Lord Stewart of Dirleton
Main Page: Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Stewart of Dirleton's debates with the Scotland Office
(2 years ago)
Lords ChamberFor my part, and I am sure it is true of others who have spoken in this debate, I am not asking the Government to exercise Article 16 tomorrow. The point is that the availability of Article 16 at a later stage is the reason why the test of necessity cannot be satisfied.
My Lords, I turn to Amendments 3 and 67 in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed. The Government acknowledge that the noble Lord and the noble Baroness are right to raise the important issue of the relationship of this Bill to the United Kingdom’s international legal obligations.
On the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, I consider that the amendments proposed are not necessary. The Government have published a statement setting out their legal position. I will expand on that position during my submission, in particular to answer the points raised by the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, and others. None the less, a statement has been published, to which the noble Lord referred, setting out the Government’s legal position that the Bill is consistent with the United Kingdom’s international obligations.
Noble Lords chided me gently for perhaps going on a bit long at Second Reading—
I am grateful to my noble friend. I was left by some of the strictures and anticipations of my point from noble Lords looking for synonyms for the words “long-standing convention”. However, in light of having been criticised for going on a bit long and the hour, I will confine myself to repeating—or rehearsing—the point noble Lords anticipated I would make.
It is a long-standing government policy and convention accepted by Governments of all parties not to comment on legal advice provided to the Government. A number of noble Lords who have been present in this debate or at Second Reading will understand personally the importance of that, having acted as internal or external counsel to His Majesty’s Government.
I was asked by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, about the protocol and its place in relation to the Belfast/Good Friday agreement. The protocol puts that agreement at the forefront; the problem is that, in its implementation, it is undermining it.
The Advocate-General has just given the totally conventional response about the Government not publishing their legal advice. In that case, why did the Government publish a four-page document in the summer setting out their legal advice?
My Lords, the Government set out their position at the outset to assuage, hopefully, the concerns of Peers and Parliament generally about the steps which they intended to take. I do not intend to go beyond that on the Government’s legal advice.
I was going on to address the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and others—the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, and the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford—about the matter of necessity. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, paid me a restricted compliment earlier. May I respond in kind by saying that I am grateful to him for the wise, kindly, and friendly manner in which he has always engaged with me since I started in this House? I look forward to further engagements with him and the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, and others on these points.
The noble Lord I think was the first to pose the question, how would it be possible for the Government to depend on the doctrine of necessity when the Government have put their signature, have become a party, to the protocol, having negotiated it? Do those facts, of themselves, prevent the Government from relying on this? Because, as the noble Lord said, the doctrine of necessity cannot be relied on by a party which by its conduct has caused the problem. The noble Lord, Lord Bew, nods his head.
Or contributed. Where I and the Government differ from the noble Lord is in this regard: we signed the protocol in good faith, we negotiated in good faith, but we are entitled also to look beyond the terms to the manner in which the protocol has been implemented and interpreted by the other side. In relation to that point, it is not a—
I am very grateful and I apologise for speaking so often, but this is Committee. If the Government’s belief is that the other side has not faithfully performed its obligations on the protocol, the protocol itself provides a mechanism by which that dispute can be resolved. The means provided is through the Court of Justice. I entirely understand why politically the Government do not like that remedy, but that is what we agreed.
To pick up the noble Lord’s point about the CJEU, the Belfast/Good Friday agreement is based, as we have heard, on the consent of both communities. It is part of a package, along with VAT and state aid rules, that causes unionists to feel less connected and less part of the United Kingdom. As your Lordships have heard in the course of the debate today, all unionist parties cited the CJEU as a key driver of a major democratic deficit. This is not a hypothetical issue; there have been seven separate infraction proceedings brought against the United Kingdom by the EU, covering issues such as value-added tax, excise, pet passports and parcels. We consider it inappropriate for the CJEU to be the final arbiter.
I listened very carefully to what my noble and learned friend said, but the situation remains the same today, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, set out, as it was on the day that the Government claimed to have an “oven-ready deal”—I think those were the words—of which the protocol was an integral part. It is a cornerstone of the EU Withdrawal Agreement and, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has stated, the remedy is in the protocol. So it is very unfair for the Members on the DUP Benches to be put in this position, but that is the position that was sold to both Houses.
My Lords, I beg respectfully to differ from my noble friend. The situation is not the same, because in the intervening period between the announcements to which my noble friend refers, and today, these problems about implementation have arisen; so the situation is not the same, and we simply cannot go back to reference the text of the argument.
I have noticed the emphasis that the Minister has placed twice now on the word “implementation”, and I want to understand precisely where he views the problems with the protocol to lie now, because the Bill that he is supporting deals with the problems in a far more fundamental way than just looking at implementation and practicalities.
I am referring to implementation in terms of the manner in which these problems have arisen: the problems that have led to the difficulties with which the House is currently grappling, such as the suspension of institutions and the democratic deficit. I think the noble Baroness wishes to speak.
I was muttering to myself, actually. Those are not problems of implementation of the protocol, those are issues that underlie the protocol; I am just trying to understand exactly what the Government see as the problem, because unless we do that in a fuller way than he is perhaps leading towards, we will not have a clear idea of what the Government are recommending the solution to be.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her intervention, and I hope I will be able to, if not clear it up directly, refer the noble Baroness to the statements in the Order Paper. Perhaps I may say, in relation to the amendments with which we are currently engaged in relation to publication of the Government’s legal advice, that it may well be—and I think I made the same observation to my noble friend Lady Altmann—that these points might be dealt with better in relation to later groups which will address the question of the protocol and the amendments which the Government propose. I give way to the noble Lord.
The noble and learned Lord has just told the Committee that the problem is with the implementation of the protocol. In his Second Reading winding speech he said that
“the problem lies in the protocol and not in its application.”—[Official Report, 11/10/22; col. 768.]
So, which is it?
My Lords, the problems with which we are grappling lie in the implementation of the protocol: I think the protocol has given a basis upon which these implementations may be made.
Is this the noble and learned Lord correcting the record now from his Second Reading speech? I am quoting directly from Hansard that
“the problem lies in the protocol and not in its application.”—[Official Report, 11/10/22; col. 768.]
But he is telling the Committee today that it is in its application.
The noble Lord promised at the very outset of Committee, when he opened the earlier debate, that this inconsistency would be pounced upon, and he has returned to the point. My answer to him is that the implementation has given rise to the difficulties we now face, and that the protocol has permitted that implementation to take place.
Could I ask my noble and learned friend to amplify what it is in the way that the protocol is working that was not anticipated? The role of the European court was always enshrined in the protocol, so I am struggling to understand what has suddenly changed to require this unilateral action to get rid of the CJEU, rather than using the mechanisms within the protocol.
My Lords, the diversion of trade and the effects upon the confidence of the unionist community in their membership of the United Kingdom have given rise to the difficulties we now face.
As I was saying before dealing with that spate of interruptions from noble Lords, it has become apparent that one of the communities—I remind your Lordships of the importance of the concept of consent in the Belfast/Good Friday agreement—has recognised that the CJEU is a part of the problem, as unionist parties have cited the CJEU as a key driver of a major democratic deficit. The Bill therefore seeks to ensure that Great Britain and Northern Ireland courts will have the final say over the laws that affect their citizens. It will permit a referral mechanism to the Court of Justice of the European Union, recognising legitimate EU interests and supporting north-south trade. We consider this to be a reasonable step which places the matter in line with normal dispute resolution provisions in international treaties.
On that point, would the Minister be able to cite any other agreement the UK has signed where the dispute resolution mechanism affords the UK the ability to bring forward unilateral legislative solutions which are contrary to the agreement we had signed? What other examples can he cite?
My Lords, that question brings me on to dealing with the terms of the argument in relation to Article 16, about which we have had some submissions from the noble Lord himself, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, the noble Lord, Lord Dodds of Duncairn, and the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford. Triggering Article 16 would not solve the problems of the protocol. It would only treat some of the symptoms, without fixing the root causes of those problems. It has inherent limitations in terms of its scope. Such safeguard measures might address trade frictions but not the broader identified impacts of the protocol such as I have been founding upon. The legislation that the Government propose provides the comprehensive and durable solution required and certainty for businesses and the people of Northern Ireland.
I must confess that I am very troubled and puzzled. If the Government have decided that this is what they are going to do, that is incompatible with having proper negotiations. How can my noble and learned friend explain that?
My Lords, as your Lordships have heard from my noble friend Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon and the noble Lord, Lord Bew, this is not identified as an inconsistency by our counterparties in relation to this matter.
The Government’s legal position is that our legislation is necessary and justified, and we make that assertion without prejudice to our position in relation to Article 16—again, as your Lordships heard from my noble friend Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon earlier. Article 16 is expressly limited. It is the Government’s view that it would not solve all the societal and political issues identified, including those identified today in some of your Lordships’ contributions to the earlier debate, whereas the Bill provides a comprehensive solution to those problems.
The noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Pittenweem—who in another context is my learned friend—referred me to the examples I cited when winding up at Second Reading of cases which set out the doctrine of necessity. The Canadian fisheries case concerned the Convention on Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, which was a treaty. The Hungary-Slovakia case to which I also referred was a dispute about an agreement between the two parties for navigation of a river and the construction of infrastructure. In any event, I think the answer to his point is that the concept of necessity and its application in these circumstances is admitted within the articles of state responsibility.
I will refer to this in the next group, but the Minister might want to add a little extra with regards to the case he cited: the International Court of Justice threw out the Hungarian case on invocation of necessity. It said that
“Hungary would not have been permitted to rely upon that state of necessity in order to justify its failure to comply with its treaty obligations, as it had helped, by act or omission to bring it about.”
I think there are some similarities in what we are hearing now, but could the Minister confirm that the ICJ did not accept Hungary’s case?
My Lords, in any case, there will be parties that are disappointed to a greater extent than others. The point is that one party proposes. That party does not determine the question; the determination of that question falls to someone else.
In relation to the point made by my noble friend Lady Altmann, our preference for negotiation clearly remains. As the Committee has heard, that negotiation is not interrupted or affected by the Bill moving through your Lordships’ House.
My Lords, the Minister said that the four-page document we saw in July was designed to assuage our concern. Unfortunately, it did not. In one sense, I am impressed that the Government are prepared to receive criticism of their legal assertions in that document from people of the stature of Sir Jonathan Jones, Professor Mark Elliott, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and my noble friend Lord Campbell of Pittenweem, and still say, “Well, the four-page document adequately sets out our case”. I am sort of impressed but also surprised that the Government are not provoked by the level and depth of that criticism to make a bit more of an effort.
One of my noble friends—I cannot remember which—highlighted the difference between the assertion made at Second Reading that the problem lies in the protocol and the emphasis this evening that the problem lies in its implementation. That would imply that there is no need to rip up the protocol, which is what the Bill is designed to achieve, and that negotiations or dispute resolution up to the ECJ would fit the bill as the problem is in the implementation. The Government keep switching their ground depending on, it seems to me, who most recently raised a point as to whether the real problem is the protocol or its implementation. The Minister said that invoking Article 16 would deal only with the symptoms not the protocol, but surely “symptoms” are the same thing as “implementation” in this context. Again, there is inconsistency here over whether the problem lies with the text of the protocol or its implementation.
The Minister rather confused me with his references to the CJEU being part of the problem. Again, that was known three years ago. The Government agreed and signed up to what the EU would not have otherwise agreed to—Northern Ireland being effectively part of the single market—without the CJEU being the ultimate arbiter of legal disputes. However, I have frankly never taken the point from the right that court adjudication creates a democratic deficit. We do not expect courts to be democratic. They are part of a liberal democracy but are not themselves supposed to be an epicentre of democracy. They rule on the application of the law.
I do not think that it says much for the Government’s knowledge, understanding, foresight or policies that they are now seeking to diverge from the single market, not least in the Bill—I cannot remember its full title; it is something like the revocation of retained law Bill, otherwise known as the Brexit freedoms Bill—that had its Second Reading in the other place today; I do not know whether that is still going on. Diverging from single market legislation makes the implementation of the protocol more difficult so there does not seem to be any coherence in the Government’s policy. They criticise the implementation of the protocol but are going to make that implementation more problematic; indeed, the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, talked about how maintenance of regulatory alignment would help east-west trade. A UK return to the single market, if not the EU, would do so even more.