reference—has had support from the Bar Council and the Bingham Centre, in a very well-argued piece that I think was circulated to most Members of the Committee. It was also supported by what we might call the interest groups: the Association of Litigation Funders and the International Legal Finance Association, which have taken a pretty objective view of the proposals in this Bill. All are of the view that the Civil Justice Council, as it is set up by the terms of reference, is the appropriate place for the review to take place. Of course, it leaves some flexibility and some obligation, because a rule-making body such as the Civil Justice Council can change the law in small ways to ensure that appropriate procedures are followed.
For reasons which some noble Lords will recognise, I am an enthusiast of independent reviewers—because I have been one—but I am not an enthusiast for an independent reviewer in this situation. Although an independent review would undoubtedly be fascinating, it would have no power whatever. We need to get nearer to the rule-making powers to ensure that the law in this area is clear, followed, applied by the judges and, above all, understood clearly by the courts.
My Lords, I rise very briefly, acutely aware of the legal weight in the Room, to which I add not a gram—although I cannot help noticing the gender balance. I apologise for not speaking at Second Reading. My noble friend Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb spoke in the Second Reading debate but she is currently taking part on the Leasehold and Freehold Reform Bill in the Chamber. I listened very carefully to the words of the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, who is satisfied with the review process that we have going forward, and I will be guided by that.
I want to stress that where we are going now is still not an adequate solution to the problems at hand. At Second Reading, my noble friend said that we need to put
“energy into thinking about a better solution”.—[Official Report, 15/4/24; col. 810.]
We have to do that in the context where we have a crucial, huge inequality of arms—Horizon is the obvious example—in an economy dominated by an increasingly small number of oligarchic, giant, often multinational companies that are deciding how things work in our economy and society, of which people are very often the victims. We have a structural problem: the law now is not equipped to deal with the structure of our economy and society. I conclude only by noting that justice unfunded is justice denied, and there is far too much justice denied to individuals in our society when they are crushed by the weight of corporations or the state.
(4 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is a tremendous privilege to follow the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot. He has shown, in his conduct in connection with the Horizon case, the courage, rigour and persistence that we all should aspire to and yet do not always achieve.
Like the noble Lord, I welcome this Bill. I have fond memories as a baby barrister of taking over preparing small cases that the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, as he now is, was far too successful to deal with by then. I used to sit in the spare bedroom at home, very early in the morning, drafting pleadings in personal injury cases. Some of them were for the defendants—the employers or their insurers—but not a small number of them were for individuals who could get legal aid to bring those cases before the county court, where I often appeared to present them if the wicked insurers did not pay up. At the end of every quarter, as I am sure the noble Lord will remember, we used to receive a payment for our civil legal aid work, from which 10% was deducted because it was legal aid. Justice was obtained by very large numbers of people through that legal process, which obviously involved solicitors instructing us as well. It was another era, and I suspect we were far too successful in the work we did for claimants and legal aid became too expensive—but there we are. We have been left with the loss of legal aid for the bulk of such cases. Litigation funding is what has replaced it and it is here to stay. I was astonished by the PACCAR ruling, because it removed the enforceability at a stroke. I do not understand how it happened—and I have read the PACCAR judgment in the Supreme Court on several occasions. There we were, with those who were funding a lot of small cases not able to recover any costs when they won.
I also recall, much later in my life as a barrister, being what one might call a jobbing, part-time chairman of the Competition Appeal Tribunal under the rigorous but agreeable presidency of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, when the CAT, on which I sat for 10 years, started to receive cases for bulk claimants. I now declare an interest, having been involved as an adviser in two such groups of cases that went before the Competition Appeal Tribunal. One group involved people who really could not afford to bring their own cases, but, taken together, the whole claim amounted to hundreds of millions of pounds. It is right that, where justice is on the side of such claimants, they should be able to bring their claims. Above all those commercial interests, it is right that people such as postmasters and postmistresses can recover damages.
There was a time in my life as a barrister when I used to do prosecutions for the Post Office on the Wales and Chester circuit, as it was then known. I do not know if I prosecuted any Horizon cases—I think not, because I took Silk a very long time ago and did not do it after that—but there was no doubt that, when instructions were presented to me as a prosecutor and when cases were presented to a court, there was a view that on financial matters the Post Office was infallible. It had a status which had an air of infallibility around it, and that has been proved to be horribly wrong. It is absolutely right that we should be supporting, in the right circumstances, those who will allow such cases to come to court. I very strongly support the principle behind the Bill and its very short provisions.
I want to express two lurking concerns, if I may, both of which have been dealt with in this debate already, so I will be brief. The first is that lawyers are regulated by statute but litigation funders are not. There is an organisation called the Association of Litigation Funders, but I have noticed that its 2018 code of practice has barely been mentioned in any publicity about this matter. My view is to welcome the CJC inquiry very strongly and that we should be prepared, if absolutely necessary, to provide statutory legislation for litigation funders—though I suspect from what I have seen that they will be willing to move voluntarily to a proper level of regulation, which is in some ways much better than statutory legislation because it is much more flexible.
Another point that has come to light came to my attention this morning, when I received a very large amount of information from an interested party, who I think instructed the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald—who has been mentioned and for whom I have immense regard—as legal counsel to provide an opinion on whether the Bill falls within the European Convention on Human Rights. The Minister has certified that it does and that it is in the Bill, which would not be here if it did not—except in the one case that we will be discussing tomorrow. I simply ask the Minister, at the appropriate time, which may not be this afternoon, whether he has had more than the three or four hours that I have had to consider what was presented to me by another person as very opportunistic lobbying, including the opinion of the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, and whether he will advise the House on whether there are any ECHR problems.
I note that, at the end of his opinion, the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, described the case against the ECHR as “arguable”. That was the word that he used, I suspect with great care. We have all used it from time to time in our legal lives, and it does not express the highest level of conviction. I am sure that the House would like to be sure that we are not, by accident, falling foul of the European convention, to which, in most respects at least—I cannot help saying this—the Government are devoted.
(5 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberI feel like just moving Amendments 40 and 41 and sitting down. I probably should.
These amendments ask the Government to provide some facts with respect to the Bill. We believe that the Bill—as well as the various debates we have had about the rule of law, compliance with international law and so on—is unworkable. We do not think it will work. We think that, in the end, the real number the Government want is one; one plane. The symbolism of one plane taking off is what they want.
Let us just try some facts—how many thousands of people are waiting, under the auspices of the Illegal Migration Act, to be deported somewhere? How many people are the Government going to send to Rwanda? If it is over 300 by the way, it costs an extra £120 million. Where are all these people? We read that the Government have lost a lot of them; they do not know where they are. Can the Government explain why they overspent by £4.5 billion and why the Home Secretary had to ask for an emergency £2.6 billion? Can the Government explain why they believe there is a deterrent, when the Permanent Secretary had to receive a ministerial direction to carry on because he did not believe there was any evidence that there was a deterrent? Yet the Government continued to say that. Instead of a Safety of Rwanda Bill overturning a finding of fact by the Supreme Court, perhaps we could have a government amendment which says, “You have to believe that it is a deterrent”.
Number after number is not provided by the Government. Amendment 40 would require a report on how the Rwanda treaty will operate, and Amendment 41 makes a series of asks of the Government. I will press Amendment 41 to a Division, because I want to know how many asylum seekers there are with respect to the Illegal Migration Act? Where are they? How many are the Government sending to Rwanda? What is the timeline for that? Where is their evidence about deterrence? Why should we believe, without any figures, the Government simply asserting that this will act as a deterrent, and that it will work?
I go back to the point I made at the beginning, which was the brunt of all my remarks. Whatever amendments are passed, be it Amendment 41 or some of those which came earlier or will come later—for example, Amendments 42 and 44—they deserve to be properly considered by the Government, and this place given its due respect.
Before the noble Lord sits down—and I hesitate to interrupt what has been a wonderfully entertaining and accurate speech—would he like to remind the Minister that, according to the figures issued by the National Audit Office just two days ago, the total cost of sending 300 people to Rwanda would be £569,262,200, and the average cost per person would be £1.9 million? Does he agree that one of the responsibilities of this House is to make the Government literally accountable for the proper and proportionate spending of public money?
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, for reminding me that I have a copy of that National Audit Office report. He is right—the cost is astronomical, and that is before anybody has been sent. The cost will go up if anybody is sent. The Government have not come forward with those figures; the National Audit Office had to find them out. We have no idea about the number of asylum seekers that the Illegal Migration Act applies to, and we have no idea what the Government will do or how many they expect to send to Rwanda.
It is almost unbelievable that we have spent months debating a Bill that not only brings into question all sorts of constitutional principles that we have debated—and no doubt will come back to—but is unworkable. That is the whole point of my Amendment 41.
(6 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, we heard this debate opened with great clarity and legal exactitude by my noble and learned friend Lord Etherton, followed by a very good speech from the noble Lord, Lord Cashman. I am not going to go over all that again, but am I right in this simple analysis of the situation in which the Government seek to place individuals who might be affected by this law?
If I can produce compelling evidence that Rwanda is not safe for me—not my brother, but me—I am entitled to a decision from the Secretary of State, no less, or an immigration officer, that I should not have to go to Rwanda. If that decision is not made in my favour, I have all the advantage of the English legal system, through which I can judicially review the decision of the Secretary of State or the immigration officer. But if I can show that there is compelling evidence not that Rwanda is unsafe for me, but only that it is unsafe for a person like me, I am excluded from all the protection of the law, just because I cannot provide evidence that relates to me as a particular individual—who may, as it happens, not be as well-known as someone like me in Rwanda.
If that is the situation, how can His Majesty’s Government possibly justify that difference? It seems to me to be fundamentally unjust. If that is the case, I hope the Minister, who is very open with your Lordships’ House, will say so, so that the House can decide on Report how to deal with my noble and learned friend’s proposal.
My Lords, it is a pleasure, as always, to follow the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. On this occasion, it is fortuitous to follow him because—without repeating the brilliant points made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, and my noble friend Lord Cashman, about the safety of Rwanda for particular groups, which are echoed in my noble friend Lord Dubs’ amendments on religious freedom—he pre-empts a point I want to emphasise about the false binary the Government appear to be creating in Clause 4, for example.
As someone who has worked with the refugee convention for about 30 years, I feel that something is missing—well, there are many things missing, but there is something particularly dangerous about tying the hands of decision-makers in the way proposed, be they the Secretary of State, Border Force, or judicial decision-makers in particular. There is a false binary, which the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, began to outline. At one end of the spectrum, the country is particularly dangerous for Josef K, not other people in Josef K’s family or political party, or in another social group. The language of the Bill uses the following adjectives:
“compelling evidence relating specifically to the person’s particular individual circumstances”,
At the other end of the spectrum—the false binary the Bill proposes—is the general safety of Rwanda, the Bill’s definition of which includes safety from refoulement in particular. Of course, any refugee lawyer or anyone with experience of dealing with asylum anywhere in the world will tell you that, for a great many refugees, the crucial issue—forget the false binary—is membership of a persecuted social group. Those are the social groups highlighted by these amendments, but they could be other political or ethnic social groups, and so on.
On an ordinary reading of this extraordinary draft statute, I have no doubt that even this odd formulation of the specificity of the person’s “particular individual circumstances” would be construed by a court as including membership of a social group. That would be a normal reading of even this draft provision. However, because of all of that odd stuff in Clause 1 about the purposive construction the Government propose—disapplying the common law, disapplying the Human Rights Act and so on—there is now a real question mark about whether social groups are included for the purposes of Clause 4, for example.
To be fair to the Minister, in his letter, which I read, the clear indication is that social groups would be covered, because HJ (Iran) and gay people who are persecuted are alluded to. But, with respect, if that is the case, in the light of the very odd formulation of this draft statute, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, and others have done the Government an enormous favour. At the very least, they ought to agree to the amendments proposed by the noble and learned Lord. Otherwise, I fear that, because of all these straitjackets in the Bill upon decision-makers, including the Secretary of State, let alone the judiciary—we will come to it later—the Government may find that they are sending people to Rwanda in circumstances where they do not want to, and contrary to the Minister’s letter. For those reasons, I support the amendments in this group.
(6 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberEven for the noble Lord, it is a bit of a leap to say that a negotiated relocation agreement with Albania has been a deterrent because they may have thought we were going to send them to Rwanda. Even factually, I am afraid that he was incorrect. The noble Lord knows that the ministerial direction sought on the migration and economic development agreement with Rwanda was specifically for this Rwanda agreement. He also knows that when the Permanent Secretary was giving evidence in December, after the Albania agreement was agreed, he said that no circumstances had changed with regard to his view for value for money for this agreement. The Permanent Secretary still believes that the Rwanda agreement will not propose to be value for money. I agree with the Permanent Secretary at the Home Office.
The monitoring committee will have eight members, as the Minister said, and its terms of reference are online. The Minister said earlier that it would be independent of government, and that is true to an extent—if you think that four members being appointed by one party and four by another constitutes independence, because when it is being established, each party will appoint them. The key thing from our point of view is the ability of the monitoring committee to, as the Minister wrote in a letter to me,
“ensure all obligations under the treaty are adhered to”.
It will not, because it cannot—the monitoring committee has no powers of enforcement. It will be able to refer aspects it considers important to the joint committee, but it is under no duty to publish any of those recommendations or any of its findings, which can be significant. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, said, the safeguards that must be in place as far the Government are concerned will be considered to be in place only if the monitoring committee has said that they are in place. We in Parliament will not know; but we are supposedly the decision-makers when it comes to whether Rwanda will be safe.
The joint committee, under Article 16, can make only non-binding recommendations to the parties. So, there is a monitoring committee that does not have a duty to publish its findings and cannot ensure adherence to the treaty. It can make only recommendations to a joint committee, which can make only non-binding recommendations, and which itself is not duty bound to report to the body that is apparently to be making the decisions: Parliament.
I asked how we would then change this if the circumstances changed. Even if we in Parliament found that out from a monitoring committee and joint committee that do not report to us, how would we change it? The noble and learned Lord rightly said that no Parliament can bind its successors. That seemed to imply that a future Parliament could change this arrangement. Well, it cannot, because, of course, no Parliament can bind its successors, but no Parliament can bind a Government on making or ending treaties—that is a prerogative function. How can we in Parliament change the treaty if we decide that Rwanda is no longer a safe country? I hope the Minister can explain that to me when he winds up.
My Lords, I want to speak in support of Amendment 67, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. I have listened to the last hour or two—I have lost count of how many hours of debate there have been—and have restrained myself, perhaps uncharacteristically, from intervening. There were contributions from, for example, my noble friend Lord Anderson, who has great experience, having appeared in courts in which I have not; from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, who has been a very senior Minister; and from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hoffmann, who has given judgment in some of the relevant cases. I thought I would leave it to them to deal with the legal aspects.
I come to this as a lawyer who has spent 38 of the last 40 years as a Member of one or other House of this Parliament. I am concerned about the balance between the legal position created by a piece of draft legislation and the role that we legitimately have in these Houses, particularly in the other place, which is more democratically accountable than we are, although we are reluctant to deny at least some level of democratic accountability.
I do not understand this concept of deterrence. There are two views on deterrence, and they are simply stated: either you believe that the provisions are deterrents, or you believe they are not. You can actually make pretty respectable arguments both ways. It seems to me that the deterrent that would stop people coming in small boats is to deal with the cases efficiently, which has not been done at least until very recently—in other words, to ensure that those who make what might well in the vast majority of cases be unjustifiable and inadmissible requests to be allowed to remain in this country, leave this country, after due process, as quickly as possible—and to ensure that Parliament retains some oversight so that it can see that the new law is being dealt with in a way of which we are not ashamed and that accords with British legal standards. Amendment 67, which I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, will allow me to say is modest, would at least allow Parliament to have that oversight of public spending and the way a new and unusual law operates to ensure it is fair and that there is value for money.
That may not be the reason why it has been so drafted, but it is my interpretation of one of the consequences of that drafting.
The point I am making is that that construct, whereby a Minister of the Crown is a private person only for the purposes of that clause, seeks to exclude Parliament’s oversight of the actions of that person. At least Amendment 67 makes a respectable attempt to ensure that parliamentarians in both Houses can review the potential operation of certain issues under this Bill.
The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, raised the issue of numbers—very well, if I may say so. The leader of the Opposition, who was a young barrister in my chambers at one time and was noted for his determination and accuracy, told the nation that about 100 people would go to Rwanda. Others have suggested a figure of about 200. Would the Minister be kind enough to confirm the actual number of places that exist in Rwanda for people who would be sent there under this Bill? I believe it to be certainly less than 200, but that is based only on attempting to find out the figures through various articles I have read online. If we are really talking about fewer than 200 people, then what is all this about, and why is Parliament not to be allowed to draw the country’s attention to the fact that this is really a pig in a poke—a political construct designed to deceive people into believing that it will stop the boats—and take appropriate parliamentary steps? That is not what will stop the boats.
My Lords, the poke is very difficult to interrogate. One of the provisions of the treaty is about reception arrangements and accommodation, which goes to the point that the noble Lord has just made. I hope that the Minister will agree with our Amendment 76A, which is about transparency and the workings of the treaty. It is only through the joint committee that we could have any hope of understanding the day-to-day implementation of the treaty. It is only if we have something like Amendment 76A—we are not wedded to the particular drafting of it—that we will be able to understand. We need a reporting mechanism to Parliament in order to scrutinise, which is one of the major reasons that we are here, what actually happens—if it ever does happen.
I am sorry, I disagree. I think I answered the question about what has to happen in order for the treaty to be ratified. It was under discussion at considerable length in the International Agreements Committee debate that we had three or four weeks ago, whenever it was.
The Minister has just said that the numbers are uncapped, but in the walkthroughs and exercises, some of which have taken place in Uganda, someone will have told the Government how many spaces are currently available in Rwanda. How many spaces are currently available in Rwanda?
My Lords, I do not have the precise number. I will find it and write to the noble Lord. As I say, the fact is that the scheme is uncapped. In a perfect world, we would not send anyone to Rwanda because the deterrence would work. Surely that is the point, as alluded to by my noble friends Lord Lilley and Lord Murray, and indeed by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, who pointed out that deterrence is entirely a binary argument. The Government take one view and others take another.
I think I have answered most of the questions—or at least I have tried to, although I appreciate not necessarily to all noble Lords’ satisfaction. We will have more to say before Report. The Bill buttresses the treaty. Alongside the evidence of changes in Rwanda since the summer of 2022, it enables Parliament to conclude that Rwanda is safe and provides Parliament with the opportunity to do so. For the reasons I have outlined, the amendments are not necessary, and I therefore respectfully ask noble Lords not to move them.
(6 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support Amendment 33 from the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate, to which I am a signatory. I am grateful to the noble Lord for the amendment and I welcome the opportunity to discuss the role of Parliament if a higher court were to declare this legislation to be incompatible with the convention right, or indeed a number of rights.
We should not forget that the Government have been unable to make a statement in the Bill that it is compatible with convention rights. As the Government nevertheless wish Parliament to proceed with the Bill, it seems prudent to probe what the role of Parliament would be in determining how any potential incompatibility should be addressed. In fact, the Attorney-General has said in the Government’s own legal position paper that it should be for Parliament to address any determination of incompatibility by the courts. The noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope, has eloquently set out the motivation for this amendment, and I agree that what it does is simply to expound what parliamentary sovereignty would look like in this context.
I appreciate that the Government believe that there is no basis for a declaration of incompatibility, and that therefore Section 4 of the Human Rights Act has not been disapplied. However, if Parliament proceeds to pass the Bill on the basis of this view, but the domestic courts declare otherwise, can the Minister say what objection there can be for giving Parliament a clear opportunity to revisit this issue? Surely the Government and Members across all Benches agree that parliamentary sovereignty includes the legislative function’s ability to oversee the executive function. As the legal position paper reads:
“The principle that Parliament should be able to address any determination by the courts of incompatibility, rather than primary legislation being quashed by the courts, is part of the fundamental basis of Parliamentary sovereignty”.
The Human Rights Act does not compel the Government or Parliament to remedy an incompatibility, but Parliament must be able to take steps to do so. It is not unreasonable to expect Ministers to explain—and to explain without delay—why they may not be bringing forward a remedial order. If the Minister disagrees with this supposition, can I ask him to please make clear the Government’s position?
Your Lordships will know that we have spoken with one voice on these Benches, as we believe that the Rwandan partnership agreement is an abdication of both our legal and our moral responsibility to refugees seeking sanctuary here in the UK. It is highly disturbing that this Bill implies that human rights are somewhat discretionary, somehow no longer universal, and that they can be disapplied for those reasons outlined in domestic law.
The fundamental truth that I believe in is that every person is equally deserving of rights, as every person is equally made in the image of God. However, this is not just a theological statement but also an indisputable legal principle that underpins our international human rights framework: that all are equal before the law. Noble Lords will know that I am not a lawyer, but this point was very well made by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. She made it powerfully, better than I could do. Removing asylum seekers from certain protections enshrined by the Human Rights Act severely undermines the universality of human rights and our collective access to justice. As the refugee convention states, protection is not a simple concession made to the refugee; he is not an object of assistance but rather a subject of rights and duties.
Human rights are not an opt-in or opt-out concept, and Section 4 of the Human Rights Act gives the courts the opportunity to remind us of that. This is surely central to the UK’s commitment to the rule of law. Parliament has the right to create law, but our authority cannot extend to creating injustices. Parliament therefore may need to ask whether we should maintain parliamentary consent if the Bill is found to not afford adequate protection of fundamental human rights, and Amendment 33 facilitates this. It is a perilous time for the protection of human rights across the globe, and the UK’s contribution should not be to diminish their value or put them further out of reach for some of the world’s most vulnerable people. I hope and pray, therefore, that we have the chance to revisit the proposals in the Bill.
My Lords, I shall speak in qualified support of Amendment 33, but before I do so I should say that it is a pleasure to follow the right reverend Prelate. Outside this House as well as within the House, I have heard her deploying her calm, compelling advice on a range of subjects connected with refugees and asylum seekers, and she has done so with her usual skill this evening.
Before I get to Amendment 33, however, I need to make two apologies and I hope the court will bear with me. The first is for my absence from the Committee until I arrived back this afternoon. My second apology is that right at the end of the debate at Second Reading, I made a factual error, for which I take full responsibility, although the advice came from elsewhere, when I said that homosexual acts were still illegal in Rwanda. I am glad to say that homosexual acts are not illegal in Rwanda: I was wrong. Having said that, the evidence of how homosexual acts are seen by society in Rwanda is now well behind the law that the Government there have introduced.
I turn to Amendment 33. We heard earlier from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, about the importance of Parliament as a court. Yes, the lawyers are more familiar than others with the expression “the high court of Parliament”. It is a nice conceit that Parliament likes to deploy from time to time, but it does not actually add up to a statement of fact. Let us just think about how courts operate. I am concerned to some extent about the abstraction of our debates on the subjects we are discussing at the moment. Let us consider what actually happens when a lawyer—say me or one of a number of my noble friends and colleagues around the House—has a client, in a room which they have entered extremely nervously, or in a very unpleasant surrounding in a place of detention, who has a very serious problem on which their whole future depends, whether it is a very long prison sentence, the break-up of the family or being sent to a faraway country where they never intended to go.
What we as lawyers do is, first, to analyse the complaint that is made. Secondly, we give an opinion as to whether there is an injustice. I hope that we are always frank; we sometimes have to be cruel to be kind in telling the truth. But if there is an injustice then we explain that the golden thread of English law actually has a number of strands. Yes, one is the jury system— I heard that replayed on the radio today—but another is that if there is a wrong, there is a remedy for it. It may be difficult to achieve a remedy for the wrong but there is a remedy and a procedure, and that procedure can be taken to a court.
Does the noble Lord share the concern, that I and various committees of your Lordships’ House have, that the declaration of incompatibility, by itself and without the other remedies and provisions of the Human Rights Act, is not an effective remedy for convention rights? That is the first part of my concern.
The second part is more political: if, because of this Act, the only legal court, as opposed to metaphorical court, that still has jurisdiction to look at the safety of Rwanda—for example, for torture victims—is the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, the Prime Minister will have turned courts into foreign courts. The collision course between the UK and the Strasbourg court will be determined.
On the noble Baroness’s first question, I agree with the sentiments that she expressed earlier.
I will answer her second question slightly differently: I am puzzled by the hostility that some in the governing party show to the European Court of Human Rights. My understanding is that, on a weekly if not monthly basis, our Government call the European Convention on Human Rights into use to justify government arguments in individual cases. I do not understand that the Government are saying that they do not want to use the convention to their advantage anymore; it is done on a very selective basis for a small number of cases, and generally against the justice of those cases.
My Lords, all of us lawyers can tell war stories about cases that we have been involved in or that we remember, but the first test of the declaration of incompatibility happened after the introduction of the Human Rights Act, when 9/11 had happened and we too were concerned with national security. We entered into a process of arresting people—detention without trial. It was a shameful thing at that time, and the case worked its way through the courts, which said that this is not compatible not only with our respect for due process and the rule of law but with the human rights protections under our new legislation. The Supreme Court—actually it was the committee of the House of Lords at that time—in the case of A and others v Secretary of State decided that this was indeed in contravention of the Human Rights Act. It spoke about how foreign nationals in particular were being gathered together in detention. There were issues about creating hierarchies and about detention without due process. As a result, a declaration of incompatibility was made.
It is important for people to know that what happened then was that the Government of the day—it happened to be a Labour Government—respected the court’s decision. That is the concern of some of us now: there seems to be less respect for court decisions. That worries us. In the ordinary way, if our Supreme Court were to make a declaration of incompatibility, one would expect a Government to do as the Labour Government did at that time, which was to look for ways in which they could introduce law that was not discriminatory to those to whom it applied and that introduced a certain level of oversight and due process. Nobody would know that better than my colleagues on the Cross Benches who, as lawyers then, sat in special capacities to oversee that sort of legislation.
It was a very interesting moment, because it was about declarations of incompatibility and how Governments should respect courts that are saying, “This is incompatible”. It concerns us that there seems to be a rising level of disrespect for the rule of law—it is happening not just in this country but elsewhere—but we should be better than other places, because that is deeply embedded in our tradition and is so important to us.
In answer to what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Murray, that somehow the European Convention on Human Rights was invoked even before the Human Rights Act, in fact it took six years to take cases from start to finish to get to the European court on matters, and that is not what we wanted. That is what the Human Rights Act was all about: bringing human rights home. That is what it did, and it is something that we should all be proud of.
My Lords, I took it that the noble Baroness was asking me a question from the way she started—no, do not ask again. First, I absolutely yield pre-eminence to her in anything related to war stories. On her substantive point, she is right. I was the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation at the time when holding people without charge in prisons on suspicion of terrorism was declared unlawful. In 2005, the law was changed. It was changed only because of the intervention of the courts following rational and detailed argument. The country did not become a more dangerous place. It became a more lawful place, with better argument about the results. There were huge benefits from that change, but it was made only because there was a fairly complex but easily dealt with legal process.
I rise with great humbleness to intervene at this point. I was planning to refer to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. I know that she has a book coming out shortly, Human Rights: The Case for the Defence. After listening to the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, I feel that possibly one of the two noble Baronesses should write a book “Courts and the Law: The Case for the Defence” because it seems to have been clearly identified that that is something we need. The point I want to make about the title of the noble Baroness’s book—she has kindly given me a copy, and I have not had time to read it yet, but I will —is how tragic it is that we feel as if we have to make a case for the defence of human rights. That is the place we are in now. That explains why I chose to attach my name to the notice of our intention to oppose the Clause 3 standing part of the Bill, as did the noble Lord, Lord German, the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and the noble Baroness, Lady Lister.
I think it is worth going back to the title of this clause:
“Disapplication of the Human Rights Act 1998”.
I fully understand that other amendments in this group are trying to make this less bad, but, following what the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, said, I feel that crying out in opposition to any disapplication of human rights is where I have to be. It is the only place that I feel that I can be. This picks up points made by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chelmsford that human rights have to be universal. I was looking at one of the main United Nations websites, which defines human rights as
“rights inherent to all human beings, regardless of race, sex, nationality, ethnicity, language, religion, or any other status”.
If we take human rights away from some people, it does not affect just those people; it makes all of us far poorer and far more vulnerable.
(1 year, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, five of the amendments in this group have my name and the names of noble and noble and learned friends on them. They are designed to remove retrospectivity in relation to the duty to deport. I, and certainly two of my noble friends, have had the advantage of a meeting with the Attorney-General and officials in recent days to discuss this, and I hope I am not being too optimistic in hoping that we will hear something at least partly welcome from the Minister at the end of this debate. I shall be very disappointed if that does not happen.
Retrospectivity is the enemy of legal certainty. Legal certainty is a basic tenet of common law and of our statutory law. In order to save time, I am not going to cite various very eminent judges who have spoken on this subject. I will simply give the names of Lord Bingham, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, and the great public lawyer the late Sir John Laws. I remind your Lordships that the House of Lords Constitution Committee has emphasised that retrospective legislation should be passed in very exceptional circumstances only. The proof of very exceptional circumstances should require more than mere assertion: it should require clear evidence. The fact that the retrospectivity asked for, as in this situation, may affect a relatively small cohort of people is no mitigation for the wrong of unnecessary retrospectivity.
The Government are not offering evidence. They are offering a refrain, and the refrain is: “Stop the boats”. But they have failed to offer any convincing evidence at all as to how the present circumstances are so exceptional as to justify the Bill’s wide-ranging retrospective powers. This is wholly unacceptable, given that the proposals represent a widespread retroactive overhaul of our asylum law, founded simply on a deterrent effect—“Stop the boats”—which is unproved.
Again, for the purposes of brevity, I will not deliver the whole speech I would have wished to—and will break the habits of a lifetime thereby. But I remind your Lordships that the deterrent effect is hardly borne out by the Government’s own figures for migrants detected crossing the channel in June 2023, the very month we are in. I was surprised they did not appear in the impact statement, because they were available before it. According to those figures, up to that point, 3,506 migrants were detected crossing the channel in June this year, compared with 3,139 in June last year—some 400 more, and 1,500 more than in June 2021. If one looks at the figures for April, May and June 2023 together, the evidence that this retrospective element is stopping the boats is a fairy tale, but one of those nasty fairy tales that keeps the victims of it awake at night because of the uncertainty of what will happen to them.
Furthermore, the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 addressed the same public policy issue and was not retrospective. As Dame Priti Patel MP, the then Home Secretary, said in the Second Reading debate on that legislation, the intention was that:
“Anyone who arrives in the UK via a safe third country may have their claim declined and be returned to a country they arrived from or a third safe country”. [Official Report, Commons, 19/7/21; col. 717.]
In other words, the policy intention was the same, but although there was a little bit of retrospectivity in that legislation, the vast majority of its provisions were not retrospective.
At the conclusion of Committee on this Bill, the Minister admitted that announcing that it applied from 7 March 2023
“may not have had a decisive impact”. [Official Report, 24/5/23; col. 967.]
Well, the evidence suggests that it has not had a decisive effect at all. At best it is equivocal, which cannot be a basis for proper retrospectivity. The evidence does not justify such broad and sweeping legislation, which seeks to apply penalties to those who cross the channel to claim asylum, being retrospective in its entirety. It would set a dangerous precedent whereby the Government could legislate retrospectively, based on no more than conjecture and anecdote.
I respectfully suggest, even at this stage of the Bill, that a dangerous precedent is being set, that we should be deadly serious about the fact that we are dealing with the law and with sound and historic legal practice, and that this is not a situation in which the case for retrospectivity is anywhere near made out.
My Lords, as the noble Lord has said, brevity does not mean half-heartedness today and these Benches whole-heartedly support the noble Lord’s amendments to which my name has been added. It is not only an academic, philosophical, juris- prudential matter; retrospectivity applied to this Bill will be cited as a precedent for the future and would have an impact in the real world for individuals.
As we have heard, the Nationality and Borders Act is not retrospective. Indeed, the two classes of asylum seekers for which it provided have not even been brought into effect. Ironically, the situation and the figures that have been cited have supported our points that it will not have the deterrent effect that has been claimed. It is a very thin claim. The weather in the case of the channel crossings, and TikTok’s policy in the case of Albania, did have an effect. That puts all of us in our place.
As the noble Lord will recall, during our exchange I made clear that not all of those 16 agreements are in the public domain, so I am not going to provide him with the list he seeks.
My Lords, I am very disappointed at the Minister’s response, for two reasons. First, despite being asked to produce evidence to show that retrospectivity has some factual basis for its inclusion, he has failed to answer that challenge, and he must have done so deliberately. I am afraid that leads me to be very suspicious about whether there is any such evidence whatever of a credible nature.
The second reason I am very disappointed in the Minister is that he knows perfectly well that it would be open to him to suggest a date other than the date of the commencement of the Act: for example, the day when this Bill does pass, which could be within days, or even today. That would, of course, be an element of retrospectivity, but it would be a considerable mitigation of what is provided in the Bill.
Given that discussions have taken place on these issues, I am very surprised that he has simply remained his intransigent self on this issue. The notion that a glut of small boats will be crossing the channel if the period between March and, say, now is not the subject of retrospectivity, is, frankly, absurd, ridiculous and completely lacking in any kind of credibility. I ask him to think about that; I am perfectly prepared not to press the amendment if he stands up and says he is prepared to consider that issue seriously and enter into discussions with other Ministers. Otherwise, I will test the opinion of the House.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Griffiths, told us during the last vote about the views of all the members of the Council of Europe and specifically mentioned Hungary questioning what the UK is doing—Hungary.
My name is on the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, on behalf of everyone on these Benches. The survivors of modern slavery should be protected and supported, not just because it is the right thing to do and the UK was lauded for it but to help the prosecution of criminals, of which we hear very little. The Bill indicates the extent to which the Government fail to put themselves in the shoes of victims and survivors, including those who have been trafficked here—who therefore have not come under their own steam—and particularly regarding the need for survivors to be in the UK to assist prosecutions. I could go on, but I will not.
The noble Lord, Lord Alton, is right that we need an independent anti-slavery commissioner in post. How long has it been—a year and how many months? A considerable number of criteria should be assessed, but we are where we are. We maintain our opposition to how slavery and trafficking are dealt with. I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, on his filleting of the Bill. We will be with him.
My Lords, my name is on Amendment 96, along with those of my noble and learned friend Lady Butler-Sloss, who spoke earlier and with whom I agree, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. It attempts to remove Clause 21(5) and (6). Those subsections mean that a person will be removed from this country unless it is “necessary” and there are “compelling circumstances” to show that it is necessary for the person to be present in this country for the dreadful crimes that we are talking about to be prosecuted. Was the Director of Public Prosecutions asked about the effect of this provision on the likely success of prosecutions? If this clause required it to be advisable for the person to be present for the purposes of the investigation and prosecution, I would be in favour of it, but it goes much further than that and is contrary to all good prosecution practice.
I confess that I have met a lot of organised criminals in my time—as a barrister. I have also met an awful lot of victims in my time, as a barrister and occasionally as a Member of this House and the other place. It is not a level playing field. If the Crown Prosecution Service were asked what was advisable, like anybody who has ever prosecuted a semi-serious case and done cases where some witnesses were abroad, as I have, it would say that it is always advisable to have the witness in court, on a local screen or interviewed in a statutory way if at all possible, not to have them on the other side of the globe somewhere—they are unlikely to turn up and will be intimidated by the process.
Let me briefly compare the criminal we are talking about with the victim. The criminal is familiar with the legal system. He—it is usually a he—is often charming. He is often wealthy and can hire lawyers who may even be Members of your Lordships’ House. He is malign, lethal and cocky in the face of the legal system. Those are the characteristics of serious organised criminals. As for the victim, what is she going to be like? She will be frightened. She is likely to be poor. She will be vulnerable and terrified of the legal system and, to use an Orwellian word, will feel like an “unperson”. Do we really want that?
My Lords, throughout the passage of the Bill here and in the other place, many people have raised serious concerns about it, and about its impact on victims of modern slavery. I fear sounding like a broken record, but I said at Second Reading and in Committee that the Bill should exclude those who are subject to abuse through the heinous crime of modern slavery. I echo the words of the former Prime Minister, Theresa May. When discussing the Bill in the other place, she said that it has always been important to separate modern slavery from immigration status. My position remains unchanged.
I would prefer that modern slavery was out of this Bill entirely. For that reason, I shall support the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. They get right to the heart of the matter as they seek to amend the Bill to ensure that potential and recognised victims of human trafficking will not be detained or removed before they can apply to the NRM and have their application considered. In the spirit of those amendments, I have tabled Amendments 102A and 105A to remove Clauses 23 and 24 respectively.
In Committee, the Minister tried to reassure us that the agreement with Rwanda covers ensuring that
“any special needs that may arise as a result of a relocated person being a victim of modern slavery are accommodated”.—[Official Report, 12/6/23; col. 1704.]
The impact assessment published on Monday was more tentative, saying there could be
“a perceived welfare loss for the individuals relocated to a third country who would otherwise be granted support in the UK although this may be mitigated to the extent that the support provided in a third country is comparable”.
This is classic British understatement. We all know that there will be loss of support. The Salvation Army has described the Bill as “potentially devastating”. The US State Department’s 2023 Trafficking in Persons Report, published since Committee, lists Rwanda as a tier 2 country, whereas the UK is a tier 1 country, and said that Rwanda did not refer any victims to services. So, I am far from reassured.
The impact assessment says that one of the strategic objectives of the Bill is “to protect the vulnerable”, but it is proposing mass detention of modern slavery victims under Clause 10 and removing their rights, under the European Convention on Human Rights and the Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings, to a recovery period and support. I find myself in agreement once more with the former Prime Minister Theresa May, who described the Bill as
“a slap in the face for those of us who actually care about the victims of modern slavery”. —[Official Report, Commons, 26/4/23; col. 808.]
The Government are arguing that this is a Bill of short-term pain for long-term gain. For victims, it will be short-term and long-term pain. The JCHR’s Legislative Scrutiny: Illegal Migration Bill concluded that the Bill not only breaches international obligations but
“may also result in the increase in trafficking and slavery”.
With this in mind, I find myself extremely disappointed that an analysis of the potential number of victims affected by the Bill was not covered in the impact assessment. Particularly at such a late stage in the passage of such significant, flagship legislation, it is troubling that we do not have to hand the most basic information in order to make reasonable determinations, based on the evidence, about the efficacy of the Government’s proposals.
As I said in the previous debate in this House, as someone who introduced a Bill in the Northern Ireland Assembly to reduce trafficking and slavery, I cannot support the inclusion of modern slavery victims in this Bill, so I shall be supporting the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt.
However, your Lordships are wise enough to take a belt-and-braces approach to this Bill, so I am also supporting the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Randall. They would mitigate some of the concerns about the lack of support by ensuring that victims of modern slavery exploited in the UK will still be able to access the support they need to recover. Why? It is simply the right thing to do.
The NRM process requires the gathering of evidence and input from the party, so it is not down entirely to Home Office resourcing issues.
The appointment of the new Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner is at an advanced stage, and I am sure that once appointed they will want to monitor closely the impact of these provisions.
In relation to my noble friend’s amendments, I repeat the assurance that my right honourable friend the Immigration Minister made in the other place: namely that we will consider additional protections through statutory guidance for those who have experienced exploitation in the United Kingdom. We are continuing to develop such guidance and in doing so will adopt an appropriate balance between protecting victims of modern slavery and delivering the intent of this Bill.
As regards Amendment 103, the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, quite properly raises the issue of how the modern slavery provisions in the Bill sit with the continued operation of the relevant EU directives in Northern Ireland. As I have said in earlier debates in Committee, the provisions in the Bill are compatible with the Windsor Framework. In particular, in the context of this amendment we do not consider that the 2011 anti-trafficking directive falls within the scope of Article 2 of the Windsor Framework.
Amendments 96, 102 and 105, tabled respectively by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, the noble Baroness, Lady Bryan, and the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, relate to the presumption that it is not necessary for a person to remain in the United Kingdom to co-operate with an investigation. As I outlined to the Committee, remote participation is now the norm in the workplace, and the criminal justice system is no different. It is simply no longer the case that a victim of crime needs to be in face-to-face contact with the police or others to assist with an investigation. In some cases, victims may even feel safer providing virtual or video-recorded evidence. I assure noble Lords that we are working to ensure that the relevant technology, interpreters and intermediaries are available where needed.
We have provided for statutory guidance to support decision-making by caseworkers when determining if there are compelling circumstances why the presumption should be set aside in a particular case, but there is no evidence as to why, in the majority of cases, such co-operation cannot continue by email, messaging and video conferencing. The presumption in Clauses 21(5), 23(5) and 24(5) is therefore perfectly proper and should be retained.
My Lords, I would be really grateful if the Minister could answer the question I asked him as to whether the Director of Public Prosecutions had been consulted about the effect on modern slavery and trafficking cases if the victim was not merely in another studio in another building in London or Manchester but in a country thousands of miles away, with no facilities to encourage or even compel them to give evidence.
I do not know whether the DPP has been consulted on that point but I will certainly find out and write to the noble Lord.
Amendment 112, put forward by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, would prevent the public order disqualification provided for in the 2022 Act being applied to a person whose positive reasonable grounds decision was based on exploitation which had occurred before they were 18. It is, in our view, entirely appropriate for the public order disqualification provided for in that Act to be capable of applying to all relevant individuals, including those exploited as children. In this regard, it is important to note that the public order disqualification in the 2022 Act applies only to specified persons, such as those who have been convicted of a serious criminal offence. In such cases, the age at which the exploitation took place is, I submit, irrelevant to the threat to public order an individual now poses, and we cannot tie our hands on this matter on the basis of the time at which exploitation took place.
The modern slavery measures in the Bill, alongside the others, are intended to deal with the immediate and pressing public risk arising from the exceptional circumstances relating to illegal entry into the UK. We need to take bold action and now. This Bill will not achieve its objective if removals are put on hold for over 500 days awaiting a conclusive grounds decision. As I indicated at the start, these amendments will quite simply wreck the Bill. I hope therefore that the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, will be content to withdraw his Amendment 12. If he is not, I invite the House to reject it.
(1 year, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberI thank the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, very much for that question. The short answer is that I agree with her. We have a new Prime Minister, which begs the occasion for looking again at that question because, frankly, we need some more weeks to see how the negotiations go and so on and, frankly—
The negotiation with the European Union is proceeding apace anyway. This is of no relevance —I keep saying this—and nobody in the Irish Government even bothered to talk about the protocol Bill.
By the way, is there a majority of popular opinion in Northern Ireland against the protocol? I think that is probably right, although there is a large minority for it, but you all must appreciate we have long since left majority rule behind.
On the calls from the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, for new information, I completely respect them, but, actually, the truth is extremely simple. We basically know where we are in terms of business. As the noble Lord, Lord Jay of Ewelme, who chairs the Sub-Committee on the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland, said on Sunday, businesses with a north-south dimension like the protocol, and those with an east-west dimension do not like it. We already have a lot of information and, politically, we already know.
By the way, the passion for the full implementation or support for it in Northern Ireland, which was real at one point, is dead—completely dead. That having been said, I would totally accept that the majority of the parties and Members in the Assembly—
(2 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I acknowledge the data that the noble Lord has placed before the House. I suggest that it is not so much a matter of imposing targets as one of following through on the Government’s approach, which will see an increase in spending over the lifetime of this Parliament and involve more special training for police officers and prosecutors in this area. Finally, although, as I have said, I acknowledge the statistics that the noble Lord has placed before your Lordships, it is important to recognise that the data is necessarily retrospective and relates to times before the Government’s actions, as set out in the action plan, commenced.
My Lords, will the Minister assure the House that, in the Attorney-General’s regular meetings with the Director of Public Prosecutions, she will hold the director to account for the chilling effect of recent changes in CPS charging guidance in relation to rape? Surely it is in the hands of the DPP that the awful statistics can be improved and victims given a proper hearing.
My Lords, I can give the noble Lord that assurance. I remind the House that, of course, as the noble Lord is well aware, we are dealing not simply with the role of government but with necessarily independent bodies, upon which our constitution relies—it relies on the independence of the judiciary and of prosecutors—but I can give the noble Lord the assurance that he seeks.
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I also rise to speak particularly about Amendment 292D. I support the noble Lord, Lord Bach, with all his experience of being an excellent police and crime commissioner.
There are many other examples. The noble Lord gave two. I shall just give one. A 59 year-old senior civil servant who worked for the Ministry of Justice in a responsible position connected with the criminal justice system, wished to retire and stand to be a police and crime commissioner. He was disqualified because, at the age of 13, he had been fined £5 for each of two minor juvenile offences. It is completely disproportionate and absurd that such people should be disqualified.
I seek to compare those disqualification rules with the rules applying to Members of another place. The last figures I saw produced by IPSA, the standards authority for Members of the other place, revealed that, in recent years, 43% of the Members of the other place had convictions of one kind or another. Maybe that tells you a lot about the other place. Nevertheless, this distinction makes its own point.
In passing on to the other issues, I agree very much with my noble friend Lord Hogan-Howe. Fundamental to this problem is the fact that we have 43 territorial police forces. This number ought to be at least quartered. If so, the structure—including police and crime commissioners—would be much more coherent. There would be far greater consistency and police forces which currently struggle to deal with very complex inquiries would be able to deal with them because they would have the critical mass of staff.
I turn next to police authorities. I hesitate to disagree with those noble Lords who tabled the first amendment in this group because I respect them all. Part of my experience as a Queen’s Counsel has been to advise police authorities when they have got into difficulties. I recall one case from the north of England in which the police authority concerned was institutionally corrupt and in the pockets of a small group of senior police officers. It had got itself into a hopeless mess and at least one criminal prosecution ensued. To describe it as an example of democratic effectiveness was an insult to both democracy and effectiveness.
I accept, of course, that some police commissioners are better than others. So are some Cabinet Ministers. So are some head teachers. So are some doctors. So are some Members of Parliament. This is inevitable. Some of the commissioners are very good, such as the noble Lord, Lord Bach, and Dame Vera Baird, who was referred to earlier. Where police and crime commissioners are effective, they are very effective indeed.
Just think about it territorially. If one of these referendums took place and there was a police and crime commissioner in Cheshire but not in Lancashire, or one in north Wales but not in Dyfed-Powys, people in the areas that did not have a police and crime commissioner would be unlikely to say, “Oh, how wonderful; this is going to be run by our local council.” In the modern world, they will say, “Our democratic rights have been diluted.”
Other noble Lords remember, as I do, when the Welsh Assembly was created. In many parts of Wales, people said, “Nobody will know who their Assembly Members are. It’s all a waste of time. It will be completely ineffective.” It is true that, for a time, people tended not to know who their Welsh Assembly Members were. Today, however, if you look at the evolution of the Welsh Government during the last 20 years or so, it has become remarkably effective. It has brought people much closer to government.
I believe that police and crime commissioners are still evolving. They have a valuable role to play, particularly, as I said earlier, if the Government have the courage to reform the territorial policing services in this country.
As to the deposits, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. The £5,000 deposit is not reasonable. I would not oppose a much lower deposit of the kind that has to be put down by somebody standing to be elected as a Member of Parliament. The election process is expensive. Some kind of gatekeeping requirement of this kind is helpful.
My Lords, with the greatest respect to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, when he started talking about amalgamating police forces again and the Welsh Assembly, I wondered whether this was turning into a filibuster. However, we move on.
The issue raised by Amendment 292D that we all agree on is that it is ridiculous that somebody convicted of a very minor offence at a very young age should be disqualified. The other side of the coin is that there is no process for the recall of a police and crime commissioner who commits an offence in office or is guilty of misconduct. Because they are democratically elected, the only way to get rid of them is by another election. Compare this to MPs, for whom there is now a process by which a by-election can be triggered. I agree with Amendment 292D, but there is another side to the same coin which also needs to be addressed.
We on these Benches have always been opposed to police and crime commissioners, notwithstanding, as everybody has said, that there are some outstanding ones, as the noble Lord, Lord Bach, was. Not just because he used to be my boss—this is the House of Peers now—I agree with almost everything the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe has said.