Unaccompanied Asylum-seeking Children

John Hayes Excerpts

Tuesday 24th January 2023 Commons Chamber

[Robert Jenrick]

I respect the right hon. Lady and her Committee, but it is not as simple as my being able to set a date by which these hotels will close, because we have to be honest with ourselves about the challenge that we face as a country. There are hundreds, if not thousands, of young people crossing the channel on small boats every year. What we need to do is flow those young people as swiftly as possible into local authority care, but if local authorities do not have the capacity to take them immediately, we have to bear in mind that we can detain somebody for only 24 hours—or now 96 hours, with the recent legal change that we have made. In a relatively short timeframe, we have to have a short period of bridging accommodation. For as long as the challenge remains as pronounced as it is today, we will need that.

The task for us is twofold. The first part is to work with local authorities and provide the incentives for them to boost their own capacity. The other is to deter people from making the crossing in the first place. We are trying to do everything within our power to do so, including by making further legislative changes, but until we beat this trade, there will be young people placed in this position.

[Sir John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)]

The particular vulnerability of children in distress touches our hearts and must move us to further action, as my right hon. Friend says. Will he tell the House when the legislation that he has described will come before us? Will he implore all those who share my compassion and concern for these desperate children to support that legislation without equivocation? Unless we deal with this problem at root, the sheer scale of it will overwhelm our capacity nationally or locally to protect these children. It is as simple as that.

National Security Bill

John Hayes Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 16th November 2022 Commons Chamber

[Tom Tugendhat]

What I am so pleased about with this Bill is that it introduces so many ideas that the right hon. Gentleman and I have discussed in private over many years when I was in a similar position to him—scrutinising a Government. The Bill introduces some of those ideas that, yes, he is right to say, seem to have been introduced quickly, but the reality, as he knows very well, is that they have been discussed slowly. Many aspects of the Bill not only date six or seven years into the past, but update aspects that date a lot further back. Sadly, some of our national security legislation is better placed to hunt those who would send secret notes on pigeons back to Germany than to hunt those sending secret messages through the internet. This is updating quite a lot of laws that date all the way back to the first world war. I am very glad that we are doing it, and I am very glad that the right hon. Gentleman’s scrutiny in the Bill Committee has been so rigorous and so onerous.

[Sir John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend is right that this is an important step. In particular, he is right about the foreign influence registration scheme, which has long been called for, including by the Intelligence and Security Committee, of which I am a member. He will also know that, because we have yet to discuss that in any detail, there may be confusion about the primary and secondary tiers—in other words, those things that are designated as being of more profound importance than these other things. Would it be helpful if he were to write to the ISC, setting out how he thinks they would work in practice, given that we understand that the secondary tier will be introduced by secondary legislation?

[Tom Tugendhat]

My right hon. Friend is right. I would be very happy to write to him. I can summarise it now by saying that the primary tier is that connected to political activity. Anybody from any foreign country who wishes to influence this House, this Parliament, any Members here, or indeed any political outcome, would be looking at the primary tier. That is the basic level, and it involves a registration on a website so that we can all know who has taken payment for what—which piper has been paid and by whom.

The enhanced registration is different and requires registration for a wider range of activities, but those depend on the specific foreign power and, indeed, the entity or operation within it. That is a different matter, and that will be down to the Secretary of State looking at what is reasonably necessary in order to protect the safety and interests of the United Kingdom—that is the enhanced tier, as we are calling it. That is the summary, but I will be happy to write to the ISC.

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[Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to be back in the Chamber at the Report stage of this hugely important piece of legislation. Bill Committee colleagues will join me in saying that it was not straightforward, for all the reasons that were highlighted in the multiple points of order. The Committee had no less than four Ministers and three Government Whips, and was forced to adjourn twice. Since Second Reading, the Bill has been the responsibility of three different Home Secretaries in—remarkably—the Governments of three different Prime Ministers.

We got off to a shaky start on the first day of the Bill Committee when the Whip, the hon. Member for North Cornwall (Scott Mann), who I am pleased has joined us this afternoon, was asked to act up as a Minister only minutes before the start. On one day, the Committee had to be adjourned because the second Minister was missing in action—the circumstances are still a mystery to this day. It was something of a relief, then, when the current Minister took office and we could turn to the serious detail of scrutinising and delivering long overdue and incredibly necessary national security legislation.

As we have said before, many of the new measures in the Bill have been born out of recommendations in the Intelligence and Security Committee’s 2020 Russia report and in the Law Commission’s “Protection of Official Data” report. With those solid foundations, we have been keen to work with Government to move the legislation forward and close the gaps in our defences. That could not be more timely in the light of stark warnings given by the director general of MI5 today, including about the fact that there have been at least 10 attempts to kidnap or even kill UK-based critics of the Iranian regime since January of this year.

That is not to say that we do not have some outstanding concerns about the detail of the provisions. In speaking to all the amendments grouped with new clause 9, I turn first to amendment 14, which was tabled by the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) and my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis). I will spend some time discussing the detail of this amendment, because it is so important.

The original clause 23—now clause 27—was a big focus for hon. Members on both sides of the House on Second Reading. Crucially, it did not have the support of Opposition members of the Intelligence and Security Committee, which has statutory responsibility for oversight of the UK intelligence community. We will always look to work with the intelligence services to find solutions to any barriers they face in undertaking their invaluable work to keep the UK safe. As things stand, however, we have been unable to get an operational understanding of why the clause is necessary.

The security services have told me directly why they believe that they need clause 27. They say that schedule 4 to the Serious Crime Act 2007 allows for a risk of liability to individuals conducting their proper functions on behalf of the UK intelligence community, and that an offence can arise when support—for example, intelligence shared in good faith—later makes a small or indirect contribution to unlawful activity by an international partner. The security services are keen to convey that their caution in this regard is having an operational impact, which requires resolution. We are sympathetic to that view; we recognise that for perhaps quite junior members of staff to face that burden of potential liability when carrying out their proper functions under instruction does not feel quite right. However, we have sought throughout the process to find a way through that does not involve what feels like gold-plating of exemptions for the security services, which could erode entirely appropriate safeguards and due diligence when considering the risks and consequences of sharing information with partners.

As the Minister knows, there is a reasonableness defence under section 50 of the Serious Crime Act, which recognises that there may be occasions when it can be shown that an individual’s actions were justified in the circumstances. Of course, a prosecution would also have to be deemed to be in the public interest. On further probing of these defences, it seems that it is not the case that the reasonableness defence is not strong enough; rather, it is untested, as no such case has been brought. We do not believe that the fact that an apparently robust defence is untested makes a strong enough case for the proposals in clause 27. We hope that properly authorised activity to protect national security should and would be interpreted as reasonable.

We have sought legal advice, including from a King’s counsel who undertakes a great deal of work in the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, and engaged with a range of stakeholders who feel genuinely involved in this space. Given that we already have section 7 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994, which allows the Secretary of State to give immunity from civil or criminal liability for pre-authorised crimes abroad, why do we need the changes proposed in clause 27? Crucially, the existing scheme requires the UK intelligence community to secure permission in advance from the Secretary of State, requiring the Secretary of State’s personal approval, with safeguards in the decision-making process and oversight by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, who is a senior judge. None of those safeguards are present in clause 27; it simply removes the relevant criminal liability. There would be no need to go to a Minister for approval; there would be no warrant for the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to consider.

Thirdly—the Minister and I have debated this—the Bill as drafted diminishes the role of a Minister in decision-making and accountability structures. Ministers will no longer need to make the difficult judgement, reviewed by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, of whether to grant an authorisation under section 7 of the Intelligence Services Act. The Government have been keen to stress their commitment to the Fulford principles—“The Principles relating to the detention and interviewing of detainees overseas and the passing and receipt of intelligence relating to detainees”, making it clear that:

“The UK Government does not participate in, solicit, encourage or condone unlawful killing, the use of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment…or extraordinary rendition. In no circumstance will UK personnel ever take action amounting to torture, unlawful killing, extraordinary rendition, or CIDT.”

However, those commitments are not on the face of the Bill.

With the understanding that there will be operational elements to these provisions, the details of which have not been and cannot be shared, we have pushed for engagement with the ISC, which is entirely the right place for those operational examples to be considered further. Were ISC members to be convinced of the case for clause 27, we might be in a different place. On that basis, we cannot support clause 27 and will vote for it to be deleted by amendment 14.

On a similar point, although we welcome much of the Bill, it is right that any provisions that include new and substantial powers are constantly evaluated for their efficacy and proportionality. Clause 53 recognises that.

[Sir John Hayes]

Efficacy and proportionality are the twin guarantees that underpin all security legislation and activity, as the hon. Lady is aware, but if anything, clause 13, for example, should go further than it currently does. She will know that that clause is built on the idea of intention—that people must intend to do harm—but people should know that they are likely to do harm if they act recklessly, and the Bill could be expanded in that direction. There is an unholy trinity of anarchists, liberals and Bolsheviks who oppose all legislation of this kind, but if anything, this legislation should be warmly welcomed and go further than it does.

[Holly Lynch]

I am grateful for the intervention. The points that I am about to make about the value and role of an independent reviewer of this legislation relate to how, if some of the thresholds are not in the right place, such a reviewer can not only be both a check and a balance on the powers but make recommendations for going further in the legislation if we find that there is an operational case for doing so. That is the sensible and constructive point that the right hon. Gentleman knows I am making.

Clause 53 recognises the need for evaluation but deems only part 2 of the Bill to be necessary for review by an independent reviewer and fails to be explicit about who that independent reviewer will be. The Minister has been unable to confirm who will perform this oversight function, which we believe is integral to finding the appropriate balance of powers and freedoms. The scrutiny of terrorism legislation provided by Jonathan Hall KC has been invaluable. The independent reviewer of terrorism legislation function has identified weaknesses in terrorism legislation and highlighted areas where stronger safeguards are needed, as well as providing crucial and checks and balances on the powers.

When he gave evidence to the Bill Committee, I asked Jonathan Hall whether there is a logic to his office taking on the additional responsibilities and whether he had the capacity to undertake that work. He said:

“My answer is that I think it actually is quite a good fit for the reviewer’s job, and I think it probably is right that the person who does the independent review of terrorism legislation should also do the state threats legislation.”––[Official Report, National Security Public Bill Committee, 7 July 2022; c. 6, Q4.].

With the highest regard for Jonathan Hall, we recognise the merit in adding to his remit the responsibilities created by clause 53. We can see the benefit of a coherent, joined-up approach to assessing both counter-terrorism and state threat legislation.

That said, were the Minister to make a case for the creation of a brand-new position, exclusively for the independent review of laws concerning state threats, we would certainly be open to that. We are, though, now reaching the Bill’s final Commons stages, and we are very much overdue an agreement that the role will begin immediately once the Bill is enacted, clarity on who will undertake the work, and a commitment that all the new provisions in the Bill will be considered in an annual review. Successive Ministers have understood the point and committed to sorting the situation out, but here we are with no progress and nothing to show for it on the face of the Bill, so we are keen to push new clause 3 to a vote.

In Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley (Jess Phillips) made a powerful case for the provisions in amendment 6, which sits alongside paving amendments 5 and 7. We made clear our concerns about part 4 of the Bill in the Committee. The restrictions on access to civil legal aid stand to do more harm than good if we do not recognise the problems in such an approach.

Let us consider the types of civil cases that legal aid might be needed for. People find themselves in civil and family court proceedings and in need of legal aid support for a multitude of reasons, including housing issues, debt problems and domestic abuse. For example, a victim of domestic abuse might need legal aid to help her to seek an injunction against her abuser. Non-molestation orders protect a victim or their child from being harmed or threatened by their abuser, while occupation orders decide who can live in a family home or enter the surrounding area. Such injunctions protect victims and children in particular. They save women’s lives. They are legal measures that protect women from violence.

My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley made the powerful point in Committee, based on her years of working in the sector, that it is easy to say that someone who has engaged in that type of criminality is not deserving of legal aid, but what if a woman’s abuser is a terrorist? The nature of terrorist offenders means that that is too often the case.

Draft Terrorism Act 2000 (Alterations to the Search Powers Code England and Wales and Scotland) Order 2022

John Hayes Excerpts

Wednesday 19th October 2022 General Committees

[Tom Tugendhat]

I am grateful for the cross-party support for these important measures.

[Sir John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)]

Given the cross-party support that the Minister was just celebrating, would it be useful for the Home Secretary to write to chief constables to remind them of the importance of the new powers, and to ensure that they are up to date on how they might be applied? It could be helpful, in the circumstances, to reflect the general consensus.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I will definitely take that back to the Home Secretary; I am sure that she will be delighted to do that. I am sure chief constables will be aware that the measures have cross-party support, and therefore the support of the whole country.

Question put and agreed to.

National Security Bill

John Hayes Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 6th June 2022 Commons Chamber

[Priti Patel]

At the end of the day, we are focused on individuals who are trying to do harm to our country. I will look specifically at that—obviously, I will—but intent is also based on the information and activity that can come together around some of the individuals. Right now, we are only referring to much of this on a case-by-case basis, but as we have learned with recent examples, some of which I might come on to, we can see the intent and the harm in the sequence of activity that has taken place around individuals.

[Sir John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)]

I am extremely grateful to the Home Secretary, who I know is trying to move to a peroration. On the issue of dynamism, intentions alter and threats change. The Bill creates the scope to take action against a changing terrorist landscape, but is there sufficient flexibility in the Bill to alter its provisions in accordance with those changing intentions and changing threats?

[Priti Patel]

My right hon. Friend makes an important point. Of course, that is the whole purpose of legislation. As I said in the first part of my remarks, we cannot remain static; we must have the agility to respond. Since February this year, with Russia’s incursion into Ukraine, techniques and tactics have changed. Yes, we are responding to them differently, but some legislative underpinning is absolutely required, as is having the flexibility and agility to respond. Hack and leak is only one example. There are so many other examples, as he will know from his time as Security Minister and from his time on the Intelligence and Security Committee. The landscape is shifting and, frankly, it is shifting fast.

We cannot wait for terrible atrocities to happen before we intervene. The Bill criminalises people who prepare to commit acts that constitute state threat offences and other harmful activity that constitutes a serious threat to life or public safety. They will face the prospect of life behind bars. When it comes to state threats, an aggravating factor will ensure that sentences for state-linked criminality recognise the seriousness of hostile activity conducted for or on behalf of foreign states. This applies to all offences not in the Bill where the foreign power condition is met.

In July 2021, the US Department of Justice announced that a New York court had unsealed an indictment against four people resident in Iran for their involvement in a plot to kidnap an unnamed Iranian-American journalist. The indictment also detailed four other individuals under surveillance by the network, including one based in the United Kingdom. Prosecutors said that one of the conspirators was an Iranian intelligence official, while the other three were assets of Iranian intelligence. Again, that speaks to the aggravating factors and the type of activity that takes place, as well as the cross-collaboration when it comes to dealing with some of those hostile state threats.

The people who engage in such nefarious behaviour are often highly skilled at keeping their activities hidden and we should never lose sight of that. Let us be under no illusion about the scale of the threat we face. In February last year, a Belgian court sentenced an accredited Iranian diplomat based in Vienna to 20 years in prison for his role in a plot to bomb a conference in Paris hosted by Iranian dissidents. The Belgian state security service stated:

“the plan for the attack was conceived in the name of Iran and under its leadership.”

Russian dissident Alexei Navalny was poisoned by Putin’s thugs and could easily have lost his life. In response, our Government enforced asset freezes and travel bans against 13 individuals and a Russian research centre.

It is vital, when creating a suite of new offences, to ensure that the police and the security and intelligence agencies have the powers effectively to investigate the threats this Bill seeks to address. I am bringing forward search and seizure powers to replace the existing investigative tool to counter complex state threats investigations. A new power of arrest for state threats activity, a new state threats detention scheme, and longer retention periods for biometric data will give the police further powers effectively to investigate these cases.

There will be some cases where it will not be possible to bring a prosecution. As is the case with counter-terrorism law, where similar challenges arise, we need a way of protecting our country. New state threat prevention and investigation measures will allow the Home Secretary to impose targeted restrictions, such as where an individual works, lives or studies, to prevent the most serious forms of harm. This is a tool of last resort. It will be used when intelligence confirms that highly damaging threat activity is planned or being undertaken, but prosecution is not realistic. These measures will be proportionate to the threat posed by an individual, and they will be subject to rigorous checks and balances, including by the courts. The Bill improves schedule 3 powers in the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019.

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[Yvette Cooper]

The hon. Member is absolutely right. The work done by those across our intelligence and security agencies often goes unseen and unremarked on, and, as a result, it is often unappreciated, but both sides of the House are clear about the debt of gratitude that we owe to many of those who work so hard to keep us safe.

In these debates, people often end up pitting liberty and security against each other or arguing, for example, that action to defend security constrains our liberty, that historic freedoms should be abandoned in the interests of security and that, somehow, they are in conflict. The truth is that, as we all know, both liberty and security are vital in a democracy, and they depend on each other. We need to feel secure to have the freedom to get on with our daily lives, and security measures also need to take account of the importance of the very freedoms that it is their purpose to defend. Our intelligence and security agencies also depend on public trust and, rightly, need always to be located within a strong legal framework with strong oversight. Where strong powers are needed to defend our national security, they need to be matched by strong oversight, with checks and balances to ensure that powers are proportionate and necessary, and never abused.

[Sir John Hayes]

As ever on these matters, the right hon. Lady is making a compelling speech. Given what she has said about the apparent paradox between freedom and order, will she join me in condemning those who in breaching secrets and leaking information, claim to do so in the name of liberty but actually act in a way that is injurious to order and therefore to freedom?

[Yvette Cooper]

I say clearly that our national security needs to be taken seriously by everybody. It should not be lightly dismissed that without it we do not have strong freedoms and liberties. The people of Salisbury had a right to the freedom to be able to walk safely on their streets and not to find their lives put at risk by a dangerous chemical attack by members of a foreign intelligence service that ultimately took a British life; patients throughout the country have a right to know that their medical records are not being hacked or interfered with by a foreign state; and our businesses, scientists and researchers, on whom our future prosperity depends, have a right to feel safe from foreign attacks that undermine the resilience of our infrastructure or from the theft of trade secrets.

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[Yvette Cooper]

I would certainly be happy to have further discussions through the usual channels about the way in which the Bill needs to be scrutinised. In the early evidence stage of the scrutiny, particularly for a Bill like this, it is important for the Committee to be able to hear evidence on this issue, in order to make sure that we get it right.

[Sir John Hayes]

With all due regard to my hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe (Mr Baker), a much better approach would be exactly as the right hon. Lady describes—to have the proposal early in the Committee’s consideration and for the proper interface to operate between the two Front Benches. I know that she is richly experienced in these subjects, as is the Home Secretary, and I am sure that a proper dialogue could take place to deal with the matter that has been raised.

[Yvette Cooper]

As I have said, these debates will rightly take place through the usual channels to ensure that we have that scrutiny. I am also keen to ensure that the evidence session can take place in plenty of time.



Another issue that Members on both sides of the House have raised is the absence of reforms to the Official Secrets Act 1989, and on that point I am slightly less clear what the Government’s intention is. My understanding from what the Home Secretary has said is that she does not plan to bring forward measures in this Bill but that she is looking at the issue further. The Law Commission has raised important issues about the need to improve prosecutions in certain areas and to have public interest safeguards, both of which are immensely important, as I think the Home Secretary has recognised. Will she and the Security Minister therefore engage at an early stage in discussions on this issue with Members on both sides of the House?

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[Yvette Cooper]

The hon. Member makes an important point about other potential gaps. I would be keen to discuss with him further how that could be addressed.

There is a principle here, which is that sometimes important powers are not subject to the normal public scrutiny—inevitably, because of how they need to be used in order to keep us safe and to deal with hostile threats, be it from other foreign states or from terrorists. However, that veil of secrecy makes the need for independent scrutiny all the more important. Rightly, we have the Intelligence and Security Committee and other Committees, but also things like the investigatory powers commissioners. Specifically on the terrorism legislation, the role of the independent reviewer has been immensely valuable. I urge the Home Secretary and the Security Minister to look at widening the oversight provisions in the Bill. While there might be areas of disagreement between us, we will come to a conclusion and measures will pass through Parliament, but there will still be weaknesses in them and there will still be problems with the legislation.

[Sir John Hayes]

The right hon. Lady is making a good point about oversight and checks and balances. She mentioned the Investigatory Powers Act and the judicial commissioners. I was involved in taking that legislation through the House, as she knows. The independent reviewer’s scope is already sufficiently wide, is it not, to look at terrorism legislation per se? So I assume that she is talking about making sure that that scope is sufficient rather than establishing a different and parallel structure.

[Yvette Cooper]

There is a very strong case for having the same independent commissioner to cover espionage and terrorism. That is obviously a matter that the Home Secretary would need to consider, but clearly, especially with the STPIMs and the TPIMs, there are overlapping issues that it would make sense for the same framework and the same independent reviewer to cover. My understanding is that at the moment the independent reviewer covers only terrorism legislation and that the provisions of this Bill will not be within their scope. It would be very easy to amend the Bill—I hope it would receive cross-party support—to allow either the same independent reviewer or a parallel independent reviewer to look at espionage legislation. That would also allow for ongoing review of whatever changes we end up concluding are needed to the Official Secrets Act 1989. Again, there will be an important need for further review to make sure that we have the right measures to protect our security and support the public interest. We can cover our many other issues with the Bill in Committee. We look forward to those exchanges and to having further discussions directly with Ministers.

I am conscious that other Members with great expertise in this area want to contribute to the debate, so I will conclude simply by saying that at a time when across Europe we are all coping with the illegal invasion of Ukraine by Russia, and supporting Ukraine’s immense bravery in standing up and responding to this appalling Russian threat; at a time when we have seen hostile state activity not just from Russia but, as the director general of MI5 has said, from countries such as China and Iran; and at a time when we all know we need to stand up for our democracy, historic freedoms, liberties and democratic values, I hope that we will be able to come together to support our national security, and continue to defend our democracy and democratic values.

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[Sir John Hayes]

If I may be helpful while my hon. Friend is finding his notes, he makes a compelling case—a case that was made prior to this Bill by the Government and by those who recommended this legislation: the ISC, the Law Commission and others. The issue is how we construct this, how it is included in legislation and in the Government’s proposals, and at what stage we will know more about that. That was rehearsed earlier in the debate, but it is important that we have real scrutiny of that process.

[Bob Seely]

I am delighted that my right hon. Friend interrupted me just as I was fiddling around with my paperwork. There are two critical points that I will come to very shortly, looking at five potential options for the foreign lobbying and foreign influence element of the Bill, and at whether we go for a light touch, a moderate touch or a deep touch.

We know the situation with the Russians has changed dramatically, although it may change back in future years, but China is now, if anything, a more important case than Russia, because we know that the Chinese Communist party uses state, non-state and quasi-state actors in the same way that Putin’s Kremlin did. The one thing I see immediately on looking at the Bill—maybe the Minister can guide me here—is a lot of references to state actors. Is Huawei a state actor? We have had Ministers claim in this House that Huawei is “a private company”. In a communist, one-party state, a major company that is a front for Chinese technology is not a private company.

What are the Government going to do about the Oleg Deripaskas and the Abramoviches of this world? I know the world has moved on somewhat, but in theory, what are they going to do about rich players who are beholden to dictators in different countries? What are we going to do about the Saudis? They do an awful lot of influencing and influence operations in this country and a great deal of lobbying. They are our allies, but that is not a democracy. To what extent do countries such as Saudi Arabia need to be more transparent about the business they do here?

Both the Kremlin and the Chinese Communist party raise issues not only about politicians—who, for me, are not the most important aspect, and I am not just saying that because I am in Parliament—but about law firms, which are critically important. This is about the power of the finance houses and former civil servants who have expert experience of policy making. It is about the special advisers who work closely with senior Ministers and know how a Secretary of State’s mind operates and how they think.

Those things are, in many ways, frankly more valuable than how a Back-Bench MP or a member of an all-party parliamentary group is going to vote. We need a foreign influence element to the Bill, and my strong recommendation to the Minister is that we need something that is flexible and captures the idea that influence nowadays is not just peddled through people in this House. In many ways, many of the most important peddlers of influence are not Members of Parliament, but people in the civil service, or ex-civil servants, ex-military or ex-politicians—people in that sort of world.

If we are to have a foreign lobbying element, what should we look at? I recommend that we create laws to compel individuals and entities who lobby in the UK for hostile states and their proxies to record that on a national register. The Government accept that. The problem is that previous laws have limited lobbying to “consultant lobbyists”, which is not adequate to the task. We know that hostile states make use of non-lobbyist individuals and entities—those backed by or linked with a state, active in the spheres of academia, economics, culture and the media. Registrable lobbyists should be anyone who influences Government decisions or national policy, and that will therefore include PR consultants, research firms, reputation managers, law firms when they offer additional services, and banks. Law firms in particular have been at the corrosive heart of some of the most corrupting elements of how individual oligarchs have tended to use and manipulate power in the west.

I would also create laws to force foreign Governments to disclose when they spend money on political activity in the UK; that ban foreign Governments or their proxies from providing political, financial and other support during election periods; and that compel foreign Governments and their proxies to label and disclose material and campaigns undertaken in the UK, especially those online. I would make those laws enforceable by criminal penalty. The Government are approaching some of those positions, which is great, but it is the breadth that is important.

On the next element, there are three options. One is a weak regime that treats everyone the same, so the Saudis the same as a Russian oligarch, or Huawei, or the New Zealand tourist board—sorry to bring up that example again. Or the Government could say that they will have a two-tier system with a very light registration for the New Zealand tourist board or the Norwegian salmon producers association, but a much higher degree of form filling and detail giving for Chinese, Iranian and Russian organisations and the potential influencing that they are doing, especially with the United Front. Or do we just have a very deep set of requests for everybody, which would probably result in a lot of unnecessary form-filling? The Goldilocks solution for me is level two, with a light layer of registration for all organisations that are working on behalf of foreign states or their entities, but a much deeper level for named countries, individuals or institutions, including Confucius Institutes.

We should also have a level that understands the importance of making sure that we know what is going on in our universities. When we have PhD students here from China whose sole purpose is to steal as much intellectual property as possible, that is not a good thing. We should at least acknowledge that that is going on.

[Sir John Hayes]

On that very point, my hon. Friend might want to turn his attention to the Confucius Institutes that are active in several of our universities and may be doing precisely what he says. I will say no more than that, but I regard them—as I hope he does—with a considerable degree of suspicion.

[Bob Seely]

As ever, my right hon. Friend stays one step ahead of me. We know that the socialist paradise of Sweden has banned the Confucius Institutes, which is a potentially attractive route forward. As several hon. Members have said, transparency is critical.



Just to finish the point about a two-tier system, while we need a light regulatory touch for most foreign entities in this country, the critical element is when would the Government have listed China, for example, for a much deeper level of requirement about proxies and registering interests—state interests and Huawei interests as well? Would they have done it in 2012, before the visit of President Xi? Probably not. Would they have done it in 2016? Would they be under pressure not to use these laws? We need a Government willing to use these laws and willing not to have an entirely laissez-faire system—a Government who understand that, in this day and age, defending our institutions, our democracy and people in this country from covert malign influence is absolutely critical, and that we need to take an approach that is deep in some areas but also broad and that captures all those involved.

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[Liam Byrne (Birmingham, Hodge Hill) (Lab)]

I apologise to the Home Secretary, who is not in her place, for missing the first 11 minutes of her opening speech.

As I think the Minister will have spotted, there is wide consensus across the House about many of the provisions in this Bill that is matched only by a level of frustration that the Bill has been an awful long time coming. We have been debating the risks of hybrid warfare, from Russia and from others, in this Chamber for at least four or five years. Therefore, having waited so long and having debated so much, I think we are within our rights to have expected a rather more substantial package from the Government.

In the spirit of consensus, which I see is running large in the House today, I hope that we will be able to add substantially to the provisions in the Bill. I do not want to criticise sins of commission today, but I do want to criticise three sins of omissions: in particular, the lack of security in defence for data; the lack of security for our democracy; and the lack of security for those defenders of freedom and those people such as brave journalists who are prepared to name and, where necessary, shame foreign influencers who are at large in our country.

Let me start with data, because it is impossible to talk about espionage in this day and age without talking about information and intelligence, and therefore about data and the channels that move that data between our country and foreign players—the companies that are on the cutting edge of the technology revolution. I am afraid I think there is a very real risk that this Bill will be out of date by the time our sovereign inks her signature on the parchment.

What is well understood by the Americans and the Chinese, and I have to say by our intelligence services, is that artificial intelligence—not simply intelligence, but artificial intelligence—will be the key to the future of warfare and conflict between states. That is why both China and the United States are seeking to be the world leaders in artificial intelligence by 2030. It is also why the head of MI6 warned last year about the risk of countries around the world falling into data traps, because there is very real alarm that the huge datasets necessary to train the algorithms that power artificial intelligence are being exfiltrated from around the world. These are the datasets that train the algorithms that will be absolutely critical in co-ordinating drone swarms, running global surveillance systems, and creating mass information—through the mountains of contents that it is possible to create with artificial intelligence—to fire at the west a fire hose of falsehood to confuse us or, still worse, to divide us.

[Sir John Hayes]

The right hon. Gentleman is making a compelling point, because there are two implications of what he is describing: the problem of scale and the problem of methodology. The scale of what he is describing will be hard for any single nation to cope with. On methodology, it is hard to conduct covert operations as we have historically against that backdrop.

[Liam Byrne]

The right hon. Member puts his finger on precisely the lesson that we should draw from allies such as the United States. Today, the United States has a battery of eight types of controls and measures that are regulating and controlling the export of—or, frankly, efforts to steal—technology and data to countries such as China.

The Bill says that it will be an offence to engage in

“conduct…that it is reasonably possible may…assist a foreign intelligence service”.

I am afraid that negligence must be part of that conduct. Our American allies now have: provisions for delisting Chinese firms, which they have applied to companies such as Sina Weibo; an investment prohibition list that has now hit 59 Chinese firms; a ban on share trading; export bans and restrictions that have added scores of Chinese entities to the unverified list, which therefore have tougher rules on receiving shipments from US exporters; an export ban; provisions for revocation of trading licences; data controls, which first President Trump and then President Biden ordered; and, of course, targeted sanctions. My question for the Minister is: where is the similar framework for the United Kingdom? We are now in grave jeopardy of a control gap emerging between the United Kingdom and our closest ally.

When I tabled parliamentary questions on those eight different measures to the Government asking where our similar framework was, I got a lot of waffle from the Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam (Paul Scully). I then asked the Government what controls are in place on nine of the 1,100 key companies now controlled in some way, shape or form in the United States: those such as Huawei, ZTE, Hikvision, Hytera and Alibaba through to China Unicom—I will not go through them all. Despite our adding China to the UK arms embargo list earlier this year, the only one company that the Minister could name that is subject to UK controls was Huawei.

I am afraid that we are now at risk of a control gap, and we are still behaving as if we believe in free movement of weapons-grade intelligence. That is presumably why individuals such as Clive Woodley, funded by the UK university system and the Ministry of Defence, are still wandering around organising conferences on weapons in China. Given the poor job that the National Security Council did on co-ordinating complex operations such as the evacuation from Afghanistan, I am seriously concerned that the Government lack the capacity to co-ordinate the Treasury, the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, the Department for International Trade, the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and the intelligence agencies in controlling what needs to be controlled. I would like to see a duty on Ministers to report to the House on companies of concern, particularly those operating from countries where we have arms embargoes, with clear measures to control them.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stewart Hosie]

Will the Minister give way?

[Sir John Hayes]

Will the Minister give way?

[Damian Hinds]

Yes, and then I can deal with both questions at once.

[Damian Hinds]

I give way to my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes).

[Sir John Hayes]

I am grateful to the Minister. I hear what the right hon. Member for Dundee East (Stewart Hosie) says. It is a compelling case, although I do not agree with it. The Official Secrets Act 1989 deals with the unauthorised disclosure of sensitive information by civil servants; giving information to journalists; a WikiLeaks-type disclosure dressed up as being by a guardian of liberty or some such other nonsense. This Bill does not deal with that unless those people are working directly for a foreign power. They might not be working directly for a foreign power, but they might be aiding a foreign power or acting indirectly for such a foreign power, and surely that needs to be included in the Bill.

[Damian Hinds]

I will come back to my right hon. Friend’s point in a moment. To the point that the right hon. Member for Dundee East (Stewart Hosie) made, our position is that a public interest defence is just not the safest and best way for people to make disclosures, for some of the reasons I gave a moment ago.

Public Order Bill

John Hayes Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 23rd May 2022 Commons Chamber

[Jonathan Gullis (Stoke-on-Trent North) (Con)]

The people of Stoke-on-Trent North, Kidsgrove and Talke warmly welcome this important legislation, because it is doing exactly what they want to see: holding those criminals accountable for their criminality. No one is standing here seriously suggesting that, when the people of Stoke-on-Trent go to Hanley town centre to stand together to protest for the rights of the Kashmiri people—I have attended in person—the police will come in heavy-handed while we stand peacefully and speak through a microphone to constituents and residents from across the area to raise concerns about the human rights abuses happening to the people of Kashmir.

No one is saying that, when certain trade unions want to stand peacefully outside my office in protest, to demonstrate against some cause, I am expecting the police to come in and round those people up. I am not. I welcome them comng outside my office. I am more than happy to hear their cause, and engage with them in conversation and debate. Even if we end up agreeing to disagree, no one in their right mind is saying that the police are going to prevent that action from happening. No one in Stoke-on-Trent North, Kidsgrove and Talke believes for a second that that would be appropriate. If that were the case with this legislation, I would stand up to oppose the Bill. But I am supporting it because it is doing something: tackling criminal behaviour.

People gluing themselves to the M25, where people are traveling at 70 miles an hour—women and children in cars that could easily crash, ending up with loss of life —are apparently willing to sacrifice their own safety and their own lives for a cause. However, they are not even able to stand up for their beliefs and values. The hypocritical nature of those campaigns is what drives people berserk in Stoke-on-Trent North, Kidsgrove and Talke.

For example, Liam Norton from Insulate Britain says he “doesn’t care” about insulating homes—his words. He does not even insulate his own home. He has no insulation in the walls and has single pane glass. People simply do not like hypocrites. He even called himself a hypocrite. We are talking about individuals who are running campaigns—some crusty eco-woke warrior wanting to make some sort of point on Twitter, so they can get lots of likes from the far left that make that particular social media platform vile and abusive. Thank God I am not on it; great for my mental health. Then we see their actions. Gail Bradbrook from Extinction Rebellion drives a diesel car and takes an 11,000-mile round trip to Costa Rica, contributing 2.6 tonnes of carbon footprint, which is a quarter of a Brit’s yearly average.

Practice what you preach. Do not stand up and virtue-signal for the sake of it or try to pontificate—as the Labour party regularly does—in order to make a point that will get a few more likes in woke London or on Twitter. Instead, stand up for people of this country who want to see an end to criminal behaviour by those jumping on top of tube trains or blocking lorries, for example, some of which are carrying cooking oil or carrying oil at a time when we have a global fuel crisis. Those are the type of mad things that people are sick of seeing.

[Sir John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)]

My hon. Friend is right that these are largely deranged members of the bourgeoise making working people’s lives difficult, but, actually, the situation is more serious still. In the case of the demonstrations and protests that he describes, the action meant holding up an ambulance on its way to an emergency and stopping a woman getting to the home of her 95-year-old mother who had had a fall. It meant that the people protesting were wholly and completely disregarding the horror and pain that they were causing. That shows the sort of people they are. This is about not hypocrisy, but carelessness and heartlessness.

[Jonathan Gullis]

My right hon. Friend makes a fantastic point. Let us think about the people who were not able to get to their cancer screening appointment; the children who were not able to be in school because of lockdown and who are having their education in the classroom—with their expert classroom teacher—further delayed; the emergency services trying to go about their jobs, having to deal with protesters; and the police from as far away as Scotland coming down to London, meaning that they are not on the streets of the local areas that they should be serving, allowing criminals potentially to run wild there because of some selfish individuals.

--- Later in debate ---

[Bell Ribeiro-Addy (Streatham) (Lab)]

Given all the crises that we are facing in our country, it speaks volumes that the first Bill of a new Parliament is yet another piece of authoritarian anti-protest legislation. The message from this Government is clear: their top priority is making it harder to protest against the cost of living crisis, rather than helping people through it.

The Government have already introduced some of the most serious and sweeping restrictions on the right to protest with their Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, and this Bill takes the assault on our rights one step further by reviving many of the failed measures that were rightly thrown out in the other place. Restricting protest, expanding discriminatory stop and search, introducing jail sentences and unlimited fines for demonstrating close to national infrastructure, and introducing new offences of locking on will not help my constituents to pay their bills, or, indeed, address many of the issues about which they will tend to protest.

This is yet another Bill that seeks to stop people making their voices heard, and it disadvantages our poorest and most marginalised communities. Laws are not reasonable or fair if rights are protected only for those who agree with the Government, and curtailed for those who wish to challenge the Government. I agree with the hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire South (Mhairi Black), who said last week that we were sleepwalking into fascism. This country’s tradition of dissent has paved the way to our rights and freedoms, and those protests are the reason why someone of my class, race and gender has the rights that I have; but this Bill contains measures that would have outlawed the protests that won votes for women and trade unions.

Given the Government’s trajectory, there is no doubt in my mind, at least, that these measures will be used against pickets in industrial disputes. According to the Bill, there will be a defence when it comes to trade disputes, but that defence will not be available to stop the new serious disruption prevention orders applying to individuals who take part in more than one protest within a five-year period, even if they have not been convicted. That obviously targets union officials who regularly attend and organise pickets. The Trade Union Act 2016, the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act and everything in between, and now this Bill, have all but eradicated what was already a severely restricted right to picket. Our unions are part of the last line of defence against this Government’s attack on working-class people, and I cannot believe that the Government would stoop so low.

It is wrong that the Bill extends stop and search powers and introduces serious disruption orders when existing stop-and-search powers are already a key component of the racially unjust criminal justice system. Marginalised communities are already disproportionately likely to face criminalisation and harassment. Just last month there was a national outcry when it emerged that a black teenager had been strip-searched by police at school, having been falsely accused of possessing cannabis. There has been a string of revelations about the racism and misogyny that still blight UK policing, clearly exemplified by the vile racism and misogyny uncovered at Charing Cross police station and the already record low confidence in policing.

[Sir John Hayes]

The hon. Lady speaks about stop and search. She will know that during a two-year period up to 2021, 150,000 arrests were made as a direct result of stop and search. She will also know that in 2019, 50,000 knives were found and removed. Those were arrests that prevented crimes, and those were knives that might have been used to take life or at least to injure. Surely the hon. Lady recognises that stop and search is just part of the means by which we can crack down on crime.

[Bell Ribeiro-Addy]

I have no issue with evidence-based stop and search. If there is a reason to stop somebody, that is absolutely fine. Unfortunately the police continue, again and again, to stop and search people from certain communities. All that that does is go further down the route of making confidence in policing extremely low, which does not do anything to solve crime.

When it comes to misogyny, I think about the horrifying treatment of those who attended the vigil in my constituency last year to commemorate Sarah Everard and other women who had lost their lives to violence. That made it clear that women opposing violence against women were not safe from male violence, even from those who were tasked with protecting us from it.

The Bill targets, in particular, the activism of groups who have already been mentioned many times: groups such as Extinction Rebellion, Just Stop Oil, Insulate Britain, Kill the Bill and the Black Lives Matter movement. All those groups have used disruption to draw attention to major injustices such as the climate crisis, attacks on our civil liberties and institutional racism. Rather than taking action to address those injustices, the Government want to stop people speaking out about them. We must remember that today’s protests are signposts for tomorrow’s progress.

How does it make sense for the Government to support protests around the world while cracking down on the right to protest here? As Amnesty International has pointed out,

“these authoritarian provisions…are similar to repressive policies in countries the UK regularly criticises—including”

—yes—

“Russia, Hong Kong, and Belarus”.

The message to the public is very clear: we must put up with it, or shut up. This continuous attempt to criminalise dissent is a threat to everyone who wants to stand up for what they believe in, and to anyone who believes in building a better society. The way in which the Government continue to push this agenda makes it clearer than ever that we must oppose this Bill today, and oppose all further attempts by them to proceed with this authoritarian way of running the country.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Bristow]

The right hon. Lady is a long-standing Member of this House, and she is enormously respected by me and by many people here, but I would respectfully point out that that is not what I said. What I said was that I was not convinced that many protests achieved anything much. There are notable examples where protests have achieved a great deal, but I am not convinced that many of the protests that we see each and every day now are achieving anything at all. That was my point.

Freedom of speech in our media should be matched by the freedom to express those views. I agree with the right hon. Lady that protest is important. That was exactly the point I was trying to make. Whether it achieves anything or not is beside the point. The fact that so much of it comes from political perspectives that are opposed to mine is also beside the point. Anyone tempted down that route just needs to look around the world. The scenes of protesters in Russia with blank signs being arrested are a reminder that what we could stand to lose is nothing less than freedom itself. I will always defend legitimate protest by those with whom I disagree. However, there are also illegitimate ways of protesting that go beyond the expression of a view to impositions on the freedom of others, to violations of our laws and to acts that can even pose a risk to people’s lives. Direct action is not a legitimate form of protest. Locking on, which is defined in clause 1 of the Bill, is not a legitimate form of protest. Obstruction of major transport works, which is defined in clause 3, is not a legitimate form of protest.

[Sir John Hayes]

My hon. Friend seems to be distinguishing between peaceful protest, of which there is a long tradition, as he rightly says, and violent protest. These acts are violent acts. The destruction of property, the attacks on individuals and the real nuisance and life-threatening damage caused when roads are blocked are acts of violence. They are militant and extreme, and they can be distinguished from peaceful, legitimate protest.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers]

I could not agree more. I am delighted to see 13,000 more police officers on our streets, and I want them to spend their time tackling the issues in Stockton South, rather than policing this jamboree.

Law-abiding citizens have been stunned by these scenes and want to see our police forces empowered to protect the rights of everyday people who are trying to go about their daily lives. Why should someone be able to prevent them from getting to work? Why should someone be able to prevent their children from getting to school? Why should someone be able to prevent their dying relative from getting to hospital in an ambulance?

Sixty-three per cent. of people support the creation of a criminal offence of locking on, and it is clear why. We must protect the freedom of our citizens against a minority who would seek to impede them. Moreover, I can see how genuine protesters would be frustrated. They turn up to a protest to stand up for a noble cause, and then some of these serial protesters turn up en masse like some sort of traveling circus. Full of clowns, these groups hijack protests for a superglue soiree. They bring individual campaigns into disrepute and damage the public support and sympathy that genuine protesters have worked hard to gain.

[Sir John Hayes]

My hon. Friend is making a compelling case for the Bill. We have heard from the Bill’s critics that the end justifies the means—that because the end is noble, in their judgment, any means, however violent or disruptive, are legitimate. Is that not the argument used by every extremist, indeed every tyrant, throughout history?

[Matt Vickers]

My right hon. Friend is entirely right. These actions undermine public support and sympathy for genuine causes, and they create division and misery in the name of genuine causes.

For everyday people right across the country who should have the right to go about their daily life without interference, for those who wish to undertake peaceful and legitimate protests, and for police officers frustrated by having to waste their time when they could be making our communities safer, this is the right way forward. Thanks to this Government, there are now 13,000 more police officers on our streets; I want to see them tackling crime, not distracted and diverted by these jamborees of disruption, division and criminality.

Finally, I disagree with the assumption that police forces will use the powers in this Bill disproportionately and improperly. Of course, there have been horrendous exceptions—cases of misuse of police powers—but we should differentiate these from the brave men and women who sign up as police officers and put themselves in harm’s way to protect us. They should be backed and given the powers that they need to get on with the job.

Nationality and Borders Bill

John Hayes Excerpts

Consideration of Lords message
Tuesday 26th April 2022 Commons Chamber

[Tom Pursglove]

The hon. Gentleman’s remarks are effectively a charter for doing nothing. What is unacceptable is for people to continue putting their life in the hands of evil criminal gangs whose only regard is for turning a profit—they do not care whether people get here safely. We have a moral responsibility to stop this, and we have a moral responsibility to act, which is precisely what we will do through this Bill.

[Sir John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)]

Will my hon. Friend accept my congratulations on the Patel-Pursglove plan vis-à-vis Rwanda? And will he ensure that, when people arrive here, they are on a plane as quickly as possible before some dodgy activist or fat-cat human rights lawyer can get their hands on them?

[Tom Pursglove]

My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary should rightly take a lot of credit for getting this new world-leading partnership over the line. My right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes) has been a passionate advocate for this approach, and I am pleased we are delivering it. I think it will make a genuine difference in acting as a deterrent and ensuring that we have global solutions to a global challenge.

In that sense, I welcome the steps that have been taken in the last few days. I hope my right hon. Friend will be reassured to know that we are working hard to make sure this is operationalised without delay and that, of course, people are on flights as quickly as possible. What we do not want at any stage—this goes back to why we need fundamental reform of the asylum system—is delay in the system. We want people to have certainty either way.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Kinnock]

Thank you for your wise counsel, Madam Deputy Speaker.

I have already pointed to the work and refugee convention amendments, but we also need to address differential treatment. Lords amendments 6D, 6E and 6F provide that a person can be a tier 1 refugee if they have travelled briefly through countries on their way to the UK, as somebody from Kabul or Kyiv would have to, or if they have delayed presenting themselves to the authorities for a good reason. They would also require compliance with the refugee convention and state that family unity must be taken into account. The Government should get behind the amendments. What in them can there possibly be to disagree with?

The channel crossings have been taken out of the Home Secretary’s hands and handed to the Ministry of Defence and the Royal Navy. The Ukrainian refugee scheme has been handed over to the Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities. This Sunday, the former director general of borders and immigration called for a new immigration Department to remove responsibility from the Home Office. With her Department now effectively in special measures, will the Home Secretary not just for once do the right thing and accept the amendments today, so that we can begin to repair some of the damage done by this deeply counterproductive legislation?

[Sir John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)]

I will not delay the House unduly; my colleagues would not want me to. I just want to make two points. The first is that the hon. Member for Aberavon (Stephen Kinnock) is right: these matters should have been addressed earlier, by successive Governments—including Labour Governments, by the way. Our immigration policy has not been planned strategically, as it might have been. The hon. Gentleman makes a valid point.

The hon. Gentleman also said that the system needs to be efficient. I spoke about Edmund Burke on Second Reading; he said that the test of civil society and the policy that relates to it was justice, and that when a policy ceased to be just it was barely a policy at all. For a policy to be just, it has to be ordered, efficient and consistent. Immigration policy has struggled with order, efficiency and consistency for a very long time. On that, the hon. Gentleman was also right.

However, the hon. Gentleman is fundamentally wrong about the amendments for the following reasons. First, the Lords seem unwilling to grasp a nettle that, as he described, previous Governments have also failed the grasp. That nettle is sorting out and amending a broken system to ensure that we can continue to give safe refuge to people in desperate need, and that the system cannot be routinely and persistently gamed—by people traffickers and, actually, by economic migrants pretending to be asylum seekers. That is the fact, and we have to face it and reform the system so that we can differentiate between the two. The Government are trying to do that. It is not an easy process, but the Lords seem to me to misunderstand the Government’s intention, which is to create a consistent, ordered and effective system.

In specific terms, the amendment pertaining to the Refugee Council is unnecessary because part 2 of the Bill is already in line with the Refugee Council. I am amazed to hear the hon. Gentleman say that asylum seekers should be allowed to work. What sort of signal does that send out to legitimate migrants who have come to this country seeking to perform a role in our economy to serve this country? What sort of signal does it send out to indigenous Britons—of all types and races, by the way—who are unemployed and seeking a job, when they are told they must compete with people arriving in the country as asylum seekers? That seems to be a nonsense, yet that is what the Lords amendment suggests.

Nationality and Borders Bill

John Hayes Excerpts

Consideration of Lords amendments
Tuesday 22nd March 2022 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Kinnock]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The whole thing smacks of a kind of bureaucratic trickery whereby every option is blocked off by some additional piece of bureaucracy. The Bill should have been an opportunity to unlock some of that, but instead it leaves us in stalemate.

[Sir John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)]

Appositely to the remarks of the hon. Member for Brighton, Kemptown (Lloyd Russell-Moyle) about where people claim asylum and how it is processed, the Bill will allow a claim to be processed elsewhere before people get here. Based on what the hon. Gentleman says, that will be a positive move, will it not? It will also mean that people who are travelling through safe countries where they could claim asylum can do so there and have their claim processed there.

[Stephen Kinnock]

I think that the right hon. Gentleman is referring to offshoring, but as we have seen, offshoring does not work: it is costing millions and millions in Australia and every expert is panning the idea. If I have understood his intervention correctly, I am afraid that it is simply a non-starter.

The Opposition support Lords amendment 6, which removes the Government’s attempt to introduce differential treatment of refugees based on method of arrival. For instance, if a Ukrainian citizen were to flee and travel here across Europe while waiting for a Government visa office to open or a safe route to be provided, clause 11 would make them a second-class refugee. To be a first-tier refugee, they would have to have taken an aeroplane directly from Ukraine. That absurd technicality shows just how unjust the proposal is.

--- Later in debate ---

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)]

Order. My plea for Members to limit themselves to four-minute speeches simply has not worked. I point out to the hon. Member for Lewisham East (Janet Daby), who intervened just now, that I consider that she has now made her contribution, because there is not enough time for everybody to get into the debate. We will now have a formal four-minute limit. I call Sir John Hayes.

[Sir John Hayes]

I am grateful to you, Madam Deputy Speaker. Disraeli observed:

“How much easier it is to be critical than to be correct.”

Many of the amendments put forward by the Lords are carelessly critical. They are veiled, as these things so often are, in a thin covering of assumed moral superiority, but surely it is not moral to oppose a Bill that tries to make the asylum system fit for purpose. Surely it is not ethical to conflate illegal immigration with the immigration of those people who diligently seek to come to this country lawfully and to surmount the hurdles we put in their path, and who, having done so, take pride in making the contribution mentioned by the right hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell).

Nationality and Borders Bill

John Hayes Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 7th December 2021 Commons Chamber

[Tom Pursglove]

I am conscious of the wide interest in a significant number of these amendments, so I will predominantly focus my remarks on the Government amendments in this first instance and address other matters in the wind-up.

Our asylum system must not reward those who enter the UK illegally from manifestly safe countries where they cannot possibly still be fleeing persecution and fear. People must claim asylum in the first safe country they come to, and making a secondary and unnecessary move to the UK puts lives needlessly in danger while pushing aside other vulnerable people, including women and children.

We must break the criminal networks that facilitate illegal immigration and exploit people. People who come to our shores illegally will be treated differently. Although we cannot resettle everyone who needs sanctuary, the large numbers we resettle in the UK will be made very welcome. We will be fair but firm in how we continue to embark on this landmark reform of our asylum system.

New clause 20 is a minor, technical amendment that will ensure a small number of references to justices of the peace in immigration legislation in the context of obtaining entry and search warrants in Northern Ireland instead become references to lay magistrates. This is a simple measure that tidies up the statute book.

[Sir John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)]

The Minister makes a critical point about claiming asylum in the first safe country. People traffickers rely on the idea of selling a destination, regardless of where the person starts. The measures my hon. Friend describes will frustrate the people traffickers and do a great service both to this country and to their many victims.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

The point that I would make is that the Government will set out their intentions in due course. I think it is right not to pre-empt. It is important to make sure that this House is kept updated as to that work, and we will be very clear in our intentions.

[Sir John Hayes]

It is extremely encouraging news that the Government are going to—at last, I have to say—consider the Blair legacy of the Human Rights Act, but to substantially reform it will require legislation. That much is implicit, is it not?

[Tom Pursglove]

As I say, Ministers will come to the House with further details in due course.

Work is under way in relation to resolving the question of retained EU law, led by Lord Frost, with input from the Attorney General and the Ministry of Justice. For these reasons, I ask my right hon. and hon. Friends to withdraw their amendment 150.

I turn to new clauses 18 and 19 on illegal immigration offences, tabled by my hon. Friends the Members for Christchurch (Sir Christopher Chope) and for Kettering (Mr Hollobone). I hope that they and other hon. Friends supporting the new clauses will recognise that, as part of our groundbreaking new plan for immigration, the Government have sought robust changes to the law around illegal entry and similar offences through the very Bill we are discussing today. The Bill, which my hon. Friends seek to amend, already addresses and indeed exceeds the changes proposed in new clause 18.

Let me turn now to new clauses 24 and 52, tabled by the hon. Members for Enfield, Southgate (Bambos Charalambous) and for Halifax (Holly Lynch), my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Moor View (Johnny Mercer), my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith), my hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat), my right hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth East (Mr Ellwood) and the hon. Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis). As both new clauses regard settlement fees for non-UK members of our armed forces, I would like to debate them together. It is a fact that our Government and our nation highly value the service of all members of the armed forces, including Commonwealth nationals and Gurkhas from Nepal.

Draft Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (Continuation) Order 2021

John Hayes Excerpts

Tuesday 30th November 2021 General Committees

[Conor McGinn (St Helens North) (Lab)]

Bore da, Ms Rees. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship and opposite the Minister. It is important to say that the security job, both in opposition and in government—I see a former Security Minister here—is unique, because such is the nature of our Parliament and politics that we debate these matters robustly. The current Minister has been impeccable in ensuring that the Opposition are briefed on all these important measures. We appreciate that, and I hope we can continue to work together in that constructive spirit.

Although these are technical measures, the statutory instrument has important implications for security and keeping our citizens, their families and communities safe. That is the priority for all hon. Members across the House. As I said during the passage of the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021, we want TPIMs to be robust and impactful, but agile enough to adapt to fast-changing threats. TPIMs are, without doubt, a critical tool in our arsenal, but given the potentially far-reaching implications for subjects of a TPIM, we also recognise the need for them to be proportional, exceptional and imposed only where necessary, backed by the strongest safeguards and clear exit strategies.

We made important progress through amendments that we, with the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West, won during the passage of the 2021 Act, particularly on maintaining a higher standard of proof than was initially envisaged, on time limits for a TPIMs notice, and on vital additional oversight and review functions for the Independent Reviewer. Given TPIMs’ importance, we all agree it would be incomprehensible were we to let these powers lapse suddenly at midnight on 13 December, as they would if the instrument was not passed. We will not let that happen. We welcome the clarity the measures gives law enforcement, the security services and their partners, who work so hard on our behalf to protect people. We also acknowledge the support of the Independent Reviewer and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner.

I have a few questions for the Minister. Are the Government happy with the effectiveness of TPIMs and the level of the resources given to administer and monitor them? What impact have recent changes had operationally? As he said, as of October, there are five TPIMs in force, which is a relatively stable number. Does he envisage that continuing? We know that the terrorism threat is evolving in complexity, as we saw most recently in my region, Merseyside, at the Liverpool Women’s Hospital, and of course our tools must keep up. The impact of self-initiated, lone actor terrorism is growing rapidly. That is why we called on Ministers to look into that specifically and to publish their findings. I hope the Government will consider doing that. Tools such as TPIMs combat such threats and help to tackle individuals radicalised under the authorities’ radar—for example, online.

[Sir John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)]

I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s early remarks and the tone of his speech. On lone actors, as he notes, there is a growing fear that people like the fellow in Liverpool—we acknowledge that the investigation is in its early stages—may not be known to the security services prior to their attack. How important does he think it is that we monitor internet activity closely, given that it is clearly being used by people to self-radicalise? These are very difficult and challenging matters, but that may well be the means by which we try to anticipate those kinds of activity.

[Conor McGinn]

The right hon. Gentleman makes hugely important point. That is the sphere that poses the fastest growing and most dangerous threat. I know the Government are bringing forward their draft Online Safety Bill, and I hope it will enable us to consider measures that directly address this threat. It is hugely important to ensure that our security services, the National Cyber Security Centre and GCHQ have all the tools they need to have at their disposal to monitor internet activity, but the truth is that it is very difficult, given people’s ability to remain anonymous, to self-radicalise and to plot acts of terrorism from a bedsit. I think we need to look at that alongside lone actor activity generally and specifically at how online activity is used. We will of course work with the Government however we can to support that, but the right hon. Gentleman makes a hugely important point.

We support the statutory instrument and the clarity the renewal of the powers brings. It would be a dereliction of duty were we to allow the tools to lapse suddenly, and we will act with the Government to prevent that. We will continue to hold the Government to account, working together in the national interest but scrutinising in the national interest too.

English Channel Small Boats Incident

John Hayes Excerpts

Thursday 25th November 2021 Commons Chamber

[Priti Patel]

There are lots of options that we could all look at, but we need the legal frameworks as well. That is why I am bringing forward the Nationality and Borders Bill.

[Sir John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)]

The tragedy in the channel draws into sharp focus an issue on which we have no doubt about the Home Secretary’s determined intentions. They are illustrated by her borders Bill, which will go some way towards fixing a broken asylum system that is gamed by traffickers, economic migrants and rights lawyers. She needs to go further, however. That is why the Common Sense Group of MPs has written to her saying that we need to disrupt the criminal gangs, process claims offshore and turn boats around in the channel, as the law allows us to do. People who voted to take back control have every right to ask the question: “If you cannot protect the integrity of the borders, what can you control?”

[Priti Patel]

My right hon. Friend will know what is in the Bill. He mentions offshoring and third countries; all those options are under consideration, and our new plan for immigration covers those areas. He is absolutely right in his principal point, which is why we are determined. We will not cease after the measures that we have already announced, but look to augment and enhance some of them. With the state of crisis that we are seeing, with global migration issues right now and with the appalling loss of life that we have seen, it is incumbent on everyone—Governments, law enforcement, border controls and all the various agencies—to come together to stop the awful trade of human trafficking.