Proceeds of Crime
John Hayes Excerpts(8 years, 3 months ago)
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The Minister for Security (Mr John Hayes)
I beg to move,
That the draft Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Investigative Powers of Prosecutors: Code of Practice) (England and Wales and Northern Ireland) Order 2016, which was laid before this House on 17 December 2015, be approved.
Mr Speaker
With this, we shall consider:
That the draft Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cash Searches: Code of Practice) Order 2016, which was laid before this House on 16 December 2015, be approved.
That the draft Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Search, Seizure and Detention of Property: Code of Practice) (England and Wales) (No. 2) Order 2016, which was laid before this House on 16 December 2015, be approved.
That the draft Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Search, Seizure and Detention of Property: Code of Practice) (Northern Ireland) Order 2016, which was laid before this House on 16 December 2015, be approved.
That the draft Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Investigations: Code of Practice) (England and Wales and Northern Ireland) Order 2016, which was laid before this House on 16 December 2015, be approved.
Mr Hayes
I am grateful, as ever, Mr Speaker, for your stewardship and indulgence.
The important matters before us are technical and, I anticipate, relatively uncontroversial; they are certainly not partisan. Nevertheless, it is important that we scrutinise them with the diligence for which this House is rightly famed, and I will be happy to deal with any amount of detail with which the House wishes me to engage.
Isaiah Berlin once said:
“Freedom for the wolves has often meant death to the sheep.”
As someone who believes in standing fierce in defence of the gentle, I know exactly what he meant. It may be of some assurance and comfort to the House that the matters under debate relate to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and were largely commenced in England and Wales on 1 June 2015. In order to extend that commencement, as is necessary, to Scotland and Northern Ireland, we are required to make codes of practice that encompass those jurisdictions and bodies using the powers there. So, the codes will largely replicate those that were considered and approved by this House, which is why I described them as technical and largely uncontroversial.
The codes are a safeguard to ensure effective and consistent use of the powers. Once commenced, the new powers will give officers important new tools for the recovery of criminally obtained assets. That is a key pledge of our serious and organised crime strategy and the Government’s commitment to tackling all levels of crime.
The codes build on previous codes. They closely follow those issued more widely to police officers under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. The codes provide an important safeguard and ensure that the powers are used in a targeted, consistent and effective way, thus providing vital reassurance to the public that the powers in the 2002 Act are being used appropriately and proportionately.
The orders bring into force a number of codes of practice that provide guidance on the use of various powers under the 2002 Act. Four current codes need updating and a new code is required as a consequence of amendments made to the 2002 Act by primary legislation already passed by this House. I draw Members’ attention to the Policing and Crime Act 2009, the Crime and Courts Act 2013 and the Serious Crime Act 2015.
We plan to commence those powers relating to the 2002 Act throughout the UK on 1 March, in so far as they are not already in force. To achieve that, we need to issue the codes of practice that will provide guidance on the use of the powers throughout the UK. The Scottish Parliament and the Northern Ireland Assembly will consider codes that fall within their competence due to devolution.
Some might think that it would be enough for me just to put those technical matters on the record, but knowing this House as you and I do, Mr Speaker, I know that it will want me to say a little more about the amendments to the 2002 Act, which require the codes of practice providing guidance—
Mr Speaker
Order. As the Minister of State has already prayed in aid Isaiah Berlin, I had supposed that it would be only a matter of time before he would refer, in an orderly way, of course, to “Four Essays on Liberty”, but perhaps I am being impatient and that will be reached in the course of the right hon. Gentleman’s peroration. We wait to see.
Mr Hayes
Mr Speaker, you are encouraging me to stray from the subject at hand, but I will just say this: in a frail and fallen world, liberty has to be handled with great caution, and I have neither the time nor the expertise to delve into those matters at sufficient depth to satisfy you, Sir, or the House as a whole.
I will therefore restrict my remarks to the matters before us and deal briefly with the areas to which the codes of practice relate, namely the power to allow search of vehicles for criminal cash; search and seizure powers to prevent the dissipation of property that may subsequently be used to satisfy a confiscation order; expanded confiscation investigation powers to allow the tracing and identification of assets following a confiscation order; expanded civil recovery investigation powers; and change of court jurisdiction so that the Crown Court rather than the High Court will make investigation orders in relation to cash forfeiture cases.
As you will understand, Mr Speaker, we are not debating the powers themselves, because they have already been approved by the House, as I have described. Importantly, however, we are considering the codes that provide guidance on the use of the powers. This is essentially about the consideration of appropriate safeguards. Such safeguards are required under the 2002 Act in investigations by law enforcement officers. There is a final further code that relates to the use of the investigation powers by prosecutors, and owing to amendments made to the powers new codes are needed to address the new provisions.
The orders will bring all the relevant codes of practice into effect, ensuring that effective safeguards and up-to-date guidance are in place, and enabling full commencement of the amendments to the 2002 Act, which I have described. For the powers that are not yet in force, we are working towards a common commencement date of 1 March. The use of the powers will be rightly guided by the revised codes of practice. I make no apology for repeating that the codes are an important safeguard to ensure the targeted, proportionate and effective use of the powers in the Act, balanced against the entitlements—my brief says “rights”, a word I always hesitate to use, but I mean the lawful entitlements that we often call rights—of individuals and communities. I therefore ask the House to approve the orders to give effect to the codes of practice.
In order not to disappoint you of all people, Mr Speaker, I conclude by quoting my favourite poet—not T. S. Eliot, but W. B. Yeats:
“Do not wait to strike till the iron is hot; but make it hot by striking.”
The Government, with appropriate alacrity and determination, and with the moderation associated with putting in place such safeguards, are indeed striking to make the iron hot. In that spirit, I hope the whole House will agree that the orders are an appropriate way forward, with appropriate checks and balances in the exercise of these vital powers.
Mr Hayes
I shall answer one or two points on the first of the codes, then, with your permission and indulgence, Mr Speaker, I shall move the subsequent ones formally.
The points that have been made are all in the spirit of wanting the measure to work. I am grateful to the House for that. The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Birmingham, Erdington (Jack Dromey), made the telling point that this has long been a consideration of this House and of successive Governments. He referenced in particular the 2002 Act and he will know that subsequent legislation to which I referred earlier builds on that Act and brings it up to date, because as crime changes, the proceeds of crime and our ability to recover them change too. Very much in that spirit, I welcome what he said.
I note the hon. Gentleman’s point about the way the measure is explained. Although with typical courtesy he did not draw the attention of hon. Members to the fact, I am aware that the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee felt that the explanatory memorandum that accompanied these orders was not sufficient. I agree that the policy background in the memorandum was insufficient and did not set out that the powers will operate in the way I want them to, as he said. To that end, I am delighted to be able to tell him that this very morning I asked my officials to redraw the explanatory memorandum in exactly the form that he requested, with worked examples of how these things might work in practice. These are complex matters, but none the less it seems to me that they need to be articulated in a way that makes it absolutely clear how the codes will introduce the kind of safeguards that we all favour.
To that end, I can assure the House that my officials are well aware that the explanatory memorandum must do just that. I am delighted to be able to tell the House that the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee has said that were that to be done with the speed and in the fashion that I have described, it would be satisfied. The hon. Gentleman has done a service to this House and it is not his fault that I have anticipated his point by doing what I have described this morning. Indeed, it shows that we are on the same page.
My hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse), who has moved—he is in his place, but his place has changed—made the interesting suggestion that the police might be incentivised, if I might put it in those terms, to go still further if they were to recover some of the costs of their inquiries. That is an interesting suggestion. It would be above my pay grade and outside my remit to agree it on the Floor of the House at this very moment, but I shall certainly take it back to the Department to discuss with the policing Minister and others.
Lucy Frazer (South East Cambridgeshire) (Con)
My right hon. Friend rightly mentioned that the explanatory memorandum could go into a little more detail, and I welcome that suggestion. Paragraph 4.9 of the explanatory memorandum suggests not only that there have been new additions but that:
“The code has been slightly restructured to make it easier to read and understand.”
Would it be possible to set out what is a clarification and what is a new provision, so that when that is considered in due course it will be clear that some points are just clarifications rather than new provisions?
Mr Hayes
With the eye for detail that my hon. Friend’s scrutiny increasingly shows, and for which she is building a substantial reputation, she draws attention to precisely one of the matters that I discussed with my officials in the conversation I had with them this morning, to which I referred in relation to the comments made by the shadow Minister. It is right that we should clarify that point. She is also right that we need to consider the whole of the explanatory memorandum in a similar spirit, and that is precisely what we intend to do. I am grateful to her for allowing me to illustrate that not only she has an eye for detail, but the Minister has too.
The points made by the hon. Member for Foyle (Mark Durkan) seemed to me to be absolutely on the button. It is important that these things are dealt with consistently and that we take them seriously. I make no comments on his remarks about the previous history in the Province, but I can assure him that we are determined that the powers shall apply across our kingdom and that they will be pursued with appropriate vehemence. There can be no greater mission than to ensure that criminals do not profit from what they do. That is precisely what we intend to achieve. I am grateful for his support and for the comments he made about that.
The hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East (Stuart C. McDonald) spoke about immigration officers’ powers. I take his point; they have been generally expanded so that they are now mainstream law enforcement officers, like the police, the NCA and others. There is appropriate training—he is right that it is very important that that takes place—and appropriate safeguards and oversight, as there always should be in such matters. This is in relation to the 2002 Act, as I said, and I will pass concerns on to the Minister for Immigration so that the people for whom he is responsible are equipped with the information and skills they need. As I said in response to the hon. Member for Foyle (Mark Durkan), it is important that we behave consistently, and I am grateful for his contribution to the debate.
The hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) spoke about effective enforcement, and not only is it important that these codes are clear, established, transparent and comprehensible, but the powers that they effect or give appropriate safeguards to must be used. As he said, it is right that there has been a determination in this House, but we must ensure that that is seen through to the point of impact. It is all very well having intent, a legislative vehicle and safeguards, but there must also be a determination that this is seen as an important priority in the Province and across the United Kingdom.
This has been a useful debate, and I am grateful for the spirit in which the House has considered these matters. It is perhaps best to end not with Yeats—although I could, and I am tempted to—but with C. S. Lewis, who said in “The Weight of Glory” that
“the art of life consists in tackling each immediate evil as well as we can”.
The proceeds of crime are an evil that this Government are entirely determined to tackle, and these codes will help us to do so. In that spirit, I commend the motion to the House.
Mr Speaker
With the indulgence of both the Chair and the House, the Minister has served up both a starter and a pudding, for which I am sure the House is deeply grateful. The main course has, of course, been provided by other hon. Members who have contributed to the debate and whom the Minister has graciously accommodated.
Question put and agreed to.
Oral Answers to Questions
John Hayes Excerpts(8 years, 3 months ago)
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Liz Saville Roberts (Dwyfor Meirionnydd) (PC)
5. What estimate she has made of the number of crimes committed online in 2014-15; and how many of those crimes were (a) recorded, (b) investigated and (c) resulted in a conviction.
The Minister for Security (Mr John Hayes)
Crime is falling and crime is changing. Different types of crime may have an online element and an accurate national picture is critical to informing our ongoing response to cybercrime. That is why the Office for National Statistics recently published, for the very first time, initial estimates of the numbers of frauds and cybercrimes committed per year.
Liz Saville Roberts
None the less, the organisation Kick it Out, which campaigns to kick racism out of football, recorded more than 130,000 instances of racist abuse of footballers and their teams via social media in 2014-15, and the chief constable leading on digital crime fears that the police are on the verge of being overwhelmed. What steps is the Minister taking to ensure that all police officers have the capacity to make risk-based assessments and to prioritise this ever-increasing crime appropriately?
Mr Hayes
The hon. Lady makes a good point. She has focused her parliamentary career so far on the issue of online harassment, although she did not mention that in detail today. She knows that it is something that she and I both take very seriously. We welcome the preliminary trial by the Office for National Statistics to better reflect fraud and cybercrime in statistics. Having a more accurate picture will allow us to take the kinds of steps that she has advertised to the House today, because we will then be able to get a better idea of the scale and character of cybercrime and to do the preparatory work that she has requested. I take this seriously, as she clearly does, and I know that the whole House will join us in that.
Michael Fabricant (Lichfield) (Con)
It is not just harassment that is done over the internet; it is also phishing and fraud. Does my right hon. Friend not think that the Home Office might have a role to play in educating internet users in how best to protect themselves against such cybercrime?
Mr Hayes
As I said, when we get to understand the figures more accurately—the measures we have taken to look at these matters in greater detail will allow us to do that—my hon. Friend is absolutely right that we will need to be precautionary in our approach. He is also right that fraud is a significant element of the problem. In dealing with online fraud, we need to measure what is happening, look at what can be done about it and take appropriate action, and that is exactly what we will do.
Stewart Malcolm McDonald (Glasgow South) (SNP)
The media today reports that as more people use social networking apps such as Tinder and Grindr, reports of burglary and rape are rising. Can the Minister outline what assessment the Home Office has made of the problem and how it plans to attack it across these islands, in co-ordination with the devolved Governments?
Mr Hayes
The hon. Gentleman will know that we have a national cyber-security programme. We have invested more than £90 million in this Parliament and the previous Parliament to bolster the law enforcement response, and we will continue to make that investment. Indeed, the Government have committed to spending £1.9 billion on cyber-security over the next five years, including tackling cybercrime. It is about resources, earlier identification and preparation, but it is also worth saying that we have established the national cybercrime unit, so the Government are doing more, taking the steps necessary, tackling this seriously, listening and learning—unafraid of taking action.
Jeremy Lefroy (Stafford) (Con)
6. What steps the Government are taking to stop firearms, illegal drugs and other contraband entering the UK.
Andrew Stephenson (Pendle) (Con)
T7. Following the horrendous attacks in Paris, what steps are the Government taking to ensure that young people’s minds in the UK are not poisoned and that they are not radicalised by the poisonous ideology put forward by Daesh?
The Minister for Security (Mr John Hayes)
My hon. Friend will know that much of this is done online, where there are those who are seeking to corrupt people to inspire them to murder and maim their neighbours. Since February 2010, more than 120,000 pieces of unlawful terrorist material have been taken down from the internet, and our Prevent programme works with communities, schools, colleges and local authorities across the country. Mr Speaker, I am intolerant—intolerant of that wickedness which seeks to do so much harm.
draft Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Interception of Communications: code of practice) order 2015
Draft Equipment Interference (Code of Practice) Order 2015
John Hayes Excerpts(8 years, 4 months ago)
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The Minister for Security (Mr John Hayes)
I beg to move,
That the Committee has considered the draft Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Interception of Communications: Code of Practice) Order 2015.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to consider the draft Equipment Interference (Code of Practice) Order 2015.
Mr Hayes
Keeping people safe is a primary responsibility of Government and one on which everything else the Government do depends. It transcends partisan politics. Indeed, many of the debates we have in Committees such as this and on the Floor of the House reflect that understanding, which crosses parties.
This is about the national interest and the common good. Before I come to the detail of the orders, it is worth emphasising the very challenging circumstances in which we debate them. The context is a terrorist threat to the United Kingdom from international terrorism that remains at severe level, meaning that an attack is highly likely. We all heard the director general of MI5, Andrew Parker, describe a few weeks ago the character of that threat and the fact that it had been thwarted more than half a dozen times in the past year. He said that circumstances were severe and that the threat level is the highest he has seen in his 31-year career.
Technological change is affecting our ability to deal with those threats. The internet has changed so many aspects of our lives—some for good, and many for ill. Revolutionary communications are taken advantage of by people for good purposes and by those who seek to do us harm, the latter of which takes two forms, in essence: not merely the willingness but the daily examples of those who seek to radicalise individuals to murder and maim their neighbours, and the ability of those malevolent individuals to communicate with one another to plan, organise and plot.
Changes to the technology that people use to communicate are making it harder for our security agencies to maintain the capability to intercept the communications of terrorists. Whenever we lose visibility of what terrorists are saying and doing, our ability to understand and mitigate the threat they pose is obviously reduced. Almost all of MI5’s top priority UK counter-terrorism investigations have used intercept capabilities in some form to identify, understand and disrupt the plots of those who seek to do us harm.
To have the best chance of preventing such harm, we need the capability to shine a light on the activity of the worst individuals who pose the greatest threats. The dark places from where those who wish to harm us plot and plan are increasing. We need to be able to access communications to obtain relevant data on those people when we have a good reason to do so.
Members will know that the House is currently considering a draft Bill introduced on 4 November last year. Indeed, a Joint Committee of Parliament will report reasonably shortly, having taken evidence from all kinds of important people in respect of that draft Bill. Some will say, “You’ve got a draft Bill before Parliament. You’re going to have new legislation. Why do you need these orders?” The reason is that this is a Government who go the extra mile, who do the right thing and who live up to their responsibilities and honour their commitments.
We committed in earlier legislation to consult on new codes of practice in these two areas, and that is precisely what we did. We consulted between February and March 2015, and the revised codes of practice reflect that original commitment and the consultation that followed it. It is right that before the draft Investigatory Powers Bill becomes law, as I hope it does, and certainly before its passage through the House, we have an adequate code of practice. It would be wrong to create a gap between the end of the consultation and the progress of that draft and, ultimately, post-draft legislation.
The safeguards provided in the codes are not new. In respect of the interception code, the law enforcement and intelligence agencies have always had robust internal arrangements overseen by the interception of communications commissioner. The draft code provides more detail about those arrangements. First, it provides additional information on the safeguards that exist for the interception and handling of external communications under section 8(4) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000—the ability to undertake bulk interception.
Secondly, the draft code sets out further information on the protections afforded to legally privileged material and other confidential material. As an example, the code requires the Secretary of State personally to consider the likelihood that the privileged material will be intercepted when determining whether it is necessary and proportionate to grant a warrant. It also requires additional internal safeguards to be applied in cases where legally privileged material is intercepted, including that, where such material is retained, it must be reported to the independent interception of communications commissioner.
Thirdly, the draft code includes minor changes to reflect developments in law and practice since the code first came into force in 2002. For example, it reflects regulations introduced in 2011, which amended RIPA to create the power for the interception commissioner to impose a fine for certain kinds of unlawful interception. Much of the new material on safeguards that apply to the exercise of interception powers reflects the information disclosed during the legal proceedings in the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. It is right that that information is included in the codes of practice so that it is easy for members of the public to access it. At this point, Ms Buck, would you like me to deal with the second code of practice?
Mr Hayes
I think that will be more convenient for the Committee. It will mean that our affairs do not continue interminably, which will please all members of the Committee.
The draft equipment interference code of practice order is new. Equipment interference is a set of techniques used to obtain a variety of data from equipment, including traditional computers and computer-like devices such as tablets, handheld devices and so on. Equipment interference can be carried out remotely or by physically interacting with the equipment. It allows the security and intelligence agencies to keep pace with terrorists and serious criminals, who increasingly use sophisticated techniques to communicate, to evade detection in dark places, and to plan and plot what they do.
Equipment interference has been instrumental in disrupting credible threats to life, including those against UK citizens. MI5 has relied on that capability in the overall majority of high-priority investigations over the past year. The Security Service Act 1989 and the Intelligence Services Act 1994 provide the legislative basis for the security and intelligence agencies to interfere with computers and communication devices. Warrants may be issued by the Secretary of State only when they consider that the activities to be authorised are necessary and proportionate. To assure the Committee that the Government are acting properly, I emphasise that necessity and proportionality are at the heart of the codes and of all we do in this area. They must always be so.
The use of the powers is subject to independent oversight by the intelligence services commissioner. Prior to the draft code that we are debating, the equipment interference powers had not had their own bespoke code of practice. This was part of the debate we had on primary legislation, part of the commitment the Government made and part of the consultation that recently came to a close.
What is new? The code does not confer new powers but simply makes public robust safeguards that the intelligence agencies already apply, but that are now in a code—clear, transparent and comprehensible. It brings greater transparency to the robust processes that the agencies adhere to when interfering with computer equipment to disrupt serious crime, and identify and stop others who seek to harm us. For the first time, the code of practice publicly sets out stringent safeguards that the intelligence agencies apply to their use of equipment interference; strict rules on how data acquired through equipment interference must be handled, and how they must be secured and safely stored; and how the data must be destroyed when it is no longer necessary or proportionate to hold them.
The code explains the consideration of necessity and proportionality that I have described, ensuring that this vital capability can be used only when the scope of the interference has been carefully considered and compared with the potential benefits of the operation. Furthermore, the code explains that equipment interference should not be considered a proportionate power if other less intrusive methods of acquiring the same data are possible. As I said earlier, it should be used only when necessary, when other things are inadequate to achieve the end.
Akin to the interception code of practice, this document also provides reassurance that the acquisition of legally privileged and confidential information is subject to even greater oversight and safeguards. The code sets out a series of tests that must be applied before any authorisation is granted and the subsequent handling arrangements should confidential material be acquired. Finally, the code also provides information regarding the use of equipment interference targeted at equipment outside this country. This section ensures that the public have a comprehensive guide to the use of equipment interference powers by the intelligence agencies and the range of safeguards that apply.
The codes of practice contain no new powers; I repeat that for absolute certainty and clarity. Instead, they reflect the current safeguards applied by the relevant agencies. The purpose of the codes is to make more information publicly available about those stringent safeguards. They ensure that the powers can be used—I emphasise again—only when necessary and proportionate. I hope that in introducing them I have been just that: necessary and proportionate.
Keir Starmer (Holborn and St Pancras) (Lab)
The Opposition welcome the codes and the tone and manner in which the debate has been opened by the Minister. I will start with some general propositions, the most obvious of which is this: the ability to intercept the communication of those who mean us harm is a vital tool in the fight against terrorism and serious crime that is available to the police and security services. I saw that for myself when I was Director of Public Prosecutions for five years. I worked closely with the police and security services, relying on the sort of intercept and data that the codes refer to on a daily basis in the fight against both terrorism and serious crime.
On the framework, the powers set out in the draft codes—the interception of communications and equipment interference, which is being put into a code for the first time—are among the most intrusive and therefore the most sensitive available. The need for strict adherence to the safeguards in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act is vital; it is those safeguards that allow the powers to be used. Whether the safeguards in the existing legislative framework are robust enough is a debate for yesterday, because the draft Investigatory Powers Bill is going through its various processes currently with the Joint Committee, and no doubt many of the issues discussed today will be equally if not more relevant in those debates. Given the legislation that we have and that we are existing under at the moment, it is welcome to have codes that give guidance to those who need to exercise such powers, and to ensure that, as far as possible, the safeguards are properly applied.
The Minister mentioned necessity and proportionality, which are key to the exercise of any of the powers referred to in the codes; they are, as the Minister says, at the heart. In that respect, I welcome the guidance in paragraph 3.6 of the interception of communications draft code and in paragraphs 2.6 and 2.7 of the equipment interference draft code, which spell out in practical terms how proportionality is to be applied. Having worked, before I was Director of Public Prosecutions, with the Police Service of Northern Ireland, I know that practical guidance to those on the ground as to how they assess necessity and proportionality is critical. It is well set out in those parts of the code, and that is welcome guidance not only for all of us and for the public to see, but for those charged with implementing the codes. In those paragraphs are the key principles that privacy must be balanced against the need for activity in operational terms, and the reminder, if it is needed for those exercising the powers, that actions should not be deemed proportionate simply because there is a potential threat to security. If that were the case, the proportionality test would be redundant.
Paragraphs 3.22 and 3.23 of the interception of communications draft code are welcome, because they make clear for the first time in a code that a
“communication remains in the course of its transmission regardless of whether the communication has previously been read, viewed or listened to.”
That central issue emerged in the investigations and prosecutions relating to allegations of hacking across various news bodies. At one stage, there was a lack of clarity about whether a communication that had already been listened to remained in the course of its transmission. That gave rise to a huge debate before and after the Leveson inquiry. It is welcome that the new code aligns the position in guidance with the approach suggested by Lord Justice Leveson, which in my opinion is the right approach.
Keir Starmer
I am grateful for that.
Regarding the remaining tricky or more complicated areas, I shall focus on legal professional privilege and the protection of communications involving confidential journalistic material and other confidential information. Before I do so, though, I highlight the point made by a number of respondents to the consultation on the equipment interference code. The Government’s response to the consultation summarises their point as saying that
“a code of practice was not a suitable vehicle for setting out the power to conduct equipment interference and that it should be provided for in primary legislation. This would offer an opportunity to have an open and transparent debate about the use of equipment interference by the Security and Intelligence agencies.”
That is a point well made in the consultation, although the Government’s response is inevitably constrained by the legislation that is currently in place. Nevertheless, it emphasises the need for a real debate on this issue as the draft Investigatory Powers Bill goes through its various stages.
I will not take up time by reminding the Committee of the importance of legal professional privilege, but the need for reform and further guidance under the code is absolutely clear. In that respect, probably the only quarrel I have with the Minister is that I am not sure that the new codes are simply about the Government doing their job properly. They were necessary as a result of the ruling in the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, which declared in February last year that the previous approach was not in accordance with article 8 of the European convention on human rights. That position was rightly conceded by the Government, because in that case the IPT ruled that
“the regime for the interception/obtaining, analysis, use, disclosure and destruction of legally privileged material has contravened Article 8 ECHR and was accordingly unlawful.”
It was therefore necessary, for the period that the current regime remains intact, to have further guidance to bring the approach into accordance with the IPT.
I remind the Committee that the previous code simply said that caseworkers
“should be alert to any intercept material which may be subject to legal privilege.”
It did not go on to state what steps should be taken if legally privileged material was identified. There was a deficiency there that the new code is intended to deal with.
Although they do not ring-fence legally privileged material, the new codes do provide much more detailed guidance, which, again, is welcome, particularly in paragraphs 4.5 to 4.25 of the interception of communications draft code and chapter 3 of the equipment interference draft code. I highlight the fact that the latter provides that, prior to any warrant being granted where interception of privileged information is likely, there must be an assessment of how likely it is that such information will be intercepted. So, first, there must be an assessment before the event. Secondly, when the interception of legally privileged information is intended, the threshold, as the Minister said, is that there must be
“exceptional and compelling circumstances that make the authorisation necessary.”
Thirdly, the code makes it clear that the threshold will be met when there is an
“imminent threat of death or serious injury or serious threat to national security”
but it is anticipated that such situations will be rare. In addition, the code states that any communication between lawyer and client or any third party for the purpose of actual or contemplated litigation
“must be presumed to be privileged unless the contrary is established”.
Those are three or four aspects in which the guidance is much sharper and clearer. Time will tell—in the limited life of such codes—whether the regime is robust enough. Over the coming weeks and months, we will obviously keep a beady eye on how matters progress. To some extent, however, such matters will be considered in greater detail as the Bill proceeds.
My only point at this stage is that there is a question mark over whether the protection in relation to dissemination is strong enough under the code. The code simply states that privileged information cannot be disseminated unless a legal adviser has been consulted on the lawfulness of such action and that “all reasonable steps” must be taken to ensure that “as far as practicable” authorities involved in legal proceedings are prevented from seeing privileged information relating to those proceedings. Why does the code not expressly prevent dissemination where legal advice has been received as to its unlawfulness? I accept, however, that that question is probably equally well suited to the forthcoming debate on the Bill.
Moving on, it is noticeable that the protection for journalistic material and other confidential information is a lot weaker than the protection for legally privileged material. In his report, “A Question of Trust”, David Anderson, the Government’s reviewer, points out:
“The Draft Interception Code sets out similar provisions in respect of journalistic or other confidential material but the threshold for access is not as high as that in respect of legal privilege.”
It is obviously a matter of some concern that there are two different regimes for protected information. This matter was raised in the consultation, and I remind the Committee that the News Media Association took the view that the current regulatory framework
“poses a threat to journalism, journalists and their sources”.
The new provisions in the code of course have a chequered history. The National Union of Journalists, in a joint statement with the Bar Council, said that
“access to professional data should be protected in law and should be subject to independent, judicial oversight. Using codes of practice—such as the draft code under RIPA—undermines the rule of law.”
To some extent, their plea is for a change in the law, which is hopefully now forthcoming. The general secretary of the NUJ said:
“The proposals contained in the existing RIPA code of practice simply do not offer the protection to journalists and to sources, and are in fact dangerously inadequate. New legislation is urgently needed—it is vital that judicial oversight is introduced to force police officers and other snoopers to apply to judges in a transparent process before surveillance powers against media and legal professionals can be considered.”
Finally, the Press Gazette and the Society of Editors said that the draft code provides
“wholly inadequate protection for journalists’ sources”
and demanded that communication between journalists and public officials be treated the same as privileged information.
I recognise that the target of some of those comments was new legislation rather than a different code and that the code can only go so far, but not to have aligned in the interim the protection for journalistic material and other confidential material with the protection now given in the code to legally privileged material is a missed opportunity.
Mr Hayes
The hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras, whom I should have welcomed to his place at the outset—I do so now with your indulgence, Ms Buck—affirmed what I said about portability and necessity. As I said when I intervened on him, this is in the code for the first time. I draw attention to paragraph 3.6 of the interception of communications draft code of practice.
The hon. and learned Gentleman asked specific questions about the consultation. He is right: there were over 150 responses, one of which did talk about whether the safeguards should be put in primary legislation or in a code. The legislation underpinning much of the good practice that he absolutely properly called for is already in place. The assertion made in the consultation was misjudged, because in the Security Service Act 1989 and the Intelligence Services Act 1994 there is a legislative basis for the security services to interfere with computers and communications devices. It is set out in that legislation.
It is true that the safeguards and protections that have been commonly used, as I said at the outset, have not previously been as accessible publicly, so the code sets them out very clearly. However, those safeguards and that diligence had applied to both those legislative vehicles up to now. We are not putting in place new safeguards but simply codifying them. That was perhaps not quite appreciated in some of the consultation.
There is also a bigger issue. As I look round and see distinguished right hon. and hon. Members of this House, I think it not unreasonable to say that there is always a debate about how much is put in a Bill and how much is dealt with in supplementary material. How often I have had that conversation! In this area in particular, which is so rapidly moving—where the threat we face is dynamic and where the technology changes very quickly—the risk of rigidity is even greater than in most legislation. Retaining a degree of responsiveness through the flexibility provided by using codes of practice seems particularly pertinent in this area, as long as they are as robust, certain and well defined as the hon. and learned Gentleman suggested. He made the very good point that the language used becomes critical if we adopt the position I just have, because the codes will be tested in law.
Perhaps I was a little coy when I spoke initially, but the hon. and learned Gentleman is right that part of the reason why we are doing this are the challenges that have taken place. He drew the Committee’s attention to them entirely properly and I would not want to disagree. That again emphasises the need for precision in language, because these things would be challenged if we were to be anything other than precise.
To that end, the hon. and learned Gentleman dwelt for a while on whether we should have used the word “prevent” in respect of the dissemination of privileged information. We considered that issue in the course of the consultation. Let me be clear: the code states that all applications to intercept communications must be authorised by the Secretary of State. Further, the draft code requires the Secretary of State to apply:
“Particular consideration…in cases where the subject of the interception might reasonably assume a high degree of privacy, or where confidential information is involved.”
There is a general assumption that the interception is of particular interest, if I can put it in those terms, where a high degree of privacy or confidential information is involved and that a bar needs to be set at a level that takes account of the importance of that privacy and confidentiality.
Keir Starmer
The point I was making was limited to dissemination where it has been established that material has been unlawfully obtained, as will happen in certain situations. My point is about the safeguard where, whatever the prior assessment, it transpires that legally privileged material has been captured and should not have been. The question was why in those circumstances there is not a prohibition on dissemination, rather than the assessment before the event.
Mr Hayes
I was going on to that point, but that would have deprived the hon. and learned Gentleman of his place in the sun, so I am glad that I did not. I was going to add that there are further safeguards on the retention and dissemination of confidential material that must apply when seeking and granting a warrant. In any case where confidential information is retained, there is a requirement for notification to the interception of communications commissioner.
The hon. and learned Gentleman is right that, although they are related, the acquisition, dissemination and retention are different issues, and each requires appropriate safeguards. He made a good, more general point, as did the former Secretary of State for Scotland, the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland, about the need to look at things again in light of the new legislation, and it is absolutely right that we do. I confirm, as they asked me to, that that will happen, but it would be inappropriate for the Government to say, “We will not do anything until then.” Unless the important cross-House Committee considering these things makes alarmingly radical recommendations or the Bill Committee in its proper scrutiny of these things forces the Minister to make radical changes, I do not anticipate extraordinary changes between what we see today and what we end up with. However, the hon. and learned Gentleman and the former Secretary of State for Scotland are both absolutely right that proper reconsideration is necessary in the context of that new legislation. It would be inappropriate not to do that. The hon. and learned Gentleman is right that we will look at such things in that way.
The hon. and learned Gentleman also raised the issue of journalists. There is a difference between journalists and lawyers in these terms, because commissioned lawyers retain for all kinds of purposes, many of which he was intimately familiar with in his previous life. My hon. Friend the Member for Fareham is right that these days defining a journalist is more complicated than defining a lawyer, but there is a good argument for applying the provisions I have just described around privacy and particularly sensitive or confidential information to those areas.
I met representatives of the National Union of Journalists in that context, and they put directly to me the case that the hon. and learned Gentleman described. It was right to hear that case. I am not insensitive to the argument, but equally we have probably got the balance about right in emphasising the need for confidentiality and the higher bar, without treating journalists in quite the same way as we treat lawyers.
I think I have covered most of the points that the hon. and learned Gentleman raised. I will sit down unless he wants to intervene on me to raise additional points.
Mr Hayes
Brevity, as you know, Ms Buck, is my middle name.
Question put and agreed to.
Resolved,
That the Committee has considered the draft Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Interception of Communications: Code of Practice) Order 2015.
DRAFT EQUIPMENT INTERFERENCE (CODE OF PRACTICE) ORDER 2015
Resolved,
That the Committee has considered the draft Equipment Interference (Code of Practice) Order 2015.—(Mr John Hayes.)
Mr Shaker Aamer
John Hayes Excerpts(8 years, 5 months ago)
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The Minister for Security (Mr John Hayes)
Mrs Moon, you and my hon. Friend the Member for Monmouth (David T. C. Davies), who has secured this debate, will appreciate that there are some things that I can deal with straightforwardly in this debate and some matters that are not appropriate to raise, which are subject to proceedings that would not be appropriate to refer to. Obviously, if there are any security matters that I am unable to raise, my hon. Friend will appreciate that, given his experience of this House, and I know that he will not test me on them.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for bringing this matter to the House. Shaker Aamer is the last UK resident to be released from Guantanamo Bay. As my hon. Friend will be aware, Mr Aamer was released and returned to the UK on 30 October into Biggin Hill airport. Other Members secured debates earlier this year, seeking Mr Aamer’s release, and as you will know, Mrs Moon, there is an all-party group on Shaker Aamer. Those Members have made their arguments and those arguments are now, of course, in the context of Mr Aamer’s release, but I appreciate that other Members—my hon. Friend is clearly one of them—who may seek to question why this Government went about trying to seek Mr Aamer’s return to the United Kingdom.
David T. C. Davies
Will my right hon. Friend give way on that issue, because that is not actually what I am raising?
Mr Hayes
Forgive me, but I will just make this fundamental point, because I think we can find a synthesis across this Chamber if we all understand it. Indefinite detention without fair trial is fundamentally unacceptable. That is central not only to our view of the legal process but, more than that, to the ethical framework on which that process is built. It is an a priori assumption that detention without trial is unacceptable, and I am absolutely certain that my hon. Friend, who is about to intervene on me again, will agree with that.
David T. C. Davies
Actually, I was just going to point out, with the greatest of respect to my right hon. Friend, whom I have known for a long time, that that is not what I have raised here. I am not making any comment about Mr Aamer’s detention. I am making a comment about the prospect of his receiving a secret payment of £1 million or thereabouts. That is what I am raising today.
Mr Hayes
That is what my hon. Friend has raised in part, but it is impossible to consider it out of the context of the circumstances that prevail in respect of Shaker Aamer. My belief, which I am sure my hon. Friend and the whole Chamber shares, is that the fairness of any judicial system is vital to its popular acceptance. The unintended consequence of Guantanamo Bay is to create a perception of unfairness, which potentially fuels distaste for and hostility towards the US and her allies. With that in mind, the UK Government committed to making best endeavours to bring Mr Aamer back to the UK. Representations on his behalf in which the UK position was made clear were made by Ministers at the most senior levels, including by the Prime Minister to President Obama. The whole Chamber will be aware of that, because it was the subject of some publicity. The fact that the US Administration agreed to review Mr Aamer’s case as a priority and then release him demonstrated our close ties once again.
Following the return of Mr Aamer, it is important to emphasise that the UK is not considering accepting any further detainees from Guantanamo Bay. The timetable for the closure of that facility has not emerged, but Members will be mindful that it remains a matter for the US Government. Members will know that President Obama has commented on that a number of times. In respect of Mr Aamer, officials in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and across the Government worked to ensure that the return happened quickly and securely.
Dr Mathias
In view of the motion’s wording, will the Minister tell us whether the Government are looking into the allegations that UK personnel may have been present at times when torture was administered to Mr Shaker Aamer, whether in Afghanistan or in Guantanamo Bay?
Mr Hayes
I will in a moment. I am not sufficiently accomplished to remember all the interventions and then respond to them in sequence. I need to do them one by one, and I am sure that my hon. Friend will understand.
My hon. Friend the Member for Twickenham (Dr Mathias) made her point and put it on record, but she must know that it would not be appropriate for me to comment on the details of anyone involved in alleged events in Guantanamo Bay, and I certainly cannot do so in this debate.
David T. C. Davies
Does the Minister not agree that the allegations of torture are simply that—allegations? Those allegations are besmirching the American Government, and I have as much right to ask why Mr Aamer was out there on a false passport, working for a charity that I cannot find out anything about, as others have to suggest that he was tortured when he got there. They are all allegations, and that is it.
Mr Hayes
With the combination of assiduity, perspicacity and good hearing that my hon. Friend personifies, he will have heard me use the phrase, “anyone involved in alleged events”.
Returning to my script, I understand that the public will have concerns in respect of a former detainee of Guantanamo Bay returning to the UK and the potential security implications. My hon. Friend articulated some of that today, but it is important for me to say that I cannot comment on why Mr Aamer was detained in the first instance or provide any details, as I said at the outset of the debate, on security arrangements in this individual case. It has been a long tradition of successive Governments not to do that, and it would be entirely inappropriate for me to break with it today, given the sensitivity of these matters.
I reassure the whole Chamber, however, that the first duty of any Government is to protect the security of our citizens, and we take that duty extremely seriously. Any individual seeking to engage in terrorism-related activity should be in no doubt that the relevant authorities will take the strongest possible action to protect our national security and ensure that they are brought to justice. Recent events around the world, particularly so close in Paris, have demonstrated that the threat remains real, severe and dynamic.
The Chamber will not be oblivious to the fact that both the Prime Minister and the director of MI5 have made absolutely clear that we have foiled no fewer than seven different terrorist plots in the past year alone through the work of our security services and police. That is ample illustration of the urgency, severity and character of the work we are doing. The police and security and intelligence agencies already have a range of powers available to them, stretching from prosecution for criminal offences relating to terrorism to executive disruption powers, such as the imposition of terrorism prevention and investigation measures.
Dealing with Syria, we have a wide range of powers to disrupt travel and manage the risk posed by returnees. Those powers include the ability to temporarily seize and retain travel documents to disrupt immediate travel and the creation of a temporary exclusion order to enable the UK Government to temporarily disrupt and control an individual’s return to the UK.
Of course there will be those who criticise some of the measures as an infringement of civil liberties, but I disagree. They are about protecting precious freedoms from terrorists who want to steal them from us. Our legislation is robust, and because of our determination to get the balance right, those powers are matched with appropriate checks and balances, safeguards and judicial oversight. We remain confident that our law enforcement and intelligence agencies have the tools available to deal with those who seek to threaten the UK.
There have been comments in the media, reflected in my hon. Friend’s speech today, about any payments that may be made to Mr Aamer. I refer those present to the statement that my hon. Friend referred to by the then Lord Chancellor, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke). On 16 November 2010, he stated that
“the Government have now agreed a mediated settlement of the civil damages claims brought by detainees held at Guantanamo Bay. The details of that settlement have been made subject to a legally binding confidentiality agreement.”—[Official Report, 16 November 2010; Vol. 518, c. 752.]
I am repeating a point that my hon. Friend made, and I know he would not expect me to go further than that today.
Mr Hayes
As the statement I just read out said, the settlement is subject to a binding confidentiality agreement. That is not uncommon in law. My hon. Friend is a distinguished parliamentarian and an authority on a number of matters, and he will know that it is not uncommon to have confidentiality agreements in such cases.
The former Justice Secretary, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe, noted that the Government of the time inherited the issues around the treatment of UK detainees held by other countries from previous Governments and that the issues needed to be addressed. He said that failure to do so would mean that our reputation as a country that believes in the rule of law and fairness, as was described earlier, risked being tarnished. As was also set out in that statement, no admissions of culpability were made in settling the claims and none of the claimants had withdrawn their allegations. It was a mediated settlement where confidentiality is a common feature. I am therefore unable to provide any further comment on legal action brought by those detained in Guantanamo Bay than that already provided by the statement.
It is open to Mr Aamer to bring a damages claim in the US. That was raised in the course of considerations, and it is a matter for the US justice system. I cannot comment on that, and I cannot comment on what Mr Aamer plans to do, because I do not know.
In conclusion, I reiterate that the UK has long held that indefinite detention without trial is fundamentally unacceptable, because it is unreasonable and unfair. The rule of law depends on popular acclaim. It depends on us all believing that we will be treated fairly, properly and equally. My hon. Friend will know that the Prime Minister has asked the Intelligence and Security Committee to examine the themes and issues set out in “The Report of the Detainee Inquiry”, which was published by the Government in December 2013. I have outlined as far as I can Mr Aamer’s immigration status and the measures in place to deal with any individual engaging in terrorist-related activity. In addition, I have reminded those present of the statement by the former Justice Secretary on the damages claims brought by those detained in Guantanamo Bay and the mediated settlement that followed. I know that my hon. Friend will be pleased to have had the opportunity to put these matters on record, and I know that he feels strongly about them. With the respect I offer him, I hope that he will respect my position in not being able to add further to these matters on this occasion in this House.
Oral Answers to Questions
John Hayes Excerpts(8 years, 5 months ago)
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Peter Heaton-Jones (North Devon) (Con)
T3. On behalf of my constituents, may I express our gratitude for the work of the security and intelligence services in protecting us from the sort of evil attacks that we have seen in Paris this weekend? Will the Minister for Security join me in publicly thanking those authorities whose work is usually done out of the public eye but is so important to our everyday lives?
The Minister for Security (Mr John Hayes)
My hon. Friend does the House a great service in drawing attention to that work. It is true that much of the work of our security services is, by its nature, secret and therefore they are not often enough given the sort of praise he has given them today. In what they do, they stand between us and chaos, and their work—alongside that of the police—is vital to our communal wellbeing and our personal safety.
Nic Dakin (Scunthorpe) (Lab)
T7. In its inadequate judgment, Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary found that Humberside police are not prepared to face their future financial challenges. Can the Home Secretary guarantee that there will be no more cuts in Humberside police’s funding that would further jeopardise their ability to deliver safety and security for my constituents?
James Cleverly (Braintree) (Con)
T4. A marauding terrorist firearms attack of the type we saw in Paris is a scenario the security services, police forces and others have trained and exercised for over a number of years. Will the Security Minister update the House on what lessons we might be able to learn from the terrible incidents in Paris to further protect the people of Great Britain?
Mr Hayes
There is always more to be learned from such events. The threat we face is dynamic, not static. France is one of our closest allies and we are working closely with it. The UK has a comprehensive approach to preparing for such tragic incidents, as demonstrated by the firearms exercise Strong Tower. As soon as the attacks happened, the police and agencies took steps to maintain the security of the UK. Prepared, fearless and certain: that is how we stand.
Mr Douglas Carswell (Clacton) (UKIP)
Is the Home Secretary confident, given the limited budget, that the security services have the resources they need to keep us safe?
Mr Hayes
It is critically important that they have the resources, but they also need the right powers. That is precisely why we are bringing together those powers—they have been mentioned several times during this question session—in a clear, transparent and comprehensive way. This is a balance between giving those who are missioned to keep us safe what they need to do the job, and having the right checks and balances in place to maintain the role of this House in holding Ministers to account for the exercise of those functions.
Bill Wiggin (North Herefordshire) (Con)
T5. One of the more irritating crimes is antisocial behaviour. Will the Government send a very positive message to the police community support officers who do so much to deal with this problem?
Chief Constable Dismissal Procedures
John Hayes Excerpts(8 years, 6 months ago)
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The Minister for Security (Mr John Hayes)
That my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg) is an ornament to all we do is well established. That he is a guardian of our liberties and freedoms is well known. But what is not so well known outside his locale is that he is a doughty champion of his constituents and their interests—as doughty as any in this House, matched by few, but matched by my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol North West (Charlotte Leslie) who, like him, leaves no stone unturned when it comes to highlighting the interests of her constituents and dealing with what they perceive to be unfairness and unreasonableness, and that is precisely what my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset in his view and mind has drawn to the attention of the House tonight. I make no comment on that and he would not expect me to comment on the particular details of the case, although I have much to say in the short time available to us.
As I am acting as a proxy for the Police Minister, it is a particular delight to see him sitting beside me. I know that he will watch over me with the gaze that he uses in dealing with all such important matters.
The leadership of our police forces is of central importance to the effective maintenance of law and order, and it is important that the people of England and Wales understand how decisions affecting the leadership are made and are scrutinised. We have heard from both my hon. Friends who have spoken and from those who have intervened. I note my right hon. Friend the Member for North Somerset (Dr Fox) in his place, as well as my hon. Friend the Member for Bridgwater and West Somerset (Mr Liddell-Grainger). The relationship between public and police depends on that absolute certainty—that trust—that things are done properly.
As I said, it would not be appropriate for me, and I do not intend, to address the specific case. Instead, I will respond to my hon. Friends’ remarks by setting out the principles underpinning the complaints and disciplinary system, and how that system works. It is well known that policing in England and Wales is built on the principles set down by Sir Robert Peel. For the convenience of the House, I wondered whether I might put those principles in the Library of the House following this short debate. Central to these principles is that
“the ability of the police to perform their duties is dependent upon public approval of police . . . actions”.
Although I may disagree with Peel on many things, particularly the corn laws, he had sagacious advice about the importance of trust and confidence in the force he established. He stated that
“the police are the public and the public are the police; the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full-time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence”.
Such is the community of trust between the public and the police. The moment that trust is lost, the public approval of police actions is in jeopardy, and policing as we know it is threatened. I say this not to be melodramatic, but to reinforce the fact that the police hold a very significant range of powers, and if they are to use those powers effectively, and maintain the Queen’s peace, the public must have the utmost trust in the police, and how they are led.
The election of police and crime commissioners marked the biggest change in police governance in living memory. PCCs give the public a direct say in how their forces are run, reinforcing the link between the public and police, and providing the public with a democratically elected voice in their local police force. This link between the public and the police is of central importance to the matters being considered here today, drawn to our attention by my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset. The chief constable of any force leads their force on behalf of the communities they serve. The PCC holds them to account on behalf of the public, and it is right that decisions relating to who leads that force are made by PCCs. It is vital that this central point is not lost in the debate we have here today.
Let me turn specifically to allegations of misconduct, and the regulations that govern how these are handled. The Government have been clear that the role of the Independent Police Complaints Commission is crucial in a system of police scrutiny and complaints that functions well and commands public confidence. The majority of misconduct allegations about chief constables are usually referred by PCCs as the “appropriate authority” to the IPCC for independent investigation. As an independent body, it is for the IPCC to decide whether to investigate an allegation about a chief constable following referral from the PCC. Ministers are, as I said, unable to comment on individual cases.
Last year, an independent review of the police disciplinary system led by Major-General Chip Chapman recommended that the IPCC should investigate all chief officer cases. The Government will shortly introduce legislation to implement that recommendation.
Dr Fox
Will my right hon. Friend give us an assurance that when the Government look at this legislation they will take on board this point: why should a good and decent public servant want to take on the role of chief constable when they can be dragged into the mud by smear and innuendo that turn out to have no basis in fact?
Mr Hayes
Smear and innuendo are never acceptable in any aspect of public service, and my right hon. Friend is right that the system must be robust in guarding against vexatious and unhappy claims. As I have said, I will not comment on the specifics of the case, but as a matter of principle he is, of course, right that the system needs to be sufficiently well designed to ensure that complaints that have merit are dealt with properly.
We have heard today, particularly from my right hon. Friend, about what might be described as “double jeopardy”—the time-honoured principle that people are not tried twice for the same thing—and it has been suggested that it should not be open to a PCC to call upon their chief constable to resign or retire when they have been subject to misconduct proceedings.
I think that it is important to note that the process of misconduct hearings, and the sanctions that may result, are rightly different and separate from the process set down in section 38 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, which enables the PCC to call upon a chief constable to retire or resign. The PCC holds the chief constable to account on behalf of the public. They are best placed to make decisions on both the appointment and dismissal of a chief constable. We have set out a clear process that must be followed, and I shall come to it momentarily.
Mr Rees-Mogg
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for that clarification, but in this case the section 38 process followed immediately from the report into the misconduct allegations, so the two were intimately and intricately linked.
Mr Hayes
With the precision and eloquence for which he is renowned, my hon. Friend has put that on the record.
The Government recognise that the decision to call upon a chief constable to resign or retire is significant and should not be taken lightly, and in that regard I take the point made by my right hon. Friend a moment ago. That is why we have established detailed procedures that must be followed whenever a PCC might wish to invoke their section 38 powers, and we remain satisfied that sufficient safeguards are in place with regard to the power of PCCs to dismiss chief constables.
These issues have, of course, been debated in this House previously, most notably during the passage of the 2011 Act. It is worth noting that the IPCC has no role within the section 38 process, although it is equally important to note that the PCC is obliged to have regard to the views of Her Majesty’s chief inspector of constabulary and to seek the views of the relevant police and crime panel, as well as providing the chief constable with the opportunity to make representations. The process is detailed and requires the PCC to take into account independent views. The final decision will remain that of the PCC, but I remain confident that the process offers sufficient checks and balances and that the interests of the people and communities who elect PCCs are properly served in this way.
Mr Liddell-Grainger
The Minister knows me well enough to know that I will speak very bluntly about this case. The PCC has promoted a senior officer who released a letter as a superintendent. He basically stabbed his boss in the back and then turned up as a senior commander in Somerset. What confidence can we have when we have a badger cull, Hinkley Point, serious flooding two years ago and a man who quite honestly is there because he is—this is a horrible term—a poodle of the PCC? That is not the way to police in this country. I am sorry to be blunt with the Minister, but I hope that he takes it in the spirit with which it was meant.
Mr Speaker
There is never a deficit of passion, or indeed of oratory, from the Minister of State.
Mr Hayes
Ah, Mr Speaker, I may be a player, but the stage is yours.
The truth is that, in particular circumstances, with the sensitivities that surround particular cases, there will be strong views held on all sides of the debate, and it is by the nature of this Chamber that my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset has been able to bring some of those strong views to our attention. I know that the Minister for Policing, Crime and Criminal Justice, who is sitting beside me, takes these matters very seriously indeed, and I may have some news at the end of my speech that may give some satisfaction to those who have contributed to this short discussion.
The process that I have described includes the PCC obtaining the views of Her Majesty's chief inspector of constabulary in writing and having regard to those views; providing a copy of those written views to the chief constable and the PCP; providing a written explanation to the chief constable and the PCP of the reasons why he or she is proposing to remove a chief constable; notifying the chief executive; and giving the chief constable the opportunity to make written representations. If the PCC still proposes to call upon the chief constable to retire or resign, he or she must give the chief constable and the PCP a written explanation of their reasons, which must also be given to the chief inspector of constabulary. A scrutiny hearing of the PCP will then be held in private, at which the PCC and chief constable are both entitled to attend to make representations, regardless of whether the PCP wishes to call them.
The PCP may consult the chief inspector of constabulary before making a recommendation to the PCC as to whether or not the commissioner should call for the retirement or resignation of the chief constable. Fundamentally —this goes to the heart of the debate—the PCC is missioned to act reasonably and fairly.
It was Disraeli, Peel’s adversary in the corn law debates, who said
“circumstances are beyond human control, but our conduct is in our own power.”
The question of how we conduct ourselves is vital to any relationship, not least that between the police and the public. I thank my hon. Friend for raising these issues and for giving me the opportunity to speak about this relationship today.
The news I want to bring to my hon. Friend and other concerned Members of this House is that, given the representations made by right hon. and hon. Members, well articulated in this debate, and typical of my right hon. Friend the Minister for Policing, Crime and Criminal Justice, he is indeed happy to meet Members of this House to discuss their concerns. He is also prepared to meet the former chief constable as part of that process. It seems to me important that that further check on reasonableness and fairness, personified by this excellent Minister, is vital both as a matter of principle and as a matter of practice in this case. I know that all who have contributed to the debate will recognise the significance of the step that my right hon. Friend has decided to take and I have imperfectly and humbly been able to draw to their attention.
Question put and agreed to.
Proposed Council Decisions on EU Signature of Council of Europe Conventions
John Hayes Excerpts(8 years, 6 months ago)
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The Minister for Security (Mr John Hayes)
Further to the explanatory memorandum I deposited on 29 June, the Government have decided not to opt in to two Council decisions relating to signature of the new additional protocol to the Council of Europe convention on the prevention of terrorism and the 2005 convention.
The additional protocol contributes to the implementation of UN Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 2178 on “threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts” on tackling foreign fighters, which was unanimously adopted by the Security Council of the United Nations on 24 November 2014. It seeks to set a minimum standard for criminalisation of recruitment to, and receipt of training for, terrorism and the act of travelling abroad for the purpose of terrorism.
The UK participated fully in the development of the additional protocol and has legislation in place which is compliant with the requirements of the additional protocol and the convention. While we consider there to be value in signing the additional protocol, I remain of the view that this is a matter for member states and do not agree with the European Commission’s assertion of exclusive EU competence.
Security is a matter for National Governments and National Parliaments. While co-operation across borders is important—indeed, often necessary—it is for the UK to judge what is best done in our national interest. Not opting in to these proposals will ensure that the UK cannot be caught by any exercise of EU competence in this area, in line with the previous Government’s decision not to opt back in to the EU framework decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism, as amended, under the Protocol 36 decision.
[HCWS266]
Scientific Procedures on Living Animals
John Hayes Excerpts(8 years, 6 months ago)
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The Minister for Security (Mr John Hayes)
My right hon. Friend the Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Bates) has today made the following written ministerial statement:
My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary is today laying before the House “Statistics of Scientific Procedures on Living Animals Great Britain 2014” (HC 511).
The adoption of the EU directive 2010/63/EU has brought about changes to how the data on the use of animals in science is categorised, and provides consistency across EU member states in the data to be published by the Commission in due course. There has been little change to the numbers or types of procedures that are required to be counted. However, the codification of the procedures has changed in line with the EU requirements for reporting.
Overall, the annual statistical report shows a decrease (6%) in the total number of procedures (3.87 million) performed during 2014 compared with 2013. Of the total number of procedures 1.94 million (50%) are related to the creation/breeding of genetically altered animals that were not used in further procedures and the remaining 1.93 million (50%) were experimental procedures. Given the changes to methodology the precise size of the reduction cannot be quantified.
Mice, fish and rats were the most commonly used species in 2014 accounting for 86% of experimental procedures carried out.
Specially protected species, horses, cats, dogs and non-human primates accounted for 0.8% (16,000) of experimental procedures (0.4% of all procedures) in 2014, the same proportion as in 2013.
I particularly welcome the new requirement for the reporting of the actual severity experienced by animals in the course of procedures. The publication of actual severity increases transparency about the real harms of animal use and will help to drive improvements in welfare standards through targeted refinement initiatives.
The severity of breeding procedures is considered separately from experimental procedures. Of the returns for severity for the 1.94 million breeding procedures, the majority (94%) of animals bred and not used in further procedures were classed as either sub-threshold or mild, 46% and 48% respectively. Only 4% were classed as moderate and 2% as severe. Of the returns for the 1.93 million experimental procedures, those classified as sub-threshold or mild were 9% and 51% respectively, 25% were classified as moderate and 8% as severe. A further 7% were classified as non-recovery.
The latest statistical report and supplementary information, including those for previous years, can be found at:
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/statistics-of-scientific-procedures-on-living-animals.
I am pleased to inform the House that I have also today placed in the Library the annual report of the Home Office Animals in Science Regulation Unit (ASRU) for the year 2014. The annual report can be found at:
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/animals-in-science-regulation-unit-annual-report-2014
and describes how the Home Office has delivered its responsibilities under the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986 to regulate the use of animals, implement the regulations as part of the delivery of the transposed directive, and engaged with stakeholders. The report also provides details of inspection and cases of non-compliance and the outcomes of those cases concluded in 2014.
The UK is a strong advocate for the life sciences. I am firmly committed to the properly regulated use of animals that continues to play an important role in improving the lives of humans and animals and the safety and sustainability of the environment. This Government seek to maintain the UK’s world-leading position by building on our strengths in the life sciences and innovation. To do this we must ensure the 3Rs (replacement, reduction and refinement) are at the heart of what we do.
I am pleased to, therefore, announce that from 1 November 2015, a policy ban on the testing of finished household products, and a qualified ban on the testing of ingredients primarily intended for use in household products, will come into effect. Testing of ingredients will only be exempt from the ban if there is a regulatory requirement for the testing, in which case testing can take place but retrospective notification will be required. In very exceptional circumstances, testing not required by regulations may be allowed but only after a full and detailed application has been considered and specific approval granted.
I am also publishing two advice notes to support how we administer and enforce the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986. The first advice note reaffirms my expectation that all project licence proposals will have fully considered all practicable opportunities to either rehome or set animals free after being used in research. However, the welfare of the animals must always be the primary consideration. Secondly, I am publishing advice on the reuse of animals under the Act. This advice note has the 3Rs at its core and aims to strike a balance between reduction and refinement considerations, taking account of the legal constraints on keeping animals alive and reusing them in further procedures.
The UK has a proud tradition of high-quality science coupled with high standards of animal welfare. Both these documents, together with the other announcements I have made in this statement today, aim to support these important considerations.
[HCWS263]
Draft Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (Risk of Being Drawn into Terrorism) (Guidance) Regulations 2015
John Hayes Excerpts(8 years, 7 months ago)
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The Minister for Security (Mr John Hayes)
I beg to move,
That the Committee has considered the draft Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (Risk of Being Drawn into Terrorism) (Guidance) Regulations 2015.
It is a delight to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Davies, which I know will be characterised by the generosity borne of your distinguished service to this House. It is a delight, too, to introduce this important provision at an important time for our country.
This House is often at its best when we put aside partisan differences and act in the national interest, which is, after all, what motivates everyone who comes here to do what is right and good. We all seek to improve our country, and when we put aside our differences we earn the respect of the whole of our nation. There could scarcely be a subject of more pressing significance that obliges us to do just that than the one we are considering today.
Make no mistake, the threat that this country faces is imminent and profound. The Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, which provides the official analysis of the scale of the threat, suggests it is severe, which means an attack is very likely. That is the technical description. To that end, it is important that the Government take their responsibility seriously by equipping those who keep us safe with the necessary powers and resources to do their job. All Governments have recognised that, and I believe that all Members of this House recognise it, too. This short debate gives us the chance to speak with a single voice in response to that threat, in the way the public expect us to do.
I can confirm that the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments has considered and cleared this instrument. I put on the record my appreciation of the Committee, which showed great forbearance in considering this instrument outside its normal timescale due to the recess.
Let me turn to the purpose and importance of this legislation. I have talked about the scale of the threat we face and described it as severe—that is not my description, but, as I said, the analysis borne of JTAC’s close consideration—but the emergence of ISIL has exacerbated all that. Many of the horrors we have endured preceded ISIL. We recently spoke about 7/7 when its anniversary was raised on the Floor of the House; we all remember those dreadful events. None the less, ISIL and the vulnerable young people who have travelled to Syria and Iraq present a heightened threat to our national security. The ideology promoted by ISIL and the extremists who champion its cause represents a clear and present danger to our security and our values.
The Prime Minister spoke recently about those subjects to teachers and students at Birmingham’s Ninestiles school. He described it as the struggle of our generation, which I think is not an overstatement, but a fair summary of where we stand and where we are. We must confront and defeat those who espouse a poisonous, subversive and extreme doctrine. We must work together to promote our shared values, time-honoured principles and traditions, embodied in institutions—not least Parliament—that are, by their very nature, inclusive and essential to building a strong, cohesive society. In short, we must build a society in which the things that unite us are greater than anything that divides us, and in which our common and shared sense of belonging inspires and protects us from the kind of poison I have briefly described. The Prime Minister said:
“Whether you are Muslim, Hindu, Jewish, Christian or Sikh…we can all feel part of this country—and we must now all come together and stand up for our values with confidence and pride.”
The intelligence agencies tell us that the threat is now worse than at any time since 9/11. It is serious and growing. The threat has changed, and so must our response. It is important to emphasise that. It would be easy to assume that the threat is static, but of course it is not; it is highly dynamic. It is easy to make that assumption because the barbarism that characterises those people is archaic. Their methods, however, are far from archaic; they are up-to-date and high-tech. The means by which they prosecute their wicked cause are ever-changing, and our response, reflecting that dynamism, must at least match it and ideally go beyond it in dealing with the threat. As part of our response, we must work together to continue to combat the underlying ideology that feeds, supports and sanctions terrorism. We must prevent people from being drawn on to that path.
With your indulgence, Mr Davies, I will digress for a moment. This morning, I visited Leeds prison with His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, whose charity, Mosaic, is doing so much to promote social cohesion, to work with Muslim communities in particular—I was speaking to some Muslim prisoners in that place—and to show those communities and individuals that they can be proud to be British because Britain can be proud of them when they do the right thing.
The Prime Minister speaks of a generational challenge, which we must face together, united and with a single voice. When this House speaks with a single voice, our enemies shudder. When we are divided, they must cackle. In that context, this instrument could scarcely be more important.
The Prevent duty is a fundamental part of our response and has been over successive Governments. It places a statutory responsibility on specified authorities to have due regard when exercising their functions to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism. The duty is built on the work of the existing Prevent strategy and its programme to protect people from the poisonous and pernicious influence of extremist ideas that are used to legitimise terrorism. It seeks to ensure that bodies across the country play their part and work in partnership.
I was speaking to two colleagues from the Labour party yesterday about their communities and the role that MPs can play. I said that perhaps we have under- estimated the role of MPs. When we go off script, our officials always get worried. The shadow Minister knows that because he was a distinguished Home Office Minister—I remember, when he served in that role and I was a mere shadow Minister, how kind and responsible he was. I say to my officials and the whole Committee through you, Mr Davies, that perhaps we should have engaged MPs more in that work. Each MP can play their part, just as local authorities can, in building those bridges and creating that shared sense of belonging. We all know our patches better than most people. We know the sensitivities and the differences, and we know how to respond to those differences in a way that is appropriate to each locality. I want MPs to be more involved, as I said to those colleagues yesterday.
The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 was debated in the House earlier this year. The primary legislation was enacted on 12 February. Consideration of the legislation led to a widespread recognition that the threat from terrorism was as I have described it, and there was broad support for the measures contained within it. It might help the Committee in its consideration of the instrument if I briefly outline what the Government seek to achieve by it and why it is now necessary.
In March, guidance was approved by this House for all specified authorities captured by the duty, which included guidance for higher and further education institutions, but not on the specific issue of extremist speakers and events, which is one of the areas of greatest concern. Professor Mohammed Abdel-Haq of the University of Bolton said that we have a duty of care to protect students from the threat of that kind of polemic, which leads first to extremism, then to violent extremism and can lead to terrorism. I am not being speculative; we know that it has happened and that there have been problems.
As shadow Minister for Further Education early in the life of a previous Government, I was involved in the Prevent review. I worked with academics and the National Union of Students under the chairmanship of Mohammed Abdel-Haq to sharpen our response to exactly the subjects we are debating today. We must now go further to reflect the dynamism of the threat we face.
My predecessor informed the House earlier this year that the duty would not be commenced for further and higher education institutions until the remaining guidance was published, which would be for the next Government—this Government—to introduce in this Session. The purpose of the regulations contained in this statutory instrument is to do just that. The guidance under consideration today sets out the detail of what the duty will mean in practice for further and higher education institutions. It explains the steps that should be taken to ensure compliance. It includes the original guidance for those sectors from the document previously published in March, with the addition of a section on speakers and events. I assure the Committee that the original guidance remains unchanged from that which was previously approved by Parliament. It is important for members of the Committee to receive that assurance.
Accordingly, the regulations will also bring into effect revisions to the earlier guidance, so as to remove the text that has been superseded by this guidance. That comes as a result of discussions we have had with HE and FE institutions. We have listened to their concerns, and we have tried to build something that can work. We know that there is always a profound tension between academic freedom and the freedom of speech and—my goodness, this is at the very heart of the idea of the university. One thinks of one of my heroes, Cardinal Newman, but we do not have time to speak of him at any great length. There is tension between all that and the need to protect Professor Abdel-Haq’s duty of care.
As members of the Committee who have a background in education know, people involved in those sectors have always taken their pastoral duty seriously. Schools, colleges and universities have always understood that pastoral care is part of what they need to offer the people who are in their charge. I have worked with my Department, and we have been in discussion with those sectors to ensure that this can be delivered and that it is possible. Of course, it is much more than possible; it is absolutely essential.
Let me say a word about the necessity of this instrument. The regulations we are debating today are crucial to ensuring that the duty can be implemented effectively. They will mean that higher and further educations institutions play their part in tackling this important issue. Partnership working is a key theme for all specified authorities throughout the statutory guidance, and the duty needs to be in force for all authorities for those partnerships to work successfully. Furthermore, universities and colleges were made subject to the duty in recognition of the very real risk of radicalisation. I could provide hon. Members with examples of problems in the past at inordinate length, but I will not as I suspect they will know many of them.
We know that radicalisation on campus can be facilitated through events held by extremist speakers, and that radicalised students can act as a focal point for further radicalisation through personal contact with fellow students and, in particular, social media activity—my goodness, we could have a long debate just on that, but again time does not permit. It is therefore imperative that universities and colleges start to implement the duty as soon as practicable.
Sectors and institutions are not alone in their vital work of countering extremist narratives and protecting this country’s young people from their damaging influence. Since 2011, the existing Prevent strategy has been delivered across the country by a network of dedicated and hard-working individuals who work with our front-line sectors to provide training and support on these vital issues. I know Committee members will say that it is great to have that sort of determination. Indeed, some Committee members will say, “John, you personify that determination.” But they will equally ask whether the universities are equipped to do this, whether the colleges are trained and whether the staff will know how to identify the problem and counter it. It is absolutely right that we put training in place to develop those skills. I acknowledge and recognise that, and I have missioned my Department to work with Prevent co-ordinators to do just that.
Much has already been done. We have held a series of events across the country, and a large number of people from the education and health sectors and local government have been involved. Seventy Prevent co-ordinators have worked tirelessly over recent years with our front-line staff to help to identify extremist influences and to prevent vulnerable individuals from being drawn into violent extremism and, ultimately, terrorism. There is a continuum that starts with extremism and ends with terrorism. It would be quite wrong to assume that those things are unrelated. Of course, it is not an inevitable, direct correlation, but there is a correlation.
Before we debate these regulations, I would like to remind and reassure the Committee about the steps that the previous Government and this Government have taken to ensure the guidance is accurate and workable for institutions. Before I do so, in the spirit of unity and the desire to illustrate that I believe that this is not a partisan matter, I want to acknowledge that the last Government but one recognised it. Let us not forget that Prevent is the brainchild not of a coalition Government or a Conservative Government, but a Labour Government. When I speak of unity and the desire to be non-partisan, I do so on the basis of evidence, not simply of hope. However, the concerns that were previously raised in both Houses about the duty and its implementation, particularly when there are existing requirements on those bodies in relation to freedom of speech and academic freedom, need to be addressed briefly before we debate the instrument.
Let me be clear once again that the issue of how universities and colleges integrate the duty with a need to secure freedom of speech and to have regard to the importance of academic freedom is important. Indeed, on account of that issue, the previous Government amended legislation to ensure that institutions pay particular regard to the importance of academic freedom and freedom of speech when complying with the duty. As I said, we have worked with the sector to try to build a deliverable, practical solution.
Nevertheless, we need to understand that order is the mother of freedom. The chaos that prevails when disorder reigns is incompatible with the duty of care that we have for those who attend such institutions. We have worked across Government and with the sector to ensure compliance with the duty. This week, I am delighted to be able to announce for the first time in the House—although the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills will have made Members aware of this—that the Higher Education Funding Council for England has been appointed the appropriate body to carry out the monitoring function for the Prevent duty for the relevant higher education bodies in England. The Government believe that the revisions to the guidance and the amendments to the Act address the concerns that have been raised by Parliament and the sectors about the duty. We must now get on with the job of ensuring our colleges and universities are as safe as possible. We should be mindful of the fact that, as the Home Secretary said, the relationship between freedom and security is not a zero-sum game, where one can grow only at the expense of the other. Free speech can thrive only in a safe environment. We have to be real and reasonable about the threat and our response. I believe that the Government have been both real and reasonable, so I commend the instrument to the Committee with confidence.
Mr Hayes
I have no wish to delay the Committee unduly, so I will deal with the points that have been made as briefly as possible. I am grateful to the shadow Minister, the right hon. Member for Delyn, for his comments on the improvements we have made since this matter was previously discussed. I am also grateful for the Committee’s support for what we are trying to achieve.
On the Universities UK briefing that the Committee received today, this measure is not a de facto ban on speakers with non-violent extremist views from speaking on campus. The guidance says that the university should consider whether the risk of those speakers drawing people into terrorism can be mitigated without cancellation of the meeting. I have confidence that our universities will handle this well and will seek to mitigate fully any risk, meaning that speaker meetings will proceed. It is right that we assess the risk and the emphasis in the guidance is on that assessment. Once a university has assessed the risk it will be able to take measures; if it feels it has to cancel a meeting, it will, but there is no de facto ban as a result of these provisions.
The second point that Universities UK made was that paragraph 19 of the guidance needed to be changed. In fact, it is consistent with the Prevent duty and Prevent strategy. I will look at that closely again, as one always should in such circumstances, but I say with confidence that it is consistent with the strategy published in 2011.
The shadow Minister asked a series of other questions. First, he asked whether, were this guidance to be revised, it would return to this House. If there is any significant revision we will of course, in the spirit that we have enjoyed today, bring it back to the House. He asked specifically about implementation. He is absolutely right that the rules will necessitate the kind of training I described. We are already engaged in work right across the sector to equip people to do the job, but I do not want to make light of it. It is not a simple or straightforward matter. We have to equip people with skills that, by necessity, require high levels of sensitivity and the ability to draw on Ministers’ expertise. We will do that through Prevent co-ordinators, and free training is available to institutions through the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. We will make sure that training events are nationwide, accessible and well publicised, so as to achieve our aims.
The right hon. Gentleman asked for a definition of extremism. He will know that the Government said in the Queen’s Speech that we will bring forward a Bill that by its nature will mean we will have to define the terms of trade, as it were. He can therefore be sure that that will happen. It is important because, as he suggested, without that definition it is hard for people to do the rest of what we are asking them to do today.
The right hon. Gentleman also asked whether we would monitor and review this work. If I may say so through you, Mr Davies, I do not think we have done enough on that. We need close evaluation. All this work tends to make a difference, but we need to be clear about how much difference and to point out best practice to ensure that it is exported to other local authorities and universities, and other parts of the country. We can, for example, model and develop the most effective practice, and he is right to raise that matter.
I also think that we have had insufficient oversight of Prevent, and I want to see what we can do on that. It is a question of evaluation and oversight, and we are looking at both carefully. They are part of the new broom that I represent—I say that without any criticism of my predecessors at the Home Office.
The hon. Member for Belfast East rightly emphasised, as did the shadow Minister, that the regulations do not apply simply to one part of the population or one part of the country, but must have broad application and take account of the fact that this kind of violence and the threat of terrorism are not limited to a particular community, religion or ethnic group but have to be looked at in the round. The shadow Minister made that clear with the example he gave from his own constituency. He can be sure that we will look at the matter in that holistic way, and the measures will have that kind of broad applicability. That will also guarantee consistency and fairness. These things have to pass a test of reasonableness, after all.
Unless the shadow Minister feels I have ignored any vital matter, I will draw my remarks to a crescendo—not merely a conclusion, as a conclusion alone would be insufficient for a Committee as cerebral as this one. Hegel—we do not hear enough of Hegel in this House—said that what is real is reasonable and what is reasonable is real. The reality of the threat that we face must of itself allow us to define reasonableness in a way that matches that threat. Were the threat very different, and much less significant, we would not be bringing in these measures. The measures have to reflect the reality of the threat that we face and I believe they do.
Finally, I draw on the words of Edmund Burke, who said that when bad men combine, good men must associate—[Interruption.] Good women, as well, I hasten to add. Good men and women will associate in this place and in the institutions for which we have legal responsibility and which are affected by this duty, and the good will prevail.
Question put and agreed to.
Resolved,
That the Committee has considered the draft Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (Risk of Being Drawn into Terrorism) (Guidance) Regulations 2015.
Oral Answers to Questions
John Hayes Excerpts(8 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Rachael Maskell (York Central) (Lab/Co-op)
13. What steps the Government are taking to address antisocial behaviour in cities.
The Minister for Security (Mr John Hayes)
New and more effective antisocial behaviour powers were introduced in the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 to protect the public and to stop such behaviour before it can escalate.
Rachael Maskell
With the Saturday night and, now, daytime alcohol-related antisocial behaviour culture at a serious level in York, resulting in families not going into the city and businesses suffering, will the Minister confirm that there will be no further reductions to policing in York and that adequate policing will be put in place at weekends to ensure we get these problems under control?
Mr Hayes
I know this is not the first time the hon. Lady has raised this matter; she raised it in business questions, I seem to recall. She has indeed championed the interests of York in this regard, but I simply say this. We have introduced the new powers precisely because we understand the relationship between alcohol consumption and crime. The new powers simplify what was there already, making it more effective. I hope that, as a new Member of this House, she will welcome those changes.
Victoria Prentis
17. They are extremely antisocial, Mr Speaker; in fact, I can think of few more antisocial kinds of behaviour than videoing children and posting their images online. Does my right hon. Friend agree that social media and other communications companies have a responsibility to work with Government and the police to reduce access to indecent images such as these?
Mr Hayes
I do agree with that. Everyone has a role to play in combating this problem, and I welcome the groundbreaking pledges by 20 leading companies at the #WeProtect summit on global action to remove child sexual abuse images from the internet and develop new tools and techniques to tackle this crime. The Government will continue to work with companies, organisations and civil society to make it much more difficult for perpetrators of this heinous, hideous crime.
Mr Douglas Carswell (Clacton) (UKIP)
T1. If she will make a statement on her departmental responsibilities.
Wendy Morton (Aldridge-Brownhills) (Con)
T2. Can the Security Minister reassure me that the police and the intelligence services will have new powers to stay ahead of extremist groups and individuals, not least in terms of technology?
The Minister for Security (Mr John Hayes)
Yes, I can. The principles and practices of our enemies may often be barbarically archaic, but the methodology they use is up to the minute. It is vital that we match that with the resources, the techniques and the skills for our security services to counter those threats.
Mr David Hanson (Delyn) (Lab)
I join the Home Secretary in remembering the victims of the attack 10 years ago. It was a heinous crime, which will live with people right up to today and beyond.
It is now over nine months since the migrant crisis started at Calais, and things are not getting any better for travellers, hauliers, the people of Calais or, indeed, for those individuals who have been trafficked there. Given the situation and recent concerns in the town of Calais, will the Home Secretary or her Minister confirm now what steps she has taken with the French Government to assess, identify and agree with the French authorities either asylum refugee claims or removal at the border? What steps is she taking to ensure that we improve security in France for UK citizens travelling through the Pas-de-Calais to the port?
Bob Blackman (Harrow East) (Con)
T4. As we heard earlier, the new Prevent duties were introduced last week. Will the Security Minister update the House on how the legislation will be used to identify and eliminate extremism?
Mr John Hayes
Governments have their part to play in delivering the national interest and the common good, but don’t we all? It is vital for communities themselves to play a part, and public services too. The organisations that we have asked to do their bit in respect of their new duties—including prisons, schools, colleges, health authorities and local authorities—already have a duty of care, including pastoral care. They are very well placed to identify radicalism, protect vulnerable people, and secure our national wellbeing and national interest.
Andrew Gwynne (Denton and Reddish) (Lab)
Earlier, Ministers were selective about positive crime statistics. What has the Home Secretary got to say about the 32% increase in sexual exploitation and sexual offences, which is a really serious matter? Will she tell us what plans she has to involve the perpetrators in the criminal justice system?