Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Lord Bew Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th October 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

My Lords, I am sure the House would not expect me to, or hope that I would, follow that contribution. I apologise for not being able to speak at Second Reading. I was travelling, as it happens, back from the United States and could not get here before the proper time and date to indicate a wish to speak in the debate. However, that travel to the United States prompts me to say this: we ignore at our peril the importance attached on both sides of the aisle, and in both Houses of Congress, to the Belfast agreement. To put it neutrally, this Bill puts a stress and strain on that settlement. For that reason, and for all the others eloquently put forward today, this Bill should at the very least be delayed.

I remind the House that, some time ago, we were presented with a Bill nominally in relation to internal markets. It contained a Part 5, the purpose of which was to create a law whereby the Government would be excused when it broke the law. The Government have form on this matter, and there is a sense in which the Bill we are discussing is simply part of the same kind of thinking. What has been said today has been said with great eloquence; what was said in this House on the internal markets Bill was said with great eloquence and eventually the Government had to abandon it.

[Lord Bew (CB)]

My Lords, I rise to speak with some trepidation as, apart from the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, this has been a convention of like-minded people, as the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, put it.

I have just come hot-foot from a Committee A (Sovereign Matters) meeting at the British-Irish Parliamentary Assembly in Cavan. We were addressed by the Taoiseach at some length and by other Irish Ministers. There was much discussion of these matters during the day. However, no Irish Minister said, “Whatever you do, when you get back to London, make sure that this protocol Bill is stopped”. It is simply not a contentious matter in these negotiations. That is a simple fact. A very large percentage of what has been said today about the need for good faith and how dropping this blunderbuss will strengthen our position is, with the kindest of respect, totally irrelevant.

The EU has decided, for its own perfectly good reasons—it is keen to reach this deal; I utterly believe in its good faith—that this Bill will not stop substantive negotiation. What it would do, if the majority opinion in this House were to prevail, is stop the Government’s attempt to bring the DUP back into the Assembly. That will be its only real effect. Neither the Taoiseach nor the other Irish Ministers said a word about it yesterday at Committee A (Sovereign Matters), because this Bill is not central to them. What is central to them is the ongoing negotiation, which is proceeding with good faith on both sides and from which I sincerely hope for a result. It is very important to say that.

A great part of what has been said is, I am sure, very well meant but, to put it bluntly, totally irrelevant. It is not the realpolitik of the moment. That is very important to understand. Dropping this Bill will not transform those negotiations into a better or worse state. They are going on now; they are facing some very difficult problems—I think there may be some progress—and we can certainly hope, as I am sure everybody in the House does, for an outcome on this. But it is simply pointless, bootless and, worst of all, deeply irrelevant to keep arguing and going on about the need to drop the Bill because it would lead to greater faith in negotiation. The negotiations are already in play, in good faith—end of story. However, it would have an effect on our ability to get the DUP back into government.

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[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

Can I ask the noble Lord whether he thinks that the Government’s intention to call a Northern Ireland Assembly election on Friday will assist matters?

[Lord Bew (CB)]

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, very much for that question. The short answer is that I agree with her. We have a new Prime Minister, which begs the occasion for looking again at that question because, frankly, we need some more weeks to see how the negotiations go and so on and, frankly—

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

That is what noble Lords have been saying.

[Lord Bew (CB)]

The negotiation with the European Union is proceeding apace anyway. This is of no relevance —I keep saying this—and nobody in the Irish Government even bothered to talk about the protocol Bill.

By the way, is there a majority of popular opinion in Northern Ireland against the protocol? I think that is probably right, although there is a large minority for it, but you all must appreciate we have long since left majority rule behind.

On the calls from the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, for new information, I completely respect them, but, actually, the truth is extremely simple. We basically know where we are in terms of business. As the noble Lord, Lord Jay of Ewelme, who chairs the Sub-Committee on the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland, said on Sunday, businesses with a north-south dimension like the protocol, and those with an east-west dimension do not like it. We already have a lot of information and, politically, we already know.

By the way, the passion for the full implementation or support for it in Northern Ireland, which was real at one point, is dead—completely dead. That having been said, I would totally accept that the majority of the parties and Members in the Assembly—

[Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Bew, for giving way. While I was not at BIPA, my clear understanding—and I have just had it confirmed—is that the Irish Government’s position is quite clear that they view this protocol Bill as an unnecessary, unilateral move that breaks international law. Of course, they want to see a successful outcome to negotiations between the UK and the EU.

[Lord Bew (CB)]

I thank the noble Baroness for her intervention. Of course I take the point, but I was saying that nationalist Ireland basically does not like this Bill. That is not the point. The point is that it is not in any way stopping or infringing or slowing up the negotiations. The point is that the equality of esteem doctrine, which we are supposed to be following with the Northern Ireland protocol, means that the House is bound by international law to pay attention and to try and do something. On whether this Bill is precisely right, there are amendments starred in the normal way to be discussed, but we are not in the situation where we are talking about amendments.

I have great sympathy for the noble Lord, Lord Howard, who raised the issue of Article 16. However, when I look at the noble Lord, Lord Frost, who was in a critical position on this matter for quite long spells in recent times, I think that he is bound to be surprised by the sudden outbreak of support for the implementation of Article 16, because at any time when he voiced the same civilised opinion in this Chamber, noble Lords were totally against it and regarded it as outrageous—of course it never was.

There is even a case now for the implementation of Article 16, made by Professor Boyle, who was professor of international law at Edinburgh, to both the House of Commons Select Committee on this matter and our own Select Committee on this matter. He is actually open to the argument for the importance of the prior international agreement and the importance of protecting it. He is a very distinguished international lawyer. What I understand him to be saying is that, first, you must apply Article 16; that is a perfectly reasonable argument that I am open to. In addition—I look at the noble Lord, Lord Howard, in engaging on this point—the other point that I very much agree with him about is that there is no need to ask the EU to change its negotiating mandate; it has to live up to its commitment to the Good Friday agreement.

The context is one in which—Members of this House do not read the Irish media as I do, and Irish books, articles and so on—there is a fairly consistent admission on the part of the Irish Government’s negotiating team that, when Theresa May was on her knees in November 2017, the advantage was pushed very hard in that agreement, and that they took sole ownership, or sole guardianship, of the Good Friday agreement. In many ways, what is happening here is an attempt by the British Government to say, “Well, actually, that is not really the Good Friday agreement. First of all, you do not have sole ownership. Secondly, we have responsibilities as a sovereign Government not held by the Irish Government and”—as I have tried to explain—"we are trying to move back to deal with this in some way.”

This does not mean that every clause in this Bill is particularly wise, but it does mean that we should not take the attitude that in principle we should not be doing it, or that we must stop now because otherwise the EU will stop negotiating—that is clearly not true. I agree that the Irish Government do not like the Bill and that they believe that it infringes international law. I absolutely accept that point, but the point is that we have to follow our obligations under international law, which means that the long-term alienation of one community must be avoided. Unless the Government do something substantive such as this—

[Lord Howard of Lympne (Con)]

Does not the noble Lord think that it is slightly odd that his justification in law for supporting the Bill is not the Government’s?

[Lord Bew (CB)]

The noble Lord has a point—but not as deep a point as he might imagine, because the Government have been consistent in saying that the primacy of the Good Friday agreement is the core of their position, in both the House of Commons and in this House. There are other details; there is phrasing. For example, as is well known, I am not as convinced of the need for language in this Bill about the Act of Union. I understand why it is there, but I am not convinced that it is relevant. There are other aspects that we will discuss, in the normal way, on amendments. There is detail that will come up later tonight, and there are things that need to be said, in the normal way. But this is not a normal discussion—

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord; he knows that I like and respect him. I am trying to follow the rationale of his argument with regards to us legislating here. Earlier, he made the case—he stressed it repeatedly—that the only purpose of the Bill as he can see it is for the DUP to return to the Northern Ireland Assembly. As far as legislators are concerned, does that mean that the DUP also has a veto on any regulations that come as a result of this Bill?

[Lord Bew (CB)]

We are in political negotiations. Here is our problem; I have already explained it. When I tried to persuade the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, I said, “Just believe the British Government when they say that the Good Friday agreement is the dominant thing”. We can see now what has happened here. You only have to read the Dublin newspapers, to be frank, to realise what has had happened.

We cannot undo a negotiation that we lost. It is not the officials’ fault; the Prime Minister had lost an election and was desperate to get in and to make any kind of progress to justify her existence. You cannot undo this; I am not suggesting that it is possible. You lose, you lose—end of story, at one level. However, at another level, what it means is that the EU is committed to the Good Friday agreement, and it does not understand what it is committed to. You only have to read Michel Barnier’s memoirs to see that he has no idea about the importance of the east-west dimension and that his description of the north-south dimension is literally fantasy, which has been derisorily commented on in all sections of the Irish media.

We are bound into this agreement, but we cannot be bound into a fantasy. We have to unhook. We must have a good-faith negotiation in which we have to acknowledge the things that have gone wrong on our side and the EU has to acknowledge that the version of the Good Friday agreement it thought it had is not the real agreement. There is a strand three, for example, which talks about the importance of the east-west arrangements and so on. You can see how the original misunderstanding runs through all the texts and leads to the difficulties we are now in. To go back again to why I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Howard, we do not need to ask the EU to change its mandate. We need to ask it to understand its mandate. Its mandate is the agreement. It does not take long to read it, by the way. There is a strand three about the importance of east-west relations, although you would not know it from Michel Barnier’s memoirs. You would not know it, and you would not really know what the north-south relationship is either. So, that is one reason why this negotiation has some potential, because both sides have to come to terms with their errors in the past.

I conclude with one thing, because I have great respect for the noble Lord, Lord Hain, and what he said about Baroness Blood—as did the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie. However, we also have to remember what other former distinguished Labour Secretaries of State said in acknowledging this difficulty. The noble Lord, Lord Mandelson—who was deeply involved in saving this process—said last week that he accepts that the Good Friday agreement and the protocol do not sit easy together; the tension is there. The noble Lord, Lord Murphy, talked about this in this Chamber as long ago as 6 December 2018. Distinguished Labour Secretaries of State know that there is a problem. The existence of the problem was not really acknowledged by the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, earlier this afternoon.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)]

My Lords, in all this discussion, not enough is said about the horror of what was experienced in the years leading up to the Good Friday agreement. We are forgetting that. In the language of decency in the House of Lords, we are allowing ourselves to somehow not remember the full horror of that period. That horror was rooted in inequality, a lack of rights for certain people in the community, and a strong sense that the only way towards peace was to somehow protect the rights and equalities of people in Northern Ireland. You would not have got people to the table if there had not been a very honest discussion about the pain, loss and suffering that came out of those inequalities. I can say this as somebody who did more trials involving those Troubles than probably anybody in this House.

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[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Bew, because he has at least made the effort to present an argument as to why the Bill is not a breach of international law—something that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, the Advocate-General for Scotland, for whom I have great admiration in other circumstances, expressly declined to do at the end of Second Reading. As I understand it, the argument from the noble Lord, Lord Bew, is that international law includes the Good Friday agreement, which recognises the need to pay close attention to the views, interests and aspirations of all sections of the community—and here, most relevantly, the views of the unionist community, and in particular the DUP.

That argument deserves an answer so I will attempt briefly to explain why, in my respectful view, it is hopeless as a matter of international law. The reason why the argument is hopeless is that international law states that the doctrine of necessity simply cannot apply where the Government have caused or contributed to the problem that they now perceive and are seeking to address. The noble Lord, Lord Bew, cannot get away from the basic facts that the Government negotiated and signed the protocol. In international law, it is simply elementary that a state cannot sign a specific agreement and then seek to resile from it because it takes the view that it is neither convenient nor in the interests of particular sections of the community. Indeed, the Government signed the protocol—and said they did so—because they took the view that it was the best way of protecting the views of all sections of the community, including the DUP. It therefore follows that, if the Government take the view that this is unacceptable, inconvenient and does not meet the DUP’s aspirations, international law demands that the Government negotiate with the EU and attempt to arrive at another solution. It is as simple as that.

[Lord Bew (CB)]

It is a little more than just “a need to”, which is definitely there. I can see perfectly clearly that the noble Lord is not familiar with Article 1(5), to which I referred, which is an international agreement held in the United States. The crucial thing is that this is also about the commitment to support the Good Friday agreement in all its parts. I am saying something slightly more complicated. We have both agreed to do this. The EU does not understand, for example, that “in all its parts” includes east-west, the totality of relations, a benign relationship and so on. It is impossible to fit the description of the east-west trading relations we now have from the protocol. This is very much a matter of decisions made by the EU, such as on how much intervention was required—or not. This is very much about its regulatory interventions going beyond what is necessary in anything that is actually in the protocol because the protocol itself says that the integrity of the UK single market will be upheld. Those are the words of the protocol—the important bit is in paragraph 25—but that is not what has happened.

My point is this: it is not just a question of the EU and the responsibility of one community, which is definitely there in paragraph 1 of the international agreement. This is about strand 3. At this point in the negotiation, we are simply saying, “We have both agreed to this. Your regulations most certainly break strand 3 at the moment”. I cannot understand why that is such a terribly complicated point in international law. We have all signed up to this; it is an argument about the interpretation of it.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I bow to the noble Lord, who has immeasurably more knowledge and experience of Northern Ireland than I could possibly have, but of course I have read the Northern Ireland agreement and understand that there are two documents in international law. The simple point is that, in the protocol, we agreed the means by which we take the view that the Good Friday agreement should be implemented in the context of the United Kingdom leaving the EU. That is what we agreed; we cannot now say that we are going to resile from it unilaterally. It is as simple as that.

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[Lord Bew (CB)]

My Lords, I would like first to take up my noble friend Lord Pannick’s point about the Government being responsible for this situation. I will give a simple example of why that is not an easy quick-fire point. Looking at the joint report of 2017, it is, as Michel Barnier insists, an international document where both sides signed up. I understand in this House the great sanctity of international documents; I have heard that a number of times today. Having said that— and I respect it—our Government signal in that document that they are determined to maintain the east-west relationship as described in strand 3 of the Good Friday agreement.

We have signalled that there is a problem, which is now at the heart of the matter. It is not that we are suddenly saying late in the day, “Oh my gosh, we never thought of strand 3”; it is in that document. The EU was perfectly aware when it signed the document that the UK was going to take the view that the east-west strand 3 relationship is very important and should be maintained in its current and best form.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

Would the noble Lord give way on that point? I am just wishing to test that a little further with the sequencing. If he is correct about the agreement made in 2017, he also has to appreciate that it was the Government in 2019 who said that the protocol they negotiated satisfied that 2017 agreement. Therefore, they got parliamentary approval to ratify that. It became a treaty obligation which is now under question. If his argument is correct, then the sequence flows that the Government knowingly said in 2019 that the protocol satisfies that 2017 agreement.

[Lord Bew (CB)]

Both the EU and the UK Government said at a number of points—three at least—that this agreement is designed to protect the Good Friday agreement in all its dimensions. Bluntly, it has not done that. We talk about legal opinion and what the Government’s argument has been. The former Lord Chancellor, in the Commons debate on this, made exactly that point. I read the protocol agreement and what did I see? There is a reference to the Good Friday agreement and the protection of it in all its dimensions. That is not actually happening. Both sides signed up in good faith hoping that was what would happen.

Both sides signed up to the protocol, which says that the UK single market should be protected in its integrity. It might be reasonably expected for that to happen. Do noble Lords think that the current provisions for checks are protecting the UK single market in all its integrity? The idea that we both signed up for stuff is very simple. I could go on forever about how “We both signed up for stuff.” To be absolutely honest, neither side fully understood what it was doing.

In particular, the negotiating history of this is clear. The EU did not understand the Good Friday agreement. Michel Barnier’s memoir is perfectly clear. We cannot make pigs fly. Michel Barnier’s memoir is based on a view of the agreement and the undertakings in it which is based on pigs flying. We cannot do it with the best will in the world and for all our enthusiasm to be loyal to something we signed up for. We cannot make pigs fly. His version of what he was protecting is not what it is—not by a long way. The reason for this is our negotiating defeat in 2017 and Mrs May, having effectively lost an election, desperately getting into talks. We cannot undo that; I am not saying we can. In history, we signed up for stuff and we are trying to find a compromise, but we cannot make pigs fly. We cannot make nonsense be operative. It does not matter how morally committed we are.

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. Is there not a possible remedy here? If there are conflicting views, should we apply the principle of contra proferentem? Those who argue for a particular view have the onus of establishing that that view is the correct one.

[Lord Bew (CB)]

We are in a situation now where in Dublin it is accepted by those involved in the negotiation that they achieved a one-sided appropriation of this agreement. This then flows into the agreement of 2019. It was because of our weakness. We cannot undo it and we signed up for it—I get all that—none the less it is accepted by them that there is a problem. The problem cannot be met by saying “You signed up for it”, “Boris was a fool” or anything like that. It is a real problem at this moment. That is the key thing we are stuck with.

This agreement and the protocol say in numerous places—the former Lord Chancellor said it in the other place, so the Government have argued this very clearly—that it is about protecting the Good Friday agreement and for good measure protecting the integrity of the UK single market. This debate is rather different from the terms it has been couched in. I keep saying that the reality is about the interaction of a prior international agreement and the protocol agreement. There are different views of this.

While we are on this subject—regarding the evidence of Sir Jonathan Jones that was cited earlier—the Attorney-General in 2019 explicitly said in the other place, and it was repeated in this place, that there is a problem: where the protocol conflicts with the Good Friday agreement, the UK reserves the right to operate the existing prior international agreements. Who was working in the Attorney-General’s office then? I am certain there were some quite good lawyers when that happened.

We heard about Professor Mark Goldie’s observations, and they are absolutely true. He is a professor in public law in Cambridge who came to our committee in the Lords. I think Professor Boyle came to both committees. Professor Goldie listened to Professor Boyle, who I am certain does not support this Bill and who is much more open in principle to the arguments regarding international law, that the prior international agreement weighs heavily here. In the interaction of the two of them he personally argued Article 16 should be applied because you cannot demonstrate necessity unless it has been applied. I have often been attracted to that argument, but I am astounded by the number of Peers in this House who are mad keen for Article 16.

I am a historian, not a lawyer. I remember a few months ago when every civilised person was regarding the application of Article 16 and no one was saying “Oh, it’s in the treaty.” I remember the intensity of emotions—that this would be another foul act of disgraceful behaviour by the Government, even though it clearly is in the treaty. I am delighted there are so many converts today. I am not even sure; I think they might be right. It is a fashion change, not an international law change. The mood of the House has changed on this point, and nothing has changed in law.

I am not saying that Professor Goldie supports the Bill; I am certain he does not. As I said, I am not sure that Professor Boyle does either. Professor Goldie accepted the burden of Professor Boyle’s argument that it is very important to have upfront protection of the Good Friday agreement. The story about what international lawyers say—I am certain this will become even more complicated in this Chamber before this Bill finishes its passage—is a little bit more complicated. That is all I want to say. I am not saying that I know. I could not possibly say that sitting on this Bench with two very distinguished lawyers.

I am not making a claim about law but about history and what actually happened, how we got here and the mood on this, because that does rather matter. What I am saying is that the Government would be within their rights to say that there is a debate on this subject and there is a real problem. If you are not even talking—as most speakers today have not—about the interaction between the Good Friday agreement, the prior international agreement, and this agreement, then you are not even in the debate in any realistic way. They would have the right to say that.

[Baroness Altmann (Con)]

My Lords, with all due respect to the noble Lord, Lord Bew, and in due deference to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, I will now inject the perspective of an economist and businessperson.

I support Amendments 3 and 67 and will try to inject a different perspective here. The arguments about protecting the Good Friday agreement are of course important and real. However, it seems that, despite arguing that the UK has contributed to the problem—which is essentially part of the reason why the doctrine of necessity seems unable to be applied here—there are options open to the United Kingdom to respect the Good Friday agreement, including maintaining regulatory alignment. Were regulatory alignment to be maintained, the east-west problem would not necessarily arise—because the EU could be reassured that there is less of a threat to its single market—and the north-south element would also not arise. If the UK wanted to diverge regulatorily, it has the option to negotiate that. So there are practical resolutions within our power to protect the Good Friday agreement and the protocol.

If we cast our minds back to the awful Brexit and post-Brexit periods, an assurance was given to noble Lords, including myself, that there would be technical arrangements—alternative arrangements—that would permit the flow of goods across the border that could be tracked, with trusted traders and technology being introduced, that would mean that we would not have these problems of customs procedures. If those arrangements were to be in place, the problem would not arise. So again, the UK Government have the option of saying, “We will maintain regulatory alignment until we have introduced those arrangements”. That would allow us to be in a position where we would not be breaking international law.

I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Bew, when he said that, if there is a problem, we should try to find a compromise, but that again means negotiation and using the facilities we have signed up to ourselves rather than threatening to blow up the whole agreement. I urge my noble friends on the Front Bench to try to get away from the magical thinking that we can somehow square this circle by threats or by breaking international law—or even by threatening to break international law—and instead to get around the table and negotiate a reasonable way forward that gets away from this kind of argument.

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[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

Perhaps I might provide a lifeline to the Advocate-General for Scotland, because I am a Scotsman too and I hate to see him being so tortured. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, asked to see the legal advice. I am sure, as he was sure, that in reply the Minister will remind us of the convention. The noble Lord’s alternative option was that the Minister should tell us now what he was unable to tell us, as it was an inappropriate time, at Second Reading.

I have a third option. I was struck that nowhere in the Minister’s quite long speech at Second Reading did he ever fall into the trap of making the applicability of the doctrine of necessity his view. It was never him explaining that he believed the doctrine of necessity applied. It seems to me that the concerns of the House might be satisfied by a memorandum. A memorandum was produced in June and July, which was a singularly unsatisfactory document in my view. It looks even less good now, having been subjected to critique at Second Reading and by the noble Lords, Lord Campbell, Lord Purvis and Lord Pannick, tonight. However, there could be a second edition setting out the Government’s response to the arguments that have been advanced, including by the Constitution Committee. So I suggest that a third option that would satisfy me and might satisfy the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, would be for the Minister to undertake tonight to produce for us a revised edition of the pre-summer memorandum.

[Lord Bew (CB)]

My Lords, very briefly, I have been trying to say that the legal advice is a little more complicated and nuanced. I am not claiming, for example, that any prominent international lawyers such as Professor Boyle support this Bill. In fact, I do not think he does; he is one of the many who believe in Article 16.

I am quite astounded. Only a few weeks ago, every civilised person knew that Article 16 was the most brutish thing they had ever heard of. All civilised Peers across all parties and all civilised people knew it was the most brutish thing they had ever heard of, just as they are sure of this tonight. However, at this point we have a serious negotiation with the EU. Why do they think that, to improve the atmosphere of these talks, it would be a smart idea for the British Government to come in on Monday morning and say, “Well, you know, civilised opinion has changed. A few months ago, we thought it was brutish; we now think this Bill is so brutish that we want you now to declare Article 16”. This is not serious. There is a serious negotiation going on. You cannot seriously ask the Government to do this. I sympathise and fully accept that the legal arguments are more complex than has been acknowledged in this Chamber this afternoon—they are difficult and I have no firm, final view—but it would be absurd for the Government to say at this point, “Oh, we were having this negotiation but, by the way, here is Article 16”. I am sorry, it just would not work.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

For my part, and I am sure it is true of others who have spoken in this debate, I am not asking the Government to exercise Article 16 tomorrow. The point is that the availability of Article 16 at a later stage is the reason why the test of necessity cannot be satisfied.

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[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, the Minister said that the four-page document we saw in July was designed to assuage our concern. Unfortunately, it did not. In one sense, I am impressed that the Government are prepared to receive criticism of their legal assertions in that document from people of the stature of Sir Jonathan Jones, Professor Mark Elliott, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and my noble friend Lord Campbell of Pittenweem, and still say, “Well, the four-page document adequately sets out our case”. I am sort of impressed but also surprised that the Government are not provoked by the level and depth of that criticism to make a bit more of an effort.

One of my noble friends—I cannot remember which—highlighted the difference between the assertion made at Second Reading that the problem lies in the protocol and the emphasis this evening that the problem lies in its implementation. That would imply that there is no need to rip up the protocol, which is what the Bill is designed to achieve, and that negotiations or dispute resolution up to the ECJ would fit the bill as the problem is in the implementation. The Government keep switching their ground depending on, it seems to me, who most recently raised a point as to whether the real problem is the protocol or its implementation. The Minister said that invoking Article 16 would deal only with the symptoms not the protocol, but surely “symptoms” are the same thing as “implementation” in this context. Again, there is inconsistency here over whether the problem lies with the text of the protocol or its implementation.

The Minister rather confused me with his references to the CJEU being part of the problem. Again, that was known three years ago. The Government agreed and signed up to what the EU would not have otherwise agreed to—Northern Ireland being effectively part of the single market—without the CJEU being the ultimate arbiter of legal disputes. However, I have frankly never taken the point from the right that court adjudication creates a democratic deficit. We do not expect courts to be democratic. They are part of a liberal democracy but are not themselves supposed to be an epicentre of democracy. They rule on the application of the law.

I do not think that it says much for the Government’s knowledge, understanding, foresight or policies that they are now seeking to diverge from the single market, not least in the Bill—I cannot remember its full title; it is something like the revocation of retained law Bill, otherwise known as the Brexit freedoms Bill—that had its Second Reading in the other place today; I do not know whether that is still going on. Diverging from single market legislation makes the implementation of the protocol more difficult so there does not seem to be any coherence in the Government’s policy. They criticise the implementation of the protocol but are going to make that implementation more problematic; indeed, the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, talked about how maintenance of regulatory alignment would help east-west trade. A UK return to the single market, if not the EU, would do so even more.

[Lord Bew (CB)]

This is a little simpler than our discussion, which has reached a rather convoluted shape. The Government were clear when they launched the Bill that its function is to fix it, not to nix it, as the then Prime Minister said when he came to Belfast, in one of his graphic expressions. That is the simple fact with the protocol, not that you would realise it from anything said in this House today. For example, the Government’s most important commitment to the EU, which is not to have a hard border and to protect the single market, is completely up front in the Bill.

This debate is on whether the Bill is completely destroying things, but we have all been told that it is to fix it, not to nix it. There really is not much to add. The idea may be wrong. There are a number of reasons why it might not work. The Government’s case in international law may not be as strong as the Government believe. The general views of international lawyers on this subject are certainly more complex than most speakers in this House acknowledge. It is certainly a more complex matter—but this is to fix it and not to nix it.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I will not prolong the debate as we all want something to eat. I simply disagree with the noble Lord.

The noble Lord, Lord Dodds, spoke of a lack of trust. As the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, said, his argument is surely not with the opposition parties, because we have not caused a lack of trust. I happen to believe that unionists in Northern Ireland have long had a bad deal from English Tories, which makes me rather surprised that they have such a close relationship.

I have sympathy with the argument about the lack of democratic input from Northern Ireland into single market legislation, but only the UK being a member state of the EU can fully solve that problem, as it did before. Obviously, I speak as a long-term member of the European Parliament. If there are ways to take into account the views of Northern Ireland, I would be the first to support those suggestions.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, answered the point on Article 16. It is not that anybody who has raised it here this evening is advocating the use of Article 16; it is just that the Government cannot invoke the doctrine of necessity when they have not exhausted all the other possibilities.

I am afraid that the Minister, who did his best in slightly shorter time than at Second Reading, has not satisfied me, and probably not my Benches, that the Government are able to put further meat on the bones of how they can justify the doctrine of necessity and thus the legal arguments for the Bill. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.