Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th October 2022 Lords Chamber

I also want to know why we are not seeing the legal opinion which says what our position is with regard to international law. There is not a lawyer in this House who does not agree that this is an affront to international law, as I mentioned last time. On Monday of this week there was a meeting in this House about the treatment of Jimmy Lai in Hong Kong. He is a media owner being put on trial under the new national security law because of the erosion of the rule of law in Hong Kong. We want to say that that is an affront to international law because of the agreement made with China over Hong Kong’s future, but how can we say that with any kind of respect in the world when we are doing this to another international treaty because it has become inconvenient to us? That really is wrong, and I would like an impact assessment on the human rights implications of this piece of legislation.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Bew, because he has at least made the effort to present an argument as to why the Bill is not a breach of international law—something that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, the Advocate-General for Scotland, for whom I have great admiration in other circumstances, expressly declined to do at the end of Second Reading. As I understand it, the argument from the noble Lord, Lord Bew, is that international law includes the Good Friday agreement, which recognises the need to pay close attention to the views, interests and aspirations of all sections of the community—and here, most relevantly, the views of the unionist community, and in particular the DUP.

That argument deserves an answer so I will attempt briefly to explain why, in my respectful view, it is hopeless as a matter of international law. The reason why the argument is hopeless is that international law states that the doctrine of necessity simply cannot apply where the Government have caused or contributed to the problem that they now perceive and are seeking to address. The noble Lord, Lord Bew, cannot get away from the basic facts that the Government negotiated and signed the protocol. In international law, it is simply elementary that a state cannot sign a specific agreement and then seek to resile from it because it takes the view that it is neither convenient nor in the interests of particular sections of the community. Indeed, the Government signed the protocol—and said they did so—because they took the view that it was the best way of protecting the views of all sections of the community, including the DUP. It therefore follows that, if the Government take the view that this is unacceptable, inconvenient and does not meet the DUP’s aspirations, international law demands that the Government negotiate with the EU and attempt to arrive at another solution. It is as simple as that.

[Lord Bew (CB)]

It is a little more than just “a need to”, which is definitely there. I can see perfectly clearly that the noble Lord is not familiar with Article 1(5), to which I referred, which is an international agreement held in the United States. The crucial thing is that this is also about the commitment to support the Good Friday agreement in all its parts. I am saying something slightly more complicated. We have both agreed to do this. The EU does not understand, for example, that “in all its parts” includes east-west, the totality of relations, a benign relationship and so on. It is impossible to fit the description of the east-west trading relations we now have from the protocol. This is very much a matter of decisions made by the EU, such as on how much intervention was required—or not. This is very much about its regulatory interventions going beyond what is necessary in anything that is actually in the protocol because the protocol itself says that the integrity of the UK single market will be upheld. Those are the words of the protocol—the important bit is in paragraph 25—but that is not what has happened.

My point is this: it is not just a question of the EU and the responsibility of one community, which is definitely there in paragraph 1 of the international agreement. This is about strand 3. At this point in the negotiation, we are simply saying, “We have both agreed to this. Your regulations most certainly break strand 3 at the moment”. I cannot understand why that is such a terribly complicated point in international law. We have all signed up to this; it is an argument about the interpretation of it.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I bow to the noble Lord, who has immeasurably more knowledge and experience of Northern Ireland than I could possibly have, but of course I have read the Northern Ireland agreement and understand that there are two documents in international law. The simple point is that, in the protocol, we agreed the means by which we take the view that the Good Friday agreement should be implemented in the context of the United Kingdom leaving the EU. That is what we agreed; we cannot now say that we are going to resile from it unilaterally. It is as simple as that.

[Lord Dodds of Duncairn (DUP)]

My Lords, I had not intended to take part in this debate because I had not realised that it would range so far and wide and across so many general issues. We had a lengthy debate at Second Reading in which a number of these topics were discussed; nevertheless, I think it is worth addressing some of the points that have been made and putting some of the issues on record as far as we are concerned.

I begin by joining noble Lords and noble Baronesses in their tributes to the late Baroness May Blood, who passed away recently. She lived and was brought up in the same part of Northern Ireland that I had the honour of representing in another place for almost 20 years, so I knew her very well indeed. I pay tribute to her great resilience, hard work, dedication and tenacity in her pursuit of the issues in which she believed strongly, as well as her dedication to young people in the Shankill and integrated education, as has been mentioned.

It is not incompatible to support this Bill and seek a negotiated outcome. On the negotiated outcome, although there is not a great history of flourishing talks with the EU and the United Kingdom on the protocol issues thus far, we hope that any negotiations lead to an outcome that is compatible with the aims and objectives contained in this Bill. This is not a matter of just tinkering around the edges and finding practical solutions, as has been said; some of the issues are fundamentally contained in the protocol. You cannot address the democratic deficit issue satisfactorily unless you address some of the content of the protocol.

No matter how much consultation, prior notice, discussion or involvement you agree to give Northern Ireland politicians in relation to EU laws covering 300 areas such as the economy—as well as further issues such as state aid, VAT and so on—the fundamental fact is that no elected representative of Northern Ireland either here at Westminster or in the Northern Ireland Assembly has any vote or decision-making capacity on vast swathes of laws that apply in Northern Ireland. How will that be addressed? This Bill goes some way to addressing that, but nothing I have heard being suggested by the proponents of delay, who are against the Bill, has offered any solution to that point. The noble Lord, Lord Hain, acknowledged the problem.

Our Sub-Committee on the Protocol, of which I have the honour of being a member, has looked at this issue in considerable detail; I recommend that noble Lords and noble Baronesses read the report that we commissioned on the scrutiny of legislation now applicable to Northern Ireland. They will see the extent to which Northern Ireland has been removed from the normal processes of democratic lawmaking, which people in this House have spoken about with great eloquence but which does not apply anymore to United Kingdom citizens in the 21st century. That is entirely unacceptable and is contrary to all the traditions of democracy that this mother of Parliaments has sought to uphold both here and abroad.

It has been asked what the problem is with delay. The noble Lord, Lord Bew, has dealt with one issue—

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[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

What I said, and I have said it before, and without prejudice to our position on other mechanisms available under the withdrawal agreement and protocol, is that the Government reserve their position on Article 16. Article 16 remains an option—the Government have not taken it off the table—and it remains an option for the EU has well.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Can the Minister explain how the doctrine of necessity can be satisfied when the Government themselves reserve their position to use a power that is contained in the protocol?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

I am sure we will return to the principle of the doctrine of necessity in later amendments. The use of Article 16 was debated during Second Reading, when a number of noble Lords, including my noble friend Lord Howard, suggested its use—indeed, that has been cause for debate. The noble Lord will be aware that that remains very much at the Government’s disposal, as it does at the disposal of the EU, because that was an agreement that was signed. On the principle of necessity, as I said, I will defer to my noble and learned friend Lord Stewart, who I am sure will discuss this with the noble Lord in other amendments that we are scheduled to discuss.

The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, talked about Article 13(8) of the protocol, which deals with how subsequent agreement interact with the NIP. The EU, from our perspective when this has been raised, continues to reject any changes to the NIP itself. However, in saying that—and I am going by the discussions we are having with the European Union at this time—my experience is that it is not just the substance of what is being discussed with the EU at the moment but the tone of the engagement as well. While there are differing opinions—I accept fully that some are saying that a delay, which has been proposed, would strengthen the Government’s position—our view remains that the EU is very clear on our position on what we are seeking to do with the Bill, but that has not prejudiced the tone or substance of our engagement with the EU.

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[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

My Lords, I thought my days of trying to beat the gun had left me behind a long time ago. I apologise.

I wish to speak in support of Amendment 3 and am glad to see that the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, is back in his place. I have a recollection, and no doubt he will correct me if I am wrong, that on one previous occasion when this issue was raised, he expressed some sympathy for the idea that the legal advice should be made available. We have heard already in these proceedings that there is not a lawyer in the House who does not think that the Government are acting illegally and that, I suppose, is a pretty unusual state of affairs.

We have also seen that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee observed at paragraph 4 of its report:

“The Bill represents as stark a transfer of power from Parliament to the Executive as we have seen throughout the Brexit process. The Bill is unprecedented in its cavalier treatment of Parliament, the EU and the Government’s international obligations.”


Given that the chorus of legal responses in the House is against the Government, perhaps the most notable being that of the noble Lord, Lord Howard of Lympne, and given the extreme criticism of the Government contained in paragraph 4, I respectfully suggest that the convention that legal advice is not made public should be set aside on this occasion. It is a convention; it is not a rule of law. If I may put it so, this is a case of such novelty and importance that it justifies the setting aside of the convention.

I also understood my noble friend Lady Ludford to be raising some questions about the issue of necessity. The Advocate-General will recall that in the course of his long response at Second Reading, he referred to the case of Slovakia against Hungary. I took the opportunity to read that case, and what we discover is that it is not in point at all. It was a case where both states were in breach of legal obligations and the international court called on them both to carry out their relevant treaty obligations. That is nothing to do with the issues which we have before us. But the noble and learned Lord was not satisfied with Slovakia; he went to Canada in 1995. He prayed in aid decisions taken then by the Canadian Government in relation to the Grand Banks and their overfishing, but there was no question of a treaty on that occasion.

If these two cases are offered as support for the notion that this case is one where necessity is justified, I would respectfully suggest that they do not support that thesis. The Government will have to do something rather more if they are to establish any question that necessity arises in this matter.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I very much agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, said about this being a context where it would be enormously helpful to this House, and to Parliament generally, for the Government to publish legal advice so that we can understand why they assert, contrary to the views of most—if not all—lawyers, that what they propose to do is not a breach of international law. I anticipate, however, that the Advocate-General for Scotland will tell us that there is a convention that the Government are not prepared to publish legal advice. If that is his position, it would be enormously helpful to the House if he could at least address the substance of the criticisms that have been made of the Government’s position in international law. The noble and learned Lord told us at Second Reading that that was not the time or the place for him to address these arguments. I very much hope that today is the time and that he will tell the House, if he is not prepared to publish the legal advice, at least the substance of the Government’s argument.

First, why do they say that the test of necessity is satisfied, even though the protocol contains a mechanism for addressing disputes and even though, as the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, told us a few moments ago, the Government are reserving the right to use Article 16? How can it be necessary to set aside the protocol when the Government themselves reserve the right to use a provision in the protocol which is designed to address the very problems that they are concerned about?

Secondly—I dealt with these points at Second Reading, but we had no answer—how can there be an “imminent peril”, when this dispute has been going on for three years, since the protocol was agreed? Why is it imminent, which is the requirement in international law?

Thirdly, since they have not told us this, what is the Government’s case as to how the doctrine of necessity can be satisfied when the International Law Commission, the academic analysis and the case law all say, “You cannot rely on the doctrine of necessity when you, the state relying on it, have contributed to the problems which you are complaining about”? How can it not be the case that the Government have at least contributed to the perceived problem when they signed the protocol after negotiations? If we are not to have the legal advice, can we please have at least some indication or hint as to what the Government’s case is?

While we are dealing with that, could we also please be told whether the Government’s legal advice associates itself with the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Bew? They have never said this, but is their argument that the Good Friday agreement establishes the test of necessity? I would like to know, please, the answers to those basic questions so that when we proceed with Committee we are at least informed as to what the Government’s position actually is.

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[Lord Dodds of Duncairn (DUP)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, and I understand what she is saying, but the issues that were being discussed at the time by Her Majesty’s Government, as it then was, and which the Labour Party was responding to, are the same issues that are before us today, which are affecting the political process in Northern Ireland and leading to problems with the supply of goods from Great Britain. They are exactly the same but when the solution, “Let’s trigger Article 16; let’s go into negotiations”, was suggested, the Labour Party derided that as being toxic. The Labour Party gave support and succour to those who have allowed this position of instability and economic and constitutional harm to continue. A lot of lies have been told around the place, but it is no good, if I may say so, the noble Baroness putting all the blame on to the Government when everybody in Parliament and all political parties have to accept that the goalposts have been shifted, often by consensus, in a way that has done damage to the Belfast agreement, as amended by St Andrews, in a way that has undermined the trust of the people in Northern Ireland in the institutions.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I entirely understand the noble Lord’s political grievance, but the fact is that Article 16 is part of the protocol and the political grievance cannot itself provide the basis for necessity in international law. This group of amendments is seeking to understand what the legal advice of the Government is.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I always find it very interesting to follow the noble Lord. As I said before, I have been trying to understand his dilemma. For all the accusations against these Benches, suggesting that we may have been party to shifting goalposts to the Government is a stretch too far in any sport, whether it is rugby or football. We have been fairly consistent with our warnings, and I refer the noble Lord to Hansard when we debated the protocol and I raised these issues in 2019. We knew there were going to be the difficulties, because what the noble Lord wanted, we knew the Government were not going to satisfy. We have had three years of government gymnastics—I am mixing my sporting metaphors all over the place—trying to present a political argument which we knew was fundamentally flawed.

The only way that this will be sustainably resolved, if one part of the UK, Northern Ireland, is to remain part of the single market, is for there to be agreement. Unilateral actions against treaty obligations is not a sustainable solution to any of these problems. I understand when the noble Lord talks about a lack of trust. It is a stretch for him to make an impassioned contribution such as that and then say, “But I am going to argue passionately in favour of a Bill that gives unprecedented Henry VIII powers” to the exact same people he has said he had lost entire trust in.

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[Lord Bew (CB)]

My Lords, very briefly, I have been trying to say that the legal advice is a little more complicated and nuanced. I am not claiming, for example, that any prominent international lawyers such as Professor Boyle support this Bill. In fact, I do not think he does; he is one of the many who believe in Article 16.

I am quite astounded. Only a few weeks ago, every civilised person knew that Article 16 was the most brutish thing they had ever heard of. All civilised Peers across all parties and all civilised people knew it was the most brutish thing they had ever heard of, just as they are sure of this tonight. However, at this point we have a serious negotiation with the EU. Why do they think that, to improve the atmosphere of these talks, it would be a smart idea for the British Government to come in on Monday morning and say, “Well, you know, civilised opinion has changed. A few months ago, we thought it was brutish; we now think this Bill is so brutish that we want you now to declare Article 16”. This is not serious. There is a serious negotiation going on. You cannot seriously ask the Government to do this. I sympathise and fully accept that the legal arguments are more complex than has been acknowledged in this Chamber this afternoon—they are difficult and I have no firm, final view—but it would be absurd for the Government to say at this point, “Oh, we were having this negotiation but, by the way, here is Article 16”. I am sorry, it just would not work.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

For my part, and I am sure it is true of others who have spoken in this debate, I am not asking the Government to exercise Article 16 tomorrow. The point is that the availability of Article 16 at a later stage is the reason why the test of necessity cannot be satisfied.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Stewart of Dirleton) (Con)]

My Lords, I turn to Amendments 3 and 67 in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed. The Government acknowledge that the noble Lord and the noble Baroness are right to raise the important issue of the relationship of this Bill to the United Kingdom’s international legal obligations.

On the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, I consider that the amendments proposed are not necessary. The Government have published a statement setting out their legal position. I will expand on that position during my submission, in particular to answer the points raised by the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, and others. None the less, a statement has been published, to which the noble Lord referred, setting out the Government’s legal position that the Bill is consistent with the United Kingdom’s international obligations.

Noble Lords chided me gently for perhaps going on a bit long at Second Reading—

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[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

My Lords, the Government set out their position at the outset to assuage, hopefully, the concerns of Peers and Parliament generally about the steps which they intended to take. I do not intend to go beyond that on the Government’s legal advice.

I was going on to address the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and others—the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, and the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford—about the matter of necessity. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, paid me a restricted compliment earlier. May I respond in kind by saying that I am grateful to him for the wise, kindly, and friendly manner in which he has always engaged with me since I started in this House? I look forward to further engagements with him and the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, and others on these points.

The noble Lord I think was the first to pose the question, how would it be possible for the Government to depend on the doctrine of necessity when the Government have put their signature, have become a party, to the protocol, having negotiated it? Do those facts, of themselves, prevent the Government from relying on this? Because, as the noble Lord said, the doctrine of necessity cannot be relied on by a party which by its conduct has caused the problem. The noble Lord, Lord Bew, nods his head.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Or contributed.

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

Or contributed. Where I and the Government differ from the noble Lord is in this regard: we signed the protocol in good faith, we negotiated in good faith, but we are entitled also to look beyond the terms to the manner in which the protocol has been implemented and interpreted by the other side. In relation to that point, it is not a—

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am very grateful and I apologise for speaking so often, but this is Committee. If the Government’s belief is that the other side has not faithfully performed its obligations on the protocol, the protocol itself provides a mechanism by which that dispute can be resolved. The means provided is through the Court of Justice. I entirely understand why politically the Government do not like that remedy, but that is what we agreed.

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

To pick up the noble Lord’s point about the CJEU, the Belfast/Good Friday agreement is based, as we have heard, on the consent of both communities. It is part of a package, along with VAT and state aid rules, that causes unionists to feel less connected and less part of the United Kingdom. As your Lordships have heard in the course of the debate today, all unionist parties cited the CJEU as a key driver of a major democratic deficit. This is not a hypothetical issue; there have been seven separate infraction proceedings brought against the United Kingdom by the EU, covering issues such as value-added tax, excise, pet passports and parcels. We consider it inappropriate for the CJEU to be the final arbiter.